Cases:

Pamil v. Teleron

FACTS:

In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in
Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival
candidate filed a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He
argued that as provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code:

in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in

active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or
contractors for public works of the municipality.

In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Victorino Teleron ruled that
the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which now allows
ecclesiastics to run.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer
operative?

HELD:

The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. If the the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy is to be maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an
ecclesiastic may run for elective office. However, this issue proved to have divided the Supreme
Court because it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare
Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be
granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered
to vacate the mayoralty position.

It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one who swore to serve
the Churchs interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict
with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The Revised
Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal.

Dissenting Opinion

J. Teehankee The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving
salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds are obviously now allowed to run for
a public elective office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 every person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces
shall ipso facto cease in their office or position on the date they file their certificates of
candidacy. This implies that they are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office.
The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining categories formerly banned under the
Revised Administrative Code, ecclesiastics and contractors for public works of the municipality
are allowed to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim, Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, they being not included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New
Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications, except those
expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.

Aglipay vs. Ruiz

FACTS:

The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church
took place sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz,
initiated the production of certain stamps the design of which would have in their center a
chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the stamps were produced
and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides for appropriation.

Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the production
and sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of said stamps commemorative to a
particular religious event is in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which
prohibits the appropriation or usage of public money for the use or benefit of any church or
denomination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.

HELD:

No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was
emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being
the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to a
religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and
printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and merely
authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government. The fact that the fund is being used for such
is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his discretion.
Taruc vs. Dela Cruz

FACTS:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28,
1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the
Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done
without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

HELD:

No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is

a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. Civil Courts will not
interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or
property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.