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SOL
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

School of Law
COMPENDIUM OF CASE DIGESTS

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Submitted to:
ATTY. MARIA LULU REYES
Submited by:
ALLAS, Lyra Cecille
AREOLA, Dionel
BANGANAN, Kirsten Gay
BAY-AN, Jayran
BUGATAN, Solomon
CASTILLO, Israel
CAYANGAO, Mandia
FLORAGUE, Sergie
PAGGADUT, Aubrey
SANTIAGO, Katrina Gynne
SAGPAEY, Jenny
September 28, 2011

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2|COMPENDIUM OF CASE DIGESTS: Persons and Family Relations SLU 2011-2012

ALLAS AREOLA BANGANAN BAY-AN BUGATAN CASTILLO CAYANGAO FLORAGUE PAGGADUT SANTIAGO SAGPAEY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABADILLA VS. TABILARAN ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 109

ABADILLA VS. TABILIRAN ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 519
ABALOS V. MACATANGAY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 337
ABALOS VS. MACATANGAY,----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 392
ABLAZA VS REPUBLIC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 228
AGABAO V. PARULAN ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 328
AGUEDA BENEDICTO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ESTEBAN DELA RAMA, DEFENDANT ------ 288
ALAIN M. DIO, PETITIONER, V. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, RESPONDENT. --------------------------- 402
ALBINO JOSEF VS. OTELIO SANTOS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 435
ALCANTARA VS. ALCANTARA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 121
ALCAZAR VS ALCAZAR ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 262
ALCUAZ VS PSBA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 81
ALFONSO LACSON, PETITIONER, VS. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 541
ALFONSO LACSON, PETITIONER, VS.CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 399
ALFREDO CHING, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT ------------------------- 321
ALFREDO V. BORRAS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 381
AMADORA VS CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 594
AMERICAN AIRLINES VS COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------- 46
AMONOY VS SPS. GUTIERREZ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73
AMPARO NABLE JOSE, ET AL., VS.MARIANO NABLE JOSE, ET AL., ---------------------------------- 391
ANAYA V. PALAROAN ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 255
ANCHETA V. ANCHETA ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 238
ANCHETA VS ANCHETA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 105
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, PETITIONER, V. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, RESPONDENT. - 173
ANTONIO VALDES, PETITIONER, VS. RTC, BR. 102 Q.C. AND CONSUELO GOMEZ-VALDES, -- 410
ANTONIO, PETITIONER V. REYES, RESPONDENT ------------------------------------------------------ 209
AQUINAS SCHOOL VS SPS. INTON --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 588
ARAFILES VS. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. ------------------------------------------------------------ 83
ARANES VS. OCCIANA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 125

ARNEL AGUSTIN, VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL-------------------------------------------------------- 486
ARTEMIO ILANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL -------------------------------------------------------- 477
ARTURIO TRINIDAD VS. FELIX TRINIDAD (DECEASED) AND LOURDES -------------------------- 128
ARTURO R. ABALOS, VS. DR. GALICANO S. MACATANGAY, JR., -------------------------------------- 445
ARUEGO JR. VS COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 101
ARUEGO, JR. VS COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25
ASAALI VS. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS ------------------------------------------------------------------ 47
ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES JR. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 118
AYALA CORPORATION VS. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ------- 55
AYALA INVESTMENTS V. COURT OF APPEALS ----------------------------------------------------------- 373
AZNAR VS GARCIA------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33
BA FINANCE V. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 378
BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 42
BALOGBOG V.BALOGBOG ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 246
BANEZ VS BANEZ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 269
BARREDO VS GARCIA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 88
BAUTISTA V. SILVA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 380
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES VS. ALELI ANGELES MAGLAYA ---------------------------------------------- 444
BELLIS VS BELLIS-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34
BELTRAN V. PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 250
BELTRAN VS PEOPLE --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 90
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, VS. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, ----------------------------------------------- 468
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS.LEONILA GINEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 277
BERNABE VS ALEJO --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 102
BERNABE VS ALEJO ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26
BERNARDINO ZAMORA, PETITIONER V. COURT OF APPEALS, DEFENDANT -------------------- 207
BESO VS. DAGUMAN -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 119
BIENVENIDO VS CA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 605
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS VS. DE LA ROSA-------------------------------------------------------------- 23
BONDAGJY VS BONDAGJY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 560
BONITE VS ZOSA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 76
BUCCAT V. BUCCAT --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 256

BUENAVENTURA VS. CA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 404
CAMELO CABATANIA, VS. COURT OF APPEALS ---------------------------------------------------------- 458
CAMELO CABATANIA, VS. COURT OF APPEALS ---------------------------------------------------------- 473
CAR COOL PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. USHIO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ------- 69
CARINO V. CARINO ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 244
CARLOS VS SANDOVAL ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 229
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. EUFEMIO SY UY, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 303
CASTRO V. MIAT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 369
CATALAN V. CA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 226
CATALAN VS BASA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 95
CECILION MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AND LUISA DE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 429
CHI MING TSOI, PETITIONER V. COURT OF APPEALS, DEFENDANT ------------------------------- 181
CHING V. COURT OF APPEALS-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 367
CIRILA ARCABA, PETITIONER VS. VDA. DE BATOCAEL, RESPONDENT---------------------------- 315
CITY OF PASIG VS COMELEC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 91
COJUANGCO V. COURT OF APPEALS -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 79
COJUANGCO, JR., VS. PALMA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 152
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. PRIMETOWN-------------------------------------------- 62
CONCEPCION VS COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 72
CONSOLACION LUMAHIN DE APARICIO, VS. HIPOLITO PARAGUYA, ------------------------------- 462
CORPUS V. OCHOTORENA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 235
CORPUS VS CORPUS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 107
CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL --------------------------------------------- 137
COSCA VS. PALAYPAYON -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 156
CRUZ V. CRISTOBAL -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 344
CRUZ VS NLRC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 38
CUENCA V. CUENCA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 350
CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, PETITIONER, V. S REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PATRICIO E.
YAMBAO, RESPONDENTS. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 188
DAVID DEDEL, PETITIONER V. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT ------------------------------- 218
DAVID V CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 572

DAVID VS. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 516
DE GUZMAN VS PEREZ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 555
DE OCAMPO V. DELIZO----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 355
DE SANTOS VS. ANGELES -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 518
DELA ROSA VS HEIRS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 110
DIANA BARCELONA, PLAINTIFF V. COURT OF APPEALS, DEFENDANT---------------------------- 215
DIAZ V. CA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 372
DIAZ VS MERCED -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 92
DIGNA NAJERA, PETITIONER, V. EDUARDO NAJERA, RESPONDENT.------------------------------ 203
DIOSDIDIT CUENCA, ET AL, PETITIONER, VS RESTITUTO CUENCA, ET AL ----------------------- 313
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, PETITIONER, VERSUS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ----- 531
DOMINGO V. COURT OF APPEALS -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 249
DOMINGO V. REED ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 375
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 96
DONATO VS LUNA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 93
DONATO VS. LUNA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116
DSWD V. BELEN -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 535
EDGARDO A. TIJING AND BIENVENIDA R. TIJING VS. COURT OF APPEALS ----------------------- 453
EDGARDO A. TIJING AND BIENVENIDA R. TIJING VS. COURT OF APPEALS ----------------------- 485
EDUARDO ARROYO J.R., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS --------------- 275
EDUARDO MANUEL, PLAINTIFF V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEFENDANTS-------------- 172
ELENA CONTRERAS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CESAR J. MACARAIG, DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 293
ELENA MERCADO-FEHR, PETITIONER, VS. BRUNO FEHR, RESPONDENT------------------------- 407
ELINO RIVERA, ET AL VS. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA, ET AL ---------------------------- 470
ELOISA GOITIA Y DELA CAMARA, PLAINTIFF VS. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, DEFENDANT ------- 311
ENBRODO V. COURT OF APPEALS--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 377
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GLICERIO V.
CARRIAGA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 297
ENRICO V. HEIRS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 224
ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN, PETITIONER,VS.ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR AND
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. ----------------------------------------------------- 192
ESPIRITU& LAYUG VS COURT OF APPEALS -------------------------------------------------------------- 574

ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG VS. JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ -------------------------------------------------- 493
ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 103
ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, PETITIONER, V. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, RESPONDENT. ---------- 164
ETERIA TAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS ----------------------------- 322
EUGENIO VS. VELEZ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 111
FACTS--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 537
FACTS: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 474
FELIX MATABUENA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PETRONILA CERVANTES, DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 316
FLORANTE MANACOP, VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL ------------------------------------------------ 439
FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA, AND TOMAS CALPATURA, JR.,
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 406
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, PLAINTIFF V. EDMUNDO MACARUBBO, ----------------------- 217
FRANCISCO GONZALES, VS. ERMINDA GONZALES,------------------------------------------------------ 405
FRANCISCO JISON, VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. ----------------------------------------------------- 481
FRANCISCO V. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 370
FRANCISCO V. ZANDUETA------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 546
FRANCISCO VS. MASTER IRON WORKS CONSTRUCTION CORP. ------------------------------------- 414
FROILAN GAUDIONCO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SENEN PENARANDA, RESPONDENT ---------- 271
FUENTES, ET AL V. ROCA, ET AL ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 330
GALANG VS. C.A. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 50
GAMBOA-HIRSCH VS CA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 564
GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA VS. COURT OF APPEALS -------------------------------------------------------- 112
GARCIA-RECIO VS RECIO ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, PETITIONER, VS. RTC OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS --- 423
GELUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 94
GERARDO CONCEPCION, VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL ---------------------------------------------- 443
GLOBE MCKAY VS BARRIOS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 39
GO V. YAMANE --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 346
GO VS .CORDERO -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 64
GOLANGCO V CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 569
GUARING VS CA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 74
GUIANG V. COURT OF APPEALS------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 383

GUY VS. COURT OF APPEALS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 60
HARDING, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES VS. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 319
HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES, VS. SPOUSES CIPRIANO MIJARES AND FLORENTINA
MIJARES, ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 394
HELD---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 537
HENCE THIS APPEAL.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 537
HERBERT CANG VS.COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------ 532
HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS --------------------------------------------------------------------- 41
HERNANDEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 223
HILARIO GERCIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SUN LIFE CO. OF CANADA, DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 317
HIYAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. EDMUNDO ACUNA AND
ALBERTO MORENO, RESPONDENTS------------------------------------------------------------------------ 424
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN V. DAILO ---------------------------------------------------------- 335
HONTIVEROS VS. RTC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 431
IDA LABAGALA, PETITIONER, VS. NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, ET AL --------------------------------- 474
IMELDA RELUCIO, V. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, ---------------------------------------------------------- 389
IMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ------------------------------------------------------------ 265
IN RE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOSE BERMAS, SR. 398
IN RE: JULIAN LIN WANG -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 601
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN
CIVIL REGISTRY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 456
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA -------------- 600
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA , HONORATO B.
CATINDIG, --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 508
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA , HONORATO B.
CATINDIG, --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 534
IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM ------------------ 530
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC.VS. ARGOS ---------------------------- 85
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSE LOCSIN, JR., VS. JUAN LOCSIN, JR. ----------------------- 475
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (PREVIOUSLY REFERRED TO AS
DR. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 539
ISSUE --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 537
JACINTO SAGUID, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ------------------------------------------------------- 416

JAIME VILLALON, PETITIONER V. MA. CORAZON VILLALON, RESPONDENT -------------------- 213
JANE GO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT ------------------------------------ 314
JANE GO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT ------------------------------------ 323
JANICE MARIE JAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL ----------------------------------------------------- 447
JARDELEZA V. JARDELEZA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 382
JARILLO VS PEOPLE -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 243
JARILLO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES --------------------------------------------------------------- 158
JIMENEZ VS. CANIZARES --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 264
JINKIE CHRISTIE DE JESUS ET AL VS THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON ---- 452
JINKIE CHRISTIE DE JESUS ET AL VS THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON ---- 461
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, PETITIONER, VS ANGELITO SUAZO AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 198
JOE A. ROS AND ESTRELLA AGUETE, PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK ------ 326
JOEY BRIONES VS. MARICEL MIGUEL, ET. AL ------------------------------------------------------------- 499
JOHNSON AND JOHNSON V. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------- 379
JOSE DE OCAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, RESPONDENT. ---------------- 281
JOSE DE OCAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, RESPONDENT. ---------------- 291
JOSE MODEQUILLO, PETITIONER, VS. HON.AUGUSTO V. BREVA, RESPONDENTS -------------- 432
JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, PETITIONER, VS. BONA J. ALANO AND REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 186
JOSE RIVERO ET AL VS. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------- 463
JOSE RIVERO ET AL VS. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------- 497
JOSE VS COURT OF APPEALS------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 89
JUANITA SIAYNGCO, PETITIONER V. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, RESPONDENT. ----------------------- 212
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS ET AL VS. DANILO PANGILINAN ET AL ------------------------------- 433
JUANIZA VS. JOSE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 421
KENNETH NGO TE, PETITIONER, V. ROWENA YU TE, RESPONDENT. ------------------------------ 204
LABAD VS. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES --------------------------------------------------- 67
LANDINGIN VS REPUBLIC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 584
LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 305
LAUREANO VS COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED ------------------------- 24

LEE VS CA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 611
LEONCIA BALOGBOG AND GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, PETITIONERS, V.S HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 162
LEONOR V. COURT OF APPEALS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 245
LEOUEL SANTOS, PETITIONER V. S COURT OF APPEALS, DEFENDANT --------------------------- 182
LIBI VS CA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 582
LLORENTE VS COURT OF APPEALS --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31
LORNA PESCA, PETITIONER V.ZOSIMO PESCA, RESPONDENT -------------------------------------- 221
LUIS MA. ARANETA, PETITIONER VS. HON. HERMOGENES CONCECPCION, RESPONDENT -- 296
LUNA V. LINATOC ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 349
LUPO ATIENZA, PLAINTIFF V.HON. FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, DEFENDANT -------------------- 178
MA. ARMIDA-FERRARIS, PETITIONER V. BRIX FERRARIS, DEFENDANT ------------------------- 208
MA. THERESA ALBERTO, VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL --------------------------------------------- 460
MACARRUBO V MACARRUBO -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 159
MACCARUBO VS MACCARUBO ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 259
MACIAS V. MACIAS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 236
MALCAMPO-SIN V. SIN ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 237
MALLILIN VS. CASTILLO --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 411
MALLION V. ALCANTARA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 230
MALLION VS. ALCANTARA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 150
MANANTAN VS COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 75
MANGONON VS COURT OF APPEALS ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 553
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS-------------------------------------------------------- 361
MANSION BISCUIT CORP. VS CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 78
MANUEL DE ASIS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL ------------------------------------------------------ 441
MANUEL LARA, ET AL VS PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR. ----------------------------------------------- 17
MANUEL VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ----------------------------------------------------------------- 35
MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 154
MAQUILAN V. MAQUILAN ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 231
MARBELLA-BOBIS V. BOBIS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 251
MARCIA VS COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 86
MARCOS VS. COMELEC ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100
MARCOS VS. MARCOS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 222
10 | C O M P E N D I U M OF CASE DIGESTS: Persons and Family Relations SLU 2011-2012

MARGARET ANN WAINRIGHT VERSOZA, JOSE MARIA VERSOZA JR., CHARLES JOHN --------- 430
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON ET AL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL ------------------- 455
MARIA SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, PETITIONER V. RAMON REYES, RESPONDENT. -------- 195
MARIANO ANDAL AND MARIA DUEAS, VS. EDUVIGIS MACARAIG -------------------------------- 448
MARIANO ARROYO, PLAINTIFF VS. DOLORES VAZQUEZ DE ARROYO, DEFENDANT ---------- 310
MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, AND ZENAIDA, ALL SURNAMED ---- 422
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, -------------------------------------------------- 450
MARQUINO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT -------------------------------------------------- 503
MARTINEZ VS. MARTINEZ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 425
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ ET AL VS. ROEL STA. INES, ET AL ----------------------------------------- 438
MENDEZONA , VS. OZAMIZ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 97
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ET AL VS. EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, ET AL ------------------------ 471
MEYNARDO BELTRAN, PETITIONER V.S PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ------------------------- 180
MICHAEL GUY, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ------------------------------------------------------------------ 495
MILAGROS JOAQUINO A.K.A. MILAGROS REYES, PETITIONER, VS. LOURDES, MERCEDES, -- 415
MORENO VS. BERNABE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 135
MORIGO VS. PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 134
MOSSESGELD V. COURT OF APPEALS ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 513
MULLER V. MULLER -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 342
NABLE-JOSE V. NABLE-JOSE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 348
NAVARRO V. JUDGE ESCOBIDO AND GO ------------------------------------------------------------------- 318
NAVARRO VS. DUMAGTOY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 149
NAVARRO VS.. DUMAGTOY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 136
NENG MALANG, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COROCOY MOSON ET. AL., RESPONDENTS ----------- 413
NENITA BIENVENIDO, PETITIONER, V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT.------------ 170
NERISSA PEREZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND --------------------------------- 396
NICANOR T. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS CONSUELO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO
AND ANDRES GUERRERO, RESPONDENTS. --------------------------------------------------------------- 427
NICOLAS V. CA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 384
NICOLAS V. COURT OF APPEALS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 341
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA VS. REYES ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48
NINAL V. BAYADOG --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 227
NINAL VS. BAYADOG-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 155

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, PLAINTIFF V. COURT OF APPEALS, DEFENDANT ----------------------- 214
NON VS DAMES ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82
OLIGARIO V. CA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 347
ONG V. COURT OF APPEALS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 362
ONG V. ONG ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 268
ORETA VS CA ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 580
PABLITO TANEO, ET AL VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL ---------------------------------------------- 440
PABLO-GUALBERTO VS GUALBERTO ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 565
PACETE V. CARRIAGA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 241
PACETE VS. CARRIAGA, JR. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 266
PACITA VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT ------------------- 320
PASTOR TANCHAVEZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. VICENTA ESCANO, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 312
PCIB VS ESCOLIN -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 45
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GLABO ------------------------------------------------------------------ 510
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GERRICO VALLEJO ------------------------------------------------- 490
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANUEL MANAHAN ----------------------------------------------- 467
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. GUADALUPE ZAPATA AND
DALMACIO BONDOC, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. ------------------------------------------------------- 279
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VS. RODOLFO SCHNCKENBERGER, -- 285
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. JOEL YATAR --------------------------------------------------------- 491
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. SGT. MORENO BAYANI,------------------------------------------- 465
PEOPLE OF THE PILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. URSULA SENSANO, DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 287
PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 77
PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 98
PEOPLE VS BORROMEO---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 106
PEOPLE VS ESTRADA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 602
PEOPLE VS VENERACION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27
PEOPLE VS. BAYANI -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 505
PEOPLE VS. MORIAL ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59
PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 260
PEREZ VS CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 576

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION VS ANGELES ------------------------------ 20
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES VS. ARCIAGA ------------------------------------------------------------- 49
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES VS VEGA ---------------------------------------------------- 21
PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 147
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, AND ISABELITA
MANALO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT--------------------------- 426
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, AND SYLVIA ILUSORIO, PETITIONERS, VS.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 308
PRIMA- PARTOSA-JO V. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------ 354
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT --------------------- 273
PRINCIPIO VS. BARRIENTOS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61
PSBA VS CA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 597
PUYAT VS ZABARTE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 71
QUISUMBING V. ICAO------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 545
QUITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 143
RAVINA V. ABRILLE --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 363
RAYMOND PE LIM, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL ----------------------------------------------------- 483
RCPI VS COURT OF APPEALS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 40
RECIO VS. RECIO ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 141
REMO VS HON. SEC. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS---------------------------------------------------------------- 598
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. GREGORIO NOLASCO, RESPONDENT. ---- 168
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V.GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, RESPONDENT.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 167
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
RESPONDENTS. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 165
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, IN HIS
CAPACITY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 523
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. ------ 526
REPUBLIC V. CUISON-MELGAR------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 234
REPUBLIC V. DYE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 528
REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 610
REPUBLIC VS COSETENG-MAGPAYO ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 607
REPUBLIC VS. ABADILLA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 506
REPUBLIC VS. ABADILLA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 512

REPUBLIC VS. CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 130
REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 115
REPUBLIC VS. ESOY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 140
REPUBLIC VS. HUGHES----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 521
REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO III ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 145
REPUBLIC, PETITIONER V. AVELINO DAGDAG, RESPONDENT -------------------------------------- 220
REPUBLIC, PETITIONER V. TOSHIO HAMANO, DEFENDANT ----------------------------------------- 216
REPUBLIC, PETITIONER V.S COURT OF APPEALS, DEFENDANT------------------------------------ 183
REPUBLIC, PLAINTIFF V. CRASUS IYOY, DEFENDANT ------------------------------------------------- 210
REYES VS. ZABALLERO ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 261
REYNALDO ESPIRITU, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS ----------------- 301
RICARDO TORING, PETITIONER, V.S TERESITA TORING AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 197
RIVERA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ------------------------------------------------------- 108
ROBERT DOMINGO, PETITIONER V. COURT OF APPEALS, DEFENDANT -------------------------- 179
RODOLFO ASPILLAGA, PETITONER, V.S AURORA ASPILLAGA, RESPONDENT. ------------------ 201
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ ET AL VS. ROMEO FERNANDEZ ET AL -------------------------------------- 442
ROSA PARAS, PETITIONER, V. JUSTO PARAS, RESPONDENT. ---------------------------------------- 206
ROSALINA ECETA, VS. MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA ------------------------------------------ 459
ROSALINO L. MARABLE, PETITIONER, V. ----------------------------------------------------------------- 190
ROSENDO HERRERA, VS. ROSENDO ALBA, ET AL ------------------------------------------------------- 488
ROSENDO HERRERA, VS. ROSENDO ALBA, ET AL ------------------------------------------------------- 501
ROXAS V. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 339
RUIZ V. COURT OF APPEALS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 547
RUIZ VS UCUL ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 87
SABALONES V CA 230 SCRA 79 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 387
SAGALA VS ESLAO ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 562
SAGALA-ESLAO V CA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 578
SALVADOR V. CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 357
SALVADOR V. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 374
SALVOSA VS IAC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 595
SAMSON T. SABALONES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS -------- 299
SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 138

SANTIAGO CARINO, PETITIONER V. SUSAN CARINO, DEFENDANT--------------------------------- 175
SANTOS VS COURT OF APPEALS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 567
SARMIENTO V. ORDONES ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 358
SEVILLA VS. CARDENAS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 123
SILVA VS CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 242
SILVA VS CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 571
SILVA VS. COURT OF APPEAL -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 514
SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 608
SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ---------------------------------------------------------- 113
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, PETITIONER, V.S MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. ------------------------------------------------------ 194
SIOCHI V. GOZON ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 306
SIOCHI V. GOZON, ET AL., -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 324
SOCORRO MATUBIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ZOILO PRAXEDES, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 283
SOMBONG VS CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 586
SPOUSES AUTHER KELLEY, JR. AND DORIS KELLEY VS. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC ET AL - 437
SPOUSES BEATO MACAYRA AND ALACOPUE MONDAY, ----------------------------------------------- 401
SPOUSES CLARO AND NIDA BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, V. BERLINDA F. SILVA, RESPONDENT.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 334
SPOUSES DE LEON. ET AL VS. DE LEON, ET AL ----------------------------------------------------------- 332
SPOUSES VIRGILIO AND MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES MIAT AND ALEXANDER MIAT, -------- 395
ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE VS MIRANDA ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 590
ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS ------------------------------------------------------------------- 592
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO VS. SUSAN YEE CARIO -------------------------------------------------------- 408
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO VS. SUSAN YEE CARIO -------------------------------------------------------- 417
SY VS. CA ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 132
TAMANO VS. ORTIZ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 248
TAMARGO VS CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 583
TAN V. COURT OF APPEALS----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 360
TAADA VS TUVERA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19
TAYAG VS. COURT OF APPEALS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 504
TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 148

TENEBRO VS. CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 160
TEOFISTA BABIERA, VS. PRESENTACION CATOTAL --------------------------------------------------- 449
TEOTICO VS. DEL VAL ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 537
TING VS. VELEZ-TING -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 57
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION V. DAVID ------------------------------------------------------ 365
TOLEDANO AND SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE AND EVELYN A. CLOUSE, RESPONDENTS. ----- 522
TOMASA VDA DE JACOB VS. CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 126
TONOG V. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 511
TONOG VS TONOG----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 557
TSHIATE UY AND RAMON UY, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIVIDAD ---- 419
TUASON V. TUASON -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 239
TUASON VS. COURT OF APPEALS --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 267
TUMLOS, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ AND LOURDES FERNANDEZ, ----- 412
TY V. CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 252
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS JADER------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37
URSUA VS CA ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 604
URSUA VS COURT OF APPEALS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28
UY V CA 346 SCRA 246 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 385
VALDES V. VALDES ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 253
VAN DORN VS ROMILLO, JR ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32
VAN DORN VS. RAMILLO -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 146
VANCIL VS BALMES --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 558
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA V. GSIS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 356
VERCELES V. POSADAS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 507
VERONICA ALCAZAR, PETITIONER, V. REY ALCAZAR, RESPONDENT------------------------------ 199
VILLALUZ, VS. MIJARES ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 161
VILLANUEVA V. CA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 258
VILLANUEVA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT --------------------------------------------------- 359
VILLANUEVA VS CA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 263
VILLANUEVA VS. ROSQUETA ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 51
VILLANUEVA, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------ 254
VILLANUEVA, JR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS ------------------------------------------------------------------ 53
VINCENT MERCADO, PETITIONER V.MA.CONSUELO TAN, DEFENDANT -------------------------- 177

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, PETITIONER, VS. DITA MAQUILAN, RESPONDENT------------------------ 397
WASSMER VS. VELEZ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44
WHETHER OR NOT OPPOSITOR HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE PROCEEDINGS? -- 537
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 117
WILLIAM GO KIM HUY, VS. SANTIAGO GO KIM HUY, ET AL ------------------------------------------ 454
WILLIAM H. BROWN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. JUANITA YAMBAO, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 289
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. VS JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO ET AL--------------------------------------------- 451
WONG V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ---------------------------------------------------------- 352
YAO KEE VS SY GONZALES -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22
YASIN VS SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 599

MANUEL LARA, ET AL vs PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR.
G.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954
FACTS
Lara et al were former taxi drivers of the defendant. When the latter sold some of his
vehicles, the plaintiffs who were no longer needed were dismissed. Because their employer
did not give them their one months salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of
the Code of Commerce, this action was instituted.
ISSUE
Whether or not the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1949
HELD
In this case, the Supreme Court in an obiter dictum held that the new Civil Code of the Philippines
took effect on August 30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the Official Gazette publishing the
Code was released for circulation, the said release having been made on August 30, 1949. The
plaintiffs then are not entitled to any compensation, the New Civil Code having repealed the Code of
Commerce.

TAADA vs TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
FACTS
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish
and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable
HELD
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratialegisnominemexcusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force
and effect.

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs ANGELES
G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996
FACTS
Philippine International Trading Co. issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
under which applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic of China
must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine products.
PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from China on the ground
that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order.
Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of
PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being
unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve applications
for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already
been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari
seeking the reversal of the said decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid
HELD
The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said
AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited
TanadavsTuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and
private laws shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days
after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES vs VEGA
G.R. No. 105364. June 28, 2001
FACTS
In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of
the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB
employees union, herein petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and
benefits.
On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by
Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24,
1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits
and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.
In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen
despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega
continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169
became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official
Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992
HELD
The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as
indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided. Citing TanadavsTuvera, this clause
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in
any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process in so far as
it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.

YAO KEE VS SY GONZALES
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
FACTS
SyKiat, a chines national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his real and personal
properties in the Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less. Aida Sy-Gonzales, et. al. filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration claiming among other things that they are
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina. The petition was opposed by Yao
kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China and
that one of her children, SzeSookWah, should be the administrator of the deceased. The CFI
decided in favor of Yao Kees petition but was modified and set aside by the court of
appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not SyKiats marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese Law and Custom
conclusive
HELD
The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if marriage between SyKiat and
Yao Kee is valid, but it is not sufficient to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law and custom. A custom must be proved as a fact according to
the rules of evidence and that a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a
court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence. In the
case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law of China
on marriage. In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed
that it is the same as that of the Philippines.

Board of Commissioners vs. De la Rosa
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31, 1991
FACTS
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized
by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of
natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old,
arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had
with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in
Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs,
Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens
and issued an identification certificate to William. The Board of Commissioners was
directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the
ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result
of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the
decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation ordered the arrest of
William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29th of the same
month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion
to dismiss was filed but denied.
ISSUE
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen
HELD
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage
as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino as
legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.

LAUREANO vs COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED
G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000
FACTS
Sometime in 1978 plaintiff Laureano was employed on a contract basis for two years as an
expatriate B-707 captain by defendant company Singapore Airlines. His first term was then
extended for another 2 years. However, defendant was hit by a recession and initiated a
cost cutting measure. Plaintiff was advised to take advance leave. Realizing that the
recession would not be for a short time, Singapore Airlines decided to terminate its excess
personnel including plaintiff.
Subsequently, Laureano instituted a case and claim for damages due to illegal termination
of contract of services before the court a quo. Singapore Airlines filed a motion to dismiss
alleging inter alia that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and
that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case. The defendant postulated that
Singapore laws should apply.
ISSUE
Whether or not Philippine laws should be applied and Philippine courts should have
jurisdiction over the instant case.
HELD
The Supreme Court concurred in the assumption of jurisdiction by the RTC which rightly
ruled on the application of Philippine laws. The SC further stated that neither can the court
determine whether the termination of Laureano is legal under Singapore laws because of
the Airlines failure to show which proves the applicability of the foreign law. It is a well
settled rule that the party who claims the applicability of a foreign law has the burden of
proof and where said party has failed to discharge the burden, Philippine laws apply. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, Philippine law should be applied.

Aruego, Jr. vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
FACTS
Antonia Aruego and her sister Evelyn filed a petition in the courts seeking Jose Aruego, Jr.
And his five minor children to recognize them as illegitimate children and compulsory heirs
of Jose who died on March 30, 1982. They claim there is open and continuous possession of
status of illegitimate children of Jose who had an amorous relationship with their mother
Luz Fabian until the time of his death. The court declared that Antonia Aruego is an
illegitimate daughter of the deceased with Luz Fabian while Evelyn is not. Antonia and
Evelyn contested the decision citing provisions of the Family Code particularly Art. 127 on
Filiation, Art.172 on illegitimate childrens filiation, and Art.256 on the retroactivity of the
code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively and will it impair
the vested rights of the respondents.
HELD
The meaning of vested and acquired rights under Art. 256 was not defined by the Family
Code, hence the court will determine it according to issues submitted to them. The action
must be governed by Art. 285 of the Civil Code and not by Art.175 (2) of the Family Code.
The present law cannot be given any retroactive effect since its application is prejudicial
under Art. 285. The supreme court denied the petition and upheld the court of appeals
decision.

BERNABE vs ALEJO
G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002
FACTS
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son was
born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on
August 13, 1993 leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Therafter, Carolina in behalf of
Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.
The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the
death of the putative father had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled
that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate
son of Fiscal Bernabe since the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article
283 of the Civil Code. Hence, appeal was interposed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.
HELD
Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is
a substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4
years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take
Adrians right to file an action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to
its enactment.

PEOPLE VS VENERACION
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
FACTS
On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion.
Respondent judge however, refused to impose the corresponding penalty of death and he
rather imposed reclusion perpetua to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a
motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four
accused. The respondent judge refused to act.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that prescribed by law.
HELD
The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose
the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious
or moral beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is
consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

URSUA VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996
FACTS
Petitioner CesarioUrsua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended by
RA 6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases by the RTC of Davao
City which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take
his letter of request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger
Oscar Perez had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name
Oscar Perez when he was requested to sign. However, LoidaKahulugan who gave him the
copy of complaint was able to know through JosefaAmparo that petitioner is not Oscar
Perez. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that
petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC as
he reasserts his innocence.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner CesarioUrsua should be acquitted on the ground that he was
charged under the wrong law.
HELD:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the law makers.

GARCIA-RECIO VS RECIO
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
FACTS
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However,
an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage
of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady
of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while
they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with
Editha Samson.
ISSUE:
Whether the decree of divorce submitted by RederickRecio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was
valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.
However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign
document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not
authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

LLORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000
FACTS
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the
outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal
home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines
he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and
was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce.
Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children.
Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3
children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC
ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of
whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are
entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD
In Van Dorn vsRamillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce
abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court
held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity since he was a foreigner.

VAN DORN VS ROMILLO, JR
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
FACTS
Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their
residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in
Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners business in Manila
is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business
and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the
certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
HELD
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys
court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.

AZNAR VS GARCIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA
G.R. No.L-16749.January 31, 1963
FACTS
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided
for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary
until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph
2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is
referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that
the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything under California law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the
successional rights of his heirs.
HELD
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that
there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to
Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside
of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must
be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.

BELLIS VS BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
FACTS
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died,
he made two wills, one disposing his Texas properties, the other disposing his Philippine
properties. In both wills, the recognized illegitimate children were not given any share.
Texas has no conflict rule (Rule of Private International Law) governing successional rights.
Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs.
ISSUE
Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellisbe entitled to successional rights.
HELD
The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas law, there are
no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his national law, still,
will govern the properties for succession even if it is stated in his testate that it shall be
governed by the Philippine law.

Manuel vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
FACTS
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to RubylusGaa on July 18, 1975,
who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned
and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in
January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the
two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of
Manuels first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera
learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a
criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his
declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he
had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years
and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable
for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on
the RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years.
Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as
there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed
the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

HELD
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid
defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal
intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to
know the law. Ignorantialegisneminemexcusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite
period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good
faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present
spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be
convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice
and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against
public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals
and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an
innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages.
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of
P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

University of the East vs Jader
GR No. 132344February 17, 2000
FACTS
Petitioner was enrolled in the defendants College of Law. He failed to take the regular
examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled
for the second semester as a fourth year student, and filed an application for the removal of
the incomplete grade which was approved by the Dean. In the meantime, the faculty
members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth year students should be
allowed to graduate. The plaintiffs name appeared on the tentative list, he also attended
the investiture ceremonies to which he tendered blowout afterwards. He thereafter
prepared himself for the bar examination and took review classes. However, he was not
able to take the bar examination because his academic requirements is not complete.
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral
shock besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights, when he was not able to
take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latters negligence. He prayed for an
award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorneys fees and cost of suit.
ISSUE
Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a
student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when
such is not the case.
HELD
The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of the
school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every
student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the
conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will
graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must
be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for
abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

Cruz vs NLRC
G.R. No. 116384. February 7, 2000
FACTS
Petitioner Cruz was hired and employed by respondent Norkis as cashier/bookkeeper in
its Cagayan de Oro City branch and was later transferred to its Valencia, Bukidnon branch.
On October 14, 1990, while petitioner and her co-employees were busy making an
inventory of the things to be moved preparatory for transfer, the petitioner suddenly
collapsed. She was rushed to the hospital. Starting October 15, 1990, respondent Norkis
was informed of petitioners condition and was able to recruit a replacement. Petitioner
sent a letter to respondent Norkis to verify the status of her employment as an answer she
received a termination letter. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
private respondent and asked for reward damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees from private respondent.
HELD
The Supreme Court held that there is merit in petitioners submission that the award of
moral and exemplary damages in her favor is warranted by her unjustified dismissal.
Award of moral and exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed employee is proper
where the employee has been harassed and arbitrarily terminated by the employer. Moral
damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation occasioned by the
employees unreasonable dismissal of the employee.

Globe McKay vs Barrios
G.R. No. L-60859 December 27, 1982
FACTS
Globe McKay Cable and Radio Corporation failed to deliver to spouses George and Olga
Barrios a cablegram from Mercy Hospital, Buffalo, New York admitting Olga for a rotating
internship in the said hospital, as a consequence of which she was unable to signify her
acceptance and the position was given to someone else. Thus, the spouses filed for
damages. The trial court granted the award of damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent spouses are entitled to the award of damages.
HELD
The Supreme Court agree with the finding of the trial court that such failure to deliver the
cablegram caused loss of earnings, serious anxiety and sleepless nights for which the
petitioner should be held liable. However, the award for damages by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals was found to be excessive. The award of damages was
modified.

RCPI vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 79578 March 13, 1991
FACTS:
Loreto Dionella alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him by the
operator RCPI not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment
and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know said
defamatory words. Dionella filed for damages and was granted by the trial court and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals the liability of petitioner company employer predicated
under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. RCPI now comes to the Supreme Court for review
by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI is predicated
under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The cause of action of
private respondent is based on Artciles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as
respondents breach of contract thru negligence of its own employees.

Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FACTS:
An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as
complainant, filed with the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and
moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of
the child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised
to marry complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950,
Soledad then a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years younger than her used to
go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he made no promise of
marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter
where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one evening in 1953 when
after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano
to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised
petitioner that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to
marry.
HELD:
It appearing that because of the defendant-appellants seductive prowess, plaintiff-appellee
overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-
control. In the present case, the court is unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten years younger but also because the CFI
found that complainant surrendered herself to the petitioner because overwhelmed by her
love for him she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy.

BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 97336February 19, 1993
FACTS:
On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of
their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single,
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the
latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they
get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing
of complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already
married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering
petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all
allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay
the private respondent damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-
delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a mans
promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of

marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

WASSMER vs. VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get
married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for
his bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it.
Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default.
Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages
P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorneys fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed,
thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.
HELD:
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set
a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out
of it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and
unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New
Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary
damages may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner.

PCIB VS ESCOLIN
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the
Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary
provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were
the laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group
contended that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no
renvoi was possible).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact
to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at
the time of her death (and not said law at any other time).

AMERICAN AIRLINES VS COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO.116044-45 : March 9, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent Amadeo Seno purchased from Singapore Airlines in Manila conjunction
tickets. In Geneva, the petitioner decided to forego his trip to Copenhagen, and go straight
to New York, private respondent exchanged the unused portion of the conjunction ticket
from International Air Transport Association clearing house in Geneva. Private respondent
filed an action for damages before the RTC of Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and
mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva Airport when the petitioners security officers
prevented him from boarding the plane, detained him for about an hour and allowed him to
board the plane only after all the passengers have boarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the action for damages.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the case was properly filed in the Philippines. It held that the
petitioner acted as an agent of the Singapore Airlines under IATA rules and as an agent of
the principal carrier the petitioner may be held liable under contract of carriage in Manila.

ASAALI VS. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. L-24170 December 16, 1968
FACTS:
On September 10, 1950 a customs patrol intercepted five sailing vessels in question on the
high seas. After ordering the vessels to stop, the custom officers boarded and found on
board their cargoes which were not covered by the required import license. The five sailing
vessels are all of Philippine registry and came to Saudaku British North Borneo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid on
the contention that the seizure was effected outside our territorial waters.
HELD:
The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a state has the right to
protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the
high seas. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its application and enforceability
not only within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its
jurisdiction while on Philippine ship.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA VS. REYES
GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel
was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes,
Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former
General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and
carried a basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it
was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive
Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around
them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-
out the hotel. All these time, DrFilart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed
by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms.
ZenaidaFruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes
was with Dr. Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the
latter was talking over the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to
leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate
consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to
finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly
kissed each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the
request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to
know what happened.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners may be held liable for damages in favor of defendant.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all
the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting
him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms.
Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will
not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES VS. ARCIAGA
G.R. No. L-29701 March 16, 1987
FACTS:
On August 24, 1960, TaurinoSingson as paying passenger on board bus belonging to the
PRBL sustained multiple serious physical injuries when the said bus crashed against an
acacia tree at Balaoan La Union. Thereafter, he brought a complaint for contractual tort. In
each answer, defendant interposed the defense that the collusion was due to fortuitous
event. The case was set for trial but the case was dismissed for non appearance of the
plaintiff. He then filed an appeal on the grounds of equity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case was proper.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the case basing its decision on the doctrine of
finality of judgment grounded on fundamental considerations concerning public policy and
sound practice. The court further states that the principle of equity cannot be applied to
him. To him, the well known maxim which is that equity aids the vigilant, not those who
slumber on their rights is applicable.

GALANG VS. C.A.
G.R. No. L-17248 January 29, 1962
FACTS:
Plaintiff Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were engaged, but Rodrigos parents were
stronglyopposed to their marriage. They lived as husband and wife in the house of one
Adolfo Dagawanuntil Rodrigo left and never returned. The evidence on other pertinent
facts is however conflicting.Plaintiff tried to prove that she and Rodrigo were engaged
despite the opposition of the lattersmother and that the father of Rodrigo agreed to give
dowry and defray the expenses of themarriage. The father even took them to the house of
Dagawan for them to stay as husband andwife.
However when Rodrigo was not able to secure a marriage license for lack of a
residencecertificate, he went back to his hometown to get such certificate but never
returned.On the other hand, the defendants sough to establish that he and plaintiff were
engaged but hisparents were opposed to the marriage. Rodrigo was agreeable to marry the
plaintiff after hisgraduation but the latter was impatient and wanted the marriage to take
place sooner. Because of continued relationships with the plaintiff, Rodrigos parents told
him to leave the parental home.He later told this to plaintiff. The plaintiff convinced him to
go to Dagawans house where shefollowed and stayed thereafter.
Because of his continued refusal to marry the plaintiff, the lattersrelatives, accompanied by
policemen and constabulary soldiers intimidated him. He was allowedto go home and
was then placed under the custody of a town mayor by his parents. He refused
toacknowledge the marriage application, which was provided by Dagawan for him to sign,
when hedid not appear before a notary public.Plaintiff filed an action against Rodrigo and
his father MaximoQuinit to recover damages for breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo
to marry her. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, which on appeal, was
reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff may recover damages for breach of promise to marry.
HELD
It is urged by the plaintiff that said Court had erred in not awarding moral damages to her.
Sheinsiststhat moral damages for breach of promise to marry are collectible under
our laws, but thisquestion has already been settled adversely to plaintiffs pretense in
Hemosisima vs. Court of Appeals. Moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not
collectible.

VILLANUEVA vs. ROSQUETA
G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue
Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs, tendered her courtesy
resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew
her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned
against her will on orders of her superior.Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo
appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosquetas position. Challenging such
appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction
against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva, then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of
Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-101539.
On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining
Villanueva and the Finance Secretaryfrom implementing Valeras appointment. On August
28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the
injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14,
2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTCs injunction
order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before
it. On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was
again enforce, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001,
authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.
During the Bureaus celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its special
Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except
respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir program, authorized by the Bureaus Steering
Committee headed by petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where
Rosquetas picture was supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was "under
litigation." Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard displayed at the Bureaus main gate
included Valeras picture but not Rosquetas. On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta
filed a complaintfor damages before the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva in
Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the centennial
anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented her from performing her
duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave
applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award her P1,000,000.00 in moral damages,
P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorneys fees and costs of suit.
But the RTC dismissedrespondent Rosquetas complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva
committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC
found that Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven

months before the Bureaus centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTCs decision,
holding instead that petitioner Villanuevas refusal to comply with the preliminary
injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover
moral damages from him. Citing the abuse of right principle, the RTC said that Villanueva
acted maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of
salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy Commissioner by
excluding her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Thus, the appellate court
ordered Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral damages, P200,000.00 in exemplary
damages and P100,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to
respondent Rosqueta.
HELD:
No. Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must,
in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead
acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are
Articles 20and 21of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers
because of such abuse of right or duty. The damage suit is an independent action. The CA
correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded
when the defendants transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiffs anguish in the
cases specified in Article 2219of the Civil Code. Here, respondent Rosquetas colleagues
and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on account of the speculation over her
employment status. She had to endure being referred to asa "squatter" in her workplace.
She had to face inquiries from family and friends about her exclusion from the Bureaus
centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to endure all these affronts and the
angst and depression they produced had Villanueva abided in good faith by the courts
order in her favor.

VILLANUEVA, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142927 MARCH 19, 2002
FACTS:
Respondents Villadores is one of the accused in the amended information in Criminal Case
Nos. 94-138744 and 94-138745 for falsification of public document before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. It appears that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against several parties, among them IBC 13. When the labor arbiter ruled in favor
of him, IBC 13 appealed to the NLRC. As an appeal bond, IBM 13 filed Surety Bond No. G
(16) 00136 issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc. with the confirmation letter
dated September 20, 1993 supposedly issued by BFs Vice President. However both
documents were subsequently found to be falsified.
Thus, two complaints for falsification of public documents were filed before the Manila City
Prosecutors office. But the charge was dismissed by the City Prosecutors office which,
however, found probable cause against respondents. Nonetheless, on a petition for review
before the DOJ, the latter affirmed the dismissal against Diaz but ordered the inclusion of
respondents Villadores as an accused in the two criminal cases. Accordingly, the original
information was amended to include respondent Villadores among those charged.
On January 7, 1999, respondent Villadores filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, seeking the annulment of the trial courts order denying the motion for
disqualification as well as its subsequent order denying reconsideration. On April 12, 2000,
the appellate court rendered its now challenged decision which reversed and set aside the
two orders of the trial court. It directed that the name of petitioner Villanueva, Jr. appearing
as the offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 be stricken out from the
records.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pronouncement of the appellate court to the effect that petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 is obiter
dictum.
HELD:
No. An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some
questions of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark
made, or opinion expressed by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, by way, that is
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon the
point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.

Based on the foregoing, the pronouncement of the appellate court is not an obiter dictum as
it touched upon the matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his petition assailing
the admission of amended information. Among the issued upon which the petition for
certiorari was anchored was whether Villanueva, Jr., is the offended party. Such argument
was clearly raised by respondent Villadores. The body of decision contains discussions on
the point and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.

AYALA CORPORATION vs. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134284, December 1, 2000
FACTS:
On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and SyKaKieng
married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained
Special conditions of sale and Deed Restrictions. The Deed Restrictions, on the other hand,
contained the stipulation that the gross floor area of the building to be constructed shall
not be more than five (5) times the lot area and the total height shall not exceed forty two
(42) meters.
Manuel Sy and SyKaKieng failed to construct the building in violation of the Special
Conditions of Sale. Notwithstanding the violation, Manuel SyanfSyKaKieng, in April 1989,
were able to sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation
with Ayalas approval. As a consideration for Ayala to release the Certificate of title of the
subject property, Rosa Diana, on July 27, 1989 executed an Undertaking promising to abide
by special conditions of sale executed between Ayala and the original vendees.
Thereafter, Rosa-Diana submitted to the building official of Makati another set of building
plans for "The Peak" which was substantially different from those that it earlier submitted
to Ayala for approval. During the construction of Rosa-Dianas condominium project, Ayala
filed an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, for specific performance, with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order against Rosa-
Diana Realty seeking to compel the latter to comply with the contractual obligations under
the deed of restrictions annotated on its title as well as with the building plans it submitted
to the latter. In the alternative, Ayala prayed for rescission of the sale of the subject lot to
Rosa-Diana Realty. However, such petition was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not law of the case is controlling in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. The doctrine of the law of the case has certain affinities with, but is clearly
distinguishable from, the doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis, principally on the
ground that the rule of the law of the case operates only in the particular case and only as a
rule of policy and not as one of law. At variance with the doctrine of stare decisis, the ruling
adhered to in the particular case under the doctrine of the law of the case need not be
followed as a precedent in subsequent litigation between other parties, neither by the
appellate court which made the decision followed on a subsequent appeal in the same case,
nor by any other court. The ruling covered by the doctrine of the law of the case is adhered

to in the single case where it arises, but is not carried into other cases as a precedent. On
the other hand, under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a point of law has been established
by the court, that point of law will, generally, be followed by the same court and by all
courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is
raised. Stare decisis proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.7
The Court of Appeals, in ruling against petitioner Ayala Corporation stated that the appeal
is sealed by the doctrine of the law of the case, referring to G.R. No. 112774 entitled "Ayala
Corporation, petitioner vs. Courts of Appeals, et al., respondents". The Court of Appeals
likewise made reference to C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled, "Ayala Corporation vs. Ray
Burton Development Corporation, Inc." in ruling against petitioner saying that it is
jurisprudentially under the doctrine of stare decisis.

TING vs. VELEZ-TING
GR. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Ting and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting were married on July 26,
1975. The couple begot six children. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more
than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen
filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered
from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which,
however, only became manifest thereafter.
During the trial, Carmen presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a

psychiatrist. Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of
Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamins
deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital
in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that
Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent
are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a
consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center,
as his expert witness. Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the
transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by
Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr.
Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers. Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra
observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters
good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. Such decision was later sustained by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case of Molina is a stare decisis in the case at bar and that the petitioner
is suffering from psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Yes, and that the petitioner is not suffering from psychological incapacity. The principle
of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this

Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. The
Court found the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that
petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and
more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present at
the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage,
she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but
such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on
the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such defects to be
incurable.

PEOPLE vs. MORIAL
GR. No. 129295 August 15, 2001
FACTS:
Edwin Morial and Leonardo Morial were arrested for killing Paula and Albert Bandibas.
After they were arrested, they were interrogated and tortured by the police officers to
admit the authorization of the said killing. Leonardo was able to admit that they were
responsible for the crime committed.
After which, Leonardo's statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed
him that they were going to contact a lawyer to assist him during the investigation.
Leonardo was told that his counsel would be a certain Atty. Aguilar. However, the
interrogation was made prior to the assistance of counsel, and that the investigation was
made in the absence of the counsel because the latter was able to leave, but before leaving
the counsel asked Leonardo if he is willing to answer the questions in his absence and he
answer in the affirmative.
After trial, the RTC convicted all the accused. However the Court finds Leonardos extra-
judicial confession invalid since he was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during
the custodial investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not right to counsel may be waived.
HELD:
No. The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation must
continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. In People vs. Lucero,
where the suspects counsel left just when the interrogation was starting, the Court
chastised both counsel and the trial court for their lack of zeal in safeguarding the rights of
the accused. Furthermore, Section 2 (a) of RA 7438 requires that any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. The last
paragraph of Section 3 of the same law mandates that in the absence of any lawyer, no
custodial investigation shall be conducted.

GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July
17, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on
October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioner and his

co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim
stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and
all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by
Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her
minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios is valid.
HELD:
No, because the Release and Waiver of Claim was executed without judicial authorization.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private
respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party
to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to
a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince intent to abandon a right.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a

known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of
it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by
a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional
rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of
the deceased.

PRINCIPIO vs. BARRIENTOS
GR. No. 167025 December 19, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Herminio C. Principio is a bank examiner at the Supervisions and Examination
Department IV of the BangkoSentralngPilipinas (BSP).
On June 25, 2001, respondent Hilario P. Soriano, president and stockholder of the Rural
Bank of San Miguel, Inc. (RBSMI for brevity), filed an affidavit-complaint against petitioner
with the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No.
3019. Respondent alleged that petitioner, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and
gross inexcusable negligence, caused undue injury to RBSMI by reporting that the bank
incurred legal reserve deficiencies of P18 million from December 31, 1995 up to August 21,
1996 and P13 million from August 22, 1996 up to September 1, 1996, and by
recommending the imposition of a fine in the amount of P 2,538,000, which was adopted by
On September 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable
cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. On November 12,
2002, an Information was filed against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of docketed as Crim. Case No. 02-207793.
On December 3, 2003, the trial court denied petitioner's motions to give due course to his
motion for reconsideration and to defer proceedings until resolution of the pending issues.
It also suspended petitioner from office for a period of 60 days. His motion for
reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2004. On July 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner acted in bad faith.
HELD:
No. the Ombudsman cannot impute bad faith on the part of the petitioner on the
assumption that he, together with other BSP officials, was part of a cabal to apply pressure
on RBSMI to sell out by subjecting it to many impositions through the Monetary Board. Bad
faith is never presumed while good faith is always presumed and the chapter on Human
Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which
springs from the fountain of good conscience. Therefore, he who claims bad faith must
prove it. For one to be in bad faith, the same must be 'evident. The Ombudsman should
have first determined the facts indicating bad faith instead of relying on the tenuous
assumption that there was an orchestrated attempt to force RBSMI to sell out.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN
G.R. No. 162155August 28, 2007
FACTS:
Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetime Property Group, Inc. applied on March 11, 1999 for the
refund or credit of income tax Primetown paid in 1997. It contends that it is entitled to it
because it suffered losses that year due to the increase in the cost of labor and materials,
the difficulty in obtaining financing for projects, and collecting receivables.
Notwithstanding this, Primetown still paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted
credible withholding tax from real state to the BIR. Thus, it claims entitled to a refund.
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit
additional documents to which the latter complied with. However, its claim was not acted
upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals on April 14,
2000.
CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for
filling a judicial claim for tax credit in accordance with Section 229 of the NIRC. According
to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Article
13 of the Civil Code wherein years are of 356 days each. Since Primetime filed its final
adjusted return on April 14, 1998 and that the year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was
filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return, therefore beyond the
reglementary period.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of CTA. It ruled in favor of Primetown
saying that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not extinguished between a regular year and a
leap year and thus it was filed on time.
The CIR appealed before the SC stating that tax refunds, being in the nature of exemption,
should be strictly construed against claimants. Hence, the claim should have been filed on
or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time it filed its final
adjusted return.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was filed within the two-year period from the date of payment.
HELD:
Yes. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
understood to be equivalent to 365 days. However, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987, a subsequent law, was enacted. It provides in Section 31 that a year shall be

understood to be 12 calendar months. The SC defines a calendar month as a month
designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain.
Due to the inconsistency, the Court held that EO 292 impliedly repealed Article 13 of the
Civil Code as the provisions are irreconcilable. Although there is a repealing clause in the
law, it cannot be said as express because there is no specific designation of the law to be
repealed.
Therefore, applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 of EO 292, Primetowns petition which
was filed on April 14, 2000, was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the
day Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary
period.

GO vs .CORDERO
G.R. No. 164703May 4, 2010
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation,
ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting
various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony
Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the
exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. As
such exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for sale to prospective buyers the 25-meter
Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan Go who is the
owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship, Cordero was
able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25, as evidenced by the
Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed
Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the
price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall
receive commissions totalling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the
sale of each vessel.
Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia, and on one (1)
occasion even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of the
building of the vessel. He shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel
accommodations, transportation and entertainment during these trips. He also spent for
long distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson and
Landicho.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he
was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second
catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT
25. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second
engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to
contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while
Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify
matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in
Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up

calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made
Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson,
Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together
in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights,
thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid commission from the sale of
the first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the sale of the
second vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and
exemplary damages, including P800,000.00 representing expenses for airplane travel to
Australia, telecommunications bills and entertainment, on account of AFFAs untimely
cancellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award
of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and
failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act committed in violation of
the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial court on December 20,
1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the
period granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss based on
failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26,
1999. Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the
termination by AFFA of Corderos authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On
the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in
connection with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in
making progress status reports and airing the clients grievances to his principal, AFFA,
such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the
documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. As to the inquiry for the
Philippine price for a Wartsila ship engine for AFFAs other on-going vessel construction,
this was merely requested by Robinson but which Cordero misinterpreted as indication
that Go was buying a second vessel. Moreover, Landicho and Tecson had no transaction
whatsoever with Cordero who had no document to show any such shipbuilding
contract. As to the supposed meeting to settle their dispute, this was due to the malicious
demand of Cordero to be given US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will expose in the media the
alleged undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. In any case, Cordero no longer had
cause of action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum
of agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering the termination of his authority by AFFAs
lawyers on June 26, 1998.
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January

29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
60354 and setting aside the trial courts orders of execution pending appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid
commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal,
AFFA.
HELD:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because
only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person
not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. Article 1314 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party.The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence
of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued
by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines,
respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by
Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the
Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of
AFFA.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot
be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the
contract can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly
held liable for the balance of petitioner Corderos commission from the sale of the first
SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson
did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted
in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

LABAD vs. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 139665. August 9, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner was a probationary faculty member of the University of Southeastern
Philippines (hereafter respondent) Laboratory (high school) and was designated as the
adviser for the schools yearbook TRAILS 95, the schools regular school organ INSIGHTS,
and the schools student government known as the LSOCSG.
On February 1, 1996, the officers and members of respondent universitys Parents
Teachers Association filed a letter-complaint with the president of respondent university,
charging petitioner with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Unfitness as a Teacher.
The Investigating Committee rendered a report recommending the penalty of dismissal
from the service through the non-renewal of petitioners probationary status on the ground
of dishonesty and misconduct. Respondent universitys Board of Regents subsequently
approved and adopted the report of the Investigating Committee as its decision.
Respondent then did not renew the probationary status of petitioner as teacher for the
school year 1996-97.
Petitioner appealed said decision to the Civil Service Commission.
On April 14, 1998, the Civil Service Commission issued a Resolution affirming the decision
of respondent universitys Board of Regent.
On December 28, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of
Period to File Petition for Review asking for 15 days from December 28, 1998 or until
January 12, 1999 to do so. Acting on the motion filed by counsel for petitioner on December
28, 1998, the Court resolves to grant petitioner an extension of fifteen (15) days from
December 26, 1998, or until January 10, 1999, within which to file petition for review. On
March 10, 1999, counsel of petitioner received a copy of the Resolution dated February 24,
1999, issued by the Court of Appeals, Former Fourth Division, dismissing the petition for
review. It reads: considering that the petition for review was filed on January 12, 1999 by
registered mail, beyond the extended period which expired on January 10, 1999, the
petition for review is hereby dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review filed by
petitioner before it on the ground that the petition was filed late.
HELD:
Yes. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of
the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance
included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a

legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working
day.
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court and as applied in several cases, where the
last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working
day. In this case, petitioner still had until December 28, 1998, a Monday and the next
business day to move for a 15-day extension considering that December 26, 1998, the last
day for petitioner to file her petition for review fell on a Saturday. The motion for extension
filed on December 28, 1998 was thus filed on time since it was filed before the expiration of
the time sought to be extended. The next issue to resolve then is when should the 15-day
extension be reckoned, should it be counted from December 26, 1998 or December 28,
1998?
As a rule, the extension should be tacked to the original period and commence immediately
after the expiration of such period. However, in Moskowsky vs. Court of Appeals and Vda. De
Capulong vs. Workmens Insurance Co., Inc., the court allowed the extended period to
commence from the specific time prayed for in the motion for extension. In this case,
petitioner specifically manifested that she be granted an extension of 15 days from
December 28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 for her to file her petition for review. Hence,
the period for reckoning the commencement of the additional 15 days should have been
from December 28, 1998, and not December 26, 1998. Thus, the petition filed by petitioner
with the Court of Appeals on January 12, 1998, exactly 15 days from December 28, 1998,
was filed on time.

CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. vs. USHIO Realty and Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 138088 January 23, 2006
FACTS:
USHIO Realty alleges that CAR COOL leased the property from the former owners, spouses
Lopez, since 1972. On June 15, 1995, Hector Lopez wrote to CAR COOL informing the latter
of his intention to sell the property. Hector Lopez gave CAR COOL the option to buy the
property before offering it to prospective buyers. CAR COOL failed to respond to the offer.
Thus, on June 28, 1995, Hector Lopez terminated the lease agreement and gave CAR COOL until August 31,
1995 to vacate the property. In a letter dated August 31, 1995, USHIO Realty informed CAR COOL that it
had purchased the property from the spouses Lopez. CAR COOL continued to occupy the
property despite USHIO Realtys demand. This prompted USHIO Realty to file a complaint for
ejectment.CAR COOL, on the other hand, alleges that Hector Lopez agreed to renew the lease
agreement for another two (2) years covering the period from January 1, 1995 to December 1996.
CAR COOL further claims that it had paid in advance to Hector Lopez the monthly rentals covering
the 2-year period. In this regard, CAR COOL asserts that to award damages to USHIO Realty would
constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of CAR COOL.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to award damages by way of rentals in favor of USHIO Realty would
constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of CAR COOL.
HELD:
No. Contrary to CAR COOLS allegations, the Supreme Court held that the payment of
damages in the form of rentals for the property does not constitute unjust enrichment. The
court finds that the allegations of the complainant (USHIO Realty) are true.
Article 22 of the Civil Code states that every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The principle of unjust enrichment under the above stated article requires two (2)
conditions, namely:1) That a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and
2) That such benefit is derived at anothers expense or damage. USHIO Realty, as the new
owner of the property, has a right to physical possession of the property. Since CAR COOL
deprived USHIO Realty of its property, the latter has the legal right to receive some amount
as reasonable compensation for CAR COOLs occupation of the property.

CAR COOL is ordered to pay the aggregate amount of P198, 000 as the rental fee for the use
of property from December 19, 1995 to November 18, 1996 (the date when CAR COOL vacated the
property).

PUYAT VS ZABARTE
G.R. No. 141536 / February 26, 2001
FACTS:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
challenging the August 31, 1999 decision of the CA which affirmed the RTC of Pasig City
and which denied reconsideration. It appears that on January 24, 1994 Ron Zabarte
commenced to enforce the money judgment rendered by the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Contra Costa. In his discussion, petitioner contends that the CA erred
in ruling in this wise:
A. That his answer failed to render genuine issue of fact regarding the following:
1. The jurisdiction of a foreign court over the subject matter,
2. The validity of the foreign judgment,
3. The judgments conformity to Philippine laws, public policy, canons of morality and
norms of unjust enrichment,
B. That the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA acted in a manner contrary to law when it affirmed the order of the
trial court granting respondents motion for summary judgment rendering judgment
against Puyat.
HELD:
No. Summary judgment in litigation is resorted to if there is no genuine issue as to the
material fact, other than the amount of damages. If this verity is evident from the pleadings
and the supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file with the court, the moving
party is entitled to such remedy as a matter of course. The grounds relied upon by
petitioner are contradictory, on the one hand, he insists that the RTC take jurisdiction over
the enforcement case in order to invalidate the foreign judgment, yet, he avers that the trial
court should not exercise jurisdiction over the same case on the basis of forum non
conveniens. Not only do these defenses weaken each other but they bolster the finding of
the lower courts that he was merely maneuvering to avoid or delay payment of his
obligation. His petition is hereby denied.

Concepcion vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120706 / January 31, 2000
FACTS:
The court a quo found that sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allen Nicolas
resided at 51 M. Concepcion, San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by
Concepcion who also resided in the same compound where the apartment was located.
Nestor was then engaged in the business of supplying government agencies with office
equipments. Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital on the condition that
after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit would be divided equally
between her and Nestor. Sometime in the 2nd week of July 1985, Rodrigo brother of
Concepcions husband (dead), angrily accosted Nestor at the latters apartment and
accused him of adultery with Concepcion. To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo to
see his relatives who allegedly have knowledge of such adultery. However, those people
denied any knowledge thereof. Nevertheless, Rodrigo reiterated his accusation and
threatened Concepcion that should something happen to his sick mother, in case the
mother would learn about the affair, he would kill Concepcion. The Nicolas spouses sued
Rodrigo for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is basis in law for the award of damages to spouses Nicolas.
HELD:
Yes. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must
be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every
plan for amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization
of every country is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person
from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted, then the laws
are indeed defective. Thus, the rights of persons are aptly protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. The
decision of the CA is affirmed.

AMONOY VS SPS. GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 140420 / February 15, 2001
FACTS:
The case had its roots in special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Julio Catolos, involving 6 parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal. Amonoy was the
counsel therein for Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba, and Alfonso
Fornilda. On January 12, 1965, the project of partition submitted was approved and 2 of the
said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Aldonso Fornilda. The attorneys fee
charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on January 20, 1965, Asuncion Pasamba and
Alfonso Fornilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said 2 lots in favor of
Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorneys fees. But it was only August 6, 1969 after
the taxes had been paid, the claims of settled and the property adjudicated, that the estate
was declared closed and terminated. Asuncion and Alfonso died; among the heirs of the
latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Thereafter, on Amonoys
motion, the orders were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots, including
the house of Gutierrez spouses. A complaint for damages in connection with the
destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in deciding that the petitioner was liable to respondents
for damages.
HELD:
Yes. Clearly, the demolition of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the
TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his
alleged right, he wantonly violated this courts order and wittingly caused the destruction
of respondents house. In the ultimate analysis, petitioners liability is premised on the
obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of ones act
or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or punishable by law.
The court ruled against Amonoy.

GUARING VS CA
269 scra 283
FACTS:
This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7,
1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the
accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Tedoro Guaring Jr., who died as a result of the
mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida
driven by Enriquez. The Lancer was heading north at a rate of 90kph, behind it was the bus.
The Cressida was on the opposite lane bound for Manila. Killed in the accident was Guaring
Jr. The heirs of Guaring brought his action for damages, based on quasi-delict in the Manila
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private
respondent Philippine Bus Lines Inc and its driver Angeles Cuevas for damages for the
death of Guaring.
HELD:
No. The appellate court did not have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did
was simply cite the findings contained in the decision of the criminal court. Worse, what
the bus driver was appellate court regarded as categorical finding that the driver was not
negligent and on that basis, declared in this case that the proximate cause of the accident
was the act of Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him. The notion that an
action for quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside.
This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case.
Article 2176 states whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not
guilty does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on a quasi-delict. It is
now noteworthy that the accident in this case also involved Philippine Rabbit Bus and that
as in this case the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt. The SC held
that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action brought by the heirs
was based on a quasi-delict.

Manantan vs Court of Appeals
GR. No. 107125 January 29, 2001
FACTS:
On June 1, 1983, the provincial fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner
Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On arraignment, petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecutions evidence, as summarized by the trial
court indicated that Manantan was driving 40 km/hr along the highway (although
according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kkm/hr on the
wrong lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle, when they met a
passenger jeepney with bright lights on). The defense version was essentially the same as
that of the prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that
Manantan did not drink beer that night. RTC found the accused not guilty but on appeal the
court modified the decision in favor of the private respondents.
ISSUES:
1. Did the acquittal of petitioner over foreclose any further injury by the court of appeals as
to his negligence of reckless imprudence?
2. Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his civil
liability?
HELD:
On the first issue, our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the
civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. The second is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. On the second issue, our scrutiny of the lower courts
decision in this case supports the conclusion of the appellate court that the acquittal was
based on reasonable doubt; hence petitioners civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge. The court note that the trial courts declaration that did not discount the
possibility that the accused was really negligent. The foregoing clearly shows that
petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been
established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies. Therefore, the
instant petition was hereby dismissed.

Bonite vs Zosa
162 SCRA 180 June 20, 1988
FACTS:
September 24, 1968, 2 PM Bonite, a caminero of the Bureau of Public Highways was
killed when he was hit by a truck driven by Abamonga. A complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide was filed by the surviving heirs of Bonite but
Abamongawas acquitted because of insufficient evidence.- In the course of the trial,
the petitioners actively participated in the proceedings through their lawyer, private
prosecutor Atty. Dulalas.- D e c e m b e r 2 8 , 1 9 7 0 T h e B o n i t e h e i r s f i l e d a n
action for recovery of damages against Abamonga based on the same act but
the court dismissed thecomplaint for damages beca use the Court believes that
the Bonite heirs did not reserve the right to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil
Code, is deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a
reservation to file a separate civil action and by their a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n o f s u c h criminal action.
HELD:
YES. W h e n t h e a c c u s e d i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e i s acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may still be instituted against him, and only a
preponderance of evidence is required to hold the accused liable. The civil liability is
not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt (based on Article 29 of the Civil Code).

People vs Bayotas
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on
June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the
National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court
in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability
arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of the accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability. Counsel for the accused-appellant on the
other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that death of the accused
while judgment of the conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his
civil liability.
HELD:
Yes. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollary, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) Quasi-delicts.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained above, an action for recovery therefore may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Sec.1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Finally, the
private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.

Mansion Biscuit Corp. vs CA
G.R. No. 94713 November 23, 1995
FACTS:
Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, ordered
numerous canons of nutria-wafer biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation, before the
delivery of the goods on November 12, 1981, Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong,
president of Mansion Biscuit Corp., four postdated checks totaling P404, 980.00 as payment
for the nutria-wafer biscuits. Four other postdated checks in the amount of P100, 000.00
each were issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui as Co-signor in December of the same year.
Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit Corp. delivered the goods. When the first four checks were
deposited, they were all dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Ang Cho Hong informed
Ty Teck Suan of the dishonor and requested him to replace the checks with good cash or
good checks. Ty Teck Suan failed to heed said request. Subsequently, Ty Teck Suan
delivered a total of 1,150 sacks of Australian flour to Mansion Biscuits plus cash advance by
Suan and the amount paid was applied as payment for the first postdated check. Hong sent
Suan a formal demand letter requesting the latter to make good the value of the remaining
dishonored checks within five days from the receipt thereof. Thereafter, the second batch
of checks were issued by Suan and Gui but were all dishonored again. Mansion Biscuit
Corporation filed a case against Suan and Gui for violation of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of Ty Teck Suan that the subject checks were issued merely
to guarantee or secure fulfillment of the agreement with the complaint.
HELD: The court concludes of the above-mentioned checks by the accused subject to these
two criminal cases, and their subsequent dishonor, cannot be considered in violation of the
Batasang Pambansa Blg.22 because one important element of the offense is missing: that
the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value and because these
were issued to guarantee the fulfillment of an agreement to deliver biscuits by complaint
when accused Suan would place orders. Accused are hereby declared not guilty of the
offense charged.

Cojuangco v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999
FACTS:
Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which
he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to
September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first,
second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for
trainer/grooms totaling more than 1 million pesos. Danding sent demand letters to the
PCSO and Fernando Carrascoso for the collection of the prizes due him. And PCSCO and
Carrascoso consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of
Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the PCGG. Danding filed a collection suit before the RTC of
Manila But before receipt of the summons, the PCGG advised PCSO and Carrascoso that "it
poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings" Immediately, this was
communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso.
Atty. Mendoza refused to accept the money since a case was also filed against them. After
trial, the RTC ruled in favor of Danding and ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay the
amount claimed plus interest, damages and attorneys fees. The trial court ruled that PCSO
and its then chairman, Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject
racehorse winnings, since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the PCGG. It
held that it was Carrascoso's unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes.
Having been a previous longtime associate of Danding in his horse racing and breeding
activities, he had supposedly been aware that Danding's winning horses were not ill-gotten.
The trial court held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith
amounting to the persecution and harassment of Cojuangco and his family. CA reversed. It
ruled that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG
in regard to the prize winnings of Danding. It noted that, at the time, the scope of the
sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies
was not well-defined. It also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated bad
faith: (1) he promptly replied to petitioner's demand for the release of his prizes, citing
PCGG's instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon PCGG's subsequent advice to
release petitioner's winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he
interposed no objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr.is warranted by
evidence and the law.

HELD:
No. The rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing
of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation cannot be
imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefore
under the Civil Code.
However, Carrascoso may still be held liable under Art. 32 of the Civil Code for violating
Dandings right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Under this
provision, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be
liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even
on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties. While
Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG's instructions, he could have further sought the
specific legal basis therefore. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there
was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of Danding.
There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The
issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard
for the requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of Danding
without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property
rights without due process of law. Hence, he is liable for nominal damages.

Alcuaz vs PSBA
FACTS:
On May 2, 1988, the Second Division rendered a decision in the instant case which prodded
the Intervener Union to file a motion for reconsideration, its arguments hinges the
pronouncement that: Likewise it is provided in the Manual, that the written contact
required for college teachers are for one semester. It is thus evident that after the close of
First Semester. The PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students,
or with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process in
untenable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a written contract between the school and its employees and students are
valid only for one semester.
HELD:
No. The motion was denied. Furthermore, in conclusion, the court reiterates that while we
value the rights of students to complete their in the school or university of their choice and
while we fully respect their right to resort rallies and demonstrations for the redress of
their grievances and as a part of their freedom of speech and their right to assemble, still
such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted peacefully, without
resort to intimidation, coercion, violence. Academic freedom in all forms, demands the full
display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be subvert freedom into degenerate license.

Non vs Dames
185 scra 523
Facts:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte,
were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The
subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to

the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse
its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that
petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college
when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school
year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of
students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal
of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly
disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are
required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline.
Issue:
Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.
Held:
Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However
there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional
Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not
materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others.

Arafiles vs. Philippine Journalists, Inc.
G.R. No. 150256, March 25, 2004
FACTS:
This is a complaint for damages filed by Catalino Arafiles, Director of the National Institute
of Atmospheric Science (NIAS) against Peoples Journal Tonight reporter, Romy Morales.
On April 14, 1987, Morales was at the Western Police District Headquarters when NIAS
employee, Emelita Despuig lodged a complaint for forcible abduction with rape and forcible
abduction with attempted rape against Arafiles. After interviewing Emelita and checking
the police blotter, Morales wrote a story about it, which was published that same day.
Arafiles then filed a complaint against Morales, alleging that on account of the grossly
malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item aspersions were cast on
his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the PAGASA was injured; he
became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed
stalker and serial rapist; and the news item deferred his promotion to the position of
Deputy Administrator of PAGASA.
For its part, Morales et al. countered that the news item, having been sourced from the
Police Blotter, which is an official public document and bolstered by a personal interview of
the victim, falls within the protective constitutional provision of freedom of the press.
The RTC ruled in favor of Arafiles, stating that the article did not use phrases like
allegedly or reportedly and that it reported the allegations of the victim as if it were fact
and truth. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was reversed. CA found no proof that
respondents were motivated by a sinister intent to cause harm and injury to petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not
attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages
HELD:
No. The SC found that the case against respondents has not been sufficiently established by
preponderance of evidence.
Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated
to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall be
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence
separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the
criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the NCC and not by the RPC
governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising thereof. These
pertinent NCC provisions are Article 19 and 21.

A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which
the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. So, the whole item,
including display lines, should be read and construed together, and its meaning and
signification thus determined.

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC.vs. ARGOS
364 S.C.R.A. 792 September 10, 2001
FACTS:
Respondents Merlin Argos and Jaja Pineda are the general manager and commercial
director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of the petitioner International Flavors and
Fragrances, Inc. (IFFI). The general managers reported directly to Hernan Costa, the
appointed managing director. Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the
positions of the general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the
termination of their services. They signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim. That same
time, Costa issued a Personnel Announcement which described respondents as persona
non grata and urged the employees not to have further dealings with them. Two
informations were filed against Costa for the criminal charge of libel. In addition,
respondents filed a civil case for damages against Costa and Petitioner Corporation (IFFI),
in its subsidiary capacity as employer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents could sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary
liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the
pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioners employee.
HELD:
No. Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, the injured
party may bring a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires
only a preponderance of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), the Court
held that Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil
liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil
liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal
case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and
found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought
against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee
is premature.

Marcia vs Court of Appeals
120 scra 7
FACTS:
On December 23, 1956, in the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated
by private respondent Victory Liner and driven by its employee, private respondent
Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia resulting in the latters death
and physical injuries to petitioners Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. The driver was
prosecuted for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence but was
acquitted. A civil case against accused was instituted based on the criminal action case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not civil case would prosper if the same was based on a criminal case wherein
the accused was acquitted.
HELD:
No. The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the CA in the criminal action on the
ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not
exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident was a bar to the civil action for
damages for the death of Clemente Marcia which action was based upon the same criminal
negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action.

Ruiz vs Ucul
153 scra 14
FACTS:
Instead of appealing civil aspects of the case, Atty. Ruiz filed a separate case for damages
based on the same facts on which a libel case litigated earlier but was dismissed. The
accused, Encarnacion Ucul filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed
and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. The
trial court dismissed the case on grounds of res judicata. On appeal, the CA certified the
lower courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case or
libel.
HELD:
No. The plaintiff-appellants contentions have no merit. The right of the plaintiff-appellant
to file the civil action for damages based on the same facts upon which he instituted the
libel case is not without limitation.

Barredo vs Garcia
73 Phil 607
FACTS:
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing
the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla
and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted.
After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the taxi
(employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of
employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his
liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against
Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD:
No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right
to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC
judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven
that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had
had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him something he failed to
overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for
damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own
negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).

Jose vs Court of Appeals
January 18, 2000
FACTS:
A collision between two vehicles, a red Ford Escort and an MCL bus. The driver and a
passenger, John Macarubo and Rommel Abraham respectively, were seriously injured and
their car severely damaged. The former lapsed into coma and died five days later. A
criminal case was filed and subsequently civil case was also filed against the bus company
wherein the information alleges that the bus driver was negligent as it was overtaking
another vehicle. It seeks to recover damages for injuries as well as to properties. The
appellate court however discredited the evidence of the complainant based on witness
testimonies that the Ford escort usurped the lane on the bus. Further, the testimony of the
witness pointed to a mechanical defect of the former which deemed the car not
roadworthy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case would prosper.
HELD:
No. Private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence against the bus driver
and were acquitted in the case for criminal negligence. Since the civil case was based on the
same incident the court dismissed the case.

BELTRAN VS PEOPLE
June 20, 2000
FACTS:
After 24 years of marriage and four children, Meynardo Beltran filed a petition for nullity of
marriage due to psychological incapacity. In answer to the said petition, petitioners wife
Charmaine Felix complained of concubinage and subsequently filed a criminal case against
the husband. Petitioner now argues that pendency of the declaration of nullity of his
marriage posed a prejudicial question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of the petitioners marriage is a prejudicial
question.
HELD:
No. The court averred that petitioners contentions are untenable. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The pendency of the
case for declaration of nullity of petitioners of marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case because the facts in the latter case are not based on the former for the
guilt of the petitioner-accused is determined.

City of Pasig vs COMELEC
September 10, 1999
FACTS:
There are two petitions which question the property of the suspension of plebiscite
proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between Municipality
of Cainta and the City of Pasig. The gist of the problem is that on two Barangays namely
Karangalan and Napico are claimed both.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangay Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between
the two local governments.
HELD:
Yes. The COMELEC declared that the plebiscite held to ratify the creation of the Barangay
Napico was null and void until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute
between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta.

Diaz vs Merced
109 Phil 155
FACTS:
Abundio Merced was married to Eufricina Tan and without such marriage having
been legally dissolved; he contracted a second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. Facing
bigamy charges by the latter, petitioner alleged force and intimidation by relatives of
Elizabeth forced him into marriage and filed for annulment. He also raised the issue of
prejudicial question
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question to the
prosecution for bigamy.
HELD:
Yes. The civil action must be decided first before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed
(before the new Family Code took effect). Since the validity of the second marriage, subject
of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case, and since prosecution
for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is
necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all
the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.

Donato vs Luna
160 scra 441
FACTS:
Leonilo C. Donato was married to Rosalinda Malupig and without such marriage having
been legally dissolved; he contracted a second marriage with Paz Abayan. Facing bigamy
charges by the latter, petitioner alleged force, intimidation and undue influence employed
by Paz which forced him into marriage. A complaint of annulment of the second marriage
was instituted on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. He is raising
the issue of prejudicial question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question to the
prosecution for bigamy.
HELD:
No. The court averred that the requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case
at bar. The nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donatos guilt
or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's 2nd wife, the herein
private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the 2nd marriage
on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Geluz vs Court of Appeals
2 scra 801
FACTS:
On two occasions, the wife of the respondent with his knowledge had an abortion at the
clinic of the petitioner. However a subsequent third abortion wherein he did not know or
gave consent constituted the plaintiffs basis in filing action for award and damages. He
claimed damages as a result of the death of a two month old fetus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be recovery for damages resulting to the death or abortion of an
unborn child.
HELD:
No. The cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child but the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on
that lacked judicial personality. Furthermore, there is no basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the husband's indifference to the previous abortions clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affection.

CATALAN VS BASA
G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007
FACTS:
Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service because
h e w a s unfit to render military service. T h i s w a s d u e t o t h e f a c t t h a t
h e w a s suffering from Schizophrenia. O n S e p t . 2 8 , 1 9 4 9 , h e m a r r i e d
C o r a z o n Cerezo. O n J u n e 1 6 , 1 9 5 1 , F e l i c i a n o a l l e g e d l y d o n a t e d t o
his sister Mercedes Catalan o n e - h a l f o f h i s r e a l
p r o p e r t y . T h e remaining half of the property remained under
Felicianos Name. T h e P e o p l e s B a n k a n d T r u s t C o m p a n y (Presently known
as BPI) was appointeda s t h e g u a r d i a n o f F e l i c i a n o d u e t o h i s
incompetency. O n N o v e m b e r 2 2 , 1 9 7 8 , F e l i c i a n o a n d C o r a z o n
d o n a t e d L o t s 1 a n d 3 o f t h e i r property to their son Eulogio Catalan. O n
M a r c h 2 6 , 1 9 7 9 , M e r c e d e s s o l d t h e property in issue in favor of her
children Delia and Jesus Basa.
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon d o n a t e d L o t 2 t o t h e i r c h i l d r e n

A l e x a n , Librada and Zenaida Catalan and Feb. 14, 1983, they also donated Lot 4 to
Eulogio and Florida Catalan. BPI filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Possession and O w n e r s h i p , a s w e l l a s d a m a g e s a g a i n s t the
respondents. BPO contends that Feliciano wasnt in the s o u n d m i n d u p o n g i v i n g
c o n s e n t o n t h e donation given to Mercedes and therefore it should be nullified. They
also contend that Mercedes had no right to sell the property to anyone. The petition
of BPI was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
ISSUE:
Is the donation made by Feliciano in favor of Mercedes valid?
HELD:
Yes. S C a f f i r m e d t h e r u l i n g o f t h e a p p e l l a t e court. What is crucial in a donation
is the donors capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. The evidence presented
by the petitioners was not sufficient to prove that Feliciano w a s
i n c o m p e t e n t w h e n h e m a d e t h e donation. A p e r s o n s u f f e r i n g f r o m
S c h i z o p h r e n i a does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligibly dispose his
property. The proof of Felicianos infirmity to give c o n s e n t w a s o n l y
established when the Court of First Instance declared him an
incompetent on December 22, 1953. This was years after he made the donation.

Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
October 17, 2001
FACTS:
Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land including the house and warehouse on
oneparcel. She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and
Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives amounting to P850.00. The petitioners
Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her closest
surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth, force
and intimidation, and refused to vacate the same. The respondent filed a complaint for
reinvindicacion against petitioners. The petitioners stated that the sale was spurious and
they are the legitimate owner of the land being the nearest kin of Paulina. The respondents
shown a carbon copy of the deed of sale not bearing the signature of Paulina only alleges
thumb mark of the latter and the deed was tainted with alterations, defects and
irregularities. The trial court found the deed fake and rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioners. The appellate court, however, reversed the decision and declared the
respondents the owner of the properties. On appeal, the petitioners asserted that there was
abundant evidence at the time of the execution of the sale, the deceased was already senile.
She could have not consented to the sale by merely imprinting her thumb mark on the
deed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the vendor has the capacity to act on the alleged sale of her property.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial court. There is a serious doubt
that the seller consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. The time of the
execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile.
She died an octogenarian barely over a year when the deed was allegedly executed but
before copies of the deed were entered in the registry. The general rule is that a person is
not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical
infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as
to prevent the person from properly, intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights
then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows
that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated
physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in
bed.

MENDEZONA , vs. OZAMIZ
February 6, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that petitioner spouses Mario Mendezona and Teresita Mendezona own
a parcel of land which they bought from Carmen Ozamiz. They initiated the suit to remove a
cloud on their respective titles of ownership caused by the inscription thereon of the notice
of lis pendens which came about as a result of an incident in a special proceeding for
guardianship over the person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz initiated by respondents
Julio Ozamiz, Jose Ozamiz, Paz Montalvan, and Ma. Terresa Zarraga,Carlos Fortich, Jose Roz,
Paulita Rodriguez and Lourdes Lon. The respondents alleged that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86
years old, after an illness on July1987, had become disoriented and could no longer take
care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing health, weak mind and
absent-mindedness. Both parties agreed that Carmen needed a guardian over her person
and her properties. Thus, as guardians, respondent Roberto Montalvan and Julio Ozamiz
filed their Inventories and Accounts of Carmens properties and other assets including the
parcel of land bought by the petitioners. Roberto and Julio caused the inscription on the
titles of petitioners a notice of lis pendens thus giving rise to the suit for quieting of titles
filed by petitioners. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners; however, the
appellate court reversed it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Carmen Ozamiz was of sound mind thus capacitated to contract with the
petitioners regarding the sale of a certain parcel of land.
HELD:
Yes. A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the condition is
presumed to continue to exist, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Competency and
freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts
executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. The respondents sought to
impugn only one document, namely, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989,
executed by Carmen Ozamiz. However, there are nine (9) other important documents that
were, signed by Carmen Ozamiz either before or after April 28, 1989 which were not
assailed by the respondents. Such is contrary to their assertion of complete incapacity of
Carmen Ozamiz to handle her affairs since 1987. We agree with the trial courts assessment
that "it is unfair for the [respondents] to claim soundness of mind of Carmen Ozamiz when
it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages them." Thus, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

People vs Bayotas
263 scra 239
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on
June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the
National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court
in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability
arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of the accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability. Counsel for the accused-appellant on the
other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that death of the accused
while judgment of the conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his
civil liability.
HELD:
Yes. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollary, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) Quasi-delicts.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained above, an action for recovery therefore may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Sec.1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Finally, the
private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. Applying this set of rules the court ruled that the death of appellant Bayotas

extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained
of, rape. Consequently, the appeal was hereby dismissed.

Marcos vs. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda Romualdez Marcos was born in a town in the first Congressional district of Leyte.
She then migrated to Manila when her parents decided to live in the said place. She was
married to the then President Ferdinand Marcos, and consequently, lived in Ilocos. After
several years, and upon returning to her birth place, she ran as a congresswoman in the
first district of Leyte. Her opponent in that position was Cirilo Roy Montejo. The case
started when Montejo asked the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos for allegedly lacking the
one-year residency requirement mandated by the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Montejo
claimed the former First Lady placed her residency in the first district of the province at
seven months preceding the balloting, which entailed that she lacked five months of the
required residency. Marcos argued that she has been a resident of the area since childhood
and has not abandoned her residency. The poll body disqualified her, and as a consequence,
she appealed it to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos is a resident of the First District of Leyte, and could run for
and could be elected to a Congressional seat.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Mrs. Imelda Marcos is a resident of the first District of
Leyte and could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat. This is based on the
ground that Mrs. Marcos is still a resident of that place and did not actually lack the
requirements of those persons who could run a Congressional seat. Mrs. Marcos lived in
Manila and in Ilocos for a long time and only went back to her town and lived there for only
seven months prior to the election but she did not really intended to abandon her birth
place. This was proved by the frequent visits that she had in that place. Mrs. Marcos is said
to have her domicile of her choice and of origin in Leyte. Yes, she did left Leyte but had
shown that her choice of residence was Leyte, as proved by her visits. Therefore, Mrs.
Marcos could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat on the First District of
Leyte.

Aruego Jr. vs Court of Appeals
264 scra 711
Facts:
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged
the sister Evelyn Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was
opposed by the legitimate children of Jose Aruego Jr.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was then
filed alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988
shall have a retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on
the ground of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the case.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect in so
far as the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the vested rights of
respondents to have her case be decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. It is a well
settled reception that laws shall have a retroactive effect unless it would impair vested
rights. Therefore, the Family Code in this case cannot be given a retroactive effect.

Bernabe vs Alejo
374 scra 180
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son
was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on
August 13, 1993 leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Thereafter, Carolina in behalf
of Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.
The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code,
the death of the putative father had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled
that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate
son of Fiscal Bernabe since the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article
283 of the Civil Code. Hence, appeal was interposed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.
HELD:
Yes. Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil
Code is a substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition
within 4 years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or
take Adrians right to file an action for recognition because that right had already vested
prior to its enactment

ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR
22 June 2006
FACTS:
In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada requested
Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pias
City, for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for
living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in
arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the
image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might
appear that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with
committing disgraceful and immoral conduct under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec.
46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code. Respondent Escritor testified that when she
entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.
She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of
marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with
another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son.] But as a member of
the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.For
Jehovahs Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes
there salting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in
countries where divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovahs
congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple cannot
secure the civil authorities approval of the marital relationship because of legal
impediments. Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the
Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of
practice, the marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses commission of
adultery are investigated before the declarations are executed.
ISSUE:
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, in
asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral
conduct, may the respondent be held administratively liable?

HELD: No. the court finds that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has
made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of
religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms -
including religious freedom - may been joyed. In the area of religious exercise as a
preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state,
and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will
erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a
showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

ANCHETA vs ANCHETA
March 4, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5,
1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent
and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-
sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a resort in
Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was already
residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at
Las Pias, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted
service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in
default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial
court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order declaring as void ab initio her
marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her
person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his
petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be
heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid?
HELD:
NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule
18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and
rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default.
The Supreme Court reiterates: The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance.
The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.
Petition is GRANTED.

People vs Borromeo
133 scra 106
FACTS:
At high noon of July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo
reported to the mother of Susana that Susana was shouting for help because Elias was
killing her. The child also informed Geronimo, Susanas brother about the incident hearing
the childs report, Geronimo informed his father and together they went to Susanas hut. By
peeping through the bamboo slats at the wall, they saw Susana motionless beside her is
their one month old child crying. Susanas father called for the police, they found Susana
already dead. Accused-appellant contends that he was not legally and validly married to the
deceased because there was no marriage contract executed therefore he could only be
liable for homicide and not parricide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-execution of a marriage contract renders a marriage void.
HELD:
No. Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed to be in fact married.
There is a presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to
each other and the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage for as long as in the celebration, all requisites of validity are present.

Corpus vs Corpus
85 scra 567
FACTS:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 29, 1939. Yangco had no forced heirs. At the
time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half
sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Osssorio, (3) Amelia Corpus, Jose A.V. Corpus and
Ramon l. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus and (4) Juana (Juanita)
Corpus. The daughter of his half brother Jose Corps, Juanita died in October, 1944. Teodoro
R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas
Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with
Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose corpus. On
October 6, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the CFI
of Manila to recover bar supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his
complaint that the dispositions in Yangcos will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon
alienation rendered it void under Article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949
partition is invalid and therefore, the descendants estate should be distributed according
to the rules on intestacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juliana Corpus the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal heir of
Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mothers supposed intestate
share in Yangcos estate?
HELD:
Yes. It is disputably presumed that a man and a women deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, that a child born in Lawful
wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bad and board, is legitimate, and that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life. Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and
since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we
hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed
hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangcos estate.

RIVERA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
February 15, 1990
FACTS:
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera
died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the
deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancios
estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera. Who
denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father
and did not die interstate but in fact left two holographic wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Rivera was the legitimate son of the deceased Venancio Rivera.
HELD:
No. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage the legitimacy of
children. Even in the absence of any certificate of marriage or other documentary proof of
the existence of marriage, the law presumes a man and woman cohabiting with each other
as being married, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Based on this unrefuted legal
presumption, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in
question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his
opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The
testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr. who authenticated the wills as having been
written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

Abadilla vs. Tabilaran
October 25, 1995
FACTS:
Respondent had been scandalously and openly living with Priscilla Baybayan as early as
1970 and begot three children all surnamed Tabiliran even while respondents marriage to
his first wife was still valid and subsisting. Respondents contention is that his first wife left
the conjugal home in 1966. And since then and until the present her whereabouts is not
known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25 years
had already elapsed since the disappearance of his first wife when he married Priscilla
Baybayan in 1986. That he represented himself as single because that is what best fits to
him since the words to choose from were widow, single and divorced. That besides both he
and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein in his former marriage to Banzuela was
honestly divulged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents marriage to Priscilla is valid.
HELD:
No. Article 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven years, it
being known whether or not the absentee is still lives, the absent shall be deemed dead for
all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By
respondents own allegation, his first wife left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time
on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla in 1970, only 4 years had
elapsed. The respondent had no right to presume therefore that his first was already dead
for all-purposes. Thus, respondents actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in
1970 when his marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross
immortal conduct. The SC said, it makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of
marriage as a basic social institution.

Dela Rosa vs Heirs
G.R. No. 103028. October 10, 1997
FACTS:
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, Vda. De Danao filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado, who died on
September 8, 1972, and Dr. Guillermo Rustia who died on February 28, 1974. The petition
was filed by Luisa Delgado on behalf of the surviving sisters, brothers, nephews, nieces and
grand-nephews and grand-nieces of Josefa Delgado. With the permission of the trial court,
Guillerma S. Rustia-(Alaras) was allowed to intervene in the proceedings upon her
assertion of the status of an acknowledged natural child, and thus, the only surviving child
and sole heir, of Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia.
On April 3, 1978, Luisa Delgado filed an Amended Petition for Latters of

Administration, this time alleging that the deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
had been living continuously as husband and wife, but without the benefit of marriage.
On March 14, 1988, herein petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa was
substituted for her sister, the petitioner Luisa Vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18,
1987. On May 11, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision appointing herein
petitioner Carlota Vda. De Dela Rosa as administrator of the estates of the two mentioned
deceased. Private respondents appealed the decision of the court but they failed to comply
with to prescribed period of filing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deceased Josefa Delgado was legally married to Dr. Guillermo
Rustia.
HELD:
Yes. Needless to state, it s presumed in our jurisdiction that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Absence of record of marriage of Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia is not enough to
overcome the validity of their marriage. Thus, all doubts must be solve in favor of the
marriage.

Eugenio vs. Velez
May 17, 1990
FACTS:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and
sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in
1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palatial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any
legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years
of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the
body of Vitaliana (who had died on28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her
common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private respondents
(Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way related to
Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking
Articles 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the
Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An
exchange of pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art.
294of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification;
hence, inthe absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas.
HELD:
No. There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The
Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But
this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of
the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring
to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis--vis Vitaliana was not
a lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.

Garcia Vda. De Chua vs. Court of Appeals
March 5, 1998
FACTS:
Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two illegitimate
sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death
of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the
guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors.
Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the
decedent being his wife; and that he decedent was a resident of Davao City and not
Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said
matters. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the
evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of
Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of
Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that
he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed
in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the
decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court
ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This
was latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of
marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in
holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the
lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the
petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports
and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has
submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage
was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that
he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the
photo stat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the
best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original
marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented.
Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious.

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 174689October 22, 2007
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8,
alleging that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling
trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a woman culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and
was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female.On June 4,
2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating that granting the
petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity; that with
his sexual re-assignment, petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman,
now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans
body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the
court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fianc and the realization of
their dreams. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG,
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing
the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23,
2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, and set aside the
decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of petitioners name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and
RA9048.
HELD:
No. Civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit
since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these

reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the
change of his first name was concerned. NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN
THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO SEX ONTHE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT. The
determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so
far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.

REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appears that
Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare
medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who,
in addition, explained that "Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes
male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male
and female." The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of sex or gender and name of respondent is valid.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The
Supreme Court made use of the available evidence presented in court including the fact
that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the
doctor that Cagandahan's body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which
is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.

DONATO vs. LUNA
April 15, 1988
FACTS:
On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado
Cantor, filed information for bigamy against Leonila Donato with the Court of First
Instance. The private respondent filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner. Respondent had no previous knowledge of petitioners existing
marriage to Rosalinda Maluping. Donato interposed in her answer the defense that his
second marriage was void and since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by respondent. Petitioner
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case contending that the civil case
seeking the annulment of the second marriage raise a prejudicial question which must be
determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
HELD:
No. Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial question because a case for annulment of
marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question on the condition that it must be
proven that the petitioners consent to the marriage was obtained through intimidation,
violence and undue influence in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage
was done involuntarily. In the petitioners argument that the second marriage should have
been declared null and void on the ground of force, intimidation and violence allegedly
employed against him by respondent only sometime later cannot be considered relevant.

WIEGEL vs. SEMPIO-DIY
FACTS:
Herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
(celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati,
Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant
therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the
ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in
Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed
that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having
been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue
agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of
force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an
opportunity to present evidence-
(1) That the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first
husband; and
(2) That the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to
someone else.
ISSUE:
WON lilias first marriage is void.
HELD:
The petition is devoid of merit.There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be
so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore
valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she
married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES JR.
FACTS:
Lupo Atienza lived together with Yolanda de Castro with whom he has two children. He
purchased a house in Bel-Air, Makati where his family stayed. He stays there too whenever
hes in Manila. In Dec., 1991, he was surprised to see Manila Metropolitan Trial Court Judge
Francisco Brillantes sleeping on his bed. Their boy informed him that Brillantes had been
cohabiting with de Castro. Later on, Brillantes prevented him from visiting his children. He
claims that Brillantes is married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children.
Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality & Appearance of Impropriety against
Brillantes.
Brillantes claims that his marriage to Ongkiko is not valid because of lack of marriage
license. According to him, Ongkiko abandoned him 19 years ago leaving their children with
him. He claims that he believed that he was single when he married de Castro because his
first marriage was void.
ISSUE:
WON Brillantes can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity.
HELD:
FC Art. 40: judicial declaration of nullity of previous marriage is needed before one can
enter into a second marriage. Rule has retroactive effect thus applicable to Brillantes even
if he got married under the Civil Code.. Bad faith and sinister motives of Brillantes proven
by his marriage to Ongkiko. They underwent two ceremonies however he never got a
license. Then, he immorally and illegally cohabited with de Castro. Not fit for the judiciary.

BESO VS. DAGUMAN
FACTS:
The Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority by Beso. In the
Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, the complainant charged judge with
solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy
and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar with
the following facts:
(a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainants fiance, Bernardito A. Yman,
got married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondents residence in
Calbayog City, Samar;
(b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant;
(c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire
regarding her Marriage Contract. The complainant found out that her marriage was not
registered;
(d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all
the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent.
The respondent averred with the following rationale:
(a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the complainant
and Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the complainant
deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy;
(b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not too
expensive and complicated for citizens to get married;
(c) Respondents failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman
absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
(d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.
ISSUE;
WON the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction; and
HELD;
The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Family Code
provides that marriage may be solemnized by, Any incumbent member of the judiciary
with the courts jurisdiction. In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the Family Code,
there are only three instances with which a judge may solemnize a marriage outside of his
jurisdiction:
(1.1) when either or both the contracting parties are at the point of death;
(1.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(1.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect.
In this case, none of the three instances is present.

ALCANTARA vs. ALCANTARA
FACTS;
Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita alleging that on 8 Dec
1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila
City Hall for the purpose of looking for a fixer who could arrange a marriage for them
before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went
through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage
was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage
license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as
neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived
separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage
contract and its entry on file. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the
Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has
three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution
for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE:
WON their marriage is valid.
HELD:
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn
the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a
marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case,
the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to
whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario,
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Petitioner,
in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that
there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do
not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of

marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The
presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law
or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.

SEVILLA vs. CARDENAS
FACTS:
On 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May
1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the
father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said
Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his
supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any
Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime
were married civilly on 19 May 1969, and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May
19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered
with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from
invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
ISSUE:
WON there is a valid marriage license.
HELD:
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar
where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second
certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the
logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the
said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or
falsity of entries therein. Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The
courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several
years producing two offspring, now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he

filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual
sometime in 1991. We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
deceit and perfidy.

ARANES vs. OCCIANA
FACTS:
Aranes filed charges against judge Salvador Occiano of the municipal circuit trial court of
Batalan, Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano solemnized aranes
marriage without the requisite marriage license the latters house which is outside the
latters jurisdiction. Aranes was not able to claim her right to inherit his deceased
husbands pension and property. Occiano avers that the ceremony took place in aranes
house because the groom had a difficulty walking and he couldnt stand traveling. The
judge was aware that there was no marriage license but due to the pleas of the couple and
everything was prepared already and the visitors were there, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage. He reminded them that marriage wont be valid without the license. They
promised to give it within tha day but they never did. Aranes desisted but the court still
decided the case.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage is valid

.
HELD:
Judge can only solemnize marriage within their territorial jurisdiction. Marriage license is a
requisite for marriage and without it, marriage would be void. It is the marriage license
that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize the marriage. And since there
was no license, Occiano did not have the authority to officiate the marriage.

TOMASA VDA DE JACOB vs. CA
FACTS;
Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.
Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administrator for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.
Respondent Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo, purportedly supported by an Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya,
CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of
Pedro Pilapil. Pedro sought to intervene during the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of Alfredo, claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and
sole surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of the marriage between
Appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant claims that the marriage
between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP,
Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of
the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenary for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa
presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
Several irregularities on there constructed Marriage Contract were observed by the court
such as: (1) no copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the
solemnizing officer; (2) a mere thumb mark was purportedly placed by the late Alfredo
Jacob on said reconstructed marriage contract on 16 September 1975 (date of the
marriage), instead of his customary signature as affixed in their Sworn Affidavit; (3)
inconsistencies in the circumstances and personalities surrounding the lost Marriage
Contract mentioned in the affidavit executed by Msgr. Yllana and in the testimony admitted
by the appellant; and (4) appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported
marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was
allegedly solemnized. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-
appellee Pilapil, sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased
Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent.
The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage between the plaintiff and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was indeed valid
HELD:
.

The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid. Pilapils claim that the
marriage was void due to absence of a marriage license was misplaced. An affidavit
executed by the appellant and the late Dr. Jacob that they lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years exempted them from the marriage license requirement (Article
76 of the Civil Code).Also misplaced was Pilapils argument that the marriage was void
because of the absence of a marriage contract and the absence of entry of such in the Books
of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar and in the National Census and Statistics Office. A
marriage contract is the best evidence of a marriage ceremony. However, the contents of a
document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided
that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction.
Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the
marriage contract. In the instant case, appellant provided competent evidence to prove
that a marriage ceremony was solemnized between her and the late Dr.Jacob. Such
evidence was supplied by appellant Tomasa, witness Adela Pilapil and the solemnizing
officer Msgr. Yllana through their sworn testimonies both in open court and in writing, and
through the photographs taken during the ceremony. The absence of an entry pertaining to
1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National
Census and Statistics Office (NCSO) does not invalidate the marriage. It is primary duty of
the solemnizing officer, not the petitioner, to send a copy of the marriage certificate to
these offices in order to be duly recorded.
In the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. As the fact that Dr. Jacob and appellant Tomasa lived together
as husband and wife was not disputed in this case, but was in fact even accepted, it would
follow that the presumption of marriage was not likewise rebutted.

ARTURIO TRINIDAD vs. FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES
TRINIDAD,respondents.
FACTS:
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of
Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein,
claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of
Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died
in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes
and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three
(3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but
the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son
of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he
died in 1941, before plaintiffs birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with
them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their
possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a
share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely,
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named
children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23).
Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-
mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he be given
the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but defendants refused.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of
his parents.
HELD:
Petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad) without objection from private
respondents -- a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes legitimate child.
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side
outweighs that of the adverse party. Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written)
ruling of the trial court, Respondent Courts holding that petitioner failed to prove his
legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance

of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case,
including the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts, the
probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their
personal credibility. Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly held
that the weight of evidence was in petitioners favor. Doctrinally, a collateral attack on
filiations is not permitted. Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present
evidence of his filiations and of his parents marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule
on the application of this doctrine to petitioners cause.

REPUBLIC vs. CA
FACTS:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas
personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract
itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting
parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she
was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted
only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro
gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put
in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her
lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas
prior to the celebration of their marriage. She now filed a certification to establish the
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between
the parties.
ISSUE:
WON there is a valid marriage license.
HELD:
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage
void ab initio. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody
of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a

specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data.
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due
search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license
no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her
petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness
to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will
be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a
city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage"
a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting
parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially
unknown to the parents of the former. In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the
case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro
sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

SY vs. CA
FACTS:
Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in Caloocan City, where he was residing, leaving
behind substantial real and personal properties here in the Philippines. Petition for letters
of administration filed by his natural children, was opposed on the ground that Sy Kiat was
legally married to Yao Kee, in Fookien, China on 1/13/31 and that the oppositors are the
legitimate children. The probate court rendered judgment in favor of the oppositors; this
was modified and set aside by the CA w/c held that both sets of children were
acknowledged natural children. Both parties moved for partial reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage is valid
HELD:
For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the
marriage in accordance w/ said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any
competent evidence relative to the law and customs of China on marriage. The testimonies
of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage
not only bec. they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that
they are competent to testify on the subject matter.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom
must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence." On this score the Court had
occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court
of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact." The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign
custom.
CARINO vs. CARINO

FACTS:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In
1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior
to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In
1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim
the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to

collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with
SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the
said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid
marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found
out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE:
WON the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD:
The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the
same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries
earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is
entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void.
This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no
impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that
everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally
contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party
notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

MORIGO vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while
but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became
sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991
she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo
married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on
the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy
and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with
Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good
faith.
ISSUE:
WON Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before
his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just
merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the
nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he
did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

MORENO vs. BERNABE
FACTS;
Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married before the respondent Judge
Jose Bernabe on October 4, 1993 but did not process the papers for the marriage contract.
The complainant at that time was pregnant and begged to the judge to have her and her
husband to be married by him. The complainant then filed a complaint allegedly for
deceiving her that the marriage is valid.
ISSUE;
WON that a Judge who held a wedding without issuing a marriage contract should be held
liable even if the complaint had expressly withdrawn by the complainant.
HELD;
Even with the withdrawal of the complainant against the respondent the Supreme Court
insisted that it should still be dealt with accordingly as the accused was a member of the
judiciary and a conduct of a higher level were expected. The judge displayed ignorance of
the law which is unacceptable for his position and is therefore
fined with 10, 000.00 pesos and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act
should be punished severely.

NAVARRO vs.. DUMAGTOY
FACTS;
Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has submitted evidence in
relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the
wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom
is merely separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an
affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven
years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it
is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy
counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the
parties.
ISSUE:
WON Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
HELD:
Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan
did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptive
death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife. Whether
wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted
the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to
hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride
NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision
is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas and the solicitor general
Facts:
Gerbert Corpuz (Gerbert) was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. He later married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas
(Daisy). Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding because of his work. He returned
after 4 months to surprise Daisy, but discovered that she was having an affair with another
man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, Canada granted his petition for divorce. Two years
after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Gerbert went to the Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisys marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) informed him that the marriage between him and Daisy still subsists under
Philippine law. To be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO Circular.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisy did not file any responsive pleading and offered
no opposition to the petition. In fact, Daisy alleged her desire to file a similar case but was
prevented by financial constrains. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
The RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was NOT THE PROPER
PARTY to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
NATURALIZED CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of
the remedy, under Art. 26, of the Family Code.
Issue:
WON Art. 26, extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Held:
The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the FILIPINO SPOUSE.

SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos.
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad Rodolfo sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the
Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this
would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.
ISSUE:
WON Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous.
HELD:
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition
as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It
held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)

accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the
Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

REPUBLIC vs. ESOY
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
on certiorari praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming
the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy (respondent) and Ada
Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36 On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada
Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, in the
same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus
learned that Felly married an American and had a child. Felly went back to the Philippines
on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children in which
she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fellys acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological
incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their
marriage contract, and the invitation where Felly used her new husbands last name as
evidences. Felly denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer,
had no job and that since 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our
laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the
CA.
ISSUE:
WON abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. Finally, Article 36 is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.

RECIO vs. RECIO
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However,
an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage
of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at our lady
of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while
they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with
Editha Samson.
ISSUE:
WON the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove
his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was
valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.
However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign
document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not
authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either an official publication or a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be: accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper

diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition
and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in
favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later
replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan
children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be
the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent
and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private
respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due
notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without
the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for
resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
ISSUE:
WON the divorce decree should considered.
HELD:
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried.
She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. To this, petitioner replied that Arturo

was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained. Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial
court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely
applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling
in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. That aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She
prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed the motion but failed
to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. The trial court did not grant private
respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding
that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the
Philippines." It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied
with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt
persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The
trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was
no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable
and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO III
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with
a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In
1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter
filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration
but it was denied.
ISSUE:
WON Orbecido can remarry under Art 26 of the FC.
HELD:
In view of the foregoing, the SC states the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows: There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still
barred from remarrying.

VAN DORN vs. RAMILLO
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their
residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in
Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners business in Manila
is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business
and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the
certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
WON the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
HELD:
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys
court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.

PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20,
1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia
as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though
in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained
a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under
the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture
that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCANO
FACTS:
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course
without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The
marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they
insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration
because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually,
their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a
decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also
married an American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos
parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him
hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not
grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00
worth of counter-claim by the Escaos.
ISSUE:
WON damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar
HELD
Tenchavez marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not
result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to
annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the
US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove
that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his
P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left
without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and
Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral
damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents.On the part of
Escaos parents. It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against
the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused
them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present
society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court
below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair.
The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

NAVARRO vs. DUMAGTOY
FACTS:
Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has submitted evidence in
relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the
wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom
is merely separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an
affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven
years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it
is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy
counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the
parties.
ISSUE:
WON Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
HELD:
Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan
did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptive
death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife. Whether
wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted
the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to
hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride
NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision
is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.

MALLION vs. ALCANTARA
FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition1 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended,
otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondents alleged psychological incapacity.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC
denied the petition in a decision dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner
"failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking."
The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution dated
June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12,
1999 another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City,
this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer
with a motion to dismiss dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on
the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC
granted respondents motion to dismiss. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also
denied in an order dated January 21, 2000.Hence, and this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage is valid.
HELD:
Petitioner is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both
petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These
grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that
holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner
and respondents marriage. Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the
marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the
alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner
impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance
with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage
license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier
case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and
received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter

which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have
been adjudged in that case.
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to
obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties
must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another
action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and
financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all
over again.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein.

COJUANGCO, JR., vs. PALMA
FACTS:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s. Complainant was a client of Angara
Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to
handle his cases. Owing to his growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire
respondent as his personal counsel. Consequently, respondents relationship with
complainants family became intimate. He traveled and dined with them abroad. He
frequented their house and even tutored complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa
Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption.
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family, respondent married Lisa
in Hongkong. It was only the next day that respondent informed complainant and assured
him that "everything is legal." Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that
respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant
found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions. Immediately,
complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and
discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.
Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent
requested from his (complainants) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with
stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented himself as "bachelor" before the
Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c) respondent was married
to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and
Eduardo Lorenzo.
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay
City a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa,
docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the Decision4 dated November 2, 1982, the CFI
declared the marriage null and void ab initio.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage is valid.
HELD:
Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet
been determined by the court with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the
present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent judgment of annulment
of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re
Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal
but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the
acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,

then the judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not also exonerate him
from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear
preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is
met, then liability attaches.

MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been
married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four
children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda
Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void
and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in
their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or
communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE:
WON the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an
existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under
Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their
marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their
subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation
with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage

NINAL vs. BAYADOG
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito
to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at
least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident
on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of
marriage license.
ISSUE:
WON the second marriage of Pepito was void?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot
be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at
least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma
is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It
can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage.

COSCA vs. PALAYPAYON
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server).
Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-
Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of
a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying
the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo
& Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio
Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the
marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of
the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage
contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order
to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with
the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because
Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are
not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay &
Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in
the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid
embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the
other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs
taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya
declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization

and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as
husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs,
judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up
to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to
believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between
Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage
license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint
affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years
already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs
2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already
before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been
less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe.
Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the
marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the
formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

JARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS;
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated November 11, 2009 and
respondent's Comment thereto dated March 5, 2010.
In the Decision dated September 29, 2009, the Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for
bigamy. Petitioner is moving for reconsideration of the Decision, arguing that since
petitioner's marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the
applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the
Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a
person may contract a subsequent marriage.
ISSUE;
WON the subsequent marriage is bigamous.
HELD:
Petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy
was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court
of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference. As held in
Tenebro, [s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage

MACARRUBO v MACARRUBO
FACTS:
Florence Macarrubo by herself and on behalf of her 2 children files a complaint for
disbarment against Edmundo Macarrubo alleging that Edmundo deceived her into
marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.Florence
further averred that Edmundo entered into a 3rd marriage with Josephine Constantino;
and that he abandoned Florence without providing them w/ regular support . Edmundo
denied the allegations, insisting instead that complainant Florence was fully aware of his
prior subsisting marriage, but that Florence dragged Edmundo against his will to a 'sham
wedding'. Edmundo submitted the decision of RTC declaring his marriage to complainant
void ab initio. Edmundo claimed that he left complainant and their 2 children w/ her
consent.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage is void.
.HELD:
Facts show that while Edmundo has a subsisting marriage w/ Helen Esparza s/ whom he
had 2 children, he entered into a2nd marriage with complainant. While the marriage
between complainant Florence and Edmundo has been annulled by final judgment, this
does not cleanse his conduct of impropriety. Even assuming arguendo that Edmundo was
coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress has ceased after wedding day. Edmundo
having freely cohabited with her and even begot a 2nd child. The decision of RTC annulling
their marriage is not res judicata on the final resolution of this case.

TENEBRO vs. CA
FACTS:
Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that
he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain
Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas
countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no
record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared
void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE:
WON Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD:
The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

VILLALUZ, vs. MIJARES
FACTS:
Through a verified letter-complaint dated 12 September 1995, retired Justice of the Court
of Appeals Onofre A. Villaluz charged Judge Priscilla C. Mijares, incumbent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, with dishonesty, corrupt practices, grave
misconduct and immorality, allegedly committed as xxxxxxx. Judge Mijares made a false
declaration of her residence as at No. 869 Pestaas Street, Pasay City, in her application for
Marriage License No. 0572927 accomplished as of December 20, 1993, on the strength of
which she contracted a sham marriage with me, solemnized by Judge Myrna Lim Verano of
Carmona, Cavite, a former trial fiscal in her sala; her purpose in procuring such sham
"marriage" with me, was to use the same as a defense to charges of immorality brought
against her by one Joseph Ligorio Naval before the Supreme Court. Anent the third
accusation, respondent staunchly denied that she made a false declaration regarding her
residence in the proceedings she filed for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband Primitivo Mijares.
ISSUE:
WON Mijares contracted a bigamous marriage.
HELD:
The falsities attributed to Judge Mijares in these charges have not, therefore, been
substantiated. The complainant has not refuted her assertion that she considered Manila as
her residence at one time because that was where her husband established their family
residence. She treats Pasay City and Quezon City as her present places of residence since
the former is where she has been working up to now as a judge and where she had lived
when still a student and the latter is where she goes home after her work. In this
connection, in distinguishing domicile from residence, it has been held that, "It is . . . quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residence in various places." So, she
could have acted in utmost good faith in filing her petition for the declaration of the
presumptive death of her husband with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for it was in
Manila where her husband was declared presumptively dead, she could no longer consider
Manila as a place of residence; hence, when she applied for a marriage license to marry the
complainant, she filed it with Pasay City where she works and which she presently treats as
a place of residence aside from Quezon City. Complainant's charge has not been sufficiently
substantiated. We find adequate respondent's testimony that it was at this address that her
husband Primitivo Mijares resided and this was where respondent and her husband
established their family residence after getting married and before the latter's unfortunate
disappearance.

LEONCIA BALOGBOG AND GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners, v.s
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older
brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for
partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate
children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third
share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
Petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino
died single and without issue in their parents residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In
the beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold to them by their
mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.
Witnesses then testified that they attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime
in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated in the Catholic Church of
Asturias, Cebu and and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the
witnesses.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. She testified that after the
wedding, she was handed a receipt, presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as,
but it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon
and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after
an illness at the age of six. She stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common
law relation with a man for a year and then they separated.
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified that Gavino
died single at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any
legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents before this case
was filed.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents
ordering petitioners to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of
the estate of Basilio and Genoveva.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to
overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that
things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Issue:
Was the decision of the Court of Appeals tenable?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. Since this case
was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined
in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil
Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of
Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and
wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the
contrary. Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot
be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and
Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as
husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the
testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose
for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be
unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not
to notice its absence. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, v. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ,
respondent.
G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998.
Facts:
On May 31, 1958, Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano married Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano, respondent, in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid
and subsisting until his death on May 18, 1994. Prior to the death, he married petitioner
Estrelita Tamano on June 2, 1993 in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
Upon knowing of such second marriage, Zorayda filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage of his husband and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. The
entries in the marriage contract of the second marriage were false and fraudulent for
Mamintal and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively.
Zorayda alleged that she and her husband never divorced and that Estrellita was
still married to Romeo Llave because the decision on the annulment of their marriage
never became final and executor for the noncompliance with publication requirement.
Estrellita then filed a motion to dismiss for she alleged that only a party to the
marriage could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse. She even
contented that since Mamintal and Zorayda were Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the
jurisdiction to hear and try the case was vested in the sharia courts pursuant to Article 155
of the Code of mUslim Personal Laws
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. This is because Mamintal and
Estrellita were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance
with P.D. No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
The Court of Appeals ruled that it would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
sharia courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the sharia court has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action
Ruling:
No. Article 13 of P.D. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites. The sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005.
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Courtbfor the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia Lea A. Julaton.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the
evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she
enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea
did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was
still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.
Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents house in Bliss, Sto. Nio, Catbalogan,
Samar. However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, he inquired Leas whereabouts but to no avail.
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked
him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the
fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27,
1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Leas friend, was staying. When asked
where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Leas
whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time
taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He
returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station. The police
authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Leas disappearance
to the National Bureau of Investigation on July 9, 2001.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on August
4, 2003, affirming the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the wife is valid
Ruling:
No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of ones spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the
Court in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. It is

the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution.
Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution
that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For
respondents failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead
and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the
petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court
and the Honorable Court of Appeals. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove
that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.
The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that
es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales. The Court finds
and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before
he filed his petition in the trial court, that his spouse Rosalia Lea Julaton was already
dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.GLORIA BERMUDEZ-
LORINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, and her husband were married on June 12,
1987. Out of this marriage, she begot three children, namely: Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and
Fatima. Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband was a
habitual drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go
out with friends to the extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work.
Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and
decided to go back to her parents together with her three children. In order to support the
children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation
from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no
communications with him, or with any of his relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition
with the Regional Trial Court. The same issued an order directing, the publication of the
petition in a newspaper of general circulation, on August 28, 2000; that after nine years,
there was absolutely no news about him and she believes that he is already dead and is
now seeking through this petition for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially
presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code were duly established in this case
Ruling:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave
error on the part of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of
Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated
the fact that the trial court decision was immediately final and executory. As it were, the
Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous
appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of
law, the judgment was not appealable. Thus, the instant petition is hereby denied for lack of
merit.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO,
respondent.
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.
Facts:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving
Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The
Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead; and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in
the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica
Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship
for six months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19
November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent
married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry
van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in
San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received
a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The
same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship
docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his
missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar
where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he
inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition hereby declaring the presumptively death of
Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed
to show that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a
basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing
wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead. Pursuant
to Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present had a well founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that
his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is
hereby reversed and both Decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.

NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994.
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6,
1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho
contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had been
living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Chito Faustino
C. Camacho, born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where
Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
Because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time.
In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or
Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her
husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from June
1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex
apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's
son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account
in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the
United States with respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of
Aurelio in order to look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin
them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 31,
1988.
Respondent Luisita was granted death benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as
the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on
Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and
the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and
that in any event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
On August 29,1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to
petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming
the property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had
represented himself to be single.
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot
in dispute.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in presuming the validity of the marriage between Aurelio
and Luisita
Ruling:
On the question of validity of Luisita's marriage to Aurelio, there is no dispute on the fact of
appellant Luisita's marriage in 1962 to Aurelio. The Court finds that the presumption of the
validity of the marriage Aurelio and Luisita has not been successfully assailed by appellee.
The Court of Appeals thus presumed the validity of Aurelio's second marriage from the
failure of petitioner to prove that at the time of such marriage Aurelio's first wife, Consejo,
had not been absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio did not have news that his
first wife we still alive.
It was the burden of herein respondents to prove that, at the time of his second marriage to
respondent Luisita, Aurelio's first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been absent for at least seven
years and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive. To assume these facts because
petitioner has not disproved them would be to stand the principle on its head. Since
Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velasco, his subsequent marriage to
respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.

EDUARDO MANUEL, plaintiff v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants
G.R. No. 165842. November 29, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gaa on July 28, 1975. Rubylus
was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after
three months and never saw her again. On or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, Eduardo
contracted a second marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel. He assured her that he was
single and was able to marry. THey had lived together fruitfully for three years until
Eduardo became distant and came home only twice a year. One day he packed up his things
and left her. Aggrieved and curious, Tina learned from the NSO that Eduardo was
previously married, she then filed a bigamy case against Eduardo. The Regional Trial Court
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. Eduardo then filed a motion to the Supreme Court claiming that he
had contracted the second marriage in good faith since he had not been able to see his first
wife for over twenty years. He alleged that under the Civil Code, no judicial decree of
presumptive death is necesssary for remarriage.
Issue:
What constitutes a valid bigamous marriage?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals. Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two
years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the
Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
It should be noted that petitioner got married on 1996, way past the time when the Family
Code came into effect. The second marriage is therefore governed by the provisions of the
family code.

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, v. MARIETTA
CALISTERIO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with
an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent
Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously
been married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married
eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court
declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of
Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a
petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa
Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the
deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the
estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with
James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being
unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the
administration of the estate of the decedent.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Teoderico and Marietta is valid evem without the
judicial declaration for presumptive death.
Ruling
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized
on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code
which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code[5] itself limited its
retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary[8] as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until

declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be,
in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James
William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before
she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This
second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus
be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of James Bounds.

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner v. SUSAN CARINO, defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages,
the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to
as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and
the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter
referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
Upon his death, Susan Nicdao inherited petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a
total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and
burial (SSS). On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that
petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she
(petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.
Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court
to declare her in default.
Susan Nicdao's marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license
while the marriage of Susan Carino was celebrated without having obtained the necessary
judicial declaration of nullity of the first void marriage. Both the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals favored granting the peitition thus leaving Susan Nicdao to file a
motion to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
a. How essential is the judicial decree of nullity of a void marriage?
b. How must presumptive legitimes be delivered in this instance?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and the initial decision of the Regional Trial Court
was dismissed. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or

illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The Court of Appeals relied on the decision of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, which is unfortunately premised on the requisite of having a judicial
decree of nullity of marriage and is therefore inapplicable to the case at hand.

VINCENT MERCADO, petitioner v.MA.CONSUELO TAN, defendant
G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000
Facts:
The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he got married to
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for
bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City,
which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against
said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22,
1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in
the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the
marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Despite this, the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still
subsisting at the time he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
\Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage necessary for remarriage?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision. Under Article 40
of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. But here, the final judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous
marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case
for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of
bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not
a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.

LUPO ATIENZA, plaintiff v.HON. FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, defendant
Facts:
Respondent Judge Francisco Brillantes was married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he
has five children on April 25, 1965. The marriage was contracted without a marriage
license. He remarried Ongkiko again without the requisite marriage license on June 5,
1965. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites
in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all
legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized
without a license.
The petitioner on the other hand alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on
his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had
been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and
instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Lupo A. Atienza then filed a complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
against Judge Francisco Brillantes.
Issue:
Is the second marriage valid when celebrated without the judicial decree of nullity of the
prior marriage?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the respondent from government service. Under the Family
Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides: The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil
Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the
Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of
the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

ROBERT DOMINGO, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 104818. September 17, 1993
Facts:
The petitioner Roberto Domingo married Emerlinda Paz on April 25, 1969. Roberto
had remarried again with the respondent Delia Soledad on November 29, 1976. She
worked primarily in Saudi Arabia and filed for a case of bigamy against Roberto. Her
husband had been solely dependent on her earnings and had been cohabiting with another
woman. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity and separation of property. Delia
appointed her brother Moises as her attorney-in-fact and for assigned him to take care of
the properties managed by Roberto. Roberto filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
declaration of its nullity is therefore superfluous and unneccessary. Roberto also claimed
that private respondent had no property in his possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Trial Court to deny the motion.
Issues:
When does a void marriage require a judicial declaration of nullity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the lower courts.
A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under the Family Code
even for purposes other than remarriage. The necessity of final judgment however applies
when the purpose of nullity is for remarriage. The declaration of nullity of marriage carries
ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property/custody, and support of children, etc.
There is no need of filing a separate civil action for such purpose. It should also be noted
that the husband admitted to possessing his properties based on the respondent wife's
earnings.

MEYNARDO BELTRAN, petitioner v.s PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16,
1973. On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,
petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived
with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found
probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them. On March 20, 1998,
petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to
Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his
marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. The Trial
dismissed his petition. Undaunted, the petitioner filed a motion to the higher courts.
Issue:
a. Is there a prejudicial question involved in the case above?
b. Can a party judge for himself the nullity of his own marriage?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. In the case at bar it must
be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower
court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 119190. January 16, 1997
Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married as evidence by
their marriage contract. From May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. Gina made attempts for sexual activity to no
avails. Medical examinations showed that both Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were capaple of
sexual conduct. Gina was still a virgin at the time of the medical examination. Gina filed a
motion for declaration of nullity and the Trial Court declared their marriage as void. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi subsequently
filed a motion to the Supreme Court citing that it was she and not he that had the problem
regarding sexual intimacy.
Issue:
a. What is psychological incapacity?
b. Can non-desire of sexual consumation be an indicator of psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft of merit. Since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have
sex with the other becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Aligned with this is the essential marital obligation, "the procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform the sexual act was
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation
of the Family Code.

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner v. s COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage,
the couple when quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia's
parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States.
Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had
then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
What is psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and
must be incurable. Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity
on the part of Julia.

REPUBLIC, petitioner v.s COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 108763. February 13, 1997
Facts:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on APril 14, 1985. After a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father. He
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, was never honest with her, was habitually
quarrelsome. He abandoned his family in the course of their marriage. Roridel filed a case
in the courts and Reynaldo's claims were that she was inefficient in the discharge of her
marital duties. The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage as void ab initio. The
decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General
challenged the decision, citing that opposing personalities as was evinced is not equivalent
to psychological incapacity. The ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature."
Issue:
How must psychological incapacity be interpreted?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the rulings of
the lower courts. What was shown was more of a difficulty rather than psychological
incapacity. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. There had been no showing of the gravity of the
problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The Supreme Court also laid down the Molina guidelines for future reference in
interpreting psychological incapacity:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the

provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June
13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor

General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."

JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, Petitioner, vs. BONA J. ALANO and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167459
Facts:
Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter
was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out. They were married on 27 October
1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. Their union produced no
offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl
whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort
Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup
detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame. . On one occasion, Bona was caught by
Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin.
Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could
no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted
Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also
made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona
left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting
the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-
2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on
the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged sexual infidelity of Bona is a ground for declaration of nullity of
their marriage base on psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case,
that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her
spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However,
we cannot apply the same conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts
constituted psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There
is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of,
or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not
satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence. Bonas alleged psychological
incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to
the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, Petitioner, v. s REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 184063
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at
the Philamlife Church in Quezon City.[5] On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage,
petitioner filed a Petition[6]before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be
declared null and void by reason of respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.[7]
In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and
respondents married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to
the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life.[8]
Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who
earned a living and took care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat
and sleep all day, and spend time with friends. When respondent would find a job, he
would not be able to stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent went into several business
ventures, which all failed. In addition, respondent loved to gamble and would gamble away
whatever money would come his way.
Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help
to change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her
caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children.[9] Later,
respondent became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see
petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When respondent started
threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately
from him.[10] She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.[11]
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence establish respondents
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage

Ruling:
There is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so
severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary,
respondents efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of
his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his
failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other
external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness
to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological
incapacity.
That respondent, according to petitioner, lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility[54] does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal
to help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged
unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none
have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality.
Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to psychological incapacity,

it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet
petitioners exacting standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that, as
petitioner alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35 years (prior
to filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage.

ROSALINO L. MARABLE, petitioner, v.
MYRNA F. MARABLE, respondent.
G.R. No. 178741 : January 17, 2011
Facts:
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at
Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December
30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed
with five children.chanro
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels
became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy
because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased when their eldest daughter
transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became worse still
when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious
attention petitioner gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only
spoiled some of them, but it also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling
between him and respondent.
Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another
woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But
despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated. Also, their business
ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was further eroded by
their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he
was unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards
respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and
stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and
respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their
children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women.
Issue:
Whether or not the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish
the existence of petitioner's psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination
conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the
examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's
psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to
exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the
report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioner's alleged psychological
incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is

suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for
the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered
and deceitful.ch
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father,
was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage.
However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general
dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his
personal history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not
shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable.
In fact, the records show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately
terminated it. In short, petitioner's marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of
a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal
obligations.

ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR y ALUNAN, Petitioner,vs.ERLINDA AMPARO-
AGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170729
Facts:
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony
officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioners family
was apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the respondents work and
because she came from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the
respondent begot four (4) children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended.[5]The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He alleged that the respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she
was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and
cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian;
did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate;
and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.
The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since
1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered
their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times.
Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of petitioner are sufficient to render their marriage
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or
neglect, in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.
The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders existing at the time of the marriage clearly
demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.

In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents
condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the
essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had
some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his
testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents defects existed
at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of
the respondents condition; neither did he mention that the respondents malady
was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to
undertake. The petitioners declarations that the respondent does not accept her fault,
does not want to change, and refused to reform are insufficient to establish a
psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code.

SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, Petitioner, v.s MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG
and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 168796, April 15, 2010
Facts:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children.
Silvino claimed that, during their marriage, he observed that May had several
manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He described her as immature, irresponsible
and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized
their marital relations. May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived
separately.
With Mays irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. RTC
declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on the
Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio. The Court of Appeals reversed
the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture and, therefore, issued
without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction
Ruling:
In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the
rendition of the assailed CA decision dismissing petitioners complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Upon close scrutiny of the records,
we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its findings.

MARIA SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner v. RAMON REYES,
Respondent.
18 August 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University
of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old.
They were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-
enrolled from the UP Los Baos campus. Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents
style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were
restricted by a university students budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family
business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good impression of the respondent was
not diminished by the latters habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that
respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB
Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year,
and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All
living expenses were shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective
salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a
monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations.
Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work
for the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in
scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not
succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but
petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital
affair.
Petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue:

Whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties
psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that they cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling that the
psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. The SC disagrees
with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting.
Accordingly, the court granted the petition.
The petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is
reversed. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No.
Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID
under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED.

RICARDO TORING, Petitioner, v.s TERESITA TORING AND REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
3 August 2010
Facts:
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunts house in Cebu. Teresita was then
his cousins teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunts house.
Despite their slight difference in age (of five years), the younger Ricardo found the dance
teacher attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and they became
sweethearts after three months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of
another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the
City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric
Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition
for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent
to the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita
null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court,
particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court in
declaring the nullity of the marriage fully complied with Molina.
Held:
Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from
psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo
merely established that Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for being
irresponsible in taking care of their familys finances a fault or deficiency that does not
amount to the psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We
reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a persons difficulty, refusal or
neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological
illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner, vs ANGELITO SUAZO AND REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
12 March 2010
Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were
residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with
Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn
and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter,
Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a
ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos
parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd
jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand,
refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and
violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She
claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, the RTC annulled their marriage and CA affirmed it.
Issue:
Whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of
law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with
Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.

VERONICA ALCAZAR, Petitioner, v. REY ALCAZAR, Respondent.
13 October 2009
Facts:
Petitioner was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan
(Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived
for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents.
Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner
at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October
2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an
upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not
communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for
five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for
Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the
Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his
arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the
Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents house in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner
went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was
not aware of respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his parents since
his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their
marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and
respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.
Ruling:

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted
during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their
wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical
incapacity on respondents part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners
marriage to respondent. Petitioners Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught Courts attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence
presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it
appears that petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent based on the latters psychological incapacity to comply with his marital
obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RODOLFO ASPILLAGA, Petitoner, v.s AURORA ASPILLAGA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009
Facts:
Rodolfo Aspillaga filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Aurora Aspillaga. Aurora alleged upon her return to Manila, she
discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her
cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfos cohabitation
with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained that both parties are
psychologically incapacitated. The RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated to
enter into marriage.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora
Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also
denied. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties psychological incapacity
Ruling:
No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995), it has
been categorically ruled that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that the psychological conditions were grave
or serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able to establish the parties personality disorder;
however, he failed to link the parties psychological disorders to his conclusion that they
are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife. The
fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their marital
obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.

It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations (Republic v. CA). The
intention of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No.
157610, October 19, 2007).Psychological disorders do not manifest that both parties are
truly incapacitated to perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that
shows incurability of these disorders. Incompatibility and irreconcilable differences cannot
be equated with psychological incapacity as understood juristically.
As to Rodolfos allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to convince.
While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of ones
marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage
null and void. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements
regarding money matters are a common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands
and wives.

DIGNA NAJERA, Petitioner, v. EDUARDO NAJERA, Respondent.
3 July 2009
Facts:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for
Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Petitioner
alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31,
1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon,
Pangasinan. They are childless. Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of
marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after
marriage
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence
submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of
respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was
not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is
unscientific and unreliable.

KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner, v. ROWENA YU TE, Respondent.
13 February 2009
Facts:
Kenneth met Rowena in a Filipino-Chinese gathering on campus. They did not have interest
with each other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness due to the fact that
they share the same angst with their families. In 1996, while still in college, Rowena
proposed that they should elope. Kenneth initially refused on the ground that he is young
and jobless but due to Rowenas persistence Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K.
The money soon after disappeared and they found themselves forced to return to their
respective home. Subsequently, Rowenas uncle brought the two before a court and had
had them be married. After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena stayed with her uncles house
where Kenneth was treated like a prisoner. Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home
otherwise he will be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he was
hidden from Rowenas family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to live with his
parents instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they
could live together separately or just stay with her uncle. Kenneth however was already
disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it is better if they live separate lives
from then on. Four years later, filed for an annulment of their marriage. Rowena did not file
an answer. The City Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted that he cannot determine if
there is collusion between the 2 parties hence the need to try the merits of the case. The
opinion of an expert was sought wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that both
parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between Edward and
Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was
caused by both parties unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the
state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved
with herself. The trial court ruled that the marriage is void upon the ruling of the expert
psychologist. The OSG appealed and the CA ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that
the psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable (Molina case). The clinical psychologist did not personally
examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further,
the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements set forth in the Molina case to be
followed as guidelines.
Issue:
Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be admitted in lieu of the
guidelines established in the landmark case of Molina.

Ruling:
The SC ruled that admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules
in ascertaining PI. So much so that the subsequent cases after Molina were ruled
accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there is not much regard for the laws clear
intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. The SC
however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The principle
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both
parties psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist. Both
parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity. Kenneth
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect
and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others. He is too dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the
essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.

ROSA PARAS, Petitioner, v. JUSTO PARAS, Respondent.
August 2, 2007
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with
Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged
that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage
as shown by the following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
Issue:
Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo.
Ruling:
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in
Santos to reiterate: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. A review of the complaint, as well as the
testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosas main grounds in seeking the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which includes
the falsification of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the
children, and abandonment of the family. Both the courts below found the charges
unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found
the evidence sufficient to support Rosas charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her
signature, and abandonment of family. The petition is denied.

BERNARDINO ZAMORA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 141917. February 7, 2007
Facts:
Bernardino S. Zamora and Norma Mercado Zamora were married on June 4, 1970.
The union did not produce any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States
to work as a nurse. She intermittently returned to the Philippines but also went back to the
United States. This contrinued until 1989, when she was already a US citizen. Petitioner
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage alleging psychological incapacity of
private respondent, citing the grounds of abandonment and non-desire to have children.
Respondent rejected the claim citing her experiences showing affection for children and
pointing out husband's infidelity as a source of her abandonment. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the petition owing to the fact that nothing in the evidence of plaintiff shows that
the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed to comply with
her essential marital obligations. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of
the Trial Court and added that the petitioner failed to present any medical expert to prove
prsychological incapacity. Petitioner filed a motion to the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of that requiment among other things.
Issues:
a. How must psychological incapacity be alleged?
b. Is the presence of a medical expert necessary to prove incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Examination of the person by a physician in
order for the former to be declared psychologically incapacitated is not considered a
requirement in Republic vs CA, 268 SCRA 198 [1997]. In Marcos vs Marcos, it was held that
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity then medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In
the case, there is proof as to the existence of psychological incapacity nor was there proof
that it had existed at the inception of the marriage.

MA. ARMIDA-FERRARIS, petitioner v. BRIX FERRARIS, defendant
G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006
Facts:
The Regiona Trial Court denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
between petitioner Ma. Armida-Ferraris with Brix Ferraris. It found that his "violence"
during episodes of epilepsy did not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision and cited that the evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects"
were incurable and already presen t at the inception of the marriage. Dr Dayan's testimony
of the respondent's mixed-personality was unsufficiently arrived at. It was alleged that he
had Schizoid characteristics in his persona. The testimony however failed to establish how
this was arrived at or that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse
integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. The petitioner then filed a
motion to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Can epilepsy constitute psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition with finality. The Supreme Court found
respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time
with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code should not be confused with Divorce or with Legal
Separation.

ANTONIO, petitioner v. REYES, respondent
G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old
and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got
married on 6 December 1990. On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his
marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. As
manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. The Trial Court declared the marriage
as null and void since it found that respondent's propensity to lie rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The Church also annuled the Catholic
marriage of the parties. The Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity and
thus reversed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner then filed a motion to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Can pathological lying constitute psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the decision of the Trial
Court. The Molina guidelines did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article
36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance. The guidelines are in fact used to interpret
incapacity in the present case. The decision of the Church to nullify the marriage was given
great weight in the consideration of the case. The other guidelines were also satisfied in
affirming the psychological condition. The pathological lying of the respondent shows a
dangerous if not unhealthy inability to distinguish reality from the fantasy world which
makes the fulfillment of marital obligations and duties impossible.

REPUBLIC, plaintiff v. CRASUS IYOY, defendant
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial
Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus,
Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America
(U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children. In 1984, she filed for divorce while in the United
States. In 1985 respondent Fely married an American citizen and became an American
citizen herself sometime in 1988. Respondent eventually filed a petition to the courts
alleging in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and
clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Regional Trial rendered its decision in favor of the respondent and declared the
marriage as null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision also citing that
under Art. 26 of the Family Code, divorce was permissible since Fely was already an
American citizen. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) then intervened claiming that
mere abandonment and sexual infidelity does not constitute psychological incapacity and
that there was error in applying Art. 26 of the Family Code. The respondent questions the
participation of the OSG.
Issues:
a. How is psychological incapacity properly alleged?
b. Is the divorce of Fely valid?
c. Can the OSG rightly intervene in the case cited above?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the decisions of
the lower courts. The root cause of psychological incapacity was not proven. According to
the Molina guidelines, psychological incapacity must be medically proven to be existent.
There was also improper application of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Since Fely only acquired
American citizenship in 1988, she was still a Filipino citizen when she acquired her divorce
in 1984. Filipinos cannot be granted divorce unless they are within the context of a mixed
marriage which was not the case back then in 1984.
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of
the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the

RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

JUANITA SIAYNGCO, Petitioner v. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, Respondent.
4 October 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were
married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973.
After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt
a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy. On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four
(24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity
on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all
throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude
towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that
she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like
his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical
arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that
she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as
judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects
around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his
professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement;
that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated
resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from
her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and,
even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the
emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through
his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Juanita is Psychologically Incapacitated.
Ruling:
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his
wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts
and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to
endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that
these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic
and essential obligations of marriage.

JAIME VILLALON, petitioner v. MA. CORAZON VILLALON, respondent
Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage. According to
petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal
to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married
life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of
marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from
any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of
companionship and consortium towards respondent.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his
alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Casanova Complex. A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to
gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a
person with Casanova Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one
relationship to another. Respondent claimed that her husband was a dutiful husband and
father during their marriage and alleged that his sexual infidelity was exhibited only on 2
occasions which were 13 years apart which was not consistent with his supposed
psychological disorder. The Regional Trial Court decided in favor the petitioner while the
Court of Appeals reversed the earlier decision and held the marriage as valid.
Issue:
What quantum of evidence must be present to properly psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for annulment of the marriage. Sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of marriage. The evidence at record did not show the alleged gravity and incurability of the
husband's psychological incapacity. In fact the evidence shows that the husband was a
responsible husband and father. It appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for
respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to her. Also, at the time of
respondents testimony, petitioners illicit relationship has been going on for six years. This
is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from Casanova Complex who,
according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another. Dr. Dayan also
failed to provide vital links and the basis for her findings. Hence the grounds for
psychological incapacity were betrayed by a lack of sufficient evidence indicating the same.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 127358. March 31, 2005
Facts:
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, declared the marriage between Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura (on July 4, 1979) null and
void ab initio. Noel was revealed to have been psychologically incapacitated; that he had
married out of parental pressure and not out of love; that he had abandoned his family; that
this caused defendant to suffer moral damages. The Regional Trial Court awarded the
defendant with damages based on Art. 2217 and Art. 21 of the New Civil Code. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling. The plaintiff-appellee therefore filed for a petition of certiorari
alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages.
Issue:
Can award for damages be provided when the alleged offender is psychologically
incapacitated?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court deleted the award for moral and exemplary damages. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity and hence
beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. Psychological incapacity therefore removes the
basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent.
Therefore, the award of moral damages damages was without basis in law and in fact. Since
the award of moral and exemplary damages was no longer justified, the award of attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.

DIANA BARCELONA, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
Facts:
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo)
filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona
(petitioner Diana). On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition
which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995. On 21 July 1995, respondent
Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana.Petitioner
Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second
petition fails to state a cause of action. The root cause of psychological incapacity was not
properly alleged. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94
(Circular No. 04-94) on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to
which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion. The lower
courts rejected the petition, after which it was sent to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
a. Is a statement of a cause for action required in the declaration of nullity of
marriage?
b. Is there forum shopping constituted by respondent Tadeo?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules also provides
that expert testimony need not be alleged. Since the new Rules do not require the petition
to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need
to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of
action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the
facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the
trial on the merits of the case.
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent
Tadeo to keep the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened
before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia
since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first
petition when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata
because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without
prejudice. Thusly, forum shopping could not be applicable in this case.

REPUBLIC, petitioner v. TOSHIO HAMANO, defendant
G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004
Facts:
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national,
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio
went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth
to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of
the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage. Her husband had sent them financial support for
two months and had abandoned ever since. He did not even visit them when he returned to
the Philippines. The wife filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage citing
the the husband did not fulfill any of his marital obligations. The Regional Trial Court
granted the petition which was affirmed by the Appellate Court.The Court of Appeals also
added that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina
and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case
involved a mixed marriage, the husband being a Japanese national.The petitioner
Republic however forwarded the case to the Supreme Court for review.
Issue:
Are the Molina Guildelines inapplicable in the instance of mixed marriages?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition. In proving psychological incapacity, there
is no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. There cannot be leniency in
the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to
any person regardless of nationality.
In the case above, the Molina guildelines were not strictly followed in that there was
no medical illness that was properly identified. As it is, mere abandonment by itself is
insuffient to prove psychological incapacity.

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, plaintiff v. EDMUNDO MACARUBBO,
Facts:
Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982. Despite this
existing marriage, he contracted a second one with Florence Teves Macarrubo, with whom
he had borne two children, on December 28, 1991. On August 21, 1998 a decision was
rendered by the courts declaring his first marriage void on the basis of his wife's
psychological incapacity. Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on
behalf of her two children, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The respondent had left his second wife and was married to another woman, Josephine
Constantino, with whom he had another pending case of annulment. The respondent
provided all relevant documents showing that he had no mark of criminality or wrong and
that he had provided support for his family though sometimes intermittent. The
investigating body hence recommended that he be suspended for a period of three months.
Issue:
Can the respondent validly contract a second marriage when the prior marriage was
annulled on the basis of psychological incapacity years after the second marriage was
solemnized?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent from legal practice. The respondent's actions
show his disrespect for the institution of marriage and the family. While a first shotgun
marriage may be excusable on the part of a lawyer respondent, two consecutive claims of
being the victim in marriage raises some questions. The fact that another petition for
annulment is lodged against the respondent's third wife shows his non commitment to the
social institution. His intermittent support to his children also does not compensate for the
monthly support that is needed in their sustenance. The respondent exhibited gross
immoral conduct in the instances mentioned above.
The decision, rendered in default of complainant, cannot serve as res judicata on the final
resolution of the present case. As this Court held in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui
generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is
not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a
disbarment case does not affect its course, then the judgment of annulment of respondents
marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as
the quantum of proof clear preponderance of evidence in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.

DAVID DEDEL, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner David B. Dedel married respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel on May 20,
1967. Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible
and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command
and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes
Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not
stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she
married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the
country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim.
Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own.
Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan
with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special
occasions. Finally the petitioner then filed a motion for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage based on psychological incapacity. The petitioner presented Dr. Dayan Natividad
who alleged that Sharon suffered from Anti-Social disorder exhibited by her blatant display
of infidelity and abandonment. These characteristics render her unable to perform
essential marital obligations.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage as null and void. The Office of the
Solicitor General appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the earlier ruling. The
petitioner then filed a motion to the Supreme Court alleging that there was error in the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall
within the term psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling the ruling of the
Court of Appeals. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations
she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It
appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. Respondents
sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.

REPUBLIC, petitioner v. AVELINO DAGDAG, respondent
GR. No. 109975. February 9,2001
Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matis married Avelino Parangan Dagdag. A week
after the wedding signs of the husband's immaturity began to manifest. He indulged in
drinking sprees and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her. On October 1993,
he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. It was learned that
Avelino became an escaped convict and remained at-large to date. On July 3, 1990, Erlinda
filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Erlinda testified and presented her sis-in-
law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the
marriage of Erlinda and Averlino void under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the
Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the decision was not
in accordance with the evidence and the law.
Issue:
What properly constitutes psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition of the OSG and reversed and set aside the
assailed decision. Since the Molina guildelines were laid down, the courts were expected to
better understand how to facilitate cases of psychological incapacity. Erlina failed to
comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts. Expert
testimony should have also been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given
an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was
prematurely rendered.

LORNA PESCA, petitioner v.ZOSIMO PESCA, respondent
GR No. 136921. April 17, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Lorna G pesca and respondent Zosimo A . Pesca were married on March
1975. In 1988, the petitioner started noticing signs of respondent's "psychological
incapacity" through his habitual drinking and physical abuse. Eventually, petitioner
forwarded a case to the courts for the annulment of the said marriage. On Nevember 15,
1995, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision, declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychologicl
incapacity. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered its decision in
his favor. Based on Article 68 of the Family Code, incapacity must be grave, psychological
no physical, etc. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
declared the marriage as valid. The petitioner filed a motion to the Supreme Court stating
that :
1) The doctrine laid down in Santos vs CA and Republic vs CA and Molina should bear no
retoractive effect.
2) The application of the Santos and Moiline dicta should warrant only a remand of the case
to the Trial Courts for further proceedings and not dismissal.
Issues:
a. What constitutes psychological incapacity?
b. How should previous judicial decisions affect future cases?
Ruling:
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. It was held that the clause
"psychological incapacity" under Article 35 of the Family Code has not been meant to
encompass all possible psychoses, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility involved. The
decisions from Santos and Molina has the force of law under the doctrine of Stare Decisis,
ordained in Article 8 of the New Civil Code. Jurisprudence would constitute part of that law
as of the date the statute is enacted.

Marcos vs. Marcos
Facts:
The plaintiff and respondent were married twice on separate dates by Judge Eriberto
Espiritu and Rev. Eduardo Eleazar. Both of them worked on a Military but they sought
discharge from the service after the EDSA Revolution. After the downfall of Marcos, he
returned in different businesses which did not prosper. This led to the frequent quarrels
between spouses. He would even to their children inflict proposal harm for slight mistake.
In 1992, they were already living separately. Petitioner, on the other hand was able to put
up a trading and construction company.
After few days, she saw her husband in their house, although, they were leaving separately.
This broke into a fight where he inflicted physical harm to her and her mother. In Aug.
1995, when she was working for her son in the Bliss unit, he got mad and even ran after
them with a samurai after knowing of their purpose. The children described their father as
cruel and physically abusive. She underwent psychological evaluation. Her husband did
not. The trial court found accused psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligators. However, the CA reversed the decision.
Issues: Whether or not there is psychological incapacity present in the case at bar?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there was no psychological incapacity because it lacks one
requirement which is juridical antecedence. The Alleged incapacity existed only during the
marriage. For it to prosper, it should be proven that the incapacity was present at the
inception of the marriage on that they are incurable.
Examination is not a mandatory requirement for filing a complaint of nullity of marriage on
the grounds of psychological incapacity. Such ground can be based and proven on the
totality of the evidence.

Hernandez vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City,
a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to
the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to
support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of
his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private
respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an
illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his
promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually
transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible,
immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having
abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three
children in the total amount of P9, 000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of
their children.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner presented a well grounded case for Psychological
incapacity of her husband as a ground for annulment of their marriage.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her
respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their marriage
her respondent-husbands character was on the "borderline between a responsible person
and the happy-go-lucky," could not constitute the psychological incapacity in
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself
ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husbands youth and very good looks, who was
admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be
the college professor of her respondent-husband. Thus the petition was denied.

Enrico v. Heirs
Facts:
The heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli
(Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and
petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and
Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.They begot seven children,
herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and
Joseph Lloyd.On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner
before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.Six months later, or on 10 February 2005,
Eulogio passed away.In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred
that the same was entered into without the requisite marriage license.They argued that
Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage
license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived
together under the circumstances required by said provision.Respondents posited that the
marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May
2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to
petitioner.Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground
of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance
impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco
Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991,
respectively.She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the
Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative
defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting
parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Issue: Whether or not it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Ruling:
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo.Nonetheless, all is not
lost for respondents.While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not
mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the
law.They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules
on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,

Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.

Catalan v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in
Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and
allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and
Orlando divorced in April 1988.Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando
married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was
bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan
City against Orlando and Merope.Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was
denied. Trial on the merits ensued.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
Ruling:
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot
be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing
it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and
whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it
is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then
the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground
that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same. The case was
remanded to the trial court for its proper disposition.

Ninal v. Bayadog
Facts:
Petitioner Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and eight months,
Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without a marriage license. Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit date December 11, 1986 that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died and after his death, petitioners filed for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma.
Issue: Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is
null and void.
Ruling:
At the time of Peptio and respondents marriage it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the
time of Pepitos marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondents, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time he started
cohabiting with respondent. The second marriage is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license; it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.
The code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity if marriage. Void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party. Void Marriages has no
legal effect except those declared by law concerning the properties of alleged spouse,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through joint contribution.

Ablaza vs Republic
Facts:
Petitioner filed an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of
his late brother Consenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honorato. He alleged n o marriage license
existed and his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who died without any issue
entitled him to one half of the real properties of the latter before his death, thereby making
him a real party interest, and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity
of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being viod ab initio.
Issue: Whether or not a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil
Code.
Ruling:
Yes. Here petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and
surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has
the material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir
under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of the deceased brother
under the conditions stated in Article 1101 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code.

Carlos vs Sandoval
Facts:
Carlos asserted that he was the sole surviving compulsory heir of his parents, Felix B.
Carlos and Felipa Elemia, who had acquired during their marriage, six parcels of land
(subject properties). His brother, Teofilo (Teofilo), died intestate in 1992. At the time of
his death, Teofilo was apparently married to Sandoval, and cohabiting with her and their
child, respondent Teofilo II. Nonetheless, Carlos alleged in his Complaint that Teofilo and
Sandoval were not validly married as they had not obtained any marriage license.
Furthermore, Carlos also asserted that Teofilo II could not be considered as Teofilos child.
As a result, Carlos concluded that he was also the sole heir of his brother Teofilo, since the
latter had died without leaving any heirs.
Carlos now sought to nullify these agreements with Sandoval for want of consideration, the
premise for these contracts being non-existent. Thus, Carlos prayed of the RTC to declare
the alleged marriage between Teofilo and Sandoval void ab initio, provided that Teofilo
died without issue, order that new titles covering the subject properties be issued in the
name of Carlos, and require Sandoval to restitute Carlos in the amount of P18, 924,800.00.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner but upon appeal the judgment was
set aside. Thus, appeal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has the legal personality to question the validity of the
marriage between the respondents and his brother.
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed. As noted earlier, the award of damages was made after a proper
hearing had occurred wherein all the concerned parties had been given the opportunity to
present their arguments and evidence in support and in rebuttal of the application for
damages. The premature award of damages does not negate the fact that the parties were
accorded due process, and indeed availed of their right to be heard.
Moreover, we are compelled to appreciate the particular circumstance in this case that the
right of private respondents to acquire relief through the award of damages on account of
the wrongful preliminary attachment has been conclusively affirmed by the highest court
of the land. This differs from the normal situation under Section 20, Rule 57 wherein the
court having jurisdiction over the main action is still required to ascertain whether the
applicant actually has a right to damages. To mandatorily require that the award of
damages be included in the judgment in the main case makes all the sense if the right to
damages would be ascertained at the same time the main judgment is made. However,
when the said right is already made viable by reason of a final judgment which is no longer
subject to review, there should be no unnecessary impediments to its immediate
implementation.

Mallion v. Alcantara
Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the RTC of San Pablo
City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara citing
respondents alleged psychological incapacity. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the
petition in the decision dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner failed to
adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking. The appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution dated June 11, 1998
for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period.
Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in dismissing petitioners petition for the declaration
of his marriage as null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license because
of the dismissal of an earlier petition for declaration of nullity of the same marriage on the
ground of his wifes psychological incapacity
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. Res Judicata requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: 1. The former judgment is final; 2. It is rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;3. It is a judgment or an
order on the merits; 4. And there is between the first and second- identity o f parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action. Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first
three requisite. He only invokes the forth requisite.

Maquilan v. Maquilan
Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated
romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having
illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of
adultery against private respondent and the latters paramour. Consequently, both the
private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months,
minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months
and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on
June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley,
docketed as Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the
petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial
imprimatur by the respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement,
which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002.
Issue: Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses
pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid
Ruling:
The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the
law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage,
from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the
petitioner argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under
Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code.

To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of
adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is
void, it never became final and executory.
Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery
is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void. These
arguments are specious. The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable to the instant
case.
Article 43 of the Family Code refers to Article 42, to wit:
Article 42.The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be

automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of
any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact
is disputed.
Where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent

spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present
case involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under
the ground of psychological capacity.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement
partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties
and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those
that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.
Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a

circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal
properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or
for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement
which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the

law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of
marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation
of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and
other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.

Republic v. Cuison-melgar
Facts:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in
Dagupan City. Their union begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for
declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogios psychological incapacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of
Eulogios psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable
jealousy, maltreatment, laziness, and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.
Issue: Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature
contemplated by Article 36.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
marriage between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
laziness, jealousy and abandonment of respondent do not constitute psychological
incapacity.

Corpus v. Ochotorena
Facts:
On February 6, 2001, a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of Marriage was
filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin Macias, her husband and incumbent presiding
judge of RTC, Zamboanga Del Norte. The respondent immediately issued summons to Mrs.
Macias. However, the summons was not served on Mrs. Macias for the reason that her
whereabouts were unknown. Consequently, Mr. Macias foiled a motion to serve summons
by publication. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the local
weekly newspaper, Tingog Peninsula based in Dipolog City in its March 11-17, 2001
issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Mr. Macias is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found Judge Wilfredo Ochotorena guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and incompetence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is hid duty to keep always abreast with
law and jurisprudence.

Macias V. Macias
Facts:
On February 6, 2001 Judge Mariano Macias( herein petitioner) filed with the RTC of
Zamboanga Del Norte, a pettion for declaration of nullity if marriage against Margie Corpus
Macias. The Sheriff personally served copies of the summons and complaint upon the
respondent, but to no avail. The trial Court issued an Order dated March 7, 2001 directing
that summons be affected in a newspaper of general circulation. On March 11-17, 2001
summons and complaint were published in the Tingog Peninsula , newspaper.
Instead on filing an answer, respondent, through counsel filed a motion to dismiss
the petition on the following grounds: the cause of the action is barred by the statute of
limitations, the trial court has no jurisdiction because it is not among those designated to
act as a family court and the parties failed to resort to barangay conciliation prior to the
filing of the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Court the respondent is deprived of her right to due process
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to section 3(e),
Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended, where the defending party fails to
file his or her answer to the petition, the trial court should order the prosecution to
intervene for the State by conducting an investigation to determine whether or not there
was collusion between the parties.

Malcampo-sin v. Sin
Facts:
On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were
married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence
filed with the RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for declaration of nullity of Marriage against
Philipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective evidences.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to
Article 48 that the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

Ancheta v. Ancheta
Facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture. On December 6,
1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their
children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the RTC of
Makati, against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial
separation of property with a plea for support and support pendent lite.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in failing to take into consideration the kind of Order
which was sought to be annulled
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer available through no fault
of hers, otherwise the petition will be dismissed. However in this case the petitioner failed
to allege in her petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for
relief were no longer available through no fault of her.

Tuason V. Tuason
Facts:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez
alleged that at the time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The
same resulted in violent fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a
womanizer and gave minimal support to the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and
abusive of his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets
without Victorias consent. Attempts for reconciliation failed because Emilios refusal to
reform. In the prayer of Victoria for annulment of marriage, she further prayed for powers
of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation. At variance,
Emilio denied the imputation against him.
Thereafter, trial ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary
evidence consisting of newspaper articles of Emilios relationship with other women, his
apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies of prior church annulment decree.
After Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilios evidence was scheduled. It was
postponed and on the reset date, he failed to appear. The court then declared Emilio to
have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victorias
marriage to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition
for relief from judgment but was denied.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the
circumstance of the case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance
during the hearing.
Ruling:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from judgment.
Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be
set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the
petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious
defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and
determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to
enable the latter to appeal there from is negligence that is not excusable. Similarly
inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the trial court of his clients confinement

and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings.
Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. Relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of
the remedy at law was to his own negligence.

Pacete V. Carriaga
Facts:
On April 30, 1938, Enrico Pacete and Concepcion Alanis got married before the
Justice of Peace of Cotabato. They had a child named Consuelo. Nonetheless, Pacete,
subsequently contracted a second marriage with a certain Clarita dela Concepcion.
Moreover, Pacete acquired vast property consisting large tracts of land, fishponds and
several motor vehicles. Several pieces of such property were fraudulently placed either in
his name or Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other dummies. With
this, Concepcion filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her
erstwhile husband Enrico and Clarita, as well as for the legal separation between her and
Pacete, accounting and separation of property. Overtures for an amicable settlement were
ignored by Pacete and reconciliation between Concepcion Alanis and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
On November 15, 1979, defendants in the complaint of Alanis were served
summons. However, frequent motions for extension finally made Alanis file a motion to
declare such defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. After presenting her,
evidence, the court promulgated a decision largely in favor of Concepcion Alanis.
Issues: Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been either an appeal
from the judgment by default or a petition for relief from judgment
Ruling:
Under ordinary circumstances, the petition would have been dismissed outrightly.
However, a petition for certiorari is allowed when the default order is improperly declared,
or even when it is properly declared, where grave abuse of discretion attended such
declaration. In such exceptional instances, the special civil action for certiorari to declare
the nullity of a judgment by default is available. In this case, the default order
unquestionably is not legally sanctioned. Moreover, section 6 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that there are no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or
for legal separation. If the defendant in actions for annulments or legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not
collusion between parties exists and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the state in
order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. The special proscription on
actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less
than the states interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the
matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.

Silva vs CA
Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local
actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two
children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship
surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career
over his vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed
that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the
two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to
allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in
his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was
opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing"
which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
The RTC held in favor of the petitioner but upon appeal of the respondent the CA reversed
the decision in favor of the respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be given the visitation right for their children.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the
decision of the trial court.
The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as
true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears
expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade
their children once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product
of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and
goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal action for the
purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a
father who is deprived of his children of tender ages.

Jarillo vs People
Facts:
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal
dated November 17, 2000). On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again
celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San
Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J.
Alocillo on October 29, 1975.
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel
Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor
Cruz on November 26, 1979. On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged
marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the
appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay CityParenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October
5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of
nullity of their marriage.
The trial court convicted her of bigamy which was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding her guilty of bigamy.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affimed the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner's
conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of petitioner's two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the
crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioner's marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court
of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
declaration of the nullity of petitioner's marriage to Uy make any difference.
As held in Tenebro, "since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage."

Carino v. Carino
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago Carino, he contracted two marriages,
the fist was on June 20, 1969 with petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino, with whom he had two
offspring and the second was on November 10,1992, with respondent Susan Yee Carino
with whom he had no children in their almost ten years cohabitation. In 1998, Spo4
Santiago became ill and bedridden due to diabetes. He passed away on November 23, 1992
under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner
and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee
filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao
praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos collectively denominated as death benefits.
Issue:
Who have the right to collect monetary benefits and financial assistance?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the appellate Court. The property
regime of Susan Nicdao and the deceased is governed by Article 147 of the Family Code.
One half of the subject death benefits shall go to the petitioner as her share in the
property regime, and the other half to legal heirs of the deceased, namely his children with
Susan Nicdao. The marriage between Susan Yee and SPO4 Santiago Carino is declared void
ab initio, they were not able to obtain a judicial decree declaring the marriage of Susan
Nicdao and the deceased void.

Leonor v. Court of appeals
Facts:
Petitioner Virginia Leonor was married to private respondent Mauricio Leonor in San
Carlos City. Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain Lynda Pond abroad. This
induced petitioner to institute a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for separation and
alimony. Private respondent counter-sued for divorce. Mauricio raised the issue of the
alleged non-existence of the marriage between him and Virginia. Meanwhile, Virgina
learned that the solemnizing officer in the Philippines failed to send a copy of their
marriage contract to the Civil Registrar of San Carlos City for registration. Hence, she
applied for the late registration of her marriage. Said application was granted.
The trial court declared said marriage null and void for being sham and fictitious. Virginia
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which dismissed the same.
Issue:
Did the court err in refusing to decide upon the merits of the case, that is, to declare
whether or not the judgment of the trial court is null and void?
Ruling :
The only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under Rule 108 are typographical of
clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage.
Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner
and her children from legitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial
proceeding.
Further, the respondent trial judge gravely and seriously abused his discretion in
unceremoniously expanding his very limited jurisdiction under such rule to hear evidence
on such a controversial matter as nullity of a marriage under the Civil Code and/or Family
Code, a process that is proper only in ordinary adversarial proceedings under the Rule.

Balogbog V.Balogbog
Facts:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 151 and 161, respectively. They had an older
brother, Gavino, who died in 135, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for
partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate
children of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
Petitioners, in their answer, denied knowing private respondents and alleged that their
borther Gavino died single and without issue in their parents residence. In the beginning
they claimed that their mother had sold the properties of the estate when she was still
alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.
Both parties to support their allegations presented several witnesses. Allegedly, Gavino and
Catalina were married sometime in 1929 but no record of their marriage was found from
the Register of Marriages, as it was presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the
war. Consequently, what private respondents can only produce was a certificate from the
Office of the Local Civil registrar that the Register of Marriages did not have any record of
Gavino and Catalina.
On June 15, 1973, the CFI of Cebu rendered judgment for private respondents ordering
petitioners to render an accounting from 160 until the finality of its judgment, to partition
the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third (1/3) of the estate of Basilio and
Genoveva, and to pay attorneys fees and costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision entitling
private respondents one-third (1/3) of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva.
Ruling:
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to
present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage. In this case, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,
that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom
died in infancy; their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their
children, herein private respondents were recognized by Gavinos family and by the public
as the legitimate children of Gavino.

The law favors the validity of marriage because the state is interested in the preservation of
the family and that the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. As stated
in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, the Code of Civil Procedure provides: that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a contract of
marriage Always presume marriage.

Tamano vs. Ortiz
Facts:
Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano married private respondent Haja Putri
Zorayda in civil rites. Their marriage remained valid until his death, prior to his death,
Tamano also married Estrellita Tamano. Zorayda filed a complaint for Declaration of
Mullty of Marriage of Tamano and Estrelita on the ground that it was bigamous. Estrellita
filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without
jurisdiction because Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and thus Sharia courts
should takes the jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the Sharia Court and not the Regional Trial Court which has the
jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
Ruling:
The petition is denied and the decision of the RTC of Quezon City, denying the
motion to dismiss and reconsideration is affirmed.
The court ruled that the marriage of husband and wife, actions for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, maybe commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of plaintiff and determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court
which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff. And that Code of
Muslim Personal Laws (Presidential Decree 1083)(, the Sharia courts are not vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil
and muslim laws.

Domingo v. Court of appeals
Facts:
Paulina Rigonan owned three parcels of land, which she allegedly sold to private
respondents, the spouses Felipe and Conception Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives.
Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capulungan, who claim to be her closest
living relatives, alleged took possession of the properties by means of stealth, force and
intimidation, and refused to vacate the property; Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint for rein
vindication against petitioners in the RTC of Ilocos Norte. Respondent asserts that they
bought the three parcels of land from Paulina through a Deed of Sale and have been in
continues possession of the subject properties and had introduced permanent
improvements thereon. The petitioner entered the properties illegally, and refusing to
vacate it when they are asked to leave.
But, petitioner challenges the claims of the respondent; by alleging that the Deed of Sale is
void for being spurious and lacks for consideration on the basis that Paulina did not sell her
properties to anyone. After the trial, lower court renders judgment in favor of Eugenio,
Crispin and Samuel. Nevertheless, Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary.
Ruling:
The CA did not err in its findings. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. Moreover, a declaration
of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property, custody
and support of children and etc. There is no need of filing a separate civil action for such
purposes.

Beltran v. People
Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine Felix were married on June 16,
1973. On February 7, 1997, after twenty- four years of marriage and four children
petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her answer to the said petition, Charmaine Felix
alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain
woman named Milagros Salting. She subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage against petitioner and his paramour.
Issue: Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of the
marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case of
petitioner
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The pendency of a civil action
for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage. They are independent of each other.

Marbella-Bobis V. Bobis
Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella- Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly
a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint a n
information for bigamy was files against respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent
initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on
the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case as
a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of the marriage
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case of respondent
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered the Trial Court to immediately proceed with the Criminal Case.
A pending civil case is not a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is one which arises
in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. I t is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Ty V. CA
Facts:
In 1977, private respondent Edgardo Reyes married Ana Maria Regina Villanueva in
a civil ceremony. A church wedding ensued. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relatives
want to declare their marriage null and void ab initio lack of a valid marriage license. The
church wedding was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria,
Edgardo Reyes married Ofelia Ty in a ceremony officiated by a judge, then a church
wedding followed.
In 1991, Edgardo reyes filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court praying that
his marriage with Ofelia be declared null and void on the ground that here was no marriage
license when they gor married. He also averred at that time he married Ofelia, the decree of
nullity of the marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only when his civil marriage to
petitioner, Ofeila Ty, null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
Issue: Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly.
Ruling:
The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before the case of of
Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon,
wherein there was no need for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of
license and consent, before such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage
of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case
therefore, the Court concluded that private respondents second marriage to Ofelia Ty is
valid.
Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied where to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her children. As held in Jison versus Court
of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested
rights.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution declared valid and subsisting.

Valdes v. Valdes
Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during
their marriage were five children. In a petition dated June 22, 1992, Valdes sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to article 36 of the Family Code. After
hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and
Consuelo Gomez is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, on the ground
of their mutual Psychological Incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations.
The three older children shall choose which parent they would want to stay with, the
younger children shall be placed in the custody of their mother. The petitioner and
respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing compliance with Art. 50, 51
and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on
the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage.
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing their desire to remain with their father Antonio Valdes.
Issue: Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern the
disposition of a family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage is declared null and null
and void because of Psychological Incapacity on the part of either or both parties to the
contract.
Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of cause thereof, the
property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Art. 137 or 148.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have obtained through
their joint efforts.
The rules set up to govern liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between common-law spouses.

Villanueva, jr. V. Court of appeals
Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the amended in formations in
Criminal Cases entitled, People of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque
Villadores, Alberto Adriano and Rolando Advincula for Falsification of Public Document
before the RTC of Manila. It appears that petitioner Villanueva Jr. filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against several parties among them IBC 13.When the labor arbiter ruled in
favor of petitioner Villaneva Jr. IBC 13 appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission. Thus the two complaints for falsification of public document were filed before
the Manila City Prosecutors Office. The charges against Respondent Villadores and Atty.
Eulalio Diaz 111 were dismissed by the City Prosecutors Office.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in failing to appreciate that Francisco Villanueva Jr.
was in fact an aggrieved party.
Ruling:
Francisco Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases. It must be underscored that it
was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken
from an adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Villanueva. We see no reason how
Villanueva could have sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the surety appeal
bond and its confirmation letter when it could have redounded to his own benefit if the
appeal would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be anyone who was
prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased a fake surety bond.

Anaya V. Palaroan
Facts:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December 4, 1953; that
defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on January 7, 1954 on
the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Fernando had
divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had a pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his; and that the non divulgement to her of the
aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of the defendant that definitely wrecked
their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly
commencedPlaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between
them constituted FRAUD in obtaining her consent, She prayed for the annulment of the
marriage and for moral damages.
Issue: Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with anither woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Ruling:
Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of
the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is
further excluded by the last paragraph of the Article, providing that no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage.

Buccat v. Buccat
Facts:
Feliciano, Leviste, D. Toms P. Paganiban y Doa Sotera N. Megia en representacin del

apelante.
Doa Luida Mangonon de Buccat en su propia representacion.
Este asunto se ha elevado a esta Superioridad por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Baguio, ya que slo suscita una cuestin puramente de derecho.
El 20 de marzo de 1939 el demandante inici la presente causa, en la que no compareci la
demandada, no obstante haber sido debidamente emplazada. Por lo que, permitido el
demandante a presentar sus pruebas, el Juzgado inferior fall el asunto a favor de la
demandada. De ahi esta apelacin. El demandante pide la anulacion de su matrimonio,
habido con la demandada Luida Mangonon de Buccat el 26 de noviembre de 1938, en la
Ciudad de Baguio, fundndose en que, al consentir endicho matrimonio, lo hizo porque la
demandada la habia asegurado que ella era virgen.
De la decisin del Juzgado inferior se desprenden los siguientes hechos:

El demandante conoci a la demandada el mas de marzo de 1938. Despus de varias
entrevistas, ambos quedaron comprometidos el 19 de septiembre del mismo ao. El 26 de
noviembre de igual ao, el demandante contrajo matrimonio con la demandada en la
catedral catlica de la Ciudad de Baguio. Despus de convivir maritalmente por espacio de
ochenta y nueve dias, la demandada dio a luz un nio de nueve meses, el 23 de febrero de
1930. De resultas de este acontecimiento, el demandante abandon a la demandada y no
volvi a hacer vida marital con ella.
No vemos razn alguna para revocar la sentencia apelada. En efecto, es inverosimil la

alegacin del demandante y apelante que l ni siquiera habia sospechado el estado grvido
de la demandada, estando sta, como queda probado, en condicin preada muy avanzada.
Por lo que no ha lugar a estimar el fraude de que habla el apelante. Lo alegado por iste en el
sentido de que no es raro hallar a personas de abdomen desarrollado, nos parece pueril
para merecer nuestra consideracin, tanto ms cuanto que el demandante era estudiante
de primer ao de derecho.
El matrimonio es una institucin sacratisima es el cimiento en que descansa la sociedad.

Para anularlo, son menester pruebas claras y feliacientes. En este asunto no existen tales
pruebas.

Hallando la sentencia, apelada ajustada a derecho, debe ser confirmada, como por la
presente la confirmamos, en todas sus partes, con las costas al apelante. Asi se ordena.
Avancea, Pres., Imperial, Diaz, y Laurel, MM., estn conformes. Se confirma la sentencia.

Villanueva v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married
on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with
the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and
that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29,
1988.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the above-entitled case
and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the
amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition and the award of
attorneys fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to
P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned
errors:
Issue: Whether or not the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent.
Ruling:
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It
is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a
security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep
himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear
upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage.

Maccarubo vs Maccarubo
Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo. Complainant Florencie
Maccarrubo averred that she was started courting by respondent Atty. Edmundo
Maccarrubo in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually
contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio
J. Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991 in the latters Manila office, and the second on
December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that
although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he
succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage
was void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with
one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children
without providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in
precarious living conditions. But respondent filed a petition for nullity of marriage since it
was contracted with vitiated consent.
Issue: Whether or not the disbarment case be dismissed basing it fro the courts declaration
of nullity of the marriage.
Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final
judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and
complainant started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage
was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was
annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good
moral character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the
Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social
institution of marriage. Hence the respondent was disbarred for gross misconduct.

People Vs. Santiago
Facts:
On November 23, 1926, Felipe Santiago asked Felicita Masilang, who was then about
18 years of age, to accompany him across the river on some errand. The girl agreed and
then they went over the river together. After crossing the river, Santiago conducted the girl
to a place about twenty paces from the highway where tall grass and other growth hid
them from public view. In this spot the Santiago manifested a desire to have sexual
intercourse with the girl, but she refused to give her consent, and he finally,
notwithstanding her resistance, accomplished his purpose by force and against her will.
After the deed had been gone Santiago conducted the girl to the house of his uncle
who lived not far away. In the course of the afternoon, his uncle brought in a protestant
minister who went through the ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over
Santiago gave the girl a few pesos and sent her home. Her father happened to be away that
night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what had happened, and this
prosecution for rape was started.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Felipe Santiago to Felicita Masilang valid.
Ruling:
The offense of rape had been committed and the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by
which Santiago hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of his act. The manner on
which Santiago dealt with the girl after the marriage, as well as before, shows that he had
no bona fide intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered
binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential
consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.

Reyes Vs. Zaballero
Facts:
This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent per annum
payable in advance, made by Dr. Ceasar Reyes to Agripino Zaballero on October 1, 1942.
Zaballero secured the payment with a first mortgage on ten parcels of land.
The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum of P1,300 plus interest
were paid in Japanese Military Script and the Payments were unreservedly accepted. On
November 30, 1944, Zaballero offered to pay the third installments and its interests which
fell due on October of the same year, but Reyes refused to accept on the ground that it was
immoral and unjust that the payment be made in Japanese Military notes which had
considerably devaluated, and that he had an option according to the contract to have the
payment in Philippine or United States currency. Zaballero announced that the next day he
would tender the whole balance. Reyes, acting upon advice given by his attorneys to whom
he had meanwhile resorted for guidance, received the money and executed the notarial
deed of release of the real estate mortgage. On the same day, he received payment, the
mortgagee (Reyes), executed an affidavit in secret, without defendants knowledge, before
a Notary Public stating that he had accepted under protest the payment of P5,200 plus
interest in the sum of P612, and that he had deposited the whole amount paid by the
debtors.
Issue: What constitutes Duress or Intimidation.
Ruling:
According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or intimidation when one of the contracting
parties is inspired by a rational and well-grounded fear or suffering an imminent and
serious injury to his person or property, of his spouse, descendants and ascendants.
Mere reluctance does not detract from the voluntariness of ones acts. There is a distinction
between a case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good
sense and judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executed
a contract or performs an act against a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one
acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and
with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as
voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when
he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.

Alcazar vs Alcazar
Facts:
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent. After their
wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the
hometown of respondent's parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but
respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter's abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh,
respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to
call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after
respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to
come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by
respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the
Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner. Instead, respondent proceeded to his
parents' house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their
marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and
respondent.
The trial court rendered judgment denying petitioners complaint and further affirmed by
the Court of Appeal.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is incapable of consummating the marriage and the
marriage shall be annulled.
Ruling:
No. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any
way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even
admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse
after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no
physical incapacity on respondent's part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner's
marriage to respondent. Petitioner's Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.

Villanueva vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married
on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with
the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and
that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29,
1988.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the above-entitled case; and ordered the
plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00,
plus the costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition and the award of
attorneys fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to
P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned
errors:
Issue: Whether or not the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent.
Ruling:
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It
is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a
security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep
himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear
upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage.

Jimenez vs. Canizares
Facts:
A husband wanted to have his marriage annulled on the ground that his wife was impotent,
her vagina being to small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. The lower
court ordered a physical examination of the wife but she refused. The court then ordered
that the marriage be annulled. The City attorney intervened and filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that the defendant be really subjected to physical examination.
When the Lower Court denied the motion the City Attorney appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Jimenez and Canizares should be annulled.
Ruling:
The trial court must order the examination of the girl because her impotence has not been
proven. Without proof of impotence, the marriage cannot be annulled because the
presumption is always in favor of potency. Her refusal to be examined does not create a
presumtion of impotency because Filipino girls are inherently shy and bashful. Incidentally,
to order a physical examination would not infringe upon her constitutional right against
testimonial or mental self-incrimination.

imenez vs. Republic of the philippines
Facts:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his Marriage to defendant
Remedios Caizares contracted on August 3, 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of
Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to
allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation, and that for that reason he
left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they have been married. The wife was
summoned and served with a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. The court
directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was collusion between
the parties and, if there was no collusion, to intervene for the State to see that evidence for
the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. The court entered an order
requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent physician to
determine her capacity for copulation and to submit within ten days a medical certificate
on the result thereof. The defendant was granted additional five days from notice to
comply with the order with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination
would deem lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence
presented by her husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, the court entered a decree
annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. The city attorney filed a
motion for reconsideration upon the ground that the defendants impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law.
Issue:
Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.
Ruling:
The annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of
the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife was really impotent
cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established because from the commencement
of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein.
A physical examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with
any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotency being an
abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The
lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

Pacete vs. Carriaga, jr.
Facts:
A declaration of nullity of the marriage of Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion
by Concepcion Alanis as well as for her legal separation with Enrico Pacete. A second
motion for extension was filed by the defendants. However, the court granted 20-day
extension and not 30 days as defendants have appealed. The 20 days is to be counted from
Dec. 20, 1979 until Jan 7, 1980. Another motion for extension was filed but was denied by
the court because it was filed after the original period given. The motion to declare the
defendants in default was granted. Therefore, the legal separation was granted based on
the evidence showed by the plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in granting the legal separation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court annulled and dismissed the decision of the lower court because
the continuation or interruption of the legal separation must not depend on the parties
themselves. The inquiry of the Fiscal should also be included to see whether the
proceedings per separation or annulment are fully justified. Furthermore, the action per
legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition. More so, when the defendant has failed to answer, the court is tasked
to order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not there is collusion between
the parties and to see if the evidence submitted was fabricated.
In the instant case, it is apparent that the judgment was based on a stipulation of
facts and no state intervention was ordered by the trial court. In view of the premises, the
trial court gravely abused its discretion.

Tuason vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari, whereby the petitioner Emilio Tuason seeks to
annul and set aside the decision of Court of Appeals in the petition of the private
respondent, Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason, for annulment or declaration of nullity of her
marriage to the petitioner. The respondent allege that she and petitioner that at the time of
their marriage the petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent
fights between them. But the private petitioner denied all the imputations against him and
claimed he and the private respondent were normal married couple during their first ten
years of their marriage and begot two children during this period and that they have
serious personal differences in 1982 only when his wife did not accord the respect and
dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the
circumstances of the case by the petitioner.
Ruling:
The petition is denied and decision of Court of Appeals is affirmed. That the decision
annulling petitioners marriage to private respondent had already been final and executory
when petition failed to appeal during the reglamentary period. A petition for relief from
judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other
available or adequate remedy. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of remedy at law was due to his own
negligence.

Ong v. Ong
Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were
married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children:
Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1)
of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41
alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation
and grossly abusive conduct.
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting
language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. While he admits
that he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills
condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of legal separation should be granted.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court rendered decreeing the legal separation of plaintiff and defendant, with
all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership properties, for which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to
submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a just and
proper division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.

Banez vs Banez
Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case No.
CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez
and respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution
of their conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the
forfeiture of respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common
children; the payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to
be taken from petitioners share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the
use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located at
Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children within 15 days
from receipt of the decision.
In G.R. No. 132592, petitioner manifested that she no longer questions the Court of Appeals
decision on the Mazda vehicle because respondent repossessed it. As to the residential
house, she claimed that being conjugal in nature, justice requires that she and her children
be allowed to occupy and enjoy the house considering that during the entire proceedings
before the trial court, she did not have the chance to occupy it. Further, she posted a bond
of P1,500,000 for the damages which respondent may suffer.
In G.R. No. 133628, petitioner Aida Baez contends that an action for legal separation is
among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing of a
record on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is required in this
case. She concludes that respondents appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to
file the record on appeal within the reglementary period, as provided under Section 1-b,
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not an action for legal separation one where multiple appeals are
allowed.
Ruling:
No. Petitions are denied. The Supreme Court was of the view that there is no
superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would
suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. The Court noted that petitioner did not refute
respondents allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2)
other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at
all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution
pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather than the

exception.
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no
superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would
suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute
respondents allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2)
other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at
all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution
pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinely, the rule rather than the
exception.
Similarly, we are not persuaded that the P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel
was properly granted. We see no justification to pre-empt the judgment by the Court of
Appeals concerning said amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts judgment was
already on appeal.

FROILAN GAUDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN PENARANDA,
respondent
G.R No. 79284. November 27, 1987
Facts:
On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gaudionco, the legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gaudionco,
filed with the RTC-Misamis Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge, Hon. Senen
Penaranda, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. On 13 October 1986,
Teresita Gaudionco also filed with the MTC-General Santos City, a complaint against
petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986, an application for the provisional
remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was
filed by Teresita Gaudionco in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge then
ordered the payment of support pendente lite.
The petitioner believes that the civil action for legal separation is grounded on
concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended
to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Petitioner also argues
that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal
separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his
alleged offense of concubinage. He also alleges that the judge acted in abuse of discretion in
ordering him for payment of support.
Issue:
Whether or not the ground is sufficient in this case?
Ruling:
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for
legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or
are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offsprings support, and disqualification from inheriting
from the innocent spouse, among others. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for
legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as
we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in
ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for
legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount of
support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or
Wherefore, the petition of petitioner is dismissed.

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992
Facts:
Jose Jo admits to cohabiting with 3 women and fathering 15 children. (wow) Prima Jo is
allegedly the legal wife who has a daughter named Monina. Prima filed for separation of
conjugal property and support. The TC ruled in favor of Prima in the support case but failed
to render a decision on the separation of property. Jose appealed, CA affirmed support but
dismissed the separation of property for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that
separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Did the CA err in saying that (1) the judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not
allowed under Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code and (2) no such separation was
decreed by the TC- Jose says since the TC decision became final sorry nalang si Prima
Ruling:
The Court decided (2) first so even if Jose is correct in saying that the decision of the TC
failed to state the separation the Court cant let technicality prevail over substantive issues
so the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment have
become final.
On (1) -The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties
was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. It held that an agreement to
live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could
not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the
only remedy available to her was legal separation which will result in the termination of
the conjugal partnership.
Prima contends that CA misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She
says that the agreement was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial
period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to
separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement ended in 1942, when she
returned to him and he refused to accept her.
Art. 128 which superseded Art. 178 states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for
judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and

2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just
cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the intent never to return, followed
by prolonged absence without just cause, and without providing for one's family although
able to do so. The acts of Jose in denying entry to the conjugal home to his wife as early as
1942 and consistently refusing to give support from 1968 constitutes abandonment.
Since Jose had abandoned her and their child she is entitled to ask for the dissolution of
their property regime. Jose used a dummy to keep the properties from Prima but the Court
said that these properties that should now be divided between them, on the assumption
that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. The
division must include such properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as
may have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy
Law.

EDUARDO ARROYO J.R., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 96602. Nov. 19, 1991
Facts:
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda
Sare and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m.,
they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio
City then proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium owned by the Neri spouses. At
around 7 pm, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Jabunan opened
the door for Arroyo who immediately went knocked at the master's bedroom where
accused Ruby Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Neri's request,
Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused
alone in the masters bedroom. About forty-five minutes later, accused Arroyo Jr. came up
and told Linda Sare that she could already come down. The event was made known to Dr.
Jorge Neri, husband of Ruby Neri, who thereafter, filed a criminal complaint for adultery
before the RTC-Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo. Both the
RTC and the CA found the two accused guilty of adultery.
Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the CA. On appeal, both accused alleges the following: that they were into an
illicit affair, however, they denied that they had sexual intercourse on November 2, 1982
which Dr. Neri claims; and finally, that a pardon had been extended by Dr. Neri, and that he
had later contracted marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting.
Issue:
Whether or not the pardon of Dr. Neri is tenable to free the two accused of their
criminal liability?
Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides: "Art.344-The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both parties, if they are both alive, or in any case, if he shall
have consented or pardoned the offenders.
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that
consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair,
nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to
the filing of a criminal complaint. In the present case, the compromise agreement stating
the pardon given by Dr. Neri, was executed only on February 16, 1989, after the trial court
had already rendered its decision dated December 17, 1987 finding petitioners guilty

beyond reasonable doubt. Because of this, the said pardon is not sufficient to free the two
accused namely Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo of the crime adultery.

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-
appellee.
G.R No. L-10033. December 28, 1956
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to
defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan. Immediately after
their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. At
about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her
husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister-in-
law and some from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his
wife. On cross-examination, Benjamin admitted that his wife also informed him by letter,
that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. All these communications prompted him in to seek the
advice of the navy legal department. In August, 1952, Benjamin went to Asingan,
Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonilas godmother. She
came along with him and both proceeded to the house of a cousin ofBenjamin, where they
stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin
tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had
committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left.
After that and despite such belief, Benjamin still exerted efforts to locate her and failing to
find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings". On November
18, 1952, Benjamin filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, Leonila who filed an answer vehemently denying the
averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After the issues were
joined and convinced that reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing
on June 9, 1953. Benjamin presented his evidences, but the counsel of Leonila moved for
the dismissal of the complaint due to the fact that there was condonation. Both the RTC
and CA believed that there was indeed condonation.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been condonation?
Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation or, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or
wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". It is to be noted, however,
that in defendant's answer she vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any
act of infidelity against her husband, and even if we were to give full weight to the

testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Court
and link such evidence with the averments of the complaint, we would have to conclude
that the facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient to establish the charge of
adultery preferred against the defendant. Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have
received from his sister-in-law, must have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant's
infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor the anonymous letters which plaintiff
also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, his wife addressed
to him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity was not
established, do not amount to anything that can be relied upon.
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there
has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses
are offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the
parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband clearly shows that
there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument
that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant-wife,
reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading
her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be
brought to the house of his cousin and together they slept there as husband and wife for
one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept
together in their house likewise as husband and wife- all these facts have no other meaning
in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that
there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten
months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. Although he
believed that her wife committed adultery, he still persuaded her wife.
It is important to note that a divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the
parties continue to live together after it was known, or there is sexual intercourse after
knowledge of adultery, or sleeping together for a single night, and many others. The
resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be inferred,
nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and wife,
especially as against the husband.
Because of this, the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC and CAs findings that there
was indeed condonation on the part of Benjamin Bugayong, therefore, the foregoing case is
hereby dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUADALUPE
ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-3047. May 161951
Facts:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by
Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour,
for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year
1946 to March 14, 1947. The defendant-wife entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to
suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on
September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts
committed by his wife and her paramour from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948. On
February 21, 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint on the
ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The
trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint.
The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second
complaints must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints
being the same and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place
continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948 is within the scope and
meaning of the constitutional provision that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.
Issue:
Whether or not consent attended the case?
Ruling:
Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency; it is an instantaneous crime which
is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each
sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. True, two or more adulterous acts
committed by the same defendants are against the same person- the offended husband; the
same status- the union of the husband and wife by their marriage; and the same
community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such
status. But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue against the
commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated,
for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an
encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional
or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were
adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.

In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the
culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not do another or
other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last act of adultery had been committed
as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not
included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed.
Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts
does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, at
the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, the paramour
already knew that his codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have
carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such
pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous
acts committed after the pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous and
not to subsequent adulterous acts
The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is
hereby reversed and set aside, and the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the
defendants in accordance with law.

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several
children. In March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to Manila in June
1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered
that while in the said city, defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose
Arcalas. Towards the end of June 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course,
she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff
surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of
Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation; to
which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the
confession of judgment by the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not pardon attended the case at bar?
Ruling:
The mere circumstance that defendant told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be
legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the
action. When she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be
separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it
takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition
to the agreement. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred
from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other
party to procure evidence necessary to prove it; and proof that the defendant desires the
divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion. Here, the offense of adultery had
really taking place without collusion by the parties, according to the evidence. The Supreme
Court does not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home
constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be
remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had
discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to
bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby
reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of
all instances against Serafina Florenciano.

SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant-
appellee.
G.R. No. L-11766. October 25, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines
Sur. For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May
30, 1944, agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until
the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement,the
significant portions of which are hereunder reproduced: (a) That both of us relinquish our
right over the other as legal husband and wife; (b) That both without any interference by
any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other
crime or suit arising from our separation; (c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any
support from my husband or any benefits he may received thereafter, nor I the husband is
not entitled for anything from my wife; (d) That neither of us can claim anything from the
other from the time we verbally separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to the present when
we made our verbal separation into writing.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting and deporting themselves as husband
and wife who were generally reputed as such in the community with Asuncion Rebulado
and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to their child. On April 24, 1956,
plaintiff Socorro Matubis filed a complaint for legal separation Alleging abandonment and
concubinage on the part of defendant. The RTC and CA dismissed the case due to the
presence of condonation on the part of the plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether or not condonation attended the case?
Ruling:
The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that
given by the trial judge. Counsel in his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two
parts. The first part having to do with the act of living separately which he claims to be
legal, and the second part, that which becomes a license to commit the ground for legal
separation which is admittedly illegal. We do not agree in appellants defense. Condonation
and consent on the part of plaintiff are the most vital part in the said agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil
Code) specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Having condoned and or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now
undeserving of the court's sympathy. Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that the complaint

should be dismissed. He claims however, that the grounds for the dismissal should not be
those stated in the decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that plaintiff and
defendant have already been legally separated from each other, but without the marital
bond having been affected, long before the effectivity of the new Civil Code." Again, we
cannot subscribe to counsel's contention, because it is contrary to the evidence.
Wherefore, the decisions of both RTC and CA are hereby affirmed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. RODOLFO
SCHNCKENBERGER, defendant-appellant
GR No. 48183. November 10, 1941
Facts:
On Mach 16, 1926, the accused, Rodolfo Schneckenberger married the complainant
Elena Cartegena and after 7 years of marital life, they agreed, for reason of alleged
incompatibility of character, to live separately from each other. And on May 25, 1935, they
executed a document in which they agreed to live separately and to choose who they want
to live with. On June 15, 1935, the accused, without leaving the Philippines, secured a
divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted another
marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel. Complainant herein instituted 2 actions for
Bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for concubinage in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction of the accused. On the trial of
concubinage, accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed.
But upon appeal by the fiscal, accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless
imprudence. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused in the offense of concubinage?
Ruling:
As to appellants plea for double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the offense
of bigamy for which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial are
two distinct offenses in law and in fact as well as the mode of their prosecution. The
celebration of the second marriage, with the first still existing, characterizes bigamy; in the
present case, mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife
characterizes concubinage.
Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of
the crime of concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused clearly
shows that each party intended to forego the illicit acts of the other. As the term pardon
unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, consent must have been
intended, agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior its commission. No
logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in
both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor,
he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the
wrong. In arriving at this conclusion, we do not wish to be misconstrued as legalizing an
agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that
an agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the

plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting
the offense.
Wherefore, judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted in the crime of
concubinage.

PEOPLE OF THE PILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. URSULA SENSANO,
defendant-appellant
No. 37720. March 7, 1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. they had one
child. Shortly after the birth of the child, the husband left his wife to go to Cagayan where
he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the
support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, she struggled for an existence of herself
and her son until the day she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to
live with him. On the return of the husband in 1924, he filed a charge against his wife and
Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to 4 months and 1 day. After
completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour. Thereafter, she begged for the
husbands pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back. He refused
to pardon her or to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he would
have nothing to do with her anymore and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the
second time, she and her child went back to Marcelo Ramos. The husband, knowing that
she resumed living with her codefendant did nothing to interfere with their relations or to
assert his rights as husband. Thereafter, he left foe Hawaii where he remained fro seven
years completely abandoning his wife and child. On his return to the Philippines, he
presented the second charge of adultery.
Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint would prosper?
Ruling:
We have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct
warrant the interference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the
accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding. We
cannot accept the argument that the 7 years of consent on his part in the adultery of his
wife is explained by his absence from the Philippines during which period it was
impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is not merit in the
argument that it was impossible for him to take any action against the accused during the
said 7 years.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed.

AGUEDA BENEDICTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTEBAN DELA RAMA,
defendant
No. 1056. December 8, 1903
Facts:
From the affidavit of the plaintiff is the following: that plaintiff and defendant had
lived together from the time of their marriage in July 1891 to August 1892. It is also
admitted that the defendant suddenly, without any previous warning, took his wife to the
house of her parents, left her there, and never lived with her afterwards. She also charged
defendant with having committed concubinage with Gregoria Bermejo in 1982. She
produced no evidence to support this allegation. On the other hand, the defendant
presented his counter-affidavit where he agreed on the time of their marriage. That on his
return from an inspection of one of his estates, his wifes maid gave him a letter in the own
handwriting of his wife which was directed to his lover, a Spanish corporal of the civil
guard named Zabal. She admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and
implored him to pardon her. That same day, he took her to the home of her parents, told
what had occurred, and left her there.
Respondent then filed for Legal Separation which was given by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Legal Separating filed by the respondent would prosper?
Ruling:
It is said that if the plaintiff is guilty, the defendant has condoned the offense. The
wife can defeat the husbands suit by proving that he has pardoned her.
Our conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to Legal Separation. As
conclusion of law from the foregoing facts, we hold that neither party is entitled to
judgment of Legal Separation against the other. That judgment be entered that the plaintiff
take nothing by her action.

WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUANITA YAMBAO,
defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-10699. October 18, 1957
Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila
to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that
while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942-1945, his wife engaged in adulterous
relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl; that Brown learned of his
wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that thereafter the
spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal
partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share, the complaint
prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of
the marriage and that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and
for their remedy as might be just and equitable. The court subsequently directed the City
Fiscal to investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, whether or not a
collusion exists between the parties. As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared
at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions elicited the fact that after
liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by
her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the
ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct
of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code that
there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed under
Article 102 of the same Code since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's
infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1955.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescription barred the success of the case?
Ruling:
ART. 100 of the New Civil Code states that The legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or of consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be
claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall
cause the dismissal of the petition. It is clear in this court that the case should be dismissed
because of Browns illegal act of cohabiting with another woman.
This court also found, and correctly held that Browns action was already barred,
because he did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned
of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article

102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one 1
year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and within five years from
and after the date when such cause occurred.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the
remedy sought, it becomes unnecessary to delve further into the case and ascertain if
Brown's inaction for ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. The
decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint is therefore affirmed.

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several
children. In March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to Manila in June
1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered
that while in the said city, defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose
Arcalas. Towards the end of June 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course,
she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff
surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of
Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation; to
which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the
confession of judgment by the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition will not prosper?
Ruling:
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The
defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story
might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could
not have practiced deception at such a personal risk. In this connection, it has been held
that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the
offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. And
proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself
collusion.
Moreover, Art. 102 of the New Civil Code stating that an action for legal separation
cannot be filed except within one 1 year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of
the cause; and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. This
court decided that the 1-year requirement was followed. The instance when plaintiff caught
his wife in 1955 with another man was deemed to be start of the 1-year requirement
period. Since he filed on that same year-1955, he properly followed the above stated
provision.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby
reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of
all instances against Serafina Florenciano.

ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG,
defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of
Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage, three children were born. Immediately before the
election of 1961, defendant was employed as manager of the printing establishment owned
by plaintiff's father known as the MICO Offset. In that capacity, defendant met and came to
know Lily Ann Alcala, who place orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials for Mr.
Sergio Osmea, who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After the elections of 1961,
defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacaang. He began to be
away so often and to come home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained
that he was out on a series of confidential missions.
In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that
defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following
October, returned to the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report
from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away. Although plaintiff, in
April 1963, also received rumors that defendant was seen with a woman who was on the
family way on Dasmarias St., she was so happy that defendant again return to the family
home in May, 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him
because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while,
defendant, if and whenever he returned to the family fold, would only stay for two or three
days but would be gone for a period of about a month. After plaintiff received reports that
Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's
employee, to verify the reports. The latter was driven by Lubos to the house in Singalong
and between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock that afternoon, she saw defendant was carrying a baby
in his arms. Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest of Singalong where she inquired
about the child of Cesar Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a copy of the
baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline Macaraig which she gave to plaintiff
sometime in October 1963.
Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with
defendant and to convince him to return to his family. Mr. Macaraig; however, Macaraig
refused. In November 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister,
Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, and the latter obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia
between plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as
she had no desire to be accused criminally but it was defendant who refused to break
relationship with her. In the early part of December 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her
two children went to talk to defendant at his place of work. Plaintiff pleaded with

defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that
she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave
Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation.
When defendant did not interpose any answer after he was served summons, the case was
referred to the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of
the Civil Code. After a report was received from Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Pearanda that he
believed that there was no collusion present, plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence.
Defendant has never appeared in this case.
The RTC and CA dismissed the complaints because it failed to follow Article 102 of
the New Civil Code providing that an action for legal separation cannot be instituted except
within one year after plaintiff "became cognizant of the cause."
Issue:
Whether or not the rule on Prescription should be followed?
Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one
year after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but
is of the essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is
an inviolable social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will
allow a disruption of its status.
In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became cognizant of
defendant's infidelity in September, 1962. Plaintiff made successive attempts to induce the
husband to amend his erring ways but failed. Her desire to bring defendant back to the
connubial fold and to preserve family solidarity deterred her from taking timely legal
action.
The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in
Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from
September 1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period of one year from the
former date, it is clear that plaintiff's complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little
too late.
The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here
involved.
Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962,
whatever knowledge appellant had acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is,
of the fact that he was then living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala, was only through the
information given to her by the driver of their family car. Much as such hearsay information
had pained and anguished her, she apparently thought it best, and no reasonable person
may justifiably blame her for it, not to go deeper into the matter herself because in all

probability even up to that time, notwithstanding her husband's obvious neglect of his
entire family, appellant still cherished the hope, however forlorn, of his coming back home
to them. Indeed, when her husband returned to the conjugal home the following October,
she purposely refrained from bringing up the matter of his marital infidelity "in her desire
not to anger nor drive defendant away." True, appellant likewise heard in April 1963
rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on the family way on Dasmarias Street,
but failed again to either bring up the matter with her husband or make attempts to verify
the truth of said rumors, but this was due, because "she was so happy that defendant again
returned to the family home in May 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the
matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away." As
a matter of fact, notwithstanding all these painful information which would not have been
legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation, appellant still made brave, desperate
attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the words of the lower court, she
"entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince
him to return to his family" and also "requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister,
Mrs. Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was of no avail. Her husband
remained stubborn.
After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law,
the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was
in the early part of December 1963 when plaintiff, accompanied by their two children went
to talk to defendant where she pleaded but however was refused by the defendant.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in
the preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and
would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be
deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation,
and it was only then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered
holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation.

LUIS MA. ARANETA, petitioner vs. HON. HERMOGENES CONCECPCION,
respondent
G.R No. L-9667. July 31, 1956
Facts:
The main action was brought by petitioner against his wife for legal separation on
the ground of adultery. Defendant filed an omnibus petition alleging that she was being
molested and harassed, to secure custody of their three minor children and a monthly
support of P5, 000.00. Plaintiff opposed the petition, denying the allegation and further
alleging that defendant has abandoned the children; alleging that conjugal properties were
only worth P80,000.00, not 1 million pesos as alleged by defendant; also alleging that
defendant had abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had
become unfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the
children the love, respect and care of a true mother and without means to educate them.
The RTC granted the custody of the children to defendant. The main reason given by
the judge, for refusing plaintiffs request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the
issues, is the prohibition contained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code stating that an action for
legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition.
Issue:
Whether the cooling-off period is tenable in the case at bar?
Ruling:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed in Art. 103 is evidently intended as
a cooling-off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of
their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions
against one another.
Take the case at bar for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery
supported by circumstantial evidence the authenticity of which cannot be denied? And why
assume that the children are in the custody of the wife when it is precisely alleged in the
petition and affidavits that she has abandoned the conjugal home?
Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of
the court as to the custody and alimony pendent elite may be lawfully exercised. The rule is
that all provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand
and given effect by reconciling them if necessary. Thus, the determination of the custody
and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of
violating the policy of the cooling-off period.

ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. HON. GLICERIO
V. CARRIAGA, respondent
G.R. No. L-53880. March 17, 1994
Facts:
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage as well as for legal separation between her husband Enrico L.
Pacete. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on April 30, 1938
before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child named; that
Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in
Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on August 1, 1979; that
during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of
land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces
of property either in his name and the name of Clarita or in the names of his children with
Clarita; that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation
between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living
with Clarita. The defendants were served with summons on November 15, 1979. They filed
a motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an answer. The court granted the
motion. On the due date, the defendants again asked for a second extension which was
again granted by the court. Again, on the agreed due date, defendants asked for another 15-
day extension which was however denied by the court. Initial proceedings using the
evidence only of Concepcion followed thereafter.
On 17 March 1980, the court through the Hon. Glicerio Carriga promulgated the
herein questioned decision namely: the valid issuance of the legal separation between
Concepcion and Enrico Pacete and declaring the subsequent marriage between Enrico
Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion to be void ab initio.
Because of this, Enrico Pacete filed a special action of certiorari questioning the
period of trial by the Hon. Carriaga.
Issue:
Whether or not the cooling-off period is mandatory?
Ruling:
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates
that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-
off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to
possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation

and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the
vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That
other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same
action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements
aforequoted. The 6-months period is clear in this court to have been followed by the RTC
judge.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the proceedings are
Nullified and Set Aside. No costs.

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his
successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, respondent
Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for
fifteen years. Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines
but not to his wife and their children but to Thelma Cumareng whom he conducted a
second marriage on October 1981 and their three children. Four years later, he filed an
action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at Greenhills, Metro
Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old,
very sick and living alone without any income. Private respondent opposed the
authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the house in
Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children. She also informed the court
that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was
instead maintaining a separate residence. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the
decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with
forfeiture of her husband's share. After trial, the court decreed the legal separation of the
spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as
well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife. This decision was
appealed to the CA. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to command the petitioner from interfering with the
administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. After hearing, the CA
granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife. The petitioner argues that since
the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal properties by the husband and
wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts erred in their decision?
Ruling:
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal
properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However,
Article 61 states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall,
in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the
spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. While it is true that no formal
designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the

decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties. That
designation was in effect approved by the CA when it issued in favor of the respondent wife
the preliminary injunction now under challenge. The primary purpose of the provisional
remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the
relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these
matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final
judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and
thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the
plaintiff.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual
or threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as
the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for
legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the
conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that
entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the
detriment of his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier
declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be
prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management. Let it be
stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner,
pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the
Family Code.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115640. March 15, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu who was employed by the National Steel Corporation
and respondent Teresita Masauding who was a nurse, first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan.
In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles to work as a nurse. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his
employer, to Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to
maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16 1986, their
daughter was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States,
their second child was born on January 12, 1988. The couple decided to separate sometime
in 1990. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo,
Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims however,
the she keeps in constant touch with her children. Reynaldo brought his children home to
the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was
sent back to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma
Layug and her family. Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children
because Reynaldo had filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of
being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually rendered only
on September 29, 1994. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on
December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the two
petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings to gain
custody over the children.
The RTC suspended Teresita's parental authority and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority. On appeal, the CA however gave custody to Teresita.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in suspending petitioners parental authority?
Ruling:
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to
discover the choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or
unfit, respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions and general propositions
applicable to ordinary or common situations. A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case
indicates that Teresita is more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother
separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character
being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interest and
welfare of her children. While the bonds between a mother and her children are special in

nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if
deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering, pride and other feelings of
either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration. The matter
of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a
future character and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined.
Decision should be based on the testimony of the daughter giving all negative
characteristics about her mother. Teresita. Moreover, the court finds Teresita being as she
entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of
petitioner Reynaldo in Pennsylvania. The record shows that the daughter suffered
emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and
kissing a boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the
conjugal home and the children.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are
now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is
clear front the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two
requirements found in the First paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The
presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children
are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for
children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute,
there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the
mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have
been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO SY UY,
respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
Facts:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married on September 30, 1934;
that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their
marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio S. Eufemio
alleged affirmative and special defenses, and counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity
ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok. But before
the trial could be completed Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on May 31,
1969. On June 9, 1969, Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two
(2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year
period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated
the action for legal separation. On June 26, 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz Both the RTC and CA denied
the substitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves
property rights?
Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes
this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse to claim legal separation; and in
its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal
in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree

of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not
come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
Accordingly, the decision of both the RTC and the CA are hereby affirmed.

Laperal vs. Republic
GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962
FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to
the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she
naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in
using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on
the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to
use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally
separated from his husband.
HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband
surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be
considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the
conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and
liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the
mandatory provision of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.

SIOCHI V. GOZON
18 March 2010
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the name of the
Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo.
Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal separation case was still pending.
Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell
involving the property for the price of P18 million. They stipulated that Alfredo was to
remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the land excluded from the legal
separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife Elvira that the property was the
exclusive property of Alfredo.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these
stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase
price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993.
Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As regards the
property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the
said property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of lis
pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by
Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA affirmed.
Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer
which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is
withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for
the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property
upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira.
IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE:
Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.
Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of their daughter
by virtue of the decree of legal separation? NO.

HELD:
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the
property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family
Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom
Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell
the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without
such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse
renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is
still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was
without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void.
As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be
perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property
was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates
that the offer was already withdrawn.
We disagree with the CA when it held that the share of Alfredo in the conjugal
partnership was already forfeited in favour of the daughter. Among the effects of the decree
of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the
offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of
Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a
buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to
make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property.

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio
is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For
many years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On July
11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together
for a period of 30 years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed
reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Makati City when he was in Manila
and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had 6 children. On
December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with
Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo City. The children alleged that during this time, their
mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant
drug. As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated. On May 31, 1998, after attending
a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and
instead lived at Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of Potenciano Ilusorio due to his advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment. She alleged that respondents refused petitioners
demands to see and visit her husband. The CA denied petitioners motion.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to
live with her in conjugal bliss?
Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The evidence shows that there was no actual
and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of
mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to
discern his actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make
choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to
see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but

these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the CA
that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration,
and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of
the Court of Appeals. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against
his fundamental constitutional right.
Wherefore, this court affirms the decision of the CA, however, it nullifies the
decision insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

MARIANO ARROYO, plaintiff vs. DOLORES VAZQUEZ DE ARROYO,
defendant
G.R No. 17014. August 11, 1921
Facts:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of
wedlock by marriage in 1910 and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation,
they lived together as husband and wife until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from
their common home with the intention to live separately from her husband. After efforts
had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, an
action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with
him as a dutiful wife. The wife answered that she had left her husbands home without his
consent because of the cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Upon hearing the cause,
the lower court gave judgment in favor of the wife, authorizing her to live apart from her
husband. They concluded that the husband was more to blame than the wife and that his
continued ill-treatment was a sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal
home.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in their judgment favoring the wife?
Ruling:
To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the
wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in Art. 142 and
143 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, it has been determined that where the wife is forced to
leave the matrimonial abode, she can, compel him to make provision for her separate
maintenance. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties and the society at large require
that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife. From this consideration, it follows that provisions should be made
for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of
the husband.
We are therefore hold that Mariano Arroyo in this case is entitled to the
unconditional and absolute return of the wife to the marital domicile. He is entitled to a
judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is
her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment of the lower court, it is declared that Dolores
Vazquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause;
and that she is admonished that it is her duty to return.

ELOISA GOITIA Y DELA CAMARA, plaintiff vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA,
defendant
Facts:
This is an action by the wife against the husband for support outside of the conjugal
domicile. Eloitia Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married on January 7, 1915
and established residence at San Marcelino where they lived together for one month
because the wife returned to the home of her parents due to the following reasons: that the
husband demand wife to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that
whenever wife rejected husbands indecorous demands, husband would maltreat wife by
words and inflict injuries on wifes lips, face and different parts of her body; and that
because wife was unable to desist husbands repugnant desires and maltreatment, she was
obliged to leave the conjugal home. The wife also seeks for support from his husband even
if she lives separately. The husband on the other hand, seeks the relief of the courts in
compelling his wife to return back to their conjugal home.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife is compelled to return to the marital dwelling?
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights,
duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the
general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the
legal existence is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled
by the government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of the society as well as
the parties.
Marriage is an institution and its maintenance is in its purity which the public is
deeply interested. In the case at bar, when the continuance of the marriage becomes
intolerable to one or both parties and gives no possible good to the community, relief from
the court should be attainable. The Supreme Court made the observation that implied
approval by the court of a wifes separate residence from her husband doe not necessarily
violate the sacredness and inviolability of the marriage. Since separation de-facto is
allowed in this case, it is only due to the fact that public peace and wifes purity must be
preserved.
Lastly, the husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty
to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal and
unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take the
advantage of her departure to abrogate his duty to still support his wife. In law, the wife is
legally still within the conjugal domicile, even if living separately, thus he is entitled to
support and maintenance by the husband.

PASTOR TANCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA ESCANO,
defendant-appellee
No. L-19671. November 29, 1965
Facts:
On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tanchavez got married and the
marriage was unknown to the parents of Vicenta. The said marriage was solemnized by Lt.
Lavares, an Army Catholic Chaplain. Their marriage was the culmination of a previous love
affair and was duly registered with the local civil registrar.
Upon the knowledge of the parents of Vicenta, they took her to their house.
Consequently, she admitted her marriage with Tanchavez. Her parents were surprised
because Tanchavez never asked for the hand of Vicenta and were disgusted because of the
great scandal because of the clandestine marriage would provoke.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued to live with her parents, while tanchavez returned to
Manila to his job. As of June 1948, the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta filed a
petition to annul her marriage; however, she did not sign the said document. Thus, the case
was dismissed because of her non- appearance at the hearing.
In 1950, Vicenta left for United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce. And on October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute was
issued. In 1954, Vicenta married an American and she lived with him and begotten
children.
Issue:
Whether or not Vicenta failed to perform her wifely duties.
Ruling:
It was held that the refusal to perform her wifely duties and her denial of
consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through he
fault. Thus, the husband is entitled for indemnity.

DIOSDIDIT CUENCA, et al, petitioner, vs RESTITUTO CUENCA, et al
No. L-72321. December 8, 1988
Facts:
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon- Cuenca were legally married, begotten two
children, Restituto and Meladora as their heirs. Maria Bangahon brought properties into
her marriage. Said property was inherited by her from her parents.
However, Agrapi had a second family who claimed to be the legitimate family of
Agrapino. Thus, they claimed that the said properties are the conjugal property of Agrapino
and Engracia, second wife.
The trial court decided in favor of the second family. However, the Court of Appeals
decided otherwise and thus favored the first family.
Issue:
Whether or not the said property of Maria is the conjugal property of Agripino and
Engracia.
Ruling:
The Court held that, the said property an exclusive property of Maria which she
inherited from her parents and brought it to the marriage. Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Thus, heirs of Maria were able to prove that that said property is the exclusive property of
their mother Maria. On the other hand, Engracia failed to prove otherwise.

JANE GO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997
Facts:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987. The video coverage of the
wedding was provided by the petitioner spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed
the video of their wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the newlywed
couple will be having their honeymoon in US, they agreed to have the video tape upon their
return.
When the couple came home, they found out that the said tape had been erased by
spouses Go.
Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only record of their wedding.
Thus, they filed a complaint. The RTC rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the
said erased tape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Alex Go be held liable.
Ruling:
The Court held that, Alex Go argues that when his wife entered into the contract
with Ong, she was acting alone for her sole interest. Thus, they found it with merit. Under
the law, a wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the
consent of the husband.
Thus, it was only Nancy Go who entered into the contract. She is solely liable to the
complainant for the damage awarded.

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner vs. VDA. DE BATOCAEL, respondent
G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001
Facts:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zozima Montallana are owners
of several pieces of land. However, when Zosima died Francisco and his mother-in-law
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. On June 27, 1961, Francisco
registered those said lots in his name.
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his
niece Leticia and His cousin Luzveminda and Cirila Abarca to take care of his house and the
store as well.
There are however conflicting testimonies as to the relationship of Francisco and
Cirila. Niece of Francisco, Leticia said that her uncle and Cirila were lovers and they slept in
the same room. Another niece of Fernando said that Francisco himself told her that Cirila is
her mistress. Cirila on the other hand claimed that they are not lovers nor she is a mistress
of Francisco. She is just a mere helper of Francisco.
Few months before the death of Francisco, he executed an instrument dominated
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of Cirila. Cirila on the other hand accepted the said
donation.
A complaint was filed by the heirs of Francisco for the declaration of nullity of the
deed of donation inter vivos basing it on Article 87 of the Family Code.
Thus, the said donation was nullified by the RTC and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the said donation is valid.
Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, Francisco and Cirila as proved by evidences and
testimonies, they actually lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
Thus, the said donation is invalid or void basing it on Article 87 of the Family Code which
provides: Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may
give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

FELIX MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES, defendant-
appellee vs.
FELIX MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellent
No. L-28771. March 31, 1971
Facts:
Felix Matabuena donated a parcel of land to Petronila Cervantes while living
martially without the benefit of marriage.
The Deed of Donation was executed by Felix in Favor of Cervantes on February 20,
1956, which same donation was accepted by Cervantes.
After six years, they got married on March 28, 1962. Felix died on September 13,
1962. after the death of Felix, Cornelia Matabuana, sister of Felix being the sole heir
claimed that the donation made by his brother is void for it was executed while her brother
and Cervantes were living together as husband and wife without the benefit of valid
marriage.
The RTC decided in favor of Cervantes on the ground that the said prohibition is
applied only for couples living together with the benefit of a valid marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation is valid.
Ruling:
The Court held that, while Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation
between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should be applied to a
common-law relationship,
However, the lack of validity of the donation to Cervantes does not necessarily
result in Cornelias exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix, the
relationship between him and Cervantes was legitimated by their marriage. Cervantes is
therefore his widow. Thus she is entitled to one-half of inheritance and Cornelia as the
surviving sister, to the other half.

HILARIO GERCIO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUN LIFE CO. OF CANADA,
defendant-appellant
No. 23703. September 28, 1925
Facts:
Andrea Zialcita was the lawful wife of Hilario Gercio. Towards the end of the year
1919, she was convicted of the crime of adultery. On September 4, 1920, a decree of divorce
was issued which had the effect of completely dissolving the bonds of matrimony
contracted by Hilario Gercio and Andrea Zialcita.
On march 4, 1922, Gercio notified the Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada that he had
revoked his donation in favor of Zialcita, and he had designated in her stead his present
wife, as the beneficiary of the policy. Gercio requested the company to eliminate Zialcita as
beneficiary, however, the company refused.
Issue:
Whether or not Gercio can change the beneficiary of the policy.
Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the insured-the husband- has no power to change the
beneficiary- the former wife- and to name the stead his actual wife, where the policy of the
insurance does not expressly reserve to the insured the right to change the beneficiary.

Navarro v. Judge Escobido and Go
27 November 2009
Facts:
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 98-599 (first complaint)6 and 98-598 (second complaint),7 before the RTC for
replevin and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen
Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in
Navarros possession.
Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises,
since it did not have the requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the
agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen Go who filed the complaints and
not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state a cause
of action.
Karen Go, on the other hand, claims that it is misleading for Navarro to state that she has no
real interest in the subject of the complaint, even if the lease agreements were signed only
by her husband, Glenn Go; she is the owner of Kargo Enterprises and Glenn Go signed the
lease agreements merely as the manager of Kargo Enterprises. Moreover, Karen Go
maintains that Navarros insistence that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Gos paraphernal
property is without basis. Based on the law and jurisprudence on the matter, all property
acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal property. Finally, Karen Go insists
that her complaints sufficiently established a cause of action against Navarro. Thus, when
the RTC ordered her to include her husband as co-plaintiff, this was merely to comply with
the rule that spouses should sue jointly, and was not meant to cure the complaints lack of
cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
Held:
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law
or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest.
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly
benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros
contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her
Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease
Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can
legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole
proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to
consider in a trial on the merits.

HARDING, plaintiff-appellees vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE
COMPANY, defendant-appellant
No. 12707. August 10, 1918
Facts:
A husband donated an automobile to his wife, who subsequently insured it for P
3,000. When the car was later completely destroyed, the wife sought to recover the
insurance indemnity, but the insurance pleaded in defense that the wife had no insurable
interest in the car, the donation by the husband being void.
Issue:
Whether or not the insurance can raise the validity of the donation as a defense.
Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the insurance company failed to show that the gift was
not a moderate one, considering the circumstances of the parties. Furthermore, even if the
gift had not been a moderate one, the company cannot assail the validity of the donation,
because at the time of the transfer, it was not a creditor.

PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 143286. April 14, 2004
Facts:
Eusebia Napisa and Nicolas Retuya were married on October 7, 1926. out of the
marriage, they begotten five children. During their marriage, they acquired real properties.
In 1936, Nicolas started to cohabit with Pacita Villanueva and out of wedlock they
had an illegitimate child, Procopio Villanueva.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties,
claiming the subject properties are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. On November 23,
1996, Eusebia died.
The RTC ruled in favor of Eusebia represented by her son. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the said decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Eusebia has the right for the reconveyance of the said properties.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that in the affirmative. Article 105 of the Family Code
explicitly mandates that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before
the Family Code to vest rights already acquired under the Civil Code. Thus, under the
Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that
they are conjugal. This is counter balanced by the requirement that properties must first be
proven to have been acquired during the marriage before it is presumed to be conjugal.
Eusebia was able to prove that those properties were acquired during their
marriage. Though Nicolas and Pacita cohabited, Nicolas and Eusebia were still married.
Thus, any property acquired during the period is considered conjugal, unless it is proven
that Pacita contributed in the acquisition of said property. However, Pacita failed to prove
the exception.

ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004
Facts:
On September 26, 1978, PBMCI obtained a loan of P9,000,000 from Allied Banking
Corporation. On December 28, 1978, ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI through its
Executive Vice President Alfredo Ching. However, PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its
loans.
PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for suspension of payments with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and at the same time seeking the PBMCIs
rehabilitation.
On July 9, 1982, the SEC issued an order placing PBMCIs business, including its
assets and liabilities under rehabilitation. In the mean time, on July 21, 1983, the deputy
sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of stocks in the
name of Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching filed a motion to
set aside the levy on attachment. She alleged that the 100,000 shares of stock levied on by
the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal
funds. Encarnacion showed to the court copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo as an
evidence.
The RTC ruled in her favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision of the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the said 100,000 shares of stock be excluded from the case.
Ruling:
It was held by the court that, for conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability, that
should appertain to the husband alone, there must be showing that some advantages
accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make conjugal partnership responsible for a liability
that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New
Civil Code to show the utmost concern for solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks
to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership. ABC failed to prove that the conjugal
partnership of Encarnacion and Alfredo was benefited by Alfredos act of executing a
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the respondents for and in behalf of
PBMCI.

ETERIA TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997
Facts:
On April 17,1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan against Alfonsos brothers, Celestino and Maximo Tan.
Spouses claimed that 1/3 of the 906 square meter residential lot was brought to
their conjugal property during their marriage. However, brothers of Alfonso objected the
claim. They claimed that the subject property was inherited by them from their mother and
was divided among them, Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo.
Eteria, admitted that she is legally married to Alfonso but they were now living
separately by virtue of a decree of legal separation.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Alfonso and Eteria, however, the Court of
Appeals decided otherwise.
Issue:
Whether or not the said 1/3 of the subject property is a conjugal property of Eteria
and Alfonso.
Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the Husbands acquisition by succession of a parcel of
land during his marriage to his wife simply means that the lot is his exclusive property
because it was acquired by him during the marriage by lucrative title.

JANE GO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997
Facts:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987. The video coverage of the
wedding was provided by the petitioner spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed
the video of their wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the newlywed
couple will be having their honeymoon in US, they agreed to have the video tape upon their
return.
When the couple came home, they found out that the said tape had been erased by
spouses Go.
Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only record of their wedding.
Thus, they filed a complaint. The RTC rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the
said erased tape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses Go be jointly held liable.
Ruling:
The Court held that, since the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or
engage in business without the consent of the husband, the husband may not be held
jointly and severally liable with his wife for breach of a contract that the latter had entered
into.

SIOCHI V. GOZON, et al.,
18 March 2010
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the name of the
Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo.
Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal separation case was still pending.
Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell
involving the property for the price of P18 million. They stipulated that Alfredo was to
remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the land excluded from the legal
separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife Elvira that the property was the
exclusive property of Alfredo.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these
stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase
price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993.
Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As regards the
property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the
said property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of lis
pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by
Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA affirmed.
Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer
which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is
withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for
the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property
upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira.
IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE:
Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.
Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of their daughter
by virtue of the decree of legal separation? NO.

HELD:
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the
property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family
Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with
whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell
the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without
such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse
renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is
still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was
without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void.
As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be
perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property
was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates
that the offer was already withdrawn.
We disagree with the CA when it held that the share of Alfredo in the conjugal
partnership was already forfeited in favour of the daughter. Among the effects of the decree
of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the
offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of
Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a
buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to
make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property.

JOE A. ROS AND ESTRELLA AGUETE, PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK - LAOAG BRANCH, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 170166, April 06, 2011
Facts:
On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the
annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against
PNB, Laoag Branch before the Court of First Instance, Ilocos Norte docketed as Civil Case
No. 7803.
The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Laoag City.
The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan
of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan,
plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land - Lot No.
9161 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and
registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan
obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal
property - a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale
and consolidation of the property - interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on
the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and
insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees' own acts [of]
omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of
estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.

Issue:
Whether or not the loan contracted by husband Joe A. Ros with respondent Philippine
National Bank - Laoag redounded to the benefit of his family, aside from the fact that such
had not been raised by respondent in its appeal.
Held:
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for additional
working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco. In her testimony, Aguete
confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it
prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did not know where he
"wasted the money. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the
family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of
loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
For this reason, we rule that Ros' loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

AGABAO V. PARULAN
1 September 2010
Facts:
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio (Atanacio) offered the property to
the petitioners, who initially did not show interest due to the rundown condition of the
improvements. But Atanacios persistence prevailed upon them, so that onFebruary 2,
1991, they and Atanacio met with Ma. Elena at the site of the property. During their
meeting, Ma. Elena showed to them the following documents, namely: (a) the owners
original copy of TCT No. 63376; (b) a certified true copy of TCT No. 63377; (c) three tax
declarations; and (d) a copy of the special power of attorney (SPA) dated January 7,
1991 executed by Dionisio authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the property. Before the meeting
ended, they paid P20,000.00 as earnest money, for which Ma. Elena executed a
handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money, whereby the parties stipulated that: (a) they would
pay an additional payment of P130,000.00 on February 4, 1991; (b) they would pay the
balance of the bank loan of the respondents amounting to P650,000.00 on or before
February 15, 1991; and (c) they would make the final payment of P700,000.00 once Ma.
Elena turned over the property on March 31, 1991.
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and
the Assessors Office of Paraaque City to verify the TCTs shown by Ma. Elena in the
company of Atanacio and her husband (also a licensed broker). There, they discovered that
the lot under TCT No. 63376 had been encumbered to Banco Filipino in 1983 or 1984, but
that the encumbrance had already been cancelled due to the full payment of the
obligation. They noticed that the Banco Filipino loan had been effected through an SPA
executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. They found on TCT No. 63377 the annotation of
an existing mortgage in favor of the Los Baos Rural Bank, also effected through an SPA
executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena, coupled with a copy of a court order authorizing
Ma. Elena to mortgage the lot to secure a loan of P500,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale between Mrs. Elena and the petitioners had been a nullity under
Held:
To start with, Article 254 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under
the Civil Code, among them theentire Title VI in which the provisions on the property
relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found.

The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of
the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it
is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the
effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in

the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Fuentes, et al v. Roca, et al
21 April, 2010
Facts: Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, ZamboangaCity. In
1982, she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. But
Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name. In
1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes
spouses). They later signed an agreement to sell prepared by one Atty. Plagata dated April
29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment
of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was
to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife,
Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an
additional P140,000.00 orP160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in
demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further
formality and payment.
As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit
in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor
of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their
agreement. A new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed
a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed an action for annulment
of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses with the RTC- Zamboanga
City. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario,
did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged.
They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the
price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.
RTC dimissed the action. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed
Held: No, the action has not yet prescribed.

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the
Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who
gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same
would be void. Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or
inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to
contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of
conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void contract is equivalent
to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by
ratification or prescription.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mothers (his
wifes) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an
action.

SPOUSES DE LEON. Et al vs. DE LEON, ET AL
23 JULY, 2009
Facts:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on
installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently,
on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal
Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma.
Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC
executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of
Bonifacio, single.
Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and
husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale
dated January 12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of
Anita.
Thereafter, or on May 23, 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church
wedding at St. John the Baptist Parish inSan Juan, Manila.
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT No. 173677
canceled. They secured the issuance in their names of TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon
City Register of Deeds.
Getting wind of the cancellation of their fathers title and the issuance of TCT No. N-
173911, Danilo and Vilma filed on May 19, 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim before the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect their rights over the subject property. Very
much later, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon
City. In their complaint, Anita and her children alleged, among other things, that fraud
attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would
show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land.

Issue:
Whether the [CA] gravely erred in concluding that the land purchased on
installment by Bonifacio O. De Leon before marriage although some installments
were paid during the marriage is conjugal and not his exclusive property.
Held:
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio
and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals
teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the
properties will still be considered conjugal.

SPOUSES CLARO AND NIDA BAUTISTA, petitioners, v. BERLINDA F. SILVA,
respondent.
G. R. No. 157434. September 19, 2006.
Facts:
On August 14, 1980, a Transfer Certificate of Title No. B- 37189 over a parcel of land
was registered in the names of Spouses Berlinda F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva.
On March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife,
Berlinda, thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by
Berlinda in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of
land covered by TCT No. B-37189 in favor of spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.
As a consequence, TCT No. B-37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. V-
2765 of the Registry of Deeds for the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of
spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4, 1988.
Evidence shows that the signature appearing on the Special Power of Attorney as
that of Berlinda is a forgery, and that consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Pedro in favor of spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlinda.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale made by Pedro is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes.
The sale of conjugal property by the husband without marital consent of the wife
affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife and it is considered a nullity.
Petitioners are not buyers of good faith since they were dealing with a seller (Pedro)
who had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that
marital consent of respondent is required before he could convey the property.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN v. DAILO
453 SCRA 283
FACTS:
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967.
During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot located at San Pablo City.The
Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
as vendee.Without the knowledge and consent of respondent, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed
a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter
to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the
spouses Dailo's house and lot in San Pablo City. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed
on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of
petitioner. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding; thus, prompting petitioner to
institute an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property, the latter as
the highest bidder.
On December 20, 1995, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died.Claiming that she had no knowledge of the
mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent
instituted with the RTC of San Pablo for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of
Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in
question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by
the late Marcelino Dailo Jr. the same having redounded the benefit of the family.
HELD:
NO. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late
husband.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . .
. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to
the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . The burden of proof that the debt
was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-
party litigant claiming as such. Petitioner's sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained was
used to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit
of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than
petitioner's bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a
finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the

benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the
payment of the principal obligation.

ABALOS v. MACATANGAY
439 SCRA 649
FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land
located at Azucena St.,Makati City. With a Special Power of Attorney dated June 2, 1988,
purportedly issued by his wife, Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of
Agreement , in favor of respondent, Dr. Galicano S. Macatangay ,binding himself to sell to
respondent the subject property.
On November 16, 1989, respondent sent a letter the spouses informing them of his
willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. On the same date, Esther, through
her attorney-in-fact, executed in favor of respondent, a Contract to Sell the property to the
extent of her conjugal interest.
Respondent reiterated his demand upon the spouses to comply with their obligation to
turn over possession of the property, as he already set aside a full payment purchase price
of the said property. However, the spouses failed to deliver the property which prompted
respondent to file a complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that the SPA ostensibly issued by Esther in favor
of Arturo was void as it was falsified. Hence, the SPA could not have authorized Arturo to
sell the property to respondent.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the SPA in favor of
Arturo, assuming that it was void, cannot affect the transaction between Esther and
respondent.The appellate court considered the RMOA executed by Arturo in favor of
respondent valid to effect the sale of Arturos conjugal share in the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be compelled to convey the property to respondent
under the terms of the RMOA and the Contract to Sell.
HELD:
NO. True, in the Contract to Sell, Esther made reference to the earlier RMOA
executed by Arturo in favor of respondent. However, the RMOA which Arturo signed is
different from the deed which Esther executed through her attorney-in-fact. For one, the
first is sought to be enforced as a contract of sale while the second is purportedly a contract
to sell only. For another, the terms and conditions as to the issuance of title and delivery of
possession are divergent.
Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family
Code. There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime, their

property relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership
of gains. Hence,the congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid
disposition of conjugal property. When there are two (2) documents on which the
signatures of the spouses separately appear, textual concordance of the documents is
indispensable.
Hence, in this case where the wifes putative consent to the sale of conjugal property
appears in a separate document which does not, however, contain the same terms and
conditions as in the first document signed by the husband, a valid transaction could not
have arisen.

ROXAS v. COURT OF APPEALS
198 SCRA 541
FACTS:
Melania Roxas, plaintiff-petitioner, is married but living separately from her

husband, Antonio Roxas. Plaintiif discovered that that her estranged husband had entered
into a contract with herein defendant, Antonio Cayetano, which covers a portion of their
conjugal lot located at Novaliches,Quezon City.
On the same lot, Melania had planned to put up her flea market with at least 20
stalls and mini-mart for which she applied an application for the Mayors permit and
municipal license, which was approved; however, when she attempted to renew such, it
was disapproved due to the complaint alleged by defendant Cayetano whose application
for renewal of Mayors permit and license for the same business permit had been allegedly
earlier approved.
Hence, plaintiff Melania filed a complaint in the court due to the illegal lease contract
executed by his husband and respondent, arguing that it was an unlawful deprivation of
her right to put up her own business on the subject lot, she being a conjugal owner.
However, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a sufficient cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint has a sufficient cause of action.
HELD:
Under Art. 165, New Civil Code, The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership,". However, administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the
husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, but he cannot alienate or
encumber the conjugal realty without the consent of his wife. Thus, under Art. 166 of NCC
"unless the wife has been declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to
give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same."
Thus, the joinder of the wife, although unnecessary for an oral lease of conjugal realty
which does not exceed one year in duration, is required in a lease of conjugal realty for a
period of more than one year, such a lease being considered a conveyance and
encumbrance within the provisions of the Civil Code requiring the joinder of the wife in the
instrument by which real property is conveyed or encumbered. In case the wife's consent is
not secured by the husband as required by law, the wife has the remedy of filing an action

for the annulment of the contract. Art. 173 of the Civil Code states "the wife may, during the
marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required.
In the case at bar, petitioner's estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas had entered
into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano without her marital consent
being secured as required by law under Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner, therefore, has
a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case for annulment of the contract of lease entered
into without her consent.

NICOLAS v. COURT OF APPEALS
154 SCRA 635
FACTS:
In 1951, respondent Anastacio Madlangsakay [a.k.a. Anastacio M. Sakay] rice dealer,
married to Lourdes Manuel bought from Felipe Garcia three parcels of land situated in
Barrio Matungao, Bulacan and known as Lot Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of Plan PSU 28714. TCT No. T-
8012 was issued on October 19, 1951 in the name of respondent. At the time of the
purchase, petitioners were occupying Lot No. 8 as tenants. Negotiations begun for the sale
of Lot No. 8 to petitioner- tenants and in an affidavit dated August 26, 1958, Madlangsakay
promised to subdivide the land among them at P0.70 per square meter; however; nothing
came out of the negotiations
On April 26, 1961, petitioners filed an amended complaint in the then Court of First
Instance of Bulacan against respondent Madlangsakay to quiet title over Lot. No. 8.In his
amended answer, Madlangsakay averred that the deeds of sale and the affidavits of
November 21, 1960 which he purportedly executed were all forgeries and that the land in
question, being conjugal property, registered under the Torrens system and mortgaged
with the Philippine National Bank, could not be alienated without his wife's consent.
The trial court upheld Madlangsakay. It dismissed the complaint, nullified the deeds of sale
and the affidavit of November 21, 1960 for being spurious and ordered the cancellation of
their registration in the Registry of Deeds, which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a conjugal property may be sold without the consent of the other spouse.
HELD:
NO. It is clear that there can be no legal transfer of ownership in favor of petitioners. One
point alone the very conspicuous absence of the wife's conforme to such disposition of
the ganancial property, there being no showing that Lourdes Manuel, whom respondent
Madlangsakay married in 1927, is legally incapacitated renders the alleged sale void ab
initio because it is in contravention of the mandatory requirement in Article 166 of the Civil
Code.
The Court likewise agreed with the findings of the CA that the evidences presented
that the signatures on the affidavits were forgeries.

MULLER v. MULLER
500 SCRA 65
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married
in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house
owned by respondents parents but decided reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992.
By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he
sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost
of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. Due to
incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision
which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner
and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the
equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired
by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held
that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent.
Pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either
spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real
property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute
community of property of the herein spouses. Thus, the CA ordered herein Elena Muller to
reimburse the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of
the Antipolo property.
HELD:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands
of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private and
residential lands.

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his
knowledge thereof to this Court. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust
was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to
respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in
trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and
in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of
the fraud.

CRUZ v. CRISTOBAL
498 SCRA 37
FACTS:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased

Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of
Buenaventura Cristobalduring his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal.On the other hand,
private respondents (Norberto,Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are
also the children of BuenaventuraCristobal resulting from his second marriage
to Donata Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535
square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by
TCT No. 10878-2 (the subject property).Sometime in the year 1930,
Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.
More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an
extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and
private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint for Annulment of
Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to
recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property.In their prayer, they
sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents. To prove
their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, their baptismal certificates were
presented.
The trial court rendered a judgment,dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to
prove their filiation and that the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant
evidentiary value and that petitioners' inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches,
which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners claim of their share over the
subject property was barred by laches.
HELD:
NO. Article 172 of the Civil Code states that filiation may be proved by any other means Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws, may consist of the child's
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child's name has been
entered, common reputation respecting the child's pedigree, admission by silence, the

testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. In the case, petitioners had presented their baptismal and birth certificates and
other testimonies as proofs. In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were
unable to present any proof to refute the petitioners' claim and evidences of filiation to
Buenaventura Cristobal.
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the right of
petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to divide the
subject property between petitioners and private respondents, as the rule on succession
prescribes.
Respondents' defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. There is no evidence
showing failure or neglect on petitioners part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier.

GO v. YAMANE
489 SCRA 107
FACTS:
Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters parcel of lot located at Res. Sec. 'K',
Baguio City, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane,
respondent herein, under TCT No. 12491.The subject property was levied to satisfy the lien
for attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000 in a case involving the Pucays sisters. The said
property was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11, 1981.
Four days prior to the auction sale, respondent filed a Third-Party Claim with the Office of
the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction on the ground that the subject property is
conjugal property and, therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal obligation
of the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale despite
respondent's protest, and was sold to spouses Josephine and Henry Go, petitioners, as
highest bidder. No redemption having been made during the one-year period, a Final
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was eventually issued.
The RTC ruled that the subject parcel of land was the paraphernal property of the late
Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse of respondent -- and was not their conjugal property.Hence,
finding that he had no legal standing to question the auction sale or to pray for its
annulment or cancellation, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit.
The CA reversed the RTC's Decision, stating that property acquired during marriage is
presumed to be conjugal, unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been
used for the purpose, and concluded that the contested land was conjugal property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is conjugal or paraphernal.
HELD:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife." As a condition sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor
of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that
the property was acquired during the marriage.
The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay
on February 27, 1967,or specifically during the marriage. We then follow the rule that
proof of the acquisition of the subject property during a marriage suffices to render the
statutory presumption operative. It is clear enough that the presently disputed piece of
land pertains to the conjugal partnership.
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership Property

OLIGARIO v. CA
238 SCRA 96
FACTS:
Spouses Marciliano Olegario and Aurelia Rivera-Olegario owned a parcel of land
located at Caloocan City as evidenced by TCT No. 124222 . The Olegario couples were
childless but reared and educated private respondents Manuel Rivera, Paz Olegario, and
Socorro Olegario-Teves. Petitioner Bonifacio Olegario is the brother of Marciliano while
petitioner Adelaida Victorino is the niece of Aurelia.On March 19, 1986, Aurelia Rivera-
Olegario died at the age of 83. To preclude her heirs from inheriting and to avoid payment
of taxes, Marciliano, then 80 years old, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject
property in favor of private respondents..
On March 10, 1988, Marciliano died intestate. Petitioners Bonifacio Olegario and Adelaida
Victorino were the sole heirs of spouses Olegario. On May 23, 1989, they executed a Deed of
Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate covering the subject lot.
Private respondents alleged that the Extra-judicial Settlement came to their knowledge
only on August 21, 1989. On that same day, they tried to register their contract of sale three
(3) years from its execution. The registration was denied as the subject property has been
transferred to Elena Adaon and Nestor Tejon.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents, annulling the Extra-judicial Settlement
of the subject lot and its sale to Adaon and Tejon, which was affirmed by the CA with
modifications.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the findings of the respondent court is correct.
HELD:
There is no question that petitioners are the lawful heirs of spouses Olegario. Under
Article 160 of the New Civil Code, the subject lot is presumed to be conjugal property. The
death of Aurelia Rivera-Olegario on March 19, 1986 dissolved the conjugal partnership. By
virtue of such dissolution, 1/2 of the property should appertain to Marciliano as his share
from the conjugal estate plus another 1/4 representing his share as surviving spouse of
Aurelia. Petitioner Adelaida Victorino, as the sole surviving niece of Aurelia, is entitled to
the other 1/4 of the lot.When Marciliano died intestate on March 10, 1986, petitioner
Bonifacio Olegario, the only surviving brother of Marciliano, stepped into his shoe.
Dissolution and Liquidation of Absolute Community Property

NABLE-JOSE v. NABLE-JOSE
41 P 713
FACTS:
Amparo N. Jose de Lichuaco and Asuncion N. Jose, as plaintiffs, commenced an action in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against Mariano N. Jose Y Vinluan to recover the
balance due on a certain contract for the payment of money and foe the foreclosure of a
mortgage given upon a certain property to secure the payment of said sum of money. The
Standard Oil Company of New York, as plaintiff, presented its second amended complaint
against Mariano N. Jose et.al., and the second and third of said mortgages were executed on
September 27, 1909.
On June 1910, Carmen Castro commenced an action against defendants Mariano
Nable Jose and T.M. Devilbliss for the purpose of recovering a certain sum of money. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Nable Jose, in apublic document, entered into a
contract by which he promised to pay her a certain sum of money, and executed and
delivered a mortgage to secure the payment of the sum. On March 1910, Ramon SalInas, as
administrator of the sate of Manuel Posadas, filed a petition of intervention, alleging that
the said Manuel Posadas during his lifetime had been the exclusive owner of the real estate,
which is the same parcel of land described in the petition of the Standard Oil Company in
its action against Mariano Jose et. al.
Upon motion, causes 839, 883, and 886, were accumulated and were tried together
in the lower court, which excluded a portion of the property mortgaged to Amparo N. Jose,
et. al., as well as the portion excluded from the property mortgaged to the Standard Oil
Company as part of the community property of Mariano Nable Jose and Paz Borja.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the lower court on the exclusion of the property mortgaged
to Amparo N. Jose as part of the community property of Mariano NAble Jose and Paz Borja
is proper.
HELD:
NO. Inasmuch as the alleged community property had never been liquidated, it was
impossible for the heirs of Paz Borja to claim any interest in the same or shoe title thereto.
The liquidation is a necessary prerequisite to the right of the children of Paz Borja. It is
admitted that all of the property mortgaged to Amparo N. Jose et. al. and to the Standard Oil
Company was duly registered in the registry of property in the name of mortgagor,
Mariano Nable Jose; hence, the lower court erred in its judgment of excluding a portion of
the property mortgaged to Amparo N. Jose et. al., as well as the portion excluded from the
property mortgaged to the Standard Oil Company, as part of the community property of
Mariano Nable Jose and Paz Bor

LUNA v. LINATOC
74 P 15
FACTS:
Jose Linatocs wife, during their marriage, had executed a sale of some parcel of
lands from their conjugal property to one Agustin De Luna. Said sale was made without no
judicial order authorizing the separation of property between the spouses.
However, Jose Linatoc was not trying to cleanse the sale of all taints such as fraud,
violence, or mistake nor was it his purpose to confer authority to his wife because he stated
that when his wife sold the parcel of land, he gave his consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority of the agent in the statute of fraud is required in the
sale of a conjugal property.
HELD:
YES. In recognition, the person acting on behalf of another is duly authorized to do

so, and is merely to cure a defect of proof unlike ratification. The instant case is one of
recognition because the husband was not trying to cleanse the sales of all taint, such as
fraud, violence or mistake, nor was it his purpose to confer authority to his wife. At the time
the sales were made by the wife, she did so with her husbands knowledge. Thus the
requirement in the statute of frauds that in a sale of real property the authority of the agent
should be in writing has been complied with. Therefore, she, the wife, was acting only as an
agent of her husband.
However, as such agent, the wife could not sell her portions of those lands in the
name of her husband, because the partition was illegal and void, because it was made
during the marriage, and that there was no judicial order authorizing the separation of
property between the spouses. Hence, the wife could, therefore, sell and did sell, as agent of
the husband, these portions as part of the conjugal partnership with the consent of the
husband, in pursuance to Article 1416 of the Civil Code.

CUENCA v. CUENCA
168 SCRA 335
FACTS:
Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca, herein private respondents, claimed

ownership over the subject parcels of land on the ground that they are the legitimate
children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria BAngahon, both deceased, and the owners of the
subject parcels of land.
Respondents alleged that some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria
while all others are conjugal properties of Maria and Agripino. They also alleged that
Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre, the latter being the mother of the petitioners, were
not legally married because at the time they lived together as husband and wife, Agripino
was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.
Petitioners denied the legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino Cuenca and
Maria Bangahon as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children of the couple. They
claimed that Agripino and their mother Engracia Basadre were legally married and that
they are the legitimate children of the spouses. They also contend that the subject parcels
of land are conjugal properties of Agripino and their mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners contentions are tenable and that Engracia is entitled to
inherit from Agripino Cuenca.
HELD:
YES. Accordingly, the appellate court declared Engracia Basadre as the surviving
spouse of Agripino Cuenca. Thus, there is no need to prove the legality of the marriage
between them much less to prove the legitimacy of the petitioners, who are undoubtedly
the children of Agripino and Engracia.
Article 160 of the Civil Code states that : all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
In the case, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not
show the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during
the marriage of Agripino and Engracia. The fact that these parcels were surveyed for
Agripino during his marriage with Engracia is not determinative that the subject parcels of
land belong to their conjugal partnership property. Moreover, the documents show that 5

out of 8 parcels of the land are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or
respondent Restituto Cuenca. As such, the presumption in relation to Article 160, NCC
cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent
third parties are involved.
Effect of Separation de Facto

WONG v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
200 SCRA 792
FACTS:
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964.
During the marriage, Romarico bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City
from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson with money borrowed from an officemate.
Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with
Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at
199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95.When Katrina failed to return the pieces of
jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their
value.
Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico
Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money of the debts of Katrina. The records of
the case show that Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. filed an answer with counterclaim but only in
behalf of Katrina, excluding her husband. After trial, the court promulgated a decisions in
favor of the Wongs. It ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the Wongs
HK$199,895.00 or P321,830.95 with legal interest, and other damages. A writ of execution
was thereafter issued which was levied upon were four lots in Angeles City all in the name
of Romarico Henson. But before the public auction takes place, the latter filed an action to
nullify the courts decision, contending that he had nothing to do with the business
transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such transactions; and that
the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital
properties and therefore, as to him, all the proceedings had in the case were null and void.
The trial court found that there was no basis for holding the conjugal partnership liable for
the personal indebtedness of Katrina.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties maybe liable to the personal indebtedness of
Katrina.
HELD:
NO. The Court held that the said properties ,having been acquired during the
marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even though
Romarico and Katrina had been living separately. The presumption of the conjugal nature
of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico.

The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be
paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the
charges against the conjugal partnership. In addition to the fact that her rights over the
properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
consent of her husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged
in the complaint and proven at the trial.
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary
for the support of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing
things necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum;
when the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courts or by the husband and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Having
failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the
conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.

PRIMA- PARTOSA-JO v. COURT OF APPEALS
216 SCRA 692
FACTS:
Private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and fathered
fifteen children. The first of these women, the herein petitioner, claims to be his legal wife
whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other women and their respective offspring are
not parties of these case.
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal
property, On November 29, 1983, Judge German G. Lee, Jr. rendered an extensive decision,
holding that the Prima Partosa was legally married to Jose Jo therefore, is entitled to
support as the lawfully wedded wife. As will be noticed, there was a definite disposition of
the complaint for support but none of the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property.Jo elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the
trial court in the complaint for support.
The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause
of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178
of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the respondent court is proper.
HELD:
NO. Under Article 128 of the Family Code aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation on either of these grounds: a. abandonment by a spouse of the other without
just cause; and b. failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family
without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the
petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she
returned from Zamboanga. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship.
Moreover, beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for support in
1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to
give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the
judicial separation of their conjugal property.

DE OCAMPO v. DELIZO
69 SCRA 216
FACTS:
Nicolas Delizo contracted a second marriage with one Dorotea de Ocampo, when his
first wife, Rosa Villasfer died. After about 20 years, the children of Rosa filed an action for
partition of the conjugal properties of the first marriage, which included 66 parcels of land
to which the original certificate of title was in thename of Nicolas Delizo married to
Dorotea de Ocampo.
The parcel of land was acquired as homestead during the first marriage because
Nicolas was ble to comply with the legal requirements for a homestead only during his
second marriage.
The trial court ruled that the said property belonged to the first conjugal
partnership, which the CA affirmed, holding that the registration of the title in the name of
Nicolas Delizo married to Dorotea de Ocampo did not prove that the property belonged to
the second conjugal partnership as the phrase married to was merely descriptive of the
status of Nicolas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the liquidation of the properties shall be to the first family and
the other half to the second family.
HELD:
YES. From the findings that the 66 hectares of land were acquired by Nicolas as
homesteads during the period of the first marriage, it does not necessarily follow that they
should be considered as properties of the first marriage, considering that being
homesteads, they were part of the public domain and it was not shown that all the
requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the grant of patent to the homestead have
been completed prior to the death of Nicolas first wife.
Thus, the total mass of the properties should be divided between the two conjugal
partnerships in proportion to the duration of its partnership. Under these criteria, the
second conjugal partnership should be entitled to 23/32 of the total mass properties, and
the first conjugal partnership should be entitled to 9/ 32 thereof pro indiviso.

VDA. DE CONSUEGRA v. GSIS
37 SCRA 315
FACTS:
Jose Consuegra contracted two marriages. His first marriage to Rosario Diaz was on
15 July 1937at Surigao where two children namely Jose and Pedro were born out of the
marriage, but both predeceased him. In his second marriage to Basilia Berdin, which was
contracted in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, seven children were born.
At the time of his death, he was a shop foreman of the office of the District Engineering in
the province of Surigao del Norte.
As a member of GSIS, he declared in his insurance policy Berdin and his children with the
latter as his beneficiaries, but there was no regard on his retirement insurance benefits.
Rosario Diaz, the first wife, claimed in a petition that she is the only legal heir of the
deceased. The other spouse, Berdin, and her children filed a similar claim contending that
they are the only ones who are entitled to receive from Jose Consuegras retirement
insurance benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Basilia Berdin and her children are the beneficiaries of the retirement
insurance benefits of the decedent.
HELD:
NO. It cannot be said that because herein appellants were designated as beneficiaries
in Consuegras life insurance that they automatically become the beneficiaries also of his
retirement insurance. Proceeds of the retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra
should be divided equally between his first living wife Rosario Diaz on the other hand, and
his second wife Basilia Berdin and his children by her on the other hand.
The beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of the
retirement insurance if the employee dies before retirement .If the employee failed to, or
overlooked to, state the beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the retirement insurance
will accrue to his estate and will be given to his legal heirs in accordance with the law, as in
the case of a life insurance if no beneficiaries is named on the insurance policy.

SALVADOR v. CA
243 SCRA 239
FACTS:
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated in Cagayan de Oro
City. Upon his death, the titles of the properties were devolved upon his 9 children.
On 1976, Pastor Makabalo, the husband of Maria Yabo, one of Alipios children, filed
a complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo, alleging that he owned a total of 8
square meters of the subject lots, having purchased the shares of seven of Alipios children
and inherited the share of his wife, Maria, and that he occupied, cultivated and possessed
continuously and openly the 2 parcels of land.
The grand children of the late Alipio filed a complaint for partition and quieting of
title with damages against Pastor Makabalo, Enecia Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and
Remedios Salvador .
The trial court rendered its decision finding Pastor Makabalo, now Eulogio and
Remedios Salvador, the owner of 8/9 shares of Lot No. 6080 and of 7 shares equivalent to
7/9 of Lot No. 6180, which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court erred in considering that Lot Nos. 6080 and
6180 formed part of the conjugal assets of the spouses Pastor Makabalo and Maria Yabo.
HELD:
NO. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to
Since the shares of the seven children of the late Alipio had been purchased by Pastor
Makabalo during his marriage with Maria, and there is no proof that these are acquired
with his exclusive money, the same are deemed conjugal properties. Not forming of the
conjugal partnership are : a. the 1/9 share inherited by Maria which remained her
exclusive property; b. 1/9 share of Gaudencia which was not sold to Pastor; and c. 1/9
share of Pelagia was acquired by Pastor, 5 years after the death of his wife, and which was
therefore his own exclusive property.
The CA should have excluded from the conjugal partnership the share of Pelagia which was
acquired by Pastor after his wifes death.

SARMIENTO v. ORDONES
153 SCRA 104
FACTS:
Private respondent Norma Sarmiento sued her husband Cesar Sarmiento for
support. In 1984, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court where the case was assigned,
rendered a decision ordering the husband Cesar to pay his wife a sum of Php 500.00 as
monthly support commencing on May 10, 1977 up to March, 1994, and that monthly
support starting April 1984 shall be deposited with the courts cashier from which the wife
may withdraw the same.
On May 3, 1984, respondent Judge Ordonez- Benitez issued an order directing the
Philippine National Bank that the amount due to Norma Sarmiento be not released without
authority of the court and until final disposition of the said case. In 1985, private
respondent filed a motion to require the PNB to deliver the accrued support out of the
retirement benefits due to the petitioner as a former employee of PNB.
Petitioner filed a petition before the CA for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge and all
respondents, and all persons acting on their behalf, from enforcing, executing, and
otherwise giving force and effect to the decision, which the court dismissed on June 3 1996.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge Ordonez order on May 3, 1984 is lawful.
HELD:
NO. The freeze order by respondent judge falls squarely within the restrictive
provisions of Section 26 of CA 186, as amended, which states that, any other benefit
granted under this Act, or other process, and applied by any legal or equitable process or
operation of law.
Clearly, the assailed order of respondent judge violates the aforementioned
provision. The retirement benefits due to the petitioner are included among those
exempted from legal process and liens.

VILLANUEVA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
192 SCRA 21
FACTS:
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners of the parcel of land. After
they died, their children Modesto and Federico adjudicated the land to themselves. The
southern portion of the lot was assign to Modesto, the northern to Federico. Modesto died
on April 20, 1973. His wife Victoria predeceased him in 1971, and that they had no
children.
It appears that Modesto has survived by two illegitimate children, Dorothea and Teodoro.
These two borrowed 180, 000 pesos from Jesus Bernas. As security therefore, they
mortgaged to Bernas their fathers property,but failed to pay their loan which prompted
Bernas to institute an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. In 1978, Bernas
consolidated his ownership over the lot, the mortgagors having failed to redeem the same.
About a month later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint
with the RTC of Roxas City against Jesus Bernas and his spouse, praying that they be
declared co-owners of the land. They grounded their cause of action upon their alleged
discovery that in 1978, two wills were executed, one by Modesto and the other by Victoria.
Victorias will allegedly bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo, and to Dorothea and
Teodoro, in equal shares pro indiviso, all of said Victorias interests, rights and
properties as her net share from the conjugal partnership property with their husband
Modesto Modestos will, on the other hand, bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro all his
interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital property
brought by him to his marriage with said wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject lot belongs to the conjugal property.
HELD:
NO. The land that was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and his husband,
Moresto. It was the latters exclusive, private property which he had inherited from his
parents Graciano and Nicolasa Aranas, the original owners of the property, registered
solely in his name. Whether Moresto succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his
marriage to Victoria, the record is unclear.
The property should be regarded as Modestos own exclusively, as a matter of law. This is
in accordance with Article 148 of the Civil Code which clearly decrees that to be considered
as the exclusive property of each spouse is inter alia, that which is brought to the
marriage as his or her own or that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative
title. Thus, even if it be assumed that Modestos acquisition of said lot took place during his

TAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
273 SCRA 229
FACTS:
On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein private respondents who are Alfonsos brothers,
Celestino and Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita, alleging in the
complaint that the parties are co-owners of a 906-square meter residential lot with
improvements thereon situated at Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant
to the provisions of Article 494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan,
being co-owners to the extent of 1/3 portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the
same.
On January 16, 1990, Alfonso U. Tan filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
contending that the case was filed only at the instance of his estranged wife, Eteria, by
virtue of the decree of legal separation, and that he had no claim whatsoever against his
brothers insofar as the family business is concerned. He prayed that the case be dismissed.
Respondent court ruled that although the subject property was acquired during the
marriage of the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan brothers that the
same was inherited from their mother, hence, their exclusive property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling of the respondent court is proper.
HELD:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
husband or to the wife. It is not necessary, to prove that the property was acquired with
funds of the partnership. So that when an immovable was acquired by purchase during the
marriage, it is considered as conjugal property. In fact, even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear, the presumption applies and it will be considered
conjugal property.\
In the case at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided 1/3 of the
parcel of land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso
Tan and Eteria Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited
from his mother, Trinidad Uy, the original owner of the property. There can be no doubt
then, that although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the 1/3 portion of the
property should be regarded as Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to
Article 148 of the Civil Code.

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS
149 SCRA 372
FACTS:
Felipe Madlangawa, private respondent, had been occupying a parcel of land in the
Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1947 upon permission from Andres
Ladorea, the overseer, with the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy
the lot.
On April 1950, owner Clara Tambunting died and her entire estate were placed under
custodia legis. Consequently, private respondent paid an initial deposit to Don Vicente
Legarda, the husband of the deceased, in payment of the land he is occupying. Eventually,
Don Vicente was appointed special administrator of the decedents state. Subsequently,
petitioner Manotok Realty became the successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting
Legarda Subdivision.Notices of publications and circulars were served to all occupants of
said state; however, private respondent refused to vacate the lots.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Don Vicente Legarda had the capacity to disposed lot in favor of the
respondent prior to him being appointed as special administrator.
HELD:
NO. Don Vicente Legarda was never the administrator of the paraphernal properties
of the deceased Dona Clara Tambunting during the latters lifetime. The sale between
private respondent and Don Vicente is void ab initio, the latter for being neither an owner
nor administrator of the subject property.

ONG v. COURT OF APPEALS
204 SCRA 297
FACTS:
On November 16, 1961, Ramon C. Ong filed a complaint against defendants Arsenio
Camino as Deputy Sheriff of Camarines Norte and Francisco Boix, to annul the auction sale
of a parcel of land, allegedly owners conjugally by plaintiff and his former wife Teodora B.
Ong, awarded in favor of Boix, as highest bidder, in an auction sale conducted on October
10, 1958 by the Deputy Sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila to enforce its decision in Civil Case No. 33396, ordering the defendant
Teodora B. Ong to pay to the plaintiff the sum P2,827.83, with interest of 8% per annum on
the sum of P1,000.00 from September 5, 1955, on the sum of P827.83 from December 30,
1955 plus 15% on the total amount of P2,827.83 as attorney's fees; and the further amount
of P2,503 with interest at 6% per annum from date of the filing of the complaint, and the
costs of the suit.
Petitioner contends that the property was conjugal and thus could not be held liable
for personal debts contracted by the wife, and that the there was no valid publication thus
making the auction sale void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property was conjugal and thus could not be liable for the
personal indebtedness of Teodora.
HELD:
NO. The Court held that the mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax
declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired
during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was
declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name of
the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records of
the present case, the Court hold that the lot in question is paraphernal, and is therefore,
liable for the personal debts of the wife.
Thus, it was held in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474, that the
presumption that property is conjugal (Art. 160, New Civil Code) refers to property
acquired during the marriage. When there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the spouse's name is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said spouse.

RAVINA v. ABRILLE
G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife,
and that they have four children. In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel
of land denominated as Lot 7 located at Matina, Davao City, and covered by TCTNo. T-
88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he
was still single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.Through
their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell
or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By
himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia
and Wilfredo Ravina.Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but
Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent. On July 5,
1991, when Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped
from entering it. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for
Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of
Davao City.During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive
property of Pedro or conjugal property.
HELD:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an
exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann.
However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of
Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was
acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.

Petitioners bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-
88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the
house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts
of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now
treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and
the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of the court.

TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. DAVID
G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010
FACTS:
Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David were married on March 25, 1957.In 1970, the
spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon City, which was
registered in the name of MARTHA S. DAVID, covered by TCT No. 156043.cIn 1976, the
spouses separated de facto, and no longer communicated with each other. Sometime in
March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan
Construction Corporation for P1,500,000.00 through a Deed of Sale dated April 24, 1995,
and that TCT No. 156043 had been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 130129 in the name
of Titan.
Thus, Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Recovenyance against Titan
before the RTC of Quezon City, arguing that that the sale executed by Martha in favor of
Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and therefore void. He prayed that the Deed
of Sale and TCT No. 130129 be invalidated, that the property be reconveyed to the spouses,
and that a new title be issued in their names.
The RTC found that the property was conjugal in character since it was purchased by the
spouses with conjugal funds during their marriage. The fact that TCT No. 156043 was
registered in the name of MARTHA S. DAVID married to Manuel A. David did not negate
the propertys conjugal nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property belongs to the conjugal property of the spouses.
HELD:
Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in force at the time of the celebration of the marriage
between Martha and Manuel in 1957, provides that All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article 153 of the same Code also provides That
which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses.. is part of
the conjugal property of the spouses.
Citing the ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat, the Court held that Manuel was not
required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.
Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear. Here, the court find that Titan failed to overturn the
presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses marriage, was part of

the conjugal partnership. Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal
partnership, the sale to Titan is null and viod , since it requires the consent of both
spouses.

CHING v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004
FACTS:
On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc., through its
Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied
Banking Corporation. By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI,executed a promissory note for the
said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978. As added security for the said loan,
on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua,
executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly guarantee the
payment of all the PBMCI. The ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI and executed a
promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29, 1981.
However,the PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, the ABC filed a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the
PBMCI.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed
a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment, alleging that the 100,000 shares of stocks
levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of
conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974.
Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive surety
ship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The trial court issued an order the
lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the sheriff
to return the said stocks to the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment
on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines.
HELD:
YES. Citing the case of Ong v. Tating, the Court held that the sheriff may attach only those
properties of the defendant against whom a writ of attachment has been issued by the
court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the property of a third
person in which the said defendant holds no right or interest, the superior authority of the
court which has authorized the execution may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in
the same case.
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the
100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of
stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his

continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. Thus, she has the right to
file the motion for said r
Property included in Conjugal Partnership of Gains

CASTRO v. MIAT
397 SCRA 271
FACTS:
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought 2 parcels of land during their coverture.
The first is located at Paranaque, and the second is located at Paco, Manila, Concordia died
on April 30, 1978. They had two children: Romeo and Alexander.While at Dubai, Moises
agreed that the Paranaque and Paco properties would be given to Romeo and
Alexander.However, when he returned in 1984, he renegotiated the agreement with Romeo
and Alexander. He wanted the Paranaque property for himself but would leave the Paco
property to his 2 sons, which they all agreed.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property. They paid its realty taxes and fire
insurance premiums. In April 1988, Alexander agreed to sell to Romeo his share in the Paco
property,but he never executed a deed of assignment in favor of the latter.
On December 16, 1988, Romeo received a letter from petitioner Castros lawyer asking for
a conference, informing him that the Paco property had been sold to Castro by Moises by
virtue of a deed of sale dated December 5, 1988.Thereafter, Romeo filed an action to nullify
the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses; to compel Moises and Alexander to
execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco property to him upon payment of
the balance of its agreed price.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property belongs to the conjugal property of Moises and
Concordia or the capital property of the former.
HELD:
Since Moises and Concordia were married before the effectivity of the Family Code,
the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply.Article 153(1) of the New Civil
Code provides that those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses belongs to the conjugal property. The records show that the Paco property was
acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the spouses common fund; hence it
has to be considered as conjugal.
Furthermore, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when
the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.

FRANCISCO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 102330,November 25, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner, Teresita Francisco, is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio
Francisco by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F.
Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have
acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment
house; and (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further
avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on
account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to
administer them. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing
their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to
administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general
power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be
declared as the administrator of the properties in dispute.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents, ruling those properties
belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties belong to the conjugal properties of the
spouses.
HELD:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However, the party who invokes this
presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the
marriage. In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the
properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with
Eusebio.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the
marriage, is considered his or her separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to
properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the
marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that
Eusebios acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the

land would still be his exclusive property because it was acquired by him, during the
marriage, by lucrative
Property included in Conjugal Partnership of Gains

DIAZ v. CA
145 SCRA 346
FACTS:
Teodulo Diaz who died intestate was the registered owner of the subject land in
dispute. He was survived by his wife, Maria Espejo(now deceased) and 5 children, one of
whom is the present petitioner, Concesco Diaz.
On June 9, 1974, the widow sold a portion of the subject land to respondent Tomas
de Guzman. Diaz, on a petition, prays that the property sold to the latter be declared null
and void because such property is part of the intestate of Teodulo Diaz; hence, Maria
Espejo did not have any judicial authority to sell the portion of the subject land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale executed by Maria Espejo is valid.
HELD:
YES. It is never disputed that the title was registered in the name of Teodulo Diaz,
married to Maria Espejo, which only shows that the property was acquired during the
existence of the conjugal partnership.
It is a settled rule that adjudication of real property to one of the spouses only does
not necessarily mean that it is his or her exclusive property, if said land was acquired
during the marriage. Hence, Maria Espejo has a half share of the intestate state of the
deceased husbad, and thus has the authority to sell the same.

AYALA INVESTMENTS v. COURT OF APPEALS
286 SCRA 272
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PMB) obtained a loan from Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC), and as a security for the credit, Alfredo Ching, the
executive-president of PMB, executed security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on
MArch 20, 1981; thus, making him jointly answerable with PMBs indebtedness to AIDC.
PMB, however, failed to pay the loan; hence, AIDC filed a complaint for the recovery
of the sum of money against PMB and respondent Alfredo Ching. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of AIDC, ordering Alfredo Ching to pay the loan.
As a consequence, 3 conjugal properties of Ching with his wife were made liable for
the loan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of Ching and his wife can be made liable for
the indebtedness of Ching alone.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching acting as surety
redounded the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The debt is clearly a corporate debt of
PMB, and AIDCs right of recourse against Alfredo Ching as surety is only to the extent of
his corporate stockholdings. It doesnt extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of the
family of Alfredo Ching.

SALVADOR v. COURT OF APPEALS
243 SCRA 239
FACTS:
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated in Cagayan de
Oro City. Upon his death, the titles of the properties were devolved upon his 9 children.
On 1976, Pastor Makabalo, the husband of Maria Yabo, one of Alipios children, filed
a complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo, alleging that he owned a total of 8
square meters of the subject lots, having purchased the shares of seven of Alipios children
and inherited the share of his wife, Maria, and that he occupied, cultivated and possessed
continuously and openly the 2 parcels of land.
The grand children of the late Alipio filed a complaint for partition and quieting of
title with damages against Pastor Makabalo, Enecia Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and
Remedios Salvador .
The trial court rendered its decision finding Pastor Makabalo, now Eulogio and
Remedios Salvador, the owner of 8/9 shares of Lot No. 6080 and of 7 shares equivalent to
7/9 of Lot No. 6180, which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court erred in considering that Lot Nos. 6080 and
6180formed part of the conjugal assets of the spouses Pastor Makabalo and Maria Yabo.
HELD:
NO. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to
Since the shares of the seven children of the late Alipio had been purchased by Pastor
Makabalo during his marriage with Maria, and there is no proof that these are acquired
with his exclusive money, the same are deemed conjugal properties. Not forming of the
conjugal partnership are : a. the 1/9 share inherited by Maria which remained her
exclusive property; b. 1/9 share of Gaudencia which was not sold to Pastor; and c. 1/9
share of Pelagia was acquired by Pastor, 5 years after the death of his wife, and which was
therefore his own exclusive property.
The CA should have excluded from the conjugal partnership the share of Pelagia which was
acquired by Pastor after his wifes

DOMINGO v. REED
477 SCRA 227
FACTS:
Respondent Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract worker from 1978 to 1986 and came
home only for short vacations. He purchased from the GSIS on installment basis a 166
square meter property located at Mangahan, Pasig. Because he was working abroad, it was
his wife, Lolita Reed, who paid the consideration to the GSIS. On July 9, 1986, TCT No. 58195
covering said property was issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, Metro '
District II in the name of Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed. Guillermo Reed had
allowed his brother, Dominador, and the latter's wife, Luz, to stay in the house constructed
on his property.
In December, 1991, Dominador and Luz Reed were summoned to the barangay in
connection with the complaint for ejectment filed against them by Eduardo Quiteves, who
claimed to be the owner of the lot where their house stands.Guillermo denied having sold
his property.
Thereafter, Guillermo discovered that his title over the subject property had been
cancelled. He later filed a complaint for reconveyance of the subject property alleging that
his wife, Lolita Reed, from whom he had been estranged, conspiring with the other
petitioners, caused the preparation of a special power of attorney, dated July 8, 1986,
wherein it was made to appear that he authorized his wife to sell the subject property, and
that he did not sign the special power of attorney nor appear before the notary public
because he was working abroad.
The trial court, however, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lolitas sale of the property is valid.
HELD:
NO. The Court ruled that the fact that Lolitas rights over the property were merely
inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, there was absolutely no proof
to her allegations that she used the proceeds of the sale to purchase necessities for the
maintenance and support of the family. Having failed to establish any of these
circumstances, she may not unilaterally bind the conjugal assets.
Additionally, the Civil Code provisions she cited pertain to what the conjugal partnership is
liable for. They do not specifically refer to whether the actual transactions entered into by

either spouse can validly bind the conjugal partnership. The issues addressed by this Court
in this case involve the essential formalities determining the validity of contracts entered
into by either the husband or the wife for and on behalf of the partner

ENBRODO v. COURT OF APPEALS
233 SCRA 755
FACTS:
Lot No. 564 originally owned by Juan Pastor and Matias Corpitanos, were sold to
Lucia Embrado, the latter was married to Oreste Torregiani since 1943. Thereafter, Lucia
sold the lot, described as her own paraphernal property to her adopted daughter, Eda
Jimenez.
On March 6, 1972, Ena sold 65 square meters of Lot No. 564 to Marcos Salimbagat
and conveyed 301 square meters of the same lot to Pacifico Cinafranca on August 1, 1972.
On September 25, 1972, the Torregianis instituted an action for declaration of
nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance of damages, alleging that the sale of
Lot No. 564 by Lucia to her adopted daughter was void not only because of the lack of
consideration, but also because Oreste did not give consent to the sale, the property being a
conjugal property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is conjugal.
HELD:
YES. The sale executed by Lucia to her adopted daughter was declared by the court
as null and void, it being a conjugal property of spouses Lucia and Oreste. As such, any
disposition and encumberance of the conjugal property requires the consent of the other
spouse. In the case, Lucia sold the property without the consent of Oreste; hence, the sale is
void.
Furthermore, the present vendees Salimbagat and Cinafranca, who bought the
property from Eda Jimenez , have failed to prove and persuade the Court that they are
buyers or purchasers of good faith.

BA FINANCE v. COURT OF APPEALS
161 SCRA 608
FACTS:
On July 1, 1975, respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner BA
Finance Corporation , as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as
representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent presented an alleged special power of
attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, purportedly authorizing Augusto tpp procure the
loan and sign the promissory note. When the obligation became due and demandable,
Augusto failed to pay the same; hence, a writ of attachment was filed by petitioners against
the spouses.
Private respondent, Lily Yulo, filed her answer, arguing that her signature in the SPA
was forged because she had never authorized Augusto in any capacity to transact any
business in behalf of the A & L Industries. The trial court ruled in favor of the Lily Yulo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the A & L Industries maybe held liable for the obligation of Augusto.
HELD:
NO. There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the marriage of
the spouses. As such, it is presumed to be conjugal in nature. For the said property to be
held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code.
In the case, the obligation contracted by Augusto was clearly for his own benefit
because at the time he incurred the obligation, he had already abandoned his family home
and had left their conjugal home. Thus, the petitioner cannot enforce the obligation
contracted by the latter against his conjugal properties with Lily.

JOHNSON and JOHNSON v. COURT OF APPEALS
262 SCRA 298
FACTS:
Delilah Vinluan was engaged in the business of retailing the products of plaintiff-
respondent Johnson & Johnson, Philippines, Inc., purchased products from the latter and
incurred an obligation of Php 235,880.89, for which she issued 7 Philippine Banking
Corporation checks of varying amounts and due dates. When the checks were presented on
their respective due dates, the checks bounced and were dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds; thus, prompting plaintiff-respondent to file a complaint
for the collection of the principal obligation plus interest, with damages, were filed against
the defendant spouses.
The court then issued two notices of levy on execution; however, such issue does
not only cover the paraphernal properties of Delilah, but also the real and personal
properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Vinluan. The husband then filed a
third-party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment declaring the defendant-wife solely liable maybe
executed upon the conjugal property over the objection of the husband.
HELD:
The trial court declared defendant-wife Delilah solely liable, without any recourse
provided against her husband. The body of the decision of the latter expressly exempted
husband from the liability, stating that, the defendant-husband cannot together, with co-
defendant, legally be held liable for the obligations of the wife.
As such, the third-party claim of the husband must be denied, and that Delilah be
solely liable of her indebtedness from her own exclusive or paraphernal property, not from
the conjugal property.

BAUTISTA v. SILVA
502 SCRA 334
FACTS:
TCT No. B-37189 which covers a parcel of land situated in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, was registered in the names of Spouses Berlina F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva
on August 14, 1980.
On March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife
Berlina F. Silva, through a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed on
November 18, 1987 by Berlina F. Silva in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in favor of defendants-spouses Claro
Bautista and Nida Bautista.
The RTC found that the signature appearing on the Special SPA as that of Berlina
Silva is a forgery, and that consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Pedro in favor of Spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlina, which was then
affirmed by the CA, upon appeal. The spouses prays that the decision be set aside,
contending that they are buyers of good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are buyers of good faith.
HELD:
NO. A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another with
the well-foundedbelief that the person from whom he receives the thing had title to
the property and capacity to convey it.
In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time they
were buying the property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has a defective
notarial acknowledgment. The Court held that it was not sufficient evidence of good
faith that petitioners merely relied on the photocopy of the SPA as this turned out to
be a mere private document.
The SPA being a forgery, as cased on the findings of the NBI, it did not vest in Pedro
any authority to alienate the subject property without the consent of
respondent. Absent such marital consent, the deed of sale was null and void.

ALFREDO v. BORRAS
404 SCRA 145
FACTS:
The subject land is owned by spouses Godofredo Alfredo and Carmen Limon Alfredo
located in Hermosa, Bataan. On 7 March 1994, the private respondents, spouses Armando
Borras and Adelia Lobaton Borras, filed a complaint for specific performance against
Godofredo and Carmen before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, alleging that Godofredo
and Carmen mortgaged the Subject Land forP7,000.00 with the Development Bank of the
Philippines,and to pay the debt, they sold the Subject Land to respondents .Thereafter, they
introduced the respondents as the new owners to the tenants of the subject land.
In January 1994, respondents learned that hired persons had entered the Subject Land and
were cutting trees under instructions of allegedly new owners of the Subject Land.
Subsequently, they discovered that petitioners had re-sold portions of the Subject Land to
several persons.
Godofredo and Carmen claim that the sale of the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia is
void on two grounds. First, Carmen sold the Subject Land without the marital consent of
Godofredo. Second, the sale was made during the 25-year period that the law prohibits the
alienation of land grants without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondents, declaring the subsequent sale
of the Subject Land to several persons as null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the Subject Land in favor of the respondents is valid.
HELD:
YES. Applying Article 173 of the Civil Code which provides that the disposition of
conjugal property without the wifes consent is not void but merely voidable, the Court
held that the contract of sale was voidable subject to annulment by the husband of Carmen.
Following petitioners argument that Carmen sold the land to Armando and Adelia without
the consent of Carmens husband, the sale would only be voidable and not void.
However, Godofredo can no longer question the sale. Voidable contracts are
susceptible of ratification.Godofredo ratified the sale when he introduced Armando and
Adelia to his tenants as the new owners of the Subject Land
Ownership, Possession, Enjoyment and Administration
of Conjugal Partnership Property
Remedies in case of Disagreements

JARDELEZA v. JARDELEZA
347 SCRA 10
FACTS:
Teodoro Jardeleza, petitioner and the son of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Jr.,
together with Gilda Jardeleza, filed a petition for appointment of judicial
guardianship over the person and property of his father and praying for the
issuance of letters of guardianship to his mother, Gilda, and later on to him on the
ground that Gilda considered the property acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and
did now want to be appointed guardian.
Consequently, respondents filed with the trial court an opposition to the
petition for guardianship and motion for issuance of letters of guardianship to the
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 124 of the Family Code applies to the instant case.
HELD:
NO. The court ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code does not apply to the
situation of Dr. Jardeleza, such provision rendering superfluous the appointment
of a judicial guardian over the person and estate of an incompetent married person.
As such, the proper remedy would be an application for appointment of
judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court.

GUIANG v. COURT OF APPEALS
291 SCRA 372
FACTS:
Over the objection of private respondent, Gilda Corpuz, and while she was in Manila
seeking employment, her husband, Judie Corpuz, sold to the petitioners-spouses,
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang, one half of their conjugal property, consisting of
their residence and the lot on which it stood.
Private Respondent filed a complaint against her husband and petitioners-spouses,
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang, praying for the declaration of the deed of sale,
which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, as
null and void, since it was executed without her prior consent.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged sale is valid.
HELD:
NO. Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the two lower
courts, states that, The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decisionThese powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void
Thus, the sale is null and void, since it was executed without private respondents
consent.

NICOLAS v. CA
G.R. No. L-37631 October 12, 1987
FACTS:
In 1951, respondent Anastacio Madlangsakay [a.k.a. Anastacio M. Sakay] rice dealer,
married to Lourdes Manuel bought from Felipe Garcia three parcels of land situated in
Barrio Matungao, Bulacan and known as Lot Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of Plan PSU 28714. TCT No. T-
8012 was issued on October 19, 1951 in the name of respondent. At the time of the
purchase, petitioners were occupying Lot No. 8 as tenants. Negotiations begun for the sale
of Lot No. 8 to petitioner- tenants and in an affidavit dated August 26, 1958, Madlangsakay
promised to subdivide the land among them at P0.70 per square meter; however; nothing
came out of the negotiations
On April 26, 1961, petitioners filed an amended complaint in the then Court of First
Instance of Bulacan against respondent Madlangsakay to quiet title over Lot. No. 8.In his
amended answer, Madlangsakay averred that the deeds of sale and the affidavits of
November 21, 1960 which he purportedly executed were all forgeries and that the land in
question, being conjugal property, registered under the Torrens system and mortgaged
with the Philippine National Bank, could not be alienated without his wife's consent.
The trial court upheld Madlangsakay. It dismissed the complaint, nullified the deeds of sale
and the affidavit of November 21, 1960 for being spurious and ordered the cancellation of
their registration in the Registry of Deeds, which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a conjugal property may be sold without the consent of the other
spouse.
HELD:
This Court finds that there is substantial and convincing evidence that the deeds of
sale were in fact falsified. Strongly indicative of their fake character is not only the
physical manifestation of imitation, but also the questionable circumstances under
which the documents were prepared and executed.
Thirdly, it was most unlikely that Madlangsakay would have sold the land in
1960 to petitioners, or to anybody else for that matter, because it was not his alone
to dispose of. The land is a conjugal property and, as such, it could not be alienated
without the conformity of his wife.

UY V CA 346 SCRA 246
FACTS:
On March 25, 1991, Ernesto Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose
and incapable of motor and mental functions. Consequently, Teodoro Jardeleza, Ernestos
son, filed a petition for guardianship of his father averring that due to Ernestos current
condition, he cannot competently administer his properties. In order to prevent the loss
and wasteful expenditure of Jardelezas real and personal assets, there was a need for a
court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. He prayed that the guardianship
be issued in favor of the wife and that in the meantime, no property be negotiated,
mortgaged or alienated to third persons
June 13, 1991 The wife filed a petition declaring the incapacity of the husband and
assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties and prayed for
authorization from the court to sell a parcel of land (lot no. 4291) due pay for medical
expenses of the husband
Teodoro filed motion for reconsideration on the following grounds:
1. CPG has other assets to pay off financial obligations.
2. Medical bills can be offset since Ernesto can pay on installment since
he has stocks in the hospital
3. Two of his attending physicians are his own sons who are not charging
him anything
ISSUE: whether or not the wide can assume sole power of administration due to the
comatose condition of the husband.
HELD:
CA ruled that due to the condition of the husband, the rules on summary proceedings in
relation to Art. 124 FC are not applicable. What Art. 124 covers are situations where the
spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other, or the consent is
withheld or cannot be obtained. SUCH RULES DO NOT APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE NON-
CONSENTING SPOUSE IS INCAPACITATED OR INCOMPETENT TO GIVE CONSENT. In such
case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship under Rule 93 of 1964 ROC.
Even if the rules of summary judicial proceedings under FC applied to the wifes
administrative powers, the wife who assumes the sole powers of administration has the
same powers and duties as a guardian under the ROC
A spouse who desires to sell a real property as such administrator of CPG must observe the
procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95
ROC, not summary judicial proceedings under FC

In the present case, RTC did not comply with the procedures under ROC and the
requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under FC: it did not serve notice of the
petition to the incapacitated spouse and it did not require him to show any cause why the
petition should not be granted.

SABALONES V CA 230 SCRA 79
FACTS:
As an ambassador petitioner Samson Sabalones was assigned to different countries and as
such, he left the administration of their conjugal properties to his wife Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones. In 1985, Sabalones retired as ambassador to live in the Philippines but did not
return to his family. In 1989, he filed judicial authorization to sell their Greenhills property.
He alleged that he was 68 yrs old, very sick and living alone with no income.
Remedies opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She
alleged that the Greenhills property was occupied by her and their 6 children and they
were dependent on the rentals of their other properties. She also informed the court that
despite Sabalones retirement, he did not return to his legitimate family and instead
maintained a separate residence with Thelma Cumareng and their 3 children. Remedios
prayed for a decree of legal separation and liquidation of their conjugal properties, with
forfeiture of her husbands share. Also prayed for preventing the Sabalones from disturbing
the tenants in the Forbes Park property and disposing any of the conjugal properties
Pendente lite, Remedios filed a motion for issuance of a write of preliminary injunction
preventing Sabalones from interfering in the administration of their properties. Petitioner
opposed motion and on April 7, 1992 CA granted the preliminary injunction. Petitioner
argued that the law provides of a joint administration of the conjugal properties by the
husband and wife, citing Art. 124 FC. Also the court failed to appoint an administrator
pursuant to Art. 61 FC
ISSUE: Whether or not the wife, pendente lite, can enter into a contract of lease of
a conjugal property without the consent of both spouses
HELD: While the law does indeed grant the spouses joint administration over conjugal
properties under Art. 124 FC, Art. 61 of the same code is to be applied in the instant case
since the legal separation case filed by the wife is still pending. Pending the appointment of
an administrator over the conjugal assets, CA was justified in allowing the wife to continue
with her administration pursuant to Art. 61 FC. This provision states that after a petition
for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written
agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as
the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share
in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That
designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the
respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.

The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo
of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the
rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise,
the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff
asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be
rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.

IMELDA RELUCIO, v. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ,
G.R. No. 138497
January 16, 2002
Facts:
On September 15, 1993, Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for APPOINTMENT AS SOLE
ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES against defendant
Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio alleging therein that private-respondent
sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez,,plaintiffs husband abandoned the former and their
four legitimate children and maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with petitioner
Relucio and that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of
the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the
total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children. It was further alleged that
defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period of cohabitation since 1976,
have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings,
cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are in
the names of defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and
proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of
money, property and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual
contribution from petitioner Relucio.
In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and husband, he excluded the
private respondent and their four children from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal
properties and the income or fruits there from. As such, defendant Lopez either did not
place them in his name or otherwise removed, transferred, stashed away or concealed
them from the private-respondent. He placed substantial portions of these conjugal
properties in the name of petitioner Relucio
Issue: Whether respondents petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against
petitioner.
Ruling: The first cause of action is for judicial appointment respondent as administratrix of
the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to
Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the
Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit:
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property xxx

The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the
exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband.
Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty
relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action.

AMPARO NABLE JOSE, ET AL., vs.MARIANO NABLE JOSE, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-7397
December 11, 1916
MAQUILAN VS. MAQUILAN
Facts: Private respondent and her paramour were convicted of adultery.

Thereafter, petitioner husband filed and action for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage and for the dissolution and liquidation of their conjugal partnership of
gains. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent
entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT regarding the partial settlement of some
of their conjugal partnership of gains. The said Compromise Agreement was
given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge.
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the
repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of
the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge on
the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and
judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise
Agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the separation of property effected by the
Compromise Agreement is valid
Ruling: Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be
effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The
questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly
such a separation of property allowed under the law.This conclusion holds
true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was
still pending.However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation
of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal
partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest purs uant to

Abalos vs. Macatangay,
G.R. No. 155043, September 30, 2004
FACTS: Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with
improvements located in Makati City. Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of
Agreement (RMOA), in favor for the respondent, binding himself to sell to respondent the
subject property and not to offer the same to any other party within 30 days from date.
Respondent sent a letter to Arturo and Esther informing them of his readiness and
willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price and demanded upon the spouses to
comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property to him. Esther agreed
to surrender possession of the property to respondent within 20 days, while the latter
promised to pay the balance of the purchase price for P1, 290, 000.00 after being placed in
possession of the property. Esther also obligated herself to execute and deliver to
respondent a deed of absolute sale upon full payment.Respondent informed the spouses
that he had set aside P1, 290, 000.00 as evidenced by Citibank Check as full payment of the
purchase price. But Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property which prompted
respondent to file a complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners.
RULING: Contracts, in general, require the presence of three essential elements: (1) consent
of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
(3)cause of the obligation which is established.The nullity of the RMOA as a contract of sale
emanates not only from lack of Esthers consent thereto but also from want of
consideration and absence of respondents signature thereon.. Under the law, a void
contract cannot be ratified and the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence
of a contract does not prescribe. A void contract produces no effect either against or in
favor of anyoneit cannot create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it
refers.The congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid disposition of
conjugal property. Where the conveyance is contained in the same document which bears
the conformity of both husband and wife, there could be no question on the validity of the
transaction. But when there are 2 documents on which the signatures of the spouses
separately appear, textual concordance of the documents is indispensable. Hence, in this
case where the wifes putative consent to the sale of conjugal property appears in a
separate document which does not, however, contain the same terms and conditions as in
the first document signed by the husband, a valid transaction could not have arisen.The
interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does
not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership,zor after
dissolution of the marriage.The new law provides that the administration of the conjugal
partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one

spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
However, the power of administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber
property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically
requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the court for the
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without which, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES, vs. spouses cipriano mijares and
florentina mijares,
G.R. No. 143826
August 28, 2003
Facts: Vicente and Ignacia Reyes were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto
since 1974. Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold a parcel
of land obtained by them during their marriage the latter misrepresenting to buyer
respondents that his wife had died and that he and their 5 minor children are the only heirs
of Ignacia. Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding the
return of her share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4,
1996 a complaint for annulment of sale against respondent spouses.
Issue: Whether or not the sale is valid on the ground that spouses Reyes has long been
separated in fact
Ruling: Separation in fact does not sever the marriage bond between spouses. Corollarily,
the marriage still subsists. In effect, as provided for under Article 166 of the civil code, the
husband cannot generally encumber and alienate any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wifes consent. However, it does not make the sale null and void
but merely voidable. In this case, there is no dispute that the property was acquired during
the subsistence of the marriage. It is beyond cavil therefore that the sale of the subject
property to respondent spouses is voidable.

Spouses VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES MIAT and ALEXANDER MIAT,
petitioners, vs. ROMEO MIAT, respondent
G.R. No. 143297.
February 11, 2003
Facts:
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two parcels of land during their
coverture. On April 30, 1978, Concordia died. Moises agreed that such properties would be
given to his two sons, Romeo and Alexander. However, when Moises returned, he
negotiated the agreement with his sons in which he kept the Paranaque property for
himself and would leave the Paco property to his two sons. In February 1988, Romeo
learned that the mother of petitioner, Virgilio, have Moises P30,000.00 as down payment
for the sale by Moises of the Paco property.
Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises, testified that even before the death of Concordia,
there was already an agreement that the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander.
This was reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia as well as to the extended Miat family
members.
Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses, to
compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco
property to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price, and to make them pay
damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the Paco property is conjugal or capital
Ruling:
The property is conjugal. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is to
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not
require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The
presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not
appear.

NERISSA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
RAY PEREZ, respondents
G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996
Facts: Private respondent Ray Perez, a doctor of medicine, is married to petitioner, Nerissa
Perez, a registered nurse. Nerissa began working in the U.S. in October 1988 and she used a
part of her earning to build a modest house for her family in Mandaue City, Cebu. She
became a resident alien in February 1992. After 6 miscarriages and a high-risk pregnancy,
Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. On January 17,
1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned
to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five week vacation and they all had
roundtrip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and
promised to follow her with their baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to stay
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind
and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding her
affairs.
When Nerissa arrived home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was
no longer in good terms. The petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws. She only
wanted to be with her only child but he was being kept away from her by his husband. On
the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here in the Philippines and maintained that it would not
be very difficult to live here since they have their own home and car. Nerissa was forced to
move to her parents. On July 26, 1993, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas corpus asking
respondent Ray to surrender the custody of their child to her. On August 27, 1993, the
court issued an order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother. Upon
appeal by Ray, the Court of Appeals, on September 27,1993, reversed the decision of the
court and awarded the custody of the child to his father.
Issue: Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to his father.
Ruling:The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from
his mother finds its raison d'etre in the basic need of a child for his mother's loving care.
Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's awarding the custody of such a
child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to
deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment
and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity
and being sick with a communicable disease.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. The custody of the
child belongs to the mother, Nerissa Perez.

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner, vs. DITA MAQUILAN, respondent
G.R. No. 155409
June 8, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent are spouses, having a son. Respondent and her paramour
was convicted for adultery. After which, respondent filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage, dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains, and
damages, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the case, the spouses entered into a compromise agreement.
The said agreement was given judicial imprimatur. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion for the repudiation of the compromise agreement and the reconsideration of the
same on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise
him of the consequential effects of the compromise agreement. Such was denied by the
RTC.
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition holding that the conviction of the
respondent of the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the
conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property by the spouses pending
the petition of nullity of marriage is valid
Ruling:
Yes. The compromise agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage
or legal separation. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be
effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned
compromise agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of
property allowed under the law. This holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration
of nullity of marriage was still pending.

In re voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership of jose Bermas, sr. and
pilar manuel bermas, petitioners-appellants
No. L-20379
June 22, 1965
Facts:
On May 31, 1962, the spouses Jose and Pilar Bermasn executed a deed entitled
"Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Separation of Property". Such
contract pertains to the voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership and the
establishment between them of the regime of separation of property grounded on Article
191 of the civil code.
The trial court denied the petition upon the ground that, under Article 191 of the
Civil Code, a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once a legal separation has been
ordered.
Issue:
Whether or not a conjugal partnership may be dissolved upon agreement of the
spouses
Ruling:
Yes. The fourth paragraph of Article 191 of the Civil Code provides that the husband
and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval. However, in the case, the liquidation cannot be effected
without a liquidation of the conjugal partnership between Jose Bermas, Sr. and his first
wife, in which the children by first marriage have an interest. The decision appealed from is
set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
conformity with this decision.

ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner, vs.CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-23482
August 30, 1968
Facts: A
lfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married on February 14, 1953. On January
9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home Bacolod City, and commenced to
reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint for custody of all their children as
well as support for them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorneys, succeeded in
reaching an amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and
separation of property
Issue:
Whether the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of the
CFI grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law
Ruling:
The compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement
are valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership.
The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil Code
provides:
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of

property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a
judicial order. (Art. 190, emphasis supplied)
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the
wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial
approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors
may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect
the creditors and other third persons
It is likewise undisputed that the couple have been separated in fact for at least five years -
the wife's residence being in Manila, and the husband's in the conjugal home in Bacolod

City. Therefore, inasmuch as a lengthy separation has supervened between them, the
propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is manifest.
MARGARET, FLORENCE, AND LUCILLE MAXEY, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND

spouses beato macayra and alacopue monday,
No. L-45870.
May 11, 1984
Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales were united together in a marriage performed in a
military fashion in 1903. During their cohabitation, they had six children. The disputed
property involving a parcel of land was acquired in 1911 before the church wedding in
1919.
Regina Morales died sometime after their marriage in 1919. The husband remarried Julia
Pamatluan who sold the properties using a power of attorney to spouses, Mr. and Mrs.
Beato C. Macarya. Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the
Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale
covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from
the herein defendant spouses, alleging that the realties were common properties of their
parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and
capital; and that the sales of the said lands in favor of the defendant spouses in 1953, after
the death of their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey,
without their knowledge and consent; and that they came to know of the above-mentioned
sales only in 1961.On the other hand, defendant-spouses deny the material allegations of
the complaint and assert by way of affirmative defenses that they are the true and lawful
owners and possessors of the properties in question having purchased the same in good
faith and that since then, they have been in possession thereof openly, exclusively and
continuously in concept of owners.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties in question are the exclusive properties of the late
Melbourne Maxey, to the exclusion of his wife Regina Morales.
Ruling: No. Where a man and woman lived as common-law partners in 1903, got married in
1919, and after the death of the woman in 1919, the surviving spouse sold a parcel of land
acquired before they got legally married, article 144 of the new civil code applies and their
children entitled to recover from the vendee.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his
late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners
should return one-half of the P1, 300.00 purchase price of the land while the private
respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties.
Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of
P650.00 on the other.

ALAIN M. DIO, Petitioner, v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011
Facts:
Alain M. Dio and Ma. Caridad L. Dio were childhood friends and sweethearts. They
started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner
and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition
for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior
Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001,
respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial
court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited
to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section
19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages6cralaw (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership governs the property regime of the spouses thereby making
section 19 (1) of the Family Code is inapplicable.
Ruling:
Article 147 of the Family Code provides for that When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by
acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their

cohabitation. The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule
are: Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and
in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. It is clear from Article 50 of the
Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared
void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In
short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting
for the liquidation of the properties of the parties

Buenaventura vs. CA
G.R. NO. 127358
March 31, 2005
Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and
respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the
amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the
care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon
respondents motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing
for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case
maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared
void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed
is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the
RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear
to have been included or involved in said distribution.

FRANCISCO GONZALES, vs. ERMINDA GONZALES,
G.R. No. 159521.
December 16, 2005
Facts:
After two years of cohabitation, Francisco and Erminda got married on February 4,
1979. They begot four children from the said union. On October 29, 1992, respondent filed
a complaint for annulment of their marriage on the ground that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital obligations. Moreover, she prays
for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.
On February 12, 1997, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent. The petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, not satisfied with the manner their properties were
divided. He did not contest the decision declaring his marriage to respondent void ab initio.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equally
between the parties
Ruling:
No. their property relations shall be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code
which creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the
parties under a void marriage, have been acquired through their joint efforts; work or
industry shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA, and TOMAS
CALPATURA, JR., heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., petitioners, vs. ROBERTO, ERLINDA,
DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR., EDNA, and NARCISA PRADO, respondents
G.R. No. 156879. January 20, 2004
Facts:
After the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio
Calapatura. In order to support her minor children with her first husband, Narcisa and her
brother-in-law, Tomas Calapatura, Sr., excuted on April 26, 1968 an Agreement of Purchase
and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the
property. Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said
property. In 1976, Tomas daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex
on the northern part half portion of the property. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, son of
Tomas cousin, built a small house on the northern portion of theproperty.
On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and
delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property conjugal or paraphernal
Ruling:
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered
into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In
the case, while Narcisa testified that she bought the property with her own funds, she,
however, admitted in the contract that the property was her conjugal share with her first
husband. A verbal assertion that she bought the land with her own funds is inadmissible to
qualify the terms of a written agreement under the parole evidence rule.

ELENA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent
G.R. No. 152716
October 23, 2003
Facts:
The marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared null and void ab
initio by the trial court under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership of property.
On October 5, 2000, the trial court held that since the marriage between petitioner
and respondent was declared void ab initio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the
liquidation and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of
the Family Code.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioners motion was dismissed for lack of
merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies in the dissolution of their
properties
Ruling:
Yes. All the elements required in Article 147 are present in the case at bar.
Considering, however, the merits of the case, the Court believes that a blind adherence to
the general rule will result in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just
share in their common property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to
support their children whom the court had entrusted to her care. The Court held that
where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be substitute for appeal will
result in a manifest failure of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are
technical rules may be relaxed.

Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario
GR No. 132529
February 2, 2001
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with
whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also
married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes
and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent
for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao
was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig,
while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying
that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had
collected. For failing to file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default.
Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence
of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between
Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous
marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of
the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was
solemnized without the required marriage license.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;
(2) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect
the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.
HELD:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case.
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of

marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void
ab initio.
It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased
was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under
Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the
two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be not absolute
community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

ANTONIO VALDES, PETITIONER, VS. RTC, BR. 102 Q.C. AND CONSUELO
GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten
during their marriage were five children. In a petition dated June 22, 1992, Valdes sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to article 36 of the Family Code. After
hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and
Consuelo Gomez is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, on the ground
of their mutual Psychological Incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations.
The three older children shall choose which parent they would want to stay with, the
younger children shall be placed in the custody of their mother. The petitioner and
respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing compliance with
Art. 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without
marriage. Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father Antonio Valdes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern the
disposition of a family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage is declared null and null
and void because of Psychological Incapacity on the part of either or both parties to the
contract.
Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of cause
thereof, the property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Art. 137 or 148.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have obtained
through their joint efforts.
The rules set up to govern liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and viodable
marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between
common-law spouses.

Mallilin vs. Castillo
G.R. No. 136803
June 16, 2000
Facts: Petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or
Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira
Castillo. The complaint alleged that petitioner and respondent, both married and with
children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief
courtship while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up
the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and
chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The
business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. D u e t o
irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded
f r o m r e s p o n d e n t h i s s h a r e i n t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t i e s , b u t respondent
refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Respondent
admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage b u s i n e s s w i t h p e t i t i o n e r b u t
a l l e g e d t h a t t h e S u p e r f r e i g h t C u s t o m s Brokerage Corporation was
organized with other individuals and duly r e g i s t e r e d w i t h t h e S E C . S h e
d e n i e d t h a t s h e a n d p e t i t i o n e r l i v e d a s husband and wife because the fact was
that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the
exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition
on the g r o u n d t h a t t h e y w e r e a c q u i r e d e n t i r e l y o u t o f h e r o w n m o n e y
a n d registered solely in her name.
Issue: Whether or not the parties are considered as co-owners of the properties.
Ruling:A c o - o w n e r s h i p e x i s t s b e t w e e n a m a n a n d a w o m a n w h o l i v e
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise
provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s
w h i c h , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f p r o o f t o t h e c o n t r a r y , i s presumed to be equal.
There is thus co-ownership even though the couples are not capacitated to marry each
other.

TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES
FERNANDEZ, respondents
G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000
Facts:
Herein respondents were the plaintiffs in a Civil Case, an action for ejectment filed
before the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and
Gina Tumlos. In their complaint dated July 5, 1996.
Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She
averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is
a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated
that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with respondent Mario
Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15, 1996, the MTC required
the parties to submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual issues defined in
their pleadings within ten days from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Guillerma Tumlos submitted her affidavit/position
paper on November 29, 1996, while the respondents filed their position paper on
December 5, 1996, attaching thereto their marriage contract, letters of demand to the
defendants, and the Contract to Sell over the disputed property.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim of co-ownership by Guillerma Tumlos valid.
Ruling:
Petitioner's central theory and main defense against respondents' action for
ejectment is her claim of co-ownership over the property with respondent Mario
Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC, she presented a Contract to Sell indicating
that she was his spouse. The MTC found this document insufficient to support her claim.
The RTC, however, after considering her allegation that she had been cohabiting with Mario
Fernandez as shown by evidence presented before it, ruled in her favor.
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced before the RTC could no
longer be considered because they had not been submitted before the MTC. Hence, the
appellate court concluded that the claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and woman who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be
deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that
each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof
of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.

NENG MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON et. al., respondents
G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000
Facts:
The applicability of the regular rules of procedure and case law in this jurisdiction.
to civil cases before the District Shari'a Courts is the issue in this petition.
On November 14, 1988, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint against private respondents
for "Quieting of Title to Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and
P-138, and Damages, With Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" with the Shari'a
District Court, 6th Shari's District at Cotabato City, Public respondent Register of Deeds of
the same city was impleaded as a nominal party. Private respondents filed their answer
dated December 1, 1988.
The case was set for trial on the merits on May 22, 1989 but it was postponed at the
instance of private respondents. Other settings were postponed for one reason or another.
However, on July 4, 1989, private respondents filed a pleading designated as "Amplification
of Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint on the Ground of
Lack of Jurisdiction." On the basis thereof, the trial court issued an order on November 7,
1989 dismissing the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Code shall govern the property relations of Muslim Marriages
celebrated before the Muslim Code
Ruling:
Yes. Since it is the Civil Code which determines the validity of the marriages contracted
before P.D. 1083, it is the same code that determines and governs the property relations of
the marriages, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in
question, the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property
relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.

Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corp.
G.R. No. 151967
February 16, 2005
Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 23 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were
married. Eduardo was then employed as the vice president in a private corporation.
The Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina
Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of
residential land with a house. The Register of Deeds made of record at the dorsal
portion of the said titles. Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando for
a loan.
It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. Eduardo, who was
then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International,
bought 7,500 bags of cement from MIWCC but failed to pay for the same. MIWCC filed
a complaint against him in the RTC of Makati City for the return of the said
commodities, or the value thereof. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
MIWCC and against Eduardo. Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim in the
trial court and served a copy thereof to the sheriff. MIWCC then submitted an indemnity
bond issued by the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The sale at public auction
proceeded. MIWCC made a bid for the property. Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC
and Sheriff Alejo in the RTC of Paraaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. She alleged then that she wasthe
sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo. Hence, the levy on
execution of the property was null and void
Issue: Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina
Castillo and Eduardo Francisco.
Ruling: The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property withher personal
funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she isthe sole owner of the
property. The evidence on record shows that t heImus Bank executed a deed of
absolute sale over the property to the petitioner and titles over the property were,
thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee after her marriage to Eduardo. It is to be noted
that plaintiff- appellee got married at the age of 23.At that age, it is doubtful if she had
enough funds of her own to purchasethe subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit
of Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that the funds were
provided by her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to shield
the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment creditor.

MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS REYES, petitioner, vs. LOURDES,
MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM, AND RODOLFO, JR.-all surnamed REYES,
respondents
G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004
Facts:
Respondent Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3, 1947
in which they had four children. At the time of the death of Rodolfo, he was living with his
common-law wife with whom they begot three children. During the common-law
relationship of Rodolfo and Milagros, they decided to buy a house and lot in which a Deed
of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of Milagros.
Petitioner, in order to secure finances with which to pay the purchase price,
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo, as attorney-in-fact to secure a
loan. The loan was payable for ten years. After the death of Rodolfo, the balance was fully
paid by the Philam Life Insurance Co. as insurer of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the salaries and earnings of Rodolfo, which were his and Lourdes
conjugal funs, paid for the loan and, hence, the disputed property was conjugal
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership of gains is created
upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal
separation, or judicial separation of property. On the other hand, Article 144 of the Civil
Code mandates a co-ownership between a man and a woman not legally married provided
that the couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage.
Article 148 of the Family Code likewise finds application to the case at bar, thus,
when a common-law couple have legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired
by themthrough their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industryshall be
owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
Respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of
Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. Also, they
have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the
property.

Jacinto Saguid, vs. HON. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003]
After a period of 9-year cohabitation, Petitioner and respondent decided to separate. On

January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of
Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of
Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan,
she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also,
from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and
accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of
P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties
and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of
their house, be reimbursed to her. The lower court ruled in favor of respondent
Issue: whether or not the evidence presented by private respondent is sufficient to justify
the ruling of the lower courts
Ruling: Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the
parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the
disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which
were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half,
i.e., P55,687.50 each
On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership
over the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in
the construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation therein should
be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.

Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario
GR No. 132529
February 2, 2001
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with
whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also
married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes
and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent
for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao
was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig,
while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying
that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had
collected. For failing to file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default.
Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence
of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between
Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous
marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of
the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was
solemnized without the required marriage license.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;
(2) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect
the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.
HELD:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case.
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of

marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void
ab initio.
It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased
was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under
Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the
two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be not absolute
community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

TSHIATE UY and RAMON UY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
NATIVIDAD CALAUNAN-UY, and THE ESTATE OF MENILO UY, respondents
G.R. No. 102726. May 27, 1994
Facts:
Respondent Natividad was the common-law wife of the late Menilo Uy, Sr. for about
thirty-six years. Their union bore four children. After the death of Menilo, Sr., petitioners
initiated a special proceeding entitled, In the Matter of the Petition for Letters of
Administration of the Estate of Menilo Uy, Sr. Respondent filed a civil case for Partition of
Properties Under Co-ownership, against the estate of Menilo, Sr.
The parties, upon the suggestion of the RTC, submittes a Compromise Agreement.
On April 24, 1991, a judgment was rendered based on such compromise. Petitioner Tshiate
filed an omnibus motion alleging that by virtue of Hong Kong marriage, she was the
surviving legal spouse of Menilo, Sr. Petitioners contended that the compromise was a
patent nullity.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for partition of property on alleged co-ownership in the
case at bar be governed by Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code
Ruling:
Yes. The action for partition is predicated on an alleged co-ownership between
private respondent Natividad and deceased Menilo, Sr. of property evidently acquired
during the period of their common-law relationship. The governing provisions, applicable
to their case, are now found in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, considering that
Menilo, Sr. died on September 27, 1990, well after the effectivity of Executive Order No. 209
or the Family Code of the Philippines on August 3, 1988.
JOSEPHINE BELCODERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents

G.R. No. 89667. October 20, 1993
Facts:
Alayo D. Busing married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three
children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he
forthwith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child,
named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status as "married to Josefa R.
Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter, dated 06 Dctober 1959, which he addressed to

Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife
Josefa R. Bosing." The final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., on 24
October 1959. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R.
Rosing, married to Alayo Bosing, On 6 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior
marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died on 11 March 1967. About three years
later, or on 17 September 1970, Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial
partition and sale of the lot in question, which was there described as "conjugal property"
of Josefa and the deceased Alayo. The notice of extrajudicial partition was published on 04,
05 and 06 November 1970 in the Evening Post; the inheritance and estate taxes were paid;
and a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 198840 was issued on 06 June 1974 in the name
of Josephine.
On 30 October 1980, Juliana and her three legitimate children filed with the court a
quo an action for reconveyance of the property. On the basis of the above facts, the trial
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and it ordered that Josephine Bosing execute a deed of
reconveyance of the property in question to the legal heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing,
and that both defendants pay, jointly and severally, actual damages by way of attorney's
fees and expenses in litigation.
Issue:
Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in 1949 when an
agreement for its purchase on installment basis was entered into between him and
Magdalena Estate, Inc., or in 1959 when a deed of sale was finally executed by Magdalena
Estate, Inc., the legal results would be the same.
Ruling:
Yes. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and
his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil
Code (Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of the
properties by the beneficiaries is ten years (Article 1144, civil code). The case has been
initiated seasonably.

Juaniza vs. Jose
89 SCRA 306
Facts: E u g e n i o J o s e w a s t h e r e g i s t e r e d o w n e r a n d o p e r a t o r o f t h e
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine
National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969which resulted in the death to
seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the
accident, Eugenio Jose was legally m a r r i e d t o S o c o r r o R a m o s b u t h a d b e e n
c o h a b i t i n g w i t h d e f e n d a n t - appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a
relationship akin to that of husband and wife. Motion for reconsideration was filed by
Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay
damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied.
Issue: Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code (now Article 148 of FC)i s a p p l i c a b l e
i n a c a s e w h e r e o n e o f t h e p a r t i e s i n a c o m m o n - l a w relationship is
incapacitated to marry.
Ruling: It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in
Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not
in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to
Socorro Ramos, there isan impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo.
Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of
the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife.
There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of,
and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the
collision.

MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, and ZENAIDA, all
surnamed ADRIANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CELESTINA, MANOLO
and AIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO, respondents
G.R. No. 124118
March 27, 2000
Facts: On October 29, 1933, Lucio Adriano married Gliceria Dorado; they had three
children, namely, Celestina, Manolo, and Aida, private respondents in this case. On or
before 1942, Lucio and Gliceria separated. The latter settled in Laguna where she died on
June 11, 1968. After their separation Lucio cohabited with Vicenta Villa and subsequently
five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta with whom he had eight
children: Marino, Renato, Leticia, Imelda, Maria, Alicia, Ligaya, Jose Vergel, and Zenaida. All
were petitioners except to Jose Vergel due to his death before the inception of the
proceedings. In 1972 the spouses separated.
On October 10,1980, Lucio executed his last will and testament disposing of all his
properties, and assigning, among others his second wife Vicenta and all his children by first
and second marriages as devisees and legatees therein. The properties bequeathed in the
will were a 45,000 sq. m. lot and the residential house, rice mill, warehouse and with all the
equipment situated thereon in Candelaria, Quezon. On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and
Celestina Adriano, Lucios executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will immediately
after the death and Vicenta opposed the said petition, but still granted. Hence, the
petitioner filed an action for the annulment of Lucio Adrianos will.
Issue: Whether or not the property bequeathed in the will of Lucio Adriano were conjugal
property of the latter and his second wife, Vicenta Villa-Adriano.
Ruling:
No. The properties, which were under this issue, belong to the conjugal property of
Lucio and Gliceria. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that a man
and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not
in any way be in capacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964,
or while Lucios marriage with Gloria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Because it was
clearly supported that the properties was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the
conjugal fund from his first marriage.

Gaudencio Guerrero, petitioner, vs. RTC of Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI, Judge
Luis Bello, and Pedro Hernando, respondents
G.R. No. 109068
January 10, 1994
Facts:
There was a complaint filed by Gaudencio Guerrero against Pedro Hernando,
respondent. On December 7, 1992, at the pre-trial conference, the relationship of petitioner
Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B.
Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law. This case was
dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brothers-in-law the
complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a
compromise. Thus, the petitioner appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.
Ruling:
The court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
respondent Hernando was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before
filing the present suit. The enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same
family does not comprehend brothers-in-law. In Gayon vs. Gayon it was emphasized that
sisters-in-law (hence, also brothers-in-law) are not listed under Article 217 of the New
Civil Code as members of the same family. Article 150 of the Family Code repeats
essentially the same enumeration of members of the family, then there is no reason to
alter existing jurisprudence on the matter.

HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. EDMUNDO
ACUNA and ALBERTO MORENO, respondents
G.R. No. 154132
August 31, 2006
Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against
Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe
and the Register of Deeds for cancellation of mortgage.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private
respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that
no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code applies in the case at bar
Ruling:
No. once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family,
the law no longer makes it a condition to precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a
compromise before an action can prosper.

Martinez vs. Martinez
G.R. No. 162084
June 28, 2005
Facts: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house
constructed thereon. Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament directing
the subdivision of the property into three lots. He then bequeathed the three
lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr. Manolo was
designated as the administrator of the estate.Rodolfo found a deed of sale
purportedly signed by his father, w h e r e t h e l a t t e r a p p e a r s t o h a v e s o l d t o
M a n o l o a n d h i s w i f e L u c i l a . Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale
and cancellation of TCT against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the
RTC.RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the action since there was no allegation in the complaint
that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted to probate. Rodolfo
appealed the order to the CA. In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila
Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo
ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file
acomplaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that
they were the owners of the property. The spouses Martinezalleged in their position paper
that earnest efforts toward a compromisehad been made and/or exerted by them, but that
the same proved futile.
No amicable settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary
conference because of irreconcilable differences.
Issue: Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations inthe complaint
that the case passed through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove that
earnest efforts were made.
Ruling: The petition was granted. As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to
imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the
same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise
before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known that a
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus,
a partys failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a
complaint against a family member would render such complaint premature.

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and
ISABELITA MANALO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 129242
January 16, 2001
Facts:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived
by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio
Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo
Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo, and Imelda Manalo, who are all
of legal age. At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac. On November 26, 1992, the eight
(8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen,
Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Regional
Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio
Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
The order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein
petitioners namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were
granted ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code shall be applied
Held:
Under Article 222 of the Civil Code, No suit shall be filed or maintained between members
of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. This is
clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against
another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or
in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an
excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the
Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family.

NICANOR T. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS CONSUELO T. SANTOS-
GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO, respondents.
G.R. No. 134787
November 15, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero
are brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both
deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo, and eight their siblings, executed a Basic
Agreement of Partition covering properties they inherited from their parents.Two years
later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero, filed suit with
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal against petitioner and two other brothers, for
recovery of inheritance. They sought for the judicial declaration of validity in the 1956
Agreement of Partition. The Santos heirs executed on May 5, 1959 another document,
denominated Deed of Partition. Spouses Guerreros filed another complaint against
Nicanor for the recovery of her share under the 1959 Deed of Partition. The Judge ordered
Nicanor and others to comply with his part of the Deed of Partition and deliver to the
Guerreros the amount of P26,650.00 without prejudice to the right of reimbursement
under the same deed.Subsequently, the Guerreros instituted another complaint against
Nicanor for recovery of sums of money under the 1959 Deed of Partition. Thereat, Nicanor,
as defendant a quo, filed a third party complaint against brothers Ernesto et al. And albeit
not touched upon in the basic pleadings, the issue of whether Nicanor was obligated to pay
Consuelo the amount stated in the 1959 partition. Nicanor was ordered by the Court to pay
Consuelo the amount due her under the May 5, 1959 deed of partition plus damages and
attorneys fees. Nicanor appealed in the Intermediate Appellate Court to reverse the
decision of the trial court but the appellate court affirmed and modified the decision of the
lower court.Approximately six years later, the Guerreros filed a complaint for revival of the
IACs decision in the RTC of Malabon- Navotas but the said court dismissed the complaint.
However, on motion for reconsideration and following a new trial, the trial court reversed
itself. Therefrom, Nicanor went on appeal to the Court of Appeals and the court dismissed
his appeal.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code, now pursuant to 151 of the Family
Code shall be applied
(b) Whether or not res judicata can barred the Courts decision
Held:
(a) A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers; While a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same
family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
made pursuant to Article 222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family
Code, a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by introduction of

evidence effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint. The
complaint filed in this case contains no allegations. An action for revival of judgment of a
dormant decision rendered in an original action can hardly be the kind of suit
contemplated in Article 222 of the Code. It cannot be over-emphasized in this regard that
the rationale of said provision is to obviate hatred and passion in the family likely to be
spawned by litigation between and among the members thereof.
(b) Res Judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment rendered by the court of a
competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the
same claim, demand or cause of action. Res judicata is not a nullifying factor, such that the
final judgment in the former action works to nullify the proceeding in a subsequent action
where the doctrine is invoked.

CECILION MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and
LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA, respondents.
No. L-23102
April 24, 1967
Facts:
Cecilio and Luisa were married on September 2, 1953 and lived together as husband and
wife until July 14, 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his
studies and practice his profession. Since then, the husband without justifiable cause or
reason deliberately abandoned and neglected the wife and despite repeated demands from
her, the husband failed and refused to provide for the maintenance and support of the wife
who is pregnant sickly and without source of revenue. Thus, she filed a complaint against
her husband. The husband filed two motions of dismissal consecutively but both were
denied. Then he petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction to stop to stop the Court of First Instance from further proceeding with the case.
After the CA heard and considered the merits, it d3enied the writ of prohibition and
dissolved the injunction.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code shall be applied
(b) Whether or not Article 2053 of the Civil Code shall be applied to claim future support
Held:
(a) Article 222 of the Civil Code requires that before a suit between members of the
family is filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made and the only way to make it so appear when the suit is filed is by proper
averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated unless
such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is a
condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of the
complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of
court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any stage
of the case even on appeal.
(b) A claim for future support that under Article 2053vof the Civil Code cannot be
subject of a valid compromise, therefore, outside the sphere of Article 222 of the Code upon
which petitioner relies. The validity of marriage is also a non-compromisable issue. Since
no valid compromise is valid on these issues, a showing of previous effects to compromise
them would be superfluous.

MARGARET ANN WAINRIGHT VERSOZA, JOSE MARIA VERSOZA JR., CHARLES
JOHN VERSOZA, and VIRGINIA FELICE VERSOZA, petitioner-appellant, vs. JOSE
MARIA VRERSOZA, defendant-respondent
No. L-25609
November 27, 1968
Facts:
On March 4, 1964, a verified complaint later amended, for monthly support in arrears and
damages and custody of the children with a petition for support pendiente lite was lodged
against Jose Maria Versoza by his wife and their three minor children. Reason gives are that
defendant has abandoned plaintiff without providing for their support and maintain illicit
relation with another woman.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case
Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code , construed in relation of Section 1 (j) Rule 16, Rules of Court;
Meaning of no suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless
it should appear that earnest effects toward a compromise have been made but that the
same have failed, subject to limitations in Article 2035. The right to support cannot be: (1)
removed; (2) transmitted to third persons; (3) nor compensated with what the receipients
owes the obligor (Article 301). The alleged defect is that the complaint does not state a
cause of action. The proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect
that the requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction
upon the lower Court. The defect is curable.

Hontiveros vs. RTC
G.R. No. 125465
June 29, 1999
Facts:
The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora A y s o n f o r d a m a g e s d u e t o
u n c o l l e c t e d r e n t a l s o n a l a n d l o c a t e d a t Jamindan, Capiz. Petitioners moved for
a judgment on the pleadings on the groundt h a t p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s a n s w e r d i d
n o t t e n d e r a n i s s u e o r t h a t i t otherwise admitted the material allegations of
the complaint. Private respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied
petitioners c l a i m s a n d t h u s t e n d e r e d c e r t a i n i s s u e s o f f a c t w h i c h c o u l d
o n l y b e resolved after trial. The trial court denied petitioners motion. After an
assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties, pleadings is
inappropriate not only for the fact that the de fendants in their answer
specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because the party claiming
damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof, however an exception to it, that is,
that when the allegations refer to the a m o u n t o f d a m a g e s , t h e a l l e g a t i o n s m u s t
s t i l l b e p r o v e d . T h e c o u r t dismissed the case and petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath
that earnest efforts toward compromise were made prior to filing thereof.
Ruling: Petition was granted. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the
Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the
husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and
sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are
not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who
is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto
Hontiveros are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner, vs. HON.AUGUSTO V. BREVA, respondents
G.R. No. 86355
May 31, 1990
Facts:
The debt was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident and the money judgment
arising there from was rendered by the Appellate Court on January 27, 1988 which
ordering the petitioner to pay the Salinas spouses the due damages. The said judgment
having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Court to satisfy
the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants including the petitioner. On
July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land registered in the name of Jose
Modequillo. A motion to quash or set aside levy of execution was filed by the petitioner
alleging that the residential land located is where the family home is built since 1969 prior
to the commencement of this case and as such is exemt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned
in article 155 thereof; and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family
home of the defendant is not one of those enumerated under article 155 of the Family Code.
Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Issue:
Whether or not the case fall under the exemption from the execution provided in the
Family Code
Ruling:
Case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.Under
the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from time it is
occupied as a family residence. Thus, the creditors should take necessary precautions to
protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family owes the
home. Exemption is effective from the time of the Constitution of the Family home as such
and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. The residential house
and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicial or extrajudicial
under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of
the Family Code of the Philippines on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicles on August 4, 1987

Juanita Trinidad Ramos et al vs. Danilo Pangilinan et al
G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010
Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint in 2003 for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc.,
a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. On
April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the aggregate amount of P1,661,490.30. The Labor Arbiter issued on
September 8, 2005 a writ of execution which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name covered
by TCT No. 38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila. Alleging that the Pandacan property was
the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and
the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents, however, averred that
the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo. The
Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash, hence, Ramos and the company appealed to the
NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters Order. Ramos and the company appealed to the
Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and was substituted by herein
petitioners. The appellate court, denied the appeal, held that the Pandacan property was
not exempted from execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals Decision holding that the levy upon the Pandacan
property was valid?
Held: The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which
must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases.
There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband
and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and
their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part
of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property of the unmarried
head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its
constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas andP200,000 in rural areas. The
family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply
with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos familyhome,
the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the

records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed
because Ramos bank accounts were already closed while other properties in his or the
companys name had already been transferred, and the only property left was the
Pandacan property. The Supreme Court denied the petition.

Albino Josef vs. Otelio Santos
G.R. No. 165060 November 27, 2008
Facts:
The trial court, found Albino Josef liable to Otelio Santos in the amount of P404,836.50 with
interest at 12% per annum reckoned from January 9, 1995 until full payment. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision. The Judgment
became final and executory on May 21, 2002. On February 17, 2003, respondent moved for
issuance of a writ of execution, the trial court granted the motion. On August 29, 2003,
certain personal properties subject of the writ of execution was auctioned off. Thereafter, a
real property located at Marikina City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
N-105280 was sold on October 28, 2003 by way of public auction to fully satisfy the
judgment credit. Respondent emerged as the winning bidder and a Certificate of Sale dated
November 6, 2003 was issued in his favor. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties
did not belong to him but to his children; and that the real property covered by TCT No. N-
105280 was his family home thus exempt from execution. The Court of Appeals issued the
assailed Resolution dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not property was a family home and must be exempted from execution?
Held:
The trial court should have made an earnest determination of the truth to petitioners claim
that the house and lot in which he and his children resided was their duly constituted
family home. Since it did not, its July 16, 2003 Order is thus null and void. Where a
judgment or judicial order is void it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated
as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. The
family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon
a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family
love and repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the
sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and
likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and
strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of
our nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the
family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive

of the family shall be recognized or given effect. The Supreme Court grated the petition and
reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Spouses Auther Kelley, Jr. and Doris Kelley vs. Planters Products, Inc et
al
G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008
Issue: Auther G. Kelley, Jr. acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from
respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Authers failure to pay despite
demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the trial court. The trial court
decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. Respondent sheriff Jorge Ragutana
sold on execution real property covered by TCT No. 15079 located in Naga City. A
certificate of sale was issued in favor of PPI as the highest bidder. Petitioners Auther and
his wife Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the trial
court on the ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt
from execution. Petitioners motion was denied for failure to comply with the three-day
notice requirement.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property was the family home and exempted from
execution?
Held: No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly
constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted
jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house
where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family
home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on
the property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall
not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and
P200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences
as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The Supreme Court Remanded
the case to the trial court for determination whether or not the property is a duly
constituted family home and therefore exempt from execution.

Mary Josephine Gomez et al vs. Roel Sta. Ines, et al
G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005
Facts: On June 17, 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo
filed a complaint for damages before the trial court against Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines, for
the latters refusal to return the TCT to the property. On January 24, 1989, the trial court
rendered judgment against Marietta ordering her to deliver to Mary Josephine and Socorro
the owners copy of TCT No. 47082 and to pay P40,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
actual or compensatory damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages, and
P15,000.00 as attorneys fees.After said judgment became final and executory, a writ of
execution was issued by the trial court, by virtue of which, a parcel of land (with
improvements) located in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, with an area of 432 square meters,
covered by TCT No. T-55314 registered in the name of Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines, was
levied upon by Flaviano Balgos, Jr., to satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case. Said
property was sold to Mary Josephine as the highest bidder. On July 12,1993, a complaint
for annulment of said sale was filed before the trial court, by Hinahon Sta. Ines together
with Noel, Roel, and Jannette, all named Sta. Ines, husband and children of Marietta,
respectively, against Mary Josephine and Sheriff Flaviano Balgos, Jr. on the ground that said
house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence. Mary Josephine
moved to dismiss the complain but it was denied. On December 1,1993, herein petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was then granted . On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the Order of dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not the beneficiaries of a family home can claim exemption from the execution?
Held:
Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was not
constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta
incurred her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only
upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, thus, the debts were incurred
before the constitution of the family home. Mariettas liability arose long before the levied
property was constituted as a family home by operation of law in August 1988. Under the
circumstances, it is clear that the liability incurred by Marietta falls squarely under one of
the instances when a family home may be the subject of execution, forced sale, or
attachment, as provided for by Article 155 of the Family Code, particularly, to answer for
debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. The Supreme Court granted the
petition and the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside.

Florante Manacop, vs. Court of Appeals et al
G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997
Facts:
On March 10, 1972, Petitioner Florante Manacop and his wife, Eulaceli, purchased a 446-
square-meter residential land with a bungalow. On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E
& L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner to collect an indebtedness of P3,
359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into
compromise agreement. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving
the aforementioned compromise agreement. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a
motion for execution and the same was granted but it was delayed. Eventually the sheriff
levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner including the family
home of the petitioner. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
assailing the lower courts Orders of September 23, 1986 and September 26, 1989. On
February 21, 1990, Respondent Court of Appeals rendered its now questioned Decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the family home is a subject of execution?
Held:
Under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became
his family home under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of said
Code. However, the said provision of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In
other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be
followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that
the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it
follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt
involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to
August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the
Family Code. The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit.

Pablito Taneo, et al vs. Court of Appeals, et al
G.R No. 108532 MARCH 9, 1999
Facts:
Two of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about
P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land with an area of about five hectares, and the other was
the family home. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966
to Abdon Gilig the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after
petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on
February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the
private respondent. Said sale has become final as no redemption was made within one year
from the registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale. On November 5,1985, petitioner
oppose such conveyance, filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance as void. The
validity of the sale in favor of Abdon Gilig was even confirmed by the Court of Appeals
Private respondent averred that a Lazaro Ba-a originally owned the subject land who sold
it to Pablo Taneo on September 18, 1941. Despite as counterclaim, private respondent
alleged that since petitioners are still in possession of the subject property, he has been
deprived of acts of ownership and possession and therefore, prayed for payment of rentals.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary to register the family home ?
Held:
The operative act then which created the family home extrajudicially was the registration
in the Registry of Property of the declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil
Code .Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer necessary, Article 153 of
the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as the family residence. The constitution of the family home by
Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such constitution did not comply with the
requirements of the law. The trial court found that the house was erected not on the land
which the Taneos owned. By the very definition of the law that the "family home is the
dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated,"
it is understood that the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit.

Manuel de Asis, vs. Court of Appeals, et al
G.R. No. 127578. February 15, 1999
Facts: On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres in her capacity as the legal guardian of the
minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against
Manuel de Asis alleging that the latter is the father minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and
despite repeated demands, he refused and failed to provide for the maintenance and
support of the Glen. Petitioner denied as the father of Glen and so he cannot be required to
support the latter. The trial court dismissed the case by virtue of the said manifestation. On
September 7, 1995, Vircel D. Andres filed another Complaint for maintenance and support
was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres. On
October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that it is barred
by the prior judgment but it was denied, the trial court ruled that res judicata is
inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future
support is prohibited by law. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the said Petition
devoid of merit and dismissed the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the prior petition would affect the second action?
Held:
The dismissal of the prior case was not adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown,
the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment
is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiffs arise, she has the right to bring
an action for support, for it is only then her cause of action accrues. Furthermore, the
agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent's mother for the dismissal
of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the
counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates
the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Rodolfo Fernandez et al vs. Romeo Fernandez et al
G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001
Facts
Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia were the registered owners of a parcel of land
consisting of 194 sq. m. and a two-storey building. Generosa gave birth to a baby boy
named Rogelio who died when he was only 12 years old. It was revealed that the late
Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased a one baby boy who was
named as Rodolfo Fernandez. On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his
wife Generosa and Rodolfo Fernandez an estate consisting a parcel of land consisting an
area of 194-sq. m. with a two-storey residential building. On August 31, 1989, Rodolfo
Fernandez and Generosa executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating
to them that 119.5 sq. m. of the said parcel of land plus the residential house will belong to
Generosa de Venecia and 74.5 sq. m. of the said parcel of land will belong to Rodolfo V.
Fernandez. On the same day, Generosa executed a Deed of Sale to Eddie Fernandez,
appellants son, over her share. After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano,
Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez,
being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a
brother of Jose, filed September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-judicial Partition of
Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. On May 10, 1996, the trial court declared the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 null and void. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the Rodolfo Fernandez was entitled successions and inheritance from
spouses Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez?
Held:
The trial court found that Rodolfo Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted
child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo
could not inherit from the spouses. Because it was negated by the fact of failing to present
any birth certificate or any public document that would give a proof of being a legitimate
child. Rodolfo even presented his baptismal as evidence but was spurious and falsified. The
Supreme Court affirmed and modified the assailed judgment that the deed of extra-judicial
partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is
concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez.

Gerardo Concepcion, vs. Court of Appeals et al
G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005
Facts:
On December 29, 1989, Ma. Theresa and Gerardo Conception got married. Ma. Theresa
gave birth to Jose Gerardo on December8 1990. Their relationship turned sour which
caused Gerardo to file a petition for annulment on the ground of bigamy. He contended that
prior to their marriage, Ma. Theresa had an annulled marriage with Mario Gopiao and he
was still alive. Maria did not deny this prior marriage but claimed that she never lived with
Mario at all. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and the
subsisting marriage with Gerardo is a bigamous one. The custody of the child was awarded
to the wife while Gerardo was granted with visitation rights. Ma. Theresa moved for the
reconsideration of the decision that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from
Conception to Almonte following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mothers
surname. However, the law applied the best interest of the child principle hence
dismissing her motion. Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but it was
also denied. The Court of Appeals further held that an illegitimate child cannot use the
mothers surname motu propio and that she should file a separate proceeding for a change
of name under the Rules of Court to effect corrections. The child, under the law, is the
legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, he
cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void marriage. Moreover, Gerardo can
claim neither custody nor visitation rights over the child and he cannot impose his surname
upon the child.
Issue:
Whether or not Gerardo can claim neither custody nor visitation rights over the child and
he cannot impose his surname upon the child?
Held:
Under Article 64 of the Family Code of the Philippines, a child who was conceived or born
during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. Under Article 167 of same Code, the child
shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulterous. Jose Gerardo is the legitimate
child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao since their marriage is valid. Gerardo Concepcion
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of Jose Gerardo. The Supreme Court
denied the petition and affirmed the decision Court of Appeals.

Belen Sagad Angeles vs. Aleli Angeles Maglaya
G.R. NO. 153798 SEPTEMBER 2, 2005
Facts:
On January 21, 1998, Francisco died, leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building,
among other valuable properties and that there is a need to appoint an administrator of
Franciscos estate. Aleli Angeles Maglaya alleged that she is the sole legitimate child of the
deceased and Genoveva Mercado, that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required of an administrator. Belen Angeles opposed the petition and
claimed to be made as the administratrix of Franciscos estate. Petitioner alleged having
married Francisco on August 7, 1948 and Francisco represented in their marriage contract
that he was single at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter,
the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further
alleged that respondent has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed
parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to
debunk respondents claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred
that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et
al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as
possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate. On 12 July 1999, the trial
court found that respondent failed to prove her filiation and dismissed the petition. The
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts order of dismissal and directed it
to appoint respondent as administratrix of the estate of Francisco.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in appoint respondent as administratrix of the
estate of Francisco?
Held:
Under Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.A legitimate child is a
product of a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is
strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. No marriage certificate or
marriage contract doubtless the best evidence of Franciscos and Genovevas marriage, if
one had been solemnized was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other
solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the
marriage between the two. None of the four witnesses respondent presented could say
anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. In all, no evidence whatsoever
was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage
contract. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Arturo R. Abalos, vs. Dr. Galicano S. Macatangay, Jr.,
G.R. No. 155043 September 30, 2004
Facts:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with
improvements consisting of about three 327 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 145316. Armed with a Special Power of Attorney, purportedly issued by
his wife, Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) dated October
17, 1989, in favor of respondent, binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property
and not to offer the same to any other party within 30 days from date. Arturo
acknowledged receipt of a check in the amount of P5,000.00, representing earnest money
for the subject property, the amount of which would be deducted from the purchase price
of P1,300,000.00. Esther, executed a Special Power of Attorney, appointing her sister,
Bernadette Ramos, to act for and in her behalf relative to the transfer of the property to
respondent. Ostensibly, a marital squabble was brewing between Arturo and Esther at the
time and to protect his interest, respondent caused the annotation of his adverse claim on
the title of the spouses to the property on November 14, 1989. Esther, through her
attorney-in-fact, executed a contract to Sell the property to the extent of her conjugal
interest therein for the sum of P650,000.00 and agreed to surrender possession of the
property to respondent. In a letter dated December 7, 1989, respondent informed the
spouses that he had set aside the amount of P1,290,000.00 as as full payment of the
purchase price. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property which prompted
respondent to cause the annotation of another adverse claim on TCT No. 145316. On
January 12, 1990, respondent filed a complaint for specific performance with damages
against petitioners. Arturo filed his answer to the complaint while his wife was declared in
default. The trial court dismissed the complaint for specific performance. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the SPA in favor of Arturo,
assuming that it was void, cannot affect the transaction between Esther and respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the Special Power of Attorney executed by Esther, in favor of her sister, that
the sale of the property to respondent was effected?
Held:
The Family provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint
undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of administration
does not include the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal
partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically requires the written consent of the

other spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
partnership property without which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Petitioners action for specific performance must fail. Even on the supposition that the
parties only disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale, assuming that it
exists, is still void for as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half
of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The
Supreme Court reversed and set aside the appealed decision.

Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals, et al
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
Facts: On October 18, 1968, Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and
guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support against private
respondent Perico Jao. However, the Perico denied paternity so the parties agreed to a
blood grouping test. Upon order of the trial court, The National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) conducted the test, the result of the blood grouping test, held January 21, 1969,
indicated that the child could not have been the possible offspring of Perico Jao and Arlene
S. Salgado.
Issue: Whether or not blood grouping test are conclusive evidence to show paternity of
Perico?
Held: A universal scientific agreement that blood grouping are conclusive as to non-
paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the
child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove
that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible
blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are cross matched,
then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. The Supreme Court held that
the result of the blood grouping test was conclusive on the non-paternity of the putative
father.

Mariano Andal and Maria Dueas, vs. Eduvigis Macaraig
G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951
Facts: On January 1941, Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. His brother, Felix,
went to live in his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or
about September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live
in the house of Marias father, until the middle of 1943. Felix and Maria had sexual
intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died
without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943,
Maria Duenas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name Mariano Andal. Brought by the
death of Emiliano Andal, Eduvigis Macaraig took possession of the land that the deceased
owned because there is none in the family has the right to inherit. Mariano Andal assisted
by his mother Maria Duenas, as guardian, filed an action for the recovery and possession of
a parcel of land situated and they alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of
Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas and that Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of
land in question whom he acquired by virtue of a donation propter nuptias from his
mother, Edivigis Macaraig.
Issue: Whether or not Mariano Andal would be considered as the legitimate child of
Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas?
Held: The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy. There cases where persons suffering from TB can do the carnal
act even in the most crucial stage of health because then they seem to be more inclined to
sexual intercourse. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the
300 next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife would
include absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent,
continuing and incurable; and imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took
place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. The fact that the wife had illicit
intercourse with a man other than her husband during the initial period does not preclude
cohabitation between said husband and wife. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed
decision.

Teofista Babiera, vs. Presentacion Catotal
G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
Facts: Presentacion Catotal filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of
Teofista Babiera. Private respondent asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Carinosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6,
1990 respectively and on September 20, 1996, a baby girl was delivered by hilot in the
house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said
spouse, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of the said spouses, caused
the registration/ recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the
child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and
made the latter to appear as the mother by forging her signature; that petitioner, then 15
years old saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto gave birth to
Teofista Guinto. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved
that petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no
evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further
observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last pregnancy had
occurred way back in 1941. The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code, which stated that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that
the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a
situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife was not his.
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct to deemed inapplicable Articles 171 of the Family
Code?
Held: A close readings of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the
father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision, however, presupposes that
the child was the undisputed offspring of the another. The present case alleges and shows
that Hermogena did not gave birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to
declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the
former is not the latters child at all. The action does not impugn petitioners filiation to
Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera because there is no blood relation to impugn in
the first place. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed assailed decision.

Marissa Benitez-Badua, vs. Court Of Appeals,
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
Facts: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties. On April
25, 1982, Isabel died. On November 13, 1989, Vicente died. He died intestate.
On September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez
Aguilar (Vicentes sister and nephew, respectively) prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicentes estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On November 2,
1990, Marissa Benitez-Badua opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of
the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering her estate. The parties further
exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
Issue: Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is a legitimate child of the deceased spouses
and she should be awarded of administering the estate?
Held: If Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez
and his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did she and Isabels only brother and sibling, Dr. Nilo
Chipongian, after Isabels death on April 25, 1982, state in the extra-judicial settlement that
they executed her estate. Dr. Chipongian, testified that it was his brother-in-law, Atty.
Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that he signed the same only because
the latter told him to do so. But why would Atty. Benitez make such a statement in said
document unless Marissa Benitez is not his deceased wifes legal heir. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for review is for lack of merit.

William Liyao, Jr. vs Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao et al
G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002
Facts: On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.
Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao
against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan
and Linda Christina Liyao. Corazon is legally married to but living separately from Ramon
Yulo for more than ten years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time on Williams untimely
demise on December 2, 1975.They lived together in the company of Corazons two children
from her subsisting marriage. Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot but failed to secure
the signature of his her husband. During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures
were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys
godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in
Baguio. With regard to the alleged son of Corazon and William, trial court ruled in favor of
the petitioner but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals decision was correct in deciding that the law
favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy?
Held: The physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is
one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code
may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set
forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. It is therefor clear that the present petition
initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to
compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of
the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage
is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The Court cannot allow petitioner to maintain
his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid
and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband,
presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of
the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged
paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child
cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. The
Supreme Court denied the instant petition.

Jinkie Christie de Jesus et al vs The Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa
Dizon
G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001
Facts: On August 23, 1964, Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein
petitioners, were born, the former on March 1, 1979 and the latter on July 6, 1982.In a
notarized document, Juan Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his
own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan Dizon died intestate on March 12,
1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on July 1, 1993 for "Partition with
Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the trail court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners filed a complaint for partition with inventory and
accounting will prosper?
Held: Petitioners were born as a result of the marriage between Carolina de Jesus and
Danilo de Jesus. The latter acknowledged petitioners as his illegitimate children in a
notarized document. They filed for partition with Inventory and Accounting after Juan
Dizon died intestate. The issue at hand cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action
having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Carolina and
Danilo de Jesus in a lawful wedlock. Declaration of legitimacy cannot be collaterally
attacked. Moreover, there is a presumption that children born on wedlock are legitimate.
However, this becomes conclusive when evidence shows proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days,
which immediately precedes the birth of the child. The Supreme Court denied the instant
petition.

Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
Facts: Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing are husband and wife and they have six
children. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent
Angelita Diamante. According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to
fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some
marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old
son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child
while Bienvenida was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita
and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house, but did
not find them there. Husband and wife looked for their missing son in other places.
However, they saw no traces of his whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida read in a
tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita,
and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida went to Hagonoy,
Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She
claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late
Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to
return to her the boy despite her demand to do so. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their
petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. On March 10,
1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not
have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court
also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it
ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is
the natural child of petitioners. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial
court?
Held: The evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas
Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr. there is evidence that Angelita could
no longer bear children. She admitted that after the birth of her second child, she
underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez
without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978,
as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 and 1988 or
for a period of ten years. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic
were ever submitted. The Court constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners and the writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child. The
Supreme Court granted instant petition.

William Go Kim Huy, vs. Santiago Go Kim Huy, et al
G.R. No. 137674 September 20, 2001
Facts: On February 26, 1974, Bonifacio Go Kim died. William Go Kim Huy, claims hereditary
rights over the mass of property, rights, and assets belonging to the estate of the deceased.
On June 18,1980, he filed a complaint against Santiago Go Kim Huy, the latters children,
Bonifacio Go Kim & Sons, and Santiago Go Kim Huy & Sons, Company, to declare the
properties and business held by them as part of the estate the Bonifacio Go Kim, and
compel them to render an accounting. Petitioner testified that he is known by his name Go
Kim Huy or William Go. He added that his schooling, sustenance and everyday needs were
shouldered by the decedent. Santiago avers that he is the only son of Bonifacio Go Kim. He
maintains that petitioner has lived and worked with them and was treated as a family
member because petitioners father was a close friend of the decedent. Petitioners real
parents were Gaw Gee and Ng Kee as appearing in his landing certificate. Respondent
denied any relation with petitioner and declares that the grant of petitioner for change of
name from Gaw Piak to William Go Kim Huy did not make him a member of the family of
Bonifacio Go Kim. Respondents counsel filed a letter-complaint with the Ministry of Justice
attacking the certification dated May 27, 1974 stating that the records filed in the Bureau of
Immigration (BID) showed that the decedent registered petitioner as one of his sons. The
BID then cancelled its certification and declared that petitioner is not a son of the decedent.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can claim legitimacy to acquire his share over the estate of
Bonifacio Go Kim?
Held: The burden of proof is on the petitioner to establish his affirmative allegation that
Bonifacio Go Kim is his father. The documents petitioner wanted the Supreme Court to
reconsider were already cancelled by the BID, which has been affirmed by the Supreme
Court thirteen years ago. Petitioners alleged filiation was merely dependent upon the
certification issued by the BID in 1974 and he has failed to show by convincing evidence,
other than the cancelled certification, that indeed he was related to the decedent. In the
voluminous records presented, it all boils down to a reconsideration of the BID finding,
which cannot be disturbed. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
questioned decision of the appellate court promulgated on November 12, 1998 and its
resolution promulgated on February 19, 1999 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration .

Maria Jeanette C. Tecson et al vs. Commission on Elections, et al
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
Facts: On December 31, 2003, respondent Fernando Poe, Jr., filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, for the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, Fernando Poe, Jr, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Petitioner herein contested
the candidacy and presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, a certification
issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no
available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found,
a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, copies of Tax
Declaration, a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and a certification issued by
the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the
said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
World War II.
Issue: Whether or not Fernando Poe, Jr. misrepresent himself as a natural born Filipino
citizen?
Held: The primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before,
the elections are held. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78,
in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the
parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation.. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction.

IN RE: Petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of
Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
Facts: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed
a petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry
of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his
registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang
and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of
their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother
are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be
discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name.
Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they
have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since
they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons
that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
The trial court rendered a decision denying the petition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied.
Issue: Whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is allowed?
Held: Office of the Solicitor General argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and
such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the
OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the
best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for
change of name and/or cancellation of entry. Even assuming that it is customary in
Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle
name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law A name is said to have the following
characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused
with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It
is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good
cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore,
inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that
middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the

maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who
may have the same given name and surname as he has. The Family Code gives legitimate
children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate
children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for Review on Certiorari.

Camelo Cabatania, vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004
Facts:
Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982. She recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981,
she look for work and was eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was while
working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City
where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner
promised to support her if she got pregnant. Camelo Babatania denied all allegations and
provided for a different version. Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was
served on him by Florencias counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent
Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, and denied the alleged paternity. The trial court gave
more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she
misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 283 of the Civil Code
on the compulsory recognition?
Held: Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person. In the same vein while a baptismal
certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries
with respect to the childs paternity. Also, private respondent failed to present sufficient
proof of voluntary recognition. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and
set aside the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.

Rosalina Eceta, vs. Ma. Theresa Vell Lagura Eceta
G.R. No. 157037 May 20, 2004
Facts:
Vicente Eceta died in 1977 however, during his lifetime he sired Maria Theresa, an
illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother,
Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa.In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, for Partition and Accounting with
Damages against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her fathers death, she became
Rosalinas co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that
the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the herein respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed and
modified the trial courts decision.
Issue: Whether or not the Maria Theresa is the illegitimate daughter of Vicente Eceta?
Held: Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly
authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate
thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to
have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. The filiation of illegitimate children,
like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. The Supreme
Court denied the petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

Ma. Theresa Alberto, vs. Court Of Appeals et al
G.R. No. 86639 June 2, 1994
Facts: On September 18, 1953, Maria Teresa R. Alberto was born to Aurora Revira and Juan
M. Alberto, both were not married. On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto was
assassinated and died intestate. His lawful wife, Yolanda R. Alberto was appointed as
administratrix of his estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the Administratrixs
Accounting approved, the proceedings were closed and terminated. On September 15,
1978, Maria Teresa R. Alberto filed a motion to leave and to intervene as oppositor and to
reopen the proceedings. The motion was granted by the probate court. Upon presentation
of evidences by both parties, the court was convinced that Maria Teresa R. Alberto had
been in continuous possession of a natural child, thereby compelling the descendants heirs
and estate to recognize her as such and allow her to participate in the estate proceedings.
However the Court of Appeals reversed the probate courts decision, finding no satisfaction
in the degree of proof to establish Maria Teresa R. Alberto as a child of the deceased.
Issue: Whether or not the Maria Albert is the natural child of Juan Alberto ?
Held: Juan Alberto to introduce Maria to the family as one of his flesh and blood, by
allowing Maria to use his family name and by giving her mother money to support her and
by openly introducing her to members of his family, relatives, and friends as his daughter.
By the effect of Article. 285 of the Civil Code, Maria seeking a judicial declaration shall be
recognized as a natural child to enable her to participate in the estate of her deceased
father. The Supreme Court Granted the petition and reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

Jinkie Christie de Jesus et al vs The Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa
Dizon
G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001
Facts: On August 23, 1964, Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein
petitioners, were born, the former on March 1, 1979 and the latter on July 6, 1982.In a
notarized document, Juan Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his
own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. On March 12, 1992 Juan G. Dizon died
leaving his assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and other
properties. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan
Dizon, including the corporation of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the
dismissal of the case alleging a call for altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and the deceased Juan Dizon but it was dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus can be considered as illegitimate
children of Juan Dizon?
Held: Only the father can impugn the legitimacy of the child while he is still alive, if not,
then his heirs. But the question in this case is can both Petitioners claim being an
illegitimate child at the same time a legitimate of other parent. Declaration of legitimacy
cannot be collaterally attacked. Moreover, there is a presumption that children born on
wedlock are legitimate. However, this becomes conclusive when evidence shows proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of
the 300 days, which immediately precedes the birth of the child. The Supreme Court
denied the instant petition.

Consolacion Lumahin de Aparicio, vs. Hipolito Paraguya,
G.R. No. L-29771 May 29, 1987
Facts: Trinidad Montilde had a love affair with a priest named Felipe Lumain to which she
became pregnant, fearful of the societal pressure, she married Anastacio Mamburao to
conceal her pregnancy, disgraceful as it is Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain even solemnized their
marriage and on October 31, 1936. Rev. Fr. Lumain died but left a last will and testament
wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and
universal heir to all his property rights and interests. This was duly probated and approved
in the Court of First Instance June 11, 1938 and was duly affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Upon turning into adulthood Consolacion filed an action against Hipolito Paraguya for the
recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to have inherited from her father, Rev. Fr.
Lumain,
Issue: Whether or not Consolacion has the rights to claim the parcels of land as her
inheritance?
Held: In the last will and testament of Fr. Lumain he not only acknowledged Consolacion as
his natural daughter but designated her as his only heir. Said will was duly probated in
Court. As Fr. Lumain died without any compulsory heir, Consolacion is therefore his lawful
heir as duly instituted in his will. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of
all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. Thus the
will must be fully be enforced, thus all of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Lumain must be
transferred to the petitioner. The Supreme Court granted the petition and affirmed
judgment appealed.

Jose Rivero et al vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005
Facts:
On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De
Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the trial court, for compulsory
recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the
administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27, 1995. Since
Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed the
complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.'s wife, was not impleaded as she had died
on July 7, 1995.During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was engaged in business, under the
business name Benito Commercial in Naga City. He courted Shirley Arevalo (Benedick's
mother) in 1991, assuring her of his sincere love, likewise promising that her college
education would be financed and that she would be provided with a better life. Blinded by
his promises and assurances of his love for her, Shirley agreed to an amorous relationship
with Benito, Sr. True to his word, Benito, Sr. then provided her with a residential house and
lot. On October 5, 1995, Benedick Arevalo Dy Chiao, Jr., the plaintiff, was born, the product
of the amorous relationship, whom Benito, Sr. acknowledged as his son. He also continued
to give Shirley and their son financial and moral support. On October 28, 1996, Benedick
filed a Motion, praying that the court order a mental examination of the Dy Chiao brothers.
On December 6, 1996, That same daythe plaintiff, through counsel, filed a "Compromise
Agreement. On December 13, 1996, the trial court approved the agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for
recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr?
Held:
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of
persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.A compromise
is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to
one already commenced. Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite
provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting
parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the
obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy
and public order. Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public policy is
null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no legal

effect at all. Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of
the RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where Benedick was recognized as the
illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and void. The Supreme Court denied the instant
petition for lack of merit.

People of the Philippines, vs. Sgt. Moreno Bayani,
G.R. No. 120894 October 3, 1996
Facts: Sgt.
Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), seeks the reversal of the
28 April 1995 decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify
complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50, 000.00) Pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. In her sworn
complaint dated February 22, 1993 and filed on February 24, 1993 with the court, the
complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed. After the
parties submitted their memoranda, the trial court promulgated the decision appealed
from and gave full faith and credit to the evidence of the prosecution. The People, through
the Appellee's Brief filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, refuted the accused's
arguments, and in closing, recommended that "apart from the FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS as indemnity, appellant should be made to support his illegitimate
child with Maria Elena, in conformity with Article 345(3) of the Revised Penal Code."
Issues: Whether or not the appellant should be made to support his illegitimate child with
complainant?
Held:
Recognition of offspring of rape cannot be ordered in the absence of evidence, in this
instance, however, before both the trial court and this Court, the accused expressly
admitted paternity of the complainant's child thus giving rise to the obligation to provide
support. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape,
seduction, or abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the offended woman; (b)
acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing; and (c) in
every case, to support the offspring. While under Article 283 of the Civil Code, the father is
obliged to recognize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction
when the period of the offense coincides, more or less, with the period of the conception. It
has been held, however, that acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married
man, with only support for the offspring as part of the sentence. With the passage of the
Family Code, however, the classifications of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction have been eliminated. At present, children are classified as only
either legitimate or illegitimate, with no further positive act required of the parent as the
law itself provides the child's status. As such, natural children under the Civil Code fall
within the classification of illegitimate children in the Family Code. Article 176 of the
Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the mother, and

likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family Code. The
Supreme Court ordered accussed to support his illegitimate child Tracy Jhuen Nieto.

People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Manahan
G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999
Facts:
Manuel Manahan was of rape and sentenced to death by the court a quo. He was also
ordered to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages, pay the costs, and
acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. Complainant Teresita Tibigar,
16 years old, worked at the Espiritu Canteen in Dagupan City. As a stay-in waitress she
slept at the second floor of the canteen. Manuel Manahan is the brother-in-law of Josefina
Espiritu, owner of the canteen. His wife Primadonna is the sister of Josefina Espiritu.
Manuel and Primadonna temporarily reside at the canteen together with the family of
Josefina as Primadonna was then pregnant. On January 5, 1995, Teresita who was asleep
was suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw
accused Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed himself on top of her. She tried to shout
but the accused covered her mouth. He then forcibly spread her legs. She cried, pushed and
kicked him many times in an effort to free herself but the accused proved too strong for
her. Soon enough she became weary and exhausted. The trial court found accused guilty of
rape and sentenced to death. On 2 October 1995, Teresita she gave birth to a healthy baby
girl and christened her Melanie Tibigar.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused should acknowledged and support of the child?
Held: On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of
the court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons
guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should
prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before
us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a
legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. The rule is
that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the
crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently,
that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain
that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law. The
Supreme Court deleted decision of the trial court ordering the accused, a married man, to
acknowledge the child Melanie Tibigar being contrary to law and jurisprudence.

Ben-Hur Nepomuceno, vs. Arhbencel Ann Lopez,
G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010
Facts:
On June 8, 1999, Arhbencel was born n out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with
Araceli and petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth. Petitioner by
a handwritten obligated himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on
the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15, 1999. Arhbencel prayed that
petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in
the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial
support until she reaches the age of majority. Petitioner countered that Araceli had not
proven that he was the father of Arhbencel and that he was only forced to execute the
handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National Peoples Army. The trial
court treated the handwritten note as "contractual support" since the issue of Arhbencels
filiation had yet to be determined. The trial court held that, Arhbencels Certificate of Birth
was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it did not bear petitioners
signature; that petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide support did not contain a
categorical acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing
that petitioner performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate
child after the execution of the note. On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals,
reversed the trial courts decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioners illegitimate
daughter and a ordered petitioner to give Arhbencel financial support in the increased
amount of P4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month, or a total of P8,000 a month.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Arhbencel to be petitioners
illegitimate daughter?
Held: The note of petitioner does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels
filiation to him. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175
of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an
admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to
support the child. The petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions,
he also has consistently denied it. The only other documentary evidence submitted by
Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same. All that Arhbencel really has is petitioners
handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to
establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in
cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of
the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the

putative fathers legitimate family. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside
decision of the Court of Appeals.

Elino Rivera, et al vs. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva, et al
G.R. No. 141501 July 21, 2006
Facts: Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), the half-sister-in-
law (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita
Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all
surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-
blood of Romualdo Villanueva. They are denominated as the heirs of Villanueva and are
represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.
The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter respondent Angelina) and
husband Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of
the late Villanueva. From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva
without the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi who
died on April 20, 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties
including the properties contested in this case. Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without
leaving a will. On August 8, 1980, Villanueva and respondent Angelina executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate
comprising a number of the aforementioned properties. Petitioners filed a case for
partition of Gonzales' estate and annulment of titles and damages, with the trial court but
dismissed the complaint, because of two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to
Villanueva and (2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and
therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the CA which
affirmed it. Petitioners contend that the trial court and CA erred in finding that respondent
Angelina was Gonzales' illegitimate daughter despite the trial court ruling in another case,
in which it appointed Epifanio Rivera as administrator of Gonzales' estate
Issue: Whether or not respondent Angelina was Gonzales' illegitimate daughter?
Held: The birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both
Villanueva and Gonzales. The conclusion that respondent Angelina was not Gonzales'
daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales had been living childless with
Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently
established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her
adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly
participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with
Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid. The Supreme Court granted the petition and
reversed and set aside decision of the Court of Appeals.

Mercedes Cristobal Cruz, et al vs. Eufrosina Cristobal, et al
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
Facts:
Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and
Elisa Cristobal-Sikat claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal
during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, Norberto, Florencio,
Eufrosina and Jose are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his
second marriage to Donata Enriquez. On June 18, 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased
a parcel of land with an area of 535 square meters. Sometime in the year 1930,
Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners learned that
private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and
transferred its title to their names. Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt
to settle the case between them and private respondents, but no settlement was reached.
Thus, a Complaint or Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the trial court by
petitioners against private respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the
subject property. To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the
baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. In the case of
Mercedes who was born on January 31, 1909, she produced a certification issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar, attesting to the fact that records of birth were all
destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that
petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the
baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that
petitioners inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject
property because of laches.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased as the
baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary?
Held:
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws, may consist of the child's
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child's name has been
entered, common reputation respecting the child's pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late
Socorro were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary
evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners

enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as being the children
of Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented
to prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. The Supreme
Court granted the petition , reversed and set aside decision of the Court of Appeals and
recognized and declared petitioners as children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal from his
first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal.

Camelo Cabatania, vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004
Facts: This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by
Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos
Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982. She recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981,
she look for work and was eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was while
working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City
where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner
promised to support her if she got pregnant. Camelo Babatania denied all allegations and
provided for a different version. Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was
served on him by Florencias counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent
Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, and denied the alleged paternity. The trial court gave
more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she
misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Private respondent presented sufficient evidence to establish his
illegitimate filiation?
Held: Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person. In the same vein while a baptismal
certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries
with respect to the childs paternity. Also, private respondent failed to present sufficient
proof of voluntary recognition. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and
set aside the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.

Ida Labagala, petitioner, vs. Nicolasa T. Santiago, et al
G.R. No. 132305 December 4, 2001
Facts:
Jose Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729. Alleging that Jose had
fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago sued
Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case
decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the
property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to
include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said property. On
February 6, 1984, Jose died intestate. On August 5, 1987, respondents filed a complaint for
recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala,
before the trial court, to, recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to
Jose but which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death. They alleged that
Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law, because they are the only
legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They claimed that the
purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March
1979 was executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable
her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title in petitioner's name alone. On
the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by
respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C.
Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject
property. On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner Ida C. Labagala.
On appealed, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is the daughter of the late Jose Santiago?
Held: The Certificate of Record of Birth plainly states that Ida was the child of the spouses
Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas. The document states that it was Leon Labagala who
made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the entries in said
Certificate. Therefore, the certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Against such evidence,
Ida could only present her testimony and a baptismal certificate stating that her parents
were Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Baptismal certificate is not a proof of the
parentage of the baptized person. This document can only prove the identity of the
baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal sponsors and the
priest who administered the sacrament nothing more. A baptismal certificate, a private
document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. The Supreme Court denied the petition and
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Intestate estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr., vs. Juan Locsin, Jr.
G.R. No. 146737 December 10, 2001
Facts:
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven months after Juan " Locsin, Sr. died
intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the trial court, a
"Petition for Letters of Administration" that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate
Estate of the deceased. He alleged, among others, that he is an acknowledged natural child
of the late Juan C. Locsin; that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties
which include undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and
1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings,
namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin;
and that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.On January 10, 1992, the heirs of
Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be
the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondents petition for letters of
administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural
child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
Respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the
bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar and it contains the
information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of
the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures. The trial court rendered a decision,
which was affirmed by the Courts of Appeals appointing the respondent administrator.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. Both motions were denied by the Appellate Court.
Issue: Whether or not presented sufficient evidence to establish his filiation?
Held: A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code
and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth
certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete
and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry has all the badges of
nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and
substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth. Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court that documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late
Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very
dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can

have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in
claiming the estate of the deceased.Respondent failed to prove his filiation with the late
Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is spurious. The Supreme Court
granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals.

Artemio Ilano vs. Court of Appeals et al
G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
Facts:
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor,
met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they renewed
acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold allocation of goods. Later, he
courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise
of marriage, they eloped in April, 1962. They stayed at an Apartment. He came home to her
three or four times a week. In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was
fetched by petitioner and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she
delivered a still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was
signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were living at Highway, private respondent
Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas
de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano.
Leoncia submitted receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined
there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano.
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of cash
personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) or thru
Merceditas herself and sometimes in the form of a check, the signature appearing thereon
having been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her checks
which he issues at home and saw him sign the checks. Both petitioner and his daughter
admitted that the check and the signature are those of the former. Petitioner denied any
relationship with Leoncia and Merceditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and
signatures in the death certificate of a female child surnamed Ilano, although opposite
father's name the typewritten name, Artemio G. Ilano, appears. The Court of Appeals
declared Merceditas Ilano as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of
Artemio Ilano.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring Merceditas Ilano as the duly
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Artemio Ilano?
Held:
While defendant's signature does not appear in the Certificate of Live Birth, the evidence
indubitably disclosethat Leoncia gave birth on December 30, 1963 to Merceditas The
inquiries were directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who heard the answers of
Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of paper. The inquiries were about the name
of the father, mother and child. After the interview the nurse told them that the information
has to be recorded in the formal form and has to be signed by Artemio but because there is

no office, as it was past 7:00 p.m., the nurse would just return in the morning for Artemio's
signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse to give the biodata to Leoncia for her
signature as he was leaving very early the following morning as in fact Artemio left at 5:00
a.m. of December 31, 1963. Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of December 30,
1963. The totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that Artemio is the father of Merceditas Ilano. The Supreme Court
denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

John Paul E. Fernandez, et al., vs. Court of Appeals et al.
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
Facts: Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started
their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in
the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not
know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred they were
married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the
marriage license which they used was spurious. In defense, respondent Carlito denied
Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of
the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. Private respondent also declared he only
learned he was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he
was sued for support. Petitioners filed a civil case for support against Carlito in the trial
court but was dismissed on the basis of immateriality, and insufficiency and incompetence
of evidence. Another action for recognition and support was filed and the decision was
rendered in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the decision was set aside and the
complaint was dismissed by respondent appellate court. It found that the proof relied upon
by the trial court is inadequate to prove the private respondent's paternity and filiation of
petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not there inadequate proof to prove the private respondent's paternity
and filiation of petitioners?
Held: Petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These photographs are far from proofs that
private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent,
he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. The pictures taken in the
house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the
evidence required to prove paternity. The baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro, naming
private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. The testimony of Violeta
Esguerra is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the
paternity of the petitioners. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the

Bienvenido Rodriguez, vs. Court of Appeals et al
G.R. No. 85723 June 19, 1995
Facts: On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought
before the trial court, by herein respondent Clarito Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez,
petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felecitas Agbulos Haber,
as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel t reveal
the identity of the plaintiffs father but the defendants counsel raised a timely objection,
which the court sustained. The plaintiff file before the Supreme Court a petition for review
on certiorari questioning the said order in UDK 8516 entitled Clarito Agbulos vs. Hon.
Romeo A. Brawner and Bienvenido Rodriguez. On March 18, 1988, the Supreme Court
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, which promulgated the questioned decision
dated November 2, 1988.
Issue: Whether or not the action for compulsory recognition and support would prosper?
Held: Petitioner contended that Felicitas Agbulos Haber should not be allowed to reveal the
name of the father of private respondent because such revelation was prohibited by Article
280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Said Article provided. When the father or the
mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal the name of the person
with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby
the other party may be identified. On the other hand, private respondent argued that his
mother should be allowed to testify on the identity of his father, pursuant to paragraph 4,
Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Worth noting is the fact that no similar prohibition found in Article 280 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines has been replicated in the present Family Code. This
undoubtedly discloses the intention of the legislative authority to uphold the Code
Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate
children. In view in Art. 172 of the Family Code, with respect to Art. 283 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, filiation may be proven by any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and directed the
trial court to proceed with dispatch in the disposition of the action for compulsory
recognition.

Francisco Jison, vs. Court of Appeals et al.
G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998
Facts:
Francisco Jison married Lilia Lopez in 1940. At the end of 1945 or at the beginning of 1946,
Francisco impregnated Esperanza Amolar, who was a nanny for Franciscos daughter,
Lourdes. As a result, Monina Jison was born on August 6, 1946. Petitioner alleges she
enjoyed continuous implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco. Francisco gave
her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became
a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of
Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of
her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such. Francisco alleged
that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period
specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did
not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or
impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, Francisco
contended that Monina had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was
barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. The trial court ruled, that Monina was
barred by estoppel by deed because of the affidavit which she signed. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial court and declared Monina as the illegitimate
daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and privileges granted by
law.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Monina as the illegitimate
daughter of Francisco Jison?
Held:
It is evident that the standard to contradict a notarial document, clear and convincing
evidence and more than merely preponderant has been met by Monina. Two glaring points
in Franciscos defense beg to be addressed: First, that his testimony was comprised of
mere denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated responses such as That is not true, I do not
believe that, or None that I know. In declining then to lend credence to Franciscos
testimony, we resort to a guiding principle in adjudging the credibility of a witness and the
truthfulness of his statements, laid down as early as 1921: The experience of courts and the
general observation of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive
faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court a false
narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies,
to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of
his message.For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the
incidents immediately related to the principal fact about which they testify, and when

asked about collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers not
infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions as I dont know or I dont
remember. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

Raymond Pe Lim, vs. Court of Appeals, et al
G.R. No. 112229. March 18, 1997
Facts:
Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She met petitioner during
her first night on the job. Petitioner wooed her and Maribel reciprocated his love. They
soon lived together, with petitioner paying the rentals in a succession of apartments.
Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and returned to Manila in October of
the same year.The couple never married because petitioner claimed that he was not
financially stable. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter. The bills for
Maribel's three-day confinement at the hospital were paid for by Raymond and he also
caused the registration of the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the child's birth certificate.
After Joanna Rose's birth, the love affair between Maribel and petitioner continued.
Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioner's feelings toward her started
to wane. He subsequently abandoned her and Joanna Rose. Maribel tried to support herself
by accepting various jobs and with occasional help from relatives, but it was never enough.
She asked petitioner for support but, despite promises to do so, it was never given. Maribel
then filed a complaint against petitioner before the trial court for support. Raymond denied
being the father of Maribel's child, claiming that they were only friends and nothing more.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
ordering herein defendant, Raymond Pe Lim to give support to his natural daughter, minor
Joanna Rose Pe.
Issue: Whether or not Joanna Rose Pe is the natural daughter of Raymond Pe Lim?
Held:
It was only after petitioner separated from Maribel that he started to deny paternity of
Joanna Rose. Until he got married to another woman, he did not object to being identified
as Joanna Rose's father as disclosed in the Certificate of Live Birth. The evidence on record
reveals that he even got a copy of the said Certificate when Joanna Rose started schooling,
as shown by a receipt in his name from the San Juan Municipal Office. His belated denial
cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence which establishes beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner is indeed the father of Joanna Rose. Petitioner has never
controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a good father
to Joanna Rose; pictures of him on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and Certificate
of Live Birth say it all. The rule in Art. 283 of the Civil Code that filiation may be proven by
any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father shall govern. Petitioner has never
controverted the evidence on record. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate

children. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of
him on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the Certificate of Live Birth say it all.
Accordingly, his suit must fail. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the

Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing are husband and wife and they have six children.
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita
Diamante. According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her
for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr.,
under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida
was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr.,
were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house, but did not find them
there. Husband and wife looked for their missing son in other places. However, they saw no
traces of his whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were
lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida went to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she
allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the
boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was
already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy
despite her demand to do so. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus
with the trial court in order to recover their son. On March 10, 1995, the trial court
concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the
alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also held that the
minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of
petitioners. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court?
Held:
The evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is
actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr. there is evidence that Angelita could no longer
bear children. She admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation
at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she
offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 and 1988 or for a period of ten
years. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.
The Court constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners and the
writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child. The Supreme Court granted
instant petition.

Arnel Agustin, vs. Court of Appeals et al
G.R. No. 162571 June 15, 2005
Facts: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin's alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before
the trial court. On 1992, Fe Angela Prollamante alleged that Arnel courted her, after which
they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe her on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave
birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000. The babys birth certificate
was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital
expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate
financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also
denied having fathered the child. On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month
old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van,
with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July
2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing
chemotherapy. Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe
had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin's conception. He claimed that Fe had at
least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but 'he
never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a
certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and
possessive. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support. The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court.
Issue: Whether or not DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support
without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.
Held: Upon receiving a party's challenge to an acknowledgment, the court shall order
genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of the child's paternity and shall
make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance with this article As a result of
DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has increased significantly
since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support agreement(current testing
methods can determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy). However, at
the time the parties before us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a
very significant obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported
results of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985. Of course, while prior
blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the possible father of a child,

those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus,
when the settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in 1980,
establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity
actions at that time were often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every
contested paternity action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the
putative father was, in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on whether the mother
could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with one man--the
putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of
proving paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her burden of
proof. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

Rosendo Herrera, vs. Rosendo Alba, et al
G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005
Facts: On May 14, 1998, Rosendo Alba, then thirteen years old, represented by his mother
filed for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. Petitioner filed
his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of
respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent's mother. Respondent
filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D.
She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute
(UP-NSRI'), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the
Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program
and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA
paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in
establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has
not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his
right against self-incrimination. The trial court granted respondent's motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. On appeal, the appellate
court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial
court.
Issue: Whether or not DNA tests could be used as proof of filiations?
Held: Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance.
The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child. DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a
biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to
generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This
DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins. The court ruled that DNA
samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case,
contrary to the belief of respondent in this action. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist
looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which
half of the child's DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged father's profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in
the child. If the man's DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the
father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father. DNA analysis that
excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If

the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable
presumption of paternity. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the

People of the Philippines vs. Gerrico Vallejo
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002
Facts: On July 10, 1999, Daisy Diolola a 9-year old was sent by her mother to their
neighbor's house, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy
with her lessons. Aimee's house, where accused-appellant was also staying, is about four to
five meters away from Daisy's house. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-
appellant. They were looking for a book which accused-appellant could copy to make a
drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy
and accused-appellant went back to the latter's house. About 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon
her mother noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and
proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisy's tutor. Aimee's mother told her nother that Daisy
was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee
was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. At about 7:00 o'clock that evening,
her mother went back to her neighbor's house, and there saw accused-appellant, who told
her that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house to borrow a book. But, when her mother
went there, she was told that Daisy had not been there. On June 11, 1999, the dead body of
Daisy was found tied to the root of an aroma tree. The trial court rendered a decision
finding accused-appellant guilty of Rape with Homicide.
Issue: Whether or not the DNA test would established the guilt of the accused?
Held: DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her
genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victim's body for the suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is
then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. In
assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. Thus, it is the
inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the
samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their
examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence
of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-
appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

People of the Philippines, vs. Joel Yatar
G. R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
Facts: On June 30, 1998, Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn
Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan
West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her
husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed
the letter to appellant earlier that morning. Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel
Dawang, left for their farm in some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband
departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she
would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the
house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house. Anita Wania and
fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the
back of the house. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he
was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. In the evening, Isabel Dawang
arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her
granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the
water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up
the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that
the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the
dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid. She found out that it was the naked
body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. When questioned by the police authorities, appellant
denied any knowledge of Kathylynss death, however, he was placed under police custody.
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, and was sentenced
to Death.
Issue: Whether the DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link the accused to a
crime?
Held: The DNA of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the
semen to be that of appellants gene type. DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic
information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not
change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA
found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue,
and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins. In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de
Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the
appellant showed that he was identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal.

Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample
given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial. The Supreme Court
affirmed and modified the decision of the trial court by deleting the award of exemplary
damages.

Estate of Rogelio Ong vs. Joanne Rodjin Diaz
G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007
Facts:
On November 1993, Jinky Diaz and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship
and later blossomed into love. Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa
Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on February 19,1993 by Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on February
25, 1998 was born. Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky
home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and
provided for all of minor Joannes needs recognizing the child as his. In September 1998,
Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely
alleging that he is not the father of the child. Rogelio failed and refused to give support for
the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive
pleading despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare him
in default. Rogelios Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was
received by the trial court only on April 15,1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence
ex parte on the basis of which the trial court on April 23, 1999 rendered a decision granting
the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. On December 15, 2000, the trial court declared
Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz.
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order
of the trial court dated January 19, 2001. From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration,
Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the case with the Court of
Appeals, Rogelios counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on
February 21, 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that
Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong, which motion was
accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the Court Of Appeals erred when it did not declare respondent as the
legitimate child of Jinky Diaz and her japanese husband?
Held: A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As
a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides: The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based
on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of

illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the
New Civil Code provides: Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.Against this presumption no
evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child. Article 175 of the Family Code provides: Illegitimate
children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals.

Michael Guy, vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
Facts: On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes
Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of
administration. Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate
valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are
his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael,
all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis estate. They likewise prayed that, in
the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special
Administrator of the estate. In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his
estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule
74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have
established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to
Article 175 of the Family Code. Private respondents claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and
Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance
received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima
Wei from any and all liabilities. The trial court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as
the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim
was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted
guardian of her minor daughters. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the
trial court.
Issue: Whether or not Remedios can sign the waiver of claim?
Held: Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides: Any person having the free disposal of his
property may accept or repudiate an inheritance. Any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians
may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. Parents
and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial
approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must
pass the courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will

not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights
because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the
deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-
heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when
petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioners invocation of waiver
on the part of private respondents must fail. The Supreme Court denied the petition,
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the records to the trial court
for further proceedings.

Jose Rivero et al vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005
Facts:
On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De
Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the trial court, for compulsory
recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the
administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27, 1995. Since
Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed the
complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.'s wife, was not impleaded as she had died
on July 7, 1995.During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was engaged in business, under the
business name Benito Commercial in Naga City. He courted Shirley Arevalo (Benedick's
mother) in 1991, assuring her of his sincere love, likewise promising that her college
education would be financed and that she would be provided with a better life. Blinded by
his promises and assurances of his love for her, Shirley agreed to an amorous relationship
with Benito, Sr. True to his word, Benito, Sr. then provided her with a residential house and
lot. On October 5, 1995, Benedick Arevalo Dy Chiao, Jr., the plaintiff, was born, the product
of the amorous relationship, whom Benito, Sr. acknowledged as his son. He also continued
to give Shirley and their son financial and moral support. On October 28, 1996, Benedick
filed a Motion, praying that the court order a mental examination of the Dy Chiao brothers.
On December 6, 1996, That same daythe plaintiff, through counsel, filed a "Compromise
Agreement. On December 13, 1996, the trial court approved the agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for
recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr?
Held:
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of
persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.A compromise
is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to
one already commenced. Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite
provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting
parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the
obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy
and public order. Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public policy is
null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no legal

effect at all. Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of
the RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where Benedick was recognized as the
illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and void. The Supreme Court denied the instant
petition for lack of merit.

Joey Briones vs. Maricel Miguel, et. al
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his
minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended
Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents. A
Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the
respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin
Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. The petitioner alleges that the
minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He
was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The
respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently
residing in Japan. On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel
came to the house of the petitioner on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child
and requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation. They promised
him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed.
However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised by them. Hence, he was
constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the trial court.Applying Article 213
(paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael Kevin Pineda
Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel and was granted visitorial rights to
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the mother should have the custody of Michael Kevin?
Held:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines
explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity. Parental authority
over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in the
father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be
exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the
rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority
resided jointly in the father and the mother. Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all
illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, without any distinction
between natural and spurious. The concept of "natural child" is important only for

purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an
illegitimate child. Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code)
child, as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal
impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son.
As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his
mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of him. The Supreme
Court affirmed and modified the decision of the Court of Appeals that the mother can have
custody of the child until he reaches the age of 10.

Rosendo Herrera, vs. Rosendo Alba, et al
G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005
Facts:
On May 14, 1998, Rosendo Alba, then thirteen years old, represented by his mother filed for
compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. Petitioner filed his
answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent.
Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent's mother. Respondent filed a
motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To
support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. She
was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-
NSRI'), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the
Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program
and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA
paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in
establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has
not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his
right against self-incrimination. The trial court granted respondent's motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. On appeal, the appellate
court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial
court.
Issue: Whether or not DNA tests could be used as proof of filiations?
Held: Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance.
The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child. DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a
biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to
generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This
DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins. The court ruled that DNA
samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case,
contrary to the belief of respondent in this action. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist
looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which
half of the child's DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged father's profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in
the child. If the man's DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the
father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father. DNA analysis that

excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If
the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable
presumption of paternity. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the

Marquino vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts
On January 10, 1971,Bibiana Romano-Pagadora brought a civil action for the Judicial
Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages against Eutiquio
Marquino. Also included, as defendants were Maria Terenal-Marquino, Eutiquios wife, and
their children, Luz, Ana, and Eva. Romano-Pagadora was born on December 2, 1926 by
Gegoria Romano and allegedly by Eutiquio, who was single then. The Marquinos personally
knew Romano-Pagadora for she was hired as a helper in their household. She claims she
has always enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child
by direct acts of the Marquinos. The Marquinos, on the other hand, denied the allegations.
During the pendency of the trial, Bibiana died on March 17, 1979. Six days later, her heirs
were ordered to substitute for her. On May 17, 1983, the Marquinos filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that an action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs, the
same being a personal act. The case was dismissed.
The heirs of the deceased interposed an appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On
August 20, 1983 however, Eutiquio Marquino died. On June 17, 1895, the appellate court
decided in favor of the heirs of Romano-Pagadora reversing the decision of the trial court.
Hence this petition.
Issues
Whether or not the death of the natural child during the pendency of her action for
recognition is transmissible to the heirs?
Whether or not the death of the putative parent also during the pendency of the case is
transmissible to the heirs?
Held
Art. 173 is the governing provision wherein the child can bring the action during his or her
entire lifetime and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the action does not
prescribe as long as he lives. The article cannot be given any retroactivity for it will
prejudice vested rights transmitted to them at the time of the death of their father.

Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
Facts
On April 9, 1987, Emilei Dayrit Cuyugan, as other and legal guardian of minor Chad D.
Cuyugan, filed a complaint for Claim of Inheritance against Corito Ocampo Tayag, the
administatrix of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Emilei D. Cuyugan, petitioner therein,
alleged that several years before Atty. Ocampo died, they had an illicit relationship, which
later brought about Chad on October 5, 1980, therefore Chad is entitled to a share of the
estate of Atty. Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs.
Petitioner Tayag, respondent therein, filed a counterclaim and a Motion to Dismiss. The
motion was denied on October 12, 1987. Likewise her Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied on November 19, 1987.
Tayag proceeded to the Court of Appeals on December 10, 1987 and filed a petition praying
for certiorari and prohibition, which was granted on August 2, 1989 and enjoined the trial
court judge to resolve petitioners motion to dismiss. In compliance with the order, the trial
court acted on and denied motion to dismiss the complaint. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied on January 30, 1990.
As a consequence, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition on March
12, 1990 with the Court of Appeals, praying to set aside the orders of the Regional Trial
Court. On May 10, 1990, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and on September
5,1990, denied motion for reconsideration
Issue
Whether or not the right of a minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right?
Held
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to this case since it
will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequently, of the
minor child she represents, both of which has been vested with the filing of the complaint
in court. The trial court, therefore, was correct in applying Article 285 of the Civil Code and
holding that private respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed.

People vs. Bayani
Facts
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), seeks the reversal of
the 28 April 1995 decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, in
Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties provided by law; to indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and to pay the costs.
In her sworn complaint dated 22 February 1993 and filed on 24 February 1993 with the
court below, the complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly
committed.
Issues
The accused seasonably appealed from the decision. In his Appellant's Brief, he assigns the
following errors to the trial court:
The trial court erred in rendering a judgment in this case on a sworn statement of the
complainant charging the appellant the crime of rape, for the reason that the signature
appearing thereon was not identified by complainant and not presented as evidence in
court by the prosecution.
Held
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the
mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the
Family Code. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment
of the offspring by an offender who is married which would vest parental authority in him.
Therefore, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is
married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there
be any. In the instant case then, the accused should also be ordered to support his
illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto,72 with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article
20173 of the Family Code, the amount and terms thereof to be determined by the trial
court only after due notice and hearing.

Republic vs. Abadilla
Facts
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino lived together without the benefit of marriage.
Their cohabitation produced two bys, Emerson and Rafael. In their birth certificates, they
were registered under the surname Abadilla and their fathers name entered as Herson.
Moreover, the date and place of marriage of their parents Gerson and Luzviminda were
registered as June 19, 1987, Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson and Luzviminda, together with their children, filed an
Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries before the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Br. 65, seeking that, (1) the place and date of marriage of Gerson and
Luzviminda is deleted and; (2) the fathers name be changed from Herson to Gerson.
Petition was given due course on February 17, 1998 and ordered the requested
corrections.
The Solicitor General interposed on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible
error when it granted the petition but failed to order the change of the minors surnames
from Abadilla to Celestino.
Hence this petition
Issue
Whether or not the minors are entitled to the surname of the feather despite their
illegitimacy.
Held
As illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their
mother, Luzviminda Celestino as provided for in Article 176 Family Code. Resultantly, with
the correction of the entries in their birth certificates, which deleted the entry in the date
and place of the marriage of the parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their
surnames should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their mothers surname.

Verceles v. Posadas
Facts:
Clarissa met Teofisto (mayor of Pandan) and the latter offered job to the former. On
November 10-15, they went to a seminar together with other companion. Teofisto fetched
Clarissa in My Bros Hotel and went to Mayon Hotel to have lunch. Clarissa was surprised
when her companions were not there. And at that moment, Teofisto was making amorous
advances on her and she run towards the comfort room and closeted herself there. Clarissa
being afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident.
Clarissa went to Virac to follow-up the funds for barangay funds. She met with Teofisto on a
hotel to update the latter with the matter. Teofisto led her to the upper floor of the hotel
and there she suddenly embraced her and said some promises to Clarissa and eventually
Clarissa succumbed. From there, Clarissa became pregnant. Clarissa presented three letters
( two of which are with the letterhead of Mayor of Pandan), pictures. On March 1987, she
received a letter and php 2,000 from Teofisto. On June 1987, Teofisto went to see her and
gave her php 2,000 for her delivery. She gave birth to Verna Aiza Posada on September 23,
1987. Clarissas statement was corroborated by her mother. Clarissa filed a complaint for
damages and coupled with support pendent lite which was granted by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada was proven
Held:
A perusal of the complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption stats
Damages coupled with support pendent lite. Clarissas averments therein, her meeting
with the petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her
pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly
establish a case for recognition of paternity. We have held that the due recognition of an
illegitimate in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court record, or in any authentic
writing is in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child and no further
court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
recognition, it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia , Honorato B.
Catindig, petitioner.
Facts
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein among
others, that Stephanie was born on june 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Gar
cia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle nameand surname, and that vhe is
now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle
name Astorga be changed to Garcia her mothers surname and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig, his Surname.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption, however, the trial
Court did not allow the use of her mothers surname as her middle name.
Thus, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her
middle name.
Issue
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother, as her
middle name, when she subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
The Court ruled that since no law granting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, as in this case, to use as middle name the mothers surname, the Court found
no reason why Stephanie should not allowed to use her mothers surname Garcia as her
middle name.
Wherefore, the petition was granted.

Joey Briones vs. Maricel Miguel, et. Al
Facts
On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel Miguel and Francisca Miguel came to the house of
petitioners in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and
requested that they be allowed to bring the child at the SM department store for recreation.
The respondents, however instead of returning the child to his father brought the child to
his mothers custody. The petitioner alleged that he exerted efforts in searching the child
but all his efforts were futile. Hence, he filed for Habeas Corpus against herein
Respondents.
Issue
Who should custody of the child?
Held
Petitioner contends that the mother of the child, Loreta is not always in the country thus
she cannot attend to the needs of the child. The court however ruled that the child being an
illegitimate should be under the custody of the mother. As the cited in David V. Court of
appeals, the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could not be a ground for
ordering the latter for support to, but not custody of, the child; it follows that only if she,
the mother, defaults can the father assume custody or authority over the minor. Of course
putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be
considered legitimate child of the adoptive parent. Wherefore, the decision of the court of
appeals is hereby affirmed but modified. The mother can have custody of the child until he
reaches the age of 10.

People of the Philippines v. Glabo
Facts:
Mila (mental retarded) and Judith were summoned by the appellant to wash clothes of his
wife. After which, Judith was commanded to wash dishes in the nearby creek. When Judith
was already washing dishes and Mila was hanging clothes, Mila was suddenly pulled by the
appellant and raped her to satisfy his lust.
It rained so hard, so Judith went back to the house. While underneath the house, she saw
Glabo on the top of Mila and saw how Mila was raped. The two girls went to their house
silently. Mila kept the incident. Until, Mila became pregnant as a result of the rape. Right
there, Mila confessed that she was raped by Glabo and they filed complaint for rape against
the accused. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision convicting Glabo for the crime of
rape and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua, with accessory penalties of civil interdiction for
life and perpetual absolute disqualification, to moral damages of php 50,000, to give
support to the child who is a result of the rape and to pay the costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the penalties imposed against the accused is proper.
Held:
Concerning the acknowledgement and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the
RPC provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: 1.
Indemnification, 2. Acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him
so doing and 3. In every case, to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code,
the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was
eliminated and now they fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental
authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that
an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the parental authority
over his child.

Tonog v. Court of Appeals
FACTS: on September 23 1989, petitioners give birth to a child, her illegitimate daughter
with the respondent. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner, left for the United
States where she found work as a nurse. The child was left in the care of his father and
paternal grandparents.
On January 1990, respondent filed a petition for guardianship, on which a month later, he
was appointed as the legal guardian. Petitioner avers that she only learned of the decision a
month later, and accordingly filed for relief of judgment, on which she was then granted to
file her opposition to private respondent petitions, as well as a motion to remand the
custody of the child to her.
The Court of Appeals decided over the issue of guardianship and custody over the child that
such custody shall then be awarded to the respondent temporarily pending the resolution
of the main case.
ISSUE: Who shall meantime hold custody over the child pending the resolution of the
guardianship proceeding, on who shall have the final custody over the child.
HELD: In custody disputes, it is the axiomatic that the criteria are the welfare and well
being of the child. Incurring at its decisions, the court must take into the account the
respective resources and the social and moral situations of the contending party.
Bearing in mind the welfare of the minor is the controlling factor; the court finds that the
Court of Appeals did not err in the allowing the father to retain in the meantime parental
custody over the child.

Republic vs. Abadilla
Facts
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino lived together without the benefit of marriage.
Their cohabitation produced two bys, Emerson and Rafael. In their birth certificates, they
were registered under the surname Abadilla and their fathers name entered as Herson.
Moreover, the date and place of marriage of their parents Gerson and Luzviminda were
registered as June 19, 1987, Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson and Luzviminda, together with their children, filed an
Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries before the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Br. 65, seeking that, (1) the place and date of marriage of Gerson and
Luzviminda is deleted and; (2) the fathers name be changed from Herson to Gerson.
Petition was given due course on February 17, 1998 and ordered the requested
corrections.
The Solicitor General interposed on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible
error when it granted the petition but failed to order the change of the minors surnames
from Abadilla to Celestino.
Hence this petition
Issue
Whether or not the minors are entitled to the surname of the feather despite their
illegitimacy.
Held
As illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their
mother, Luzviminda Celestino as provided for in Article 176 Family Code. Resultantly, with
the correction of the entries in their birth certificates, which deleted the entry in the date
and place of the marriage of the parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their
surnames should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their mothers surname.

Mossesgeld v. Court of appeals
Facts:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld gave birth to a baby boy. The presumed father is Eleazar Siriban
Calasan and signed the certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the
childs first name as Jonathan, middle name as Mossesgeld and last name as Calasan.
Calasan executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child.
Due to the refusal of the person in charge at the hospital in placing the
presumed fathers surname as the childs surname in the certificate of live birth, petitioner
himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of mandaluyong for
registration. And the same was rejected pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code that
illegitimate shall use the surname of their mother.
Issue:
Whether or not the child can use the presumed fathers surname.
Held:
Artcle 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children must use the
surname and shall be under the custody of the mother and shall be entitled to support in
conformity to this code. This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits
paternity. Consequently, the LCR correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of
the petitioners illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the
latters consent.

Silva vs. Court of appeal
Facts
Carlito E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local

actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift ion their relationship surfaced. It
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his
viogorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzaleswho claimed that she,
in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two
eventually parted ways.
his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by
Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in gambling and womanizing which she
feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
Take out the children without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an
appeal from the RTCs order to the Court of Appeals.
For the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated to
Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true,
cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed
by repondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their
children once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of
respondents unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and

Issue
The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead, the case merely
concerns the visitation right of a parent over his hildren which the trial court has adjudged
in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have visitorial rights to his children during
Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the children without the
written consent of the mother. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a
noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.
Held
The court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant
concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior
motives or undue designs more than a parents natural desire to be able to call on, even if it
were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court,in any case, has seen it fit to
understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., in no case (can petitioner) take
out the children without the written consent of the mother.

David vs. Court of Appeals
Facts
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R.

Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of
four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J. was
followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and
Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondents wife when Daisie took Christopher
J. to Villars house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to
Villars legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J. then six years of age, to
go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back
the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next
school year.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception,
his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than
the childs mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under
the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such
authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent; she is entitled to
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Issue
Whether or not the private respondent has the right of the custody of the child knowing
that the child is below seven years of age and an illegitimate.
Held
Habeas Corpus; Parent and child; custody; while it is true that the determination of the
right to the custody of whom children is relevant in cases the parents, who are married to
each other are for some reason separated from each other, it does not follow that it cannot
arise in any other situation

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than
seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken
from the mothers custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mothers
custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed
preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the family code, courts must respect
the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit and here
it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child.
Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support
for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent)
WHEREFORE, private respondent is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T.

David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary
support in the amount of P3,000.00 pending the fixing of the amount of support in an
appropriate action.

De Santos vs. Angeles
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona with which they were
blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner, Maria Rosario de Santos. Thereafter, the
relationship of the spouses became stained to the breaking point. Dr. de Santos fell in love
with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag. Antonio sought the dissolution of his previous
marriage by obtaining a decree of divorce in Nevada. Antonio and Conchita then proceeded
to Tokyo in 1951 to wed. This union produced eleven children.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, Antonio
and Conchita contracted a marriage in Tagaytay celebrated under Philippine laws. On
March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate.
On May 15, 1981, Conchita, herein private respondent, went to the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Br.121, asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor over
the settlement of her late husbands estate. Petition was granted.
After six years of intestate proceedings, herein petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in her
motion of November 1987, she argued that private respondents children were illegitimate
on November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondents accent of her administration,
the court denied petitioners motion. A motion for reconsideration was also denied on
January 9, 1992.
ISSUE
Whether or not the children of private respondents are natural children by legal fiction?
HELD
While a legitimated child may enjoy the same successional rights granted to legitimate
children, a natural child by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that to which an acknowledged
natural child is entitled, insofar as hereditary rights are concerned. It is thus incongruous to
conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioners half siblings can rise to her
level by the fact of being legitimized for two reasons: First, they failed to meet the requisite
of legitimation that they be natural children within the meaning of Article 269; second,
natural children by legal fiction cannot be demand that they be legitimized simply because
it is one of those rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural children.

Abadilla vs. Tabiliran
Facts
The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by
Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent, Judge Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr. Respondent stands charged with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and
corruption unbecoming of a judge.
In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross

immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously and
publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his
legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation,
respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan
on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact
that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela. Furthermore,
respondent falsely represented himself as single" in the marriage contract and dispensed
with the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for
five years. In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent
caused to be registered as "legitimate," his three illegitimate children with Priscilla
Baybayan , respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.
Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts
renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser of justice.
Issue
Whether or not the children are legitimated?
Held
The Civil Code on ratification on contracts in general is allowed to be applied, it being
ratification of marital cohabitation. Article 76 of Civil Code, now Art 34 of the Family Code
was intended to facilitate and encourage the marriage of persons who have been living in a
state of concubinage for more than five years. However, it also requires that parties in the
cohabitation do not suffer from any impediment. In the case at bar, Judge Tabiliran was
still validly married when he cohabited. For purposes of remarriage, he has to wait for
seven years from 1966, at the time of claimed abandonment but in 1970, he already had a
child with Priscilla. Thereby, the ratification of their cohabitation was not valid.
It is important to note that these children were born prior to the marriage of respondent to
Priscilla. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent
marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be

considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.
Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of

parents, who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of

adulterous relations. The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on
August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus the Civil Code provides
under Art. 17 7, [o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other may be legitimated.

Republic vs. Hughes
FACTS
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of United States married Lenita
Mabunay, a Filipino citizen, who was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On June
29, 1990 the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to
adopt Ma. Cecilia. Neil and Mario, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews who
had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well
as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.
The petition was granted in the Regional Trial Court and was affirmed in the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not spouses Hughes could legally adopt under Philippine Law.
HELD
Art 184 of the Family Code provides that aliens are not qualified to adopt except (a) a
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity, (b) one who seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse, and (c) one who is married to a
Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity
of the latter.
It is clear that James is not qualified to adopt while Lenita seems to appear to be qualified,
unfortunately, Art 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition
which must be read along with Art 184.
The court is not unmindful of the possible benefits that an adoption can bring for the
adopting parents and adopted children. It also realize that in proceedings of this nature,
paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of
the adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been designed. When,
however, the law is clear and .no other choice is given, the court must obey its full mandate.
The decision is reversed and set aside.

TOLEDANO and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE,
respondents.
FACTS
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon
Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order
issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said
Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales and
City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.
The principal evidence discloses that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural
born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981
at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United
States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable
of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph
Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave
his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the
adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and
Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
The trial court granted the petition for adoption filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn
A. Clouse and decreed that the said minor be considered as their child by adoption.
The Solicitor General, however, interposed contending that Spouses Clouse are not
qualified to adopt minor Solomon under the law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt under the law.
HELD
No. There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases. In the first place, he is not
a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the

second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the
legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse
jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino
citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988. Under
Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family
Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from
adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Thus, the petition was granted.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R.

HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA
MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents, spouses Munson on March 10, 1994, filed a petition to adopt the
minor Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by rule
of the Rules of Court for adoption of the minor. In the very same petition, private
respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor to Aaron Joseph, the
same being the name with which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and
friends since May 1993 when he arrived at the private respondents residence.
On April 18, 1994 hearing, petitioner, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the
inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption, citing it would
be a violation of the Rule 103 of the Rules of Court . In its formal opposition, dated May 3,
1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption, and the
petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be
conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. After considering the evidence and
arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in granting the change in name of minor as embodied
in the petition for adoption of the said minor.
HELD
Yes. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a
substantial change in ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a
judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is
simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of
the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree
recording such change.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein, If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and
strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly
determined.

Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial
court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. A petition for
change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements
therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar
as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together cannot but lead to
the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of
name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to
employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Thus, the Court granted the petition of the Republic and modified the order of the
trial court; the name of the adopted child shall remain as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade
until a proper proceeding for the change of name shall have been effected.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B.
CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents.
FACTS
The petition at bar was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime
B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years
old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven
years old.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the
name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." Thereafter the case was heard during which
private respondent Zenaida Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and
the minor testified. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the
ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention
that the correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. On
January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Private
respondents were required to comment.
ISSUE
Whether or not a change of name of an adoptee could be effected simultaneously with the
adoption proceeding.
HELD
Petitioner's contention is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
for adoption because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor
child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for adoption and
the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child ("Rosanna E.
Cruz") instead of her name in the record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). The present case is
different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted.
That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.
The Court held, however, that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in
granting private respondents' prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil
registry.

Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to
this case and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court,
insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or
effect.
The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the
correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons.
This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to "changes of name.", Article 412 of the
Civil Code to implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the Rules of Court in 1964 covers
"those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly
misspelled." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, it was held that "the change of petitioner's name
from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration
wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate."
While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition
for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that, notice only the prayer for
adoption of the minor was stated. The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the
civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for
correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction
of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the
subject matter.
Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals was modified that the decision of the
Regional Trial Court to order to the local civil registrar to change the name "MIDAEL" to
"MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the child, was deleted. In other respects relating to the
adoption of Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from was affirmed.

Republic v. Dye
FACTS:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due,
ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a
member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air
Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized
American. They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural
parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the
petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by
adoption. Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap
requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen
years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation
of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote
the welfare of a child. The court also found that the petitioning spouses are mentally and
physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial capability and love
and affection for the intended adoptees.
ISSUE: Whether or not spouses Dye are qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin
Due.
RULING: As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under
Article 184 (3) of the Family Code which states that an alien may not adopt, except: (a) A
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;(b) One who seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a
Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity
of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance
with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from
adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three
afore quoted exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks
to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child.
Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married
to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the
petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here
does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt

jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general
rule that aliens may not adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No.
603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and
wife may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional
character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory. Article 185 of the Family Code
provides that a Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one
spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other. None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina
Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister.
The Court has previously recognized the ineligibility of a similarly situated alien husband
with a former Filipino wife seeking to adopt the latter's nephews and niece in the case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals. Although the wife in said case was qualified to adopt under
Article 184, paragraph 3 (a), she being a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity, she could not jointly adopt with her husband under Article 185 because he
was an alien ineligible to adopt here in the Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of
the welfare of children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that
will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with
compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court
is not in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar,
for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, the
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor
children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of
DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel
Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael
and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the
case at bar. Incase spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental
authority. The use of the word shall signify that joint adoption of husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to
be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, itis but natural to require spouses
to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects
of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, petitioner, versus, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Facts
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America
(USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who
was born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5,
1989. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and
Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,
the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological
mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second
marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-
laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being
financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria
passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors
have given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the
fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married,
gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in
Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came
back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written
consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while
in petitioners custody.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner
Held
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child
in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-
established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent
of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Herbert Cang vs.Court of Appeals
Facts
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23,
1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.Not long thereafter, however, Anna
Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend
of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board." That the
plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any person or
persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of the husband; or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husband's consent as the parties are by this
agreement legally separated;
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce
decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving
"rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging
that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her
brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the
children; that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family
business, "leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-
seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over
the children for the following reasons:The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to
enter into any contract without the written consent of her husband;

Issue
Whether or not minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural
parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them.
Held
Petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of parental authority,
notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To
reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the
spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, there
was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible
person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds
under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation
case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna
Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie's motion
for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of
custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against
them.
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a
valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant
case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to
warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is
one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in
this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts
below on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a
misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia , Honorato B.
Catindig, petitioner.
Facts
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein among
others, that Stephanie was born on june 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Gar
cia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle nameand surname, and that vhe is
now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle
name Astorga be changed to Garcia her mothers surname and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig, his Surname.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption, however, the trial
Court did not allow the use of her mothers surname as her middle name.
Thus, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her
middle name.
Issue
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother, as her
middle name, when she subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
The Court ruled that since no law granting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, as in this case, to use as middle name the mothers surname, the Court found
no reason why Stephanie should not allowed to use her mothers surname Garcia as her
middle name.
Wherefore, the petition was granted.

DSWD v. Belen
FACTS
Respondent Elma P. Vedaa, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is charged with disregarding the provisions of the
same Circular No. 12 of this Court in connection with the aforementioned special
proceeding.
As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano,
both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of
their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. In due time, respondent Judge Belen granted
the petition in a decision dated June 25, 1992, after finding that petitioner spouses were
highly qualified to adopt the child as their own.
Among other evidence adduced before him, respondent judge based his decree primarily
on the findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one
hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional
attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor.
However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel
clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the
department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said
minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the
adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to
conduct a Home and Child Study Report in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive
from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with
the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minors adoption.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondents committed an error concerning the adoption in question.
HELD
The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident.
Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken
was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No.
5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said
department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed
by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover,
respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social
welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was

his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the
adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.

Teotico vs. Del Val
FACTS
On July 14, 1955, Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. De Aguirre died leaving properties worth
P600, 000.00. She left a will written in Spanish whish had her signature signed in the
presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their
signatures. Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton acknowledged the said will.
Among the many legacies and devices made in the will was one made of P20, 000.00 to
Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrixs niece Josefina Mortera. The testatrix also
instituted Josefina as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955. A day
before the said hearing however, Ana Del Val Chan, herein oppositor-appellant, claiming to
be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged
natural child of Jose Mortera, deceased brother of the testatrix, filed an opposition to the
probate of the will.
Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition saying that oppositor has no
legal personality. Oppositor was not allowed to intervene. Oppositor however added an
allegation saying that the will is inoperative with respect to the share of Rene A. Teotico.
On November 10, 1960, the probate court admitted the will to probate but declaring
the portion made in favor of Rene A. Teotico void and should be passed to the testatrixs
heirs be way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico fled a motion for reconsideration. Also, oppositor filed her motion
for reconsideration on the portion of the judgment that decreed the probate of the will.
Both motions were denied.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not oppositor has the right to intervene in the proceedings?
HELD
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as an executor or as a claimant in the estate. Under the terms of the
will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as

heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by
the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her heir, legatee or
devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate
because she is not a co-owner thereof.

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred
to as DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent.
FACTS
In 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption of herein respondent. In keeping
with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo
to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her
petition, she averred that the herein respondent had continued to used his surname,
Sibulo, to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the
Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally
issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his
practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
Petitioner alleged further that respondent had been jealous of her nephews and
nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were
only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
Furthermore, in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and
uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded
feelings, knowing that after all respondents only motive to his adoption is his expectancy
of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband.
However RA 8552, a new statute, deleted from the law the right of adopters to
rescind a decree of adoption. Nonetheless, the trial court respected petitioners right to
rescind the decree of adoption under the Family Code but likewise denied her petition
citing grounds of prescription.
ISSUE
Whether or not the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.
HELD
No. The Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 on adoption later modified by the Child and
Youth Welfare Code and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, gave immediate
statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations
initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the
Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No.
8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the
legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as

well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and
gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process
that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right
has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to
rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura
lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It
is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an
adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court that herein respondent is still
the legal child of petitioner.

ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner, vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner spouse) and Carmen San Jose-
Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the respondent spouse) were married on February 14,
1953. On April 27, 1963 they filed a joint petition dated April 21, 1963, docketed as special
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (hereinafter referred to as
the CFI).
In a compromise agreement executed by petitioner and respondent governing the
separation of their properties and custody of their children, they agreed, among others,
that the custody of the two elder children named Enrique and Maria Teresa shall be
awarded to petitioner Alfonso Lacson and the custody of the younger children named
Gerrard and Ramon shall be awarded to petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson. Petitioner
Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance of
P300.00 for the support of the children in her custody.
In compliance, with the compromise agreement the petitioner spouse delivered all
the four children to the respondent spouse and remitted money for their support.
Respondent spouse however failed to return the two elder children to petitioner spouse
but petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to relieve her of the agreement
and pertaining to the custody and visitation of her minor children and that since all the
children are now in her custody, the said custody in her favor be confirmed pendente lite.
The JDRC dismissed the case, which respondent spouse appealed.
On October 14, 1964 the Court of Appeals certified the said appeal to the Supreme
Court (G.R. No. The petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and, on June 1, 1963, filed a
motion for execution of the compromise judgment and a charge for contempt. From the
aforesaid compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 and execution order dated June 22,
1963, the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
32798-R) wherein she likewise questioned the validity or legality of her agreement with
the petitioner spouse respecting custody of their children. As prayed for, the Court of
Appeals issued ex parte a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the
order dated June 22, 1963 for execution of the compromise judgment rendered in special
proceeding 6978. The petitioner spouse filed an urgent motion dated July 5, 1963 for the
dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte which urgent motion was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated July 9, 1963. The petitioner spouse likewise
filed his answer. The petitioner spouse moved to reconsider, but his motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals, thus the present petition.
ISSUE

Whether or not respondent spouse is entitled to the custody of all the children.
Whether or not the respondent spouse is entitled to support from petitioner spouse.
HELD
Yes. It is not disputed that it was the JDRC, which first acquired jurisdiction over the
matter of custody and support of the children. The complaint docketed as civil case E-
00030 in the JDRC was filed by the respondent spouse on March 12, 1963, whereas the
joint petition of the parties docketed as special proceeding 6978 in the CFI was filed on
April 27, 1963. However, when the respondent spouse signed the joint petition on the same
matter of custody and support of the children and filed the same with the CFI of Negros
Occidental, she in effect abandoned her action in the JDRC. The petitioner spouse, who
could have raised the issue of lis pendens, in abatement of the case filed in the CFI did not
do so - had the right, therefore, to cite the decision of the CFI and to ask for the dismissal of
the action filed by the respondent spouse in the JDRC, on the grounds of res judicata and lis
pendens. For it is no defense against the dismissal of the action that the case before the CFI
was filed later than the action before the JDRC.
The CFI erred in depriving the mother, the respondent spouse, of the custody of the
two older children (both then below the age of 7). The Civil Code specifically commands in
the second sentence of its article 363 that "No mother shall be separated from her child
under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." No
man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age.
The exception allowed by the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the
child and if the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt unless such separation is grounded
upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.
Neither does the said award of custody fall within the exception because the record
is bereft of any compelling reason to support the lower court's order depriving the wife of
her minor children's company. True, the CFI stated in its order dated June 22, 1963,
denying the respondent spouse's motion for reconsideration of its order dated April 27,
1963, that if the parties agreed to submit the matter of custody of the minor children to the
Court for incorporation in the final judgment, they purposely suppressed the "compelling
reasons for such measure" from appearing in the public records. This is for the sake and for
the welfare of the minor children.
Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the couple's agreement regarding the
custody of the children. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the

courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the right
granted to him by law. This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement of the
spouses-parents. When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from
each other, and the question as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of
their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to
any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing testimony as may be pertinent, shall award
the care, custody and control of each such child as will be for its best interest permitting the
child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the
parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty.
One last point regarding the matter of support for the children assuming that the
custody of any or more of the children will be finally awarded to the mother.

Joey Briones vs. Maricel Miguel, et. Al
Facts
On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel Miguel and Francisca Miguel came to the house of
petitioners in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and
requested that they be allowed to bring the child at the SM department store for recreation.
The respondents, however instead of returning the child to his father brought the child to
his mothers custody. The petitioner alleged that he exerted efforts in searching the child
but all his efforts were futile. Hence, he filed for Habeas Corpus against herein
Respondents.
Issue
Who should custody of the child?
Held
Petitioner contends that the mother of the child, Loreta is not always in the country thus
she cannot attend to the needs of the child. The court however ruled that the child being an
illegitimate should be under the custody of the mother. As the cited in David V. Court of
appeals, the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could not be a ground for
ordering the latter for support to, but not custody of, the child; it follows that only if she,
the mother, defaults can the father assume custody or authority over the minor. Of course
putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be
considered legitimate child of the adoptive parent. Wherefore, the decision of the court of
appeals is hereby affirmed but modified. The mother can have custody of the child until he
reaches the age of 10.

Quisumbing V. Icao
FACTS
Appellant, Carmen Quisumbing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao. In her
complaint, defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with
her several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent. As a result she
became pregnant. She claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorneys fees.
Defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did
not allege that the child had been born. And after hearing arguments, the trial judge
sustained defendants motion and dismiss the complaint.
ISSUE
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born
HELD
A conceived child, although not yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality
of its own for all purposes favorable to it. The unborn child therefore has a right to support
from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant appellee whose paternity is deemed
admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss, even if the said child is only en ventre
de sa mere. Furthermore, such unborn child may receive donations.

Francisco v. Zandueta
Facts:
Luis Francisco seeks to procure the abrogation of an order of the respondent Judge, dated
May 2, 1935, granting the respondent Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, a monthly pension of
P30.
It appears that the respondent, Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, age (2) years, through his
natural mother and guardian and litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support
against the herein petitioner in the Court of First instance of the City of Manila, case No.
47238. In that case, it is alleged that the herein plaintiff is the acknowledged son of Luis
Francisco and as such is entitled to support. The petitioner, as defendant in that case,
answered by a general denial of each and every material allegation contained in the
complaint and as a special defense alleged that he never acknowledged and could not
present at the baptism of the plaintiff and that he was married at the time it is alleged that
the plaintiff was born.
Notwithstanding the denial of paternity the respondent judge issued the order of May 2,
1935. On May 11, 1935, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of that order on the
ground that it was issued in excess of Jurisdiction in view of the fact that the civil status of
the plaintiff has no right to monthly support from the defendant until his status as a child of
the latter is finally determined in his favor and that as a guardian and litem of the plaintiff
admits his lack of means to defray even the ordinary expenses of existence it would be
possible for the defendant to recover whatever amount he may advanced to plaintiff as
support pendente lite, should it finally be decided that he is not the father of the plaintiff.
The Civil code grants the right of support to a son. This status with appearing by a
final Judgment, the respondent Judge was without Jurisdiction to order the petitioner, as
defendant case No. 47238, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is held liable to support his child while his civil status is in
litigation.
Held:
The writ prayed fro is granted and the order of the respondent judge of May 2, 1935,
ordering the herein petitioner as defendant in Case No. 47232 to pay the plaintiff in that
case the sum P30 monthly, as support, pendente lite, is hereby declared null and void,
without costs.

Ruiz v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his
only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes,
and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs
substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his
estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of
his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with
the decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any
action for the probate of his father's holographic will.
Four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes
who filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of
Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz, 3
Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under
undue influence.
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties the court resolves to
allow Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession of the rental payments deposited
with the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may be
necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support of Maria
Cathryn Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are subject to collation and
deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and insofar as they exceed the
fruits or rents pertaining to them.
Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is ordered to submit an accounting of the expenses
necessary for administration including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn
Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required
can be withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to creditors with reasonable
dispatch.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before
payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority:
(1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren;
(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and
(3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

Held:
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his
father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As
executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are
trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.
He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the
fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a
determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness
The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the order dated
December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court are affirmed with the modification that
those portions of the order granting an allowance to the testator's grandchildren and
ordering the release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to creditors are
annulled and set aside.

Sps. Lim v. Lim
FACTS: In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of
petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace
and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in
Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her
husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family business, which provided him with a
monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of
income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children
with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught
with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very
compromising situation."
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano
(defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for
support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente
lite
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to
respondents.
RULING: Yes. However, the Court modified the appealed judgment by limiting petitioners
liability to the amount of monthly support needed by respondents Lester Edward, Candice
Grace and Mariano III only.
Petitioner is Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal
support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they
limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are
liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental
Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental
authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the childrens
minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the
latters offspring ends with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe
constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the
governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on
Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a
common ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal
support, they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and

its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. Thus, although the obligation to
provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the
child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during
the obligee's lifetime. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative
parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or
suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon
default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.

VERCELES vs. POSADA
FACTS: Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), met a close family friend, petitioner
Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the
visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayors office.
With companions, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town
planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My
Brothers Place" where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they
would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they
reached the place her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started
making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort
room where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the
hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee.
One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
On orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay
projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions
of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby
and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the
upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced
her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He
also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed
to his advances. But again she kept the incident to herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote
petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.
When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father fetched her and
brought her back to Pandan. The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with
Support Pendente Lite.
ISSUE:
Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with
support pendente lite.

RULING:
No. Respondents are not entitled to damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states
moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case because
Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner.
Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is nothing in law or
jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to
damages. Respondents Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or
jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.

Mangonon vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor
children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with
application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged
that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly
married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time,
petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the
marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil
Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the
assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica
and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where
petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally
settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was
accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite their
admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of
pursuing collegiate education
Issue:
Wether or not respondent Federico is liable to provide monthly support pendente lite in
the total amount of P10,000.00 by taking into consideration his supposed income of
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00 per month.
Held:
It is a basic procedural edict that questions of fact cannot be the proper subject of a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule finds a more
stringent application where the Court of Appeals upholds the findings of fact of the trial
court; in such a situation, the Supreme Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as
determined by the appellate and the lower courts. This rule, however, is not ironclad as it
admits of the following recognized exceptions: "(1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the

judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner?s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. The case at bar falls within the
seventh and eleventh exceptions.
The petition is partly granted. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, fixing the amount of support pendente lite to
P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel, are MODIFIED in that respondent
Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente lite in the amount to be
determined by the trial court pursuant to this Decision.

DE GUZMAN VS PEREZ
FACTS
Roberto P. de Guzman and Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in the
University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when Aberde became pregnant
and subsequently gave birth to de Guzmans child, Robby Aberde de Guzman. However,
they never got married. In 1991, de Guzman married another woman with whom he begot
two children.
De Guzman sent money for Robbys schooling only twice the first in 1992 and the second
in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, de Guzman gave Aberde P7,000.00 to help
defray the cost of the childs hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these
instances, de Guzman never provided any other financial support for his son.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robbys needs, Aberde accepted a
job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was only because of
her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to school.
However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide
for her and Robbys needs. The childs continued education thus became uncertain.
On the other hand, de Guzman managed the de Guzman family corporations. He apparently
did well as he led a luxurious lifestyle, owning a palatial home in an exclusive enclave in
Quezon City, built a bigger and more extravagant house in the same private community,
and sent his children
to expensive schools in Metro Manila. He also regularly travelled abroad with his family.
Despite his fabulous wealth, however, de Guzman failed to provide support to Robby. In a
letter, Aberde demanded support for Robby who was entering high school that coming
school year (June 2000). She explained that, given her financial problems, it was extremely
difficult for her to send him to a good school. De Guzman ignored Aberdes demand. The
latter was thus forced to rely on the charity of her relatives so that she could enroll her son
in De La Salle high school in Lipa City.
Thereafter, Aberde filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of child under
Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Lipa City. To prove
de Guzmans financial capacity to support Robbys education, Aberde attached a notarized
copy of the General Information Sheet (GIS) of the RNCD Development Corporation. It
showed that de Guzman owned P750,000.00 worth of paid-up corporate shares. The City
Prosecutor of Lipa City dismissed the complaint for abandonment but finding probable
cause to charge petitioner with neglect of child punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603 in
relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610. Then, an information was filed for the crime of
neglecting a minor child.

Before de Guzman could be arraigned, however, he filed a petition for review. Justice
Secretary Hernando B. Perez dismissed de Guzmans petition for review of the City
Prosecutor of Lipa Citys resolution. Reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Who exercises parental authority and custody
HELD:
De Guzman does. He is charged with neglect of child punishable under Article 59(4) of PD
603 which provides that:
Art. 59. Crimes. Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who:
(4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the familys station in life and
financial conditions permit.
The crime has the following elements:
(1) the offender is a parent;
(2) he or she neglects his or her own child;
(3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the child and
(4) the offenders station in life and financial condition permit him to give an appropriate
education to the child.
Here, de Guzman acknowledged Robby as his son. He has not denied that he never
contributed for his education except in two instances (1992 and 1993). He admitted that
the boys education was being financed by Aberde and her relatives. He stated under oath
that the last time he sent material support to his son was in 1994 when he gave P7,000 for
the latters hospitalization and medical expenses.
There is a prima facie showing from the evidence that de Guzman is in fact financially
capable of supporting Robbys education. The notarized GIS of the RNCD Development
Corporation indicates that he owns P750,000 worth of paid-up shares in the company. The
argument that criminal liability for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of PD 603 attaches
only if both parents are guilty of neglecting the childs education does not hold water.
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does
not depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish
the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the
education which the familys station in life and financial condition permit. The
irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by
invoking the other parents faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties.

TONOG VS TONOG
FACTS
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith
Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol.
Petitioner was then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician.
They cohabited for a time and lived with private respondents parents and sister in the
latters house in Quezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the
family. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America
where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father
(private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On March 9, 1992, the trial court rendered
judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith. Upon
the petition of petitioner, the trial court reversed its original decision and awarded the
childs custody to Dinah. Thereafter respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari which was denied but overturned when he filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
HELD
Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article
213 of the Family Code provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be
observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is
specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother
is the best custodian.
In the case at bar, the Court was tasked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court
have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have
final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the
controlling factor, the Court finds that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father
(private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. It shall
be only understood that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of
the subject minor should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending
final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.

VANCIL VS BALMES
FACTS
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the
United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his
lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,
Helen G. Belmes.
Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent.
At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child.
On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian
over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.
On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an
opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed
a similar petition for guardianship before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City,
asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they
are permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at
the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court,
Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes
motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and
instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as
such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. Her motion for reconsideration
was likewise dismissed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissed
Special Proceedings.
ISSUE
HELD
This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides: Art. 211. The
father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there
is a judicial order to the contrary.

Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding
natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held:
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent
one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature
of the parental relationship.

BONDAGJY VS BONDAGJY
FACTS
Respondent Fouzi and Sabrina were married on February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel,
Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, Sabrina became a Muslim by
conversion. However, the conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines. They begot two children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13,
1989, and Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a
Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced. After their marriage, the couple moved in
with respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990, the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's in Ayala Alabang.
Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the court. Even
with a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang,
Muntinlupa City .
Thereafter Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names changed from
Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage
Selina Artadi.
Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd
hours in Manila, and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits.
Such clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let
their children sweep their neighbor's house for a fee after the children come home from
school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be happy to see him but
they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from
school.
On March 11, 1996, respondent Fouzy Ali Bondagjy filed with the Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City, an actions to obtain custody of his two minor children, Abdulaziz and
Amouaje which was granted.
ISSUE
HELD
Either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. In cases
where both parties cannot have custody because of their voluntary separation, the Court

takes into consideration the circumstances in knowing which parent can better take care of
the children. Although there is the need for the children to have both a mother and a father,
the Court found that petitioner has more capacity and time to see to the children's needs.
Respondent is a businessman whose work requires that he go abroad or be in different
places most of the time.
Under P.D. No. 603, the custody of the minor children, absent a compelling reason to the
contrary, is given to the mother. However, the award of custody to the wife does not
deprive the husband of parental authority. Thus, the Court granted visitorial rights to
respondent as his Constitutionally protected natural and primary right.

SAGALA VS ESLAO
FACTS
On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married
and stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband. Thereafter two children
were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao who was born on February 23, 1986 and Angelica
Eslao who was born on April 20, 1987. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of
petitioners mother in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, while Angelica stayed with her parents at
respondents house. On August 6, 1990, petitioners husband Reynaldo Eslao died.
Petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed
upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son
just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least
compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned to her
mothers house in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently on March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr. James Ouye decided to get married
and petitioner migrated to the USA, to join her new husband. At present, the petitioner is a
trainee at the Union Bank in San Francisco, while her husband is a progressive practitioner
of his profession who owns three cars, a dental clinic and earns US$5,000 a month.
On June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
children and bring them to the United States. However, respondent resisted the idea by
way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and
accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica.
Petitioner then instituted an action to recover custody of her child, which was granted by
both the RTC and CA.
ISSUE
Who must exercise parental custody over the child
HELD
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When
a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.

Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor
child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did
not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached
to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan
institution which do not appear in the case at bar.

GAMBOA-HIRSCH VS CA
FACTS
Franklin and Agnes were married on December 23, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, and
established their conjugal dwelling in Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. On December
21, 2002, a child was born to them and was named Simone. In 2005, the couple started to
have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that
they stay in Boracay Island. On March 23, 2006, Agnes came to their conjugal home in
Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklins permission for her to bring their daughter
to Makati City for a brief vacation. Franklin readily agreed, but soon thereafter discovered
that neither Agnes nor their daughter Simone would be coming back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone
in court. On May 19, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas
corpus be issued ordering that Simone be brought before said court on May 26, 2006. After
a series of hearings and presentation of evidence, the CA, on June 8, 2006, promulgated the
assailed Decision granting Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child. Agnes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision, which was denied in the CAs August 3,
2006 Resolution for lack of merit.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Tender Age Presumption Rule governs the instant case
HELD
The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of
the minor child to both parents.The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code,
in the same way, unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and
custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother is declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the
mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child.
All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mothers
custody.

PABLO-GUALBERTO VS GUALBERTO
FACTS
On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo
Gualberto, with a prayer for custody of their almost 4-year-old son minor Rafaello, whom
Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school when she
decided to abandon Crisanto sometime in early February 2002. On April 2, 2002, RTC Judge
Helen B. Ricafort heard the ancillary prayer of Crisanto.
In the case, several testimonies were presented by Gualberto. He testified that Joycelyn
took their minor child with her to Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. At that time,
the minor was enrolled at B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. Despite efforts exerted by him, he
has failed to see his child. Joycelyn and the child are at present staying with the formers
step-father at the latters residence at Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he was commissioned by
Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn and came up with the conclusion that [she] is
having lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay Cuidadano in Cebu City.
The findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a house helper of the
spouses who stated that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of
the house and on one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slapping the child.
Both the RTC and CA awarded the custody to Crisanto.
ISSUE
HELD
Yes. The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother has been
declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to
deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the
mothers immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her
husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of

custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse
effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising
proper parental care.
Based on the above jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely
that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported
relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under
circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral development. Such a fact has not
been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged
sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a
result. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the
mothers custody.

SANTOS VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who
was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until
sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents,
private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital
bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do
so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work.
Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in
the United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their
daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through
deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him
away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as
respondent, and such was awarded to them.
ISSUE
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
HELD
The Court finds considerations presented as insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental
authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.,
particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate
father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor,
particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to
support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son
from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without
permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's
custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest

criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision
against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious
efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son
and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.

GOLANGCO V CA
FACTS
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent Lucia Carlos
Golangco against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 144. The couple had two children, Justin Rene and Stefan Rafael. During the
proceedings of the case, a hearing for custody pendente lite of the two children was held.
In an order dated July 21, 1994, the trial court awarded the two children to Lucia while
Rene was given visitation rights of at least one week in a month. Thereafter Rene
questioned the order dated July 21, 1994 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
however, dismissed the petition and instead affirmed the order of the trial court. Not
contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the order dated
July 21, 1994 before this Court, and the case was docketed as G.R. No. 120831. On July 17,
1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of petitioner Rene to show that
grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the appellate court.
On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. She sought redress due to an
alleged incident on July 5, 1995, in which her estranged husband physically abused their
son Justin.
In an order dated October 4, 1995, the trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction
restraining Rene from seeing his children.
Aggrieved, Rene filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
before the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 38866), alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the October 4, 1995 order.
In a resolution dated January 10, 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
violation of Circular No. 28-91 on non- forum shopping.[8] Hence, this petition
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner violated the rule on non- forum shopping
HELD
The petition is partly granted. What is being questioned in G.R. No. 120381, that is the
order dated July 21, 1994 and in CA-G.R. SP No. 38866, the order dated October 4, 1995.
The latter case questioned the October 4, 1995 order of the trial court granting the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by Lucia, which enjoined her husband from seeing their
children. On the other hand, G.R. No. 120381 questioned the order dated July 21, 1994,

affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which granted custody pendente lite of the children to
their mother.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the issues raised in the two petitions, that is, first
questioning the order dated July 21, 1994 and second, the order dated October 4, 1995 are
distinct and different from one another.
In sum, two different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were
raised, and two objectives were sought; thus, forum-shopping cannot be said to exist in the
case at bar.

SILVA VS CA
FACTS
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local
actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two
children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship
surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career
over his vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed
that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the
two eventually parted ways.
his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was
opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing"
which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
In an order, dated April 7, 1989 the RTC granted Silva visitorial rights to his children.
Gonzales, however, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which ruled in her favor.
ISSUE
Whether or not Silva be granted be granted visitorial rights to his children
HELD
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the
paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has
recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the
children, however, could not all be that detrimental to the children. Similarly, what the trial
court has observed is not entirely without merit; thus:
The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true,
cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed
by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their
children once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of
respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and

DAVID V CA
FACTS
Petitioner Daisie David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon Villar, a
businessman. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all
grown-up. The relationship between Daisie and Ramon developed into an intimate one, as
a result Christopher J was born to them followed by two more children, both girls. Private
respondents wife knew of the relationship when Daisie took Christopher J to Ramons
house. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Ramon to his house as they
were eventually accepted by his legal family.
In summer 1991, Ramon asked Daisie to allow Christopher J, then 6 years old to go with his
family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip Ramon refused to give back the child.
Daisie filed a petitioner for Habeas Corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Daisie, granting rightful custody to the natural
mother. The CA reversed on appeal holding that Habeas Corpus was not proper; the
question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a Habeas Corpus case contemplates
a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated.
ISSUE
HELD
It is indeed true, as the CA observed that the determination of the right to the custody of
minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are
for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise
in any other situation. For example, in the case of SALVANA VS. GAELA (55 PHIL 680), it
was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person
of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception,
his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than
the childs mother. As such pursuant to Article 176 of the family Code, Christopher J is
under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of
such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to the
issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under

Article 213 of the Family Code, no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
That petitioner receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three
children is not a point against her. Cooperation compassion, love and concern for every
member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino
family and have made it what it is.

ESPIRITU& LAYUG VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in
1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and
Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles,
California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In
1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a
common law relationship of husband and wife.
On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while
they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and
upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the
name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in
1990. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo,
Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however,
that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch
with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had
to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and
filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody
over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended
Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the
parties and to be approved by the Court. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
ISSUE

HELD
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both
over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from
the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two
requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The
presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children
are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for
children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute,
there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the
mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have
been affected in their emotional growth by her behaviour.

PEREZ VS CA
FACTS
Private respondent Ray Perez is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while petitioner
Nerissa, his wife is a registered nurse. They were married on December 6, 1986. After six
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray
II in NY on July 20, 1992.
Petitioner who began work in the US in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a
modes house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive
miscarriages in New York. In February 1992, petitioner became a resident alien. Private
respondent stayed with her in the US twice and took care of her when she became
pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed. In
January 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the US.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no
longer on good terms. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her
husbands meager income of P 5,000.00. She longed to be with her only child but her
husband was keeping him away from her. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here,
where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. Petitioner was forced to
move to her parents home in Mandaue.
Nerissa filed a petition for Habeas Corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of
their son to her. The court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one year old child
to his mother, citing paragraph 2, of Art. 213 of the Family Code which provides that no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the Court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts order and awarded custody of the boy to his
father. Holding that granting custody to the boys father would be for the childs best
interest and welfare.
ISSUE:
HELD:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable law. Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal

separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such petitioner and
private respondent, are covered within its terms.
The general rule that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother
finds its raison d' etre in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most
compelling reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to
someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In
the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction , maltreatment of the child, insanity and
being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the
welfare and best interest of the child.

SAGALA-ESLAO V CA
FACTS
On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married.
After their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the
husband, at 1825, Road 14, Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila. Out of their marriage, two children
were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao.
Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioners mother while Angelica stayed
with her parents at respondents house. Reynaldo Eslao died. Petitioner intended to bring
Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the
custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage
her grief thereofr, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss
of her late son.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American.

Their acquaintance blossomed into a marriage and the petitioner migrated to San
Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband. The petitioner returned to the
Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United States. The
petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to take custody of Angelica and
explained that her present husband, Dr. Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and
Angelica and to provide for their support and education;
Respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when
she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica.
The lower court rendered its decision ordering respondent to cause the immediate transfer
of the custody of the Angelica to her natural mother. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower courts decision.
ISSUE:
RATIO:
Yes. The trial courts disquisition, in consonance with the provision that the childs welfare
is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody is
enough to convince the Court to decide in favor of private respondent.
When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what
she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment
or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,

guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution which do not
appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance also, is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one,
which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of
the parental relationship.

ORETA VS CA
FACTS
Fe Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18,
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan,
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal,
which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.
Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina
and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private
writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T.
Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent
and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private
respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due
notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without
the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for
resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner remains to be the legitimate surviving spouse of the
deceased Arturo.

HELD
Although respondent was able to establish that she and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao which held that "a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction, disregarded the divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage
subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. On 27 November 1987
only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals

ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring
null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate
heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by
granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed
Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to
the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the
present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

LIBI VS CA
FACTS
Julie and Wendell were sweethearts for 2 years when Julie broke it off due to Wendells
sadistic and irresponsible nature. A month after their break-up, Julie and Wendell died each
from a single gunshot wound traced to the gun licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi, the
father of Wendell. There were 2 versions of the story. First is that another man shot the two
sweethearts. The second is that Wendell shot Julie and then committed suicide. The
Gotiongs filed for damages against the Libis under Art. 2180. The trial court dismissed the
petition for insufficiency of evidence, but this was revered upon appeal and held Libi
subsidiary liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell be held liable for the death of Juli under Article
2180 of the Civil Code
HELD:
Yes. Libis are primarily liable CA affirmed. The Libis were grossly negligent from
preventing Wendell from having access to the key to the safety deposit box where the gun
was stored. Diligence required is that of instruction and supervision of the kid.But, liability
is not subsidiary, it is a primary rule on parents liability is correct but characterization of
their nature must be given a second look. If the liability of the parents for crimes of their
minor children is subsidiary, then they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability
on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages. But if the liability is direct and primary, the diligence would constitute a valid and
substantial defense. Hence, the liability of parents for crimes of their minor kids as
contemplated in 2180 is primary and not subsidiary.

TAMARGO VS CA
FACTS
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of
Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with
whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such
petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.
ISSUE
Whether or not parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child
where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.
HELD
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of
parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining
the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto
was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties
to the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by
the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code.
The Court did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no
actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it
permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article
35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody
period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting
incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

LANDINGIN VS REPUBLIC
FACTS
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage and a
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who
was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;
and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The minors are the natural
children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,
the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological
mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second
marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-
laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being
financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria
passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors
have given their written consent8 to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the
fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married,
gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in
Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came
back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written
consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while
in petitioners custody. After the adoption proceedings, she was awarded the decree of
adoption of all the children but this was reveresed by the CA upon review.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner should be granted the adoption decree for the three minors
without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos
HELD
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect
the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the
proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-
established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent
of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Petitioners contention on the biological mothers alleged abandonment must be rejected.
When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect.
Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed
by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she
should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

SOMBONG VS CA
FACTS
Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Signal
Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. Some time in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six
months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, located at 121 First Avenue, Kalookan City,
for relief of coughing fits and for treatment of colds. Petitioner did not have enough money
to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged, then,
because of the petitioners failure to pay the bill.
Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to the effect that she allegedly paid the private
respondents by installments in the total amount of P1,700.00, knowing for a fact that the
sum payable was only P300.00. Despite such alleged payments, the owners of the clinic,
Dra. Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr. Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to
her. Petitioner claims that the reason for such a refusal was that she refused to go out on a
date with Mr. Ty, who had been courting her. This allegedly gave Dra. Ty a reason to be
jealous of her, making it difficult for everyone all around.
On the other hand and in contrast to her foregoing allegations, petitioner testified that she
visited Arabella at the clinic only after two years, i.e., in 1989. This time, she did not go
beyond berating the spouses Ty for their refusal to give Arabella to her. Three years
thereafter, i.e., in 1992, petitioner again resurfaced to lay claim to her child. Her pleas
allegedly fell on deaf ears.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
with the Regional Trial Court11 of Quezon City. The trial court conducted a total of eight (8)
hearings, for the period, from October 28, 1992 to December 11, 1992. On January 15,
1993, it rendered a decision granting the Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordering
respondent Alviar to immediately deliver the person of Cristina Grace Neri to the
petitioner, the court having found Cristina to be the petitioners long lost child, Arabella.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is culpable negligence on the part of the petitioner so that her
parental authority over her child may be suspended
HELD
As to the issue of the welfare of the child, petitioner-appellees capability to give her child
the basic needs and guidance in life appear to be bleak. Before the lower court petitioner-
appellee filed a motion to litigate as pauper as she had no fixed income. She also admitted
that she had no stable job, and she had been separated from a man previously married to

another woman. She also confessed that she planned to go abroad and leave her other child
Johannes to the care of the nuns. The child Arabella Sombong wherever she is certainly
does not face a bright prospect with petitioner-appellee. The Court finds that private
respondents are financially, physically and spiritually in a better position to take care of the
child, Cristina. They have the best interest of Cristina at heart. On the other hand, it is not to
the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the custody of petitioner, had the
petitioners custody rights over Cristina been established.

AQUINAS SCHOOL VS SPS. INTON
FACTS
In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School
(Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who
began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis grade three religion
class.
On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his
assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin
noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and
went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the childs behavior,
Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled
and shoved his head on the classmates seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he
was on that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the blackboard while seated
on the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton filed an action for damages
on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against
Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was
sentenced accordingly.
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother
Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victorias personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis
favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary
damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Aquinas may be held solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages
awarded to Jose Luis
HELD
No. In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a
congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would
send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that
it was not the school but Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her for the task of
catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the
catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was

quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods. At any
rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the
incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect. The Intons had not
refuted the school directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the
CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.

ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE VS MIRANDA
FACTS
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph Colleges
premises, the class to which respondent Jayson Val Miranda belonged was conducting a
science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the supervision
of Rosalinda Tabugo, as the subject teacher and employee of petitioner SJC.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured
it from any untoward incident or occurrence. Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of
the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with
magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it
close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted
out and several particles of which hit Jaysons eye and the different parts of the bodies of
some of his group mates. As a result thereof, Jaysons eyes were chemically burned,
particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his
medication.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, Jaysons mother, who
was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares
and had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount
of at least P40,000.00.
Then, too, Jayson and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded
feelings as a result of his injury due to petitioners fault and failure to exercise the degree of
care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for
moral damages. Also, Jayson sent a demand letter to petitioners for the payment of his
medical expenses as well as other expenses incidental thereto, which the latter failed to
heed. Hence, Jayson was constrained to file the complaint for damages which was granted
by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether or not the SJC may be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to Jayson
HELD
Yes. In this case, petitioners failed to show that the negligence of Jayson was the proximate
cause of the latters injury. The Court finds that the immediate cause of the accident was
but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals independent of any intervening
cause. Petitioners could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of
care, caution and foresight.

The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by St. Joseph College will not
exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity
in the supervision of its teachers and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe
and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is still
liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information
on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert
damage and injury to students.

ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS
FACTS
St. Marys Academy conducted an enrolment drive for the incoming school year which
involved visitation of schools. Sherwin Carpitanos, who was partof the campaigning group
rode the jeep, along with the other high school students. The jeep was owned by Villanueva
and was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student. They were on their way to an
elementary school when the jeep turned turtle due to Jamesreckless driving. Sherwin
sustained injuries which caused his death. The Carpitanos sued St. Marys,James, the
Daniels (parents of James) and Villanueva.
The trial court held that St. Marys is liable for damages under Artocle 218 and 219 of the
Family Code and this was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether or not St. Marys Academy and the parents of James be held liable
HELD
The special parental authority under Article 218 of the Family Code applies to:
the school, its administrators and teachers and the individual, entity or institution engaged
in child care.
This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Such authority
and responsibility applies to fieldtrips, excursions, and other affairs of the pupils and
students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor under their supervision,
instruction or custody. But, for St. Marys to be held liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered a s negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident.
a. The proximate cause of the accident was not the negligence nor the reckless driving of
James, but the mechanical defect of the jeep. The steering wheel guide was detached while
the jeep was running.
b. Theres no evidence that St. Marys allowed the minor James to drive the jeep. It was the
grandson of Villanueva, who had control and possession of the jeep who allowed James to
drive.

Whether the accident was due to James negligence or the mechanical failure, the parents
must be held primarily liable. St. Marys negligence was only a remote cause, and either the
Daniels negligence or the mechanical failure was the intervening cause

AMADORA VS CA
FACTS
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by
Pablito Daffon resulting to the formers death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through
reckless imprudence. The victims parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for
damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of
boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against
the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and
reversed CFI Cebus decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic
institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the
custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear
identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary
diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline.
Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he
went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics
reports).
ISSUE
Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
HELD
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was
immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high
school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority
over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-
charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable
considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later
returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher
authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily
link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only
the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held
liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

SALVOSA VS IAC
FACTS
Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for damages filed against Abon,
Salvosa being the Executive Vice President of BCF. Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of
the Baguio Colleges Foundation. He was also appointed as armorer of the schools ROTC
Unit. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP.
He received orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges
Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an
employee(officer) of the AFP.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot
Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the
former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died
and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
HELD
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The
rationale of such liability is that so long as the studentremains in the custody of a teacher,
the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student."
Likewise, the phrase used in Art. 2180 so long as the students remain in their custody
means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time." In line with the case of Palisoc "at attendance in the school,"
contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student
still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or
the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not
include dismissal.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more
does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody'
of the school, as contemplated in the law.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court ruled that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be
considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he
shot Napoleon Castro. . Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

PSBA VS CA
FACTS
A stabbing incident on August 30, 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista on the
premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)prompted the parents
of the deceased to file suit in the Manila RTC. It was established that his assailants were not
members of the schools academic community but were outsiders. The suit impleaded
PSBA, its President, VP, Treasure, Chief of Security and Assistant Chief of Security. It sought
to adjudge them liable for the victims death due to their alleged negligence, recklessness
and lack of security precautions.- Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit
dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
the complaint states no cause of action against them since academic institutions, like PSBA,
are beyond the ambit of that rule. Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
And the MFR was similarly dealt with. Petitioners the assailed the trial courts dispositions
before the respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial courts ruling.
ISSUE
Whether or not PSBA may be held solidarily liable
HELD
Although a school may not be liable under Art. 2180 on quasi-delicts, it maystill be liable
under the law on contracts. The case should be tried on its merits. But respondent courts
premiseis incorrect. It is expressly mentioned in Art. 2180 that the liability arises from acts
done by pupils or students of the institution. In this sense, PSBA is not liable. But when an
academic institution accepts students for enrollment, the school makes itself responsible in
providing their students with an atmosphere that is conducive for learning. Certainly, no
student can absorb the intricacies of physics or explore the realm of arts when bullets are
flying or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb.

REMO VS HON. SEC. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FACTS
Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose passport was then expiring on
October 27, 2000. Being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear:
Surname: Rallonza Given Name: Maria Virginia Middle name: Remo. Prior to expiry of her
passport, the petitioner (marriage still subsists) applied for renewal in DFA Chicago,
Illinois, U.S.A. with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement
passport and was denied. Thereafter she wrote the matter to the DFA Secretary.
On August 28, 2000, DFA through Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota, denied the request, stating:it
is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name. Use of maiden name is
allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous
application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of 1996
(RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a woman may revert to her maiden name,
that is, of only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms.
Remos case does not meet any of these conditions.
On November 15, 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President. On July
27, 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal with the same argument as the
Asst. Secretary of DFA. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her passport, can
revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence
of her marriage.
HELD
No. Ms. Remo cannot revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport,
despite the subsistence of her marriage because she used her husbands last name when
she applied for her passport for the first time. According to the rule, upon renewal of
passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use
her maiden name. And once a the woman adopted her husbands surname in her
passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in cases enumerated in
section 5(d) of RA 8239.

YASIN VS SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT
FACTS
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin, a Muslim divorcee, filed in the Shari'a District Court in
Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name".She was formerly married
to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim rites and
customs, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the
Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law. The divorce
rites was officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his certification dated march
13, 1984. Thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to
another woman.
Her petition was denied owing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance
in accordance with Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition
for change of name under rule 103 of the Rules of Court
HELD
No. Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner
does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed
to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji
Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal
right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation
may be obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the
right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a
specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been
alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the
court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of
maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right
conferred by law.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA
FACTS
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein,
among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name.
On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
ISSUE
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father
HELD
Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will
maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and
Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house
built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides
for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls
them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.

IN RE: JULIAN LIN WANG
FACTS
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wan (then unmarried to each other). His parents got married on
September 22, 1998, executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name
was changed from: Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. They anticipate that
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition for
the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition did not fall within the
grounds recognized by law: change sought is merely for the convenience of the child.
Names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Legitimate children have
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, (Art 174 of the FC) and there is
no reason why this right should now be taken from Julian (a minor). When Julian reaches
the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his
middle name.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a
resolution dated May 20, 2004.
ISSUE
Whether or not the dropping of the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174
of the Family Code
HELD
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he
has. The only reason for the dropping his middle name is convenience. How such change of
name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not
clearly established.

PEOPLE VS ESTRADA
FACTS
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558)
was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A
separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise
filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having
been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and
committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he
acquired during his tenure and his true identity as the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally represented himself as
Jose Velarde in several transactions and use and employ the said alias which is neither his
registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities.
ISSUE
Whether or not Estrada be held liable for violation of CA 142
HELD
Our close reading of Ursua particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the
user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited above tells us that the required
publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of
the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or
to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No.
142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be
known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be
manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose
Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to
be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua
were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the confidential
matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of
Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was
a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the
privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his
signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and
Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged

representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these
representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were
made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

URSUA VS CA
FACTS
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases by the
RTC of Davao City which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his
counsel to take his letter of request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firms
messenger Oscar Perez had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name
wrote the name Oscar Perez when he was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan
who gave him the copy of complaint was able to know through Josefa Amparo that
petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who
recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his
conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was
charged under the wrong law.
HELD
The Court held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the law makers.

BIENVENIDO VS CA
FACTS
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3,1942. On February 6,
1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho
contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he
had been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino
C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage wassolemnized in Tokyo, Japan
where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958. There were instances during Luisita
and Aurelios marriage when, because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling
place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times
in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her
husband, Luis Rivera. He lived with her from June 1968 until Aurelios death on May 28,
1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioners
daughter,
Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelios son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year
in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado
Street in which they were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette
Infante-Moozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single.
On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of
petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioners name on January 11, 1985.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and
the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and
that in any
event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.

In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the
property in question using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living
together for fourteen years, that the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with
respondent Luisitas consent; and that she was a purchaser in good faith.

ISSUE
Whether the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is valid
HELD
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and
Aurelios marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They
failed to discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. It has been held that the first
exception refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the
remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period of seven years had lapsed. This
exception cannot be invoked in this case in order to sustain the validity of Aurelios
marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the time
of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living together as
husband and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a child, in 1961, even before their
marriage in 1962.

REPUBLIC VS COSETENG-MAGPAYO
FACTS
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim
Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on
March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22,
2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to
Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics
Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in its National Indices of
Marriage." Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college
showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where
"Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran
and was elected as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rd District using the name "Julian M.L.
Coseteng.
The trial court granted respondents petition and directed the Civil Registrar to
amend the respondents birth certificate.
ISSUE
Whether or not the change of name affects the status of respondent from being legitimate
to illegitimate
HELD
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in
relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103
then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication. As held in Labayo-Rowe v.
Republic, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are
substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings . . ."
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
FACTS
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered
as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex
was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks
and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by
Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely,"
and his sex from "male" to "female."
ISSUE
Whether or nor petitioner is entitled to a change of entries in his birth certificate
HELD
No. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. RA 9048 now governs the change
of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first
name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds
for which change of first name may be allowed:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil
status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.

REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN
FACTS
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appeared that
Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare
medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics.
To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing
that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that "Cagandahan genetically is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally,
thus has organs of both male and female." The lower court decided in her favor but the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same
was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE
Whether or nor petitioner is entitled to a change of entries in his birth certificate
HELD
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The
Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that
private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor
that Cagandahan's body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.

LEE VS CA
FACTS
This is a story of two sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two
different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek
Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are
allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee
Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K.
Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two
separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of
Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio
Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the
petition against all petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 [5 and later
assigned to Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On
February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan
and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 [6 and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge
Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all
pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or cancelling therein the name of
Keh Shiok Cheng as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan,
who is allegedly the petitioners true birth mother.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a change in the entries in their birth certificates
HELD
Republic Act No. 9048 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code. This law
speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be
corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the
correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for
the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the
civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre
had said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress response to the confusion
wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure
for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that
appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we

must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary
proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act
No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate
adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of
Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the
preceding treatise.


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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

COMPENDIUM OF CASE DIGESTS

September 28, 2011

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