RULE 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

A. Definition/Description
- when a matter of right
- distinguish from Preliminary Examination
Read: Fenequito vs. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113
Burgundy Realty Corporation vs. Reyes, 687 SCRA 524
B. Who may conduct P. I.
Read: Abanado vs. Bayona, 677 SCRA 595
Heirs of Nestor Tria vs. Obias, 635 SCRA 91
C. Procedure in Metro Manila vs. Outside Metro Manila
Read: Uy vs. Javellana, 680 SCRA 13
D. Inquest, what is
- when applied
- waiver of Art. 125 of RPC
Read: People vs. Valencia
E. Quantum of Evidence
- probable cause vs. prima facie

A. Definition/Description
Josue
FENEQUITO vs. VERGARA, JR.
G.R. No. 172829 July 18, 2012
Criminal Procedure; Office of the Solicitor General; Prosecutors; Administrative Code of 1987, mandates
the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings, whereas, Section 11 of Presidential Decree no. 1275 provides that
the provincial and city prosecutor shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanours and
violations of city or municipal ordinances in courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all
the duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions. It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is
the OSG which has the authority to file an appeal with the RTC. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III of
Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, mandates the
OSG to represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings. On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled reorganizing the
Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals,
Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service, which was the
law in force at the time the appeal was files, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to
as prosecutor) shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes. Misdemeanours and violations of city
of municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the
duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecution.

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Same; prosecutors; unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file
an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), questioning the dismissal by the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City
Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. Petitioners reliance on the Presidential Decree No. 911 is
misplaced, as the cited provision refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutors
power to file an information or dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law
which provides that in cases of appeal an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file the
same only upon prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. Stated
differently, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an
appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even
without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor.

Facts
On February 11, 2004, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila (representing
Bernardo Vergara Jr.) against Rosa Fenequito, Corazon E. Hernandez, and Lauro H. Rodriquez. On April
23, 2004, Fenequito, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause. The
MeTC issued an order granting the said motion. Upon appeal by the public prosecutor, however, the RTC
set aside the MeTCs order and directed the latter to trial. Fenequito, et al, filed an appeal before the CA,
which subsequent ruled that the RTCs assailed decision was interlocutory in nature and was therefore
not appealable. Hence, the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not RTCs decision was interlocutory and can be appealed.
Held
RTCs decision was interlocutory in nature. As such, it cannot be appealed.
One of the grounds for the CAs outright dismissal of Fenequito et al.s petition for review was
because of the latters failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the
petition filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with
the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to
appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilities the orderly disposition of appealed cases.
But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, the Court still finds no cogent
reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. This is because Fenequito et al. erroneously
assumed that the RTC Decision is final and appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. An order is
interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done
upon its merits. In contrast, a final order is one that which dispose of the whole subject matter or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined.
Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and directed the
court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that
the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to
be done on its merits.

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Note: The doctrine promulgated in the case does not particularly relate to the topic indicated in
the outline, i.e., preliminary investigation distinguished from preliminary examination.

Probable Cause
Quiniquini
Burgundy Realty Corporation v.
Josefa Jing C. Reyes and SEC Raul Gonzalez of the DOJ
GR no: 181021 December 10, 2012
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to
appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,exercise the power of
direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify
their rulings. It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercise the power of direct control
and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify reverse or modify their rulings.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors find
basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or
negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency
should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; A preliminary investigation constitutes

a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. It must be remembered that the finding of probable
cause was made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a
realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.

Same; same; same; In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether
there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial; A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence. This Court
need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines
whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on
the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence. Precisely, there
is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable cause; Words and Phrases; Probable cause has been
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted; A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such
facts and circumstance as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is or may be, well
founded on such state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not
mean actual or positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on

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opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charge.

Facts
Private respondent offered her services to petitioner as the latters real estate agent in buying
parcels of land in Laguna. She informed petitioner that more or less ten lot owners are her clients who
were willing to sell their properties. Convinced of her representations, petitioner released the amount of P
23,432,327.50 in her favor to buy those parcels of land. Instead, Reyes misappropriated the money given
by the petitioner to her personal use and benefit. Petitioner then sent formal demand to Reyes to return
the amount given. Reyes denied the fact that she had received such amount of money and
misappropriated it.
A Preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes in Makati City. Thereafter, an
Information for the crime of Estafa was filed against Reyes in RTC Br.149 Makati City.
Undeterred, Reyes filed a petition for review before the DOJ but it was dismissed by the
Secretary of Justice (SOJ) through the State Prosecutor. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for
reconsideration and the said motion was granted.
SOJ issued a resolution granting the petition of Reyes and ordering the City Prosec of Makati to
cause the withdrawal of the information for estafa.
Hence the petition.
Issue
Whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
Held
Yes.
Preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. In a
preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is a probable cause or
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty and should be held for trial.
In the case at bar, the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of all the
elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount of
P23,423,327.50 from petitioners as proven by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the
parcels of land. Thus, the mere presumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude that
a probable cause exists for the indictment of Reyes for estafa. Finding probabe cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
the act of omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Therefore, the court ordered to proceed with the arraignment of Josefa Jing C. Reyes.

Lozada
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P ABANADO VS JUDGE ABRAHAM A BAYONA
677 SCRA 595
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; The conduct of a preliminary investigation is
primarily an executive function. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive
function. Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting

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preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. An examination
of 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors of the Department of Justice- National Prosecution Service
(DOJ-NPS Manual), therefore, is necessary.

Same; Same; The Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service(DOJ-NPS) Manual states

that the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as practicable. Thus, such
attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules. We find that there is nothing in the DOJ-
NPS Manual requiring the removal of are solution by an investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal
of a criminal complaint af t er it was r e ver s ed b y th e pr o v inc i al , c i t y or c h i ef
state prosecutor. Nonetheless, we also note that attaching such a resolution to aninformation filed in court
is optional under the aforementioned manual. The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as practicable. Thus, such
attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.

Administrative Law Judges Gross Ignorance of the Law Not every judicial error is tantamount t
o ignorance of the law and if it was committed in good faith, the judge need not be subjected to
administrative sanction.
Not every judicial error is tantamount to ignorance of the law and if it was committed in good faith, the
judge need not be subjected to administrative sanction. While complainant admitted thathe erred in
insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution despite the provisions of the DOJ-
NPS Manual, such error cannot be categorized asgross ignorance of the law as he did not appear to be
motivated by bad faith. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the prosecution office were not clear as to
whether or not an investigating prosecutors resolution of dismissal that had been reversed by the
city prosecutor should still form part of the records.

Same Same Gross Misconduct Gross misconduct presupposes evidence of grave irregularity in
the performance of duty. Neither did respondents action amount to gross misconduct. Gross
misconduct presupposes evidence of grave irregularity in the performance of duty. In the case at bar,
respondents act of requiring complainant to explain why he should not be cited in contempt for his failure
to submit the Jarder Resolution in court was in accordance with established rules of procedure.
Furthermore, complainant did not abuse his contempt power as he did
not pursue the proceedings in view of the May 29, 2009 and June 15, 2009Gellada orders. Lastly, as
previously discussed, respondent issued those orders in good faith as he honestly believed that they
were necessary in the fair and just issuance of the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 0903-16474.
Facts
This administrative complaint stemmed from Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines vs
Cresencio Palo, Sr. which Information was filed by complainant before the Metropolitan Trial Court in
Cities of Bacolod City and was eventually raffled to Branch 7 presided by respondent judge. In connection
with the issuance of the warrant of arrest as regards the criminal complaint, respondent judge issued an
Order (April 13, 2009) ordering complainant to submit, among other records, a Memorandum of the
transfer of the case from designated Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor. Complainant,
however, explained on a letter that there was no Memorandum of transfer as complainant disapproved
the recommendation of dismissal by Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis S. Jarder, the investigating officer
for the Palo case, pursuant to Sec 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Unsatisfied,
respondent issued another Order (May 5, 2009) requiring complainant to submit the Jarder resolution but
was answered by a letter from complainant that such Memorandum was no longer part of the records.
Moreover, attached to the letter was an explanation by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno that

58
resolutions disapproved by City/Provincial Prosecutors were not released to the parties and/or to their
counsels. Respondent judge insisted that such resolution was necessary for evaluation of the issuance of
warrant of arrest and issued an Order (May 14, 2009) requiring complainant to explain why he should not
be cited for contempt. Complainant filed for an Inhibition and subsequently a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order for respondent to restrain from proceeding with
the contempt hearing. The petition was granted and complainant moved to file administrative complaint
against respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law procedure, gross misconduct, and violation of
Court Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1987.
Issue
Whether or not complainant erred in not submitting the Jarder resolution.
Held
The Court held on the negative. As held by Judge Gelleda, when a city or provincial prosecutor reverses
the investigating assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding probable cause replaces the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The result
would be that the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case. It is
no longer required that the complaint or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and be examined by the judge.
The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not intend to unduly burden trial judges by requiring
them to go over the complete records of the cases all the time for the purpose of determining probable
cause for the sole purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused. "What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-
affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make
his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to
the existence of probable cause.

Summary Procedure
Montilla

UY VS. JAVELLANA
680 SCRA 13 , September 05, 2012
Arrests; The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever
required.Judge Javellanas issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio, is in
violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that [t]he court
shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required. Judge Javellana
never claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was
wanted for the crime of attempted homicide,
being tried in another case, Crim. Case No. 04-096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative of his
ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge Javellanas court as Crim. Case No. 04-097,
is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is for attempted
homicide, although both cases involved the same accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or made applicable to the other.
Same; Preliminary Investigation; Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; The Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said
Rule.The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to
the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be
commenced in the following manner: SEC. 11. How commenced.The filing of criminal cases falling

59
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except
when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus
two (2) copies for the courts files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of
filing, the case may be dismissed.
Same; Same; Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a
preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to
the fine.Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary
investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As
has been previously established herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People
v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.
Same; Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely
adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the
constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.Judge Javellana did not provide any
reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress
that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy
disposition of cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those
specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the
resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.

FACTS
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and procedures,
gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct
and others," filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of PAO against Presiding Judge Javellana of the
Municipal Trial Court, La Castellana, Negros Occidental.
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint: Judge Javellana was grossly
ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several
occasions as examples: Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite
Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; did not grant the motion to dismiss for non-
compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading; refused to dismiss outright the complaint
even when the same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her
witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and,
instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming
that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in
their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.
Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their
witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge

60
Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when
a warrantless arrest had been effected.
Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v.
Bautista, for preliminary investigation even when the accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said
investigation without informing the accused of his rights to remain silent and to have a counsel Judge
Javellana stressed that the charges against him were baseless and malicious; and the acts being
complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the proper subject of an
administrative complaint.
Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant complaint against him. The
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report, found Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of
the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases
appropriately covered by said Rule.
ISSUE
Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation by Judge Javellana is not valid for not following
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

HELD
YES. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to
the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be
commenced in the following manner: SEC. 11. How commenced.The filing of criminal cases falling
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except
when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus
two (2) copies for the courts files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of
filing, the case may be dismissed.
Also, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation
be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed
by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy
disposition of cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those
specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the
resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.

Preliminary Investigation; Warrantless Arrest

Romero
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEJANDRO C. VALENCIA
G.R. Nos. 94511-13
Information; can be filed without a preliminary investigation against an accused arrested without
warrant. We held under this case that a person who is lawfully arrested without a warrant pursuant to
paragraph 1(b), section 5, rule 113, rules of court should be delivered to the nearest police station and
proceeded against in accordance with rule 112, section 7. Under said section 7, rule 112, the prosecuting

61
officer can file the information in court without a preliminary investigation, which was done in the accused-
appellants case.

Preliminary investigation; deemed waived when not invoked. Since the records do not show whether
the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had been filed in court, as in
fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, the court can only conclude that he
waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his
arraignment.

Facts
The antecedent events based on the summary given by the Solicitor General are as follows; Arlyn
Barredo-Jimenez, her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr., aged five and three, respectively, and her
mother, are residents of 2008 F. Muoz St., Paco, Manila. At about 9:00 p.m. of March 19, 1989, as she
was about to eat supper, she noticed appellant standing five steps away from the open door of her house
and holding a sumpak, a homemade shotgun. Seized with fear, she closed the door. After a few
moments, she heard a burst of gunfire. This was followed by cries of pain from her children inside the
house. Seeing her children bloodied, she immediately went outside and shouted for help. As she did so,
she saw appellant running away, carrying the sumpak. Two neighbors assisted Jimenez in bringing the
injured children to the Philippine General Hospital. Patrolman Renato Marquez, a homicide investigator,
interviewed Jimenez at the hospital about the shooting incident. Since she was still experiencing shock
over the incident Jimenez forgot to mention the name of appellant as the one who shot her children
Acting on the report of a barangay tanod, Patrolmen Roberto Cajiles, Romeo de la Pea and
Carlos Castaeda, assigned at the Ong Detachment, Police Station No. 5, conducted an investigation of
the shooting incident in the house of Jimenez. At the time, Jimenez and her injured children were already
in the hospital. Nevertheless, Pat. Cajiles was able to interview the mother of Jimenez, the barangay
captain, a certain Josie, and appellants brother, Rolando, who all mentioned appellant as the gunwielder.
Moreover, the policemen discovered the presence of six pellet holes and one big hole with the size of the
circumference of a shotgun bullet on the door of the house of Jimenez. Three pellets were also found at
the crime scene.
Early next morning, the three policemen were led by Rolando Valencia to the residence of Sonia
Castillo, his aunt, where he believed appellant was sleeping. The police apprehended appellant there and
took him to the Ong Detachment for initial investigation . He was indorsed to the police headquarters for
further investigation in the evening of March 22, 1989.
When arraigned, the accused-appellant pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial then proceeded resulting in
accused-appellants conviction as above stated.
On appeal, Accused-appellant raised as one of the errors of the trial court: B. In finding that the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the defendant-appellant beyond reasonable doubt in spite of the
fact that there was allegedly no preliminary investigation, and that no sufficient evidence exists proving
his guilt.
Issues
1. Whether or not a prosecuting officer may immediately file an information in court when an accused was
lawfully arrested without a warrant, even in the absence of a preliminary investigation.
2. Whether or not the accused-apellant, Alejandro Valencia, who did not invoked a preliminary
investigation after the case had been filed in court, may be deemed waiving his right to a preliminary
investigation, and thus be tried and validly convicted even in the absence of such.

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 Held
1. The court rules in the Affirmative.
In the case at bar, what happened was that the accused was lawfully arrested, without a warrant
pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court 23 should be delivered to the nearest
police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. Under said Section 7, Rule
112, the prosecuting officer can file the Information in court without a preliminary investigation.
2. The court rules in the Affirmative
Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary
investigation after the case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his
readiness to be arraigned, the Court can only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary
investigation, when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment. Ponga was convicted
because all the circumstances pointed to no other person but him Ponga as the sumpak-wielder
Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez testified that while they were taking their supper that night of March 19, 1989, she
happened to glance through the open door of their hut and she saw the accused, outside, standing a few
meters away, holding a homemade shotgun (sumpak). Lest she may get embroiled in any untoward
incident, she hurriedly went to close the door. She recognized that person standing outside due to the
light in front of their house and the fluorescent lamp at the back of their neighbors house, thus
illuminating the place where the person was standing. Soon after she closed the door, there was a gun
blast and then she heard the moanings and cries of pain of her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr.
When she looked at them, she saw them bloodied and writhing in pain. Immediately, she opened the door
of their hovel to ask for help. Once she opened the door, she saw the accused, Alejandro Valencia,
running away and carrying with his right hand the homemade shotgun.
In addition, the telltale bullet marks of the door proved without doubt that they were produced by a
shotgun bullet and pellets thereof. Pat. Renato Marquez testified that he saw those bullet and pellet holes
at the door when he went to investigate the place after he received a report of the incident from Pat.
Ramon Cajiles of the Ong Detachment. From his investigation, only one suspect has been consistently
mentioned and that is accused Alejandro Valencia who is identified by those he investigated as Ponga.
All these circumstances are found by the Court to be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused, Alejandro Valencia, is guilty thereof, and at the same time inconsistent
with any other hypothesis except that of his guilt. They constitute an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, Alejandro Valencia, to the exclusion of all others, as
the author or the two crimes, a chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other and
they certainly cannot be overcome by the very inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by him
(Erlanger and Galinger, Inc. v. Exconde, L-4792 and L-4795, September 20, 1953) as will be pointed out
later. Then, too, the facts that no less than the accuseds brother, Ramon Valencia, brought the
policeman to their aunts house to arrest the herein accused is another circumstance to show that,
indeed, herein accused is guilty thereof.
The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED

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Probable Cause
Naca
PCGG v. NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ
GR No. 194159 21 October 2015
Same; Same; Probable Cause; It must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the
crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty.

In this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes
of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a
finding based on more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. To
reiterate, the validity of the merits of a partys defense or accusations and the admissibility of testimonies
and evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary stage. In sum, the Court
is convinced that there is probable cause to indict individual respondents of violating Sections 3(e) and (g)
of RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint against them.

Ombudsman; Doctrine of Non-Interference; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently refrained
from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable
cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is
not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsmans action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not
an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsmans
action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsmans exercise of
power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Probable Cause; The conduct of
preliminary investigation proceedings whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor is
geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for
trial for the supposed crime that he committed.

In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings whether by
the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause
exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v.
Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 (2012), the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the
existence thereof in the following manner, to wit: Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean actual
or positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a

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crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence
to secure a conviction.

Same; Same; Same; Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering

whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.

Verily, Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require
an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. [A preliminary investigation] is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecutions] evidence. The presence and
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Hence, the validity and merits of a partys defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Hearsay Evidence Rule; In the
recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2005), the Supreme Court (SC) declared that
hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties.

It was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWGs findings contained in the Executive
Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-serving, and of little
probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. In
the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court declared that hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing
a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.

Facts
On 8 October 1993, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 14 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans. The same was created to identify the
behest loans entered into by the past administrations. Subsequently, Memorandum No. 619 was issued.
It laid down the criteria to aid the said ad hoc committee in the determination of whether or not a loan is
behest in character.

65
 The ad hoc committee and the technical working group then examined documents evidencing
loans granted to different institutions during the administration of former President Marcos. Among those
was a series of loans granted by the Developmental Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to the National
Galleon Shipping Corporation.
In total, the value of Galleon's obligations to DBP amounted to Php 2,039,284,390.85 while the
value of its collaterals was merely Php 539,000,000. The ad hoc committee concluded that the loans
obtained by Galleon from DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans, considering that: (a)
Galleon was undercapitalized; (b) the loan was undercollateralized; (c) the major stockholders of Galleon
were known to be Marcos cronies; and (d) certain documents pertaining to the loans were found to bear
marginal notes of the former President Marcos.
The PCGG then filed a criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against the individual
respondents. The respondents contended that the action was already barred by prescription for more
than 20 years has passed. Moreover, Roque also averred that he was not a crony of the President
Marcos.
The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint filed by the PCGG. It held that the complaint
lacked probable cause as the executive summaries and technical reports were consisted mostly of
hearsay and of little probative value.
Issue
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding that there was no
probable cause for the complaint filed by the PCGG against the respondents.
Held
Yes. Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion. The petition of PCGG has merit.
The conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings is geared to determine whether or not
probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed.
In this light, probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. It does not import absolute certainty.
A finding of probably cause needs only to rest on evidence that a crime has been committed by
the suspects. It does not need to be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
Hence, the determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay as long as the
person making the hearsay statement is credible and there is substantial basis for the same.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
because such is merely preliminary and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of the parties.
The ad hoc committee, as contained by the narration of facts in their reports, found that the loans
or accommodations extended by the DBP to Galleon were behest in nature. There was substantial basis
to credit the findings as such were based on official documents prepared by the DBP itself. It was
Ombudsman's error to discredit the findings in the executive summary for being hearsay and of little
probative value.

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Purpose of Preliminary Investigation
Parulan
DE LIMA vs. REYES
G.R. No. 209330 January 11, 2016
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; In a preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused.In a preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. As such, the prosecutor does
not perform quasi-judicial functions.

Facts
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the of the Court of Appeals, which rendered null and void
Department of Justice Order No. 710 issued by the Secretary of Justice. The said DO created a second
panel of prosecutors to conduct a reinvestigation of a murder case in view of the first panel of
prosecutors failure to admit the complainants additional evidence.
Dr. Gerardo Ortega was shot dead in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with
police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. He made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he
shot Dr. Ortega. He executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter Terrorism Division of the NBI
where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr.
Ortega.
Sec of Justice De Lima issued Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors
(First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation.
The First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued a resolution dismissing the
Affidavit-Complaint. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which,
sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes and Edrad.
While the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel.
The Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators
(Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case to address the offer of additional evidence denied
by the First Panel.
The Second Panel issued a Subpoena requiring Reyes to appear before them and to submit his
counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. Former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel.
The Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of
informations on all accused. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan subsequently issued
warrants of arrest.
Reyes filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review Ad Cautelam assailing the
Second Panels Resolution. He also filed before the Court of Appeals a Supplemental Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO impleading Regional
Trial Court of Palawan.
Reyes argued that the RTC could not enforce the Second Panels Resolution and proceed with
the prosecution of his case since this Resolution was void. The CA in a decision declared DO 710 as null

67
and void and reinstated the First Panels Resolutions. According to the CA, the Sec of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion, that she should have modified or reversed the Resolutions of the First Panel
pursuant to the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal instead creating the Second Panel.
The Secretary of Justice, the Second Panel, and Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of CA but, however, was denied. It stated that the Secretary of Justice
had not shown the alleged miscarriage of justice sought to be prevented by the creation of the Second
Panel since both parties were given full opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel.
The Secretary of Justice and the Second Panel filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners argue that the Sec of that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on
Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a
case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Petitioners position was that the First Panel appear[ed] to have ignored the rules of preliminary
investigation when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the
determination of the existence of probable cause
Petitioners argue that since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within
the discretion of the trial court Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Secretary of Justice had
no authority to order motu propio the reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to
submit her alleged new evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Respondent argues that the Second Panels Resolution dated March 12, 2012 was void since the Panel
was created by a department order that was beyond the Secretary of Justices authority to issue. He
further argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by
the Second Panel was void.
Issues
1. Whether or not Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu propio another panel of
prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case
2. Whether or not his Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court
Held
1. YES. The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review before the
Secretary of Justice can reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct of a
reinvestigation in order to resolve the petition for review. Under Section 11: SECTION 11.
Reinvestigation.If the Secretary of Justice finds it necessary to reinvestigate the case, the
reinvestigation shall be held by the investigating prosecutor, unless, for compelling reasons,
another prosecutor is designated to conduct the same. Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu propio reverse or modify resolutions of the
provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for
review.
The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her
authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.
2. YES. A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is only conducted to aid the
prosecutor in preparing the information. It serves a twofold urpose: first, to protect the innocent

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against wrongful prosecutions and second, to pare the state from using its funds and resources
in useless prosecutions. In Salonga v. Cruz Pao:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and
expensive trials.
Moreover, a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial. It is not a trial on the merits.
An accuseds right to a preliminary investigation is merely statutory it is not a right guaranteed by
the Constitution. Hence, any alleged irregularity in an investigations conduct does not render the
information void nor impair its validity.
Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to
dismiss the case or to determine the accuseds guilt or innocence rests within the sound
discretion of the court.
Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by
the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against respondent. Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the
case, therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of
the preliminary investigation in any other venue had been rendered moot by the issuance of the
warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the
trial court issued its warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired jurisdiction over
the case and the existence of probable cause has been judicially determined, a petition for
certiorari questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases to be the plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy provided by law. Since this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot
Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.

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