Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil.

79
FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of
the street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was
attached came along the street in the opposite direction at great speed. The horses ran into the
carromata and wounded Martinez servely. The defendant presented evidence that the cochero
was a good servant and a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied
the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon
to unload the stuff to be delivered. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver
cracked a whip and made some noises which frightened the horses and which made it ran away.
The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and was unable to stop the horses. The
horses collided with the carromata.

ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero

HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It
has been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to
leave horses in the manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in
all cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.

FIRST DIVISION
CIR v. Aichi Forging Company (2010)
G.R. No. 184823 October 6, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.

Lessons Applicable: Legal Period: 1 year = 12 months, Exhaust Administrative Claim Before Judicial
Claim, Lex Posterioni Derogati Priori

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

Aichi forging, a VAT entity filed a claim for refund of input VAT for its zero-rated sales with
the Dept. of Finance One-Stop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center on Sept 30,
2004.
On the same date, it filed a Petition for Review with the CTA.
CTA partially granted the refund by reducing the leaseless claims.
CIR filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that they were filed beyond the prescriptive
period in accordance to Art. 13 that: 1 year = 365 days and that filing an administrative claim is a
condition precedent before a judicial claim can be filed with the CTA.
CTA and CTA En Banc denied petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the claim was filed with the prescriptive period of 2 year provided under Sec. 112 (A) NIRC
2. W/N filing an administrative claim is a condition precedent to a judicial claim for refund.

HELD:
1. Yes. Sec. 204 (c) and 229 are applied only in instances of erroneous payment and illegal
collection. Sec. 112 (A) of NIRC applies here. Sec. 31 Chapter VIII Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987 being the more recent law governing legal period applies making 1 year = 12 months.
The principle of Lex Posterioni Derogati Priori applies. Thus, since it is filed on exactly Sept. 30,
2004 filing is timely.

2. Yes. Sec. 112 (D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has 120 days from date of the
submission of the complete documents in support of the application within which to grant or deny the
claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the recourse is to appeal before the CTA within 30
days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act
on the application for tax refund, the remedy is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to the CTA within 30
days.

G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)

Tenchavez vs. Escao

FACTS:
Vicenta Escao, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24,
1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil
registrar. However, the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June
1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same
year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on
the ground of Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. A decree of divorce, final
and absolute was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an
American, lived with him in California, had several children with him and, on 1958,
acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escao whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta
from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicentas parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughters acts,
and counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escao is valid and binding upon courts
of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaos parents were sufficient in form.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez marriage remain existent and undissolved
under the Philippine Law. Escaos divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid
under the Philippine Law to which Escao was bound since in the time the divorce decree
was issued, Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not
complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause,
leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally
getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the
husbands feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus
entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.

2. No. Tenchavez charge against Vicentas parents are not supported by credible
evidence. The testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaos animosity toward him strikes the
court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez own letters
written before the suit had begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents
of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their
part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover
damages.

Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June
1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On
Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of
Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13,
1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958.
On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her
parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an award for
damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely
measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a
foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because
this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts
plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an
omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act.

Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of
her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband.

Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She
was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now
in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation.
 For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation
of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover,
recognition would give rise to scandalousdiscrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment
of those members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC,
is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which
was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner
"contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10)
authorizes an award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has
been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful
acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to
individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be
denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse
renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it
may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical
coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".

Bellis vs Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Lessons Applicable: Divorce, Doctrine of Processual Presumption

Laws Applicable: Art. 16, 17 1039 NCC

Violet Kennedy (2nd wife) Amos G. Bellis --- Mary E. Mallen (1st wife)
Legitimate Children: Legitimate Children:
Edward A. Bellis Amos Bellis, Jr.
George Bellis (pre-deceased) Maria Cristina Bellis
Henry A. Bellis Miriam Palma Bellis
Alexander Bellis
Anna Bellis Allsman

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman
By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin
G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his estate as
follows:
1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen
2. P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis
3. remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives
July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A
 September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on
People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will directed
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the ground
that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will

HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed

Doctrine of Processual Presumption:
The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof,
otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.
In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours. Apply Philippine laws.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Llave vs Republic, GR 169766, March 30, 2011

646 SCRA 637 Civil Law Family Code Article 35 Nullity of Marriage
Bigamy
Annulment of Marriage Collusion Participation of the Solicitor General
Who may file an annulment case
In May 1993, Mamintal A.J. Tamano (a former senator) married Estrellita
Juliano-Llave under a civil ceremony. In June 1993, both got married again
to each other but this time under Muslim rites. Unfortunately, in less than
a year, Tamano died.
In November 1994, mother and son Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano and Adib
Ahmad Tamano filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between Estrellita and Tamano for being bigamous. It appears that
Zorayda and Tamano were already married in 1958 under civil rites and
Muslim rites.
 In her defense, Estrellita averred that Tamano was already divorced when
he married Estrellita in 1993. This was evidenced by Tamanos declared
status of divorced at the time of their marriage in 1993.
After a long and tedious process, the marriage between Estrellita and
Tamano was finally declared void for being bigamous by the RTC and later
the Court of Appeals.
Estrellita now questions the said ruling on the ground that:
a. Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to question the marriage
between Estrellita and Tamano because they were not parties to the
marriage contract; that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, an action to file the declaration of nullity of marriage
is only limited to the husband or the wife;
b. The proceedings in the RTC and the CA are void because under Article
48 of the Family Code as well as A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Solicitor
General or the public prosecutor are required to appear or participate in
the proceedings in order to determine collusion between the parties this
was not the case here, according to Estrellita;
c. The Muslim Code or PD 1083 was enacted in 1977 and that the
marriage between Zorayda and Tamano happened in 1958; that Muslim
Code provides for Muslim Divorce; that under said law, if Muslim divorce
need not be registered.
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrellitas arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. Zorayda and Adib have the legal personality to question the marriage
between Estrellita and Tamano. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only
the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in
application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the
ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
2. The participation of the Sol-Gen or the public prosecutor can be
dispensed with. First of, the public prosecutor was actually ordered by the
RTC at the onset of the case to make a report on whether or not there was
a collusion between the parties. And as the records of the case would
show, the prosecutor did submit a report finding no collusion. Second, the
rationale behind the requirement for the Sol-Gen or public prosecutor to
participate is to make sure that theres no collusion between the parties.
In this case, the lack of collusion between the parties (between Estrellita
and Zorayda) is apparent because of the vehement opposition of
Estrellita to the petition filed by Zorayda.
3. The Muslim Code did not automatically cover all Muslim marriages
already existing at the time of its enactment. Further, the Muslim Code
finds no application to marriages celebrated under both civil and
Muslim rites. Further still, the Muslim Code did not provide for
 retroactive application. It cannot retroactively override the Civil Code
which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Tamano and
Zorayda.
Thus, the law applicable on the marriage between Tamano and Zorayda is
the Civil Code and nowhere in the Civil Code is divorce allowed. The
declaration of Tamano that he was divorced is therefore without effect as
to the validity of his earlier marriage with Zorayda. Hence, the ruling of
the RTC and the CA is correct the marriage between Tamano and
Estrellita in 1993 is void for being bigamous.