Cases Full text appropriate place within the area.

In the absence of plantable area in the property,

required to plant within forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which sh
maintained and protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of the plant
G.R. No. 165448 - Ernesto Aquino v. People of the Philippines
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD
amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; andcralawlibrary

5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry la

regulations shall render this permit null and void without prejudice to the impositio
accordance with existing laws and regulations.

FIRST DIVISION This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereo
the herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first.4

[G.R. NO. 165448 : July 27, 2009]

On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo
Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine
ERNESTO AQUINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. being cut at Teachers' Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site w
found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng superv
DECISION cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and M
(Masing) on the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab
whoCARPIO,
were alsoJ.:supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest rangers found 23 tre
of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut with per
cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic met
The Case
market value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest char
were P11,833.25.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision2 and 24 September
2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 7055 (PD 705)
against petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:
The Antecedent Facts
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City o
On behalf of Teachers' Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named a
Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the confederating and mutually aiding one another, and without any author
conspiring,
Teachers' Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic permit,
meters, did
were
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine tre
to be used for the repairs of Teachers' Camp. volume and market price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and uni
bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total sum of P194,
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members Teachers
from the Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as required under existin
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cutengand regulations,
(Cuteng), a particularly the Department of Environment and Natural Resource
05, Series ofof1989, in violation of the aforecited law.6 rbl r
forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent
Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut. lbrr

Masing the
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was no
cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and conditions: of the permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of pet
claimed to be in possession of the necessary permit. He stated that three of the tre
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee; about four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he wa
petitioner and Salinas were present.
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioner's supervision. He stated that p
possession of the permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into permit.
lumber while
two were stumps and two were rotten.
Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial court's Decision.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely followed
petitioner's instructions. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the
In its 5 permit
June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision
was issued. He stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-appellants
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers' Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago
Santiago and
and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appel
Masing cutting down the trees in petitioner's presence. Aquino is found guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) mo
(1) day
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers' Camp. He of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No
allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the
permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy ofSOthe vicinity 9
ORDERED.
map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the
overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, p
three other men.
the duty to supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied
of the permit which only he possessed. The Court of Appeals ruled that while it was
The Decision of the Trial Court Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of
rejected petitioner's claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his
In its 26 May 1994 Decision,7 the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trialSantiago
court), ruled
because petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do so
as follows: Appeals further rejected petitioner's contention that the law contemplated cutting o
permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting down the trees. The Court
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were not covered by the permit
MICHAEL
CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty
Theof
Court
SIX (6)
of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, th
YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal,
Appealsas found that the prosecution failed to prove Cuteng's guilt beyond reasonabl
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government in the amounts of P182,477.20
Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago because he was only following orders
trees
and P11,833.25, representing the market value of and forest charges on the Benguet to trees
pine cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares in the costs.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution,
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited inAppeals
favor of denied
the the motion for lack of merit.
Government.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS are
acquitted on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for their The Issue
provisional liberty in the amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated
February 4, 1996 and February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
receipt therefor.
Section 68 of PD 705.

SO ORDERED.8
The Ruling of this Court

The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be
The petition has merit.
cut. The trial court further ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the
 PD 705.
The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises
questions of facts and not questions of law. We do not agree.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain stateofficer
of facts,
of awhile
partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gather
collection,
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged orFor
facts. 10 is in possession of the pine trees.
questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants.11 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision a
WHEREFORE,
law provides on the given set of circumstances.12 September 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petit
Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decre
In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705. Costs de officio.

Section 68 of PD 705 provides: SO ORDERED.

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without
License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from EN BANC
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, [G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit: and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief,
Special Actions and Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and
[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.13

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber
PEOPLEor other
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, orCAPULONG,
from in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise
Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro
the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removedManila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.
the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the
cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers' Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not
likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were
acquitted of the charges against them.
[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting
trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could
have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY.
petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under SectionVINCENT
68 of A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation
Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
 ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H.
CALLORINA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally
assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were
subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan
Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village,
Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer
with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No.
NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent
A. Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the
Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches,
shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to
conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members
saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322,
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the
driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team
seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound
at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.[1] The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.[2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive
Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioners
lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number
of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa.[3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's
lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining
stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board
feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding
certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from
the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source
and origin.[4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner
retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles
is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from
disposing them until further orders.[5]
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an
extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents
covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of
lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on
the ground that the documents being required from the petitioner must accompany
the lumber or forest products placed under seizure.[6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to
Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit
of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and
resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie)
without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including
the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic]
now at the DENR compound in the event its owner fails to submit
documents showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten
days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang
Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal
possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when
recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as
the lumber loaded therein for transport lumber using recycled
documents.[7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately
the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the
petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should
not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles
informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required documents
and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.[8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting
the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered CONFISCATED
in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law the
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and
sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard.[9]
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary
injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A.
Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case
No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The petitioner questioned
therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued
by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber
consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a
total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990
for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705
(The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and
acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a
team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No.
1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila.The team caught the petitioner operating as a
lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended on 23
April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went
inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon
investigation, the team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be
delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering
the transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to the
caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president
and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's
photographer was able to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including
newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and
the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a
constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted
sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor.[10]
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with
the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter,
the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned
to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint
against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a
resolution[11] whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in
violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered
by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa.[12]
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III,
who served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging. [13]
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the
DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the
information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto,
within the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in
his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. [14]
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision [15] in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation
in favor of the Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of
lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and
seized from the lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune
Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990
(Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the
respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano
Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and
almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate
action before the proper court regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber
of assorted sizes and dimensions loaded in petitioner's truck bearing
Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990
shall be rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents
with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga
lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this judgment be returned to said petitioner, is withheld in this case until
after the proper court has taken cognizance and determined how those
lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and
seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of
lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did
not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a
valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions
where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving
vehicle.[16] As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a
continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the
search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not
even question.[17] And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is
settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed
during the conduct of the search.[18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the
reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by
Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with
the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial
court ruled that the same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of
the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner
admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to
the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to
Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the
information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed
to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same
may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal
seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the
FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the
legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question.[19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal
documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then
argued that exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the
law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid
denudation of our forest resources.[20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE,[21] respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the
ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest
laws and regulations is not a crime."[22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October
1991,[23] the People filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424,
wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [24] in CA-G.R.
SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in
the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As
to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law
punishing the possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession
without the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended,
the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product
involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate
business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is that when
appellant was required to present the valid documents showing its acquisition and
lawful possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the period
of extension granted to it.[25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court
of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992. [26] Hence, the petitioner came to this
Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed
on 2 May 1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a
decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b)
when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully
sell lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under
Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a
warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's
appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied
upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the
definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared
for the market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz.,
"wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various building purposes," the respondent
Court held that since wood is included in the definition of forest product in Section
3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under
the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can
seize the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant
to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as
follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or
any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest products
cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are
the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or
possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
 Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of
Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27
February 1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which
the other two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-
91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-
Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in
the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product"
under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof
without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said
section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information
may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an
offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense, [29] and
matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information,
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well
as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal
of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any
authority; and (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex
gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's
coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly
charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion
that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are
alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent, without the required legal
documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as lumber.
They cannot refer to the lumber in no. (2) because they are separated by the words
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not with the preposition
of. They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section
3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 3. Definitions.
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil,
honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant,
the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in
forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the
information. The public and the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the
averments in the information.Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68,
the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as
to them, the information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting
opinion that this Court go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment
as to whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the
pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that only lumber has
been envisioned in the indictment.
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the
rule that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be
considered in determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his
conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman
Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to,[30] cannot lead one to infer that
what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4)
truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra
lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (Italics
supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution [31] of the investigating
prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit
itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of
almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of
PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an
affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the
coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof
without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules
that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in
the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in
paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in
the definition of Processing plant; which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for
the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In
the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market. [32] Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.[33] And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents
is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between
raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos
distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the
RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said
case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision
of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No.
CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with
the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its
cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by
Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly
held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search
was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted
without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to
the constitutional mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue
of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable
cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented
warrantless search.[35]
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done
under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge
Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a
lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and
if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be
continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a
warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the
following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.[36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because
possession of lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor
included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view
of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably fail
to show prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of
Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996
in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is
no need to require the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the
judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed
the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by Secretary
Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license
had only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right
to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or
his authorized representative had the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to
THIRD DIVISION
Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:

Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized JOHN ERIC LONEY, G.R. No. 152644
Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest STEVEN PAUL REID and
laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative may PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ,
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or Petitioners, Present:
abandoned. . . .
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized CARPIO,
must also fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. - versus - CARPIO MORALES, and
106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which TINGA, JJ.
involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the suspension of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
the petitioner's license as lumber dealer. Respondent. February 10, 2006

All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than x--------------------------------------------------x
rituals to cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines
(P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the
serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the DECISION
commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action
against despoilers of our forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the CARPIO, J.:
generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of
sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect the
environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to violate our The Case
laws for the utilization and protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the
and ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash
1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172,
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. Informations filed against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B.
324-V-91, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po; (c)
REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d) Hernandez (petitioners). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for
DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor to hear and
decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and reconsideration.

2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for The Facts
utter failure of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions of
29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and
CIVIL CASE.
Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, in the province of Marinduque.
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque.
At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It
appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994,
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged
millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal
Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Article 91(B),[4] sub-paragraphs 5
and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD
1067),[5] Section 8[6] of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree
of 1976 (PD 984),[7] Section 108[8] of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 (RA 7942),[9] and Article 365[10] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.[11]
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations
were duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act;
(2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when
the incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain
allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 (Joint Order), the MTC[12] initially deferred ruling on
petitioners motion for lack of indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x.
The MTC scheduled petitioners arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners
motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997(Consolidated Order), granting
partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD
1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article
365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to
mine tailings which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and
Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to
negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent pollution
and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and
condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence
required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of the
Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence
necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the
elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant
to the Philippine Mining Act.In both instances, the terms and conditions of
the Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In
other words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of
the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the
parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid
laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine
Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for
[v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067)
should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the
aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute
violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for
[v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and
96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby
DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and
96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to
be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the
common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to
[sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law
punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The
prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the
prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to
property.[13]

The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May
1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to be
arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for
violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it
maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of record petitioners manifestation,
the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of not guilty pleas on the
charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac,
Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for
violation of RA 7942. Petitioners petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public
respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the
Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public
respondents appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondents motion, Branch 38
ordered public respondents appeal consolidated with petitioners petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution[14] of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondents appeal but
denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed
the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated.
Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion
that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses,
as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each
other. The elements of proving each violation are not the same with each
other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted
in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the
information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct
offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that
A single act may offend against two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one
does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x.
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of
each crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require
[sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not
although they stemmed from a single act.[15]
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94
acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD
984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC proceed from and are based on a single act or
incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2) the
duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v.
Relova.[16] Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very same acts complained of in the
charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners
should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC. [17]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94s ruling. The
appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the
aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the grounds
upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
 xxxx I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR
IN MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE
3, Rule 117]. CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067)
AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
xxxx
We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF
respondent contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE
being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions. POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A
to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the context of the SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING
second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU
Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
sentence of the same section. x x x B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR
DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE CHARGES
xxxx CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN
IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986]
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the THAT AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE
case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS
violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in character. FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT
FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS
xxxx EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR
OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents ELEMENTS.
understanding that the laws by which the petitioners have been [charged] II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of each crime are IN RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR
different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND
element which the other does not, although they stemmed from a single IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL
act. x x x CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER
xxxx CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING
ACT CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.][19]
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence
that would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
reversing the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the Informations against
the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally
finds no error in the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to quash The Issues
R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.[18]

The petition raises these issues:

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed
Resolution of 14 March 2002.
for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence

Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and

Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
 (2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
contravenes People v. Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one
offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110[20] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but
one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges
more than one offense.[21]
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity
of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit
the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his
defense.[23] Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses,
with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke
duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition
deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all the charges filed against them proceed from
and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru
dumping of mine tailings and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs
the other charges since the element of lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence,
recklessness and imprudence is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or
incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law
thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. [24] The only limit to
this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.[25] In People v. Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or more)
offenses arising from the same act are not the same
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.[27] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. [28] However,
for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners claim that they should be charged with one
offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984,
RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners
were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be
established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and
the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities
 concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper
permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes
prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942
(Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can are the special laws enacting them.
be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of
actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its
Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the
necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.
People v. Relova not in Point
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved
is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In
the absence of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution contravenes
law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of
this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Courts statement
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions for
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and
Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused This contention is also without merit.
satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure
containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does
not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code,
Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these
laws. charging one Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power under the RPC, after

On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the
accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under
the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine
tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much
more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law
are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal
Code which are mala in se.[29]
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the
same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized
installation of electrical wiring, violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held
that it did, not because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because the
act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling
within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second
sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:

The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance

On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in
se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
[of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the
Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit
the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is
not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.

prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the
 The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course
correct. This is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional
provision involved which reads as follows: SO ORDERED.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the

same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act. x x x
Associate Justice
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the
petitioners position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of WE CONCUR:
the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but
rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence
of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for
an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon Associate Justice
the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) Chairperson
embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy isavailable although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised
Penal Code, providedthat both offenses spring from the same act or set CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
of acts. x x x[30] (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied) Associate Justice Associate Justice

Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a ATTESTATION

single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident

punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short,
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits
Associate Justice
multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the Chairperson

same incident.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

Chief Justice

[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis with Associate Justices Ramon A.
Barcelona and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring.
[3] Mine tailings or mine waste refer to soil and/or rock materials from surface or underground
mining operations with no present economic value to the generator of the same
[7] The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-47, 96-48,
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order No. 96-40
(1996) (DENR DAO No. 96-40), Section 5[be]). Waste from milling operations or mill
tailings is defined as materials whether solid, liquid or both[,] segregated from the ores
during concentration/milling operations which have no present economic value to the
generator of the same (DENR DAO No. 96-40, Section 5 [au]).
[4] This provision states: A fine exceeding Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) but not more
than Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) or imprisonment exceeding three (3) years but not
more than six (6) years, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court,
shall be imposed on any person who commits any of the following acts:
xxxx
5. Constructing, without prior permission of the government agency concerned,
works that produce dangerous or noxious substances, or performing acts that result in
the introduction of sewage, industrial waste, or any substance that pollutes a source of
water supply.
6. Dumping mine tailings and sediments into rivers or waterways without
permission.
[5] The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-44, 96-45,
and 96-46. Except for the names of the accused and their respective designations at
[8] This provision states: Violation of the Terms and Conditions of the [E]nvironmental
Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 54-62):
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, in the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines,
and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously dispose, discharge or
introduce industrial waste, particularly mine tailings, without permission
[9] The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-50, 96-51,
into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River system which is a
source of water supply and/or dump or cause, permit, suffer to be
dumped, without permission, mine tailings or other waste matters
discharged due to breach caused on its Tapian drainage pit/tunnel, thus
causing pollution and siltation in the Makulapnit River and the entire
Boac River system which became a dead river, resulting to damage and/or
destruction of living organisms, like fish or other aquatic life in the
vicinity, and to health and property in the same vicinity.
[6] This provision states: Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise dispose
into any of the water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer
to be thrown, run, drain, allow to seep or otherwise dispose thereto any organic or
inorganic matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution
thereof.
No person shall perform any of the following activities without first securing a
permit from the [National Pollution Control] Commission for the discharge of all
industrial wastes and other wastes which could cause pollution:
(1) the construction, installation, modification or operation of any sewage works or
any extension or addition thereto;
(2) the increase in volume or strength of any wastes in excess of the permissive
discharge specified under any existing permit;
(3) the construction, installation or operation of any industrial or commercial
establishments or any extension or modification thereof or addition thereto, the
operation of which would cause an increase in the discharge of waste directly into the
water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines or would otherwise alter their
physical, chemical or biological properties in any manner not already lawfully
authorized.
and 96-49. Except for the names of the accused and their respective designations at
Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 63-71):
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, in the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River and the
entire Boac River system and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or
allow to seep into such river/waterway, mine tailings or other waste
matters discharged due to breach caused on its Tapian drainage pit/tunnel
for his failure to institute adequate measures as a managing head thereof,
thus causing pollution of such rivers/waterways due to exceedances [sic]
in the criterion level for cadmium, copper, and lead, as found by the
Pollution Adjudication Board, which rendered such water resources
harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare or
which adversely affected their utilization for domestic, agricultural,
and/or recreational purposes.
Compliance Certificate. Any person who willfully violates or grossly neglects to abide by
the terms and conditions of the environmental compliance certificate issued to said person
and which causes environmental damage through pollution shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) months to six (6) years or a fine of Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), or both at the discretion of
the court.
and 96-52. Except for the names of the accused and their respective designations at
Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 72-80):
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, in the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River and the
entire Boac River system and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or
allow to seep into such river system, mine tailings or other waste matters
discharged due to breach caused on its Tapian drainage tunnel for his
failure to institute adequate measures, thus causing pollution and siltation
in the entire Boac River System thus, willfully violating or grossly
neglecting to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued to [Marcopper Mining C]orporation
x x x, particularly that the Marcopper Mining Corporation should ensure
the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Magpog
and Boac Rivers, resulting to damage and/or destruction of living
 organisms, like fish and other aquatic life in the vicinity, and to health
and property in the same vicinity.
[10] This provision states, in part: Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it
would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
xxxx
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from
an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall
in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to
do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
[11] The Informations under this charge were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-53, 96-54,
and 96-55. Except for the names of the accused and their respective designations at
Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 81-91):
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, in the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, x x x, did then and there negligently, imprudently, unlawfully
and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit
River or Boac River system and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or
allow to seep into such river system/waterway, its mine tailings due to
breach caused on the Tapian drainage pit/tunnel of the [Marcopper
Mining C]orporation so managed and operated by said accused, in a
negligent, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regard and
in gross violation of the conditions set forth in the Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the Environmental Management Bureau
to the said corporation on April 6, 1996, and the accused, x x x, did not
take the necessary or adequate precaution to prevent damage to property
thus causing by such carelessness and imprudence said corporation
operated by him to discharge mine tailings into the Makulapnit River at
the rate of 5 to 10 cubic meters per second then resulting to damage
and/or destruction of living organisms, like fish or other aquatic life in the
said river system and which also affected agricultural products, the
rehabilitation and restoration of which will cost the government the
approximate sum of not less than P50,000,000.00.
[12]
Presided by Judge Celso De Jesus Zoleta.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008
SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution
dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed the
conviction of petitioner Sesinando Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section
68,3 Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705),4 as amended by Executive Order No.
277. The Resolution dated 14 May 2003 denied admission of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.5
The Facts
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81
(trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting],
gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in
Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant
Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.6
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned
that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter
to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998,7 Royo
summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the
meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed
that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to
petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under
a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed
by Calix's wife.8
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez
(Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When Hernandez confronted petitioner about the
felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier claim to Royo that he cut the tree with
Calix's permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk
into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted
the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and
enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had
been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the
lumber,9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension
receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod
Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the matter. 10
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon
(Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit
reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree with Calix's permission. The Provincial
Prosecutor11 found probable cause to indict petitioner and filed the Information with
the trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including Tansiongco, Royo,
and Hernandez who testified on the events leading to the discovery of and
investigation on the tree-cutting. Petitioner testified as the lone defense witness and
claimed, for the first time, that he had no part in the tree-cutting.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as
charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered the seizedlumber forfeited in
Tansiongco's favor.12 The trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of
his repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property
with Calix's permission. With this finding and petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut
the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial.
Petitioner also contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest
officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the
trial court is excessive.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. 13 The
Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his
extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any
DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also found nothing irregular in the filing of the
complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the case
underwent preliminary investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information
with the trial court.
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of its ruling,
sentenced petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion
temporal. However, in the body of its ruling, the Court of Appeals held that "the
penalty to be imposed on [petitioner] should be (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,"14 the same penalty the trial court
imposed.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14
May 2003, did not admit his motion for having been filed late.15
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED PROHIBITING
THE CUTTING, GATHERING, COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER
OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS FROM ANY FOREST LAND APPLIES
TO PETITIONER.
II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN
PRIVATE LAND CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX AND PRIVATE-
COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY SECTION 80 OF
P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE CHARGE
EVEN WITHOUT THE STANDING AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE
INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AS MANDATED BY
SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE FILED BY PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS REQUIRED
BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED WHO MUST BE THE ONE
TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE SAME.16
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered
that (1) the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco,
and not a DENR forest officer, filed the complaint against petitioner and (2) petitioner
is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:17
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207
even though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a
DENR forest officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.
 The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the
cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals,18 non-
compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such
cases.19 However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against
chastity20 and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further,
Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint
before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section
80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the
offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any
forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall
immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area
where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the
evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the
investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in
Section 80 refers to "reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer
assigned to the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of
Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of
forest laws not committed in their presence."22
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or
any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting
in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over
the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an
investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or
report."23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD
705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for
petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the
trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within
its exclusive original jurisdiction.24
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts25 penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority;
(2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;26 and (3) the
possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations.27 Petitioner stands charged of having "cut,
gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private
land28 without x x x the necessary permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever, should be
limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber," under the
second category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed that petitioner did not
perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the act of "cutting" a
lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether petitioner "cut x x
xtimber" in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit.29
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property without a
DENR permit, petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner
consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod
Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified,
petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that
petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him.30 Petitioner does not explain why Royo
and Hernandez, public officials who testified under oath in their official capacities,
would lie on the stand to implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to
mention that the acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity.
Further, petitioner does not deny presenting Calix's authorization to Royo and
Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner
has no use of Calix's authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any
tree in the Mayod Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property
constitutes "timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not
define "timber," only "forest product" (which circuitously includes "timber.") 31 Does the
narra tree in question constitute "timber" under Section 68? The closest this Court
came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that
"timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."32 In other jurisdictions, timber is
determined by compliance with specified dimensions 33 or certain "stand age" or
"rotation age."34 In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court was faced
with a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to
determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling
in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or common
usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber," thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of
Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common
usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary,
words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far as possession
of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
PD No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw and procesed
timber. Neither should we.36 x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing
supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be
taken in its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building
or for carpentry or joinery."37 Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too
small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered
timber.38
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same
into "several pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs.
2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet x x x." These measurements were indicated
in the apprehension receipt Hernandez issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999 which
the prosecution introduced in evidence.39 Further, Hernandez testified that the larger
portion of the felled log left in the Mayod Property "measured 76 something
centimeters [at the big end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the
length was 2.8 meters."40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted
to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under
the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft
under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by
the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in
the next preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin
temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos
but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos
but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos
but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but
does not exceed 50 pesos.
 6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value
does not exceed 5 pesos.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is
committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of
the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not
exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions
of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
Footnotes
. 1
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50
pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and
the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty,
or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or
his family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber
measuring 111 board feet were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of the log left
at the Mayod Property is included, the amount increases to P20,930.40. To prove this
allegation, the prosecution relied on Hernandez's testimony that these amounts, as
stated in the apprehension receipt he issued, are his "estimates" based on "prevailing
local price."41
This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing
the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the
prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such
fact.42 In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate,
courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the
property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. 43 In People v.
Dator44 where, as here, the accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended, for possession of lumber without permit, the prosecution's
evidence for the lumber's value consisted of an estimate made by the apprehending
authorities whose apparent lack of corroboration was compounded by the fact that the
transmittal letter for the estimate was not presented in evidence. Accordingly, we
imposed on the accused the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)45 of the RPC.46
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner, under the
circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision correcional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution
dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioner
Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos with Associate
Justices Cancio C. Garcia (a retired member of this Court) and Marina L.
Buzon, concurring.
3 Re-numbered as Section 77 under Section 7, Republic Act No. 7161.
4 The Revised Forestry Code.
5 Filed by petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Marcelino P. Arias.
6 The Information alleged (CA rollo, p. 10):
That on or about the 23rd day of December 1998, in barangay Ipil,
municipality of Magdiwang, province of Romblon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously cut, gather, collect, remove and/or caused to be cut,
gathered and removed one (1) narra tree [from] the private land
owned by OSCAR M. TANSIONGCO and converted the same into
several pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and
three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 narra sawn lumber were confiscated by the
elements of the DENR personnel consisting of 111 board feet,
valued in the sum of P3,330.00, Philippine currency, including the
remaining felled narra tree showing the total amount of P20,930.40
due to the government, without having first secured and obtained
the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents
from the proper authorities.
7
Other parts of the records place this date on 26 December 1998.
8 Imelda Muros.
9 Valued at P3,330.00. If a larger part of the narra tree, left at the Mayod
Property, is included in the valuation, the total amount is P20,930.40. The
Information filed against petitioner alleged the higher amount.
10
The records do not contain the results of the investigation.
11 Senior State Prosecutor-OIC PPO Francisco F. Benedicto, Jr.
12 The dispositive portion of the ruling provides (rollo, p. 31):
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused SESINANDO MERIDA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
aforementioned Information, dated January 28, 2000, and hereby
sentences him to an indeterminate sentence of from fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, and to pay the costs.
13
The dispositive portion of the ruling provides (id. at 51):
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 24 November 2000 trial
court decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Defendant-
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years of
reclusion temporal as maximum. The forest products derived from
the narra tree, including the 6 pieces of lumber, are confiscated in
favor of the government.
14 Id. at 51.
15 The Court of Appeals entered judgment on 27 August 2002.
16 Rollo, p. 14.
17The OSG does not claim that this Court is precluded from reviewing the
Court of Appeals' rulings for having attained finality. At any rate, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition in the interest of justice taking into
account the nature of the case and the issues raised for resolution.
18 Section 5, Rule 110.
19See People v. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372 (1934); People v. Trinidad, 58 Phil.
163 (1933).
20Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abduction, and Acts of
Lasciviousness.
21
G.R. No. 46772, 13 February 1992, 206 SCRA 187.
22 Id. at 194.
23
It cannot be said, however, that Hernandez failed to act on Tansiongco's
report as Hernandez conducted field investigation, oversaw the confiscation
of the lumber, and took part in the subsequent DENR investigation.
24
Under Section 20 in relation to Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, Regional Trial Courts are vested
with exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses punishable with
imprisonment exceeding six years. Here, the offense for which petitioner
was charged is punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods (that is, 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years) and
thus falls under the RTC Romblon's exclusive original jurisdiction.
25 The other acts penalized under PD 705, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1559 and re-numbered by RA 7161, are: cutting, gathering
and/or collecting timber or other products without license (Section 77);
unlawful occupation or destruction of forest lands (Section 78); pasturing
livestock (Section 79); illegal occupation of national parks system and
recreation areas and vandalism therein (Section 80); destruction of wildlife
resources (Section 81); survey by unauthorized person (Section 82);
misclassification and survey by government official or employee (Section
83); tax declaration on real property (Section 84); coercion and influence
(Section 85); unlawful possession of implements and devices used by forest
officers (Section 86); payment, collection and remittance of forest charges
(Section 87); and sale of wood products (Section 88).
26Thus, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that Section 68 of PD 705 does
not penalize the cutting of timber in private land.
27
In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. 104988, 18 June
1996, 257 SCRA 430), the acts falling under the first and second groups
were lumped together. The elements for the criminal acts under the first and
second groups are: (1) that the accused cut, gathered, collected, or removed
timber of other forest products; (2) that the timber or other forest products
cut, gathered, collected, or removed belong to the government or to any
private individual; and (3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing
was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit
granted by the state (People v. CFI of Quezon, G.R. No. 46772, 13 February
1992, 206 SCRA 187).
28
It cannot be determined from the records if the Mayod Property is
registered.
29
Under DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21, dated 28 February 2000,
private land owners are required to obtain a Special Private Land Timber
Permit (SPLTP) from the DENR to cut, gather and utilize premium hardwood
species, whether planted or naturally-grown.
30Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: "The act, declaration of the offense in this case. Such evidence would both be unreliable and
or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against inconclusive considering the lack of independent and competent source of
him." such information.

31 44
Section 3(q), PD 705 provides: "Forest product means timber, pulpwood, Supra.
firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan,
or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the 45 Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic
resources in forest lands." (Emphasis supplied) 46The Court also took into account the following circumstances: (1) the
32
accused, a janitor, cut the pieces of soft lumber from his mother's
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June landholding for use in renovating his house and (2) the accused had no prior
1996, 257 SCRA 430. record for violation of PD 705. Here, petitioner also appears to have no
record for violation of PD 705.
33 In the Pacific and Northwestern Region (Region 6) of the United States
Forest Service, timber utilization limits are set as follows: length - 8 feet;
diameter (breast-height) - 9 inches; and top diameter - 4 inches (see A
Review of the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia and Fourteen other
Republic of the Philippines
Jurisdictions Background Report - 1995 at
SUPREME COURT
http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/tasb/legsregs/westland/report/2-3.htm [British
Manila
Columbia Report]).
EN BANC
34 In the Baden-Wurttemberg State of the Federal Republic of Germany, the
"stand ages" are: 50 years for coniferous stands and 70 years for deciduous
stands (Section 16 of the Forest Law). In Sweden, the following are the METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. Nos. 171947-48
minimum rotation age: conifer stands - 45 years to 100 years (depending on DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
the quality of the site); hardwood stands - 35 years; and oak and beech trees DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
- 100 years (see British Columbia Report). AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Present:
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
35 Supra. CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] PUNO, C.J.,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, QUISUMBING,
36 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Supra at 448.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC CARPIO,
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
37 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1996 ed.). DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND CORONA,
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE CARPIO MORALES,
38 Wood pulps from timber can also be used for paper production. COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE AZCUNA,
NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME TINGA,
39
GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF CHICO-NAZARIO,
Exh. "E." THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL VELASCO, JR.,
GOVERNMENT, NACHURA,
40 RTC Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 25. Petitioners, REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
41 CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 42. - versus - BRION, JJ.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF
42
MANILA BAY, represented and
Lucas v. Court of Appeals, 438 Phil. 530 (2002). See also People v. joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
Elizaga, 86 Phil. 364 (1950). SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
43People v. Dator, 398 Phil. 109 (2000). The Court deems it improper to DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS
take judicial notice of the selling price of narra at the time of the commission QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,
FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,
HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and Promulgated:
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
Respondents. December 18, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of

the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
DECISION
the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed

from:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of
late gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights
on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills,
and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of
environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply
heals by itself.[2] But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission
or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger
to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life
of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly
and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay
and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-
diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]

action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of

petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the (2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To (4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their (7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a (9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment. (11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once

brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to

recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the

official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference. purpose.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by
an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality
Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from
different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content
ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR
Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of
contact recreational activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml. [4]
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and
in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along
the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study
being conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean
the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of respondents. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies,
jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore
its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and
other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with
defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months
from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising
a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the
rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate
[sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and
increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings,
provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of
waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to
install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and
hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-
generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking
vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and
appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid
disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-
use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to
revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with
indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for
the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances
that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge
solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the
construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to
actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels,
and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic
and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the
treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people
through education the importance of preserving and protecting the
environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to
protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
 [SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO
THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO]
NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways

(DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard II

THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF
(PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS
THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.

The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the
consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-
headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in
G.R. SP No. 74944.
general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can

petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the ManilaBay?

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent

provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack

of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of

the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus. Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the
The CA Sustained the RTC
premises.
By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and
affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws. [7] Can be Compelled by Mandamus

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. [8] A

petition on the following ground and supporting arguments: ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT
judgment.[9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing
HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E.,
IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING THAT it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and
SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS imposed by law.[10] Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters
SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL
COLIFORMS. involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the
other.
ARGUMENTS

I
 Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate
solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise
of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out
its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that
petitioners duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not
require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in
particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to
clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents
maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of
solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to
such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as
defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two
different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a
decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so
in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City of Manila to
enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil
players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals
within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the
instant case, the MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid
waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial,
its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec.
3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates
the scope of the MMDAs waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include
formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and
projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include
the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related
facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to
reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of
sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each
site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are
Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among
others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open
dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled
dumps.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth
not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This
duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for,
as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries
to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.[13] A discretionary duty is one that
allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. [14] Any
suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-
related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws
would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from Framework.[16] Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality

choosing not to perform these duties. Consider: Management Area Action Plan.[17] Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to

accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.

(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,[15] is the primary agency responsible for Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR,

the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and with the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-

natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a

hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation

and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation

pollution, the DENR, under the Acts Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of water of the Manila Bay.

pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other

pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases

technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution. should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under

The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, existing laws.

an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality

Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and (2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,[18] is vested with jurisdiction, supervision,

adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides: and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now

the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x with the duty:
x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following (g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be
functions, powers and responsibilities: necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four comprising the System; x x x
(24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the
Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or
as the need arises, said report;
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of
twelve (12) months following the completion of the status report;
these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan
within 12 months following the completion of the framework for these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection,
each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be
treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the
reviewed by the water quality management area governing board
every five (5) years or as need arises. LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation

facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of disposal system in the different parts of the country.[19] In relation to the instant petition, the

completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management

LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO
292),[20] is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances
respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources.
Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in
coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of
establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic
resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable
basis.[21] Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and
DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.[22] More specifically,
its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources(BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall
primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development,
management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked
under EO 292[23] to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among
others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national
development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-
wide services relating to flood control and sewerage management which include the
formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated
flood control, drainage and sewerage system.
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and
MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in
Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for
flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage
services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along
rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other
pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard
Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,[24] or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the
primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution
within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and
regulations in accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution
Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and
enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship,
vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at
sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and
inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be
thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or
other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf,
manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any
kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any
navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such
navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any
navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water,
where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water,
either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise,
whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the
level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked
to perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers. Under Sec. 86,
RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter
acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet
attained the capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine
pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions

of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of

the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of jurisdiction.[29]
1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law

and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.[25] Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated

are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to establish, develop, of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable

regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open

national development.[26] Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an

authority within the environmental compliance certificate.

ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and

functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or
exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law
enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the demolition may be allowed when persons or entities occupy danger areas such asesteros,
following:
xxxx railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination
persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of
with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures,
watercraft.[27]
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws
along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways,
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the
and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by
directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to
MARPOL 73/78,[28] the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate
implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other
reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in
encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with
Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent
the DPWH and concerned agencies.
the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into

the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water
vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP
Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal
Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And

under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary
concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal
disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment
system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage
management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines,
and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure
the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies
through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation
clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their
environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code
(PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school
curricula at all levels.[32] Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the
DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and
pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management,
conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of
environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste
management principles.[33]
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of
the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government
funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the countrys development objectives. [34]
One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth
in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh,
brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among
others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of
pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental
strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality
management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from
concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and
quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble
objectives of RA 9275 in line with the countrys development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear,
categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner
under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of
the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage,
the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be
necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed
water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the
polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his
own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies
concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations
and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the
persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
 When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the
subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment
Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions of
Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes
water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be
responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his
own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered
unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event
emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to
immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other
government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal
and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be
reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution under
proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost
incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such
other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than
real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the
designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as
opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read
alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms cleanup operations and
accidental spills, as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing
the pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-
spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous
substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions
and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the
government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations
of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that
the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to water pollution incidents, which are situations
that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the
corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they
argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires cleanup operations to restore the body of water
to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either
intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec.
62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting
the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental
spills only. Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even
expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152
may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of
businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in
the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting
provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills
as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD
1152.
To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with
their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water
quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying
that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase
cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition.
As pointed out, the phrases cleanup operations and accidental spills do not appear in said Sec.
17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.
 line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152

the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, mentions water pollution incidents which may be caused by polluters in the waters of
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that

requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to any person

quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies, which may refer to an individual or an

section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to take such establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the

measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are

underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized

pollution incident. as beyond the specific pollution incident level.

Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of

that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of

who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been

agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners assertion, that required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of

they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16

pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general
cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the cleanup situation.

Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in

even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the

invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation

cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and

what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from

as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic

program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the

17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents. [35] ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves
the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices

Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and

implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal

of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus,[36] the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the
doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the
length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37]
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized
structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the
National Capital Region (NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-
Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and
connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the
accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If
there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay,
these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or
unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all
efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary
said as much.[38]
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD
1067 or the Water Code,[39] which prohibits the building of structures within a given length
along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the
seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of
three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas
and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to
the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation,
floatage, fishing and salvage.No person shall be allowed to stay in this
zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage,
fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing
along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But
while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments
undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial
establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment
facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters,
from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such
period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to
comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study
on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The
Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as
it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila
- the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming
quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids
that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface
and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the
environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a
large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas,
which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to
sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an
understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous
contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into
ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig Riversystems
and Manila Bay.[40]
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever
be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003).
Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the
MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid
Waste.No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice
or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which
[constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the
 effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall
be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis
added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5)
years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill
which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like
littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation
of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do
not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage
system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275,
which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious
wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid
waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or
machine of substances to the aquatic environment including dumping/disposal of waste and
other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous
materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid
substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure.
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to
emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to
immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is
of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of
the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices
and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical
landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore
the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived
in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if
those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their
minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has
to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must
transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at
hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and
instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in
cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind
two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are
required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and
improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which
explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other
civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.[41] Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically
prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of
the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of
the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay,

subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as

shall now read: prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said
preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level
facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water,
(Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR
Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay,
skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.

In particular:
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate,

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal,

the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.

natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government

agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully (4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and in

implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage

restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage

call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the

ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its earliest possible time.

indicated completion schedules. (5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and

restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using

of the Local Government Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management

programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs (6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in

in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend

factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent

systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina- marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-

Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International Convention for

(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such

measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-
generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its

violators. environmental sanitation clearance.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, [49] the

flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental

DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and

Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove allstructures, hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty

constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and

applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las the entire Philippine archipelago.

Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways

and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and (11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations

projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration,

Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development

Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,

demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and revival of our marine waters.

and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the (12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM,

Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the
connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay. principle of continuing mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the

Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as Decision.

prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision.On

matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on No costs.

the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the

apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective SO ORDERED.
penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
laws on pollution.
WE CONCUR:
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1)

year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have
REYNATO S. PUNO
the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from Chief Justice
septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Associate

Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice