Uson v.

Del Rosario, 92:530| Andres

FACTS: This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land
in Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four illegit children.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson.
However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria
del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her husband, executed a
public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration
of which Uson was given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right to inherit any
other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. CFI found for Uson. Defendants
appealed.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of her husband.
2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife have successional rights.
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case.
There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a common-law wife with whom
she had four illegitimate children with the deceased. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda
died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at
the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art 777
NCC).
As this Court aptly said, The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the
same before his death. From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson
over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband
may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the
simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.
2. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation only if no vested rights are
impaired.
Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in
1945 upon the death of her late husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in
favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the
impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

Borja v. Borja, 46 SCRA 577 | Ang

FACTS: Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa
Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal.
He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole
administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate
proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special
administatrix.
Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of
the compromise agreement.
She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement
without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will
was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been
probated.
HELD: YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary
share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the
heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to
any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedents estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines,
Art. 777)there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of
her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such
share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Bonilla vs. Leon Barcena
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
Martin, J.:
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Bonilla, mother of minors Rosalio and Salvacion, wife of Ponciano Bonilla
(petitioner) instituted a civil action to quiet title over certain parcles of land located in Abra. Respondents opposed
and when Fortunata died, moved to dismiss the same since a dead person has no legal capacity to sue. CFI
dismissed the civil action earlier instituted and although counsel for the plaintiff prayed that Rosalio and Salvacion
be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, the same was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not children of the deceased be allowed to substitute the deceased plaintiff.
RULING:
If the plaintiff dies, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of
the proceeding can be substituted.
Rule 16, Sec 3 ROC states, whenever a party to a pending case dies it shall be the duty of his
attorney to inform the court promptly of such death and to give the name and residence of his
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
This duty was complained with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff but the court, instead of allowing the
substitution, dismissed the petition on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. Art 777 NCC
provides the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
When Fortunata therefore died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished but was
transferred to her heirs upon death.
CASE # 18
G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-
HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
Vito Borromeo, a widower, died on March 13, 1952, at the age of 88 years, without forced
heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu. All his brothers and sisters
predeceased him.
On April 19, 1952, JOSE JUNQUERA filed a petition for the probate of a one page document
as the last will and testament, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia (all
surnamed Borromeo), in equal and undivided shares and designating Junquera as executor.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, the probate court held that
the document presented as the will of the deceased was a forgery. The decision was
affirmed upon appeal.
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties
came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo.
On April 10, 1969, the trial court issued an order declaring the following, to the exclusion of all
others, as the INTESTATE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED VITO BORROMEO: Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, Judge Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera, Salud
Borromeom Asuncion Borromeo, Marcial Borromeom Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and, The
heirs of Canuto Borromeo.
- The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be
divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the
9 declared intestate heirs.
 On August 25, 1972, respondent FORTUNATO BORROMEO filed a motion to be declared as
one of the heirs of the deceased, alleging that he is an illegitimate son and that he was
omitted in the declaration of heirs.
- As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in
every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.
- Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the
court dated April 10, 1969, the court dismissed the motion.
Fortunato filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted, Fortunato
changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a
WAIVER OF HEREDITARY RIGHTS (7/31/1967). In the waiver, five of the nine heirs
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the claim; Fortunato is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement;
that the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the
same is void having been executed before the distribution of the estate and before the
acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject
matter.
- The "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" has been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by
Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and
effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been
a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043
of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must
be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the
inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the
inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a
person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is
required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit
and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the
signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document
were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance
as shown in the waiver document itself.
On December 24, 1974, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs who signed the
waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same
rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Waiver of Hereditary Rights executed in 7/31/1967 is valid as to
entitle Fortunato to the estate of Vito?
RULING:
The heirs could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate
was issued only in 1969.
- In Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., the Court held: The properties
included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with
respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do
such properties have the character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right
to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased (Article 657 and applied
by Article 661), the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or
less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter
into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to
the moment of the death (Article 989). The right is vested, although conditioned
upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion.
However, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective.
- For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the
knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right.
 - The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and
when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or
advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.
The circumstances of this case that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the
clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus:
- (1) On October 27, 1967, Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled
"Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case.
In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that the petitioner is an heir of
the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of
Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent purports it to be. Had the
intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to
concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased
- (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on
how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. The Agreement of Partition was
approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969.
- (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia
Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an
intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo.
- (4) On June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the
deed of assignment) in turn executed a Deed of Reconveyance in favor of the heirs-
assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was
P50,000.00;
- (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by
Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo
signed this document on March 24, 1969.
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION: The trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
waiver agreement. In Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the probate
of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, the Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court. Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing claims or petitions
alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. There is no impediment
to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate.
[COMMENT: Bwisit tong case na to. Ang habatapos konti lang ung kailangan. Pero to
summarize the cases that were consolidated: (1) G.R. No. 41171; (2) G.R. No. 55000: Issues
are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171; the supposed waiver of hereditary rights
cannot be validated. The essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and convincing
intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in this case; (3) G.R. No. 62895: For the
termination and closure of Special Proceedings No. 916-R; pending motions to compel
petition as co-administrator to submit an inventory; (4) G.R. No. 65995: Matter of attorney's
fees; (5) G.R. No. 63818: Respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra O. Borromeo filed
a motion for inhibition in the CFI of Cebu, presided over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to
inhibit the judge from further acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R; (6) G.R. No. 65995:
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any and all incidents in
Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this petition and No. 63818.]
Rioferio v. CA
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004

On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City
leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan
City and
 Kalookan City.He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom
he
married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the
herein
respondents.
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
paramour, Teodora Rioferio and their children.

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada,

legitimate children of Alfonso, discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner
Teodora
Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the
decedent
located in Dagupan City.

On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the

Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with
Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Titles.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the
defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial
settlement pertained to the
properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the
titles
thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had
managed
to register them in his name.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights
belonging
to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the
administration proceedings

YES. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without

doubt
have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
accordance
with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he rights to
succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
The provision in turn is
the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the
extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or
others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs
 may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed.
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to
represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs
from
representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which
an
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses
the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have
already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two

exceptions,
1. If the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
2. When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act
complained of
and he is made a party defendant

Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984.

20

JUL

[GUTIERREZ, JR., J.]

FACTS

The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily
residing with her sister; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and
testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death,
her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with
the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. An opposition to the
reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things that
the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void. The petitioner maintains that
since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracions will, Hermogenes
C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.

ISSUES
[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of
a will executed by an undisputed foreigner.

[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed of
Adoracions heirs.

RULING

[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of
the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20
SCRA 358).It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedents national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.

[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
(Article 1039, Civil Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campos will is the law
of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the
parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all
the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner
argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of
Philippine Law.

Testate Estate of the late Reverend Father

Pascual Rigor, The Parish Priest, G.R. No. L-
22036, April 30, 1979.
20JUL
[AQUINO, J.]

FACTS
Father Rigor died leaving a will naming as devisees the testators three sisters.
The will also contained a bequest to be given to the nearest male relative who
shall pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as priest. Inasmuch as
no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the
legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the
ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic.

ISSUE

Whether the testators nearest male relative who took the priesthood after the
testators death falls within the intention of the testator in providing to whom the
bequest is to be given.

RULING

NO. The Court held that the said bequest refers to the testators nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. In
order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at
the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is
proper (Art. 1025, Civil Code).Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any
nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the rice
lands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will was likewise
inoperative.

FACTS:

Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decent Margarita S. Mayores
(Margarita) while respondent was the decedents lifelong companion since 1929.

On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs
as her parents, grandparents, and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her
first cousins which included petitioner.

Before her death, Margarita executed a will where she bequeathed portions of her
undivided shares in real properties to respondent. Margarita also left all her personal
properties to respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.

RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and
respondent as executor of the will. CA affirmed.
ISSUES:

(1) W/N the CA erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the
formalities required by law. NO
(2) W/N it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of
Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner. NO

HELD:

We rule in favor of respondent.

(1) A review of the findings of the RTC reveal that petitioners arguments lack basis. The
RTC correctly held:

About the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason
that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of 3 pages while the will, in
truth, only consists of 2 pages only because the attestation is not part of the notarial will,
the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the
will, the court is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as
stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be
noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which
is sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error
must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument
consisting of 3 pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The
position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation
enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code.

The Court also rejects the contention that the signatures of the testator were
affixed on different occasions as the signature on the first page is allegedly different in
size, texture, and appearance as compared to the signatures on the succeeding pages.
The picture shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show that the first
signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.

We find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC.

(2) Since, petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under
Article 887 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a
will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the
decedents estate.

The petition is DENIED. The assailed CA decision is AFFIRMED.

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954

Facts: Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Father Sancho
Abadia, which was executed on September 6, 1923, filed a petition for its probate. Some cousins and nephews of the deceased,
who would inherit his estate if he left no will, filed opposition. The trial court ruled in favor of Enriquez, stating that even if the
said document is a holographic will, one which is not permitted by law at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testators death, such form of a will is already allowed at the time of the hearing of the case since the new Civil Code is already
enforced, and that to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may
override any defect in form. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity of the holographic will of Rev. Sanchio, the time of the hearing of
the case shall be considered and not the time of its execution

Held: No. The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the
supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was
execute, as supported by Art. 795 of the new Civil Code. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates
upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and
among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
becomes a completed act.

When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution
then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate
succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution
should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills. Hence, the trial courts decision was reversed.

G.R.No.L32636March17,1930
InthematterEstateofEdwardRandolphHix,deceased.
A.W.FLUEMER,petitionerappellant,
vs.
ANNIECOUSHINGHIX,oppositorappellee.
MALCOLM,J.:
FACTS:Fleumer,thespecialadministratoroftheestateofEdwardRandolphHixappealedfromadecision
ofJudgeofFirstInstanceTuasondenyingtheprobateofthedocumentallegedtobythelastwilland
testamentofthedeceased.Appelleeisnotauthorizedtocarryonthisappeal.Wethink,however,thatthe
appellant,whoappearstohavebeenthemovingpartyintheseproceedings,wasa"personinterestedinthe
allowanceordisallowanceofawillbyaCourtofFirstInstance,"andsoshouldbepermittedtoappealto
theSupremeCourtfromthedisallowanceofthewill(CodeofCivilProcedure,sec.781,asamended;
Villanuevavs.DeLeon[1925],42Phil.,780).
ItistheoryofthepetitionerthattheallegedwillwasexecutedinElkins,WestVirginia,on
November3,1925,byHixwhohadhisresidenceinthatjurisdiction,andthatthelawsofWestVerginia
Code,Annotated,byHogg,CharlesE.,andascertifiedtobytheDirectoroftheNationalLibrary,should
govern.
ISSUE:WhetherornotthelawsofWestVirginiashouldgovern.
RULING:Thelawsofaforeignjurisdictiondonotprovethemselvesinourcourts.thecourtsofthe
PhilippineIslandsarenotauthorizedtotakeAmericanUnion.Suchlawsmustbeprovedasfacts.(Inre
EstateofJohnson[1918],39Phil.,156.)Heretherequirementsofthelawwerenotmet.Therewasnowas
printedorpublishedundertheauthorityoftheStateofWestVirginia,asprovidedinsection300ofthe
CodeofCivilProcedure.Norwastheextractfromthelawattestedbythecertificateoftheofficerhaving
chargeoftheoriginal,underthesaleoftheStateofWestVirginia,asprovidedinsection301oftheCode
ofCivilProcedure.NoevidencewasintroducedtoshowthattheextractfromthelawsofWestVirginia
wasinforceatthetimetheallegedwillwasexecuted.
Note:Inaddition,thedueexecutionofthewillwasnotestablished.Theonlyevidenceonthis
pointistobefoundinthetestimonyofthepetitioner.Asidefromthis,therewasnothingtoindicatethatthe
willwasacknowledgedbythetestatorinthepresenceoftwocompetentwitnesses,ofthatthesewitnesses
subscribedthewillinthepresenceofthetestatorandofeachotherasthelawofWestVirginiaseemsto
require.OnthesuppositionthatthewitnessestothewillresidewithoutthePhilippineIslands,itwouldthen
thedutyofthepetitionertoproveexecutionbysomeothermeans(CodeofCivilProcedure,sec.633.)
ItwasalsonecessaryforthepetitionertoprovethatthetestatorhadhisdomicileinWestVirginia
andnotestablishthisfactconsistedoftherecitalsintheCATHYwillandthetestimonyofthepetitioner.
AlsoinbeginningadministrationproceedingsoriginallyinthePhilippineIslands,thepetitionerviolatedhis
owntheorybyattemptingtohavetheprincipaladministrationinthePhilippineIslands.
Whiletheappealpendingsubmissioninthiscourt,theattorneyfortheappellantpresentedan
unverifiedpetitionaskingthecourttoacceptaspartoftheevidencethedocumentsattachedtothepetition.
Oneofthesedocumentsdisclosesthatapaperwritingpurportingtobethewaspresentedforprobateon
June8,1929,totheclerkofRandolphCountry,StateofWestVirginia,invacation,andwasdulyproven
bytheoathsofDanaWamsleyandJosephL.MAdden,thesubscribingwitnessesthereto,andorderedto
berecordedandfiled.Itwasshownbyanotherdocumentthat,invacation,onJune8,1929,theclerkof
courtofRandolphCountry,WestVirginia,appointedClaudeW.Maxwellasadministrator,cum
testamentoannexo,oftheestateofEdwardRandolphHix,deceased.Inthisconnection,itistobenoted
thattheapplicationfortheprobateofthewillinthePhilippineswasfiledonFebruary20,1929,whilethe
proceedingsinWestVirginiaappeartohavebeeninitiatedonJune8,1929.Thesefactsarestrongly
indicativeofanintentiontomakethePhilippinestheprincipaladministrationandWestVirginiathe
ancillaryadministration.Howeverthismaybe,noattempthasbeenmadetocomplywithCivilProcedure,
fornohearingonthequestionoftheallowanceofawillsaidtohavebeenprovedandallowedinWest
Virginiahasbeenrequested.Thereisnoshowingthatthedeceasedleftanypropertyatanyplaceotherthan
thePhilippineIslandsandnocontentionthatheleftanyinWestVirginia.
ReferencehasbeenmadebythepartiestoadivorcepurportedtohavebeenawardedEdward
RandolphHixfromAnnieCousinsHixonOctober8,1925,intheStateofWestspecificpronouncements
onthevalidityorvalidityofthisallegeddivorce.
Foralloftheforegoing,thejudgmentappealedfromwillbeaffirmed,withthecostsofthis
instanceagainsttheappellant.

PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL. vs. MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and CA

G.R. No. L-20234
December 23, 1964

Facts: SpousesBernabedelaCernaandGervaciaRebaca,executedajointwillandtestamentinthelocaldialectwherebythey
willedthatthepropertiesduringtheirmarriagebegiventoManuelaRebaca,theirniece,becausetheydidnothaveanychild.Bernabe
diedonAugust30,1939,andtheaforesaidwillwassubmittedtoprobatebysaidGervasiaandManuelabeforetheCFIofCebu.Upon
thedeathofGervasia,anotherpetitionfortheprobateofthesamewillinsofarasGervasiawasconcernedwasfiledonNovember6,
1952ofthesameCFI,butfailureofthepetitionerandherattorneytoappear,thecasewasdismissed.

TheCFIorderedthepetitionheardanddeclaredthetestamentnullandvoid,forbeingexecutedcontrarytotheprohibitionofjoint
willintheCivilCode.Onappeal,theCAreversedthedecisiononthegroundthatthedecreeofprobatein1939wasissuedbyacourt
ofprobatejurisdictionandconclusiveonthedueexecutionofthetestament.

Issue: Whetherthejointwillexecutedbythespouses,despiteitsprohibitionundertheCivilCode,canbeconsideredasvalid

Held:Yes.Admittedlytheprobateofthewillin1939waserroneous,however,becauseitwasprobatedbyacourtofcompetent
jurisdictionithasconclusiveeffectandafinaljudgmentrenderedonapetitionfortheprobateofawillisbindinguponthewhole
world.Still,thisisonlytruewithrespecttotheestateofthehusbandbutcannotaffecttheestateofthewife,whowasthenstillalive,
andoverwhoseinterestintheconjugalpropertiestheprobatecourtacquirednojurisdiction,preciselybecauseherestatecouldnot
thenbeinissue.BeitrememberedthatpriortothenewCivilCode,awillcouldnotbeprobatedduringthetestator'slifetime.

Consideringthatajointwillisaseparatewillofeachtestator,Itfollowsthatthevalidityofthejointwill,insofarastheestateofthe
wifewasconcerned,mustbe,onherdeath,reexaminedandadjudicateddenovo.Hence,theundividedinterestofthewifeshould
passuponherdeathtoherintestateheirsandnottothetestamentaryheir
Adecreeofprobatedecreeisconclusiveonthedueexecutionandtheformalvalidityofthewillsubjecttosuchprobate.