PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PONENTE: Reyes

TOPIC: Marital rape

FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her

husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their
residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant
boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really
cause marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both
frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal
degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would
immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina.
His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist
his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouses bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead,
rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask
angrily: Why are you lying on the cot?, and to instantaneously order: You transfer
here to our bed.

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she

had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons
did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it
against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where
she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
 The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his
desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by
warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried
to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the
sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKKs daster,41 stretched her legs apart and
rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and
succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued
to protest by desperately shouting: Don t do that to me because Im not feeling well.

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated
the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of
their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over
their wives bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if
not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital
rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their
proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.

The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between
marital rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in
defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and
property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest
scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to
be unconstitutional.
 Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with
absolute immunityfrom prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal
and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable
when he aids or abets another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the

rapists legal relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which
was raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual

violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or
against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party
to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353.
People vs. Gutierrez G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010

Self-defense- the burden of proof is on the accused

Facts:

On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and three
(3) counts of attempted murder were filed against appellant.

When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits then ensued.

Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted him of murder,
frustrated murder and attempted murder on three (3) counts.

Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecutions evidence.
He admits having killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense.

Issue:

Did the accused act in self-defense?

Ruling:

No. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes
only if satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on his part.

In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:

One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the
burden of proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person claiming self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on
the accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must
concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.

In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression.
His version of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible
by the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving victims were unanimous that appellant
suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility of the
prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial court, and it found their testimonies to
be more convincing. As a rule, the appellate court gives full weight and respect to the
determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge has the
best opportunity to observe their demeanor. While this rule admits of exceptions, none of
such exceptions obtains in this case.

In Razon v. People, we held:

Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and
competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-
defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellants plea of self-
defense.

This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying
circumstance. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor
on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victims.

The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that
treachery was employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified to by the
witnesses, and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the victims was not proven, and
appellants testimony that the victims were about to attack him cannot be given credence.
The victims had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming and had no opportunity to mount a
defense. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the crime to
murder.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the
crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 223 of the RPC. The prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-
3639 is correct.

We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder, not of frustrated
murder, in Criminal Case No. 03-3640 for the injury sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof
was offered to show that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal and would have caused his
death had medical help not been provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted
on the victim are not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, as
the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the
victim's death.
Norberto Cruz y Bartolome v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014
Bersamin, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving
different victims. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Cruz guilty of both crimes
charged, hence, this appeal.

Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their plastic wares and glass wares
in La Union. Upon reaching the place, they set up their tents to have a place to sleep. Petitioners wife
and their driver went back to Manila to get more goods. While sleeping, AAA felt that somebody was on
top of her mashing her breast and touching her private part. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she
will be killed. AAA fought back and Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. AA left the tent to
seek for help. When she returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. This
prompted Norberto to leave the tent.

Norberto denies the commission of the crime alleging that he could not possibly do the acts imputed out
in the open as there were many people preparing for the simbang gabi. He further assails the credibility
AAA for the crime of rape, alleging that the complaints were filed only for the purpose of extorting money
from him.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape against AAA?

HELD:
NO, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge of a
female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a
woman, in other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
touches the external genitalia of the female. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis
indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface
thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.

Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In
attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of
having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape
in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts
without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means
by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the
intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands
and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on
her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be
highly unwarranted. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or susceptible of double interpretation,
such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular
injury.

The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of
lasciviousness is committed. Petitioners embracing and touching the victims vagina and breasts did not
directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the
position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her.
At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. The intent to commit rape should not easily be
inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts
leading to rape.

Hence, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape.