THIRD DIVISION

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

ANITA CHENG, G.R. No. 174238

Petitioner, DECISION

Present:

NACHURA, J.:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

Chairperson, This is a petition1[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court of the Order dated January 2, 2006 2[2] of the Regional Trial
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
Court (RTC), Branch 18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita
VELASCO, JR., Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy.
NACHURA, and
The antecedents are as follows
PERALTA, JJ.
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC,
Branch 7, Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and Promulgated: (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-

TESSIE SY,
1[1] Rollo, pp. 3-19.
Respondents. July 7, 2009
2[2] Id. at 22-27.
1
969953 against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce
(PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of
their loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been
drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999,
filed against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25,
Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa
cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The
Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as
to the civil liability of Tessie Sy. 3[3] On the other hand, the Order in Criminal
Case No. 98-969953 contained a statement, Hence, if there is any liability of
the accused, the same is purely civil, not criminal in nature. 4[4]
3[3] Id. at 45-47.
4[4] Id. at 48-50.
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP
Blg. 22 cases in its Order5[5] dated February 7, 2005 on account of the
failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The
Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of
accused respondents.
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the
RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaint6[6] for collection of a sum of money
with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount
of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the
estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order7[7] dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18,
Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the
civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already
impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph
(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
5[5] Id. at 42-44.
6[6] Id. at 51-53.
7[7] Supra note 2.
2

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 8[8] which the court
denied in its Order9[9] dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition, raising the
sole legal issue
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular
No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and
prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are
applicable to the present case where the nature of the order
dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the
respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to
identify both the accused (respondents herein)?10[10]
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were
filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only
prospective application. She further contends that that her case falls within
8[8] Rollo, pp. 28-38.
9[9] Id. at 41.
10[10] Id. at 6.
the following exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the
criminal action is deemed instituted with the latter
(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused
is necessary for the resolution of the civil aspect of
the case;
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as
or even more expedient than a timely remand to the
trial court where the criminal action was decided for
further hearings on the civil aspect of the case;
(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as
to the civil liability of the accused amounting to a
reservation of the right to have the civil liability
litigated in a separate action;
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist;
(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-
contractu and not ex-delicto pursuant to Article
3111[11] of the Civil Code; and
(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had
under Article 2912[12] of the Civil Code.
11[11] Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
3
 Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private
prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.

The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases
against respondents, where the petitioner has not made any waiver, express
reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civil
action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the

12[12] Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted

on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to
file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
4
criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases. 13 [13]

13[13] Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a

criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others.
The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said
civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa
and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability was
impliedly instituted and remained pending before the respective trial courts.
This is consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada14[14] that the
possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check
can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case
and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to
the complaining party, without traversing the prohibition against forum
shopping.15[15] Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP Blg.
22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to have elected
either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal
proceedings to the exclusion of the other.16[16]

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for

the same act or omission of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against
the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for
actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is
alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees
shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for
trial. (Rule 111, 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure)
14[14] G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 338.
15[15] Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, id. at 350.
16[16] Ibid.
5
 The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to
prove the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubtwhere in Criminal
Case No. 98-969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil
liability of the accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial
court declared that the liability of the accused was only civil in
natureproduced the legal effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her right
to litigate separately the civil action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases,
following Article 29 of the Civil Code.17[17]
However, although this civil action could have been litigated
separately on account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable
doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such civil action be
prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v.
Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the
identity of the accused, the question that arises is whether such dismissal
would have the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put
17[17] Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 425, 433 (1989), citing
Bernaldes, Jr. v. Bohol Land Transportation, Inc., 117 Phil. 288, 291-
292 (1963) and Bachrach Motors Co. v. Gamboa, 101 Phil. 1219
(1957).
differently, may petitioners action to recover respondents civil liability be
also allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure states
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions,
the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on
the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered
as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If
the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is]
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on
the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and
trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court
6
 trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only
both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is
this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions. filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP
Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the
Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for
1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable. 19[19]
pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants rights does not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts,
of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that
while not cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation
he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason
of justice and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this
for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
objective.20[20]
procedural laws.18[18]

However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for
petitioner would be left without a remedy to recover from respondents the
violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the
P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the
amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even
prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file 19[19] Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corp., G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454, 461-462.

18[18] Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 556, 559 (2002). 20[20] Id.
7
petitioners Notice of Claim involving the same amount filed in Special
Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin
Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived
21
for failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of time. [21]
Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense that petitioner had
already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the amount of the checks
along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.
It is in this light that we find petitioners contention that she was not
assisted by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical.
Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and
prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the
accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed
impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with
petitioner.
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioners recourse
pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the
civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the
bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a
21[21] Rollo, p. 23.
preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal
within the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the
remedy to recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the
gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to
digress from this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and
omission of their counsel.22[22] But this rule admits of exceptions (1) where
the counsels mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and
denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence
resulting in the clients deprivation of liberty or property without due process
of law.23[23] Tested against these guidelines, we hold that petitioners lot falls
within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of
existing laws and rules and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty,
they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their
22[22] Lynx Industries Contractor, Inc. v. Tala, G.R. No. 164333,
August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 169, 176.
23[23] Ceniza-Manantan v. People, G.R. No. 156248, August 28, 2007,
531 SCRA 364, 380.
8
obligations as members of the Bar.24[24] Further, lawyers in the government
service are expected to be more conscientious in the performance of their
duties as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited,

the Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.

service.25[25] Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or

with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the enrich himself inequitably at anothers expense. One condition for invoking

2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed to appeal the civil this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other

action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining recourse based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other

remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to provision of law.26[26]

respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By this

failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to prosecute the respondents
for their obligation to pay their loan. Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a
liberal interpretation and application of the rules which will give the parties
the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth.

Moreover, we take into consideration the trial courts observation The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should

when it dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if not be barred by technicalities.27[27] For reasons of substantial justice and

there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in nature. equity, as the complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense

Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of

loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as

they may now conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on
account of a technicality applied against petitioner.
26[26] Chieng v. Santos, G.R. No. 169647, August 31, 2007, 531
24[24] Santiago v. Atty. Rafanan, 483 Phil. 94, 105 (2004). SCRA 730, 747-748.

25[25] Ramos v. Imbang, A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007, 530 SCRA 27[27] LCK Industries, Inc. v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No.
759, 768. 170606, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 634, 653.
9
power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
incompetent to do so,28[28] we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-

112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby
ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ATT E STAT I O N
SO ORDERED.

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice
C E RT I FI CAT I O N
Chairperson

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
28[28] Id. at 652.
10
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005]
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA
BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA
SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners, vs. HON. NORMANDIE
B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101,
DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS, President/Chairman,
respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated March 1, 2002, petitioners
assail the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and
January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and
denying their motion for reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their
complaint to recover civil indemnity for the death and physical injuries of
their kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was
charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a
southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace
Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to
five (5) of the vans passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as
there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of
civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision
promulgated on December 17, 1998.[2]
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against
Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file
a separate civil action.[3] They cited therein the judgment convicting
Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper
service of summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of
non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as
defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its
officers.[4]
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the
right to file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned
11
from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was no
appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed
barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause
of action had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based
on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe
four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding
the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the
complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.[5]
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal of
the complaint as summons was served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the
legal department without mentioning her designation or position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the
complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction
in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the
judgment.[6] The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
reiterating that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and had
prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was
filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular accident.[7] As regards the
improper service of summons, the trial court reconsidered its ruling that the
complaint ought to be dismissed on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal.[8] The
appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reasoning
that even if the respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the
permissible remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and they failed to
allege that the petition was brought within the recognized exceptions for the
allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal.[9]
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that
certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a judicial rejection of
an existing obligation arising from the criminal liability of private
respondents. Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the
complaint arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The trial court
allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause
of action invoked by petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that
the action had prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of
private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the
judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally
flawed, petitioners implore the Court to exempt this case from the rigid
operation of the rules as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical injuries caused by private
respondents for which no civil liability had been adjudged by reason of their
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment[10] dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription was in order. They
point out that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action for
quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the
prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time the
accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since
Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron
Transits contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated
in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the
civil aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation
to file a separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of Appeals
via certiorari was improper as petitioners should have appealed the adverse
order of the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other procedural
lapses allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of certification
against forum-shopping; lack of duplicate original or certified true copy of
12
the assailed order of the trial court; and non-indication of the full names and
addresses of petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply[11] dated September 14, 2002, while private
respondents filed a Rejoinder[12] dated October 14, 2002, both in reiteration
of their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.[13] Such civil liability may consist of restitution,
reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential
damages.[14] When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising
from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to
three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the
right to recover damages from the accused; second, when the offended party
reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in
order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and
third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private
suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,
which governed the institution of the criminal action, as well as the
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111
thereof states:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution
of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately
waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be
made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused
by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees
for such action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil
action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this
reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting
Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to
file a separate civil action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint,
they seek to recover private respondents civil liability arising from crime.
Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the
trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners cause of action was
based on quasi delict and should have been brought within four (4) years
from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
13
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent
with petitioners claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability
arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part
of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners
were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has
the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime
under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil
Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto,
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of
as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and
culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the
injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from
the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.[15] Either of these
liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar
proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause
of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can
pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the
surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the
action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been
expressly reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company[16] was decided upon a
similar set of facts. Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property. The
plaintiff made an express reservation for the filing of a separate civil action.
The driver was convicted which conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later,
plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi delict which
was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was
instituted more than six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had
already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action, this time
based on the subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court
dismissed the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil case
operated as a bar to the filing of the action to enforce the bus companys
subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar
to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily
liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved
party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on
the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex
delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners allegations in
their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss[17] and motion for
reconsideration[18] of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to
recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate
civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the
avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same
act or omission of the offender.[19] However, since the stale action for
damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more
occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as
the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for
obvious reasons.
14
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the [7] Id. at 79-82.
order of dismissal of the trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be [8] CA Records, pp. 60-61, Resolution dated September 10, 2001 penned by
exempted from the strict application of the rules in order to promote their Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino and concurred in by Associate Justices
fundamental objective of securing substantial justice.[20] We are loathe to Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by
a final judgment of conviction based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to [9] Id. at 77-78, Resolution dated January 9, 2002.
prevent such an injustice.[21]
[10] Rollo, pp. 207-240.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, [11] Id. at 289-314.
2002, respectively dismissing the present action and denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated [12] Id. at 315-321.
February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
[13] Art. 100.
SO ORDERED.
[14] Art. 104, Revised Penal Code.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
[15] Cancio v. Isip, G.R. No. 133978, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 393.
concur.
[16] No. L-26407, March 31, 1978, 82 SCRA 243.

[17] RTC Records, pp. 37-41.

[18] Id. at 57-60.

[1] Rollo, pp. 25-45.
[19] Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, 386 Phil 41 (2000).
[2] Id. at 57-63.
[20] Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140576-99, December 13, 2004,
[3] RTC Records, pp. 1-5.
446 SCRA 166.
[4] Id. at 20-32.
[21] Diana v. Batangas Transportation Co., 93 Phil. 391 (1953).
[5] Id. at 54-56, Order dated February 26, 2001.

[6] Id. at 57-66.

15
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

16
 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
HEIRS OF EDUARDO G.R. No. 157547

SIMON,
DECISION
Petitioners, Present:

BERSAMIN, J.:
BRION, Acting Chairperson,**

BERSAMIN,

-versus - ABAD,*** There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability
arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished
VILLARAMA, JR., and
under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated: Antecedents

ELVI

* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,* Misspelled as Elven in

the caption of the petition and in the rollo.
** ** Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales
who is on leave per Special Order No. 925 dated January 24, 2011.
*** *** Additional member per Special Order No. 926 dated January
24, 2011.
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the
late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion
reads:

17
 That sometime in December 1996 in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue
to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank
Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to
cash in the amount of P336,000.00 said accused well
knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days
from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin
Chan the amount of the check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 29[1]
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin
Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection
of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a
writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00). 30[2] He
alleged in his complaint the following:
29[1] Rollo, p. 31.
30[2] Id., pp. 35-37.
xxx
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing
fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation encashed a check dated
December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000.00 to the
plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is duly funded and
that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached
as Annex A;
3. However, when said check was presented for
payment the same was dishonored on the ground that the
account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the
Philippines has been closed contrary to his representation
that he has an existing account with the said bank and that
the said check was duly funded and will be honored when
presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to
make good the payment of the value of the check, xerox
copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex B,
but despite such demand defendant refused and continues to
refuse to comply with plaintiffs valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to
comply with the plaintiffs valid demands, plaintiff has been
compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he
agreed to pay as reasonable attorneys fees the amount of
P50,000.00 plus additional amount of P2,000.00 per
appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty
of fraud in contracting the obligation upon which this action
is brought and that there is no sufficient security for the
claims sought in this action which fraud consist in the
18
 misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing
account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact
his account was already closed at the time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and
this action is one which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph
(d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines
and the amount due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for
which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond
conditioned upon the payment of damages should it be
finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. 31[3]
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of
preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through
the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. 32[4]
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, 33[5]
pertinently averring:
with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, stating:
31[3] Id., pp. 35-36.
32[4] Id., p. 24.
33[5] Id., pp. 38-46.
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a
consequence of the pendency of another action between the
instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon, docketed thereat as Criminal
Case No. 275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under
Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character
as contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case No. 915-
00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10),
the basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiffs
criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge
of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of
the alleged dishonor in plaintiffs hands upon presentment for
payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280
dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000- drawn
allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused
in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed
by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997
hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex 1.
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that,
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves
his right to institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss
19
 1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to
dismiss plaintiffs complaint is the alleged pendency of
another action between the same parties for the same cause,
contending among others that the pendency of Criminal Case
No. 275381-CR entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Eduardo Simon renders this case dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1,
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the
criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest;
however, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied
reservation of the right to file a civil action has already been
made, first, by the fact that the information for violation of
B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make
any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is
there any claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the
plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case, during
the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not
represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no
evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the
criminal case to prove damages; all of these we respectfully
submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the
right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for
damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a)
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which mandates that
after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in
the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule
111 which provides as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party during the pendency of
criminal case provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based on fraud, this
action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the
criminal action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even
without any reservation at all of the right to file a separate
civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant
case because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation
which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the
negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the
defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the
plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of
the defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check
payable to bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was
payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery by
who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation
was valid and effective against the drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the
defendant regarding the circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the
plaintiff to have been aware that such check was intended
only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering
that the said check was payable to bearer and was not even
crossed;
20
 6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate
and apart from the criminal case without a reservation is a
civil action arising from the criminal offense charged.
However, in this instant case since the liability of the
defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are
created by the negotiable instruments law, even without any
reservation at all this instant action may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiffs
complaint the application for damages against the bond is
totally without any legal support and perforce should be
dismissed outright.34[6]
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons
urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment
bond for damages,35[7] dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court
resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the
application to charge plaintiffs bond for damages.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of
an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity
of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in
34[6] Id., pp. 47-49.
35[7] Id., pp. 50-54.
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the
judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated
as Sum of Money and the criminal case for violation of BP
Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only
identical but also the cause of action being asserted, which is
the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280
in the amount of P336,000.00. In both civil and criminal
cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts, are identical.
Plaintiffs claim that there is an effective implied
waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the fact
that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case
and that there was no private prosecutor during the
presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is
basic that when a complaint or criminal Information is filed,
even without any allegation of damages and the intention to
prove and claim them, the offended party has the right to
prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is
made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has
instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of
the said provision conveys that the waiver which includes
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must
be both clear and express. And this must be logically so as
the primordial objective of the Rule is to prevent the
offended party from recovering damages twice for the same
act or omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not
waive or made a reservation as to his right to pursue the civil
21
branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 3. Charge the plaintiffs bond the amount of
against the defendant herein. To the considered view of this P336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the
court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the
indeed legally barred. The right to institute a separate civil implementation of the writ of attachment;
action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present
its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxx
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiffs RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the defendants
submission that the herein case for sum of money is one physical possession the vehicle seized from him
based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the on August 16, 2000; and
Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to
wit:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.
an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party during the pendency of
criminal case provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action SO ORDERED.
shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Chans motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20,
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court 2000,36[8] viz:
resolves to:

1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of

Considering that the plaintiffs arguments appear to be
litis pendentia;
a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and which
submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by
into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the
this court on August 14, 2000;
Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly

36[8] Id., p. 56.

22
 in that case, the plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation
to file a separate civil action, the Motion for Reconsideration
is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City
upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint, disposing:37[9]
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed
decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
by petition for review,38[10] challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
In his comment, 39[11] Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad
faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that
37[9] Id., pp. 76-79.
38[10] Id., pp. 80-88.
caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that
the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia
based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was
warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, 40[12]
overturning the RTC, viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of
injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the
criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is
the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which
injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which
is also civil in nature. Thus, every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an
accused arising from the commission of the offense in the
39[11] Id., pp. 89-97.
40[12] Id., pp. 23-27; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona
(retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico
(retired) and Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria.
23
criminal case since the civil action is either deemed
instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000,
provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institute the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of
civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has
been changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the
Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability
arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through
Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
There is no more need for a reservation of
the right to file the independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The reservation and
waiver referred to refers only to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense charged. This does not
include recovery of civil liability under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission which may be prosecuted separately
without a reservation.
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent
civil actions which became effective on
December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
24
 Procedural laws may be given retroactive REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
effect to actions pending and undetermined at REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
the time of their passage. There are no vested
rights in the rules of procedure. xxx SO ORDERED.

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an

independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against
respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for
Civil Code, may proceed independently even reconsideration.41[13]
if there was no reservation as to its filing.

It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar

with the instant suit. The complaint was also brought on
allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA
committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check
which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an
despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation of BP independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the
changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure Code; that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit
pertaining to independent civil action became effective on Cooperative Inc. v. Velez42[14] stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling,
December 1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive
application and may be made to apply to the case at bench, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
since procedural rules may be given retroactive application. Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of money,
There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.43[15]
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is
therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of the
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by the Regional 41[13] Id., pp. 29-30.
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the 42[14] G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 72.
dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby
43[15] See note 19, p.16.
25
 In his comment,44[16] Chan counters that the petition for review A
should be denied because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil action;
and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22

preclude the filing of his separate civil action.

The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation

Issue of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,45[17]
holding:

The lone issue is whether or not Chans civil action to recover the
xxx
amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
civil action.
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so

Ruling
provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had
on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered
as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an
integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
The petition is meritorious. commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22
SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil
692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action
for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil
action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage,

44[16] Rollo, pp. 105-109. 45[17] G.R. No. L-78911, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 325. 26
 and indemnification for the losses (United States v.
Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be
denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the
payment of money for which the worthless check was
issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the
framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended
private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the
civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy,
which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having
to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended
party unable to recover even the face value of the check
due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the
expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks
to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of
a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly
provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the
civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in
the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is
specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing
fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint
may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.46[18]
46[18] Bold emphasis supplied.
27
 procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is
actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from,
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the
procedural laws.47[19] Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts
action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, 48[20] except that in
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or
filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the
first lien on the judgment.
time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
Where the civil action has been filed separately and
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.49[21]
trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the
both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
the Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal violation of any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted
actions. from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed

independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. 47[19] Cheng v.Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 155,
164-165.

48[20] Aldeguer v. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. 502; Ayala de Roxas v. Case, 8 Phil.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in 197.
effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are
49[21] Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution; Cooleys Principle of
nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of Constitutional Law, p. 313.
28
 granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule
notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus
henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all consolidated.
criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which
penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check 4. This Circular shall be published in two (2)
without funds or credit: newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on
November 1, 1997.
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include
the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.50[22]

2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in
civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based upon the amount of the check involved which Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
shall be considered as the actual damages claimed, in Corporation,51[23] thus:
accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and
Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended
by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1,
1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce
against the accused civil liability by way of liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall
pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on the
amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or xxx
information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such fees We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the
civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of
separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.

50[22] Bold emphasis supplied. 51[23] G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454, 459-461.
29
The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer
needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions.
(a) xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and
civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages,
the offended party shall pay additional filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed
separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted,
the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-
97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal action
for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant
to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal
cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in
complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the
payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint.
This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which
are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the
courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is
charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee
uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect
his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial
court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the
civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the
courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is
also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases.
Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal
and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and
tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by
the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil
action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a
separate civil action, which means that one can no longer
file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is
filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed
ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal
cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil
action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the
dishonored checks would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and
would further delay the final disposition of the case. This
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners
30
 rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before
the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil
liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special
rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31
of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to
the case at bar.52[24]
The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v.
53
Velez [25] to give due course to the civil action of Chan independently and
separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees,
which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case,
which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled
that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct
crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,54[26] the procedures for the recovery
of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and
non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to
reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent
55
action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, [27] as DMPI
52[24] Bold emphasis supplied.
53[25] Supra, note 14.
54[26] E.g., Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos.155531-34, July 29,
2005, 465 SCRA 338, 343.
55[27] Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the
Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a
separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of
thebouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the
check involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be
independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the
aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding
the allegations of fraud and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the
civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No.
915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action,
the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there
must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in
both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
31
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the
two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the
existence of the third becomes nil.56[28]
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381
ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and,
accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the Court
of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October
23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same.
Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Associate Justice
Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check WE CONCUR:
No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the
ARTURO D. BRION
rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the
reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any Associate Justice
judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res
Acting Chairperson
judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision
dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
affirming the MeTC.
ATT E STAT I O N

56[28] Taningco v. Taningco, G.R. No. 153481, August 10, 2007, 529
SCRA 735.
32
 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
JOSEPHINE M. SANCHEZ, G.R. No. 155309
the Courts Division.
Petitioner,
ARTURO D. BRION
Present:
Associate Justice
Panganiban, J.,
Acting Chairperson
Chairman,
C E RT I FI CAT I O N
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,*

Corona,
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Carpio Morales, and
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
Garcia, JJ
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST Promulgated:
RENATO C. CORONA
COMPANY,[1]
Chief Justice
Respondent. November 15, 2005
A
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
THIRD DIVISION
33

t bottom, the resolution of this case hinges on the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies. Since the factual findings of the lower
courts are disparate, this Court painstakingly reviewed the records. It
A found no sufficient reason to disbelieve the well-explained findings and
equally logical conclusions of the trial court. The evidence proffered by
respondent even corroborated relevant portions of those of petitioner. Thus,
the evidence supported the ruling of the trial court that the acquittal of
petitioner was based on its reasonable finding that she had not committed the
crime imputed to her. Consequently, she incurred no civil liability for the
alleged offense.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse the July 31, 2001 Decision[3] and the August 30,
2002 Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 53715.
The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed order is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. [Petitioner] JOSEPHINE SANCHEZ is hereby ordered to
pay [Respondent] Far East Bank and Trust Company, the amount of
One Million One Hundred Eighty Seven Thousand Five Hundred
Thirty Pesos and Eighty Six Centavos (P1,187,530.86) as actual
damages. This is without prejudice to [petitioner]s recourse of
reimbursement from the other persons who participated in the
transactions.[5]
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The antecedents of the case are related by the CA as follows:
It is undisputed that Kai J. Chin was the director and representative of
Chemical Bank. Its subsidiary, the Chemical International Finance Limited
(CIFL), was an investor in [Respondent] Far East Bank and Trust [C]ompany
(FEBTC), x x x. In representing the interest of CIFL in FEBTC, Chin was
made a director and sr. vice president of FEBTC. [Petitioner] Josephine
Sanchez was, in turn, assigned as secretary of Chin. CIFL also maintained a
checking account (CA# 0009-04212-1) in FEBTCs investment arm, the Far
East Bank Investment, Inc. (FEBII). Chin was one of the authorized
signatories in the said current and money market accounts.
According to [respondent], [petitioner] made unauthorized withdrawals from
the account of CIFL in FEBTC through the use of forged or falsified
applications for cashiers checks which were deposited to her personal
accounts. Once credited to her account, she withdrew the amounts and
34
misappropriated, misapplied and converted them to her personal benefit and 464801 05/24/93 180,090.00 H
advantage, to the damage of FEBTC.
465405 06/30/93 107,400.00 I

[Petitioner supposedly] employed three modes in the said fraudulent

transactions, namely: In compliance with bank procedures [petitioner] signs the checks twice, one
as an endorsement and two as proof of receipt of the proceeds which she then
deposited to her FEBTC account.

In the First Mode, [petitioner] caused the issuance of a cashiers check
payable to bearer with number 461390, dated September 29, 1992, in the sum
of P250,040.86. This is the subject of Crim. Case No. 93-126175. She
presented a forged letter of confirmation bearing the forged signature of Chin
addressed to Beatriz Bagsit, Cash Department Head of FEBTC. This check
was paid pursuant to the said confirmation. [Petitioner] immediately
deposited this check to her FEBTC Savings Account No. 0101-39109-9 and
on September 30, 1992, she withdrew P200,040.86.
Under the Second Mode, [petitioner] filed applications forms to purchase
cashiers checks payable to her, [with] Chin as the supposed purchaser. Said
applications were accompanied by a forged memorandum of Chin confirming
[petitioner] as the payee-beneficiary. After the approval by Bagsit of the
applications and memoranda, checks were issued, as follows:
The Third Mode, was frequently used which involved checks payable to
Chin.
[Petitioner] was designated as Chins representative to purchase cashiers
checks using applications which bore forged signatures of Chin as a
purchaser and the payee.
After Bagsit has approved the application and has checked the authenticity of
Chins signatures, a cashiers check is issued. Then [petitioner] claimed the
check, left then came back soon to encash it. The check when presented for
encashment already had two signatures of Chin on its dorsal side, both
signatures being forged. The first forged signature represents Chins
endorsement of the check as payee and the second, Chins purported receipt
of the checks proceeds. The teller pays the value of the check only if initialed
by Bagsit.
In this mode, 16 checks were issued, to wit:

Check No. Date Amount Exhibit

Check No. Date Amount Exhibit
461417 10/13/92 P100,000.00 K
461488 10/20/92 150,000.00 L
462197 11/17/92 50,000.00 M
461739 10/22/92 P489,450.00 F 461318 11/26/92 190,000.00 N
462420 12/09/92 200,400.00 O
461963 04/11/92 160,550.00 G 462482 12/12/92 220,000.00 P
35
 462717 01/04/93 210,000.00 Q Ruling of the Trial Court
462946 01/18/93 200,000.00 R
463241 02/01/93 180,000.00 S
463606 02/26/93 180,000.00 T The Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not find Kai Chin to be a credible
463776 03/08/93 200,000.00 U
463850 03/19/93 200,000.00 V witness. According to the RTC, FEBTCs records showed that, contrary to his
464108 04/01/93 150,000.00 W
464329 04/20/93 100,000.00 X testimony, he had expressly authorized petitioner to transact matters
464432 04/27/93 150,000.00 Y
464620 05/13/93 150,000.00 Z concerning Chemical Banks account.[8]

[Petitioner allegedly] confessed to Chin that she tampered with the CIFL
account. Chin referred the matter to the FEBTCs audit division for further The trial judge doubted the integrity of the findings and the report of the
investigation. All the cashiers checks, funded by an unauthorized debit
against the CIFL account, as well as the corresponding applications for their PNP handwriting expert. He noted the nonuse during the handwriting
issuance were examined at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.
All of Chins signatures borne on all the checks and applications were found analysis of Kai Chins contemporaneous signatures. Besides, the examination
to have been good forgeries. With the damage done, FEBTC had to
reimburse the CIFL account and ultimately suffered the total misappropriated was initiated unilaterally by FEBTC officials, who had submitted sample
amount of P3,787,530.86.[6]
signatures of their own choice.[9]
The main defense of petitioner consisted of a denial of the forgeries.

She asserted that she had deposited the checks to her account, under the The RTC added that the allegedly fraudulent transactions had occurred from

authority and instructions of Kai Chin. Afterwards, petitioner withdrew the September 1992 to June 1993, with the use of documents bearing the

amounts and gave them to him.[7] signatures of other officials and employees of respondent. In other words, all

the questioned transactions had been approved and allowed by the bank
Kai Chin denied that he had given that authority to her, and insisted
officials concerned, despite apparent procedural infirmities.[10] Yet, only
that she had signed the subject documents. However, he did not rebut her
petitioner was indicted.
testimony that she had turned over the proceeds of the checks to him.

36
Thus, the RTC disposed as follows: arising from the same act that could also be considered a quasi delict.

Moreover, FEBTC did not have to reserve its right to file a separate civil
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds
and so holds that the prosecution failed to prove the culpability of the action for damages, because the law had already made that reservation on
accused in any of these cases with moral certainty, and consequently
acquits her from all the charges, with costs de oficio. Her bail bonds respondents behalf.[14]
are released and the hold departure order as well as the order of
attachment are lifted.[11]
The CA further held that, contrary to the trial courts clarifications in its

March 20, 1996 Order, petitioner had been acquitted merely on reasonable
Subsequently, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
doubt arising from insufficiency of evidence to establish her identity as
civil aspect of the RTC Decision. In an Order[12] dated March 20, 1996, the
perpetrator of the crime. Her acquittal was not due to the nonexistence of the
trial court denied reconsideration. Quoting portions of its Decision, the RTC
crime for which civil liability could arise.[15] Although it agreed with the
said in its Order that the acquittal of the accused was not exactly on the
RTC that forgery had not been satisfactorily proven by FEBTC, the CA
ground of reasonable doubt, but that she was not the author of the frauds
nonetheless found petitioner liable for her failure to turn over to respondent
allegedly perfpetrated (sic). Thus, it held that no civil liability against her
the proceeds of the checks. The failure supposedly constituted an actionable
may properly be made.
fraud.[16]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Thus, the appellate court ordered petitioner to pay respondent P1,187,530.86

Granting respondents appeal, the appellate court ruled that the trial courts as actual damages, representing the value of the checks that had been paid in

judgment of acquittal did not preclude recovery of civil indemnity based on a her name and to her account.[17]

quasi delict.[13] The CA held that the outcome of the criminal case, whether
Hence, this Petition.[18]
conviction or acquittal, was inconsequential in adjudging civil liability
37
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
(1) Whether the judgment of conviction had already become
final at the time the motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect was
filed by the complainant-appellant?
(2) Whether an appeal on the civil aspect may be made from
a decision in a criminal case acquitting the accused for being not the
author of the crime?
(3) Whether a separate civil action is necessary to be
instituted after the accused is acquitted in a criminal case based on
reasonable doubt?
(4) Whether the civil aspect of the criminal offenses where
the accused was acquitted may be pursued by a party other than the
offended parties? Otherwise stated, whether the civil liability may be
pursued by a party which is not a real party in interest after the
acquittal of the accused of the offenses charged?[19]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Timeliness of the
Motion for Reconsideration
Because the RTC Decision had been promulgated on December 15, 1995,
and respondents Motion for Reconsideration was filed two months after, on
February 14, 1996, petitioner instantly concludes that the Motion was filed
out of time.
Respondent, however, contends that the time for filing the Motion should be
counted from February 1, 1996 -- when it received the trial courts Decision --
not from the date of notice to the public prosecutor.[20] To determine the
period for filing from the latter date would undermine the dual aspects of a
criminal litigation, in which the right of the offended party to appeal the civil
aspect is independent of the decision of the accused on whether or not to
appeal the case.[21]
We uphold respondent on this issue. Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court states as follows:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice
of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal
shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion
has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the
balance of the period begins to run.[22]
38
Clearly, the period available to the accused for filing an appeal is fifteen
(15) days from the promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final
order appealed from. As early as Landicho v. Tan,[23] the Court has held that
one who desires a review of a criminal case must appeal within fifteen days
from the date the decision or judgment was announced in open court in the
presence of the accused, or was promulgated in the manner set forth in
Section 6 of Rule 116 (now Section 6[24] of Rule 120) of the Rules of Court.
This ruling was reiterated in People v. Tamani,[25] in which the Court has
further clarified that the word promulgation in the old provision should be
construed as referring to judgment; and notice, to order.[26]
The above ruling, however, is relevant and applicable to the accused
who appeals. In the present case, we are confronted with the Motion filed by
the private offended party for reconsideration of the civil aspect of the RTC
judgment. It should also be noted that she was not required to be present
during the promulgation of the judgment.
In a long line of cases[27] as far back as People v. Ursua,[28] this Court has
ruled that the appeal period accorded to the accused should also be available
to the offended party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of a decision.
Similarly, courts may apply this ruling to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment. For them to do so will be consistent with this
Courts policy of giving lower tribunals a chance to rectify their possible
errors[29] and thereby promote the speedy and just disposition of
controversies.
The relevant question is, when should the period for the filing of a motion by
a private offended party begin? In Neplum v. Orbeso,[30] this Court
explained that the period begins to toll upon service of the notice of judgment
upon the offended party. Thus:
Indeed, the rules governing the period of appeal in a purely
civil action should be the same as those covering the civil
aspects of criminal judgments. If these rules are not
completely identical, the former may be suppletory to the
latter. x x x. Being akin to a civil action, the present appeal
may be guided by the Rules on Civil Procedure.[31]
In the case before us, respondent undisputedly claims that petitioner
received notice of the RTC Decision only on February 1, 1996. Records show
that FEBTC filed its Motion for Reconsideration on February 14, 1996. The
Motion was thus filed within the reglementary period.
39
 Second, Third and Fourth Issues: accused is exempt from criminal liability under the instances enumerated in

Civil Liability in Case of Acquittal Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[32]

Being interrelated, the second, third and fourth issues will be discussed
Petitioner finally argues that the real party-in-interest is not respondent, but
together.
Chemical Bank and/or Kai Chin, the owners of the accounts from which the

Petitioner contends that her acquittal was not based merely on reasonable withdrawals were made.[33]

doubt, but on the determination that she was not the author of the imputed

felonies. She reiterates the trial courts ruling in its March 20, 1996 Order that

she could not be held civilly liable, because she was not responsible for the Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that the offended party may appeal the

crimes charged. civil aspect of the criminal proceeding despite the judgment of acquittal.[34]

Arguing on the assumption that she was acquitted on the basis of reasonable

doubt, petitioner explains that the appellate court was nevertheless precluded
Civil Action Deemed Instituted
from taking cognizance of the civil aspect of the case, as a separate civil
in the Criminal Proceeding
action should have been filed after the judgment of acquittal. She contends

that Article 29 of the Civil Code, which mandates the courts to make a

finding on the civil liability in case of an acquittal based on reasonable Article 100 of the RPC states that every person criminally liable for a felony
ground, applies only to situations when a crime has been committed but the is also civilly liable. This rule holds true, except in instances when no actual

40
damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation. [35]

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised

Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Clearly, the extinction of the penal liability does not always carry with it the

extinction of the civil.[36] According to Article 29 of the Civil Code, if the

x x x x x x x x x.
acquittal is made on the ground that the guilt has not been proved beyond

reasonable doubt, the accused may be held civilly liable for damages arising
Clearly, under the foregoing 1985 rule, an action for the recovery of
from the same act or omission constituting the offense. As in any ordinary
civil liability arising from an offense charged is necessarily included in the
civil case, the liability may be established by a mere preponderance of
criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action,
evidence.
or (2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action

was filed prior to the criminal complaint.

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, the prevailing law during

the trial of this case below,[37] provided the consequences of acts that
For this purpose, the offended parties are allowed to intervene in the criminal
produced both civil and criminal liabilities, as follows:
proceedings, but solely to enforce their right to claim indemnification for

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a damages arising from the criminal act.[38] In Roa v. De la Cruz,[39] in which
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal the offended party failed to submit evidence of damages despite having

41
participated in the criminal proceedings, we had the occasion to rule in this
wise:
x x x. For such failure, she has only herself or her counsel to
blame. Of course, she could have still filed a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal to rectify the error. But this she
failed to do, thus allowing the decision to become final and
executory. Under the principle of res judicata, that judgment
is conclusive as to future proceedings at law not only as to
every matter which was offered and received to sustain the
claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter that
could have been offered for that purpose.
In the present case, the original action involved a prosecution for estafa or
swindling through falsification of commercial documents, an offense defined
under the RPC. Records do not show -- and respondent does not claim -- the
presence of any of the three instances precluding the automatic institution of
the civil action together with the criminal complaint. Ineluctably, respondents
right to damages, if any, was deemed prosecuted in the criminal proceeding.
Thus, a separate civil action may no longer be instituted.
Appeal of the Civil Aspect of the
Decision Acquitting the Accused
The consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the accused are
discussed by the Court in Manantan v. CA[40] in this wise:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is
an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author
of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to
be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is for the same act or omission. x x x.
In Salazar v. People,[41] the Court further expounded thus:
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court
declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c)
where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or
is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
42
 acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but
the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal
case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of
acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the
accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil
aspect of the case within the period therefor.
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is settled that the private offended
party may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the
accused. But this recourse may prosper only if the nature of the trial courts
judgment falls under any of the three categories stated in Salazar.
Acquittal of Petitioner Due to the
Noncommission of the Imputed Acts
A close scrutiny of the RTC Decision and Order leads us to the
conclusion that petitioner did not commit the crime imputed to her. Hence,
her acquittal likewise extinguished the action for her civil liability.
In support of this conclusion, we initially quote at length these
findings of the trial court:
Re: Crim. Cases No. 93-126175. This case involves the bearer check for the
amount of P250,040.86[.] This is the earliest questionable transaction
allegedly committed by the accused as it happened on 29 September 1992.
According to FEBTC records, this was the initial transaction concerning the
Chemical account wherein a cashiers check payable to Chemical (CIF) was
used by the accused to purchase another cashiers check payable to bearer
which was later deposited to the account of accused. During the investigation
by the banks Investigation Committee, Mrs. Bagsit averred that she
confirmed the transaction with Kai Chin and which was later on supported by
an authorization letter from Kai Chin. (p. 11, Exh. 1).
There is no dispute that the check was deposited to the personal account of
the accused (Exhs. C, C-1 and D) and part of the amount thereof was
subsequently withdrawn by her (Exh. E), but accused asserted that the
deposit of said check to her account and the subsequent withdrawal of its
amount were upon the authority and instructions of Kai Chin, and that the
withdrawn amount was actually given by her to Kai Chin.
Although Kai Chin denied having signed the confirmation memorandum
(Exh. B), there is absolutely no evidence on record that the money was never
turned over to Kai Chin. Kai Chin did not testify, on direct evidence or on
rebuttal, concerning this aspect of the case. x x x.
Re: Crim. Cases Nos. 93-126172, 93-126178, 93-126189 and 93-126190. --
These four cases involve the Cashiers Checks applied for and made payable
to the accused (Exhs. G-1, F-2, H-2 and I-2). Exhs. G-1 and F-2 were
encashed by the accused because they bear at their back two signatures of
hers, and according to the witnesses for the prosecution the first of such
signatures constitutes the indorsement while the second signifies receipt of
the proceeds of the payment thereof. On the other hand, Exhs. H-2 and I-2
were deposited by her in her personal account. According to the accused the
drawing of the checks in her name and their encashments and deposit to her
account were upon the authority and instructions of Kai Chin, and that the
values thereof were all turned over to Kai Chin.
43
xxxxxxxxx
Re: Crim. Case No. 93-126171. This case involves a Cashiers Check applied
for and made payable to Kai Chin, signed twice at the back but accused
nonetheless signed for the receipt of the payment thereof. x x x While Kai
Chin denied on direct evidence that he signed the application for the purchase
of this check and also the back of the check itself, there is also no showing
that the value thereof did not reach him. Accused asserted that this check was
applied for and encashed upon the authority and instruction of Kai Chin, and
that the value thereof was turned over to the latter.
xxxxxxxxx
Re: the rest of the other criminal cases. -- The remaining fifteen other cases
involve checks applied for and drawn in the name of Kai Chin and twice
signed at the back. As intimated earlier, the first signature at the back of the
check constitutes the indorsement thereof while the second signifies receipt
of the payment of the value.
The only intervention of the accused concerning these checks, as appearing in
the documentary exhibits, was her being named as the representative of the
purchaser and she must have picked up the checks for and in behalf of the
purchaser. (See Exhs. P, N, O, K, L, S, T, M, U, V, W, X, Y and Z). There is no
indication, at least from the documents of the prosecution, that accused had a
hand in the encashments of the checks, otherwise, she should have been made to
sign, as what was done in the case of the check marked as Exh. Q-1.[42]
As can be clearly gleaned from the above, petitioner consistently
claimed that she had acted merely upon the instructions and authority of her
superior, Kai Chin. While admitting that she had deposited the proceeds of
some of the checks to her personal account, she firmly insisted that she
subsequently withdrew the cash proceeds and turned them over to him. She
denied -- and the records do not show -- that she had ever appropriated those
moneys for her personal gain.
On the other hand, as the trial judge clearly noted, Kai Chin did not
even bother to rebut the statement of petitioner that she had turned over the
proceeds of the checks to him.[43] All he asserted was that he had neither
signed the applications for the purchase of the checks nor endorsed those
checks. His credibility was assessed by the judge thus:
Credibility of Kai Chin. It must be noticed that, with the exception of the
bearer check involved in Crim. Case No. 93-126175, the value of the
Cashiers Checks involve[d] were debited from the Chemical account. Kai
Chin is undisputably one of the authorized signatories to the Chemical
account, and under ordinary course of things, he must be the payee and/or
beneficiary of the checks.
Initially, Kai Chin sweepingly testified as follows:
Q: In her capacity as your secretary,
when she was your
secretary did Josephine
Sanchez have anything to
do with the Chemical
International Finance
account?
A: No, sir. (tsn, p. 9, 8 Nov 1994)
44
 The records of the bank and FEBII, however, show otherwise. Thus, as early
as April, 1992, Kai Chin had already authorized the accused to transact
matters concerning the Chemical account, through a memorandum he sent to
Mrs. Beatriz Bagsit and one Ms. Enriquez, reading as follows:
This is to request for the following:
1) Ms. Enriquez to partially
terminate the amount of
P250,000.00 from the CIFs
placement (P3M) and credit the
same to SA#0101-58459-8
maintained at Intramuros Branch.
2) Ms. Bagsit to debit SA#0101-
58459-8 for P290,000.00 and entrust
the same to my Secretary, Ms. Jo
Sanchez for proper disposition.
In view of my home leave/business trip scheduled on April
29-June 8, 1992, the above requests will be confirmed by
Ms. Sanchez upon my instructions before the end of May,
1992. (Memo [dated] 28 April 1992, attached as Annex B to
Exh. 2.)
Kai Chin never denied his signature on this document, either on direct
evidence or on rebuttal (as he was not presented as a rebuttal witness).[44]
The authority conferred by Kai Chin upon petitioner was also borne
out by the reports of the FEBTC Investigating Committee, pertinent parts of
which were quoted in the RTC Decision as follows:
4. Initial interview with the officers of FEBII disclosed the following:
4.1 In January, 1992, Mr. Kai Chin personally went to the
office of MS. URSULA A. ALANO, Vice President of FEBII
and allegedly informed the latter that he will directly manage
the CIF [also referred to as CIFL or Chemical] account. Mr.
Chin informed MS ALANO that instructions concerning the
account will either originate from his or his representative,
MS. J. M. SANCHEZ;
Based on Mr. Chins instructions, placements
/preterminations/payments of the account were transacted by
Mr. Chin himself or his authorized representative, J.
SANCHEZ. (p. 9, Exh. 1, underscoring supplied; see also p. 11
of the same exhibit.)
These facts were recited in the Memorandum of Ms. U.A. Ulano, attached as
Annex B to Exh. 1, which reads as follows:
Facts: Due to the transfer of Mr. Kai Chin to FEBTC Head
Office in Intramuros last January 1992, he personally went to
see me in my office to inform me that he was directly
managing the CIF account. He also informed me that
instructions concerning the account will either originate from
him or his authorized representative, Ms. J. M. Sanchez.
Based on the given instructions of Mr. Kai Chin,
placements/preterminations/payments of the account were
transacted by Mr. Kai Chin himself or his authorized
representative, Ms. J. M. Sanchez. [Underscoring by the
RTC.][45]
45
The above evidence led the trial court to conclude that Kai Chin, definitely, Answering in the affirmative, the CA explained that a single act or

was less candid to the [c]ourt when he testified[46] that petitioner had omission may produce two forms of civil liability: one is for ex delicto or that

nothing to do with the CIFL account. which arises from a crime under our penal statutes; and the other is for a

As regards petitioners testimony, the trial judge observed that she quasi delict or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, civil liability ex

had firmly and straightforwardly echoed the material allegations in her delicto was foreclosed by the acquittal. Nonetheless, [a]lthough the act from

Counter-Affidavit; and that, furthermore, her testimony had been which the civil liability might arise did not exist due to [petitioners] acquittal,

corroborated by the Peoples exhibits themselves.[47] Indeed, her claim that [respondents] cause of action makes out a case of quasi delict.[50]

she had prior authorization from Kai Chin to undertake the questioned
Contrary to the trial court, the CA disbelieved petitioners assertions
transactions was supported by no less than the prosecution evidence.
that she had turned over the proceeds of the checks to Kai Chin. Granting
Thus, the trial court emphatically concluded that petitioner was not the author
that she was authorized to encash the checks, she supposedly had no like
of the frauds allegedly perfpetrated [sic],[48] if any. The Court of Appeals
authority to deposit the proceeds to her personal bank account. The appellate
concurred in that conclusion when it categorically held thus: We rule out the
court concluded that, in breach of Article 33[51] of the Civil Code, she
issue of forgery as this was not satisfactorily proved x x x.[49]
abused the confidence reposed in her by [respondent] in the performance of

Under Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, a her duty.[52] Thus, the CA ordered her to pay respondent the amount of

finding in a final judgment that the fact from which civil liability may arise P1,187,530.86 as actual damages, representing the total value of five checks

does not exist carries with it the extinction of the liability. Thus, the critical paid in her name and to her account.[53]

issue in the present appeal is this: was the civil liability of petitioner duly
In view of the conflicting findings of the lower courts as regards the
established by the evidence?
credibility of the witnesses, we invoke the time-honored rule that the
46
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter signatures that she purportedly forged; and CIFLs account that she, in effect,

best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to misappropriated. Be it remembered that respondents own documentary

observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude evidence unequivocally concurred in the assertion of petitioner that Kai Chin

under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in had given her express authority to transact CIFLs account on his behalf.

evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in Consequently, it was his, not respondents, confidence that she had exploited.

the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire In other words, the factual premises of the CA did not support its conclusion.

proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable

In sum, we hold that petitioners acquittal was based on the fact that
discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to disbelieve.[54]
she had not committed the offense imputed to her. Consequently, she cannot

Barring arbitrariness and oversight of facts that might affect the be held civilly liable. In concluding that she, as well as her testimony, was

result of the case otherwise, the RTCs assessment of the witnesses and their credible, the trial court cannot be faulted with arbitrariness or negligence.

testimonies in this case binds even this Court.[55] In any event, we scoured Tellingly, her testimony that she turned over the proceeds of the subject

the records and, unlike the CA, we found no sufficient reason to reject the checks to Kai Chin stands unrebutted.

trial courts assessment. There was no arbitrariness or oversight of any fact or

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed CA
circumstance of weight and influence to justify a different conclusion.
Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE. The December 15, 1995 Decision and

Moreover, the CA based its imposition of civil liability upon the March 20, 1996 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52,

petitioner on her supposed abuse of her employers confidence. Granting for are hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

the sake of argument that she indeed forged the checks and misappropriated
SO ORDERED.
the proceeds to her personal benefit, it must be recalled that it was Kai Chins
47
 ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN ATTESTATION

Associate Justice I attest that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Chairman, Third Division Courts Division.

W E C O N C U R: ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
(On official leave)
Associate Justice

Chairman, Third Division

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
CERTIFICATION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES CANCIO C. GARCIA

* On official leave.

Associate Justice Associate Justice [1] The Petition named the Court of Appeals as a respondent. The Court
deleted it from the title, pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court governing petitions for review.

[2] Rollo, pp. 7-20.

48
[3] Id., pp. 22-47. Special Eleventh Division. Penned by Justice Ruben T.
Reyes (Division chair) and concurred in by Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
and Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. (members).
[4] Id., p. 54.
[5] CA Decision, pp. 26-27; rollo, pp. 46-47.
[6] Id., pp. 3-8 & 24-29. Citations omitted.
[7] RTC Decision penned by Judge David G. Nitafan, p. 16; rollo, p. 112.
[8] Id., pp. 19-22 & 115-118.
[9] Id., pp. 23-25, 28-29 & 119-121, 124-125.
[10] Id., pp. 28, 31 & 124, 127.
[11] RTC Decision, p. 32; rollo, p. 128.
[12] Rollo, pp. 69-75.
[13] CA Decision, pp. 15-16; rollo, pp. 35-36.
[14] Id., pp. 16-17 & 36-37.
[15] Id., pp. 18 & 38.
[16] Id., pp. 21-22 & 41-42.
[17] Id., pp. 24-26 & 44-46.
[18] This case was deemed submitted for decision on November 11, 2004,
upon this Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty.
Justino M. Marquez III. Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Arturo M.
de Castro, was received by this Court on April 10, 2003.
[19] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 91.
[20] Respondents Memorandum, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 162-163.
[21] Id., pp. 12-13 & 162-163.
[22] The provision, while not identical, is similar to 6 of Rule 122 of the
1985 Rules. The only difference is that the present provision makes clear that
promulgation refers to judgment; and notice, to final order appealed from.
Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 384 SCRA 466, 479, July 11, 2002.
[23] 87 Phil. 601, 605, November 16, 1950.
[24] SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by
reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon
request of the court that rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the
judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve
the bail bond pending appeal.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at
the promulgation of the decision. In case the accused fails to appear thereat
the promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the
criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or
counsel. If the judgment is for conviction, and the accuseds failure to appear
49
was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the [37] The Rules on Criminal Procedure were amended in 2000. With respect
accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to the changes in Section 1, the Court explained in Philippine Rabbit Line,
to him or his counsel. Inc. v. People (427 SCRA 456, April 14, 2004, per Panganiban, J.) thus:

[25] 55 SCRA 153, January 21, 1974.

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of
[26] Id., p. 157, per Aquino, J. Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is
[27] People v. Rodriquez, 97 Phil. 349, July 29, 1955; People v. Coloma, 105 instituted, the civil action for the
Phil. 1287, April 29, 1959; Torrijos v. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 395, recovery of civil liability arising
October 24, 1975; Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme, 157 SCRA 518, January from the offense charged shall be
29, 1988. deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party
[28] 60 Phil. 252, August 1, 1934. waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or
[29] Lopez Development v. CA, GR No. 148470, April 29, 2005; Madrigal institutes the civil action prior to the
Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corp., 436 SCRA 123, August 11, criminal action.
2004. xxxxxxxxx
Only the civil liability of the accused arising
from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
[30] Supra, p. 480.
instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
[31] Id., p. 481, per Panganiban, J. right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to
the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil
[32] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 7; rollo, p. 93. liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution
[33] Id., pp. 9 & 95. on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out
to the employee.
[34] Id., pp. 13-14 & 163-164. It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the
requirement of reserving independent civil actions
[35] Regalado, Florenz D., Criminal Law Conspectus (1st ed., 2000), p. 258 and allowed these to proceed separately from
(citing People v. Orais, 65 Phil. 744, June 30, 1938.) criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall
[36] 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court; People v. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026, remain separate, distinct and independent of any
February 25, 1947. See Sapiera v. CA, 373 Phil. 148, September 14, 1999; criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are
Sesbreo v. CA, 330 Phil. 909, September 23, 1996. some direct consequences of such revision and
omission:
50
 1. The right to bring the [41] 411 SCRA 598, 606, September 23, 2003, per Callejo Sr., J.
foregoing actions based on the Civil
Code need not be reserved in the [42] RTC Decision, pp. 15-19; rollo, pp. 111-115. Underscoring in the
criminal prosecution, since they are original.
not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the [43] Id., pp. 27 & 297.
waiver of the right to file a separate
civil action arising from the crime [44] Id., pp. 19-20 & 115-116.
charged does not extinguish the
right to bring such action. [45] Id., pp. 21-22 & 117-118.
3. The only limitation is that
the offended party cannot recover
[46] Id., pp. 22 & 118.
more than once for the same act or
omission.
What is deemed instituted in [47] Id., pp. 27 & 123.
every criminal prosecution is the
civil liability arising from the crime [48] RTC Order, p. 4; rollo, p. 72.
or delict per se (civil liability ex
delicto), but not those liabilities [49] Assailed Decision, p. 21; rollo, p. 41.
arising from quasi-delicts, contracts
or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a [50] Id., pp. 16 & 36.
civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal [51] ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
prosecution remains, and the action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
offended party may -- subject to the may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
control of the prosecutor still independently of the criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance
intervene in the criminal action, in of evidence.
order to protect the remaining civil
interest therein. [52] Id., pp. 23 & 43.

[38] Roa v. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8, February 13, 1960. Citations omitted. [53] Assailed Decision, p. 21; rollo, p. 44.

[39] Supra, p. 13, per Gutierrez David, J. (citing Miranda v. Tiangco, 96 Phil. [54] People v. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93, 100-101, February 12, 1997, per
526; 51 Off. Gaz., [3] 1366; NAMARCO v. Judge Macadaeg, 98 Phil. 185; 52 Panganiban, J.; Bugatti v. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 335, October 17,
Off. Gaz. 182.) 2000; Lorenzana v. People, 353 SCRA 396, March 1, 2001.

[40] 350 SCRA 387, January 29, 2001, per Quisumbing, J.

51
[55] People v. Corea, 269 SCRA 76, 86, March 3, 1997; People v. Basquez, On November 14, 2012, this Court rendered its Decision1 in this case finding
366 SCRA 154, September 27, 2001. accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 01442 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is also ordered to
pay "AAA" the amounts of 30,000.00 as civil indemnity, 30,000.00 as
moral damages, and 30,000.00 as exemplary damages. "AAA" is entitled to
an interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum :from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.2

The said Decision supposedly became final and executory on December 20,
2012.3 Subsequently, however, the Court received a letter from the Bureau of
Republic of the Philippines Corrections informing us of the death of accused-appellant on August 16,
SUPREME COURT 2012. In compliance with our directive, the Director of the Bureau of
Manila Corrections submitted on November 11, 2013, a certified true copy of the
death certificate4 of accused-appellant.
SECOND DIVISION
Clearly, accused-appellants demise on August 16, 2012 transpired before the
G.R. No. 179031 February 24, 2014 promulgation of this Courts Decision on November 14, 2012 or before its
finality on December 20, 2012. Therefore, when accused-appellant died, his
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff Appellee, appeal before this Court was still pending resolution.
vs.
BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:

RESOLUTION ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

52
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to ACCORDINGLY, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court is SET
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of ASIDE and Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692 before the Regional Trial Court
the offender occurs before final judgment; of Quezon City, Branch 94, is DISMISSED on account of accused-appellant's
demise.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
In People v. Amistoso,5 this Court encountered a similar situation wherein
the accused-appellant died before his appeal could be resolved. The Court MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
explained the implications of the accused-appellants demise as follows: Associate Justice

Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal WE CONCUR:
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil
liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as ANTONIO T. CARPIO
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action Associate Justice
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto Chairperson
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the Associate Justice Associate Justice
promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When
Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
unresolved.1wphi1 The Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it Associate Justice
was not immediately informed of his death.
ATT E STATI O N
Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the Courts Decision dated
January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
Court's Division.
The Court had no course of action but to set aside its Decision and dismiss ANTONIO T. CARPIO
the criminal case against Amistoso by reason of his death.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape had become
C E R TI F I CAT I O N
irrelevant and ineffectual by reason of his death on August 16, 2012.
Consequently, the same must be set aside and the case against accused-
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
appellant must consequently be dismissed.
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
53
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to The Case
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 31May2011 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461.
Chief Justice The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-
136584. The RTC found appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer
Footnotes the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered appellant to pay
damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno (Cueno).4
1 With Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion.
The Facts
2 Rollo, p. 50.
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which
3 Id. at 62. reads as follows:

4 Id. at 74. That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring, confederating with two (2) other persons whose
5 G.R. No. 201447, August 28, 2013. true names, identities and definite whereabouts have not as

yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and
with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of superior
strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
SECOND DIVISION
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
April 20, 2016
RONALDO CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing him
repeatedly with bladed weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his
G.R. No. 200302 body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, prejudice of the heirs of Ronaldo Cueno y Bonifacio.
vs.
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant. CONTRARY TO LAW.5

DECISION Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty
to the charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated on 26 October 2005, and
CARPIO, J.: trial on the merits ensued.
54
The CA summarized the parties evidence as follows:
The Prosecution[s] Evidence
Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno, testified that
on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., she was in her house located in
[sic] Lot 34, Block 4, Sipna Compound, Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. She
was about to leave the house to go to the market when she saw appellant, his
brother Larry Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim by repeatedly
stabbing him. She was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters from the
incident. Shocked at what she had just witnessed, she shouted for help and
pleaded the assailants to stop, but they did not stop stabbing the victim. In her
account, she recalled that the assailants, including appellant, used a tres
cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse [bottle]. At one
point, the victim managed to take the knife away from appellant and
brandished the same at his attackers. Thereafter, the victim fell on the
ground. Upon seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other assailants left the
scene. Through the help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed the victim to
a hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw appellant
together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata [stab] her father to death in front
of their house. She recounted that upon arriving at home from work on
September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., her father immediately went to the
house of her aunt Mercelinda Valzado, which was located only a block away
from their house, to ask for malunggay leaves.
Upon coming home from her aunts house, the victim was attacked by the
Lipatas which prompted the victim to run away. Thinking that his assailants
were no longer around, the victim proceeded to their [sic] house but then the
Lipatas stabbed him to death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8)
meters away from the scene. She further testified that she had no knowledge
of any reason why the Lipatas would kill her father, but her fathers death
brought her pain and sadness and anger against the perpetrators of her
fathers killing.
The Defense[s] Evidence
The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant himself.
According to appellant, he was resting in his house in Sipna Compound,
Brgy. Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00
p.m. when two children, namely John Paul Isip and a certain Rommel, called
him and told him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed to
his brother and upon arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the victim. He
instantaneously assisted his brother but the victim continued stabbing Larry,
causing Larry to fall to the ground. Thereafter, appellant managed to grab the
knife from the victim and stab the victim. Then he fled from the scene [of the
crime] because he was wounded. Appellants sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen,
brought him to the Amang Medical Center for treatment of his stab wound
where he was apprehended by police officers.6
The RTCs Ruling
The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of
defense of a relative, he hypothetically admitted the commission of the
crime. Hence, the burden of proving his innocence shifted to appellant. The
RTC found that the defense failed to adequately establish the element of
unlawful aggression on the part of Cueno. There was no actual or imminent
danger to the life of appellant or of his brother Larry. On the contrary, the
three Lipata brothers (appellant, Larry, and Rudy)7 employed treachery and
took advantage of their superior strength when they attacked Cueno after
Cueno left the house of his sister-in-law. Cueno suffered 17 stab wounds on
his trunk from the Lipata brothers. The existence of multiple stab wounds on
the trunk of the unarmed Cueno is inconsistent with appellants theory of
defense of a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the prosecution failed to
show conclusive proof of evident premeditation.
The dispositive portion of the RTCs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court
here[b]y renders judgment finding the accused GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and he is hereby
55
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the
following amounts:
(a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the
accused;
(b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by the
heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his death plus 12% interest per
annum computed from 6 September 2005 until fully paid;
(c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and emotional
anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the death of Rolando
Cueno; and
(d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.
The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive
imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.8
Appellant, through the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a notice of
appeal9 on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted appellants notice in an Order10
dated 19 April 2010.
The CAs Ruling
The CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The CA agreed with the RTCs ruling that appellants claim of defense of a
relative must fail. There was no actual or imminent threat on the life of
appellant or of his brother Larry. There was also no reason for appellant to
stab Cueno. Cueno was outnumbered by the Lipata brothers, three to one.
The requirement of lack of provocation on the part of appellant is negated by
the multiple stab wounds that Cueno sustained.
The CA disagreed with appellants contention that the prosecution failed to
establish treachery. The CA pointed out that Cueno was not forewarned of
any impending threat to his life. Cueno was unarmed, and went to his sister-
in-laws house to gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other
hand, were readily armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and a broken piece of
glass from a Red Horse bottle. The execution of the Lipata brothers attack
made it impossible for Cueno to retaliate.
The CA also disagreed with appellants contention that there was no abuse of
superior strength. The three Lipata brothers were all armed with bladed
weapons when they attacked the unarmed Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused
to stop stabbing Cueno until they saw him unconscious.
The dispositive portion of the CAs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is hereby
DISMISSED. The appealed decision of the trial court convicting appellant of
the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
The PAO filed a notice of appeal12 on behalf of appellant on 10 June 2011.
The CA ordered the immediate elevation of the records to this Court in its 30
June 2011 Resolution.13
Appellants Death Prior to Final Judgment
This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,14 noted the records
forwarded by the CA and required the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) to
confirm the confinement of appellant. The BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July
2012, informed this Court that there is no record of confinement of appellant
as of date. In a Resolution dated 10 September 2012,15 this Court required
the Quezon City Jail Warden to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid Prison
56
and to report compliance within ten days from notice. The Quezon City Jail
Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012,16 informed this Court that
appellant passed away on 13 February 2011. The former Quezon City Jail
Warden wrote to the RTC about appellants demise in a letter dated 23
February 2011. Attached to the 22 October 2012 letter were photocopies of
appellants death certificate and medical certificate, as well as the former
Quezon City Jail Wardens letter.17 In a Resolution dated 7 January 2013,18
this Court noted the 22 October 2012 letter from the Quezon City Jail
Warden, and required the parties to submit their supplemental briefs on the
civil aspect of the case if they so desire.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18 March
2013,19 which stated that it had already exhaustively argued the relevant
issues in its appellees brief. The PAO, on the other hand, filed a
supplemental brief on 26 March 2013.20
In view of appellants death prior to the promulgation of the CAs decision,
this Court issued a Resolution dated 25 September 2013 which ordered the
PAO "(1) to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the
deceased appellant as party; and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability of
appellant within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution."21
The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the
Deceased Appellant on 29 November 2013.22 According to the Public
Attorneys Office-Special and Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the
deceased appellant have not communicated with it since the case was
assigned to its office on 29 September 2010. The PAO sent a letter on 4
November 2013 to Lilia Lipata, who was appellants next of kin per official
records. Despite receipt of the letter, the relatives of appellant still failed to
communicate with the PAO.
In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:
xxxx
9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is
based solely on the act complained of, i.e. murder, the same does not survive
the death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the abovecited ruling
[People v. Jaime Ayochok, G.R. No. 175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA
324, citing People v. Rogelio Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994,
236 SCRA 239], the death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction
extinguished his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon.
10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute
the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased as party does not
arise.23
On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the
[PAO] shall continue as the legal representative of the estate of the deceased
[appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this
case."24
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, we declare that because of appellants death prior to the
promulgation of the CAs decision, there is no further need to determine
appellants criminal liability. Appellants death has the effect of extinguishing
his criminal liability. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability
is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellants death with
regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,25
57
reconciled the differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We
concluded that "[u]pon death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer
a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it
is on the criminal."26
We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then
applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate
civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on
other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate
civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced."27
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of
action. If the act or omission complained of arises from quasidelict or, by
provision of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property,
the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of
the estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.28 On the
other hand, if the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.29
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation
of right by prescription.30 (Emphases supplied)
58
The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000
provided for the effect of the death of the accused after arraignment and
during the pendency of the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish
the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil
action instituted under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted
to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued
against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
notice.1wphi1
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in
the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against
the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without
prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of
the deceased.
Contrary to the PAOs Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of
the Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died because of appellants fault. Appellant
caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts.32 Appellants civil liability
ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellants death on 13
February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both
his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of
obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our
subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate
of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil
aspect of this case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in
Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to
institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the
deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation.35 The separate civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance
of evidence.36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the
estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new
provisions of Section 16 of Rule 337 in relation to the rules for prosecuting
claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.38
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no
separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any
reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from
quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a
separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The
lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict
leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cuenos death, his heirs cannot
recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.
However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court for study and recommendation to the Court
En Banc appropriate amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive
resolution of such similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the
private offended party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies after
conviction by the trial court but pending appeal.
In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39 this Court declared that our law recognizes that an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused does not
exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto which may be proved by
59
preponderance of evidence. This Courts pronouncement in Lumantas is
based on Article 29 of the Civil Code:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.
We also turn to the Code Commissions justification of its recognition of the
possibility of miscarriage of justice in these cases:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as
to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the
civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate
and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while
the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The
two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon
the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition
of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper
that, for the purpose of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved
beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable
by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform
under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an
inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for disillusionment on the part of
innumerable persons injured or wronged.40
In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be recommended
by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court shall aim to provide
the aggrieved parties relief, as well as recognition of their right to indemnity.
This reform is of course subject to the policy against double recovery.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31 May 2011
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The criminal and
civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared
EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.
Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
60
 MARIANO C. DEL 3CA rollo, pp. 44-55. Penned by Pairing Judge Luisito G. Cortez.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
CASTILLO
Associate Justice 4Also referred to in the Records as Ronaldo Cueno.
Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN 5 CA rollo, p. 9.

Associate Justice
6 Rollo, pp. 3-6.
ATT E STATI O N
7 The RTC also stated that: "From the time Larry and Rudy Lipata fled from
the scene of the crime on 1 September 2005, they have been at large and
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in went into hiding in order to escape criminal liability." CA rollo, p. 16.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division. 8 Id. at 20.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO 9 Id. at 21.

Associate Justice
Chairperson 10 Id. at 22.

C E R TI F I CAT I O N 11 Rollo, p. 18.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division 12 Id. at 20.
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of 13 Id. at 23.
the opinion of the Court's Division.
14 Id. at 25.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice 15 Id. at 29.

Footnotes 16 Id. at 30.

1Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules bf Criminal Procedure.
2Rollo, pp. 2-19. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, with
Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Edwin D. Sorongon
concurring.
17 Id. at 31-34. Based on the medical certificate issued by the East Avenue
Medical Center, appellant was admitted on 13 February 2011, and was
pronounced dead at 8:27 in the evening of the same day. The immediate
cause of death as stated in the death certificate was "Hypoxic Ischemic
Encelopathy secondary to Cardiopulmonary Arrest."
18 Id. at 37.

61
19 Id. at 39-40.
20 Id. at 42-47.
21 Id. at 51.
22 Id. at 61-66.
23 Id. at 64-65.
24 Id. at 77.
25 G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239.
26 Id. at 251.
27 Id. at 253-254.
28 Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt
or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
29 Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness
of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth
by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting
them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may
be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered
in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the
true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented
directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet
due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
30 G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239, 255-256.
31 Rollo, pp. 61-66.
32 Article 20 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: "Every person
who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same." See also Articles 30, 1157 and 2195
of the Civil Code.
33 Rollo, p. 77.
34 Supra note 25.
35 Casupanan v. Laroya, 436 Phil. 582, 593 (2002).
36 Section 3, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
37 Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the
fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground
for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.
62
 If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased BERSAMIN,*
party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the
specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a ABAD, and
specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ.
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

38 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, 2 REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 352 MARIA CHRYSANTINE

(2004). Rule 86 refers to Claims Against Estate, while Rule 87 refers to
Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators.
L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated:
39 G.R. No. 163753, 15 January 2014, 713 SCRA 337, citing Manantan v.
Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 298 (2001). OF THE PHILIPPINES,

40 Commission, pp. 45-46, quoted in ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, 1 Respondents. September 13, 2010
COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES 121-122 (1990). x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

SECOND DIVISION

DECISION
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060

Petitioner,
CARPIO, J.:
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

**Designated additional member per Special Order No. 886 dated 1
- versus - PERALTA,
****Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 September
63
 The Case
57
Before the Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the
Decision58[2] of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223
(RTC Quezon City).
57[1]Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
58[2]Rollo, pp. 27-34. Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E.
Maambong with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucenito
N. Tagle, concurring.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the
pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend
the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence
of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal
case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 59[3]
holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a
59[3]Id. at 50-51. Penned by Presiding Judge Ramon A. Cruz.
64
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before
it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could
be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in
question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the
Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit,
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.60[4]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005
Order,61[5] the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
60[4]Id. at 51.
61[5]Id. at 53.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court
of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the
RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of
the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts
of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled
that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to
the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all
that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
65
 Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure 62[6]
provides:
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the
Court of Appeals decision.

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements

The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension
of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before
the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information 63[7] for
Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC
Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the

The petition has no merit. Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for
pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.64[8] Respondents petition65[9] in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5
Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case 62[6]Dated 1 December 2000.

63[7]Rollo, p. 54.

64[8]Id. at 56.

65[9]Id. at 61-65.
66
November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the
filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement
of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met
since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question
that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. 66
[10] A prejudicial question is defined as:
66[10]Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA 773.
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 67
[11]
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide,68[12] which punishes any person who shall
kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. 69[13] The relationship between
the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
67[11]Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 150329-30, 11 September 2007,
532 SCRA 574, 577-578.
68[12]People v. Dalag, 450 Phil. 304 (2003).
69[13]Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
67
murder70[14] or homicide.71[15] However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case
for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
72
petitioners will. [16] At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have
no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
70[14]Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
71[15]Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
72[16]See Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married
to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals73[17] that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of
a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question
in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. 74[18] In fact, the Court declared
in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
States penal laws are concerned.75[19]
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court
of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the
73[17]467 Phil. 723 (2004).
74[18]Id. at 744. Italicization in the original.
75[19]Id. at 742.
68
resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the Associate Justice Associate Justice
guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
Associate Justice

SO ORDERED.

ATTESTATION

ANTONIO T. I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
CARPIO
the Courts Division.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

WE CONCUR: Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Associate Justice Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

69