Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
June 25, 2010
Summary: How does the West deal
with an autocratic ally like Azerbai-
jan — an energy-rich country whose
cooperation and support is key to
achieving many Western objec-
tives but which is also increasingly
authoritarian and distrustful of the
West? Amanda Paul argues that the
answer lies in a much broader policy
of engagement that more fully takes
Baku’s legitimate interests and
needs into account — and treats it
as more than an energy provider.
Above all, the West needs to make
progress on principled yet thorny
issues like Nagorno-Karabakh,
and reassure Baku in the wake of
the Russia-Georgia War of 2008.
Gorkhmaz Askarov argues that
“engagement” is a euphemism for
accepting the authoritarian regime
in Baku and conducting business
as usual. He argues that the West
needs to work to bring our interests
and values back into alignment
through democratic change in Baku.
If the West wants Azerbaijan back
as a real partner, it needs to recog-
nize that the ultimate guarantors of
Western interests in the country are
reviving and strengthening demo-
cratic institutions.
1744 R Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 745 3950
F 1 202 265 1662
E info@gmfus.org
How Do You Deal with An
Autocratic and Energy-Rich Ally like
Azerbaijan?
Why We Need to Engage Azerbaijan —
and Treat It as More than Just a Gas Station
By Amanda Paul*
Azerbaijan is a country of increasing
geo-strategic importance in a region
— the South Caucasus — plagued by
territorial, ethnic, and identity conflicts.
This “land of fire” was the world’s first
oil capital, with the earliest offshore oil
drilling in 1846, and it is a key energy
player today, especially in unlocking
and allowing the transfer of Caspian
energy to the West. It is also a secular
state with a Muslim majority popula-
tion and has a reputation for religious
tolerance. It is unique in being a

There are approximately 1,300 mosques, 40 churches,
5 synagogues, and more than 500 other places of wor-
ship for other faiths.
Azerbaijan: Democracy Matters
By Gorkhmaz Askarov
Since the emergence of an independent
Azerbaijan in the wake of the Soviet
collapse in 1991, U.S. policy toward this
country has been beset by the familiar
dilemma between democratization and
engagement. While trying to gently
nudge the country toward democratic
reforms, Washington has also been
willing to deal with the autocratic
leaders in Baku and has given support
to multibillion-dollar energy projects
that have de facto strengthened the
regime at home while also cementing
*
Amanda Paul is Policy Analyst and Program Executive at the European Policy Center in Brussels. Gorkhmaz Askarov is Vice-
chairman of Azerbaijani-Americans for Democracy and Editor-in-chief of the Azerireport News Website. The views expressed
here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
country that shares three identities: as a
Muslim, European, and ex-Soviet state.
However, at the same time, Azerbaijan
remains a politically closed society with
a dynastic presidency. The consider-
able revenues it has earned from its vast
hydrocarbon reserves have not resulted
in greater openness or democracy.
Instead they have made the country’s
rulers progressively more independent
and self-confident, and increasingly
resistant to Western pressure and
concerns over human rights, democ-
racy, and freedom of speech. This
Continued on page 2
Azerbaijan’s ties to the West. For nearly
ten years, from 1993 until 2003, when
Azerbaijan was governed by former
Soviet apparatchik Heydar Aliyev, the
United States believed it had success-
fully found a formula that reflected
both cooperation and a gentle push
for democratic reforms. The official
American policy laid out cooperation,
security, and democratic reforms as
three key principles guiding relations
with Azerbaijan.
Continued on page 5
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
Continued from page 1
situation has, in turn, undercut some support for Azerbaijan
in the West. As such there is an ongoing debate as to how the
West can best deal with Azerbaijan and influence the process
of modernization and democratization — embrace Baku, or
keep it at arm’s length?
This paper argues that the only effective approach the
West has is that of engagement, and that we can maximize
our influence through the deepening of ties. This involves
remaining seriously engaged on a wide spectrum of issues
— not just energy — while at the same time having a more
principled approach to Azerbaijan’s national interests.
“A Geopolitical Pivot”
Azerbaijan is situated at the crossroads between Europe
and Asia, Russia and the Middle East. During his presi-
dency (1993–2003), Azerbaijani leader Heydar Aliyev tried
to balance the interests of the major powers in the region
to secure Azerbaijan’s independence. Ever since that time,
Azerbaijan has pursued an even-handed foreign policy,
performing a delicate balancing act making it, in the words
of former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzez-
inski, “a geopolitical pivot.” The country is a natural trans-
port corridor between the energy resources of the Caspian
basin and the West, and it has a crucial role in the TRACECA
(Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia) initiative,
with Baku emerging as the capital of Eurasia and bringing
together all these regions while consolidating Azerbaijan’s
position as a strategic hub.
Energy has been one of the primary foundations of Azer-
baijan’s relations with the West. With the signing of the
“Contract of the Century” in September 1994 for the devel-
opment of the Azeri–Chirag–Guneshli oil field, American
and Western European companies secured major stakes
in projects to develop Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon reserves.
Azerbaijan is the only westward route from the Caspian Sea,
breaking Russia’s monopoly on world export markets with
the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum
(BTE) oil and gas pipelines transporting 1 million barrels
of oil per day and 6.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas per
year, respectively (with a capacity to increase). Azerbaijan’s
hydrocarbon reserves are currently and rather modestly
estimated at around 7 billion barrels of oil and 1.2 trillion
cubic meters of gas. Azerbaijan is also the linchpin of EU
Southern Energy Corridor projects including the Nabucco
gas pipeline, which, once constructed, will have the capacity

BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2009

to transport 31 billion cubic meters of gas across Turkey to
Central Europe. Finally, the country is the gateway to the vast
wealth of Central Asian hydrocarbons.
Azerbaijan also has one of the strongest armed forces in the
South Caucasus. It was one of the first countries to support
the United States after the events of September 11, 2001,
playing a crucial role in the Global War on Terror when the
region became a potential launch pad for U.S. military forces
en route to the Middle East and Afghanistan with airspace
opened for Operation Enduring Freedom. Azerbaijan
has actively taken part in the NATO-led Kosovo Force (34
troops), U.S.-led missions to Iraq (150 troops), and currently,
Afghanistan (90 troops are deployed) — and there is exten-
sive military cooperation with the United States on different
projects. Since 2003 there has been a U.S.-financed Caspian
Guard initiative for extra security in the Caspian Sea; and
since 2004 the United States has funded a $20 million mari-
time border-guard training program. Azerbaijan joined the
NATO Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and continues
to work on reforms that are essential for the implementa-
tion of its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Since
independence, Azerbaijan has strongly resisted the return of
the Russian military to its territory, although it is something
Moscow continues to press for. With a large Russian military
base in Armenia, this would be highly undesirable.
The Shortsighted Policy of the West
Its assets should make Azerbaijan a partner that the West
wants to embrace. Unfortunately, that does not always seem
to be the case. Recently, the policies of the West often seem
to be aimed at alienating Baku, or simply portraying it as
little more than a giant source of energy, a kind of geopo-
litical filling station or a “stopover” en route to Afghanistan.
Azerbaijan feels it is being taken for granted and its national
interests ignored and jeopardized.
Unfortunately, although the South Caucasus has the poten-
tial to be a strategic bridgehead, domestic policies and rela-
tions with the Kremlin have become more important to the
West than strategic considerations, with little or no under-
standing of the realities on the ground.
Since the mid-1990s, the United States has had a relatively
good relationship with Baku, described by some as a “stra-
tegic partnership” even though the significant Armenian
diaspora in Washington — one of the best-organized and
most well-connected global communities — has sought to

Svante Cornell & Kenneth Yalowitz, “The critical but perilous Caucasus,” 2004

Ogtay Asadov, Azerbaijani parliament speaker, following a meeting with Anne Derse,
the U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan, in January 2006
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
prevent the strengthening of ties. More recently, relations
have regressed as Washington has adopted a shortsighted
policy for short-term gains. The EU also lacks a coherent
and principled approach in its relationship with Baku, which
is part of the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy and is
predominantly focused on energy cooperation. Brussels
plays a careful balancing act that it describes as fair regarding
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with neighbor Armenia.
This “fair” approach frequently equates to the EU criticizing
Baku for its less-than-perfect record on democracy, free-
doms, and human rights, while virtually never criticizing
Yerevan over its continued occupation of around 17 percent
of Azerbaijan’s territory. However, the recently adopted Euro-
pean Parliament Resolution on an EU Strategy for the South
Caucasus has been a welcome exception.
The Unraveling of Relations with the United States
These days, the South Caucasus is far from being Washing-
ton’s main area of focus, with Afghanistan and Iran domi-
nating the U.S. foreign policy agenda. This is a far cry from
the mid-1990s when, on July 21, 1997, Strobe Talbott, then
deputy secretary of state, described the Caspian area as a
“strategically vital region” destined to become part of the
Euroatlantic community, which the United States could “not
afford” to neglect. In the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia
War, then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Eurasia Matthew
Bryza outlined three objectives: supporting Georgia;
blunting Russia’s strategic goal of undermining the Southern
East-West energy corridor; and shoring up friends in the
wider region. Under President Obama, these objectives have
been weakened, as the role of the United States has increas-
ingly been defined through the prism of Russia, leading to a
strategic drift — Ukraine being the latest country to suffer
from reduced interest.
Over the last year, U.S.–Azerbaijani relations have suffered.
This has come as a disappointment to Baku, as Azerbaijan
believed it has proved itself a reliable partner for U.S. stra-
tegic interests and policies over the years. In Baku, the United
States is seen as having rolled back its involvement in the
region in exchange for cooperation with Russia. Washing-
ton’s support of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation was also
seen as one-sided and having a pro-Armenian tilt that im-
pacted on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This perception
is principally a consequence of the U.S.-supported Turkey–
Armenia rapprochement and pressure on Turkey to open the
border before any progress had been made on the settlement
of the conflict, such as a partial withdrawal of Armenia from

Cited from www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.html

Speech before Congress on security and cooperation in Europe, September 10, 2008

the seven districts bordering Nagorno-Karabakh. At the
same time, it also drove a wedge between Azerbaijan and
Turkey that trickled down into other areas of their relations,
including gas prices and transit fees.
The fracture in relations was further exacerbated when Baku
announced the suspension of military exercises planned with
the United States for May 2010. Coming only days after the
launch of Obama’s Nuclear Summit in Washington, to which
Azerbaijan was not invited — the only South Caucasus state
not to be — it was seen as further confirmation of Washing-
ton’s downgrading of ties with Baku.
The West should stop taking
Baku for granted and deepen
its engagement and ties with
Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan has also been frustrated by the failure of the
United States to appoint a new ambassador to the country
(the post has been open for eight months), with Matthew
Bryza being nominated only a few weeks ago. An increasing
number of anti-U.S. articles have appeared in the Azerbaijani
press, and the result is an increasingly assertive but unpre-
dictable Azerbaijan, which, emboldened by energy revenues,
has started challenging things it does not like.
Nagorno-Karabakh — Time for a Principled Approach
To make matters, worse, America’s ability to be an impartial
player as a Minsk Group mediator is now being questioned.
The OSCE Minsk Group was established in 1992 — France,
the United States, and Russia are the current co-chairs — to
assist the resolution of the conflict. However, over the years
there has been little tangible progress.
Although international law is without question on Azer-
baijan’s side, the West remains inconsistent in its approach.
Whereas Armenia continues to occupy Nagorno-Karabakh
and seven surrounding regions from which almost 1 million
Azerbaijanis were ejected, the West seems more concerned
about Armenian events that took place almost a century
ago. This sovereign Azerbaijani territory remains a vital
bargaining chip for the Armenians in negotiations regarding
the future status of Karabakh. Azerbaijan and Armenia are
currently negotiating a set of “basic principles.” Although
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
Azerbaijan has recently accepted the latest version of these
principles, Armenia has still not committed. The United
States used to be viewed as the only power that both sides
trusted, but this is no longer the case. The United States (like
Russia) does not use the leverage it has to press Armenia
— rather, it seems to reward Yerevan (and the Karabakh
separatists) with financial support. The United States has
provided almost $2 billion to Armenia in financial aid, the
highest per capita amount in the newly independent states.
The cancellation of this aid has never been up for question
in spite of Armenia’s continued occupation. Furthermore,
the U.S. Congress allocates (on a yearly basis) direct aid to
Nagorno-Karabakh, which contradicts the State Depart-
ment’s policy in the region. On the other hand, the Arme-
nian lobby, via Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, has
prevented Azerbaijan receiving any financial and military
assistance except for nonproliferation and disarmament
activities.
The EU has virtually no role in the conflict, offering
little more than verbal support to the Minsk Group and
promoting confidence-building measures. The EU continues
to hide behind what it says is the existence of two contradic-
tory principles in international law — the right of territorial
integrity and the right of self-determination of a people.
However, the right of self-determination does not necessarily
include the right of territorial separation from an interna-
tionally recognized state as defined in the Helsinki Final Act.
Furthermore, by failing to criticize the ongoing occupation,
the EU actually gives the impression that it approves it.
The EU is based on certain values and should promote
these values in its neighborhood. Although the EU is right
to continue to encourage Baku to work on democracy and
human rights issues (including using conditionality as a
means to this), at the same time it could adopt a more prin-
cipled approach to Karabakh. It should renounce the idea of
“independence” and instead promote models that exist in the
EU itself — for example, South Tyrol in Italy, and Finland’s
Aland Islands. All efforts should be made by the international
community to push for the restoration of the territorial
integrity of a sovereign state. The prolongation of the status
quo is only favorable to the separatist regime and those that
support it. The longer it continues, the more embedded it
will become, making territorial integrity more difficult to
restore.
Clearly, military intervention should be the last option,
although it is Azerbaijan’s right under Article 51 of the UN
Charter (an article that has been used on numerous occa-

http://www.today.az/news/politics/67927.html

sions by the West to justify military intervention). However,
military action would damage Azerbaijan’s international
standing, impact its leverage on world energy markets, and
endanger existing pipelines (such as BTC).
Russia Wants Azerbaijan
None of this is taking place in a vacuum — or without
Russia’s looking for opportunities to benefit from the down-
turn in Azerbaijan’s relations with the West. Russia’s desire
for influence in the region far exceeds its desire for stability.
Russia is by far the best placed to play the “great game” as it
takes advantage of the strategic retreat of the United States
from its earlier ambitious plans. Moscow has used the
opening and Obama’s “reset” as an opportunity to “move the
furniture around” in its backyard. However, such a zero-sum
game for leverage in so fragile an area is risky, and it is not
in the best interests of either the major external actors or the
region’s people.
Although cooperation between Baku and Moscow has
increased due to Russia’s working hard on soft power confi-
dence-building measures, there has been no major break-
through so far. Though Russia wants Azerbaijan increas-
ingly at its side, this may prove difficult to achieve, not least
because Baku simply does not trust Moscow. Furthermore,
whereas Azerbaijan may have improved its ties with Russia
(and Iran), both countries have closer ties with Armenia that
outweigh their relations with Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan’s vast gas reserves, however, put the West into
direct competition with Russia, which wants to maintain
its dominant hold on the EU market and is willing to go
to almost any lengths to purchase Azerbaijani gas. Four
days after the Protocols were signed between Turkey and
Armenia, Azerbaijan agreed to sell Russia at least 500 million
cubic meters of gas annually as of 2010. One undesirable
scenario is the development, with Russian facilitation, of an
Azerbaijan-Iran north-south energy corridor, which could
reshape the Eurasian energy map by seriously challenging
East-West energy routes.
Even though it may not be in the best interests of Azerbaijan
to further align with Moscow, there is a real danger that if
relations with the West continue to deteriorate, we may push
Baku to inch closer to Moscow.
Getting Back on Track
It is unlikely the West has purposely adopted an anti-Azer-
baijan policy. Rather, its current mistakes have resulted
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
precisely from the lack of any coherent vision on where and
how Baku fits into a broader U.S. strategy. Azerbaijan also
knows that a good rapport with the United States provides
useful leverage for its other relationships. Those factors,
hopefully, will put a brake on any further deterioration in
relations. Washington has begun to try to “patch up” rela-
tions with the recent visit of Defense Secretary Robert Gates,
who brought with him a letter from President Obama
underlining U.S. support for the country.
However, if the West really wants to have an effective and
visionary policy in the region, it needs to take a different
tack. First, it needs a strong ally in Azerbaijan, not least
because of Azerbaijan’s unique independence in the region.
By continuing to constructively engage with Azerbaijan, the
West should be able prevent the country from slipping into
an anti-Western orientation; it could also improve democ-
racy and human rights by encouraging Baku to integrate
further into the Euroatlantic structures and promoting
regional stability. Azerbaijan’s strategic support also remains
essential for the viability of a free and independent Georgia,
which is continuing to pursue a Euroatlantic path in spite of
the Russia-Georgia War of 2008.
To achieve this, the West may need to offer greater support
on the issues that are of crucial importance to Azerbaijan.
The most important thing the West can do now is to demon-
strate it has a principled approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict and give a big push for progress. Resolution of this
conflict will change the face of the entire region. The Minsk
Group needs to deliver. If it cannot, then an alternative
mechanism needs to be sought. Otherwise, malaise and lack
of trust in the process will continue to contaminate relations.
However, at the same Azerbaijan also needs to realize that it
takes “two to tango,” and if Baku wants a strong relationship
with the Obama administration it also needs to consider U.S.
concerns — including demonstrating a greater will to make
further progress on issues related to democracy and human
rights by, among other things, releasing activists from prison.
What happens in Azerbaijan matters if the West is going to
achieve its long-term strategies related to energy security, the
War on Terrorism, regional security, and keeping a resurgent
Russia in check. Azerbaijan is more than a gas station. The
West should stop taking Baku for granted and deepen its
engagement and ties with Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan: Democracy Matters
Continued from page 1
However, it is far from clear that this policy has succeeded
either in terms of making Azerbaijan a more democratic
country or in solidifying a true partnership rooted in values.
The succession of Ilham Aliyev, the son of former president
Heydar Aliyev, to power has upset the previous equilibrium
of what had seemed to be a policy based on solid founda-
tions. Many Western observers hoped or predicted that as
president, Ilham Alieyev would further open up Azerbaijani
society. That reading proved false. Lacking a real popular
mandate and the gravitas of his father, Ilham Aliyev has
instead gone in a different direction. He almost immediately
targeted the institutions of civil society by launching an
aggressive persecution of the opposition, independent media,
and human rights activists. To be sure, the worsening polit-
ical atmosphere in Azerbaijan has given numerous Western
observers pause about Azerbaijan’s future possible directions.
In April 2010 the Obama administration snubbed President
Aliyev by not inviting him to the nuclear security summit
in Washington, DC, which was attended by the presidents
of Azerbaijan’s neighbors — Georgia and Armenia. In May
2009, on World Press Freedom Day, Barack Obama became
the first U.S. president to openly denounce Azerbaijan’s
human rights record and equate it with that of Zimbabwe.
Azerbaijan responded in turn by canceling its joint military
exercises with the United States.
Thus, the perception in both Baku and Washington is that
relations between the two countries have reached a new low.
For the one-time supporters of Ilham Aliyev who had hoped
he would become a young, modern, reformist leader, these
recent developments in Azerbaijan have been a severe disap-
pointment. Yet, for many of us with up-close experience with
political developments in Azerbaijan, Washington’s engage-
ment policy toward the Aliyev regime has been like watching
a train wreck in slow motion. Indeed, U.S. policy has suffered
from serious flaws that in turn have been rooted in misper-
ceptions about the country’s geopolitical circumstances and
Azerbaijani society’s democratic potential. If Washington
hopes to find a new balance between pushing for a more
open and democratic Azerbaijan and working together in
the areas of energy and strategy, it will have to rethink those
assumptions and recalibrate its strategy.
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
What Made Azerbaijan Pro-Western?
The importance of Azerbaijan, a small country with an
officially registered population of nearly 9 million people,
transcends its physical size. The geopolitical value of this
country is not limited to its energy resources alone. Today
the Eurasian map is divided into two halves separated by
a potential geopolitical wall formed by Russia, the South
Caucasus, and Iran. If Russia manages to control the South
Caucasus, then Western access to Central Asia and beyond is
effectively blocked by land barriers of anti-Western regimes.
At the moment Georgia, an effective Western ally, stands
as an obstacle to the completion of that wall. However,
Georgia is somewhat isolated and has a weak economy, and
its anti-Russian stance cannot be sustained for long without
an alliance with another country in the South Caucasus
— Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan, the initiator of independent energy projects
in the Caspian Sea and the author of the Baku–Supsa and
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipelines, has played a vital role
in breaking the energy monopoly of Russia in the Eurasian
continent. In many ways the Western orientation of Azer-
baijan has served as an essential precondition for the Geor-
gian path to Euro-integration. In 1997 these two countries
launched an independent regional organization serving as an
alternative to the pro-Russian Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS), which later expanded to include Ukraine
and Moldova. This larger alliance, known as GUAM, was
once a powerful regional organization but is currently at
its lowest ebb, since Russia has successfully neutralized the
pro-Western drive in Moldova, Ukraine, and — increas-
ingly — also Azerbaijan. Currently, Georgia is left alone in
the field, with token support from Azerbaijan and very little
support from either Ukraine or Moldova apart from their
diplomatic refusal to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
As a country with a majority Muslim population and long
governed by imperial Russia, Azerbaijan has a history and
set of traditions that place it apart from most other nations
in the Islamic world. Azerbaijan is home to the pioneer
Muslim playwright Mirza Fatali Akhundov, whose 19th-
century comedies became the first staged theatrical produc-
tions in the Middle East. That same Akhundov authored
the idea of introducing the Latin alphabet into the Azeri
language, replacing the Arabic script. (The idea was even-
tually embraced by Azerbaijan in 1928 as well as by the
Ataturk administration in Turkey in the same year.) In 1875
Hasan bey Zardabi established an Azeri-language news-
paper, Akinchi, which came to be the first regular news-
paper produced by Muslims in the region. Dubbed as the

Azerbaijani Mark Twain, Jalil Mammadguluzadeh founded
the political satiric magazine Molla Nasraddin in 1906 — a
leading publication of the reformist Jadid movement that
took root in the Muslim peripheries of Tsarist Russia in the
early 20th century. In 1908 Uzeyir Hajibeyov, born in the
Azeri city of Shusha, composed the first opera in the Muslim
world — Leyli and Majnun. Shortly after the Russian Empire
dissolved in 1918, the Azeris declared the Azerbaijan Demo-
cratic Republic — the first republic among Muslim coun-
tries (Turkey’s republic was declared in 1923) to hold free
parliamentary elections. The republic granted voting rights
to women in 1919, a year prior to that step being taken in the
United States.
Relying on the goodwill of the
Aliyev government alone will not
accomplish this objective [of
creating a real partnership]. It will
require a principled stand as well
as the fundamental recognition
that democratic institutions
comprise the ultimate guarantor
of Western interests in that
country.
It was this political memory and tradition that fueled
Azerbaijan’s national democratic movement as it took center
stage against Kremlin rule alongside the Baltic republics
and Georgia in 1989–91. After the Soviet Union collapsed
in 1991, the national democratic movement led by the
Popular Front of Azerbaijan seized power from communist
henchman Ayaz Mutallibov. In 1992 Azerbaijan held its
first and so far the only truly democratic elections recog-
nized as such by the OSCE since the collapse of the USSR.
With 54 percent of the votes, Abulfaz Elchibey was elected
president. In a one-year period, the Elchibey government
carried out profound political and economic reforms. The
democratic government evicted the Russian troops from the
country before most Central and Eastern European nations
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
did, implemented comprehensive education reform, and
strengthened the role of independent media and civic orga-
nizations in the country.
In many ways, the Elchibey government represented the
enlightenment trends rooted in the pre-Bolshevik period of
Azerbaijani history. As such, it viewed modernization of the
country through embracing Western values as a matter of
national evolution as well as national security. In this respect,
the origins of the idea of integrating with Europe in both
Georgia and Azerbaijan have similar historical roots and
motivations.
When former KGB general Heydar Aliyev, aided by Russia,
overthrew Abulfaz Elchibey in 1993, the former communist
official did not inherit Azerbaijan as a tabula rasa. Heydar
Aliyev took over the presidency in a country with strong and
viable pro-Western opposition parties that maintained a
strong presence in every region, an independent media, and
a wide spectrum of civic organizations, nearly all of whom
shared Western values at least to the degree that they under-
stood them. The population was largely anti-Russian (partly
because of Russia’s heavy military support to Armenia in its
war against Azerbaijan), sought integration with Europe, and
regarded the West as a guarantor of Azerbaijan’s indepen-
dence.
The rationale behind the coup d’etat, as presented by Heydar
Aliyev, was that Russia was too powerful to be ignored.
Although Azerbaijan needed to integrate with the West,
Elchibey ostensibly had been too impatient in promoting
his pro-Western policies. The implicit claim was that Aliyev
would be more professional and careful in dealing with
Moscow. The concessions that Heydar Aliyev’s government
made to Russia were presented as a “necessary evil” to avoid
even tougher steps that might be taken by Baku’s northern
neighbor.
Decreasing Chips
But Heydar Aliyev was certainly not a democrat. His pro-
Western choices from 1994 to 1996 were largely tactical
and necessitated by his desire to defeat his political oppo-
nents and consolidate power. After 1996 the Azerbaijani
government’s pro-Western policies were heavily influenced
by backdoor political bargaining in which the West squeezed
concessions out of Heydar Aliyev by using credible threats
such as throwing support behind the democratic opposition
in the country. Likewise, Heydar Aliyev squeezed out Western
acquiescence to his suppression of democratic institutions in
the country in return for granting, or sometimes only prom-

ising to comply with, the West’s demands in other fields such
as energy cooperation and foreign policy issues.
On the eve of every subsequent election in Azerbaijan
— 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2003 — the pre-campaign period
was accompanied by energetic support from Western,
particularly U.S., organizations to strengthen democratic
institutions in the country, ranging from the opposition
political parties to civic organizations and independent
media. This was always followed by, in turn, cooperative
statements by the Azerbaijani government expressing its
support for Western regional projects; falsified elections and
crackdown on the opposition and democratic institutions
of the country; and the withdrawal of Western support from
the democratic institutions in the country until the next
campaign period.
Most notably, prior to every election, the Azerbaijani govern-
ment would take a position signaling possible compromises
in peace negotiations with Armenia, focusing the efforts
of Western countries on that issue; after the elections in
Azerbaijan, the government would completely negate its
previously signaled compromises. The confusing results
of the peace negotiations in Istanbul, Paris, and Key West
had one reasonable explanation: As realpolitik’s founding
father, Niccolo Machiavelli, might have put it, the king does
not have to honor his promise when the reasons condi-
tioning that promise are no longer present. The seesaw game
between the West and the Aliyev regime had one funda-
mental flaw: The conditions for Western pressures on the
Azeri dictator were never permanent. Every time the West
acquiesced to the Azerbaijani government’s carrying out
one more crackdown on its opposition, that diminished the
future “bargaining power” of the West. Since 1993 the regime
in Azerbaijan has consistently grown stronger and stronger
while democratic institutions in the country have steadily
declined.
In 2003, when the West almost overtly supported the succes-
sion of Heydar Aliyev by his son Ilham Aliyev, the realpolitik
scholars of the West were gambling away their last chips. A
day after the “elections,” on October 16, 2003, as the Azer-
baijani government rounded up over 1,000 opposition
supporters in the country, with many suffering in torture
chambers, then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage congratulated Ilham Aliyev on his “landslide
victory.”
This was the start of new era in the U.S.–Azerbaijani rela-
tions. For the first time since 1992, the United States had to
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
deal with an Azerbaijani government that was no longer held
in check by any viable political opposition in the country.
“We Have Our Own Path”
“Azerbaijan does not need financial support or recommen-
dations from the international community. The govern-
ment knows well what it is doing and will not allow any
interference in its internal affairs.… What will happen if we
leave these organizations? Azerbaijan will not fail.” This is
what the current Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, said
in 2008 with respect to Council of Europe demands that
Baku comply with minimum standards of human rights.
By March 2010 the president was even more unequivocal in
responding to international criticisms on the nature of his
regime: “If we need an advice, we will ask for it. Whoever
wants to interfere into our internal affairs should understand
that their efforts are fruitless.”
These developments are not without consequences in other
spheres of relations between the West and Azerbaijan. On
May 15, 2008, the Russian energy monopoly Gazprom stated
that it wanted to buy all the natural gas produced by Azer-
baijan. Shortly afterward, on January 1, 2010, Azerbaijan
started pumping natural gas to Russia, and on January 21,
Azerbaijan agreed to double the volume of its gas export
to Russia (bringing the total up to 2 billion cubic meters)
for the year 2011. The strategic Western energy project
Nabucco, which was planned to ease Russia’s grip on energy
resources in Eurasia, still has an uncertain future, although
Baku has finally, after a long delay and equivocation, agreed
to provide some start-up resources.
Azerbaijan has also considerably distanced itself from
GUAM. It has entered into antagonistic relations with
virtually every Western entity, be it a country or a regional
organization, actively threatening to abandon its commit-
ment to Western energy projects in the future. In fact, one
pro-government member of the parliament — Fazail Agha-
mali — suggested that the Azeri government should punish
the United States by reducing the latter’s existing shares in oil
contracts. Aghamali said the United States had used Azer-
baijani oil income to support the Armenian separatists in
Karabakh. “We need to stop all the U.S. activities in Azer-
baijan,” he added. Once an agreeable partner, Azerbaijan has
now turned “touchy,” looking for every excuse to justify the

Turan Information Agency, July 8, 2008

Turan Information Agency, March 23, 2010

Bloomberg Report: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aF
Dux_hYIA3Y&refer=home

Turan Information Agency, January 21, 2010

Turan Information Agency, April 20, 2010

upcoming breakup and a possible change of political orien-
tation from the West toward Russia.
Reasons for the Reorientation of Azerbaijan
Much of the current leading Azeri government comes out
of the old Soviet bureaucracy. Many of them were never
comfortable with the liberal rhetoric of the West. Ramiz
Mehdiyev, chief of the Presidential Administration of
Azerbaijan and former secretary of the Central Committee
of Azerbaijan Communist Party on Ideology, is still writing
Soviet-style articles analyzing global affairs from the Cold
War prism. Ilham Aliyev himself is an alumnus of Moscow
State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), which
was the elite Soviet school producing government officials
for the USSR. The level of trust and comfort between these
leaders and the politicians in Moscow is often organic and
natural. Their cooperation with the West has been largely
tactical.
Russia has consistently staked its efforts to regain influence
with this political elite in Azerbaijan, even when Heydar
Aliyev pushed for the oil contracts. When confronted with a
choice, Moscow could never side with the Azeri democrats.
A democratic government in Azerbaijan was and still is
regarded as an anathema for the Russian autocracy.
The West can try to pander to the Aliyev government.
However, will the West ever be able to extend to Azerbaijani
leadership the package that Russia can offer? Russian elec-
tion observers come to Azerbaijan only to issue a statement
praising the Azeri government for holding “fully democratic
elections.” What does the West have to offer? Lukewarm
praise such as “This election was an improvement over the
last elections” and “The present elections were a step forward
toward democracy” cannot beat unequivocal Russian
support for the suppression of political freedoms in Azer-
baijan. When Russia panders to the Azerbaijani government,
there is not a single article published in a Russian newspaper
criticizing the Azeri government due to total government
control. What about the United States? Can its government
order the Washington Post or The New York Times to stop
publishing articles critical of the authoritarian policies of the
Azerbaijani government?
Friendship between the Azerbaijani government and the
United States or any Western democracy is an insincere, ad
hoc arrangement in which both partners will always feel
great unease — something that is absent in the Azerbaijani
government’s dealings with Russia or Iran. Whenever the
United States or any Western democracy tries to befriend the
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
Azerbaijani government, it enters into the game of trying
to imitate Russia, China, or Iran. That imitation will never
succeed in beating the autocracies at their own game.
Alliances do not exist in vacuum. They develop in the
context of shared interests, values, and many other common
purposes. The idea that similar regimes foster and differing
regimes hinder the alliances between states is not new. Aris-
totle noted it in the fourth century b.c. That is why Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia are such complicated and unreliable U.S.
allies and also constitute breeding grounds for anti-Ameri-
canism and terrorism. Alliances that are not preceded or
followed by the establishment of shared values are always
going to rest on shaky ground.
It would of course be wrong to compare the Azerbaijani
government’s situation with its counterparts in the Middle
East. Unlike the regimes of the Middle East, where United
States has military bases, and where the legacy of British or
French colonial rule runs deep, an Azerbaijani dictatorship in
Baku will always have the luxury of choice. Russia is nearby,
with its arms stretched out to embrace Baku. And the West
can’t outbid Russia by being more Russian than Moscow.
That being said, Moscow’s offer is wrapped in what would
be quite an unpleasant package for any government in Baku.
Moscow still views Armenia as its strategic stronghold in
the region, and part of the price of closer Moscow–Baku ties
would probably mean that Azerbaijan would have to agree to
the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. It is unlikely that the Azerbai-
jani government could survive such a concession.
Western Policy Choices
The West’s policy options with regard to Azerbaijan are not
limitless, if only for reasons of geography. But those choices
are also not as stark or as narrow as they might appear at
first glance. First, it must be acknowledged that the so-called
positive engagement that many advocate will not result in
the reform of an authoritarian country such as Azerbaijan.
Like most dictators, Ilham Aliyev is not so naïve as to stifle
democracy due to his lack of knowledge or experience with
the outside world. He does what he does because he thinks it
is in his interest and he can get away with it. In that sense, he
correctly interprets the term “engagement” as a euphemism
for accepting dictatorships as they are and working with
them in other spheres. In the case of Azerbaijan, this means
“energy security.”
Secondly, Azerbaijan has always needed the West more than
the West needs Azerbaijan. A small nation in a hostile neigh-
borhood, Azerbaijan can be pressured into reforms through

promotion of democratic institutions in the country. The
Aliyev regime may not be happy with its burgeoning NGOs
and free press, but so long as the West makes it clear that it
values these institutions as being vital to its strategic interests
in Azerbaijan, they will be as safe as the pipelines carrying
Azeri oil to the Mediterranean. Relying on the goodwill of
the Aliyev government alone will not accomplish this objec-
tive. It will require a principled stand as well as the funda-
mental recognition that democratic institutions comprise the
ultimate guarantor of Western interests in that country.
Finally, there are growing signs that the Azeri people are fed
up with the corrupt, dysfunctional, and oppressive dictator-
ship in the country. People frequently compare their living
standards to those in nearby Georgia, where by all measures
the Georgians appear to do far better than the oil-rich Azeris.
The Azeris know the benefits of democracy. They long for
it. The wisest, though not the simplest, decision on the part
of the West would be to give a hand to its greatest and most
powerful political allies in the region — the people of Azer-
baijan — and help them in their quest for more freedom and
democracy.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
non-partisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between
North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF
does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the
transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy
and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on
transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster
renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition,
GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies.
Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memo-
rial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on
both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washing-
ton, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris,
Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
About the On Wider Europe Series
This series is designed to focus in on key intellectual and policy debates
regarding Western policy toward Wider Europe that otherwise might
receive insufficient attention. We want to encourage creative think-
ing, offer alternative ideas and foster debate. Anyone with additional
ideas should feel free to contact Ronald Asmus at rasmus@gmfus.org.
We hope you enjoy these papers and they contribute to a constructive
debate and better policies.