MOSQUEDA CASE

Background:
Discussion on Police Power, LGU Powers, Due Process and Equal Protection Clause.
1. Police Power

To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged test:
the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law);
and the
substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and
reason, and its consistency with public policy)

The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53 and Section 54 of The Local
Government Code. These provisions require the ordinance to be passed by the majority of the
members of the Sanggunian concerned, and to be presented to the mayor for approval.

2. Corporate Powers of the LGU

The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in order to promote the
general welfare. Such legislative powers spring from the delegation thereof by Congress through either
the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of the Local
Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the local government unit to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain local
autonomy.

Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely:

the general legislative power; and the
police power proper

General legislative power refers to the

o power delegated by Congress to the local legislative body, or the Sangguniang
Panlungsod in the case of a provincial city
o this power enable the local legislative body to enact ordinances and make regulations
o LIMITATION:
This power is limited in that the enacted ordinances must not be repugnant to
law, and
 power must be exercised to effectuate and discharge the powers and duties
legally conferred to the local legislative body.
The police power proper

authorizes the local government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the
health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of
the local government unit and its constituents, and for the protection of their property

Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the local government unit with the authority
to enact legislation .aimed at promoting the general welfare,

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16
of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under
Section 22 of this Code.

In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology, the local
government unit takes its cue from Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and the Constitution, the acts of the local
government unit designed to ensure the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a balanced
and healthful ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in the local government unit.

Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental integrity are privileges
that do not only advance the interests of a group of individuals. The benefits of protecting human health
and the environment transcend geographical locations and even generations. This is the essence of
Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we declared that the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications.

3. Due Process

Valid Ordinance

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. In order to declare it as a valid piece of local
legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely:

(1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) it must be fair, not oppressive;
(3) it must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) it must not be unreasonable

In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government. A local government unit is considered
to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites:
 (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State (refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution)
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive (refers to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution)

Substantive due process

This requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's action.
This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or
despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance
realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to
achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a
due process challenge.

4. Equal Protection Clause

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection
secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's
duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.123 In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally
applicable to all members of the class.

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban
against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City, which had been
contested.
Aerial Spraying - refers to application of substances through the use of aircraft of any form which dispenses
the substances in the air.
Agricultural Practices - refer to the practices conducted by agricultural entities in relation to their agricultural
activities;
Agricultural Activities - refer to activities that include, but not limited to, land preparation, seeding, planting,
cultivatlo.n, harvesting and bagging;
Agricultural Entities - refer to persons, natural or juridical, involved in agricultural activities
 RTC
The ordinance was challenged by Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association Incorporated after it
took effect on March 23, 2007 more than a month after it was approved by then Mayor Rodrigo Duterte
challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged that the ordinance
exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the
confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant to Section 5116 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).

RTC DECISION:
1. The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police powerunder the General Welfare
Clause of the Local Government Code;
2. That the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent withthe Equal Protection
Clause;
3. That aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the
residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift; and that the ordinance enjoyed the
presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated
the Constitution.
4. However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the 3-month transition period under Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07, recommended the parties to agree on an extended transition period.
RTC granted the prayer for a preliminary injunction, but later on declared the ordinance as valid and
constitutional.

CA
Petitioners Davao City, and Wilfredo Mosqueda et al, who intervened and argued in favor of the ordinance,
appealed to the CA and sought injunctive relief. The CA issued a temporary restraining order.
CA DECISION:
The CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.
1. It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable
and oppressive; found the three-month transition period impractical and oppressive in view of
the engineering and technical requirements of switching from aerial spraying to truck-mounted boom
spraying;
2. Ban ran afoul with the Equal Protection Clause inasmuch as Section 3(a) of the ordinancewhich
defined the term aerial spraying - did not make reasonable distinction between the hazards, safety and
beneficial effects of liquid substances that were being applied aerially; the different classes of
pesticides or fungicides; and the levels of concentration of these substances that could be beneficial
and could enhance agricultural production.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL & INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
It is within the mandate and authority of the City of Davao to enact Ordinance since it is a measure that has an
ostensible LAWFUL SUBJECT: protection of public health and the environment against the alleged harmful
effects of aerial spraying of pesticides or fungicides.
However, UNLAWFUL MEANS since unduly oppressive to individuals and the three months period shift from
aerial spraying to ground spraying unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with.
City of Davao lacked:
- Technical understanding on the intricacies of the engineering works required for the efficient operation
of banana plantations, indifference to corporeal rights of banana planters to protect and enhance their
investments.

- To abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert and adopt other spraying
practices would preclude the banana planters from being able to fertilize their plantations Such an
apparent eventuality would prejudice the operation of the plantations and the economic repercussions
thereof would just be akin to shutting down the venture.
Also, since SEPARABILITY CLAUSE IS NON-EXISTING, the whole ordinance is unconstitutional.
No scientific basis for banning aerial spraying. Testimonies in favor of City of Davao did not prove that the
aerial spraying of substances is the proximate cause of the various ailments the victims allegedly suffered.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE it does NOT classify which substances are prohibited from being applied
aerially even as reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of
liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and the environment
Ordinance is confiscation of property without due process of law, it deprives plantation owners of the lawful
and beneficial use of such areas to be ceded, without just compensation (with regards to buffer zones required
by the ordinance)

The City of Davao and the intervenors filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motions on August 7, 2009

SC
Mosqueda, et al. state that the CA ignored well-established precepts such as:

like the primacy of human rights over property rights and the presumption of validity in favor of the
ordinance;
that the CA preferred the preservation of the profits of respondents PBGEA, et al. to the residents' right
to life, health and ecology, thereby disregarding the benevolent purpose of the ordinance;
that the CA assumed the functions of the lawmaker when it set aside the wisdom behind the enactment
of the ordinance;
that the CA failed to apply the precautionary principle, by which the State was allowed to take positive
actions to prevent harm to the environment and to human health despite the lack of scientific certainty;
 that the CA erred in applying the "strict scrutiny method" in holding that the ordinance violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it only thereby applied in reviewing classifications that affected
fundamental rights;
that there was nothing wrong with prohibiting aerial spraying per se considering that even the aerial
spraying of water produced drift that could affect unwilling neighbors whose constitutional right to a
clean and healthy environment might be impinged;
that as far as the three month period was concerned, the CA should have considered that manual
spraying could be conducted while the PBGEA, et al. laid down the preparations for the conduct of
boorri spraying;
that 'reasonableness" could be more appropriately weighed by balancing the interests of the parties
against the protection of basic rights, like the right to life, to health, and to a balanced and healthful
ecology;
that PBGEA, et al. did not substantiate their claim of potential profit losses that would result from the
shift;
that business profits should remain inferior and subordinate to their fundamental rights as residents of
Davao City, which were the rights that the assailed ordinance has sought to protect;
that PBGEA, et al. did not explore other modes of pesticide treatment either as a stop-gap or as a
temporary measure while shifting to truck mounted boom spraying;29 that the imposition of the 30-
meter buffer zone was a valid exercise of police power that necessarily flowed from the protection
afforded by the ordinance from the unwanted effects of ground spraying; that the imposition of the
buffer zone did not constitute compensable taking under police power

MAIN ISSUE
The main issue is whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power:
(a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5;
(b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under
Section 5;
(c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural
lands in Davao City.

HELD:Petitioners then brought the issue to the SC, but the High Court unanimously denied the consolidated
petitions on certiorari for lack of merit.
The SC made 3 points on the question of "whether a prohibition against aerial spraying is a lawfully
permissible method that the city government can adopt to prevent the effects of the so-called aerial drift":
1. The ordinance violates the due process clause - The High Court said Davao City "must not act arbitrarily,
whimsically or despotically regardless of the ordinance's salutary purpose."
- On Section 5, the SC said 3 months would be inadequate time for the city to shift from aerial to truck-
mounted boom spraying, effectively depriving the city an efficient means to combat disease.
- But the High Court disagreed with PBGEA that the buffer zone required by the ordinance is in violation
of due process since the purpose is to minimize the effects of aerial spraying.
2. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause - The SC said equal protection was violated since the
ordinance made no substantial distinctions when it prohibited aerial spraying per se regardless of the
substance or the level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied, and when it imposed the 30-meter
buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the size of landholdings.
3. The ordinance is an ultra vires act - According to the SC, the city disregarded regulations implemented by
the Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority (FPA), including its identification and classification of safe pesticides and
other agricultural chemicals.
Regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals, the SC said, is a function lodged with the
FPA and not with local government units.
Thus, when Davao City enacted the ordinance "without inherent and explicit authority to do so" the SC said the
local government performed an ultra vires act.

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. et al., petitioner.
vs.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines) et al, respondents.

THE BT TALONG CASE

TOPIC BACKGROUND:
Q: What does Bt mean?
A: Bt means Bacillus Thuringiensis. A spore forming bacterium that produces crystals protein (cry
proteins), which are toxic to many species of insects. - University of California San Diego,
http://www.bt.ucsd.edu/what_is_bt.html
Q: Where is Bt Found?
A: Bt can be found almost anywhere in the world. Surveys have indicated that Bt is distributed in the
soil sparsely but frequently worldwide. Bt has been found in all types of terrain, including, desert, and
tundra habitats. *ibid
Q: Can it harmful to humans?
A: Bt belongs to the family of bacteria, which includes Bacillus Cerus (B cerus) which are strains
that produce toxins that cause gastroenteritis (food poisoning) in humans and Bacillus Anthracis,
the causative agent of anthrax. Bacillus Thuringiensis, on the otherhand are toxic to many species of
insects, - Genome Differences That Distinguish Bacillus anthracis from Bacillus Cereus and Bacillus
Thuringuensis, http://aem.asm.org/content/69/5/2755.full#ref-10.
This Report aims to answer the legality of the said Bt talong field trials based on the case to be
discussed.
Significant Biotechnology Terms and Concepts:
GMO Genetically Modified Organism
Recombitant DNA (rDNA) Technology is often referred to as genetic engineering. It allows scientists
to transfer genes from one (1) organism to any other circumventing the sexual process. In other to
transfer certain traits from animals and plants species, for its own benefit, you can now transfer
genes from an animal specie to a plant specie and vice versa with this genetic engineering. An
organism created by genetic engineering is called a Genetically Modified Organism (GMO).
(GM) Foods refers to crop plants created for human or animal consumption using the latest molecular
biology techniques. These plants are modified in the laboratory to enhance desired traits such as
increased resistance to herbicides or improved nutritional content. In this process, DNA acts as a
carrier of plant traits which will be beneficial in the said plant.
This application of Biotechnology in agricultural production promises to overcome the major
constraints being faced in farming such as insect pest infestation and diseases which lead to
substantial losses. Pest resistant crops could substantially improve yields in developing countries
where pest damage is rampant and reduce the use of chemical pesticides.
On the other hand, the usage of a foreign element in a local environment has also bad effects. GM
Crops affect the environment in more ways than one such as contaminating non-GMO plants,
creating super weeds and super pests, harming non-target species, changing soil microbial and
biochemical properties, and threatening biodiversity.
No study has made any accurate predictions about the long-term effects of GMOs on human beings
and the environment, thus, there is genetic instability. Continued testing is either very expensive or
impractical, and there is still a great deal about the process that scientists do not understand.
Sustainable traditional farming
The aim of the project was to address food security. GM critics say that the real problem is not on the
scarcity but on the lack of access to food. The poor lack money to buy food and lack the land on
which to grow them. This system supports corporate control and impedes common persons access
to adequate food. The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology
for Development (IAASTD) found little evidence to support a conclusion that a modern
biotechnologies are well-suited to meeting the needs of small-scale and subsistence farmers,
particularly under the increasingly unpredictable environmental and economic conditions that they
face.
A study conducted by the IAASTD called the Agricultural Knowledge, science and technology (AKST)
in relation to meeting development and sustainability goals of (1) reducing hunger and poverty (2)
improving nutrition, health and rural livelihoods; and (3) facilitating social and environmental
sustainability had a conclusion that a radical transformation of the worlds food supply farming
systems - especially the policies and institutions that affect them - is necessary if we are to overcome
converting economic and environmental crisis and feed the world sustainably. Also, it held that high-
yielding crop varieties, agrochemicals and mechanization have primarily benefited the better-
resourced groups in society and transnational corporations, rather than the most vulnerable ones.
THE PARTIES:
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES) Respondent - is the Philippine branch of
Greenpeace Southeast Asia. A non-governmental environmental organization operating in 40
countries with an international coordinating body in Amsterdam, Netherlands.
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, INC.
(ISAAA) Petitioner an international non-profit organization founded in 1990 which aims to facilitate
the acquisition and transfer of agricultural biotechnology applications from the industrial countries, for
the benefit of poof farmers in the developing countries and also to alleviate hunger and poverty in the
developing countries. Partly funded by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) to promote the use of agricultural biotechnology such as genetically modified organisms
(GMOs).
MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG) Respondent
a coalition of local farmers, scientists and NGOs working towards the sustainable use and
management of biodiversity through farmers control of genetic and biological resources, agricultural
production, and associated knowledge.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAOS (UPLB) Autonimous constituent of the
University of the Philippines (UP). Is the center of biotechnology education and research in Southeast
Asia and home to at least four international research in Southeast Asia and home to at least four
international research and extension centers.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAOS FOUNDATION, INC. (UPLBFI) Petitioner a
private corporation organized to be an instrument for institutionalizing a rational system of utilizing
UPLB expertise and other assets for generating additional revenues and other resources needed by
UPLB.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (UP) Petitioner an institution of higher learning. A state
university task by the former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to perform its unique and distinctive
leadership in higher education and development. Also, it is to serve as a research university in
various fields of expertise and specialization by conducting basic and applied research and
development, and promoting research in various colleges and universities, and contributing to the
dissemination and application of knowledge.
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE PHILIPPINES
Biotechnology Is any technique that uses living organisms or substances from those organisms to
make or modify a product, to improve plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific
uses.
DEVELOPMENT OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE PHILIPPINES
1979 President Marcos established the National Institute for Applied Microbiology and
Biotechnology (BIOTECH) at UPLB. A premier research and development institution applying
traditional and modern biotechnology in innovating products, processes testing and analytical
services for agriculture, health, energy, industry and development.
1990 President Corazon Aquino E.O. 430 creating the National Committee on Biodiversity of
the Philippines (NCBP) tasked to identify and evaluate potential hazards involved in initiating
genetic engineering experiments or the introduction of new species and genetically engineered
organisms and recommend measures to minimize risks. To formulate and review national policies
and guidelines on biosafety, such as the safe conduct of work on genetic engineering, pests and their
genetic materials for the protection of public health, environment and personnel and supervise the
implementation thereof.
1991- NCBP formulated the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines governs and regulate the importation
or introduction, movement and field release of potentially hazardous biological materials in the
Philippines.
1993 December 29 - Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) multilateral treaty recognized that
modern technology has great potential for human well-being if developed and used with adequate
safety measures for the environment and human health.
1998 Guidelines on Planned Release of Genetically Manipulated Organisms (GMOs) and
Potentially Harmful Exotic Species (PHES).
2000 January Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol) aims to contribute to
ensuring an adequate level of the safe transfer, handling and use of living method organisms
resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking into account risks to human health, and specifically
focusing on transboundary movements.
2000 March 24 - The Philippines signed the Cartagena Protocol which came into force on
September 11, 2003. This was later adopted by the Philippine Senate through Senate Resolution No.
92 Resolution Concurring in the Ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) to the
UN Convention on Biological Diversity on August 14, 2006.
2002 April The Department of Agriculture (DA) issued DA Administrative Order (AO) No. 08
providing rules and regulations for the importation and release into the environment of plants and
plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology. (DAO-08-2002) covers the importation
or release in to the environment of:
(1) Any plant which has been altered or produces through the use of modern biotechnology if the
donor organism, host organism, or vector or vector agent belongs to the genera or taxa classified by
the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) as meeting the definition of plant pest or is a medium for the
introduction of noxious weeds; or
(2) Any plant or plant product altered through the use of modern biotechnology which may pose
significant risks to human health and the environment based on available scientific and technical
information.
2006 March 17 EO No. 514 (EO 514) or Establishing the National Biosafety Framework (NBF),
Prescribing Guidelines for its Implementation, and Strengthening the NCBP. It shall apply to the
development, adoption, and implementation of all biosafety policies, measures and guidelines and in
making decisions concerning the research, development, handling and use, transboundary
movement, release in to the environment and management of regulated articles. It provides that
unless amended by the issuing departments or agencies, DAO 08-2002, the NCBP Guidelines on the
Continue Use of Genetically Modified Organisms, and all issuances of the Bureau of Food and Drugs
Authority (DFA) on products of modern biotchnology, shall continue to be in force and effect.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) was executed between UPLBFI,
ISAAA and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc (UPMFI). It is in pursuance of a collaborative research and
development project on eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer. Also included in the
project were UPLB through its Institute of Plant Breeding, Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company
(MAHYCO) of India, Cornell University and the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII)
of USAID.
As described in the Field Trial Proposal, the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was
described as a bioengineered eggplant, Bacillus Thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the
eggplant genome to produce the protein Cyr1 Ac which is toxic to the target insect pests. Said protein
was to affect a specific insect the lepidopteran Larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer.
A contained experiment was started in 2007 until March 3, 2009. This was supervised by the
NCBP thus was given by said agency a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment stating
that During the conduct of the experiment, all the biosafety measures have been complied with and
no untoward incident has occurred.
Thus, on March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, BPI then issued Biosafety Permits to UPLB to be
conducted on the following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan;
Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.
Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents (Greenpeace, et al) on April 26, 2012 filed a
Petition for Writ of Kalikasan and Writ of Continuing Mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). They alleged that the Bt talong filed trials
violate their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering that:
(1) The required environmental compliance certificate under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1151
was not secured prior to the project implementation;
(2) As mentioned in DAO 08-2002, Bt talong is presumed harmful to human health and the
environment, and there is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bt talong for human
consumption and the environment;
(3) A study conducted by Professor Gilles-Eric Seralini showed adverse effects on rats who were
fed Bt corn, while local scientists also attested to the harmful effects of GMOs to human and animal
health;
(4) Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species as higlighted by a research conducted in
the US which demonstrated that pollen from Bt maize was toxic to the monarch butterfly;
(5) Data from the used Bt Cyr1 Ab maize indicate that beneficial insects have increased mortality
when fed on larvae of a maize pest, the corn borer, which had been fed on Bt, and hence non-target
beneficial species that may feed on eggplant could be similarly affected;
(6) Data form china show that the use of Bt crops (Bt cotton) can exacerbate populations of other
secondary pests;
(7) The built in pesticides of Bt crops will lead to Bt resistant pests, thus increasing the use of
pesticides contrary to the claims by GMO Manufacturers; and;
(8) The 200 meters perimeter pollen trap area in the field testing area set by BPI is not sufficient
to stop contamination of nearby non-Bt eggplants because pollinators such as honeybees can fly as
far as four kilometers and an eggplant is 48% insect-pollinated.
The full acceptance of the findings of MAHYCO Dossier was strongly assailed on the ground that
these do not precisely and adequately assess the numerous hazards posed by Bt talong and its field
trial.
It was also claimed that the Bt Talong field testing project did not comply with the required
consultation under Sec 26 & 27 of the Local Government Code evidenced by a random survey
conducted by Greenpeace on July 21, 2011. Various provinces surrounding the testing area were not
aware of the said testing and complained of lack of information on the nature and uncertainties of the
Bt talong field testing.
Greenpeace calls for the application of the precautionary principle. This principle emphasizes
the fact that Bt talong field testing being a classic environmental case where scientific evidence as to
the health, environmental and socio-economic safety is insufficient or uncertain and preliminary
scientific evaluation indicates reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially dangerous
effects on human health and the environment.
The following reliefs are thus prayed for:
a. Upon the filing [of this petition], a Temporary Environment Protection Order should be
issued:
(i) enjoining public respondents BPI and FPA of the DA from processing for field testing, and
registering as herbicidal product, Bt talong in the Philippines;
(ii) stopping all pending field testing of Bt talong anywhere in the Philippines; and
(iii) ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong for field trials as their very presence pose
significant and irreparable risks to human health and the environment.
b. Upon the filing [of this petition], issue a writ of continuing mandamus commanding:
(i) Respondents to submit to and undergo the process of environmental impact statement
system under the Environmental Management Bureau;
(ii) Respondents to submit independent, comprehensive, and rigid risk assessment, field
tests report, regulatory compliance reports and supporting documents, and other material
particulars of the Bt talong field trial;
(iii) Respondents to submit all its issued certifications on public information, public
consultation, public participation, and consent of the local government units in the
barangays, municipalities, and provinces affected by the field testing of Bt talong;
(iv) Respondent regulator, in coordination with relevant government agencies and in
consultation with stakeholders, to submit an acceptable draft of an amendment of the
National BioSafety Framework of the Philippines, and DA Administrative Order No. 08,
defining or incorporating an independent, transparent, and comprehensive scientific and
socio-economic risk assessment, public information, consultation, and participation, and
providing for their effective implementation, in accord with international safety standards;
and,
(v) Respondent BPI of the DA, in coordination with relevant government agencies, to
conduct balanced nationwide public information on the nature of Bt talong and Bt talong
field trial, and a survey of social acceptability of the same.
c. Upon filing [of this petition], issue a writ of kalikasan commanding Respondents to file their
respective returns and explain why they should not be judicially sanctioned for violating or
threatening to violate or allowing the violation of the above-enumerated laws, principles, and
international principle and standards, or committing acts, which would result into an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of petitioners in particular and
of the Filipino people in general.
 d. After hearing and judicial determination, to cancel all Bt talong field experiments that are
found to be violating the above mentioned laws, principles, and international standards; and
recommend to Congress curative legislations to effectuate such order.
On May 2, 2012, The court issued the Writ of Kalikasan against the ISAAA, Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) BPI / Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) and UPLB, ordering them
to make a verified return within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days, as provided in sec. 8 Rule 7
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
ISAAA, EMB / BPI / FPA, UPLBFI and UPMFI filed their respective verified returns. Their
defenses as stated on the returns as stated are as follows:
a. The Issuance of Writ of Kalikasan is not proper because in the implementation of the Bt talong
project, all environmental laws were complied with
b. The Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)
Law and that Bt talong will not significantly affect the quality of the environment nor poses a hazard to
human health
c. That there is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed, on the safety of Bt
talong human consumption;
d. That the allegations regarding the safety of Bt talong as food are irrelevant in the field trial
stage as none of the eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals, and all materials that will not
be used for analysis will be chopped, boiled and buried following the Biosafety permit requirements;
e. They also sited the 50-year history of safe use and consumption of agricultural products
sprayed with commercial Bt microbial pesticides and a 14-year history of safe consumption of food
and feed derived from Bt crops;
f. Also mentioned was the almost 2 million hectares of land in the Philippines which have been
planted with Bt corn since 2003, and the absence of documented significant and negative impact to
the environment and human health;
g. The statements given by scientist and experts in support of the allegations of Greenpeace, et
al. on the safety of the Bt corn was also addressed by citing the contrary findings in other studies
which have been peer-reviewed and published in scientific journals;
h. Procedural aspect:
h.1 ISAAA sought the dismissal of the petition for writ of kalikasan for non-observance of the
rule on hierarchy of courts and the allegations there in being mere assertions and baseless
conclusions of law;
h.2 The legal standing of Greenpeace, et al. in filing the petition for writ of kalikasan as they
do not stand to suffer any direct injury as as result of the Bt talong field tests, Greenpeace have
failed to allege that they have been prejudice or damaged, or their constitutional rights to health
and balance ecology were violated or threatened to be violated by the conduct of Bt talong field
trials.; and
h.3 the failure of the petition to state a cause of action and for utter lack of merit.
 I. In Davao City, there were no further field trials conducted after the actual field trials at Bago
Oshiro which started in November 25, 2010 were uprooted by Davao City officials, on December 17-
18, 2010, hence no violation of constitutional rights of persons or damage to the environment; and
J. That the precautionary principle is not applicable considering that the filed testing is only a
part of a continuing study being done to ensure that the field trials have no significant and negative
impact on the environment. Moreover, the issues raised by Greenpeace, et al. Largely involve
technical matters which pertain to the special competence of BPI whose determination thereon is
entitled to great respect and even finality.
On October 12, 2012, CA resolved that (1) greenpeace, et al. posses the requisite legal standing
to file the petition for writ of kalikasan; (2) assuming arguendo that the field trials have already been
terminated, the case is not yet moot since it is capable of repetition yet evading review; (3) the
alleged non-compliance with environmental and local government laws present justiciable
controversies for resolution by the court.
CA then proceeded with the case, adopting the hot-tub method where in the expert witness of
both parties testify at the same time. Each side had various witnesses presented in court.
On May 17, 2013, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of Greenpeace, et al. Granting the
petition and the respondents are directed among others to permanently cease and desist from
further conducting Bt talong field trials; and to protect, preserve rehabilitate and restore the
environment in accordance with the foregoing judgment of this Court.
The decision of CA was based on the fact that the existing regulations issued by the DA and the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) are insufficient to guarantee the safety of the
environment and health of the people. This is in concurrence to Dr. Malayangs view (in this case,
expert witness for the petitioners), that the government must exercise precaution under the realm of
public policy and beyond scientific debate, the appellate court noted the possible irreversible effects
of the field trials and the introduction Bt talong to the market.
Also, Sec 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Stressing the fact that
the over-all safety guarantee of the Bt talong remains unknown. the appellate court cited the
testimony of Dr. Cario (expert witness for the respondents), who admitted that the product is not yet
safe for consumption because a safety assessment is still to be done. Amid the uncertainties
surrounding the Bt talong, the CA upheld the primacy of the peoples constitutional right to health and
a balanced ecology.
CA denied the motions for reconsideration of the pro-Bt talong field testing.
CA clarifies that the writ stops the field trials of Bt talong as a procedure but does not stop Bt
talong research, there is no assault on academic freedom.
CA also emphasizes on the theory that introducing a genetically modified plant into our
ecosystem is an ecologically imbalancing act. In introducing a genetically modified plant in our
intricate world of plants by humans certainly appears to be a ecologically imbalancing act. The
damage that it will cause may be irreparable and irreversible.
Petitioners Arguments per case:
GR. No. 209271
ISAAA claims:
A) that CA gravely erred in refusing to dismiss the petition for writ of continuing mandamus and
writ of kalikasan considering that the same is already moot and academic;
B) That the CA gravely erred in refusing to dismiss the petition for writ of continuing mandamus
and writ of kalikasan considering that the same raises political questions;
C) That the respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies since the primary
jurisdiction over the same lies with the regulatory agencies;
D) That the CA erred in granting the writ of kalikasan in favor of the respondents when evidence
was shown that Bt talong complied with all the environmental laws, rules and regulations
in order to ensure that the peoples right to a balanced and healthful ecology are protected and
respected. That the field trials do not cause environmental damage and do not prejudice the
life, health and property of inhabitants of two or more provinces or cities, and in applying the
precautionary principle in this case despite the fact that respondents failed to present an iota
of evidence to prove their claim;
E) That the CA erred in granting a writ of continuing mandamus against petitioner ISAAA;
F) That the CA Decision dated May 17, 2013 and Resolution dated September 20, 2013 is an
affront to academic freedom and scientific progress.

G.R. No. 209276

EMB, BPI and FPA as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) assails the CA
Decision granting the petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus despite the
failure of Greenpeace, et al. To prove the requisites for their issuance.
(1) That the respondents failed to present evidence to prove their claim that the Bt talong
filed trials violated environmental laws and rules.
(2) That the respondents presented evidences of studies which were insubstantial as they were
not published in peer-reviewed scientific journals.
(3) That the application of the precautionary principle was misplaced.
(4) Petitioners also avers that no damage to human health since no Bt talong will be ingested by
any human being during the field trial stage and if the results of said testing are adverse, petitioners
will not allow the release of Bt talong to the environment.
(5) Respondents failed to prove that there was any unlawful deviation from the provisions of DAO
08-2002. The BPIs factual fining on the basis of risk assessment on the Bt talong project should thus
be accorded respect, if not finality by the courts.
(6) Petitioners add that the CA treads on judicial legislation when it recommended the re-
examination of countrys existing laws and regulations governing studies and research on GMOs.
G.R. No. 209301
UPLBFI argues:
(1) That respondents failed to adduce the quantum of evidence necessary to prove actual or
imminent injury to them or the environment as to render the controversy ripe for judicial
determination;
(2) That the respondents spoke only of injury in the speculative, imagined kind without any
factual basis. UPLBFI submits the specific facts borne by competent evidence on record against the
respondents bare allegation;
(3) That the precautionary principle was misapplied in this case because the testimonial and
documentary evidence of respondents do not amount to scientifically plausible evidence of threats of
serious and irreversible damage to the environment;
(4) That the respondents failed to show proof of specific facts of environmental damage of
magnitude contemplated under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases as to warrant
sanction on the Bt talong field trials; and,
(5) That the Bt talong field trial was an exercise of the constitutional liberty of scientists
and other academicians of UP which was deprived without due process of law.

G.R. No. 209430

UP alleges:
(1) Same with the UPLBFIs reasoning that it was conducted in the exercise of UPLBs academic
freedom;
(2) That such field tests were performed in accordance to limits prescribed by DAO 08-2002;
(3) That the Bt eggplant were not yet intended to be introduced into the Philippines ecosystem
nor to the local market for human consumption; and,
(4) That the CA could not support its Decision and Resolution on the pure conjecture and
imagination of one witness. Basic is the rule that a decision must be supported by evidence
on record.

Respondents defenses:
The filing of said petition is based on the fact that the inherent and potential risks and adverse
effects of GM crops are recognized in the Cartagena Protocol and our biosafety regulations. Said
contamination may be caused by pollination, ingestion by insects and other animals, water and soil
run off, human error, mechanical accident and even by stealing was inevitable in growing Bt talong in
an open environment for field trial. Such contamination may even manifest after many years and in
places very far away from the trial sites.
 In the issue on violation of the law, the petitioners omitted their crucial duties to conduct
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA); evaluate health impacts, get the free prior and informed
consent of the people in the communities; and to provide remedial and liability processes in the
approval of the biosafety permit and conduct of the field trials in its five sites located in five provinces.
Making the people and the environment at serious and irreversible risks.
Also, respondents sited studies conducted by foreign countries as well as local reports to add to
their defenses. They also made mention of various cases drawn from various news reports and
specific scientific literature which were also submitted to court.
The claim of the petitioners that the respondents failed to present enough evidence to call for the
court to render a affirmative decision for them. The respondents claim that the biosafety evidence
cannot be contained in a corpus delicti to be presented in court. This is why the Cartagena Protocols
foundation is on the precautionary principle and development of sound science and its links, to social
and human rights law though its elements of public awareness, public participation and public right to
know. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases specifically provides that the
appreciation of evidence in a case like this must be guided by the precautionary principle.
The non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, respondents stressed that nowhere in the 22
sections of DAO 08-2002 that one can find a remedy to appeal the decision of the DA issuing the
field testing permit.
Finally, in the Writ of continuing mandamus, respondents made mention of EO 514 explicitly
stating that the application of biosafety regulations shall be made in accordance with existing laws
and the guidelines therein provided. In addition to that, pursuant to the PEISS law and Sections 12
and 13 of the Philippines Fisheries Code of 1998, an environmental impact statement (EIS) is
required and an environmental compliance certificate (ECC) is necessary before such Bt crop filed
trials can be conducted.
ISSUES:
1. Legal standing of the respondents;
2. Mootness;
3. Violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Application of the law on environmental impact statement/assessment on projects
involving the introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country;
5. Evidence of damage or threat of damage to human health and the environment in two or more
provinces, as a result of the Bt talong field trials;
6. Neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public respondents in connection with
the processing and evaluation of the applications for Bt talong field testing; and
7. Application of Precautionary Principle.
SC RULING
Legal Standing
A right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question particularly to a partys personal
and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result and
thus calls for more than just a generalized grievance. Being a matter of procedure, it may be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires such when the subject matter requires transcendental importance.
In Oposa v Factoran, Jr., the court recognized the public right of citizens to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Ordinary citizens not only have legal standing to use for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future
generations. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned.
The liberalization rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases.
Mootness
Since the termination of all field trials on August 10, 2012, the petitioners argue that the case is
now moot. The rule on moot cases is that it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the
issues involved have become academic or dead, or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention. This rule is subject to an exception
where in the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. Nonetheless, courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic if:
(1) It is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;
(3) When the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public; and
(4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The second and fourth exceptions justified the CA in not dismissing the case despite the
termination of Bt talong field trials.

Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first
avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes, again subject to exceptions
such as when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy and when strong public
interest is involved as mentioned in the case Republic v Lacap.
Another point is that clearly the provisions of DAO 08-2002 do not provide a speedy, or adequate
remedy for the respondents to determine the questions of unique national and local importance
raised here that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus respondents were
justified in coming to this court. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that GMF is an intensely
debated global issue, and despite the entry of GMO corps, like Bt corn, in the Philippines in the last
decade, it is only now that such controversy involving alleged damage or threat to human health and
the environment from GMOs has reached the courts.
 Upon discussions during the hot tub method, it presented more of scientific uncertainty than
valid arguments. The present uncertainty warrants further research and it has been demonstrated
that here is a risk of bias relying on hypothesis that dominate mainstream science. There is therefore
a need for independent research that is without prejudice and unbiased by economic and
professional interests.
Application of current environmental laws
It must be stressed that the DAO 08-2002 and related DA orders are not the only legal basis for
regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO 514 establishing the National Biosafety
Framework (NBF) provides that the NBF must apply all biosafety policies, measures and guidelines
to the field trials development, adoption and its implementation. Also, in making the biosafety
decisions concerning the research, development, handling and use, transboundary movement,
release into the environment and management of regulated articles. It aims to enhance the decision-
making system of the application of products of modern biotechnology, making it more transparent
and participatory. It also mandates that decisions shall be arrived with the participation of all relevant
stakeholders and organizations who shall have appropriate access to information and the opportunity
to participate responsibly and in an accountable manner in biosafety decision-making process.
EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most particularly DENR-EMB, BPI
and FPA, make a determination whether the EIS system should apply to the release of GMOs into
the environment and issue joint guidelines on the matter.
Considering the minimum requirements under the most comprehensive national biosafety
regulation to date, compliance by the petitioners with DAO 08-2002 is not sufficient. Sec. 7 Public
Participation of the NBF mandates a more transparent, meaningful and participatory public
consultation on the conduct of field trials beyond the posting and publication of notices and
information sheets, consultations with some residents and government officials, and submission of
written comments, provided in DAO 08-2002.
The DOA lacks the mechanisms to mandate applicants to comply with international biosafety
protocols. Also, it was a being claimed that the BPI had approved nearly all of the applications for
GMO field trials as confirmed by the data posted on their website, and because of this respondents
avers that the DAO 08-2002 should be declared invalid.
Also, as mentioned above, under Section 12 and 13 of RA 8550 Philippine Fisheries Code, all
government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who intend to undertake
activities or projects which will affect the quality of the environment are required to prepare a detailed
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and an environmental compliance certificate (ECC) prior to
undertaking the development activity.
All government agencies as well as private corporations who wishes to undertake activities or
projects which will affect the quality of the environment are required to prepare a detailed
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to such development activity. The Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) regard this project concerning the usage of GMO in the country as to
poses potential hazards to human health and the environment, therefore is considered by such
agency as an Environmental Critical Project (ECP). ECP is likely to have significant adverse impact
that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse and which may include activities that have significant
environmental consequences.
We find that the petitioners simply adhered to the procedures laid down by DAO 08-2002 and no
real effort was made to operationalize the principles of the NBF in the conduct of field testing of Bt
talong.
Application of Precautionary Principl
It must be noted that NBF requires the use of precaution. Section 2.6 Using Precaution - In
accordance to with the Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 and the relevant provisions of the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Articles 1, 10 (par. 6) and 11 (par. 8), the
precautionary approach shall guide biosafety decision. The principles and elements of this approach
are hereby implemented through the decision-making system in the NBF.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, finalized and
adopted in Montreal on January 29, 2000, established an international regime primarily aimed at
regulating trade in GMOs intended for release into the environment, in accordance with Principle 15
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. It thus provides:
Article 10: Decision Procedure - 6. Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified
organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking
also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism in question as referred to in
paragraph 3 above, in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.
Article 11: Procedure for living modified organisms intended for direct use as food or feed, or for
processing - 8. Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into
account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate,
with regard to the import of that living modified organism intended for direct use as food or feed, of
for processing, in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.
Annex III Risk Assessment
General Principles
4. Lack of scientific knowledge or scientific consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as
indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of risk or an acceptable risk
The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s,expressing the normative idea
that governments are obligated to "foresee and forestall" harm to the environment. For the first time,
the precautionary approach was codified under Principle 15.
Principle 15: In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.
It also indicates that a lack of scientific certainty is no reason to postpone action to avoid
potentially serious or irreversible harm to the environment.
According the The Precautionary Principle World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific
Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) in March 2005, the precautionary principle applies when the
following conditions are met:
there exist considerable scientific uncertainties;
there exist scenarios (or models) of possible harm that are scientifically reasonable (that is
based on some scientifically plausible reasoning);
uncertainties cannot be reduced in the short term without at the same time increasing ignorance
of other relevant factors by higher levels of abstraction and idealization;
the potential harm is sufficiently serious or even irreversible for present or future generations or
otherwise morally unacceptable;
there is a need to act now, since effective counteraction later will be made significantly more
difficult or costly at any later time.
The Rules on Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) likewise incorporated the
principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
SEC. 1. Applicability. - When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle
in resolving the case before it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the
benefit of the doubt.
SEC. 2. Standards for application. - In applying the precautionary principle, the following factors,
among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future
generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the environmental
rights of those affected.
Under this Rule, the precautionary principle finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence
in cases before the courts. It bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual findings
cannot be achieved. The court may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or
inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment. The second paragraph of
section 1 above shows a bias is created in favor of the constitutional right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology(Article II, Sec. 16, 1987 Philippine Constitution), thus, shifting the burden of
evidence of harm away from those likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring to change the status
quo.
For purposes of evidence, the precautionary principle should be treated as a principle of last
resort, where application of the regular Rules of Evidence would cause in an inequitable result for the
environmental plaintiff - (a) settings in which the risks of harm are uncertain; (b) settings in which
harm might be irreversible and what is lost is irreplaceable; and ( c) settings in which the harm that
might result would be serious. When these features - uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible
harm, and the possibility of serious harm - coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is
strongest. When in doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology. Parenthetically, judicial adjudication is one of the strongest fora in
which the precautionary principle may find applicability. Assessing the evidence on record, as well as
the current state of GMO research worldwide, the Court finds all the three conditions present in this
case - uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm and the possibility of serious harm. Alongside
the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF in the crucial stages of risk
assessment and public consultation, including the determination of the applicability of the EIS
requirements to GMO field testing, are compelling reasons for the application of the precautionary
principle.
There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of GMOs into the environment
threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and eventually the health of our
people once the Bt eggplants are consumed as food. Adopting the precautionary approach, the Court
rules that the principles of the NBF need to be operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the
concerned departments and agencies before allowing the release into the environment of genetically
modified eggplant.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated May 17, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00013 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1. The conduct of the assailed field testing for Bt talong is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED;
2. Department of Agriculture Administrative Order No. 08, series of 2002 is declared NULL AND
VOID; and
3. Consequently, any application for contained use, field testing, propagation and
commercialization, and importation of genetically modified organisms is TEMPORARILY ENJOINED
until a new administrative order is promulgated in accordance with law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

VINUYA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the
SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA,
and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes
against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in
the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years,
these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of
a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve
large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the
people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the
Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to
the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest
of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.
The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary
length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given
ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if
apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on
the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever
means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or
legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to
furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and
do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners
have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time
the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga
omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction
should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that
they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

QUINTO vs. COMELEC

Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official
Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.
Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and
who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend
that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting
provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that
they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of
their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law
unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those
who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its
classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal
a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is
not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as
the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would
be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the
law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure
is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the
danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare
of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral
arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would
be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
 If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the
classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or
an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive
Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President
who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were
appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and
foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them
differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in
the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period
and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive
office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy
would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure
encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of
the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an
earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides that
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within
this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four
requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and
fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment
of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the
deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that
elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were
excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign
will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such
officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar
as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the
law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service;
the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with
the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition;
and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3)
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official
or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled
corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a
barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law,
there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one.
For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.

SEMA vs. COMELEC

Facts:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Sec.19,
Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting
the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of
Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 maintaining the status
quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845
stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment
of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No.
07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City prayed for the
nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that
office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3),
Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.
2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House
of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.
Held:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5 of Art.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the
Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code (LGC)
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU must follow the
criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third,
there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress
can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and
provided no conflict arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative
bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria established
in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an Act of Congress can
create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1 representative in the
House of Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more
than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least 1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of the
Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the Constitution, the
power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to apportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to
reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing
ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted
by regional/local legislative bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power
(of Congress) to make laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415
(1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body which created it.
Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in its membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be
exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office because Sec. 20, Art.X
of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited only within
its territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to
create/apportion legislative districts for Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Since the ARMM
Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a
legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is
void.