1. PICART vs. SMITH, JR.; G.R. No.
L-12219; March 15, 1918 the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his
pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the
defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his
horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and
after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as
it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the
rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He
says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile
approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side
of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that
the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while
yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting
across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it
became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.
thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse
died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability
Picart has appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a
civil obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence
of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined
in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in
the particular case.
1
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm
as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the
actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the
existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case
we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed
in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized
that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and
would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as
reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances
the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of
the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the
law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
2. Civil Aeronautics Board vs. CA; G.R. No. L-51806, November
8, 1988
FACTS: Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was Honorary
Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. He went to Manila
International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. As the plane was
landing, he and his companions went to the viewing deck to watch the
arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke slipped on an elevation 4
inches high and fell on his back, breaking his thigh bone in the
process. He underwent a 3-hour operation and after recovery he filed
a claim for damages against the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), which was the government entity in charge of the airport.

ISSUE: Whether or not CAA was negligent

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault,
for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
HELD: CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a legitimate
wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was
purpose for being on the terrace and was never intended to trip down
also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover
people and injure them. It was there for no other purpose but to drain
which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted
water on the floor area of the terrace."
that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
2
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.

But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it was found that the
terrace was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is charged with
the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding,
maintenance...etc. of the Manila International Airport.
Responsibility of CAA
The SC held that pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the person, of the time, and of the place." Here, the obligation of the
CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public,
requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As these
people come to look to where the planes and the incoming
passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement of the
viewing deck, the CAA should have thus made sure that no
dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to
prevent any undue harm to the public.
Contributory Negligence
Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent act
or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the
proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own damage.
The Court found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v.
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.
Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value
but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-overn their
conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to
them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the
future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent
man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
3
followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.... [Picart v.
Smith, supra, p. 813]
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the
lower court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would
befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if
the private respondent had been looking where he was going, the
step in question could not easily be noticed because of its
construction.
"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 51172-R is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."
3. PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY; G.R. No. L-21291; March 28, 1969
FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force
Base. The jeep he was driving while accompanied with a P.C. soldier,
collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company (MRC) close
to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga,
in front of the Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at
the hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical
injuries and burns.
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.
In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the
evidence, concluded that the deceased in his eagerness to beat, so
to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to
reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his
own miscalculation.
The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower
court, satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking.
Hence this appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the concept of
damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40.
ISSUE: WON the lower courts decision is erroneous
HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is
affirmed.
NO
The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of
correctness. It is entitled to great respect. In the absence of
compelling reasons, [the factual] determination is best left to the trial
judge why had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and
observing their demeanor on the witness stand.
But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil
Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the
damage done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that
MRC was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The
crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.
4
Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v.
Juanillo and United States v. Barias. Cooley formulation was quoted
with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: Judge
Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to
be:
The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers
injury.
There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co.
Thus:
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a
relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC
and the action of Corliss must necessarily fail. The facts being what
they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened
on MRC had not arisen.
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.
Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be
decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present
themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that
observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
situation demands.
4. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad Company
Facts: David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin
boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical
engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads office (his dad
was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical
draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was mature well
beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of
Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps
which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor
experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he
lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps
causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one
eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the
caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the
companys negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
5
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or
some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and
the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in
disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that
said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection
between the companys negligence and the injuries sustained by
Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the
explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in
multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that
led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age;
he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to
take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he
well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of
his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the
contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about.
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.
Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to
him through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation
therefor from another.
5. YLARDE VS. AQUINO
FACTS: Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the
Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in
Tayug, Pangasinan. Private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a
teacher therein. At that time, the school was fittered with several
concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was
destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were
serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of
Sergio Banez started burying them one by one as early as 1962. In
fact, he was able to bury ten of these blocks all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino
gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class
dismissal. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig
beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the
stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The following day,
also after classes, private respondent Aquino called four of the
original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils
Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito
6
Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters
deep. At this point, private respondent Aquino alone continued digging
while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that
was brought about by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete
block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the
hole. Then, said private respondent left the children to level the loose
soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about
thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez
the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope. Before
leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to
touch the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four
kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit.
Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on
top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the
opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the
excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block
caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a
standing position. As a result, Ylarde sustained injuries and days
later, he died.
ISSUE: WON Aquino (teacher-in-charge) and Soriano (school
principal) can be held liable for NEGLIGENCE.
RULING: Only respondent Aquino can be held liable.
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.
The petitioner contends that Aquino shall be held liable under Art.
2176 of the NCC while Soriano shall be held liable under Art. 2180.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180 states that:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made
responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of
an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Also,
Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
The ruling in this case is also based on Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals, wherein the Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine
that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and
not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for
torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in
a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who
can be held liable.
7

GR: teachers shall be liable for the acts of their
students
XPN: where the school is technical in nature, in which
case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable
serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an
excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher
who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure
that the children are protected from all harm in his company.

ALSO NOTE: The degree of care required to be exercised must vary

In this case, Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when
with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A
he:
minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers
his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of
(2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after
persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which
they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying
a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care
nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil
ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
who by chance may go to the perilous area
knowledge and experience under the same or similar
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when
circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child
it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling
Ylarde with reckless imprudence.
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the
children's safety
(5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously 6. JARCO MARKETING CORP. VS. CA
attractive nuisance.
FACTS: Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of
Syvels Department Store, Makati City. Private respondents are
The negligent act of Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a
spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH). One
dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of
day, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvels
the child Ylarde. A reasonably prudent person would have
Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit
foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and more so,
card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a
leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident.
sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind
An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple
her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor,
warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the
8
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.
her young body pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-
wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and
screaming for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to
ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and
retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor.
ZHIENETH, a six year old girl was quickly rushed to the Makati
Medical Center where she was operated on. The next day
ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with
CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate. The injuries she
sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen
(14) days after the accident.
The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
After the burial of their daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco
Marketing the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and
wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. But, they
refused to pay. Criselda filed a complaint for damages.
TC: dismissed the complaint and counterclaim and ruled that the
proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of
clinging to it.
CA: favored Criselda judgment. It found that petitioners were
negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. Two former
employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the
attention of the management the danger the counter could cause. But
the latter ignored their concern.
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.
ISSUE: WON Jarco Marketing is NEGLIGENT or it was just an
ACCIDENT.
RULING: JARCO MARKETING IS NEGLIGENT.
In ruling this case, the court stated the difference between
negligence and accident. Also, it uses the ruling in Picart vs.
Smith.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or
negligence attaches to the defendant. It is a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without
any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of
the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one
cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person
concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by
9
fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by
any means suggested by common prudence.
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated
in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
In this case, it is proven that JARCO is guilty of negligence when
the court give credence to the testimony of one of the witness
when the child was rushed to the hospital. ZHIENETH, when
asked what happened tells the witness that she does not come
near the counter and the counter just fell on her. Also,
petitioners were already informed of the danger posed by the
unstable counter but neither of them initiated any concrete action
to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store
employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent
man would have done. Clearly, summing all the facts gathered,
the court found that petitioner JARCO Marketing is guilty of
Negligence.
7. FRANCISCO VS. CBCI
FACTS: Francisco was the owner and manager of a Caltex Station
in Rizal. A certain Basca and hiscompanions came to his station and
represented themselves as CBCI employees and offered to sell to
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.
Francisco CBCIs diesel fuel. Francisco checked his ID and therefore
agreed to purchase the fuel under the 3 conditions that:
1) Petron Cor should deliver such fuel at his business add w/c
should be properly indicated in Petrons inovoice;
2) the delivery tank be sealed and
3) that Basca should issue a separate receipt to Francisco.
All of which were complied with in the 17 deliveries of fuel made to
Francisco. One day, CBCI sent a letter demanding payment for such
fuel that have been previously paid by CBCI which Francisco rejected.
CBCI claims that Petron sold fuel to the former but were delivered
instead to Francisco. The latter should have known that since only
Petron, Caltex and Shell are authorized to sell and distribute
petroleum products, the fuel from Basca came from illegal acts.
Petitioner alleged that he was blind and asked his son to check the ID
of Basca where the latter said that CBCI was in immediate need of
cash for salary of daily paid workers and petty cash, thus the sale
but they enjoyed a big credit line with Petron. He therefore acquired
the diesel in good faith and for value.
TC: ruled in favor of petitioner on the premise that he was a buyer in
good faith and CBCI should sue Basca for he was authorized
to receive payment for the fuel.
CA: reversed the ruling of TC .The sale by Basca was his personal
act and does not bind CBCI. Petitioner should have verified with CBCI
if Basca had authority considering he had doubts to his authority.
10
Moreover, the receipts were only improvised since it was on a plain
bond paper with no letterhead of CBCI. Petitioner cant invoke
estoppel because he is at fault for choosing to ignore the tell-tale
signs of petroleum diversion and not exercising prudence.
ISSUE: WON Francisco, in not exercising the due diligence required
as a blind person can be held liable.
RULING: YES. Francisco is liable of Negligence
Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of the person, time and place. The most common
standard of conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of a
reasonably prudent person. To determine the diligence which must be
required of all persons, we use as basis the abstract average
standard corresponding to a normal orderly person.
The required diligence of any physically disabled person, is the same
degree of care that a reasonable careful person who was the same
physical disability would use. Such handicaps are treated as part of
the circumstances under which a reasonable person must
act. HOWEVER, Francisco has been in the business for 15 years and
his blindness was not a hindrance for him to transact business until
this time. He failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a
person who is blind. Francisco did not acquire any title over the diesel
fuel since CBCI did not perform any act to authorize Basca to sell.
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.
Therefore, CBCI was unlawfully deprived of its property and it may
recover from Francisco even if he pleads good faith.
8. UNITED STATES VS. BONIFACIO
FACTS: Bonifacio was an engineer and was conducting the heavy
freight train one morning n Batangas. The train had just rounded
a curve when Bonifacio saw a man (Eligio Castillo) walking along the
railroad track. The former immediately blew his whistle twice;
unknown to him, Castillo was a deaf-mute. Noticing that Castillo did
not step aside from the track, Bonifacio tried to slow down the engine,
but did not succeed in stopping in time to avoid running down
the pedestrian, who, about that time, turned and attempted to cross
the track. Bonifacio was charged in the trial court with homicide
committed with reckless negligence and he was convicted of homicide
committed with simple negligence.
ISSUE: WON Bonifacio is liable for the death of Castillo.
RULING: He is not liable. There is no obligation on an engine driver to
stop, or even to slow down his engine, when he sees an
adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near the track, unless there
is something in the appearance or conduct of the person on foot
which would cause a prudent man to anticipate the possibility that
such person could not, or would not avoid the possibility of danger
by stepping aside. Ordinarily, all that may properly be required of an
engine driver under such circumstances is that he give warning of his
11
approach, by blowing his whistle or ringing his bell until he is assured
that the attention of the pedestrian has been attracted to the
oncoming train. An engine driver may fairly assume that all persons
walking or standing on or near the railroad track, except children of
tender years, are aware of the danger to which they are exposed; and
that they will take reasonable precautions to avoid accident, by
looking and listening for the approach of trains, and stepping out of
the way of danger when their attention is directed to an oncoming
train. Any other rule would render it impracticable to operate railroads
so as to secure the expeditious transportation of passengers and
freight which the public interest demands. Bonifacio was without fault;
and that the accident must be attributed wholly to the reckless
negligence of the deaf-mute, in walking on the track without taking the
necessary precautions to avoid danger from a train approaching him
from behind.

12
AGUINALDO, DINO. LAPEZ, MAGUERA, MORALES C., MORALES I.