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Risk-based inspection and maintenance

in power and process plants in Europe

Article in Nuclear Engineering and Design December 2003

DOI: 10.1016/j.nucengdes.2003.06.001


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Aleksandar Jovanovic
Universitt Stuttgart


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Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182

Risk-based inspection and maintenance in

power and process plants in Europe
A. Jovanovic
MPA Stuttgart, Pfaffenwaldring 32, 70569 Stuttgart, Germany
Received 22 November 2001; received in revised form 3 April 2003; accepted 25 June 2003

The paper provides review of current practices and trends in the area of RBI/RBLM, primarily by comparing European and
US work. It highlights the background and needs of industry and shows the relationship between RBI/RBLM and other possible
approaches to maintenance. Finally, indicates the current solutions and results yet to be achieved, also in the new European
projects and initiatives (RIMAP, EPERC).
2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction high-temperature components in power and process

plants, where possible failures of these components
There is, undoubtfully, revived interest in risk and (Fig. 1) can appear as the main source of risk.
risk-based approaches in inspection, maintenance and
management in power and process plants in Europe
and elsewhere nowadays. This coincides with the fact 2. Safety versus economy, static versus new,
that both the real and the perceived risk have become dynamic approach
economic and public relation and political issues. In
other words, risk is not only a safety issue only, it is The above way of reasoning shows already that risk
not any more an issue of rules and regulations, it has (technical risk) in todays life has two main, hardly
become also an economic category, merchandise in separable aspects, namely:
a way, having its price, its market(s), its traders . . . . the safety-related aspects, and
Who invests in, e.g. risk mitigation or reduction, ex- the economy (e.g. operation and maintenance) re-
pects an economically measurable benefit, too. This lated aspect.
change of paradigm, means in the practice that it is
more important to know and manage the risk, than to Both aspects impose practical risk limits in real life.
necessarily reduce or eliminate it by all means . . . . Safety limits are usually imposed by law (e.g. radia-
(Slovic, 2000) This is also the starting point for consid- tion related ones in nuclear power plants, or pollutant
erations made hereto examine how these this change emissions in chemical plants)it means that if the
in paradigms applies to life management of critical risk of certain averse event in the plant must be kept
below the limit, otherwise the plant will be shut down.
Tel.: +49-711-685-3007; fax: +49-711-685-3947.
Economic limits (e.g. in conventional thermal power
E-mail address: plants) mean that the additional cost due to experi-
(A. Jovanovic). enced and/or potential damage (increasing, e.g. the

0029-5493/$ see front matter 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
166 A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182

Fig. 1. Material-related failures in power plants: Tn turbine blades, pipes, general machinery, turbine rotors, etc. leading to gross damage.

insurance costs) will burden the operation so much that main issue appears to be finding of the right balance
the plant will have to be shut down as non-profitable. between
The conventional (classic) approaches propose
solutions for the above problem in such a way that they gain/profit obtained by risk-reduction measures (e.g.
life extension, higher availability and similar); and
assess risk/cost (statically, i.e. for one given set of cost of the risk-reduction measures.
establish the distance between the current level of In the conditions of the liberalized market, the above
risk/cost and the limit one; and approach is not sufficient, because it does not take into
propose/introduce measures for risk/cost reduction. account the fluctuation of market prices. Therefore,
In the case that the measures have been successful, the new market-oriented approaches advocate on-line
the plant can be kept in operation for longer time dynamic analysis of the price cost ratio (Fig. 3).
(Fig. 2). Much of the consideration in this classical
approach is devoted actually only to the internal plant
costs, e.g. those of maintenance. For example in the 3. Evolution of maintenance concepts
case of a 300 MW power plant only boiler and piping
maintenance cost over the lifetime of the plant can Including risk considerations into the daily prac-
reach the level of the 10% of the capital cost for the tice of maintenance was not a straightforward and
whole plant. (EPRI 1987a, b, 1992) Therefore, the easy process. In order to come to its current state,
A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182 167

Fig. 2. Time dependency of cost, safety and risk (after introduction of risk-reduction measures).

Fig. 3. Dynamic approach to profitability of a plant.

the practice has passed through a number of phases, nance (RCM), risk-aware maintenance and similar
which can, generally, be described as (Katchmar, 1997; Westkmper et al., 1999).
corrective maintenance, First and most natural approach to maintenance is
scheduled maintenance, and certainly the one of corrective maintenance. It is based
condition-based maintenance, leading nowadays on the fits it when it brakes principle, i.e. on the re-
to concepts known as reliability-centered mainte- pair when necessary, when a part is broken. Although
168 A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182

historically the oldest one and in many instances re- strategies based on the condition state of the compo-
placed by the new ones, the approach of corrective nent and related risk. Thus, the overall safety, reliabil-
maintenance still lives in the daily practice, mainly for ity and economy of the plant can be improved and the
non-critical components. resources optimally used by ensuring that inspection is
The above approach, especially for in the main- focused onto the critical components. Two elements of
tenance of critical systems and components has risk have to be assessed separately: probability (like-
been widely replaced later by the concept of sched- lihood) of occurrence and nature of consequences.
uled/planned maintenancethe concept which was To derive the probability, a detailed knowledge of the
essentially saying that everything related to design continuing degradation mechanisms, which can affect
and maintenance of critical components (e.g. pres- each item of equipment, is required. This must be
surized components) should be prescribed, should based on a thorough evaluation of the component it-
be done as prescribed and, thus, safety would be self (condition assessment), its operating conditions
achieved (exclusion of failures). and the process in the plant. Similarly, assessment of
Further assumptions are that (a) the nature and ex- the consequence requires a full understanding of the
tent of degradation of components can be predicted mode of failure and its consequent effect.
(e.g. based on the inspection history of those com-
ponents or of other components in similar service)
and (b) that the equipment, which has been proven 4. Critical components
not to degrade, need not be inspected further. Unfor-
tunately, real life often cannot be prescribed. Whilst One of the main goals of the current practice is
the prescription-based approach is well established in to concentrate onto critical components. A critical
design, its application in inspection was much less component in the sense of this work (and it is consis-
suitable because the state of the component depends tent with the position of, e.g. API 580/581, of Seveso
strongly on mode and overall boundary conditions of II guidelines, of IEC 61508 and similar documents)
plant operation. For example, if the mode of operation is a component mostly contributing to the risk,
has to follow better the demand (in the case of power where risk, again, has to be understood as defined in
plants it was exactly what has happened: e.g. through this work, later on. This practically means, that the
shifting from base load operation to cyclic load for components that can lead to the extreme, but only hy-
many power plants and changing to combined cycle pothetically possible critical situations (e.g. disas-
including the gas turbine). Furthermore, the overall trous accidents) are not necessarily the most critical
conditions changed also through need to drastically re- components. Only those components, on the other
duce prices and, consequently, cost of operation, lead- hand, which lead or may lead to significant problems
ing further to reductions of personnel outsourcing the with significantly high consequences are considered
activities and similar measures. critical in terms of this work. This situation shown in
In such a situation, inspection of components at Fig. 4 indicating, as pointed out by Koppen (1998),
fixed time intervals can that in most of the plants only about 20% of plant
impair plant safety by diluting inspection resources, components contribute to the virtually the whole risk
induce unnecessary costs, and in a plant (80% of the risk). Practically, it means
produce false image of the damage state of the plant. that it is generally enough to concentrate onto the crit-
ical 10 or 20% of components and eliminate most of
The solution for the problem has been offered by the risk, achieving thus two seemingly incompatible
the new concepts of condition-based maintenance, goals, namely:
RCM and risk-aware maintenance, risk-based inspec-
tion (RBI), risk-based life management (RBLM) and savings (inspections concentrate on say only 20% of
others. components, scope of inspection can be drastically
These risk-aware solutions mean that it is nec- reduced on the remaining 80% of components); and
essary to move away from the traditional (officially increased reliability, safety and availability (as the
prescribed) and time-based practices, and to adopt risk-bearing components are now those on which
A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182 169

100 the inspection concentrate, the probability of unex-

90 pected failure decrease).
80 ~80% of all components
% of total risk

70 yielding ~20% of total risk This approach is often misunderstood by people

60 working in the area of safety, who, correspondingly,
~20% of components tend to create their scales of criticality primarily
yielding ~80% of total risk
30 based on the possible/imaginable consequences, i.e.
20 the worse the possible problem (e.g. accident), the
more critical the component.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 100
% of components 5. How can optimized RBLM improve
profitability of a plant?
Fig. 4. Typical contribution of single components to total risk of
a plant (Koppen, 1998).
Using RBLM one can check the influence of various
scenarios onto the predicted costs, and consequently

Fig. 5. Choosing the right operating and maintenance strategy (portfolio of management actions) in order to assure desired profitability of
the plants.
170 A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182

Fig. 6. Obtaining optimal profit risk can be just one of the criteria for selection of the strategy: RBLM concept allows modeling the
influence of other criteria, too (e.g. environment, politics, etc.).

onto the expected, where type and intensity of opera- producer (e.g. the one non-depending on weather con-
tion measures and/or maintenance actions can be de- ditions). The issues like subsidies, tax breaks, guaran-
cisive: choosing the right operating and maintenance teed output prices, purchase obligations, green power
strategy (portfolio of management actions) can assure price insurance, price caps, penalties and strategies,
desired profitability of the plants. The above is the international trade of, e.g. sulfur allowance prices and
core goal of the whole work which should prove that similar make the whole situation (from the point of
the improved risk management (trough introduction of view of risk) even more complex, as clearly shown by
RBLM) leads to prevention of losses/increased profits, the experiences available (CaliforniaGreen-e, UK
and, thus, improved overall business practice of plants Future Energy, AustraliaGreen Power, Canada
and utilities (Figs. 5 and 6). Last but not least, risk Ecologo, APX market of Green certificates . . . ).
and RBLM will play an increasingly important role From the technical point of view, the issue might
in the production and trading of green electricity be of even greater interest for the second, and prob-
(Groscurth and Beeck, 2000). A green producer (hy- ably last chance of nuclear energy, to promote itself
droelectricity, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, waste as a green producer. With increase of 2.3% in total
burning, landfill gas, waves, tides and currents, chp gross inland consumption by product type in 1999
and nuclear) trades namely not only with electricity and the share 15.7% in inland consumption in EU
(but with his environmental friendliness) in form of countries in 1999, this chance is certainly existing,
the green energy certificates (Fig. 7, linked to, e.g. but, can be endangered by both, otherwise closely
US sulfur allowance trading volumes). A risk-related dependent, technical risk (resulting in unavailability)
problem, e.g. damage, spills, pollution . . . , can lead and public perception of that risk (resulting in public
not only to lost electricity production, but also lead to acceptance). In fact, the unplanned unavailability in-
the loss of his green producer status and loss of fur- dicators of nuclear power plants have not improved,
ther green electricity products sold as certificates. showing relatively high (on average over 8%) un-
Furthermore, non-managed or poorly managed risk planned unavailability, often higher than the planned
(e.g. risk due to unfavorable overlapping of weather oneas shown in Fig. 8. Reducing the unplanned un-
conditions and maintenance plans) can hit a green availability by only 25% could thus result in savings
electricity producer much worse than a conventional of over 5 million for a large power plant.
A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182 171

Fig. 7. Risk and green electricity.

Fig. 8. Unplanned unavailability in European nuclear power plants (Lefebvre, 2000)total For EU-15 countries.

6. Quantifying needs of industry Life Assessment Network). Furthermore, the inquiry

has used direct contacts and interviews to establish this
An inquiry with the goal to establish needs of Eu- collection of case studies. For each interviewed com-
ropean industry in the area of RBI/RBLM was per- pany the following information has been collected:
formed by MPA Stuttgart during 1999 and in early
2000 within the framework of EPERC (European Pres- Regulatory basis: codes, norms, standards, guide-
sure Equipment Research Council and PLANPlant lines;
172 A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182

Fig. 9. Sample results.

Corporate policies: acceptance and expectations; Finally, more than a half of participants expressed
Practical implementation; their support for the proposed RBI/RBLM related
Future: under construction, planned, expected. EU projects (like RIMAP and similar) and con-
firmed that European RBI/RBLM guidelines are
The interviewees were also supposed to provide urgently needed. Over 70% of participants think
data either on the applications of their own or about that a set of European software tools for RBI/RBLM
data about applications, which have been taken as should be developed. Less than 10% says, how-
references when making the decision to introduce ever, that with API and ASME Guidelines devel-
RBI/RBLM approaches. oped it makes no sense to develop new European
The inquiry can be summarized as follows: guidelines.
43 participants have answered the questionnaire, In addition to the open, Internet-based inquiry
coming from Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, described above, 10 case studies were selected for
Germany, Israel, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, further, more qualitative analysis. The target of the
Slovenia, Sweden, UK, Ukraine and USA. Proba- survey is European situation, and, as the inquiry
bly due to the origin of the main organizer (MPA was anonymous, the companies and the organizations
Stuttgart), most of the answers came from Germany. are only labeled as, e.g. manufacturing or utility.
Work of approximately 60% of participants is re- This is, however, not really always appropriate, the
lated to power plants and 40% to process plants and manufacturers nowadays inspect, the inspectors con-
relevant respective activities. sult, the utilities maintain not only their own plants,
From those using any type of RBI/RBLM approach but also those of others . . . (Fig. 10).
at all, approximately 25% have referred ASME, ap- The inquiry and interviews have confirmed the fol-
proximately 25% API, approximately 10% DNV, lowing needs on all levels:
and approximately 40% other documents, as their
main respective reference documents (Fig. 9). Inspection, maintenance and management strategies
More safety and expected savings are main reasons for all parts of a production plant, should be as-
for RBI/RBLM for approximately 60% of partic- sessed considering cost, safety and other criteria
ipants. The third main reason can be qualitatively within the same framework (RBLM). This can be
described as general interest in RBI/RBLM (ap- achieved only if the inspection/testing, monitoring,
proximately 30%). The rest are other reasons. and the maintenance efforts are focused consistently
Only about 15% of participants report about manda- onto the important components and degradation pro-
tory use of RBI/RBLM risk-related guidelines and cesses which contribute to the safety, environmen-
other similar norms in their companies. tal, and economic risks for the facility.
A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182 173

for integration of these departments and further

integration of the efforts to minimize downtime
unplanned and reduce production cost. The approaches taken
outage old optimum
costs to inspection planning have been called risk-based
cost of inspection (RBI) or the more qualitative approach
risk-informed inspection. In the maintenance area,
RCM has been widely used as a tool to determine
appropriate maintenance types for components,
where one alternative could be inspection, which
number of components
is also considered in RBI. The two approaches are
new optimum
inspected often used to address the same systems/equipment
and the need for a unified approach is identified as
Fig. 10. Introducing RBI leads to a new optimum in planning well as a clear definition of the requirements to the
of inspections and maintenance in a plant, by reducing needed in- content of an analysis. This will benefit the compa-
spections and increasing availability/reliability of the plant through nies doing the work as well as facilitate government
reduction of unplanned outages. audits and make controls more consistent (Fig. 11).

The key element of RBI/RBLMthe prioritization

of the inspection and maintenance efforts for the 7. RBI initiatives and projects
whole plant, need to be done consistently while
maintaining an overview of risks involved through- Koppen (1998) defines RBI shortly and informally
out the operational life of the installation. as a method for using risk as basis for prioritiz-
There is a need for a European approach, which ing, where the risk is defined as the product of the
should lead to a code of practice and a standard. likelihood of failure and the consequences of that
The smaller industry branches with lower safety po- failurethat it applies to candidates for inspection
tential need this most urgently in order to achieve in a process plant, i.e. components and systems, like
cost optimization what will enhance their competi- (pressure) vessels, reactors, exchangers, columns,
tiveness for these industries. tanks and piping.
Maintenance and inspection have traditionally been The role of the leader in risk-based operation and
separate activities. Modern plant management calls maintenance of plants belongs nowadays to process

Interest for RBI/RBLM

process plants
very high
interest Advanced inspectors
and R&D
Inspectors and end-users
moderate R&D
to high
interest Manufacturers RBI/RBLM
Utilities projects and
power plants applications

intended and planned large RBI/RBLM

RBI/RBLM applications applications under way

Fig. 11. Summarizing results of the inquiry.

174 A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182

industry (refineries, chemical plants, petrochemical Although the idea of risk as an optimizing mea-
plants, off-shore). In a series of actions led either sure for in-service inspection was accepted in princi-
by single large companies, or organizations like API ple by many, the first real tangible results appeared
(1998) the risk-based approach in inspections evolved only in late 1980s with appearance of USA the concept
from an interesting alternative into official company of risk-based in-service inspection resulting in first
policies, sometimes even national policies. published documents in early 1990s (ASME, 1991).
In the gap between rich oil industry and Further, the NRC carried out verification and vali-
state-related nuclear industry, conventional power dation exercises while in Europe, a Working Group
plants were searching for their own balance for a long on risk-based in-service inspection has been set up
time. It was only in the 1990s, that the concepts like within the European Network on Inspection Qualifi-
cation (ENIQ, 1997).
RCM/SRCM (streamlined RCM) and
The results were applied later on, in 1990s guide-
lines published by ASME, and/or API (see corre-
have reached the level of a properly organized and sponding references). Most relevant of them is the
supported systemsvery much thanks to the efforts certainly the API coordinated work, sponsored by
of organization like ASME and EPRI (ASME, 1991, 16 large multinational companies, like Amoco, Dow,
1993, 1995, 1996a,b; EPRI, 1998a,b). Exxon, Fina, Shell, Texaco, etc. and performed pri-
Reliability and risk analysis are important issues in marily by DNV Det Norske Veritas in Houston, USA
the area of IT systems in control, too. The most recent (API, 1998, 1999; Koppen, 1998).
example is the standard IEC 61508, covering the com-
plete life cycle of components and systems. IEC 61508
is a standard for safety critical systems. It applies to 8. RBI codes and standards
a variety of safety systems, in multiple industrial sec-
tors like petrochemical, medical, railway, avionics and The core of the US activities is represented by the
automotive systems. It is also internationally accepted following API guidelines:
allowing use in many countries. It combines functional
API 581 Risk-Based Inspection Resource
safety with procedural safety, hardware safety with
Document (API, 2000a)
software safety, it addresses long term safety and the
API 580 Risk-Based Inspection, draft
overall safety lifecycle. It allows for pre-certification
May 2000 (API, 2000b)
of stand-alone components and enables simple reuse
API 580 Lite Risk-Based Inspection, draft
of already certified components in new systems. The
Version May 2000 (API, 2000c)
standard defines four Safety Integrity Levels (SIL).
SIL 1 and 2 apply to safety-related systems, whereas These documents are supported/completed by the
SIL 3 and 4 apply to safety critical systems. following ones:

API Standard 510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: maintenance, inspection, rating, repair, and alteration
API Standard 570 Inspection, repair, alteration, and rerating of in-service piping systems
API Standard 653 Tank inspection, repair, alteration and reconstruction
API RP 521 Guide for pressure-relieving and depressuring systems
API RP 530 Calculation of heater tube thickness in petroleum refineries
API RP 579 Fitness-for-service
API RP 941 Steels for hydrogen service at elevated temperatures and pressures in petroleum
refineries and petrochemical plants
API 750 Management of process hazards
ASME Risk-Based Inspection Guidelines, Handbook for Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants, 1996
Risk-Based In-Service TestingDevelopment of Guidelines, Volume 2Part 2, 1996
A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182 175

Risk-Based In-Service TestingDevelopment of Guidelines, Volume 2: Light Water Reactor

Nuclear Power Plant Components, 1996
Risk-Based In-Service TestingDevelopment of Guidelines, Volume 1: General Document, 1996
Risk-Based Inspection Development of Guidelines: Volume 2Part 2, 1996
Risk-Based Inspection Development of Guidelines: Volume 2Part 2, 1996
Risk-Based Inspection Development of Guidelines: Volume 3, Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Power
Plants, 1995
Risk-Based Inspection Development of Guidelines: Volume 2Part 1, Light Water Reactor
Nuclear Power Plant Components, 1993
Risk-Based Inspection Development of Guidelines: Volume 1, General Document, 1991
EPA Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accident Release Prevention, 40 CFR Part 68, Proposed
Rule, Docket A-91-73
OSHA Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals Standard, Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 1910.119 (FR 57(36))

The three documents API 580/581 provide thus the screening and boundary identification,
framework for Risk-Based Inspection methodology collecting data and information,
that uses risk as a basis for prioritizing and managing identifying deterioration mechanisms and failure
of inspection programs. The Risk-Based Inspection modes,
program is supposed to achieve the following three determining unmitigated risks (probabilities and
main goals: consequences),
assessing risks: acceptable or not,
to define and measure risk;
managing risks with mitigation: inspection (or
to allow management to thoroughly review safety,
other) activities,
environmental, and business-interruption risks in an
periodic reassessment and updating,
integrated, cost-effective manner; and
documentation and record keeping, and
to provide a procedure to systematically re-
roles and responsibilities (Fig. 12).
duce the likelihood of failures by optimizing
use/effectiveness of inspection resources. When compared to the situation in USA, the situ-
ation in Europe, in the term of regulation of RBI, is
Furthermore, in the past, the focus of risk assess-
characterized by the following features:
ment has been on-site safety-related issues, but API
581 extends it to other issues, like: The documents covering single issues are usually
of comparable technical level and detailship (e.g.
What are the consequences associated with risks
specific types of inspections or assessment). For
that could interrupt the business?
example, PED 97/23 and/or Seveso II guideline
Risk of damage to the environment?
can certainly be considered as a European advan-
Off-site risk to the surrounding community?
API 581 can be applied on several levels. Primarily, Generally, there is lower degree of consistency
the document focuses on the equipment within the among single documents, e.g. the terminology used
primary pressure boundaries, but can be expanded to in one standard is not necessarily comparable-
the system level to include additional equipment such consistent to the other one.
as instruments, control systems, electrical distribution, Generally, the overall coverage of the complete
and critical utilities. issue of RBI is better in the US set of documents.
In the newest revisions of the documents (API, In other words, there are often significant gaps in
2000a,b,c), it has become more and more obvious single specific areas, some of issues are often simply
that the RBI cannot be limited to the inspection only. not tackled at all.
They require, namely, that RBI should include the There is still a lack of a document like API 581/580,
following aspects: i.e. there is no central document(s), which would
176 A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182


Supporting documents Basic Evaluation &

& reports (resource) Implementation
for specific documents recommendations
issues & reports & documents

API 510 API 581 API 581

Pressure Vessel Risk-Based RBI recommended
inspection Inspection practice

API 570 API 579

API 581
Piping Fitness for
RBI recommended
inspection Purpose
(not finished!)
(Lite Version - draft!)

API 653

API 750

Fig. 12. Relationships among API RBI-related documents.

link the existing pieces and create a consistent and need to cover other damage mechanisms, both
comprehensive RBI system. those which can be classified as operating time
In terms of general deregulation Europe has still dependent (e.g. corrosion, creep, fatigue . . . ,
a way to gothe USA are already well over the Fig. 16) and those which can be classified as op-
hill. Consequently, the organizations like PVRC, erating time independent (e.g. external damage,
ASME, API and similar are often more capable to explosions and similar, purely random), causes
react in a more flexible and, often, more efficient need to have scaleable (European!) solution, that
way than their European counterparts (e.g. EPERC, would consistently fit both to an, e.g. small un-
1999). For the RBI issue it means that much of it in manned power plant in far Lapland and, at the same
the USA is profit driven and much of it in Europe time, a time 5000 man refinery plant in as densely
regulation driven. populated area of Holland.

The above views, saying that the RBI can be lim-

9. From RBI to RBLM ited to prioritization and inspection only, that the con-
cept of RBI has to be extended, are shared by this
Open issues in RBI which can summarized in the work and have lead to the more comprehensive con-
following major points: cept of RBLM which is its main topic. The members
need to include the whole life management, whole of TTF3 of EPERC have also supported this initia-
plant and its complete life cycles (not only inspec- tive during their discussions taking place at meetings
tions); in 1999/2000. The proposed extension means that, as
A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182 177

Table 1
Risk-informed approach to inspection, maintenance and life management of critical components (Jovanovic, 1999)
Issue Solution

WHEREcritical locations, based on component state RBI/RBLM/. . .
HOW, HOW MUCHoptimized scope Risk-informed inspection, maintenance and operation =
and methods, corresponding to the component/plant life management!
expected/possible damage
WHYcomponent state driven decision
WHENoptimized time of next inspection
WHOclear identification of responsibilities
and logging of decisions made

Table 2
Typical expected result of RBI/RBLM analysis (here: inspection planning for a component potentially exposed to high temperature hydrogen
attack, TMSF is the score factor calculated according to API 581, the efficiencies of inspections as defined in API 581)
TMSF Action or inspection Frequency

Over 10000 Engineering assessment with appropriate repairs ASAP

2000 <= TMSF <= 10000 Usually effective inspection 3 years
500 <= TMSF < 2000 Usually effective inspection 6 years
Fairly effective inspection 3 years
100 <= TMSF < 500 Usually effective inspection 12 years
Fairly effective inspection 6 years
10 <= TMSF < 100 Usually effective inspection 20 years
Fairly effective inspection 10 years
TMSF < 10 No inspection N/A

Table 3
Excerpt from the list of generic equipment failure frequencies as suggested by API 581
Equipment type Leak frequency (per year for four hole sizes)

1/4 in. 1 in. 4 in. Rupture

Centrifugal pump 6 103 5 104 1 104

Column 8 105 2 104 2 105 6 106
Compressor, centrifugal 1 103 1 104
Filter 9 104 1 104 5 105 1 105
Fin/fan coolers 2 103 3 104 5 108 2 108
Heat exchanger, shell 4 105 1 104 1 105 6 106
Heat exchanger, tube side 4 105 1 104 1 105 6 106
Piping, 0.75 in. diameter, per feet 1 105 3 107
Piping, 1 in. diameter, per feet 5 106 5 107
Piping, 4 in. diameter, per feet 9 107 6 107 7 108
Piping, 8 in. diameter, per feet 3 107 3 107 8 108 2 108
Piping, 16 in. diameter, per feet 1 107 2 107 2 108 2 108
Piping, >16 in. diameter, per feet 6 108 2 107 2 108 1 108
Pressure vessels 4 105 1 104 1 105 6 106
Reactor 1 104 3 104 3 105 2 105
Reciprocating pumps 0.7 0.01 0.001 0.001
Atmospheric storage tank 4 105 1 104 1 105 2 105
178 A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182



documents Implementation documents standards,
for specific recommendations for specific codes &
issues & documents issues norms

Safety NDT Certification

Environemnt Qualification Environemnt
Consequence assessment... RBLM Testing...
R&D projects
R&D projects

Examples of
regulatory documents

CEC/EPERC ISO/CEN/EN National (German)

Implementation documents standards,
recommendations codes &
& documents norms

ENIQ EN 1050 DIN EN 1050

recommendations Risk assessment Risk assessment

TTF3 - RBI Seveso II DIN 19250

recommendations Guideline Risk assessment
Hazard management

RBLM PED 97/23 KTA 3201

TTF3 Document Testing inspection Inspection, monitoring
draft! pressure equipment Nuclear power plants

IEC 61 508 TRD 300/301/508

Safety related systems Design, montoring
Conventional power plants


European guideline testing, inspection
(under construction) pressure vessels

TRB 801/15
Fatigue load analysis

Fig. 13. Relationships among some European, national and international RBI-related documents.
A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182 179

partially shown in Fig. 13, the following should be PROBABILITY: CONSEQUENCES:

done: (probability that an importance of the
adverse event happens) component, in terms like
an overall concept of RBI/RBLM specified; state of cost
available methods, tools, codes, standards, etc. em- component safety
external environment
bedded into the above concept; load/factors other
additional needed methods, tools, etc. developed
and included into the above concept;
necessary steps towards the development of the new Risk =
codes, standards and other similar documents un- probability consequences
These are some of the main goals of the RIMAP Priority
project of the EU (Table 1, Fig. 14).
When compared to RBI the extended concept Maintenance strategy
RBLM must provide:
better overview of the state of the plantthe com- Risk-based
ponents prioritized based on the component state COMPONENT / PLANT LIFE MANAGEMENT
and their contribution to overall risk, and last but
not least;
Fig. 15. Prioritization as an input for the RBLM and risk-aware
better answer to the question WHY to inspect;
maintenance strategy.
better (more comprehensive) consideration of real
or possible damage and/or failure mechanisms and
modes, including uncertainties, in

2 years 1 year

oject Demonstra
Demonstra- RIMAP
Coordinator DNV tion
tion Network
Lead Partner DNV
Pro ect Project
Pro ect
Coordinator DNV
Coordinator MPA
Lead Partner
Lead Partner MPA
Development of Operating agent:
European RBI/RBLM Applications of JRC Petten
Guidelines / European RBI /
Application RBLM Guidelines / Dissemination of
Workbooks Application information and
Workbooks results of work on
the European RBI /
RBLM Guidelines /

4 years

Fig. 14. European R&D project RIMAP (see

180 A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182

material properties,
damage development inspection methods/techniques,
vs. time damage propagation analysis methods and tech-
niques (e.g. for operating time dependent
Fig. 16 and operating time independent types of
allowable best estimate damage);
damage possibility to combine consistently and in a
conservative scaleable way different criteria in ranking and life
management related decision making (Fig. 15).

10. RBI/RBLMtypical results

Fig. 16. Probabilistic analysis of damage development dependent Typical results of an RBI/RBLM analysis are
on operating time and/or operation cycles (e.g. creep, fatigue). usually

Fig. 17. RBLM risk map: an example of selected boiler components plotted on a likelihoodconsequence diagram in ALIAS-RBLM system
(normalized axes for consequences and likelihood; multiple criteria considered, including, e.g. cost of downtime, cost of inspection, image
of the company, etc.).
A. Jovanovic / Nuclear Engineering and Design 226 (2003) 165182 181

a risk map (Fig. 17); involving at the European and world level virtu-
detailed/optimized plan of inspections, including al- ally all interested parties (almost 40 in the case of
ternatives (Table 2). RIMAP) promise to deliver the desired level of Euro-
pean RBI/RBLM consolidated practice in foreseeable
Achieving these results is usually neither easy, nor future (23 years).
straightforward, especially if a detailed quantitative
analysis is made. In this case large number of data
might be needed, starting with, e.g. those on generic Acknowledgements
component failure frequencies (Table 3), over those
for probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis, up to The support provided by the European Commission
those describing the management system of the plant to the activities cited in projects RIMAP and PLAN
(Figs. 1517). is greatfully acknowledged here.

11. Conclusions References

API, 1998. API Publication 581, Base Resource Documentation

A successfully implemented RBLM should lead to Risk-Based Inspection, 1st ed. Order # No.: C58101, 1995
the following benefits: 1999. American Petroleum Institute.
API, 1999. API Publication RP 580, Recommended Practice for
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components). Petroleum Institute.
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scope inspection programs (i.e. avoid unnecessary Version, API Recommended Practice, Draft #1, May 2000,
2000. American Petroleum Institute.
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