Fabian vs Desierto: No definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within
the scope of Supreme Courts rule-making power, and those which are substantive.
Sec. of Defense vs Manalo: Respondent Manalo in this case sought forand all other legal reliefs under Art 8, Sec. 5(5).
The Court granted the Writ of Amparo. Amparo Rule was promulgated in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
5. Basis of Decisions
Phil. Const. Art 8, Sec14
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
De Castro vs JBC
Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department): (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
C. Judges
1. Qualifications
Phil Const. Art 8 Sec 7
(1) Natural-born citizen (SC and lower courts), at least 40y.o. (SC) , and must have been for 15yrs or
more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) Person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Kilosbayan vs Exec Secretary
From the records, Ong (who was appointed by the President as member of SC) is a naturalized citizen
(formerly Chinese) and is not qualified to be a judge.
2. Role and Standards
a. Independence (In Re Allegations of Macasaet; blind items about bribery in SC)
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence (individual/judge and
institutional/judiciary as a branch) are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and
integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority.
Personal attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that misrepresent and distort the nature and
context of judicial decisions, those that are misleading or without factual or legal basis, and those that
blame the judges for the ills of society, damage the integrity of the judiciary and threaten the doctrine of
judicial independence.
b. Integrity (OCA vs Floro)
A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice "should not
only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial,
independent and honest" as well. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion.
Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to
suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve
personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness.
Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. "His
language, both written and spoken must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued."
c. Impartiality (People vs CA)
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that there must be
an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus,
every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just.
d. Propriety (In Re: Allegations against Ong)
Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. Justice Ongs
act of visiting Napoles was grossly improper (this case was related to PDAF).
e. Competence and Diligence (Ocampo vs Arcaya-Chua)
Judge Arcaya-Chua accorded TPO to Albert Tan. R.A. No. 9262 (VAWC) is specifically applicable to
"women and their children," not to men. Thus, while the TPO may be justified with respect to the
protection accorded the minor, the same is not legally tenable with respect to the petitioner, Albert Tan.
Under R.A. No. 9262, a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife. Certainly, such a TPO
would be absurd. Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in this regard was found to be gross ignorance of the law.
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elementary a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position
and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith
and in grave abuse of judicial authority. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.
3. Liabilities of a Judge
a. Civil Liability (Civil Code, Art 27 & 32)
b. Criminal Liability
RPC Art 204-206
Santiago III vs Enriquez
An admin complaint is not appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available.
Judicial immunity insulates a judge or a justice from being held to account criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous decision made in good faith.
c. Administrative Liability (A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC )
d. Discipline of Members of Bench
Phil Const Art 8, Sec11
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reached the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order
their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
OCA vs Yu (Case about implementation of night courts and appointments of Clerk of Courts which was
disobeyed/disagreed by Judge Yu and other admin complaints against Yu)
By her refusal to adhere to and abide the Admin Order on night courts, the Judge deliberately
disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the law at all times. Judge Yu had no good reason
to reject the appointments of the concerned Clerks as such appointments were valid.
Some administrative cases against justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of
regular and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise
grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action
against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not
also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in
both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
i. Misconduct: In Re: Charges of Plagiarism against Judge del Castillo
This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the Court, a designated
member plagiarized the works of certain authors and twisted their meanings to support the
decision.
When Justice Castillos researcher "cut" research materials from a law website and "pasted"
them on the decision's main manuscript, the attributions were "accidentally deleted." Justice
Del Castillo retained control over the writing of the decision in the Vinuya case without,
however, having to look over his researchers shoulder as she cleaned up her draft report to
ensure that she hit the right computer keys. Notwithstanding this, the court held that there was
no inexecusable negligence on the part of Justice del Castillo.
II. The Executive and Legislative Branches in Relation to the Judicial Branch
A. The Executive
1. Who comprise the Executive? President, VP, Cabinet Secretaries, Local Governments
2. What is the scope of Executive Power? (Marcos vs Manglapus)
Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The
request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel. It must be treated as
a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in
and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
3. Executives Calling Out Power, Power to Declare Martial Law, and Power to Suspend the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus (Lagman vs Medialdea)
4. The Concept of Executive Privilege
US vs Nixon
When the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the
confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument
that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly
diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district
court will be obliged to provide.
The legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege.
Neri vs Senate
Elements of presidential communications privilege
1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power"
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
5. Immunity of President from Suit
Soliven vs Makasiar
Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of
her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under
the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands
undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing
in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President
may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative.