CASE NO. 1
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is
Hannah Eunice D. Serana v. Sandiganbayan and People of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008
FACTS: Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the
University of the Philippines-Cebu. She was appointed
by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, with a one (1) year
term from January 1 to December 31, 2000. In the
early part of 2000, she discussed with President
Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman. On September 4, 2000, together with her
siblings and relatives, she registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. One of the projects
of the OSFRI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex to be renamed after to the then President
Estrada, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student
Hall. President Estrada gave him Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15, 000,000.00) to the OSFRI as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of
funds came from the Office of the President. But the
said renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding
student regent, Bugayong and De Guzman , Secretary-
General of the KASAMA sa UP, a system-wide alliance
of student councils within the state university, filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman .
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due
investigation, found probable cause to indict Serana
and her brother Jade Ian D. Sera for Estafa. Serana
moved to quash the information. She claimed that
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as
UP student regent. She claimed that R.A. No. 3019 as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or
offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. Sandigandbayan denied her motion for
lack of merit. Serana filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied with finality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over an estafa case?
HELD: Section 4(B) of P.D. 1606 which defines the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan: Other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection A
of this section in relation to their office. While the first part of
Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the said court.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that
statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid
an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Every section, provision or
clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature. Evidently, from the provisions of Section 4(B) of
P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other
felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.(2) Petitioner
falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she
does not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed thereby
express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606
explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the BOR performs function similar to those of
a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.
By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed,
a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
CASE NO. 2
Facts:
Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Comptrollership of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Atty. Maria Olivia Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer of the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the
Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a complaint against
Garcia for violation of: 1) Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713(Code of
Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); 2) Article 183, of the Revised Penal Code; 3)
Section 5 2(a)(1), (3) & (20) of the Civil Service Law.
The wife and three sons were impleaded for violation of R.A.
No. 1379 (An act declaring forfeiture in favor of the state any
property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public
officer or employee and providing for the proceedings
therefor) insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits,
dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating,
using and disposing of ill-gotten wealth.
Also, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for
the Issuance of A Writ Of Preliminary Attachment was filed by
Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan against Garcia, his wife
and three sons. The Ombudsman, after conducting inquiry
(similar to Preliminary Investigation) has determined a prima
facie case exists against Garcia since during his incumbency as
a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of
money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer and his other lawful income.
Petitioner (as respondent a quo) filed a Motion to Dismiss in
Civil Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No.
1379 (civil action). On the same day, petitioner filed the
present Petition, raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on
the part of the Sandiganbayan.
Garcia argued in his Petition that the Sandiganbayan is without
jurisdiction over the civil action for forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that such
jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as
provided under Sec. 29 of the law, and that the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan in civil actions pertains only to separate
actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against
President Marcos, his family, and cronies as can be gleaned
from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as
amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 1411and 14-A.
In their Comment, the Sandiganbayan submitted the contrary,
noting that the issue has been settled in Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan17 which ruled that there is no issue that
jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now
rests with the Sandiganbayan. They argued that under the
Constitution and prevailing statutes, the Sandiganbayan is
vested with authority and jurisdiction over the petition for
forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 filed against petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. The seminal decision of
Republic v. Sandiganbayan squarely rules on the issues raised
by petitioner concerning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. After
reviewing the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and the
Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the
question of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over violations of
R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the Solicitor
General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
before the then Court of First Instance of the city or province
where the public officer or employee resides or holds office,
pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379. Upon the creation of the
Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486, original and
exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in the
said court. P.D. No. 1606 was later issued expressly repealing
P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions
brought in connection with crimes within the exclusive
jurisdiction of said court. Such civil actions removed from the
jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan include those for restitution or
reparation of damages, recovery of instruments and effects of
the crime, civil actions under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil
Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided for under R.A. No.
1379.
In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present
state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
petitioners argumentthat the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture since it is civil in
nature collapses completely. The civil nature of an action for
forfeiture was first recognized inRepublic v. Sandiganbayan,
thus: [T]he rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are
actions in rem and, therefore, civil in nature. It is logically
congruent that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding
is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired
property amounts to a penalty. Petitioner should abandon his
erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only
over petitions for forfeiture filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies.
CASE NO. 3
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124644. February 5, 2004]
ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk
of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch
21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents.
FACTS:
Escobal is a graduate of the Phil Military Academy, member of
AFP and Phil Constabulary, and Intelligence Group of the PNP.
While conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at
a restaurant in Naga City, he got involved in a shooting incident
resulting in death of Rodney Nueca.
Amended information was filed with RTC charging Escobal and
Jun Bombita with murder. Escobal was arrested by virtue of a
warrant of arrest issued by RTC.
After arraignment, Escobal filed a Motion to Quash the
Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act
No. 408, in relation to Sec 1, PD 1822 and Sec 95 of RA 6975,
the court martial, not the RTC has jurisdiction over criminal
cases involving PNP members and officers.
Escobal filed a Motion to Dismiss the case arguing that since he
committed the crime in the performance of his duties,
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
RTC issued an Order declaring that EScobal committed the
crime charged while not in the performance of his official
function. It also added that upon enactment of RA 7975, the
issue had been moot and academic. The amendatory law
transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a
salary grade of 27.
The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend
the Information to include allegation that the offense charged
was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions, nor in relation to his office. Escobal filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said order and asserted that
RTC failed to consider exceptions to the prohibition and
asserted further that RA 7975 could not be applied
retroactively.
RTC reversed and set aside its Order declaring that Escobal was
on official mission when the shooting occurred and ordered
public prosecutor to Re-Amend the Information and transmit
the records to Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan ordered the return of criminal records to RTC
for the reason that RTC retained jurisdiction over the case,
considering Escobal has a salary grade of 23. The prosecution
had already rested its case and Escobal had commenced
presenting his evidence in RTC, following the rule on continuity
of jurisdiction, RTC should continue with the case.
ISSUE: Whether RTC has jurisdiction over offense committed
by a public official with a salary grade of 23.
HELD: Yes. RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the crime
charged.
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it
is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation
between the office of the offender and the discharge of official
duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to
merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was
committed by the offender in relation to his office because
that would be a conclusion of law.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime
charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
corresponding to a salary grade below 27, the proper Regional
Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the
petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade 23.
He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion
temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the
crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be
applied retroactively.
Petition is DISMISSED.
CASE NO. 4
People of the Philippines vs. Henry T. Go
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Nature: Petition for review on Certiorari assailing the
Resolution of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB)
which quash the information filed against herein respondent
for alleged violation of section 03 (g) of R.A 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Doctrine:
The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent
the conviction of the survivor or survivors.Indeed, it is not
necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment
for conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy,
any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in
contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are
jointly responsible therefore. This means that everything said,
written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or
furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been
said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no
difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or
insane at the time of trial. The death of one of two or more
conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors. Thus, this court held that .....conspiracy is in its
nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The
crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more
persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be
convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a
co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for
conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
The avowed policy of the state and the legislative intent to
repress acts of public officers and private persons alike, which
constitute graft or corrupt practices, would be frustrated if
the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a
private person who conspired with such public officer in
violating the Anti Graft Law.The court agrees with petitioner
that the avowed policy of the state and the legislative intent to
repress acts of public officers and private persons alike, which
constitute graft or corrupt practices, would be frustrated if
the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a
private person who conspired with such public officer in
violating the Anti- Graft Law.
FACTS:
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon found probable cause
to indict, among others, respondent Henry Go for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he
was no longer indicted because he died
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
The prosecution was given a period of ten
(10) days within which to show cause why this case should not
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused considering that the accused is a
private person and the public official Arturo
Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not
an accused in this case. The prosecution
complied with the above Order contending that the SB has
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by
reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for
consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also
argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's
case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to
have conspired with a public officer. The respondent filed a
Motion to Quash the Information filed against him contending
that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the
public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by
any official authority as a government agent, may not be
prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The
Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to quash and dismissed the
case.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent Go, despite him
being a private individual?

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Settled is
the rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if
found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the
avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto. The only question that needs to be settled in the
present petition is whether herein respondent, a private
person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information. Respondent contends that by reason of the death
of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged
in the Information and, as such, prosecution against
respondent may not prosper. It is true that by reason of
Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer
with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A.
3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their
alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal
liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it
remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and
private respondent. The requirement before a private person
may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to
have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If
circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public
officer has already died, the private person may be indicted
alone.
CASE NO. 5
RAMISCAL JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and on National
Defense and Security (collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee) carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the
"coup rumors and the alleged anomalies" in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits Systems (AFP-
RSBS). In its Report, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
outlined, among others, the anomalies in the acquisition of lots
in Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba, Laguna and Iloilo City by the
AFP-RSBS, and described the modus operandi of the
perpetrators as follows:
The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the
same transactions with two deeds of sale. One deed of sale
would be signed only by the seller or sellers (unilateral deed).
Another deed of sale would be signed by the seller or sellers
and the buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral deed). These Unilateral
Deeds of Sale recorded lower consideration paid by the System
to the buyer(s) than those stated in the Bilateral Deeds. The
motivation was obviously to evade payment of the correct
taxes to the government and save money for the seller(s),
broker(s) and who knows, probably even for the kickbacks
going to certain officials of RSBS, the buyer.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to "prosecute and/or cause the prosecution of Gen.
Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had
signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition
of certain parcels of land," Ombudsman Investigators
conducted a fact-finding investigation. They executed a Joint
Affidavit-Complaint, stating that based on their findings,
B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., among others, may be charged with
falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e)
and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
ISSUE:
Whether private individuals can participate in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan..
HELD:
Parties, like the private respondents herein, may,
likewise, enter their appearance as offended parties and
participate in criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.The respondent law firm entered its
appearance as private prosecutor.
The petitioner avers that the crimes charged are public
offenses and, by their very nature, do not give rise to criminal
liabilities in favor of any private party.
He contends that the Information in for falsification of
public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, do not contain any allegation that the AGFOI or
any private party sustained any damage caused by the said
falsifications. The petitioner further argues that absent any civil
liability arising from the crimes charged in favor of AGFOI, the
latter cannot be considered the offended party entitled to
participate in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
According to the petitioner, this view conforms to Section 16,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
The court agreed with the contention of the petitioner
that the AGFOI, and even Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen.
Navarro, are not the offended parties envisaged in Section 16,
Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules, all criminal actions
covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direct supervision and control of the public
prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the
accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts
is impliedly instituted and the offended party has not waived
the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or
instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, the
prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains
under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The
prosecution of offenses is a public function.
 Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal
action personally or by counsel, who will act as private
prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to
be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties
and further delay the final disposition of the case. The
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied
institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of
the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense,
to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order.
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is
for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason
of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.
The offended party may be the State or any of its
instrumentalities, including local governments or government-
owned or controlled corporations, such as the AFP-RSBS,
which, under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution of
their properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification.
CASE NO. 6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PHOTOKINA MARKETING
CORPORATION
VS.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO
Two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed
under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of Court:
G.R. No. 154473
Facts:
Respondent, Alfredo L. BENIPAYO, then Chairman of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the
Forum on Electoral Problems held at Quezon City and this was
subsequently published in the issues of the Manila Bulletin.
Petitioner, PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, believing
that it was the one alluded to by the respondent in his speech
filed an Affidavit-Complaint for libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent
questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City (OCP-QC). Despite the challenge, the City
Prosecutor filed an Information for libel against the
respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407.
Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered
consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal Case No. Q-02-
103406, which is the subject of G.R. No. 155573] pending with
RTC.
Respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal of the case
on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his
person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could not
be criminally prosecuted before any court during his
incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally
prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should
investigate him and the case should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
The trial court issued the challenged Order dismissing Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109407 and it ruled that the case had to be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged
libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office he
delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair.
Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction
over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.
Petitioners filed before the Court, on pure questions of law,
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
G.R. No. 155573
Respondent, as COMELEC Chair, delivered a statement as a
guest of the talk show televised nationwide on the ANC-23
channel.
Petitioner, corporation, considered respondents statement as
defamatory, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for libel. Respondent
similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC. The City
Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal Case
No. Q-02-109406 by filing the corresponding Information with
the RTC of Quezon City.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information
raising similar arguments that the court had no jurisdiction
over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that,
even if criminal prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested
with the Sandiganbayan.
The trial court issued the assailed Order dismissing Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent. The RTC denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners filed
before this Court, on pure questions of law, another Petition
for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD
NO JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act No. 4363, is explicit on which court has
jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense.
A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of
other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an
express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RPC
vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations
in writing or by similar means. The grant to the Sandiganbayan
of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to public
office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs,
did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction
to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the
offense is committed in relation to office.
CASE NO. 7
PANFILO LACSON v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 128096; 20 January 1999
Facts:
Eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the
Kuratong Baleleng, an organized crime syndicate, were killed
by the elements of Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG). Said group was composed of several police
units including the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task
Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by herein petitioner.
Consequently, a police from the Central Investigation
Command (CIC), another unit belonging to ABRITG, stated that
what transpired between the ABRITG and the gang members
was a summary execution. This led to the investigation of the
incident, finding that said encounter was a legitimate police
operation.
However, the review board modified the findings and
recommended for the indictment for multiple murder against
all of the respondents of the case, including herein petitioner.
Information for murder were filed against the same before the
Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman then filed an amended
information to the Sandiganbayan, charging herein petitioner
only as an accessory.
The petitioner then moved to question the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, contending that since the amended
information only charged him as an accessory, his case would
thereby fall within the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.
Petitioner asserted that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
is limited only to cases where one or more of the principal
accused who are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent
or higher. When the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
information, it ordered for the case to be transferred to the
RTC of Quezon City.
Consequently, while the case was pending to be
resolved, a law was passed defining and expanding the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (RA 8249), removing the
word principal from principal accused in Section 2 of RA
7975 (Old Sandiganbayan Law). Aggrieved, petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of the law and argued that it is
prejudicial to his cause considering that the law shall apply to
all cases pending in any court over which a trial has not begun.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to
try and decide the case.
HELD:
Yes. Sandiganbayan has the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan also covers the felonies committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office. Since herein
petitioner was charged with murder, what determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the official position or rank
of the offender that is, whether he is one of those officers
enumerated in the law. The provisions of RA 7975 (Old
Sandiganbayan Law) do not make any preference to the
criminal participation of the accused public officer as to
whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice, or accessory.
In effect, the Congress, in enacting RA 8249 (New
Sandiganbayan Law), did not mention the criminal
participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
CASE NO. 8
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig),
The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary
of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB,
CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J.
LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six respondents in
their official capacities as members of the State Prosecutor's
Office), respondents.
FACTS:
Prosecutors filed with RTC Laguna 7 informations charging
Mayor Antonio Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon,
Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo
Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and
killing of Allan Gomez.
SC transferred the venue of the cases to RTC Pasig after the
Secretary of Justice expressed his apprehension that the trial of
said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of
the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favour of
Sanchez and the relationship of an employee of the trial court
in one of the accused.
Sanchez argued that since most of the accused were
incumbent public officials or employees at the time of the
alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them
should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
not of the regular courts.
ISSUE:
Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense
committed by Sanchez as he is a public officer.
HELD:
No. The case should be tried by the RTC and not
Sandiganbayan. Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as
amended by P.D. No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner
stands charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1),
which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it
covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense
committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
There is no direct relation between the commission of the
crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as
municipal mayor because public office is not an essential
element of the crime charged. The offense can stand
independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in
the information that the commission of the crime charged was
intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's
official functions.
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no
allegation therein that the crime of rape with homicide
imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of
his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate
connection" between the offense and his office. It follows that
the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the
regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
The petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED
to continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141,
101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to
decide them with deliberate dispatch.
CASE NO. 9
Serana vs Sandiganbayan
542 SCRA
Facts: Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a
government scholar and a student regent of the University of
the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance
of her official functions, she represented to former President
Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will
be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the
amount of P15,000,000.00.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over her person because as a UP student regent, she was not a
public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a
member in representation of the student body since she
merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple
student and did not receive any salary as a UP student regent;
and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27.
The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the
BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers of
administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office.
Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines
reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of
administration and corporate powers in the university. It is
well-established in corporation law that the corporation can
act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in
the case of non-stock corporations.
Issue: WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a
public officer.
Held: Yes.
First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer. (Laurel vs Desierto)
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public
office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Third, it is well established that compensation is not an
essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.
Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of
P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.
CASE NO. 10
Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 18, 2014, 716 SCRA
Facts:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions
of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012, unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the
cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can
connect to the internet, a system that links him to other
computers and enable him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of
information that he needs for research, study, amusement,
upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures
and videos, for the general public or for special audiences like
associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make
purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like
government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses,
credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools;
and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person
through his e-mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and
billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and
uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of
the current generation for greater information and facility of
communication. But all is not well with the system since it
could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would
want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes.
One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to
unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by
posting defamatory statements against him that people can
read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to
communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or
surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or
defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can
use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for
exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to
the internet. For this reason, the government has a legitimate
right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish
wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to
wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and networks
of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the
laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent
individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses
or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems,
networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly
has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from
happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the
Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities
violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of
course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put
order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and
prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in
these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the
original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it
earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law
until further orders
Issue:
Whether RTC has jurisdiction of Cybercrime law?
Held:
The designation of special cybercrime courts of course is not
outside our power to undertake: Section 21 of the Cybercrime
Law grants the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over any
violation of the Cybercrime Law, and provides that special
cybercrime courts manned by specially trained judges should
be designated. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
on the other hand, empowers this Court to promulgate rules
on the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.
*Military Court Jurisdiction:
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 lays down the general rule that
members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law
who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised
Penal Code (like coup detat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court, except that,
where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the
offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall
be tried by a court martial, and with the further exception that,
where the President, in the interest of justice, directs before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil court.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses
shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 70
to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No, 408, as
amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-
martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed
therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or
local government ordinances.
CASE NO. 11
G.R. No. 178607: December 5, 2012
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and
representative of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS,
CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and MARKOS A VGOUSTIS,
Respondents.
JUSTICE BRION
FACTS:
Dante Jimenez is the president of Unlad Shipping &
Management Corporation a local manning agency while the
private respondents are some of the listed incorporators of
Tsakos Maritime Services another local maritime agency. On
August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against
the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal
recruitment. The petitioner alleged that the respondents
falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSIs articles of
incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment
agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA). On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and
Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-
affidavits allegations. While Avgoustis and Alamil did not
submit any counter-affidavit. In May 4, 2004 the 3rd Assistant
City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for
syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the
respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his
recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal
information with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City
presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali. Subsequently, the
city prosecutor reexamined the case and filed a motion with
RTC to withdraw the information and the respondents file their
opposition and comments. an August 1, 2005 resolution, the
RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the
existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.
Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest
against the respondents, the respondents appeal and was
denied by the RTC, on the ground that the court is the sole
judge whether or not a criminal case should be dismissed.
Having the said decision, the respondent filed for motion for
reconsideration and inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being
biased or partial. In a January 4, 2006 order, Judge Capco-
Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did not
resolve respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration and the
petitioners motion to expunge.
The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214,
presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon. The Regional Trial Court
was dismissed and the warrants was set aside for lack of
probable cause. On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to
prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no
standing to seek any relief from the RTC. While the CA in its
August 7, 2006 joint order, the RTC denied the petitioners
notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the
conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to
represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions
appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal
expunged from the records. October 18, 2006, the petitioner
elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari assailing the RTCs March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006,
and August 7, 2006 orders. The CA Ruling its November 23,
2006 resolution, the CA dismissed outright the petitioners
Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition
on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only
the Office of the Solicitor General has the legal personality to
represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. Petitioner was not
the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a
victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere
competitor in their recruitment business. Denied the MR that
followed. Petitioner: He has a legal standing to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case since he is the private
complainant and a real party in interest who had been directly
damaged and prejudiced by the respondents illegal acts;
Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC
since she is a fugitive from justice. Respondents: lacks a legal
standing since the power to prosecute lies solely with the
State, acting through a public prosecutor; Petitioner acted
independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor
in the prosecution and appeal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal personality in assailing
the dismissal of the case?
HELD: NO, the petitioner has no legal standing, in a criminal
case the party interest is the people of the Philippines. As a
rule "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest," "who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the
party entitled to the avails of the suit." "All criminal actions
commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and
before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People (Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code) SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government
of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation
or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party.
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal
case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. As an exception
is when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the
criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of
due process).
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2006
and June 28, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
CASE NO. 12
G.R. No. 175602 February 13, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-
Appellants
FACTS:
The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On
January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as
charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs
of each victim actual damages, moral damages and civil
indemnity.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC.
The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but
on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw
appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby
deeming Edwins appeal closed and terminated.1
On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on
the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty of three
counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and
meting on him for each count of homicide the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum,
Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self-
explanatory letter3 dated March 12, 2012, where he pleaded
for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on
January 18, 2012 on the ground that the judgment would be
beneficial to him as an accused. He impleads favorable
Humanitarian consideration on his letter.
The Solicitor General interposed no opposition to the plea.
The court granted the plea for reduction of Edwins sentences.
The final judgment downgraded the crimes committed by
Eduardo from three counts of murder to three counts of
homicide.
ISSUE: W/N the downgrading of Edwins sentence was proper.
HELD:
The testimonial accounts of the States witnesses entirely jibed
with the physical evidence.
As to the matter of procedure, it is unavoidable for the Court
to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of
three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently
alleging the attendance of treachery.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
The use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per
se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve
the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the
term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term,
standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an
averment of a fact.
The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to
inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge
against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This
requirement accords with the presumption of innocence in his
favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being
charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the
information determine the crime of which he stands charged
and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with
common sense and with the requirements of plain
The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be
favorable to him based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court.
Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present
appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal in a criminal
proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its
aspects, including those not raised by the parties. The records
show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial
reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court provides that "an appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and
applicable to the latter." As we have elucidated, the evidence
against and the conviction of both appellant and Rodriguez are
inextricably linked. Hence, appellants acquittal, which is
favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the
latter.
In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty
only of homicide.1wphi1 Such verdict was applied to his co-
accused, Jose Precioso, who was previously found guilty by the
trial court of robbery with homicide, despite the fact that
Precioso appealed but failed to file an appellants brief. The
Court also modified Preciosos civil liability although the
additional monetary award imposed on Arondain was not
extended to Precioso since it was not favorable to him and he
did not pursue the appeal before the Court.
Accordingly, the court grants the plea of Edwin Valdez.
CASE NO. 13
Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 172035
FACTS:
Vice Mayor and other local officials of Koronadal City, South
Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) charging the petitioner,
Fernando Miguel, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, in connection
with the consultancy services for the proposed Koronadal City
public market.
The Ombudsman directed the petitioner to submit his counter-
affidavit. After moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his
counter-affidavit. Then, the Ombudsman found probable cause
against the petitioner and some private individuals for violation
of R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for
Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Ombudsman filed the corresponding Informations with the
Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. So, the
petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and orally moved for
a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan likewise granted.
The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days within
which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked
the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day extension to submit his
counter-affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of the extension
requested, the petitioner asked the OSP for an additional
thirty-day period to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the two
extensions asked and granted, the petitioner asked the OSP
anew for a twenty-day extension period.
Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner
failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting Prosecutor
Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his
right to submit countervailing evidence. Then, Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto approved the resolution.
Prosecutor asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and
trial of the petitioner and of the other accused private
individuals.
After several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal
cases against him. The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners
motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation this,
despite the OSPs earlier termination of the reinvestigation for
the petitioners continuous failure to submit his counter-
affidavit. The petitioner did not question the denial of his
motion.
The petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both
criminal cases.
The OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] pendente
lite. The petitioner filed his Vigorous Opposition based on the
obvious and fatal defect of the information.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution
suspending the petitioner pendente lite.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension
order and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to file this
certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension
order.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE ABSENCE OF AN ACTUAL PRE-SUSPENSION
HEARING RENDERS INVALID THE SUSPENSION ORDER AGAINST
THE PETITIONER.
RULING:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court considered the
opposition of the accused (motion to suspend pendente lite) as
sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the
prosecutions motion for hearing.
The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People, where the
Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension
hearing held to determine the validity of the Informations that
had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the
numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved
the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied
nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the
consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings,
memoranda and other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process
requirement, when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses
against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then
an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual
hearing was conducted. It is well settled that to be heard does
not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no
denial of procedural due process exists.
CASE NO. 14
PEOPLE VS SORIA
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179031
November 14, 2012
FACTS:
On February 26, 2000, AAA and her siblings enjoyed the
spaghetti their father (appellant) brought home for merienda.
After eating, AAA went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter,
appellant also entered the room and positioned himself on top
of AAA, took off her clothes and inserted his penis into her
vigina. AAA felt intense pain and thus told her father that it
was painful. At that point, appellant apologized to his
daughter, stood up, and then left the room. The whole incident
was incident was witnessed by AAAs brother.
The pain persisted until AAAs vagina started to bleed. She
thus told her aunt about it and they proceeded to a hospital for
treatment. Her mother was also immediately informed of her
ordeal. Subsequently, AAA was taken into the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Appellant denied committing the same. Instead, he claimed
that the filing of the rape case against him was instigated by his
wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair with a man
residing in there community.
On June 30, 2005, the trial court rendered its Judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
against AAA and sentences him to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH
On appeal, the Court ruled that while the appellate court was
convinced that appellant raped AAA, it nevertheless noted
the prosecutions failure to present her birth certificate as
competent proof of her minority. Thus, the CA concluded that
the crime committed by appellant against his daughter was
only simple rape and accordingly modified the penalty imposed
by the trial court from death to reclusion perpetual and
reduced the civil indemnity awarded from P75,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court gravely erred in imposing the
death penalty upon the accused assuming arguendo that he is
guilty of the crime charged.
COURTS RULING:
Yes, the Trial Court gravely erred in imposing the death penalty
upon the accused.
Rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse
or by sexual assault. Rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is
referred to as rape through sexual intercourse. Carnal
knowledge is the central element and it must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. It is commonly denominated as
organ rape or penile rape and must be attended by any of
the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of
paragraph 1.
On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is
commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator,
user any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis
into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It is
also called instrument or object rape, also gender-free
rape.
The Information in this case did not specify whether the crime
of rape was committed through sexual intercourse or by sexual
assault.
However, based on evidence the Court find appellant guilty of
rape by sexual assault. The Court ruled that it cannot be denied
that appellant inserted an object into AAAs female organ.
AAA categorically testified that appellant inserted something
into her vagina. She claimed to have suffered tremendous pain
during the insertion. The insertion even caused her vagina to
bleed necessitating her examination at the hospital. Both the
trial court and the CA found AAAs testimony to be credible.
The Court find no compelling reason not to lend credence to
the same.
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape by sexual
assault is prison mayor. However, the penalty is increased to
reclusion temporal if the rape is committed by any of the 10
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this
article. The Information alleged the qualifying circumstances
of relationship and minority. It was alleged that appellants the
father of AAA. During the pre-trial conference, the parties
stipulated that AAA is the daughter of appellant. During trial,
appellant admitted his filial bond with AAA. Admission in
open court of relationship has been held to be sufficient and,
hence, conclusive to prove relationship with the victim.
With respect to minority, however, the Information described Desi Tomas filed a motion to quash citing that the Makati MTC
AAA as a 7-year old daughter of appellant. Her minority must has no jurisdiction as the document was submitted and used in
be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself. Pasay and that there was no crime committed as not all of the
elements of perjury was present.
There must be independent evidence proving the age of the
victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses The lower courts denied the motion saying that Makati has
and the absence of denial by the accused. Documents such as jurisdiction as it was notarized there and ruled that she was
her original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal sufficiently charged with perjury.
certificate or school records would suffice as competent
evidence of her age. Here, there was nothing on record to ISSUE: Whether, in a crime of perjury, the proper venue is
prove the minority of AAA other than her testimony, where it was notarized or where it was used.
appellant absence of denial, and their pre-trial stipulation. The
HELD: The SC ruled that Makati was the right venue.
prosecution also failed to establish that the documents
referred to above were lost, destroyed, unavailable or The SC cites Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of Court where it
otherwise totally absent. was stated that criminal action shall be instituted where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential elements
It is settled that when either one of the qualifying occurred.
circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or
lacking, that which is pleaded in the Information and proved by The SC, one-by-one stated the elements of perjury and
the evidence may be considered as an aggravating provided that Tomas did all things in Makati, thus making
Makati the right venue for the case.
circumstances. As such, appellants relationship with AAA
may be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
CASE NO. 16
Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape by sexual assault and is sentenced to suffer G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
the penalty of twelve years of person mayor, as minimum, to DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,
twenty years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is also vs.
ordered to pay AAA the amount P30,000.00 as indemnity, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
FACTS:
damages.
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has
been pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
CASE NO. 15
the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of
anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through operation
Union Bank vs. People, 667 SCRA 113 (G.R. No. 192565)
conducted on a three-year old patient born with an
imperforate anus.
FACTS:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with
The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City
an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners
underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of
Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas
the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling
(collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the
him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati
his body.
City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying
the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted
Tomas.
at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. The
petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum) was the
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2)
anesthesioligist. During the operation, Gerald experienced
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
bradycardia, and went into a coma. He regained consciousness
against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John
only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717,
was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13,
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma.
1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-
Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence
000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC,
resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutors
Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas
Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutors Office
183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate
filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum.
against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did
not commence any other action or proceeding involving the
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
same issue in another tribunal or agency.
Manila, but was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997).

On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr.
Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On January
20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum.
ISSUE(S):
1) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal
negligence.
2) Wether or not Dr. Solidum was civilly liable
HELD:
1) No
2) No
RATIO:
Issue 1:
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and
regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said
Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly
imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald.
Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not preclude the probability
that other factors related to Geralds major operation, which
could or could not necessarily be attributed to the
administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and
had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido
revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the
anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and
precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding
side effects did occur."
The existence of the probability about other factors causing
the hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a
reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums guilt, and moves us to
acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries. "
Issue #2
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not
immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we cannot now
find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances
that have been established here do not present the factual and
legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only
from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and
competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused.
That meant that the manner of administration of the
anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the
hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard.
Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to
speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to
do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.
CASE NO. 17
Castillo vs. Salvador, July 2014
Facts:
The respondent Phillip Salvador and his brother Ramon
Salvador were charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner,
Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman who is engaged in real
estate business, educational institution, boutique, and trading
business. Petitioner met respondent through a common friend
in December 2000 and became close since then. Petitioner
eventually met respondents brother and manager, Ramon
Salvador. She was then enticed by the respondent and his
brother to engage in freight and remittance business.
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent and
since she trusted him very much as he even acted as a father to
her children when her annulment was on-going, she agreed to
embark on the remittance business. In December 2001, they
went to Hong Kong and had the Phillip Salvador Freight and
Remittance International Limited registered. A Memorandum
of Articles of Incorporation and a Certificate of Incorporation
were issued. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any
profit derived from the business would be equally divided
among them and that respondent would be in charge of
promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, while Ramon would
take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines and
she would be financing the business.
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising
the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual
operation. When petitioner already had the money, she
handed the same to respondent in May 2002 at her mothers
house in Las Pias City, which was witnessed by her disabled
half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business
never operated. When she asked respondent about the money
and the business, the latter told her that the money was
deposited in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent
confessed that he used the money to pay for his other
obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at
all.
Respondent testified that he and petitioner became close
friends and eventually fell in love and had an affair. His defence
was that it was the petitioner who suggested a remittance
business upon seeing how popular he was among the Filipino
domestic helpers when they travelled to Hong Kong and
Bangkok. He denied receiving the US$100,000.00 capital from
the petitioner. He claimed that no remittance business was
started in Hong Kong as they had no license, equipment,
personnel and money to operate the same.
On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision which rendered
the accused, Philip Salvador guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Estafa and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correctional maximum as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum
and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
US$100,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency.
Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. On February
11, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision reversing the decision of
the RTC. Petitioner then files the instant petition on the civil
aspect of the case.
Issue:
Whether the award of damages be retained despite the
acquittal of the accused in the criminal case
Ruling:
No. The award of damages cannot be retained. Our law
recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the
civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground
that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for
a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any
act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such
act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is
out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of
the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based
on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is for the same act or omission.
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been
committed by appellant, the general presumption, "that a
person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor.
The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa
are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of appellant. Thus, since the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.
In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., Preponderance of
evidence is defined as the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to
be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence"
or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.
However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by
preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money
in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting
versions on the source of the same. She also failed to require
respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the
transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money
was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong. Moreover,
petitioners claim of trust as reason for not requiring
respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she
conducted her previous transactions with him and her
behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was
inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been
swindled.
Thus, the petition for the award of damages is denied.
CASE NO. 18
G.R. No. 175256
Petitioner: Lily Lim
Respondent: Kuo Co Ping aka Charlie Co
G.R. No. 179160
Petitioner: Kuo Co Ping aka Charlie Co
Respondent: Lily Lim
Facts:
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC),
owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued
several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement
dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These
withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the
dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each
withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for
six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative
manager, Gail Borja, sold the withdrawal authorities covering
50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P3.15 million or
P63.00 per bag. On February 15, 1999, Co sold these
withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of P64.00
per bag or a total of P3.2 million. Using the withdrawal
authorities, Lim successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement,
and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering
10,000 bags, to Co. In April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to
withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags. Lim clarified the matter
with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented
a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim
pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser
quantity of cement.
After failed demands, Lim filed a criminal case of Estafa
through Misappropriation or Conversion against Co before
Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. She
alleged that Co with intent to defraud her, with grave abuse of
confidence, with unfaithfulness, received in trust
P2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but
far from complying with his obligation, misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit
the said amount of P2,300,800.00 and despite demands, the
accused failed and refused to return said amount. On
November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154,
rendered its Order14 acquitting Co of the estafa charge for
insufficiency of evidence as the first and second elements of
the crime of estafa were not established by the prosecutions
evidence. After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case,
the Pasig City RTC
also relieved Co of civil liability.
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civil
aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the CA.
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of
Manila. The defendants in the civil case were Co and all other
parties to the withdrawal authorities. Lim asserted two causes
of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights.
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific
performance and damages, Co filed motions to dismiss the said
civil case and Lims appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case.
He maintained that the two actions raise the same issue, which
is Cos liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of
cement, and should be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens
and forum shopping. The appellate court (Second Division)
favorably resolved Cos motion and dismissed Lims appeal
from the civil aspect of the estafa case. It held that the parties,
causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lims appeal and in
her civil complaint are
identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is the
payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement. Thus, the
CA Second Division dismissed Lims appeal for forum shopping
Lim filed the instant petition for review.
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Cos Motion to Dismiss. The
Manila RTC held that there was no forum shopping because
the causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It
observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an
obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict, whereas the
civil liability involved in the appeal of the criminal case arose
from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari prayed for the nullification of
the Manila RTCs Order in Civil Case No. 05-112396 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The CA
Seventeenth Division denied Cos petition and remanded the
civil complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. The CA
Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila RTC that the
elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met.
Co filed the instant Petition for Review. Upon Cos motion, the
Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions.
Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for
specific performance and damages during the pendency of her
appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
Ruling:
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended
party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability
arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is,
civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal
proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on
an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony, as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such
as for breach of contract or for tort53). It may also be based on
an act or omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action
by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (in cases of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries). The civil liability
arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is
inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason,
the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the
criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is
instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal
action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome
of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is
extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action
declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves the obligations arising
from contract and from tort whereas the appeal in the estafa
case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the
otfense charged. They present different causes actions, which.
under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent from each other. Both cases can proceed to their
final adjudication subject to the prohibition on double recovery
under Article 2177 of
Civil Code.
Thus, Lily Lim's petition is granted. The assailed October 20,
2005 Resolution of the Second Division of the is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Lily Lim's. appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is
ordered REINSTATED and the CA is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the
same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.
CASE NO. 19
CAPUSANAN v. LAROYA
GR No. 145391, August 26, 2002
Facts: The vehicle of Capitulo driven by Casupanan and
another by Laroya figured an accident. After the
unpleasant incident, the latter filed criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and the former filed civil case
against Laroya for quasi-delict, both in Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac.
Subsequently, Laroya file a Motion to dismiss the civil
case. For him, the presence of the case constitutes
 forum shopping while the civil aspect arising from
delict is pending. For Casupanan, the civil case can
proceed independently since it is a separate and
distinct civil action source from the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether the civil case filed by Casupanan be
dismissed
Held: No. Forum shopping exists if there are multiplicity of
suits with same facts and reliefs prayed for. However,
it would not be violative if there is a law allowing
separate civil action from the civil aspect pending in
criminal case.
Here, the civil case should not be dismissed even if
there is multiplicity of suits. The civil case filed by
Casupanan is supported by the provisions of the Civil
Code referring to quasi-delicts different from the civil
actions pertaining to crime.
CASE NO. 20
G.R. No. 112985. April 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARTIN L. ROMERO and
ERNESTO C. RODRIGUEZ
Rule 111- Effect of Death on the Civil Action
Facts:
SAIDECOR started its operation on August 24, 1989 as a
marketing business with Martin Romero as the President and
General Manager and Ernesto Rodriguez as the operations
manager. Later, it engaged in soliciting funds and investments
from the public guaranteeing an 800% return on investment
within fifteen (15) to twenty one (21) days.
On September 14, 1989, Ernesto A. Ruiz went to SAIDECOR
office in Butuan City to make an investment handing over
P150, 000.00 to SAIDECOR collection agent Daphne Parrocho.
Ernesto Rodrigues issued a post-dated check. The check was
presented for payment on October 5, 1989 and was
dishonored for insufficiency of fund while both the accused
cannot be located at that time.
On October 25, 1989, an information was filed against Romero
and Rodriguez at the RTC in Butuan city for estafa.
On the same day, the city fiscal filed with the same court
another information against the two (2) accused for violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, arising from the issuance of the
same check. On January 11, 1990, both accused were arraigned
before the Regional Trial Court, where they pleaded not guilty
to both informations.
On November 13, 1992, the parties submitted a joint
stipulation of facts, signed only by their respective counsels.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision. On March 30,
1993, the trial court promulgated a Joint Judgment acquitting
the accused for violation of BP 22 and convicting them for
estafa.
On March 30, 1993, accused filed their notice of appeal. During
the pendency of the appeal, on November 12, 1997, accused
Ernesto Rodriguez died.
Issue: WON the death of Ernesto Rodriguez extinguished his
criminal and civil liability ex delicto.
Ruling: Yes. Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs.
Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
The Court hereby affirms with modification the appealed
judgment. The Court hereby sentences accused-appellant
Martin Romero to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen
(16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
to indemnify Ernesto A. Ruiz in the amount of one hundred
fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00) with interest thereon at six
(6%) per centum per annum from September 14, 1989, until
fully paid, to pay twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as moral
damages and fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), as
exemplary damages, and the costs
CASE NO. 21
FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and ELENA M. LIBROJO
(G.R. NO. 148072, JULY 10, 2007)
Facts: Petitioner, Francisco Magestrado loaned a sum of money
from Private Respondent, Elena M. Librojo. As a security for
the said loan, Magestrado executed a mortgage and
surrendered the said title of the property to Librojo. Private
respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint for
perjury against petitioner, before the MeTC of Quezon City.
Alleging that the petitioner willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath,
Magestrado effected an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public
falsely asserting that he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate of
TCT No. N-173163, which document was used in support of a
Petition for Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of
Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Petitioner Magestrado then filed a motion for
suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question
alleging that the civil cases for recovery of a sum of money for
cancellation of mortgage, delivery of title and damages both
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City must be
resolved first. On his contention that since the issues in the
said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues
raised in the criminal action. Hence, MeTC issued an Order
denying petitioners motion for suspension of proceeding,
appearing that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
actions is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The Petitions for Certiorari filed by the petitioner with
RTC and the CA were dismissed. Moreover, the relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which
Issue: Whether the criminal case should be suspended pending distinguishes it from the crime of murder and homicide.
the outcome of the prejudicial question of the civil case? However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar
or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case stated.
Held: No. The determination of whether the proceedings may Furthermore, the relationship between the two is not
be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
whether the facts and issues raised in the pleading in the civil
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It
cases are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case stated that In the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the
such that the resolution of the issue in the civil case would also issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of
determine the judgment in the criminal case. the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not
perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
In the case at bar, the pending civil cases are principally for the accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the
determination of whether a loan was obtained by Magestrado other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of
from Elena Librojo and whether the former executed a real marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of
estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-
Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
173163. On the other hand, the criminal case involves the
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to
determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
executing an Affidavit of Loss to support his request for alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy. It is evident that the already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all
civil case and the criminal case can proceed independently of that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at
each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil case, it the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still
subsisting.
will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the
criminal case for perjury.
CASE NO. 23
CASE NO. 22
G.R. No. 208587, July 29, 2015
Pimentel vs Pimentel
JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC., HELEN D.
630 SCRA 436
DAGDAGAN, PATRICK PACIS, KENNETH PACIS, AND SHIRLEY
DOMINGUEZ, Petitioners, v. CECILIA LICLICAN, NORMA D. ISIP,
FACTS:
AND PURITA DOMINGUEZ, Respondents.
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel (private respondent) filed
an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel
The Facts
(petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Joselito received a summon to appear before the Regional Trial
During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioner JM
Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case
Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. (JMD) held on December
for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of
29, 2007 at the Baguio City Country Club, the election for its
the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
new set of directors was conducted. Conflict ensued when
Joselito then filed an urgent motion to suspend the
petitioners Patrick and Kenneth Pacis were allegedly not
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the
allowed to vote on the ground that they are not registered
existence of a prejudicial question.
stockholders of JMD.
ISSUE:
Tensions rose and respondents, allegedly, walked out of the
Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of
meeting. But since the remaining stockholders with
marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension
outstanding shares constituted a quorum, the election of
of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against Joselito.
officers still proceeded, which yielded the following result:
HELD:
Officers:
The petition has no merit.
1. Helen D. Dagdagan as President
2. Patrick D. Pacis as Vice-President
Pursuant to Section 7 Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, the
3. Kenneth D. Pacis as Secretary
elements of prejudicial question are as follows: (a) the
4. Shirley C. Dominguez as Treasurer
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
After staging the walk-out, respondents, on even date,
criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
executed a Board Resolution certifying that in the stockholders
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The civil case
meeting, the following were elected directors and officers of
for the annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case
JMD.
for the frustrated parricide, thus, requirement of the
aforementioned rule was not met as the civil action was filed
Board of Directors:
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
1. Cecilia D. Liclican Chairman and Presiding Officer
 2. Norma D. Isip
3. Purita C. Dominguez
4. Tessie C. Dominguez, and
5. Shirley C. Dominguez
Officers:
1. Cecilia D. Liclican as President and Presiding Officer
2. Norma D. Isip as Vice-President
3. Gerald B. Cabrera as Corporate Secretary/Treasurer and
Oscar Aquino Financial Consultant Auditor
In reaction to the foregoing developments, petitioners
Dagdagan, Patrick and Kenneth Pacis, and Dominguez filed a
Complaint against respondents before the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City (RTC) for nullification of meetings, election and
acts of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs,
raffled to Branch 59 of the court. Docketed as Civil Case No.
6623-R, the case, after a failed mediation, was referred for
appropriate Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) to Branch 7 of the
RTC.
Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners Dagdagan and
Patrick Pacis, executed an Affidavit-Complaint7 dated
December 15, 2008 charging respondents Liclican and Isip with
qualified theft. The criminal cases for qualified theft were then
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 29176-R (based on I.S. No.
3118) and 29175-R (based on I.S. No. 3111). On March 10,
2009, the corresponding warrants were issued for the arrests
of Isip and Liclican.
In due time, respondents lodged a petition for certiorari with
the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.108617, to annul and set
aside the two (2) March 10, 2009 Orders by the RTC Branch 7,
anchored, among others, on the alleged existence of a
prejudicial question. According to respondents, petitioner
stockholders, by filing the complaint-affidavit, are already
assuming that they are the legitimate directors of JMD, which
is the very issue in the intra-corporate dispute pending in the
RTC, Branch 59.
The appellate court held that Judge Tiongson-Tabora should
have refrained from determining probable cause since she is
well aware of the pendency of the issue on the validity of
JMDs elections in Civil Case No. 6623-R.
Issue:
Whether or not Civil Case No. 6623-R constituted a prejudicial
question warranting the suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R.
Ruling
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-
Tabora acted with grave abuse of discretion when she ordered
the arrests of respondents Isip and Liclican despite the
existence of a prejudicial question.
As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally
exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that
must be pre-emptively resolved before the latter may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.24The rationale
behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions,25and
its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case No. 6623-R, the
intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R. To be sure, Civil Case
No. 6623-R involves the same parties herein, and is for
nullification of JMDs meetings, election and acts of its
directors and officers, among others. Court intervention was
sought to ascertain who between the two contesting group of
officers should rightfully be seated at the companys helm.
Without Civil Case No. 6623-Rs resolution, petitioners
authority to commence and prosecute Criminal Case Nos.
29175-R and 29176-R against respondents for qualified theft in
JMDs behalf remained questionable, warranting the
suspension of the criminal proceedings.
The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context,
cure the grave abuse of discretion already committed. The fact
remains that when the RTC, Branch 7 issued its challenged
Orders on March 10, 2009, the Judgment in favor of petitioners
was not yet rendered. Consequently, there was still, at that
time, a real dispute as to who the rightful set of officers were.
Plainly, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should not have issued the
challenged Orders and should have, instead, suspended the
proceedings until Civil Case No. 6623-R was resolved with
finality.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it should be made clear that
the nullification of the March 10, 2009 Orders does not, under
the premises, entail the dismissal of the instituted criminal
cases, but would merely result in the suspension of the
proceedings in view of the prejudicial question.
CASE NO. 24
Fenequito vs. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113, G.R. No. 172829 July
18, 2012
Facts:
The present petition arose from a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents filed by herein respondent
against herein petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila.
On February 11, 2004, Information for falsification of public
documents was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila against
herein petitioners. On April 23, 2004, herein petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable
Cause. After respondents Comment/Opposition4 was filed,
the MeTC issued an Order dated July 9, 2004 dismissing the
case on the ground of lack of probable cause.
Aggrieved, respondent, with the express conformity of the
public prosecutor, appealed the case to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila.
On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment setting aside the
July 9, 2004 Order of the MeTC and directing the said court to
proceed to trial.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for
review.
On March 9, 2006, the CA rendered its presently assailed
Resolution dismissing the petition. The CA ruled that the
Decision of the RTC is interlocutory in nature and, thus, is not
appealable.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA
denied it in its Resolution dated May 22, 2006. Hence, the
instant petition.
Issue: Wheter RTCs decision was interlocutory and can be
appealed?
Held: RTCs decision was interlocutory in nature. As such, it
cannot be appealed.
One of the grounds for the CAs outright dismissal of Fenequito
et al.s petition for review was because of the latters failure to
submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent to the petition filed, as required under Section 2,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. An appeal being a
purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply
with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. The
rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as
the Rules are designed to facilities the orderly disposition of
appealed cases.
But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present
petition, the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from
the assailed ruling of the CA. This is because Fenequito et al.
erroneously assumed that the RTC Decision is final and
appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. An order is
interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be done upon its merits. In contrast,
a final order is one that which dispose of the whole subject
matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined.
Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of
the MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by
allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is
clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose
of the case completely, but left something more to be done on
its merits.
CASE NO. 25
G.R. No. 181021 December 10, 2012
BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES and SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ of
the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents.
Facts: Private respondent Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes (Reyes),
sometime in 1996, offered her services to petitioner as the
latter's real estate agent in buying parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf
course. Convinced of her representations, petitioner released
the amount of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be used in buying
those parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those parcels of
land, converted and misappropriated the money given by
petitioner to her personal use and benefit. Petitioner sent a
formal demand for Reyes to return the amount
of P23,423,327.50, to no avail despite her receipt of the said
demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of
Estafa against Reyes before the Assistant City Prosecutor's
Office of Makati City.
After a preliminary investigation was conducted against
Reyes, the Assistant Prosecutor of Makati City issued a
Resolution2 dated April 27, 2005. It is recommended that
respondent be indicted of the crime of Estafa defined and
penalized under the Revised Penal Code.
Thereafter, an Information for the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was filed
against Reyes and raffled before the RTC, Branch 149, Makati
City. Undeterred, Reyes filed a petition for review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), but it was dismissed by the
Secretary of Justice through State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo
on June 1, 2006. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for
reconsideration, and in a Resolution4 dated July 20, 2006, the
said motion was granted. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied by the Secretary of Justice in a
Resolution dated December 14, 2006. Eventually, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA.Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated December 20, 2007
hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE DOJ SECRETARY, RAUL GONZALEZ,
CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY AND WHIMSICALLY DISREGARDED
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THE [EXISTENCE] OF
PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR ESTAFA
UNDER ARTICLE 315 1(b) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
Ruling: The petition is meritorious.In reversing the finding of
probable cause that the crime of estafa has been committed,
the Secretary of Justice reasoned out that, [the] theory of
conversion or misappropriation is difficult to sustain and that
under the crime of estafa with grave abuse of confidence, the
presumption is that the thing has been devoted to a purpose
or is different from that for which it was intended but did not
take place in this case.1wphi1 The CA, in sustaining the
questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, ruled that
the element of misappropriation or conversion is wanting.
It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was
made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A
preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of a case.13 Its purpose is to determine
whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether
there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof.14
This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary
investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines
whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application
of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. 15 The complainant need not
present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.16 A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties' evidence.17 Precisely, there is a trial
to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to
substantiate their respective claims.18
The mere presumption of misappropriation or conversion is
enough to conclude that a probable cause exists for the
indictment of Reyes for Estafa. As to whether the presumption
can be rebutted by Reyes is already a matter of defense that
can be best presented or offered during a full-blown trial.
To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.22 Probable cause is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well
founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor
as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing
is so.23 The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor
does it import absolute certainty.24It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief.25 Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.26 It is enough that
it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.27
CASE NO. 26
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO, complainant,
v Judge Gellada granted the petition for certiorari holding that
JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BAYONA, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Bacolod City, respondent.
FACTS:
The case sprang from a criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Cresencio Palo, Sr. It was initially handled by
Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder who found no probable
cause against Palo. However, complainant, upon review, found
that there was a probable cause against Palo. Thus,
complainant disapproved Jarders Resolution and filed the
Information in court.
In connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
accused Palo, respondent Judge Bayona issued an order
directing complainant Abanado to present (1) a copy of the
Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation, (2) Resolution of
the Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder, (3) Memorandum
of the transfer of case assignment from designated
Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor, and (4) Exhibit
to the Court, to enable his court to evaluate and determine the
existence of probable cause.
With respect to item 3, complainant explained in a letter that
there was no memorandum of transfer of the case from
Investigating Prosecutor Jarder to him.
Respondent was dissatisfied with the explanation of the Office
of the City Prosecutor. In an Order, respondent stated that the
Jarders Resolution dismissing the complaint was part and
parcel of the official records of the case and, for this reason,
must form part of the records of the preliminary investigation.
He further stated that because there was a conflict between
Jarders and complainants resolutions, those documents were
necessary in the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence to
establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Palo. He, thus, ordered complainant to complete the
records of the case by producing the Jarders Resolution. The
Office of the City Prosecutor again sent a letter explaining the
impossibility of submitting it to the court. The letter stated that
the Resolution was no longer part of the records of the case as
it was disapproved by complainant.
Respondent did not accept the explanations made by the
Office of the City Prosecutor. In an order, he required
complainant to explain why he should not be cited for
contempt. Complainant requested for a ten-day extension to
comply with it but respondent denied the request. He likewise
ordered the Clerk of Court to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad
testificandum to Jarder directing him to testify on the existence
of his resolution dismissing the case against Palo and to Office
of the City Prosecutors Records Officer Myrna Vaegas to
bring the entire record of the preliminary investigation of the
Palo case.
Aggrieved, complainant immediately filed a motion for
inhibition against respondent and a petition for certiorari with
a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) to restrain respondent from proceeding with the hearing
of the contempt proceedings. Complainants prayer for a TRO
was granted by Presiding Judge Pepito Gellada of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City.
when a city or provincial prosecutor reverses the investigating
assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding
probable cause replaces the recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the
case. The result would be that the resolution of dismissal no
longer forms an integral part of the records of the case. It is no
longer required that the complaint or entire records of the
case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and
be examined by the judge. The rationale behind this practice is
that the rules do not intend to unduly burden trial judges by
requiring them to go over the complete records of the cases all
the time for the purpose of determining probable cause for the
sole purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused.
What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient
supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make
his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to
verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause.
Complainant executed an administrative complaint and the
same was received by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). He alleged that respondent was guilty of gross
ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct. He
essentially asserted that respondent unduly burdened himself
by obsessing over the production of the records of the
preliminary investigation, especially Jarders Resolution.
Respondent, in his Comment with Counter-Complaint for
Disbarment of Prosecutor Abanado, reiterated the importance
of the Jarders Resolution in deciding whether to issue a
warrant of arrest.
The OCA submitted its report and recommendation. It noted
Judge Gelladas Order which held that the resolution of the city
or provincial prosecutor finding probable cause replaces the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. In such case,
the resolution recommending the dismissal is superseded, and
no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case and
it need not be annexed to the information filed in court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of a preliminary investigation is an
executive function
HELD:
Yes. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an
executive function.
Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the
Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question.
The Department of Justic-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-
NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as
practicable. Such attachment is not mandatory or required
under the rules.
CASE NO. 27
HEIRS OF THE LATE NESTOR TRIA, petitioner
vs.
ATTY. EPIFANIA OBIAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175887
November 24, 2010
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated August 14, 2006 and
Resolution2 dated December 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 86210. The CA denied the petition for
mandamus/certiorari filed by the petitioners which assailed
the Order3 dated March 24, 2004 of the Office of the President
(OP) dismissing the murder charge against the respondent.
FACTS
On May 22, 1998, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning at
the Pili Airport in Camarines Sur, Engr. Nestor Tria, Regional
Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Region V and concurrently Officer-In-Charge of the
2nd Engineering District of Camarines Sur, was shot by a
gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was
brought to a hospital but died the following day from the lone
gunshot wound on his nape. Subsequently, the incident was
investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
During its investigation, the NBI found that the accused Aclan
and Ona had been conducting almost a daily surveillance at the
office of the victim. In the morning of the day of the incident,
Atty. Obias, together with Aclan, was at the house of the
victim. The victim was shot by Aclan at the back of his head
immediately after the victim and Atty. Obias shook hands and
talked at the airport.
The NBI also anchored their basis for the motive on the part of
Atty. Obias to kill the victim on the the fact that the
respondent acted as a broker between the victims family and
spouses Prudencio Jeremias on the sale of a real property. The
victims family gave the respondent the full payment of P2.8
Million for the sale with the agreement that Atty. OBIAS would
take care of all legal processes and documentations until the
Deed of Absolute Sale is delivered to the TRIA family. After the
death of TRIA, the surviving spouse and heirs made several
attempts to contact Atty. OBIAS to demand immediate delivery
of the deed of sale, but the latter deliberately avoided the TRIA
family and, despite verbal and written demands, she failed and
refused, as she still fails and refuses, to fulfill her legal
obligation to the TRIA family.
On July 31, 1998, NBI Regional Director Alejandro R. Tenerife,
Chairman of Task Force Tria, recommended to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Roberto "Obet"
Aclan y Gulpo, Juanito "Totoy" Ona y Masalonga and Atty.
Epifania "Fanny" Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of Engr. Tria.
On July 2, 1999, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Sur issued a resolution8 directing the filing of an
information for murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissing
the case for insufficiency of evidence as against herein
respondent, Atty. Epifania Obias.
Petitioners appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
assailing the Provincial Prosecutors order to dismiss the charge
against respondent. Based on the findings that the respondent
acted with complicity, the DOJ Secretary modified the
resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and directed the latter
to include respondent in the information for murder filed
against Aclan and Ona.
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJs
resolution but the same was denied by the Justice Secretary.
The respondent then filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office
of the President. Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q.
Flores adopted the resolutions of the DOJ and affirmed the
same. Respondent thus filed a motion for reconsideration,
followed by a Supplemental Pleading and Submission of Newly
Discovered Evidence. This newly discovered evidence consisted
of an affidavit of two witnesses, Calayag and Jennis Nidea,
alleging that the respondent was not responsible for the
offense.
Based on this newly discovered evidence submitted by the
respondent, Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo granted
respondents motion for reconsideration and reversed the DOJ
resolutions. Accordingly, the case against respondent was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioners then filed before the CA a petition for
mandamus/certiorari, but the same was denied by the CA.
Petitioners ultimately filed the present petition before the
Supreme Court alleging, among others, that they were denied
due process since they have not confronted nor cross-
examined the witnesses who executed the additional
affidavits.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process
when they were not able to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses who executed the additional affidavits which served
as newly discovered evidence.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Petitioners argument that the non-referral by the OP to the
DOJ of the appeal or motion for reconsideration filed by the
respondent had deprived them of the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses on those affidavits belatedly
submitted by the respondent is likewise untenable. Under the
procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended,38 in case the investigating prosecutor conducts a
hearing where there are facts and issues to be clarified from a
party or witness, "[t]he parties can be present at the hearing
but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may,
however, submit to the investigating officer questions which
may be asked to the party or witness concerned."39Hence, the
non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the motion for
reconsideration of respondent, in the exercise of its discretion,
did not violate petitioners right to due process.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence on record, we
find no such grave abuse when the Secretary of Justice found
probable cause to charge the respondent with murder in
conspiracy with Aclan and Ona. The following facts and
circumstances established during preliminary investigation
were sufficient basis to incite reasonable belief in respondents
guilt: (a) Motive - respondent had credible reason to have Engr.
Tria killed because of the impending criminal prosecution for
estafa from her double sale of his lot prior to his death, judging
from the strong interest of Engr. Trias family to run after said
property and/or proceeds of the second sale to a third party;
(b) Access - respondent was close to Engr. Trias family and
familiar with his work schedule, daily routine and other
transactions which could facilitate in the commission of the
crime eventually carried out by a hired gunmen, one of whom
(Aclan) she and her father categorically admitted being in her
company while she visited Engr. Tria hours before the latter
was fatally shot at the airport; (c) Suspicious Behavior --
respondent while declaring such close personal relationship
with Engr. Tria and even his family, failed to give any
satisfactory explanation why she reacted indifferently to the
violent killing of her friend while they conversed and shook
hands at the airport. Indeed, a relative or a friend would not
just stand by and walk away from the place as if nothing
happened, as what she did, nor refuse to volunteer
information that would help the authorities investigating the
crime, considering that she is a vital eyewitness. Not even a call
for help to the people to bring her friend quickly to the
hospital. She would not even dare go near Engr. Trias body to
check if the latter was still alive.
All the foregoing circumstances, in our mind, and from the
point of view of an ordinary person, lead to a reasonable
inference of respondents probable participation in the well-
planned assassination of Engr. Tria. We therefore hold that the
OP in reversing the DOJ Secretarys ruling, and the CA in
affirming the same, both committed grave abuse of discretion.
Clearly, the OP and CA arbitrarily disregarded facts on record
which established probable cause against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated August 14, 2006 and Resolution
dated December 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 86210 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 25, 2000
Resolution of then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas modifying
the July 2, 1999 resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Sur and directing the latter to include respondent in
the information for murder filed against Aclan and Ona is
hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.
No costs.
CASE NO. 28
LESSON / DOCTRINE:
In Metro Manila and in chartered cities, the filing of criminal
cases shall be commenced only by information, except when
the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG,
Complainants
vs.
JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA
CASTELLANA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
AM No. MTJ-07-1666 (Formerly AM OCA IPI No. 05-1761-MTJ)
05 September 2012
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS
An administrative case was filed against Judge Javellana arising
from a verified complaint for gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct
improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and
others, filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of the Public
Attorneys Office.
The complaint/allegations involve cases decided and/or were
handled by Judge Javellana and his alleged business relation as
co-agent in a surety company. In People vs Lopez, a case of
malicious mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a
preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and
pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her
witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts
alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for
dismissal of said case.
ISSUE/S
Whether Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
RULING
Yes. Without any showing that the accused in People vs Lopez,
et al were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief
particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code
the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods which under
Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be
imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6)
months. Clearly, this case should be governed by the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. Also, the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under Rule 16,
but in People vs. Lopez, Judge Javellana conducted a
preliminary investigation even when it was not required or
justified.
Section 11 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure states:
How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within
the scope of this Rule shall be etiher by complaint or by
information; Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila
and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de
oficio.
On the other hand, Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary
investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or
information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law
is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
without regard to the fine. As has been previously established
herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief
in People vs. Lopez, et al is just six (6) months.
CASE NO. 29
G.R. Nos. 94511-13. September 18, 1992
People of The Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
Alejandro C. Valencia, Accused-Appellant
Facts:
1. This was about a person convicted of (a) Homicide
with the use of unlicensed firearm, penalized by
Reclusion Perpetua with accessory penalties provided
for by law and further without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and (b) Less
Serious Physical injuries, penalized by imprisonment
of 6 months of arresto mayor with the accessory
penalties provided for by law without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
2. One night, a mother and her two children were having
supper. The former noticed the accused, Alejandro
Valencia was few steps away from their shanty who
was carrying a sumpak, a homemade shotgun. She
immediately closed the door as she seized with fear.
3. After a few moments, burst of gunfire was heard and
followed by cries of pain from her children inside the
house. She saw her bloodied children who were
immediately sent to the hospital for cure.
4. She saw the accused running away carrying the
sumpak.
5. During the investigation, the policemen discovered
the presence of 6 pellets hole and 1 big hole size of
the circumference of a shotgun bullet on the door of
the victims.
6. Through his brother, the accused was apprehended
and brought him in the detachment for initial
investigation.
7. The following day, 1 injured children died as a result
of the wounds she suffered while the other child was
discharged from the hospital 1 week after the
incident.
8. The accused pleaded not guilty with the following
appeal.
a. The mother, being the witness has not proven his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt in spite of the fact
that there was allegedly no preliminary
investigation.
b. There was no sufficient evidence exists proving
his guilt on the ground that he was allegedly the
holder of the unlicensed firearm.
c. The witness had flip-flopping allegations as she
could not tell the identity of the suspect when she
was queried at the hospital.
9. From the foregoing, settled was the rule that the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of the
witnesses are accorded great respect and finality in
 the appellate court where the same are surrounded
by the evidence on record.
10. For there was no showing whatsoever of motivated ill
or evil design to testify against the accused, her
motive and integrity, her testimony should be given
full credit in the light of the time-honored
pronouncement that the absence of such strengthens
the witnesses credibility.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant was deprived of his right
of preliminary investigation when he was arrested without
warrant.
Held:
A person who is LAWFULLY arrested, without warrant pursuant
to paragraph 1(bb), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court should
be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. Under the
latter section, Rule 112, the prosecuting officer can file the
information other than the offended party, peace officer on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting
officer or person.
However, prior to the filing of such complaint or information,
the person arrested may ask for preliminary investigation by a
proper officer in accordance with this rule, BUT he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 124 of the RPC as amended,
with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of
a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice.
Since the records did not show whether the accused asked
from a preliminary investigation and in fact, the latter signified
his readiness to be arraigned, the Court can only conclude that
he waived his right to have a preliminary investigation when he
did, in fact, pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.
CASE NO. 30
PCGG vs. MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, et al.
GR NO. 194159, October 21, 2015
Facts:
The PCGG through its Legal Consultant in-charge of
reviewing behest loan cases filed an affidavit-complaint dated
July 15, 2003 against former officers/directors of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) namely Ferry,
Tengco, Zosa, Zalamea, Castell and Sison, as well as former
officers/stockholders of National Galleon Shipping Corporation
(Galleon), namely Cuenca, Tinio and Roque charging them of
violating Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. The affidavit-
complaint contained all findings of the PCGG Ad Hoc
Committee that loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon
from DBP totalling Php 2,039,284,390.85 as approved by
Resolution No. 3002 possessed the characteristics of behest
loans because, a) that Galleon was undercapitalized, b) that
the loan itself was under collateralized; c) that major
stockholders of Galleon were known to be cronies of the
former President Marcos; and d) that certain documents
pertaining to the loan account were found to bear marginal
notes of President Marcos himself.
In a Resolution dated May 30, 2007, the Ombudsman
found no probable cause against private respondents and
dismissed the criminal complaint on the grounds that evidence
attached to the case were not sufficient to establish probable
cause against the individual respondents, considering that the
documents presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of
hearsay, self-serving, and mostly of little probative value. The
PCGG moved for reconsideration which was denied in an Order
dated April 13, 2009. Hence, a petition for certiorari assailing
the Resolution dated May 30, 2007 and the Order dated April
13, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman was filed in this
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman
gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to
indict the respondents of violating Section 3(e) and (g) of RA
3019.
Held:
Yes. The Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint against
individual respondents for lack of probable cause. Individual
respondents were accused of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
All the elements to indict the accused are presents. There were
charged also with violation of Section 3(g) of the same law. The
case reveals that Galleon made a request for guarantees from
DBP to cover its foreign borrowings for the purpose of
acquiring new and second hand vessels. The DBP itself raised
various red flags regarding Galleons request but still agreed to
grant the same request under certain conditions which were
eventually not complied with. As a result, Galleons obligations
to DBP ballooned to Php 2,039,284,390.85 while security of
such obligations were only valued at Php 539,000,000.00 as of
March 31, 1984.
The Ombudsman discredit the findings adopted by the
PCGGs Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-serving, and
of little probative value. In the case of Estrada vs. Ombudsman,
the Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in preliminary investigations
because such investigation is merely preliminary and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Probable
cause can be established with hearsay evidence as long as
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. The factual
findings of the Ad Hoc Committee appears to be based on
official documents prepared by DBP itself in connection with
the behest loans extended in favour of Galleon. These are facts
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
respondents.
 The Court is convinced that there is probable cause to
indict individual respondents of violating Section 3(e) and (g) of
RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the criminal complaint against the PCGG. The
petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 30, 2007 and
the Order dated April 13, 2009 of the Office of the
Ombudsman are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Ombudsman is directed to issue the proper resolution indicting
individual respondents of violating Section 3(e) and (g) RA No.
3019.
CASE NO. 31
Facts: Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (former Governor
Reyes) was implicated in the murder of Dr. Gerardo Ortega. A
special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) was created by
Secretary of Justice Leila de Lima to conduct preliminary
investigation. The First Panel concluded its preliminary
investigation and dismissed the Affidavit-Complaint. Secretary
of Justice De Lima created a new panel of investigators (Second
Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second
Panel found probable cause and recommended the filing of
informations on all accused, including former Governor Reyes.
Reyes filed a case in the Court of Appeals, which found that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when
she created the Second Panel.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
when she issued Department Order No. 710, and with
regard to this:
a. Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710
was an executive function beyond the scope of a
petition for certiorari or prohibition; and
b. Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create
motu proprio another panel of prosecutors in order to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
2. Whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been
rendered moot by the filing of the information in court,
pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul.
Decision:
1. The Court of Appeals erred.
a. The determination by the Department of Justice of the
existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding.
i. An administrative agency performs quasi-judicial
functions if it renders awards, determines the rights
of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the
same effect as the judgment of a court.
ii. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in
affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors
may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
b. The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon
motion or motu proprio, to act on any matter that may
cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. This action may include,
but is not limited to, the conduct of a reinvestigation.
i. The Secretary of Justice exercises control and
supervision over prosecutors and it is within her
authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the
resolutions of her prosecutors. Decisions or
resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to
the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised
Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over said prosecutors; and
who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their
rulings.
2. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the
regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after
the trial court completes its determination of probable
cause and issues a warrant of arrest.
a. Once the information is filed in court, the court
acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to
dismiss the case or to determine the accused's guilt or
innocence rests within the sound discretion of the
court
CASE NO. 32
[GR No. 205472, January 25, 2016]
Amado I. Saraum, Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines,
Respondent.
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was formed regarding an illegal drug
activity in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City against a
certain Pata. During the operation, Pata eluded arrest as
he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the house, the buy-
bust team saw Saraum and Peter Esperanza, who were holding
drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a
shabu pot session. The police operatives recovered from
Saraums possession a lighter, rolled tissue paper, and
aluminum tin foil (tooter).
Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II
(Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) of RA 9165,
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He
testified that he was held by men with firearms and they were
already with Antik and Pata, both of whom were his
neighbors. Believing that he had not committed anything
illegal, he resisted the arrest.
The RTC rendered the decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, CA sustained the
judgment of conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether Saraums warrantless arrest was valid.
HELD:
The Court denies the petition.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, apparatus
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12,
Article II of RA 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the
accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia
for or intended for smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the
body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. The
prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum was in
possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin
foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered
and admitted in evidence.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which
instance does not require a warrant in accordance with Section
5(a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In
arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the
very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has
just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit to crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to
search the shanty for objects relating to the crime and seize
the drug paraphernalia they found. As these items were plainly
visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Since
the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti
of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain
the judgment of conviction.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
CASE NO. 33
WARRANTLESS ARREST
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205926
July 22, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
___________________________________________________
__
FACTS:
On or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been
lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drugs, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly
have in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic)
and 0.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with a total
of 0.43 grams which was found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug.
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the
evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan)
of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag)
were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their
way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo,
Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per
hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about
10 meters, two (2) men later identified as Comerciante and a
certain Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) - standing and showing "improper
and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain
shabu, they immediately stopped and approached
Comerciante and Dasilla At a distance of around five (5)
meters, P03 Calag introduced himself as a police officer,
arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from
them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said
sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to
evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal.
However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer
to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and
ordered him to present his evidence.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking
for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the
area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in
front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken
to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have
confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in
exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the
demand, they were brought to another police station to
undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged
with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest validly exercised.
ACTIONS OF COURTS:
Regional Trial Court
The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless
arrest on Comerciante, which yielded two (2) plastic sachets
containing shabu. In this relation, the R TC opined that there
was probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest,
considering that P03 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante
was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach
and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent
any proof of intent that P03 Calag was impelled by any
malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly
performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante.
Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
Court of Appeals:
CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that P03 Calag
had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of
Comerciante, given that the latter was committing a crime in
flagrante delicto; and that he personally saw the latter
exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to the CA,
this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that those
sachets might be shabu, and thus, P03 Calag had every reason
to inquire on the matter right then and there.
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration which
was, however, denied. Comerciante then filed a petition to the
SC contending that P03 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless
arrest on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result
of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets
containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily
resulting in his acquittal.
Supreme Court:
Reversed the decision of RTC and CA.
HELD:
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:
SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances
when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest
of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner
who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2)
elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application
that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact
of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under
Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in
Section (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case
reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless
arrest made on Comerciante. P03 Calag himself admitted that
he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30
kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla
standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant
movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the
other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an
arrest.
The Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even
assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify
with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of around
10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed
of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white
crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets
held by Comerciante.
The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly
attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of
P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.
Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his
companion were showing "improper and unpleasant
movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would not have
been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest. As such,
the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be
acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
CASE NO. 34
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG vs. PEOPLE
Ponente: SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
At around 3:00 am of March 2003, Rodel Ong Luz was flagged
down by PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza of the Naga City Police
Station, for violating a municipal ordinance of driving a
motorcycle without a helmet. Alteza invited Luz to their nearby
sub-station. While Alteza and another police officer were
issuing a citation ticket, he noticed that Luz was uneasy and
kept on getting something from his jacket, thus, he told Luz to
take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a
nickel-like tin or metal container. After instructed to open the
container, Alteza noticed a cartoon cover and something
beneath it; and upon Altezas instruction, Luz spilled out the
contents suspected as shabu.
Luz was charged of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and
later convicted by the RTC of the same crime. The RTC found
that Luz had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and
then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery of
two plastic sachets of shabu. The RTC also found Luzs defense
of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Hence, this petition filed under Rule 45 for Review on
Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure on the
ground that there was no lawful arrest.
Held:
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit. There was no
valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely
for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or
she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
(Sec 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court) It is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the
arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching
of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under
the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest, but the confiscation of the drivers license.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, U.S. Supreme Court held that, such
questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can
it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the
questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer,
and the length of time the procedure is conducted. The usual
traffic stop is more analogous to a "Terry stop" than to a
formal arrest.
According to the City Ordinance violated, the failure to wear a
crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine
only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be
issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. Neither can a warrantless arrest be
made for such an offense.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall
be the duty of the arresting officer to read his Miranda rights.
But these constitutional requirements were complied only
after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving
vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search;
(vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to
this case.
While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest
at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. The subject items seized during the illegal
arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal
of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in affirming the judgment of conviction of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED
CASE NO. 35
GEORGE ANTIQUERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013
FACTS:
Six Police Officers were conducting a police visibility patrol in
Pasay City when they saw two unidentified men rush out of a
house and boarded a jeep. Suspecting a crime, they
approached the house which these two men came out from.
Peeking through a partially opened door of the house, the
officers saw accused Antiquera and his live-in partner Corazon
Cruz, engaged in a pot session. The policemen entered the
house, introduced themselves and arrested Antiquera and
Cruz. While inspecting the immediate vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan
saw a jewelry box which contained Shabu and unused drug
paraphernalia. Accused disputed the story and claimed that he
and his partner were sleeping when the police officers knocked
at his house.
The RTC rendered a decision finding them guilty of illegal
possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs which the CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of the accused by the police officers
was valid and considered as an arrest in flagrante delicto
considering that the door was only partially open
HELD:
No.
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is what constitutes an
arrest in flagrante delicto, when an overt act constituting a
crime is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. But the circumstances here do not make out a
case of arrest made in in flagrante delicto. The testimony of
PO1 Cabutihan provides that the door was only open
approximately 4-6inches and that they had to push it to see
what is inside because even as they peeked through it, they
saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Neither did
they consider securing first a search warrant before entering
the property. No crime was plainly exposed to the view of the
arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused without
warrant.
Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure
that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly
found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having
proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the
confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit accused.
His failure to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is
not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the RTC and CA
Decisions and ACQUITTED accused Antiquera for lack of
evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
CASE NO. 36
People vs. Vasquez, 714 SCRA 01/15/2014
FACTS:
The case for illegal possession of drugs was raffled to RTC but
upon motion it was consolidated with the case of illegal sale of
drugs. On arraignment, the appellant (Donald Vasquez)
pleaded not guilty n both charges. The pre-trial was held, but
was terminated without them entering to the detailed facts of
the case. During the trial the prosecution stated the events
that a confidential informant reported to PO2 Trambulo about
the illegal drug activities and Fajardo from the buy bust team.
It was during that buy bust operation that Donald Vasquez was
arrested.
RTC, convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC
gave more credibility to the prosecutions evidence given that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. On
Appeal the CA affirmed the conviction of the appellant. Hence
in his appeal he argued that the Police officers did not have a
search warrant or a warrant of arrest at that time he was
arrested. Inasmuch as the arrest was illegal, the appellant
avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was
precluded in court.
Issue:
Whether Donald Vasquez may assail the validity of the arrest?
Held:
No.
Ruling: The court ruled that the appellant can no longer assail
the validity of his arrest. It was reiterated in the case of People
vs Tampis, that any objection, defect or irregularity attending
an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea of
arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants
are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest.
His arrest falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a) Rule 11354 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure when arrest made without
warrant is deemed lawful. With the validity of the warrantless
arrest in this case, it was held that warrantless seizure of illegal
drugs from the appellant is likewise valid.
It was also held in the Case of People vs. Cabugatan that, The
interdiction against searches and seizures, however is not
absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long
been deemed permissible by the jurisprudence in the instances
of (1) Search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view (3)
customs searches (4) waiver of consented searches (5) stop
and frisk situations and search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrest to
(1) arrest in flagrante delicto (2) arrest affected in hot pursuit
and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. Donald cannot seek pardon
by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest.
CASE NO. 37
Provincial Prosecutor Dorentino Z Floresta vs Judge Eliodoro
G uBIADAS
FACTS:
The complainant administratively charged the herein
respondent with gross ignorance of law , grave abuse of
authority and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
 Complainant faults respondent for granting, without
giving notice to the prosecution, the petition for bail of Jose
Mangohig, Jr. , who was arrested by virtue of warrant issued in
Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable
cause against him for violation of section 5 (b), Art III of R.A.
7610.
Respondent argued tha he informs the petition for
bail for Mangohig, Jr., who was then under preliminary
investigation, which motion was filed on January 3, 2000 on
which same date a copy of said petition was furnished to the
public prosecutor, was as set by Mangohig, Jr heard on the
morning of January 4, 2000, during which there was no
appearance from Prosecutors Office; and that the offense is
ordinarily bailable, respondent granted him bail.
The Office of Court Administrator(OCA) stressed that
the Rules of Court requires movant to serve notice of his
motion on all parties concerned at least three days before the
hearing thereof, hence, respondent erred in granting the
petition for bail without hearing the prosecutors side.
The OCA accordingly recommend that the respondent
be fined in the amount of twenty thousand pesos.
Issue :
Whether bail is a matter of right or judicial discretion.
Whether or not the respondent is liable for gross
ignorance of the law in granting bail to the respondent-
detainee- Mangohig without hearing the prosecution.
HELD :
Admission to bail as a matter of discretion
presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and
guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must
first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because
by the very nature od deciding applications for bail, it is on the
basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weight against
in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In
other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally
within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after
evaluation of evidence submitted to the prosecution. Any
order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.
Section 18 of Rule 114 on application for bail, no
period is provided as it merely requires the court to give a
reasonable notice of hearing to the prosecutor or require him
to submit recommendation, and the general rule on the
requirement of three day notice for hearing of motions under
section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to call for
hearing his petition for bail in shorter notice.
Mangohig was arrested for violation of Section 5, Art
III,R.A. 7610, punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua, for statutory rape qualified by relationship,
punishable by death.
Under the circumstances, by the respondent assailed
grant of bail, the prosecution was deprived of due process for
which he is liable for gross ignorance of law or procedure
which is serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.
Wherefore, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, Presiding
Judge of RTC Bramch 72, Olongapo City, is found GUILTY of
undue delay in resolving a motion and of ignorance of the law
or procedure in granting an application for bail without
affording the prosecution due process. He is accordingly FINED
in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS, with warning
that the repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
CASE NO. 38
RULE 114- Bail
38. Zuno vs. Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382
[A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ. November 26, 2004]
Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO R. ZUO, complainant, vs.
Judge ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Batac, Ilocos Norte, respondent.
FACTS:
In a Criminal Case for illegal possession of prohibited or
regulated drugs which was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
the respondent judge issued an Order granting bail to the
accused, even without the latters application or motion for
bail.
In this regard, the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration. But instead of acting thereon, respondent
judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further
proceeding with the case. Complainant prosecutor thus prays
that respondent judge be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the practice of
law.
Respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he
issued the Order granting bail to the accused without any
hearing, the same was premised on the constitutional right of
the accused to a speedy trial, for there was delay in the
proceedings due to complainants frequent absences and
failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in court,
resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. He added that the
prosecution did not object to the grant of bail.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judged erred in granting a bail
without any hearing.
RULING: Yes. A hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it
is a matter of right or discretion. In order for the judge to
properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing
to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
The respondent judge granted bail to the accused without
conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Included in the duties of the judge in case an application for
bail is filed, is that where bail is a matter of discretion, he shall
(i) conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; from there,
(ii) decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and (iii) if the
guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bail bond; otherwise the petition should be
denied.
Respondent judge did not conduct a hearing before he granted
bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an
opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail. The
importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence
cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
Also, the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the
part of the prosecution in an application for bail does not
dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing.
With regard to respondent judges contention that the accused
were entitled to their right to a speedy trial, there is no
indication in the records of the criminal case that the
prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even
assuming there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail
without a hearing.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge is found guilty of violation of
Supreme Court Rules, specifically Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure on the grant of bail. This administrative
offense is considered a less serious charge, punishable under
Section 9(4) and Section 11(B-2), Rule 140 of the same Rules.
.CASE NO. 39
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN
ANTONIO MUOZ
G.R. No. 153675 (April 19, 2007)
FACTS: Private respondent Muoz was charged before a Hong
Kong Court with bribery and conspiracy to defraud. As a result,
an order for his arrest was issued which the Supreme Court
later upheld as valid.
Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with
the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private
respondent. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same
case, a petition for bail.
The petition for bail was initially denied, the judge holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and
that private respondent is a high "flight risk." After the first
judge inhibited himself, the case was raffled off to another
branch presided by respondent judge Olalia. He reversed the
decision on motion for reconsideration and allowed private
respondent to post bail, subject to certain conditions.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner argues that the
admission of private respondent to bail has no Constitutional
or statutory basis, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
Issue: Whether the right to bail extends to a potential
extraditee.
Ruling: Yes. While jurisprudence (US vs. Purganan) states that
the right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings, the
Court took cognizance of trends in international law which
uphold the fundamental human rights and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section 2, Article II of
our Constitution and the various treaties the country has
entered into giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty.
The Court departed from the Purganan ruling on the following
grounds: first, the exercise of the States power to deprive an
individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings, but even administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine. Second, Philippine jurisprudence
has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only, but even to persons in detention during the
pendency of administrative proceedings, i.e. deportation cases
(US v. Go-Sioco and Mejoff v. Director of Prisons). Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot
be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue.
An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative,
bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee
may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty,
and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. Private respondent has been detained for over
two years without having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of
proof required in granting or denying bail should be "clear and
convincing evidence" (separate opinion of Reynato Puno in the
Purganan case). This standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
CASE NO. 40
G.R. No. 158754 August 10, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and JOSE "JINGGOY"
ESTRADA, Respondents.
FACTS: In November 2000, as an offshoot of the
impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal
complaints against the former President and members of his
family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman. On April 4, 2001, the
Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several
criminal Informations against the former President and the
other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for
the crime of plunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and
among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of
arrest for Jinggoy and his co-accused. On its basis, Jinggoy
and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, Jinggoy filed a Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put
him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing
that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and
not in a series or combination of overt or criminal acts as
required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right. He prayed that he be excluded from the
Amended Information. In the alternative, he also prayed
that he be allowed to post bail.
On June 28, 2001, he filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose
Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An
Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its
Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A
Non-Bailable Offense As To Him.
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Jinggoys Motion
to Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion.
His alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after
arraignment of all accused.
Jinggoy moved for reconsideration of the Resolution.
Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign
him.
From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately
adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a petition for certiorari before
this Court claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in, inter alia, (a)
sustaining the charge against him for alleged offenses and with
alleged conspirators with whom he is not even connected, and
(b) in not fixing bail for him. Pending resolution of this petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 148965, Jinggoy filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical
Reasons. The Ombudsman opposed the motion. The
Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion for bail, with
one Dr. Roberto Anastacio of the Makati Medical Center
appearing as sole witness for Jinggoy. Jinggoy filed with the
Court an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his
Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. He
reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayans Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying
Jinggoys motion for bail for lack of factual basis. According
to the graft court, basing its findings on the earlier testimony of
Dr. Anastacio, Jinggoy failed to submit sufficient evidence to
convince the court that the medical condition of the accused
requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that
he be allowed to post bail. On February 26, 2002, the Court
dismissed Jinggoys petition in G.R. No. 148965.
Upon proper motion of Jinggoy, respondent Sandiganbayan
should conduct hearings to determine if the evidence of
Jinggoys guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to
him.
On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an
Omnibus Application for Bail10 against which the prosecution
filed its comment and opposition. Bail hearings were then
conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda.
In the herein assailed Resolution of March 6, 2003, respondent
Sandiganbayan (Special Division) granted the omnibus
application for bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting bail
to Jinggoy Estrada.
HELD: The imputation of grave abuse of discretion to
the public respondent is untenable. The Court rules that
public respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when, after
conducting numerous bail hearings and evaluating the
weight of the prosecutions evidence, it determined
that the evidence against individual respondent was not
strong and, on the basis of that determination, resolved
to grant him bail.
Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution
mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may
justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is
great. Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed
Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy
does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a
flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court
wrote in this regard
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant Jinggoy has, in
general, been consistently respectful of the Court and its
processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by deed,
that he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his
continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his conduct, social
standing and his other personal circumstances, the possibility
of his escape in this case seems remote if not nil.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is
now almost nil, given his election on May 10, 2004, as Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the
fact that those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters
mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people for as
long as they can flee from the retribution of justice. On the
other hand, those with a reputation and a respectable name to
protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court,
to be sure, cannot accept any suggestion that someone who
has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any
plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a
fugitive from justice.
CASE NO. 41
OKABE V GUTIERREZ
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with Estafa for failure to deliver the
money agreed upon with Cecilia Maruyama through door-to-
door delivery. The 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J.
Vibandor came out with a resolution finding probable cause for
estafa against the petitioner. The trial court issued a warrant
for the arrest of the petitioner with a recommended bond of
P40,000. The petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said
amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon City, who
forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal bail
bond of the petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City.
Upon her request, the petitioner was furnished with a certified
copy of the Information, the resolution and the criminal
complaint which formed part of the records of the said case.
The petitioner left the Philippines for without the trial courts
permission, and returned to the Philippines. She left the
Philippines anew and returned. The trial court issued an Order
setting the petitioners arraignment and pre-trial. On the same
day, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for
the issuance of the hold departure order. The trial court issued
an order on the same day, granting the motion of the private
prosecutor for the issuance of a hold departure order. The
petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment. The
petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold
Departure Order and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan
because of her minor children. She refused to enter her plea
with leave of court. When it was elevated to the CA, her
petition was partially granted. The CA ruled that by posting bail
and praying for reliefs from the trial court, the petitioner
waived her right to assail the respondent judges finding of the
existence of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether or not posting a bail bond waives the right to assail
the trial courts issuance of warrant of arrest.
Held:
No. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the
appellate court erred in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, viz.: SEC. 26.Bail not a
bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation.An application for or admission to
bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of
his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided
that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall
resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the
start of the trial of the case. It bears stressing that Section 26,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new
one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an
application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall
be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant
issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon.
The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People
v. Red.The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it
was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural
rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are
applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in
application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate
retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to
cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to
actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31,
2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in
effect. It behooved the appellate court to have applied the
same in resolving the petitioners petition for certiorari and her
motion for partial reconsideration.
CASE NO. 42 (no case digest uploaded yet as of sending)
CASE NO. 43
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS: Senator Juan Ponce Enrile filed a petition for certiorari
to assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 2014 and
August 8, 2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan, where he has
been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile
insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his
Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The objective of the petition for certiorari is to annul the
decision of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail
and motion for reconsideration on the following grounds: 1.)
the prosecution failed to show conclusively that Enrile, if ever
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; 2.) the
prosecution failed to show that the evidence of Enriles guilt is
strong; 3.) Enrile is not a flight risk.
(Antecedent) On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in
the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). On June 10, 2014 and
June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and
Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against
him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the
Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution
denying Enriles motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on
the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not
yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the
custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered
the arrest of Enrile.
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued,
Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong
of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his
medical examination.
ISSUE: Whether Senator Juan Ponce Enrile can bail?
HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan
arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail and unwarrantedly
disregarded Sen. Enriles fragile health and advanced age. Bail
is a matter right and is safeguarded by the constitution, its
purpose is to ensure the personal appearance of the accused
during trial or whenever the court requires and at the same
time recognizing the guarantee of due process which is the
presumption of his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme
Court further explained that Bail for the provisional liberty of
the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed
independently of the merits charged, provided his continued
incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his life.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile
be granted the right to bail it will enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and attended, which
will then enable him to attend trial therefore achieving the
true purpose of bail.
In addition, It is the Philippines responsibility in
the international community under the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights .of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due processunder the obligation
to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. He is
also not a flight risk because of his social
and political standing and his having immediately surrendered
to the authorities upon being charged in court. Lastly, the
fragile state of Enriles health is a compelling justification for
his admission to bail.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence
of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according
to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be
allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency
of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his
bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any
party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after
notice to the adverse party in either case.
CASE NO. 44
Del Castillo vs.People, 664 SCRA
FACTS:
Police officers had conducted a search in petitioners
house after receiving a report that he was engaged in
selling shabu. Thereat, petitioner had managed to escape
after the officers had served the warrant. Consequently,
the officers decided to closely guard the place where the
subject ran.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson
Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner searched
the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the
petitioner allegedly ran for cover. One of the barangay
tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several
articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that
were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat- sealed
transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory
examination, the result of which proved positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his
counsel, pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
of the charge against him in the Information.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the
latter affirmed the decision of the RTC.
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied
by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
The Court of Appeals erred in its application of the element of
possession as against the petitioner, as it was in violation of
the established jurisprudence on the matter. had the said court
properly applied the element in question, it could have been
assayed that the same had not been proven.
RULING:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment
dated February 10, 2009, argued that the Court of Appeals did
not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of prohibited
drugs because it stated that when prohibited and regulated
drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and
occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that
such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law,
and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
On the other hand, the Court emphasized that it must be put
into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of
Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every prosecution for the illegal
possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a
regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by
duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.
It furthermore ruled that while it is not necessary that the
property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must
be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants
control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a
constructive one. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed
that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of
electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession.
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution do not also provide proof as to the ownership of
the structure where the seized articles were found. During
their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating their
basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner.
During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly
concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by
petitioner. However, during cross-examination, SPO3
Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical shop but
denied what he said in his earlier testimony that it was owned
by petitioner.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge
of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under
his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With
the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under
petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical
to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of
the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty
that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who
act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
CASE NO. 45
MIGUEL V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Koronadal City, South Cotabato Vice Mayor (and others) filed a
complaint before the Ombudsman against herein Petitioner for
violation of RA 3019 in connection with architectural and
engineering works in the proposed Koronadal public market.
Ombudsman required Petitioner to submit a counter-affidavit,
which was submitted after a request for extension.
Ombudsman found probable cause to file the Information
before Sandiganbayan charging Petitioner with violation of RA
3019 and falsification of public document. The information
essentially said that Petitioner committed the offense charged,
taking advantage of his position, and acting with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality
The next turn of events would show that prior to arraignment,
Petitioner asked several extensions to file a counter-affidavit,
which he repeatedly failed. Petitioner orally moved for
reinvestigation, and extension of 10 days to file counter-
affidavit, which was granted Again asked for 30-day extension,
and before the expiry of that request, he again asked for
another 30 days. Both were granted, but asked for another 20
days, which was also granted. Despite the extensions given, he
failed to submit his counter-affidavit. This prompted the
Prosecutor to declare that petitioner has waived his right to
submit counter-availing evidence, and asked the
Sandiganbayan for the arraignment of Petitioner. Petitioner
then asked an extension to file a motion to quash and/or
reinvestigation, Sandiganbayan denied due to the already
pending reinvestigation and his apparent failure to submit a
counter affidavit. Petitioner did not question this denial
Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
Prosecution moved to suspend Petitioner pendente lite, which
Petitioner opposed. This was eventually granted by
Sandiganbayan. Motion for reconsideration of Petitioner
likewise denied , hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether the Petitioner waived his right to present evidence
and be heard
Held:
Yes. Petitioner claims that Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion ordering his suspension despite the information
failing to prove the evident bad faith and manifest impartiality.
OSP argues that the information sufficiently established all the
elements of the crime. Petitioner failed to cite how the evident
bad faith and manifest impartiality was not proven.
The test of w/n an information sufficiently describes the crime
charged is if the information describes the crime in intelligible
terms and in such particularity with reasonable certainty so
that the accused is duly informed of the crime charged. In this
case, what Petitioner is essentially assailing is that of evident
bad faith and manifest impartiality. At best, what Petitioner
can ask is a bill of particulars.
The main topic on right to present evidence and be heard is
attached to the validity of the suspension of Petitioner RA 3019
mandates that a public officer charged under that Act or under
RPC shall be suspended from office. The suspension requires a
prior hearing to determine the validity of the information. The
accused public official may challenge the information even
before the suspension order on the grounds of: (1) Validity of
the proceeding that led to the filing of information, (2)
propriety of the prosecution on the grounds that the act
imputed did not have all the elements of the crime Petitioner
says that, according to a previous jurisprudence, the trial court
should issue a show cause order against the prosecution
before ordering the suspension. However, in that same
jurisprudence he cited, the show cause order is unnecessary
when a motion to suspend pendent lite was already filed.
Moreover, the show cause order (essentially a pre-suspension
hearing) is aimed at securing for the accused a fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
information or the validity of the proceedings against him.
Such proceedings offer the accused to be heard, and being
heard and does not necessarily mean oral pleadings before the
court. It can also be written pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard either through oral arguments or written pleadings
has been granted no denial of due process exists. Accused has
repeatedly failed to present his counter-affidavit despite being
granted several extensions. Moreover, the said suspension is
not a penalty. It is merely a preventive measure that reflects
the constitutional mandate that a public office is a public trust.
CASE NO. 46
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTURO LARA Y. ORBISTA
G.R. No. 199877; 13 August 2012
FACTS:
On or about 31 May 2001 in Pasig City, the accused,
armed with a gun, conspired and confederated with an
unidentified person and with violence and intimidation, stole
and divested from one Joselito M. Bautista cash amounting to
P230,000.00 and shot and assaulted the same inflicting several
wounds which led to the his death. The money belonged to San
Sebastian Allied Services, represented by the witness Enrique
Sumulong. On the said date, Sumulong was accompanied by
Virgilio Manacob, Jeff Atie, and the deceased after
withdrawing the money supposedly for the salary of the
companys employees.
The accused pleaded not guilty and the trial
commenced. During the course of the trial, the prosecution
presented several witnesses including Enrique Sumulong, SPO1
Cruz, and PO3 Calix.
The first witness testified that on 07 June 2001, while
on his way to barangay San Miguel in Pasig City, he saw the
accused walking in Dr. Pilapil Street. He then alerted the other
witnesses about this incident. Consequently, Sumulong,
together with four (4) policemen, went to the said street and
positively identified the accused. Having confirmed the identity
of the accused, the police approached him and invited him at
the police station for questioning. The accused was then placed
in a police lineup and there, Manacob and Atie attested that it
was really the accused who robbed and killed the deceased.
Thereafter, the accused was informed of his rights and
subsequently detained.
In his defense, the accused stated that on the said
date of the robbery, he was at his house fixing a sewer trench.
Finding this as a weak alibi, the Court considered the vicinity of
his residence and the crime scene located in the same
barangay, the RTC convicted him of robbery with homicide.
 On appeal, the accused raised several errors including
the argument that he was not assisted by counsel when the
police placed him on the lineup, which according to him, was a
flagrant violation of his right under Section 12, Article III of the
constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lara was denied his right to counsel
thereby making his arrest illegal, making it a sufficient ground
to invalidate the proceedings.
HELD:
No. Since the contention of Lara was a belated
invocation, the court did not find merit on his appeal. Any
objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have
been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused
entered his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Furthermore,
the Court held that the illegal arrest is not a ground to set aside
conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that
sufficiently establishes his culpability. As regards his claim that
he was denied a counsel, the Court dismissed the same stating
that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel
because the police lineup was not part of the custodial
investigation.
CASE NO. 47
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015
JOSE PEPE SANICO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER SON-TENIO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Sanico and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for
trespassing and theft of minerals in MCTC of Catmon-Carmen-
Sogod, Cebu. MCTC rendered judgment convicting Sanico and
Batiquin with violation of Sec 103 of RA 7942 or Phil Mining Act
of 1995 but acquitted them for trespassing.
On April 22, 2009, Sanicos counsel filed a notice of appeal of
MCTC judgment. RTC ordered Sanico to file his memorandum
on appeal but he did not comply. RTC dismissed the appeal for
failure to file Memorandum on Appeal.
On April 26, 2010, Atty. Dennis Caete, another lawyer acting
for Sanico, filed a motion for reconsideration averring that
Sanico was preoccupied with the condition of his ailing wife
who subsequently died; and his counsel, Atty. Baring, suffered
from a medical condition which caused her to forget how she
got the case and whom to contact as principal counsel.
RTC denied the motion for lack of verification and affidavit of
merit, and because the supposed sickness of Sanicos wife and
the lapses of Atty. Baring were not justifiable reasons.
Atty. Caete filed a petition for review in CA contesting his
conviction, and assailing the dismissal of his appeal, which was
denied on the following grounds, namely: (a) the docket fees
were not paid; (b) there was no proper proof of service of a
copy of the petition for review on the adverse party; (c) the
petitioner did not furnish to the RTC a copy of the petition for
review; (d) there was no affidavit of service; (e) no written
explanation for not resorting to personal filing was filed; (f) the
documents appended to the petition were only plain
photocopies of the certified true copies; (g) no copies of
pleadings and other material portions of the record were
attached; (h) the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping were defective due to failure to contain a statement
that the allegations therein were based on the petitioners
personal knowledge; (i) the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping did not contain competent evidence of
identity of the petitioner; and (j) the serial number of the
commission of the notary public and the office address of the
notary public were not properly indicated.
CA also denied the motion for reconsideration and held that a
client is generally bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique.
ISSUE:
Whether Sanico is bound by the mistakes of his counsel in the
realm of procedural technique.
HELD:
No. The petitioner could reasonably expect that his counsel
would afford to him competent legal representation. The mere
failure of the counsel to observe a modicum of care and
vigilance in the protection of the interests of the petitioner as
the client as manifested in the multiple defects and
shortcomings discovered in the petition for review was gross
negligence in any language because the defects were plainly
avoidable by the simple application of the relevant guidelines
existing in the Rules of Court. If the incompetence of counsel
was so great and the error committed as a result was so
serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in
court, the litigation ought to be re-opened to give to the client
another chance to present his case. The legitimate interests of
the petitioner, particularly the right to have his conviction
reviewed by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be
sacrificed in the altar of technicalities.
Although the right to appeal is statutory, it must be respected
and observed because it is an essential component of due
process.
CASE NO. 48
People v Ayson 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine
Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales
of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an
investigation to be conducted. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by
it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA)
to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating
his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of
the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he
misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented
from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise
however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa
was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty.
Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written
admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being represented
by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that
accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence
this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge is correct in
making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement
of accused.
Held: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the
accused was not under custodial investigation when his
statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the
right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self-
incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only
when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which
involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a
person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any
way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the
purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be
admitted in court.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda
v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning
if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such
warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him. The objective is to
prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."
CASE NO. 49
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 151258
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
Vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, et. al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 154954
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
Vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 155101
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
Vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, et. al., Respondents.
G.R. No.s 178057 & 178080
February 01, 2012
Ponente: SERENO, J.
BRIEF
This is are 5 consolidated cases involving the death of Leonardo
Lenny Villa, a freshman law student of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law, during initiation rites of the Aquila
Legis Juris Fraternity.
FACTS
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo
de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to
join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza,
Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera,
Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa (neophytes).
The neophytes had to undergo initiation rites that were
scheduled to last for three days. Initiation rites include physical
and psychological sufferings such that the neophytes were
punched, given knee blows to their thighs, paddled and were
required to memorize and recite the principles of the Aquila
Legis Juris Fraternity.
The neophytes had survived their first two days of initiation.
However, after the neophytes had concluded their second day
of initiation, and after a while, accused non-resident or alumni
fraternity members Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation
rites, Nelson Victorino, initially refused. Upon insistence of
Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites.
After receiving again several blows and paddles, the initiation
for the day was officially ended and the neophytes had their
dinner, then they slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by
Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings. When his
conditioned worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the mathematical computation of the number of postponements
hospital, but Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. of the scheduled hearings of the case. The conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be
Consequently, two criminal cases for homicide was filed considered are factors such as the length of delay, the
against 35 Aquilans, one under Criminal Case no. C-38340(91) assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice
and the other was Criminal Case no. C-38340. The trial in wrought upon the defendant.
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) commenced thereafter. On the
other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in xxx xxx xxx
Criminal Case no. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain
matters that had to be resolved first. We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal
of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy
separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, trial. The court held thus:
Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon
(Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings An examination of the procedural history of this case would
against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) reveal that the following factors contributed to the slow
shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court progress of the proceedings in the case below:
found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a
result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving xxx xxx xxx
the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November
1993. For "various reasons," the initial trial of the case did not
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the
commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the
Court of Appeals and the prosecutions failure to comply with
arraignment of the nine accused.
the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified
true copies of the same.
The trial court in Criminal Case no. 38340 dismissed the charge
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his
xxx xxx xxx
right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between
the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing
Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of the
Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA reversed the trial courts
petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right
Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their
right to speedy trial.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner Villa filed a Petition for Certiorari, praying for the
reversal of the CAs decision involving the dismissal of the [T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the
criminal charges against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca and Adriano. fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order
of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case
the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as
involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an
and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their
Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of
right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She
Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the
also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the
Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said
delay, as the original records and the required evidence were
Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court
not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated
ISSUE/S of the CASE
when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case against
even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the ground of their
disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the
right to speedy trial.
basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by
co-accused Concepcion x x x.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
xxx xxx xxx

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in
August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there
Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This
was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for
right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious,
the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners,
capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated
the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by
when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17,
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is
1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained
allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no
dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged
cause or justifiable motive. In determining the right of the
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
constitution frowns upon x x x.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting
Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The appealed Judgments in
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise
affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and
the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed closed and
TERMINATED.
CASE NO. 50
[G.R. Nos. 117485-86. April 22, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELCHOR
ESTOMACA y GARQUE, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Estomaca an illiterate laborer was charged with 5
counts of rape. In May 24, 1994, consequent to five separate
complaints, Criminal Cases were filed in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 38, Iloilo City charging herein appellant, an
illiterate laborer, with rape committed on five separate
occasions against his own daughter, complainant Estelita
Estomaca. Melita is the eldest daughter of the accused, the
second husband of Melitas mother. Melita has a full-blood
younger brother around twelve (12) years old. She has two (2)
half-blood sisters (from) the first marriage of her mother who
are residing in Manila. She was first raped July of 1993, and
subsequently on December of 1993, January of 1994, February
of 1994, and march of 1994. But the accused on his
arraignment plead guilty on the two events and not guilty for
the three events of raped. As to two guilty case, That
sometime in the month of December, 1993, in the Municipality
of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, that the accused was
taking advantage of his superior strength, abuse of confidence
and trust, he being the father of the undersigned, with
deliberate intent and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned who,
at that time, (was) 15 years of age. The accused also waived
the presentation of evidence in his defense, proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He was sentence reclusion perpetua
and indemnity for damages. But the court was not convince
regarding the procedural aspect of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Arraignment of the accused is
valid?
HELD:
No, Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the
arraignment should be made in open court by the judge
himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of
the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated
therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that
is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge.
The requirement that the reading be made in a language or
dialect that the accused understands and knows is a
mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1
should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords
the accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him
and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist
the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral
aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution. That
the compliant must be fully explained and understand by the
accused and can be translated in any language that would be
appropriate for the person to fully understand. That the court
ruled, that Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated
is not a new rule for it merely incorporated the decision of this
Court in People vs. Apduhan Jr. and reiterated in an unbroken
line of cases. The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt
must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the
searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the
voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court
failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilty of the
appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellants full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The records
do not reveal any information about the personality profile of
the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age,
socio-economic status, and educational background of the
appellant were not plumbed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in
Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571 convicting accused-
appellant Melchor Estomaca y Garque of two crimes of rape is
hereby SET ASIDE. Said cases are REMANDED to the trial court
for further and appropriate proceedings, with instructions that
the same be given appropriate priority and the proceedings
therein be conducted with deliberate dispatch and
circumspection.
CASE NO. 51
G.R. No. 171020 March 14, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO PANGILINAN y TRINIDAD, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed with modification the decision of (RTC) of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, finding appellant Alfredo
Trinidad Pangilinan guilty of two counts of rape. The Court of
Appeals upheld the two death sentences imposed on appellant
but modified the award of damages.1vvphi1.nt
Two informations were filed charging appellant with raping
AAA, his daughter. Appellant, who was arrested and detained
with no bail recommended, filed a petition for bail.
In the hearings for the petition for bail, the prosecution
presented the private complainant-victim, BBB, and Dr.
Melinda Layug.
From the evidence presented, the prosecutions version of
what transpired, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General, is quoted by the Court of Appeals:
Inasmuch as the penalty it imposed was the death penalty, the
trial court forwarded the records of the case to the Supreme
Court for automatic review pursuant to Section 10, Rule 122 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.14However, pursuant to
our ruling in People v. Mateo,15 the case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. 16
The Court of Appeals affirmed the death penalties imposed by
the trial court but modified the amounts of damages awarded.
The Court of Appeals elevated the records of the case to the
Supreme Court for automatic review. Thereafter, in our
resolution dated 28 February 2006, the parties were required
to submit supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within thirty
(30) days from notice. The parties opted not to file
supplemental brief on the ground they had fully argued their
positions in their respective briefs.
ISSUE:
W/N appellants rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that
he was arraigned only after his case was submitted for decision
HELD:
We do not think so. Appellants belated arraignment did not
prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his
counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection
that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even
cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsels active
participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was
fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel
would have objected and informed the court of this blunder.
Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was
subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the
procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after
being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that
appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It
is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court
will not allow it.
CASE NO. 52
DAAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NOS. 163972-77
Facts:
Joselito Daan together with co-accused Benedicto Kuizon were
charged for three counts of malversation of public funds which
they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book
and payrolls for given period making it appear that some
laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall
building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries
thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in
addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also
indicted for three counts of falsification of public document by
a public officer or employee.
The accused offered withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and
substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the
mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and
voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the
alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused
proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the
crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of
falsification of a public document by a private individual. On
the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered
to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of
"guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable
officer to render accounts.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain,
despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the
main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its
approval. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners plea bargaining offer.
Held:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or
to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment
in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by
the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's
motion to plea bargain.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it
appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a
lesser offense of falsification by private individual defined and
penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will
strengthen the cases against the principal accused, the
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the
master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the movants
herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as
draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality
of Bato, Leyte.
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO
J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00
as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of
Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to
the government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily
surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the accused is also
willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind,
merits consideration.
Petition granted.
CASE NO. 53
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JANJALANI
G.R. No. 188314
January 10, 2011
FACTS:
On February 14, 2005 night, the bus conductor of RRCG bus
noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on
getting on the bus and so the conductor obliged and let them
in. Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, immediately became
wary due to their unusual conduct. One of the two men sat
two seats behind the driver while the other sat at the back of
the bus. Both of them paid for two passengers. At that point,
Andales became certain that the two were up to no good.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala
avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus.
The bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus due
to a Makati ordinance prohibiting the unloading except at
designated bus stop. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and
allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got
off the bus. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion and saw
that the bus was on fire. He ran out of the bus and when he
went back he saw their passengers either lying on the ground
or looking traumatized.
After the explosion, the spokesperson for Abu Sayyaff
announced over radio that the explosion was a valentines gift
for the former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
Accused Trinidad, in an exclusive interview, confessed his
participation in the Valentines Day bombing. Baharan, in
another exclusive interview, likewise admitted his role in the
bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television
interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive
devises for the bombing.
The accused were then charged with multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and
Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused members of
Abu Sayyaf remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge, Baharan,
Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other
hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder
charge, accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and
Baharan pled not guilty. Rohm pled not guilty to both charges.
The trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad
were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the charge
of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they plan guilty
to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defence counsel conferred with
accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the
consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledge the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-
arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan
and Trinidad plead guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting
accused-appellants plea of guilt despite insufficiency of
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.
COURTS RULING:
The Court ruled that it was unnecessary to rule on the
sufficiency of the searching inquiry.
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argued that the trial
court did not conduct a searching inquiry after they had
changed their plea from not guilty to guilty.
Trial court judges are required to observe the following
procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
require that prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in
his behalf.
The requirement to conduct a searching applies more so in
cases of re-arraignment. In People vs Galvez, the Court notes
that since accused-appellants original plea was not guilty, the
trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into
why he changed his plea to guilty.
According to the Court: The stringent procedure governing the
section of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the
death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave
no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might
have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision on 9 November
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry 2010, which granted the Petition for Certiorari to reverse and
should not be deemed satisfied in cases which it was the set aside DOJ Sec. Alberto Agra's resolution and a prayer for
defence counsel who explained the consequences of a guilty issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. The appellate court stated that the
plea to the accused, as it appears in the case.
petitioner has copyright of its news coverage, but respondents
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that they are not unmindful of act of airing five (5) seconds of the homecoming footage
without notice of the No Access Philippines restriction of the
the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or
live Reuter's video feed, was undeniably attended by good
of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the faith and thus, serves to exculpate from criminal liability under
accused. The Court observed that accused Baharan and the Intellectual Property Code.
Trinidad previously plead guilty to another charge - multiple
murder - based on the same act relied upon in the multiple ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause to charge respondents
frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to with infringement under Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise
known as the Intellectual Property Code. The resolution of this
the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and
issue requires clarification of the concept of "copyrightable
Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt - one through an
material" in relation to material that is rebroadcast live as a
extrajudicial confession, and the other via judicial admission. news story. We are also asked to rule on whether criminal
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Court deem it prosecution for infringement of copyrightable material, such as
unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching live rebroadcast, can be negated by good faith.
inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-
arraignment is not warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt HELD:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED ABS-CBNs petition
was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under
and ordered RTC Q.C. Branch 93 to continue with the criminal
consideration. proceedings against Grace Dela Pea-Reyes and John Oliver
Manalastas due to copyright infringement. The other
respondents, Atty. Felipe Gozon, Gilberto Duavit Jr., Marissa L.
Flores, and Jessica A. Soho were held not liable for the
CASE NO. 54
(criminal) act of copyright infringement. The Court held that
their mere membership in GMA7's Board of Directors does not
ABS-CBN Corp. vs. Gozon, 753 SCRA 1
mean that they have knowledge, approval, or participation in
the criminal act of copyright infringement., as there is a need
FACTS:
for their direct/active participation in such act. Also, there was
On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal
lack of proof that they actively participated or exercised moral
complaint against respondent GMA for (alleged) act of
ascendancy over Manalastas and Dela Cruz-Pena. Contrary to
copyright infringement under Sections 177 and 211 of the
GMAs contention, the Supreme Court deemed GMA's mere
Intellectual Property Code (RA 8293, as amended), because the
act of rebroadcast of ABS-CBNs news footage (arrival and
respondent aired footage of the arrival and homecoming of
homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq last
OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq without the
22 July 2004) for 2 mins and 40 secs.without the latter's
petitioner's consent. ABS-CBN stated that it has an agreement
authority creates probable cause to find GMA's news
with Reuter's that the petition will contribute news and
personnel Manalastas and Dela Pea-Reyes criminally liable for
content that it owns and makes to Reuters in exchange of the
violating provisions of Intellectual Property Code (Section
latter's news and video material, and Reuters will ensure that
216217 of RA 8293, as amended) that imposes strict liability for
ABS-CBN's materials cannot be aired in the country. The
copyright infringement, since they have not been diligent in
respondent was a subscriber of Reuter's and CNN live feeds.
their functions to prevent that footage from being aired on
After it received the live feed of Angelo Dela Cruz's arrival and
television. They knew that there would be consequences in
homecoming from Reuter's, it immediately aired the video
carrying ABS-CBNs footage in their broadcast which is why
from that news feed. The respondent alleged that its news
they allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon seeing ABS-
staff was not aware that there was (a news embargo)
CBNs logo and reporter.
agreement between ABSCBN and Reuters. Respondent alleged
that it was not also aware that it aired petitioner's footage.
The difference of an act mala in se and mala prohibita was
stated in the present case. Acts mala in se requires presence of
Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued resolution
criminal intent and the person's knowledge of the nature of
on 3 December 2004 which found probable cause to indict Dela
his/her act, while in acts mala prohibita, presence of criminal
Pea-Reyes and Manalastas. The respondents appealed the
intent and the person's knowledge is not necessary. The Court
Prosccutor's resolution before DOJ. DOJ Secretary Raul M.
also stated that Philippine laws on copyright infringement does
Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents in his resolution dated 1
not require criminal intent (mens rea) and does not support
August 2005 and held that good faith may be raised as a
good faith as a defense. Thus, the act of infringement and not
defense in the case. Meanwhile, DOJ Acting Secretary Alberto
the intent is the one that causes the damage.
C. Agra issued a resolution on 29 June 2010 which reversed
Sec. Gonzalez's resolution and found probable cause to charge
It held that ABS-CBN's video footage is copyrightable because it
Dela Pea-Reyes, Manalastas, as well as to indict Gozon,
is under audiovisual works and cinematographic works and
Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho for violation of the Intellectual
works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or
Property Code (due to copyright infringement).
any process for making audiovisual recordings. It also stated
that news or the event itself is not copyrightable. The Court
differentiated idea and expression idea meant as a form, the
look or appearance of a thing while expression is its reality or
the external, perceptible world of articulate sounds and
visible written symbols that others can understand. Thus, the
Supreme Court stated that only the expression of an idea is
protected by copyright, not the idea itself, citing the US
Supreme Court's decision in Baker vs Selden (101 U.S. 99). In
the present case, expression applies to the event captured and
presented in a specific medium via cinematography or
processes analogous to it. The Court also gave the four-fold
test under the Fair Use Doctrine (stated in section 185 of RA
8293 or the Intellectual Property Code, as amended) to
determine fair
use:
a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit
educational purposes;
b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
Fair use, which is an exception to copyright owners monopoly
of the work's usage, was defined by the Supreme Court as
privilege to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without the copyright owner's consent or by copying
the material's theme or idea rather than its expression. It also
said that determination of whether the Angelo dela Cruz
footage is subject to fair use is better left to the trial court
where the proceedings are currently pending.
CASE NO. 55
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE
THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
Facts:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an
Information3 for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes,
Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis
before the Sandiganbayan.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an
urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence
on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion
for bail)
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enriles motions
and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder
case against the accused
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars
before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed a motion
for deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced
the Courts denial of Enriles motion for bill of particulars
essentially on the following grounds:
(1)
the details that Enrile desires are substantial reiterations of
the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to the
issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information;
and
(2)
the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best
ventilated during trial.
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars
despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed
against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious
violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his
specific participation in the crime of plunder had been. He
posits that the Information should have stated the details of
the particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed series
or combination of overt acts that led to the charge of plunder.
Enrile posits that his desired details are not evidentiary in
nature; they are material facts that should be clearly alleged in
the Information so that he may be fully informed of the
charges against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the
trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of
particulars are cited in a context different from his opposition
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the
resolution of the probable cause issue was interlocutory and
did not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent
proceedings especially in the context of a different
proceeding.
ISSUE (S)
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan exercised its discretionary
power in an arbitrary or despotic manner in denying Enriles
motion for bill of particulars
Held:
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the
petition under the terms outlined below.
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and
SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayans resolutions dated July 11, 2014,
which denied Enriles motion for bill of particulars and his
motion for reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this
Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars
containing the facts sought that we herein rule to be material
and necessary. The bill of particulars shall specifically contain
the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Ratio

The constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a
criminal offense has the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him
The objective is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to
fully appraise the accused of the nature of the charge against
him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead to injustice.
Otherwise, the accused would be left speculating on why he
has been charged at all. The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, specifically require certain matters to
be stated in the Information for its sufficiency. The
requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare
for his defense since he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged.
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the
charges or claims in an action, which an accused may avail of
by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead
and prepare for trial.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with
sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the crime
charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment.
The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what the Information
means.
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or
criminal proceedings, is to guard against surprises during trial.
It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the
evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be
required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence
relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the
offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of
factual information included in the bill of particulars
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal
attitude towards its granting and order the government to file
a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should
be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to
the accuseds Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Wherefore, the petition is granted as to the part of
Sandiganbayans resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied
Enriles motion for bill of particulars.
CASE NO. 56
People vs. Lacson, April 2003
Facts:
Herein petitioners file a motion for reconsideration for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the
application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of criminal cases filed
against the respondent and his co-accused. In the said criminal
cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with
multiple murders for the shooting and killing of eleven male
persons. The respondent opposed petitioners motion.
Issues:
a) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the
express consent of the accused;
b) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the
offended party;
c) whether the two-year period to revive it has already
lapsed;
d) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases
beyond the two-year period;
Held:
a) No. The respondent did not give his express consent to
the provisional dismissal of the case. The respondent
allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court
of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that he did
not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even agree
to a provisional dismissal thereof.
b) No. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the
victims were served with copies of the resolution
dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any
attempt on the part of the trial court to notify all the
heirs of the victims of the respondents motion. No
notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and
subsequent dismissal was given to the offended
parties.
c) No. The two-year period did not lapse yet. The two-
year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and
not retroactively against the State. The Judge dismissed
the case on March 29, 1999, and the New rule took
effect on Dec 1, 2000. It would only in effect give the
petitioners one year and three months instead of two
years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said
rule and therefore they should not be penalized for
that. To apply the time limit retroactively to the
criminal cases against the respondent and his co-
accused would violate the right of the People to due
process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the
States substantive right to prosecute the accused for
multiple murders.
d) To require the State to give a valid justification as a
condition sine qua non to the revival of a case
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused before the effective date of the new rule is to
assume that the State is obliged to comply with the
time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This
would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be
given a period of one year or two years as the case may
be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case
without requiring the State to make a valid justification
for not reviving the case before the effective date of
the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is
entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State.

CASE NO. 57
Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo
Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to
P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and
his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in
favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said
loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of
both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on
18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for
insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the
checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26
June 1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili
and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his
counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been
unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since
petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal
capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases
against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that
he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several
documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were
purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He
also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein
Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III
Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and
dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a
partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even
while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court.
In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it
was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and
that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against
Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but
his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S.
Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against
Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief
State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga
held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through
Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same,
stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act
No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then
Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor
and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the
filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted
the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ,
presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed
and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its
sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies
to violations of special acts that do not provide for a
prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg.
22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the
offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and
not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the
prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The
petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition,
petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave
error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in
ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit
and the questions are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did
not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the
Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law
which does not provide for its own prescriptive period,
offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No.
3326.
Issue:
Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22
per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution
of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?
Held:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on
4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at
the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of
the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the
offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within
the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed
his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor
(24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed.
Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he
had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early
as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's
flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their
rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed
to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying
tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet
prescribed. Petitioners filing of his complaint-affidavit before
the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified
the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of
the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg.
22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable
cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is
no longer any impediment to the filing of the information
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
CASE NO. 58
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO
GR No. 168918, March 2, 2009
Facts: The Government Service Insurance Systems (GSIS)
owns parcel of land. In one of the meetings of the
members of the GSIS Board of Trustees (Board),
including Mr. Dumlao, the Board authorized its
Management to enter into a Lease-Purchase
Agreement (Agreement) with certain individual.
After the investigation by the Ombudsman on said
Agreement, it filed an information before the
Sandiganbayan charging, among others, Mr. Dumlao
for violating Republic Act No. 3019 as the Agreement
is disadvantageous to the government. Mr. Dumlao
filed a Motion to Quash against the information. For
him, the facts stated therein do not constitute the
offense since there was no quorum in the members of
the Board when the Resolution was issued rendering
the Agreement non-existing. For the People, the
Ombudsman claims that the case should proceed to
trial for the prosecution to present their case.
The Sandiganbayan granted the Motion for other the
reason that the evidence is not sufficient.
Issue: Whether the grant of the Motion by the
Sandiganbayan is proper
Held: No. Under Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure (Rules), the grounds to quash
the information are:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute
an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the
information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially
to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged
except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously
convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Meanwhile, one of the reasons for the dismissal of the
case after presentation of evidence by the prosecution
is insufficiency of evidence.
Here, the dismissal of the case is not proper. The
Sandiganbayan used to dismiss the information with
reason not provided under the Section 3. The trial
court utilized the ground not raised by Mr. Dumlao,
and in an inappropriate time and context.
In effect, the Sandiganbayan prevent the prosecution
of its opportunity to prove Mr. Dumlaos culpability.
CASE NO. 59
G.R. No. 162336, February 1, 2010
HILARIO P. SORIANO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Rule 117 Motion to Quash
Facts:
Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of
the BSP, through its officers, transmitted a letter dated March
27, 2000 to Jovencito Zuo, Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ.
The letter has five affidavits attached. These affidavits, along
with other documents, stated that spouses Enrico and Amalia
Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8 million with
the Rural Bank of San Miguel Inc. (RBSM), but had never
applied for nor received such loan; that it was petitioner, who
was then president of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and
received the proceeds of the loan; and that the P8 million loan
had never been authorized by RBSM's Board of Directors and
no report thereof had ever been submitted to the BSP.
An Information, dated November 14, 2000 was for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents, under Article
315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in
relation to Article 172 of the RPC and PD 1689. Another
Information dated November 10, 2000 was filed for violation of
Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795. The information
alleged that, in his capacity as President of RBSM, petitioner
indirectly secured an P8 million loan with RBSM, for his
personal use and benefit, without the written consent and
approval of the bank's Board of Directors, without entering the
said transaction in the bank's records, and without transmitting
a copy of the transaction to the supervising department of the
bank.
On June 8, 2001, petitioner moved to quash these informations
on two grounds: that the court had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged, and that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense. Essentially, the petitioner theorized that the
characterization of possession is different in the two offenses.
If petitioner acquired the loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned
money and therefore, cannot misappropriate or convert it as
contemplated in the offense of estafa. Conversely, if petitioner
committed estafa, then he merely held the money in trust for
someone else and therefore, did not acquire a loan in violation
of DOSRI rules.
In an Order dated August 8, 2001, the trial court denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash for lack of merit. The lower court
agreed with the prosecution that the assailed OSI letter was
not the complaint-affidavit itself; thus, it need not comply with
the requirements under the Rules of Court. Since these
affidavits were duly subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public, there was adequate compliance with the Rules. The trial
court further held that the two offenses were separate and
distinct violations, hence the prosecution of one did not pose a
bar to the other.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in
an Order dated September 5, 2001. Aggrieved, petitioner filed
a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating his arguments
before the trial court. The CA denied the petition on both
issues presented by petitioner. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper
remedy against an Order denying a Motion to Quash?
Ruling: No. This issue may be speedily resolved by adopting our
ruling in Soriano v. People, where we held:
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action
for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a
motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such
a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without
prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had
invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits,
an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners should not have
forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the
special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are
no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case
that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for
certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error,
much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.
CASE NO. 60
JOSEPH C. CEREZO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JULIET
YANEZ, PABLO ABUNDA, JR., AND VICENTE AFULUGENCIA
(G.R. NO. 185230, June 1, 2011)
Facts: Joseph C. Cerezo, the petitioner filed a complaint for
libel against respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr.,
Oscar Mapalo and Vicente Afulugencia. Finding probable
cause, the Prosecutor filed the corresponding information
against them, but reversed its earlier finding and
recommended the withdrawal of information. Relying on the
recommendation of the prosecutor, the RTC ordered the
criminal case dismissed on the ground that it is settled rule
that the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests
primarily with the Public Prosecutor who is vested with quasi-
judicial discretion in the discharge in the of this function. Being
vested with such power, he can reconsider his own resolution
if he finds that there is reasonable ground to do so.
However, upon petitioners motion for reconsideration, the
RTC granted the same and reinstated the case after the DOJ
Secretary reversed the resolution the prosecutor.
Issue: Whether there was a valid termination of the case so as
to usher in the impregnable wall of double jeopardy.
Held: The petition is impressed with merit. The rule is that
once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on
the sound discretion of the court. Hence, resolving a motion to
dismiss a case or to withdraw an information, the trial court
should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public
prosecutor of the Secretary of Justice. To assess independently
the merits of the motion is the courts bounden duty. Further,
the assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing
of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or
the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not
binding on court.
In this case, obviously the RTC judge failed to make his own
determination, evaluation or assessment of the merit of the
case. He blindly relied on the manifestation and
recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been
more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to
dismiss and Withdraw information especially so when the
prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided and
irresolute on whether to indict respondent.
Beyond the object, double jeopardy did not set in. Double
jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: 1. A
first jeopardy attached prior to the second; 2. The first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and 3. A second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only: a.) after a valid indictment; b.)
before a competent court; c.) after arraignment; d.) when a
valid plea has been entered; and e.) when the accused has
been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
CASE NO. 61
CO VS. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS
727 SCRA 503
FACTS:
New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy,
filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 against William Co. In
the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were
tentatively dismissed on 09 June 2003 in open court with
respect to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Uy received a copy of the said Order on 02 July
2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.
A year after, Uy filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases
which was granted. Co then filed a petition challenging the
revival of the said cases. He argues that the 09 June 2003
Order provisionally dismissing the criminal cases should be
considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to
speedy trial was denied. Assuming that the criminal cases were
only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such
dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the
09 June 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He
also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the
trial court's issuance of the order granting the revival must be
within the one-year period. Even assuming that the one-year
period to revive the criminal cases started on 02 July 2003
when Uy received the 09 June 2003 Order, Co asserts that the
motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisional dismissal of the criminal case
has become permanent.
HELD:
NO. The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which are conditions sine qua
non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph
thereof are: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of
the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2)
the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the
motion and dismissing the case provisionally; (4) the public
prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.
In this case, there is no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal or of the hearing which was served on the private
complainant at least 3 days before said hearing as mandated
by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. Furthermore, the second
paragraph of the new rule should be construed to mean that
the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who
has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having
been revived. Correlatively, when a party is represented by a
counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should
be sent to the latter at his/her given address pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The public prosecutor cannot
be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served
with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Moreover, the contention that both the filing of the motion to
revive the case and the court order reviving it must be made
prior to the expiration of the one-year period is not found in
the Rules. Further, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is
inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy's motion to
revive the criminal cases. Even if the Court will consider that
2004 is a leap year and that the one-year period to revive the
case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order
of provisional dismissal by Uy.
CASE NO. 62
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANTONIO SAYAO JR. y DE LEON, accused-appellant
GR No. 124297
21 February 2001
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS
Complainant Jenny Sayao is the fourth of five children of
accused-appellant Antonio Sayao Jr and his wife Teresa Sayao.
The family lived in Brgy Ibaba, Sta Rosa, Laguna. Jenny testified
that accused-appellant had been sexually molesting her since
she was in Grade I. IT began with accused-appellant fondling
her private parts, but in 1987, when she was in Grade II and
was eight years of age, accused-appellant started having sexual
intercourse with her.
The first incident of rape took place at around 3pm of June 15,
1987. Afterwards, accussed-appellant raped her several times.
She estimated that she must have been raped by her father at
least 30 times, the last time being in February 1994, when she
was a 3rd year high student and 16 years of age. Jenny said she
kept quiet about her misfortune because she was afraid of her
father, a big man who threatened to kill her if she told her
anyone what he was doing to her. But, after she had been
raped in February 1994, Jenny finally told her mother what
accused-appellant had done to her.

On 13 November 1995, the trial court rendered judgment

convicting accused-appellant and sentencing him to suffer the
death penalty and to pay complainant civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages. Hence, the automatic
review of the decision.

Accused-appellant contends that the information in this case is

void for being vague and ambiguous as to the date of the
commission of the crime. As a consequence, he claims that he
has been deprived of the opportunity to prepare his defense.

ISSUE/S

Whether the decision of the RTC may be overturned for the

vagueness and ambiguity of the information filed against
accused-appellant.

RULING

No. There may be inelegance in the way that the information in

this case had been drafted, but it is not defective for being
vague. First, Rule 110 provides that it is not necessary for the
information to allege the exact date and the time of the
commission of the crime is such is not an essential ingredient
of the offense. In the crime of rape, the date of commission is
not an essential element. Second, even if the information fails
to specify the date of commission of the crime, accused-
appellant waived objection on this ground because he failed to
file either a motion for a bill of particulars or a motion to quash
the information. Third, the vagueness of the information could
not have prejudiced accused-appellant since his denial and alibi
are so general that it cannot be said that his defense hinges on
the date of commission of the crime.

In sum, it is held that the trial courts finding that accused-

appellant is guilty as charged is fully substantiated by the
evidence on record. However, accused-appellant cannot be
sentenced to death as the information against him failed to
allege Jennys minority and her relationship to accused-
appellant.

DECISION

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch

31, San Pedro, Laguna is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that accused-appellant Antonio Sayao Jr. y De Leon is found
guilty of thirty (3) counts of rape and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, subject to
the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. He is
further ordered to pay Jenny Sayao for each count of rape
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.