52. VICTORINO TORRES vs.

LEON VENTURA

G.R. No. 86044 July 2, 1990 187 SCRA 96

FACTS:

Petitioner was the leasehold tenant of a 4,000 square-meter parcel of land included in the Florencio
Firme Estate and located at Caloocan, Cabatuan, Isabela. In 1972, when Presidential Decree No. 27 was
signed into law, petitioner was the tiller of the aforementioned piece of land and was automatically
deemed owner of the property. Under Presidential Decree No. 27, any form of transfer of those lands
within the coverage of the law is prohibited except as otherwise provided therein. Two years later or in
1980, petitioner offered to pay the loaned amount but private respondent asked for an extension of one
more year to continue cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits. Because of this, the money being
offered by petitioner to pay for the loan was utilized for other purposes. In 1981, though petitioner
really wanted to get the property back, he could not do so that he lacked the necessary funds. It was
only in 1985 when petitioner was able to save enough money to make another offer but this time
private respondent categorically denied said offer and refused to vacate the land. Hence, petitioner filed
a complaint with the barangay captain of Magsaysay, Cabatuan, Isabela stating therein that he
mortgaged his land to private respondent and that he already wanted to redeem it. On the scheduled
date of hearing, private respondent failed to appear. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of
the trial court was reversed. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE :

Whether or not, the petitioner is favorable by the court to have the rights over the land.

HELD :

This would be in favor of the petitioner. It is not disputed by private respondent that petitioner was in
fact the tiller of the subject land when Presidential Decree No. 27 was promulgated in 1972. As a
consequence of the law, petitioner was granted the right to possess and enjoy the property for himself.
In its decision, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner having found his version more convincing than
that of private respondent whose evasive attitude did not go unnoticed therein. The trial court further
ruled that the transfer of property from petitioner to private respondent is null and void for being
violative of Presidential Decree No. 27. In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the contract, being void
ab initio, must be given no effect at all. The parties in this case are to be placed in status quo which was
the condition prevailing prior to the execution of the void contract. The rights and interests covered by
the Certificate of Land Transfer are beyond the commerce of man. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 15482 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cauayan, Isabela in Civil Case No. Br. XIX-167 is hereby ordered REINSTATED. Costs against
private respondent.
53. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No. 103125, 1993

FACTS:

On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a
Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and nontraditional agricultural
crops and a housing project for provincial government employees Pursuant to the Resolution, the
Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation against
Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur. The San
Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount
provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for the damages that private respondents may suffer in
the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from
the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion
to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the
petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337),
there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that
the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of
the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. The Court of Appeals set
aside the set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession
of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It
also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural
land.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

HELD : To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc.,
without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be
the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or
public use.
54. LILIA Y. GONZALES, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al

GR No. 106028 May 9, 2001 174 SCRA 398

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26891 which dismissed the petition for Certiorari and prohibition
with temporary restraining order. The pertinent facts are as follows: Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales received
two Orders dated November 27 , 1990 and April 22, 1991 from the Regional Office of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), signed by the respondent DAR Regional Director Antonio S. Maraya, and issued
pursuant to the operation land transfer program of the government under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
27. Petitioner was directed to surrender the titles to her land and to submit the other requirements of
the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said bank was ordered to pay the petitioner an
aggregate amount of P55,690.74 as compensation for the two parcels of land. On December 20, 1991,
the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order with the
Court of Appeals to restrain the enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional
Director on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction, alleging that the petitioner never filed a land
transfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in the execution of the final survey plans and the
valuation of her land. After requiring the respondents to file their Comment, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision dated June 29, 1992, denying due course to, and dismissing the petition for failure
of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals also held that Certiorari
cannot be used by the petitioners as a substitute for appeal of the assailed issuances.

ISSUE:

Is the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in dismissing the petition for failing to exhaust
administrative remedies?

HELD:

Hence, the proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a reconsideration of
the orders of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the DARAB, or to its executive adjudicator in the
region, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Prior resort to these administrative bodies
will not only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may likewise prove
advantageous to the parties as the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not be limited by
the technical rules of procedure and evidence. From there, the petitioner has yet another forum
available--the Special Agrarian Courts which are the final determinants of cases involving land valuation
or determination of just compensation. SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The
Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving
the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No.6657,
Executive Order Nos. 229, 69 228 and 129-A,Republic Act No.3844 as a mended by Republic Act No.6389,
Presidential Decree No.27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the cases involving the valuation of
land, and determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,
disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the
Land Bank. Thus, the procedural short-cut taken by the petitioner which finds no justification both in law
and in jurisprudence must be considered fatal to the petitioner's cause of action. Accordingly, we rule
that the Court of Appeals committed no error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
55. LOPE MACHETE et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO VILLALON

G.R. No. 109093 November 20, 1995 250 SCRA 176

FACTS:

On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope Machete, Nicasio
Jumawid, Santiago Jumawid, John Jumawid, Pedro Gamaya, Renato Delgado, Fernando Ombahin,
Matias Roleda, Pasiano Baro, Ignacio Baro, Mamerto Plaras and Justiniano Villalon. The complaint
alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to private respondent's
landholdings under which petitioners were to pay private respondent a certain amount or percentage of
their harvests. However, despite repeated demands and with no valid reason, petitioners failed to pay
their respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him back
rentals and damages. Petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose
from an agrarian relation and that respondent appellate court failed to consider that the agreement
involved is an agricultural leasehold contract, hence; the dispute is agrarian in nature. The laws
governing its execution and the rights and obligations of the parties thereto are necessarily R.A. 3844,
R.A. 6657 and other pertinent agrarian laws. Considering that the application, implementation,
enforcement or interpretation of said laws are matters which have been vested in the DAR, this case is
outside the jurisdiction of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent court erred in its decision.

HELD:

Yes. Section 17 of E.O. 229 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance
with law. Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR,
created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian
reform cases. Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction
over this case .At any rate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private
respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic in Quismundo vs. Court of Appeals, the resolution
by the DAR is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian
disputes, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.
Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the
technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will
be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.
56. NINA M. QUISMUNDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 95664 September 13, 1991 201 SCRA 609

FACTS:

On February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a complaint with the trial
court of Angeles City praying that their relationship with petitioner be changed from share tenancy to a
leasehold system, pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. Petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action since the law that should allegedly govern the
relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 271, and not Republic
Act No. 3844, as amended.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction to try the case at bar?

HELD :

Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests
in the Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters. The pertinent provision of said executive order reads as follows: SECTION 17.
QuasiJudicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA).
57. Modesto T. Ualat vs. Judge Jose O. Ramos

A.M. No. MTJ-91-588 December 6, 1996 265 SCRA 345

FACTS:

Complainant Sabio claims that he is an agricultural lessee of an agricultural land consisting of 4.7
hectares owned by Leonardo Coma. Complainant Ualat, on the other hand, alleges that he is Sabio's
caretaker. It appears from the two complaints that on August 6, 1990, complainant Sabio filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for Recovery of Possession 2
against the landowner and Raymundo Sabio, brother of complainant Sabio. On August 30, 1990, the
landowner filed against herein complainants a case for Illegal Detainer with respondent's Sala. On July
23, 1990, 3 the DARAB ruled in favor of complainant Sabio declaring that the right of the complainant as
the tenant-tiller to peaceful possession and cultivation should not be disturbed. On November 5, 1990,
however, respondent Judge rendered a decision 4 in favor of the landowner ordering the complainants,
among others, to vacate the property.

ISSUE :

Was respondent Judge correct in deciding the case for illegal detainer despite the fact that the case was
originally filed with the DARAB? Otherwise stated, the issue is whether respondent judge properly
comported himself in the face of the obvious matters brought before him.

HELD:

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In the proceedings before respondent
judge, complainants were even represented by a lawyer from the DAR. These matters should have been
sufficient to put respondent Judge on notice that complainants were claiming protection under our
agrarian laws. At that point, he ought to have realized that there existed a genuine issue involving
agricultural tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject property. Respondent judge is hereby
FOUND LIABLE for gross ignorance of the law and is hereby imposed a fine in the sum of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).Respondent is further ADMONISHED that commission of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
58. REMIGIO ISIDRO, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ

G.R. No. 95664 September 13, 1991 228 SCRA 503

FACTS:

Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares
located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and
also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the
abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to
meet his family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that
petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental
and converted the same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded
from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said
land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4120.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction on the instant case?

HELD:

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing
tenancy laws (Caballes v. DAR, et al., G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988). The fact remains that the
existence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship was not proven by the petitioner. And in the
absence of a tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawful detainer is properly within the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Court, as provided in Sec. 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
59. DE LUNA vs CA,

221 SCRA 704

FACTS :

Petitioner Teofila de Luna appeals from the Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring null and void the
proceedings conducted and the decision rendered by the MCTC in Civil Case No. 245 upon the ground
that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of that action. Petitioner Teofila de Luna had
been in peaceful and continuous possession of four (4) hectares of land located at Barangay Masinao,
Sta Maria, Laguna. Petitioner and her father, Martin de Luna, had worked for many years on this land as
agricultural tenants thereof.. After the demise of petitioner's father, she continued to cultivate the
subject parcels of land. Petitioner's name appears in the master list of agricultural tenants in the
Province of Laguna issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as a full-fledged tenant of
landholder Atty. Francisco Redor. On May 21, 1986, petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against her two
(2) brothers, private respondents Casiano and Flaviano de Luna, who allegedly had turned petitioner out
of her possession of the parcels of land through stealth. The complaint for forcible entry was filed with
the MCTC. The complaint was initially dismissed by the MCTC on 30 September 1986 on the bases that
the case fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC. However, after considering an Omnibus Motion of
petitioner, the MCTC set aside its earlier order and instead referred the case to the DAR. After the
referral to the DAR and acting upon the certification issued by DAR that the caswe was proper for trial in
the municipal court, the MCTC proceeded to hear the complaint for ejectment. In due course, the MCTC
rendered a decision requiring private respondents to vacate the premises and to pay petitioner Teofila
de Luna the amount of P5,000.00 as actual damages and P 3,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of
the suit. Private respondents Casiano and Flaviano del Luna wnet befor the RTC on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction, seeking annulment of the proceedings
conducted and the decision rendered. Their petition was dismissed by the RTC, however, upon the
grounds that (a) the ejectment case was within the jurisdiction of the MCTC, and (b) the special civil
action of certiorari was not a suitable remedy for a lost appeal. Dissatisfied, respondent De Luna
brothers appealed to the Court of Appeals and raised the issue of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the
dispute. On 16 January 1991, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision, now in question, reversing
that of the RTC. Applying Section 21 OF ra No 1199 in relation to Section 23 of BP Blg 29, the Court of
Appeals declared that the controversy was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC as successor of
the defunct Court of Agrarian Reform.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the RTC has the exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.

HELD :

We find the petition meritorious. That where no agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the
contending aprties and the situation is one merely for forcible entry, the RTC acting as an agrarian court
has no jurisdiction. Considering the fact constituting the case, we do not believe the MCTC exceeded its
jurisdiction in acting on the ejectment suit. No juridical tie connects private respondents with petitioner,
which compels characterization of the present controversy as an agraian dispute. Respondents, it is true,
claim that they were co-tenants of their father, Martin de Luna, who was apparently the original tenant
or lessee with whom landholder Atty Redor had entered into a contract of agrarian tenancy or
landholding. This allegation, however, in their answer, did not divest the MCTC of jurisdiction over the
dispute. It is common place doctrine that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of the cause
of action and the relief alleged and sought in the compliant, and not by the averments in the answer.
Clearly, the dispute between the partied to the caase involved the situation of forcible entry only. The
trial court correctly concluded that private respondents cannot, through force and stealth, terminate
petitioner's continuous and peaceful possession, even upon the pretension that they were co-tenants,
or entitled to be co-tenants, with Teofila over the land in question. Private respondents were not
entitled to take the law in their hands. Wherefore, the petition for review is granted due course, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals set aside. A new judgement is hereby rendered, reinstating and
affirming the decision of the MCTC. Costs against private respondents.
60. REPUBLIC vs CA, 263 SCRA 758

FACTS:

Private respondent Acil Corporatio owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao del
Norte, which the government took pursuant to the CARL (RA NO 6657). Private respondent's certificates
of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. It appears,
however, that in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings (LISTASAKA) which private
respondenthad earlier led with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower Fair Value
Acceptable to Landowner was stated. Private respondent rejected the government's offer, pointing out
that nearby lands planted with the same crops were valued at a higher price. The matter was brought
before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who sustained the initial valuation made by
the LBP. Private respondent led a petition for Just Compensation in the RTC of Tagum Court. Private
respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P 24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its
petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latter's Revised Rules of Procedure, before
recourse to it could be had. In addition, the RTC found that, in violation of the DARAB's rules of
procedure the petition had been led more that fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision of the
PARAD. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. Private respondent
therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending that a petition for just
compensation under RA No. 6657 falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. His
contention was sustained by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the RTC for
further proceedings.

ISSUE :

Whetehr or not in cses involving claim for just compensation under RA No. 6657 an appeal from the
decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to
the RTC.

HELD:

The contention has no merit. It is true that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. However,
Special Agrarian Courts, which are RTCs are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories
of cases, to wit (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and (2) the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657. The DAR is an administrative agency which
cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain. Consequently, although the new rule
speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it
is clear that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to
transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are
empowered to do is to only determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid
to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.
62. FRANCISCO SORIANO AND DALISAY SORIANO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR 184282 April 11, 2012

FACTS:

Spouses Soriano were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land located in Hijo, Maco,
Compostela Valley Province. The first parcel had an area of 5.2723 hectares and was covered by TCT No.
(T-8935) T-3120, while the second parcel had an area of 4.0887 hectares and was covered by TCT No. (T-
2906) T-749. In October 1999, the two parcels of land were compulsorily acquired by the government
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. The LBP made a preliminary determination of the value of the
subject lands. Petitioners, however, disagreed with the valuation and brought the matter before the
DARAB for a summary administrative proceeding to fix the just compensation. On September 30, 2000,
the DARAB rendered its decisions affirming the LBPs preliminary determination. Notices of the decisions
were duly received by counsel for petitioners. But petitioners belatedly filed a petition before the RTC
acting as SAC, for the fixing of just compensation. Thus, the DAR moved to dismiss the petition arguing
that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of
the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. On June 27, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and
declared that the "DARAB Rules of Procedure must give way to the laws on prescription of actions as
mandated by the Civil Code." The DAR sought reconsideration of the order, but its motion was denied.
Thus, the DAR lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court. The CA granted the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action to fix just compensation for lands placed under R.A. No. 6657 is outside the
purview of the ordinary rules on prescription as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily dismissing said re-filed Petition.
Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the dismissal should be
granted. Under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their
taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an
offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and
afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case
may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does
not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in
essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In
accordance with it, the private respondents case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error
for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners." It would subvert this "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC for
76 the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the
RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Consequently, although the new rules
speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it
is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any
effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs
into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are
empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid
to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.
63. CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION vs. RENATO L. MATEO

G.R. No. 175485 July 27, 2011

FACTS:

The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land with an area of 6.693 square meters. More or less,
located in barrio pulang lupa, Las Pinas City, that was originally owned by Isaias Lara, the respondents
maternal grandfather. Upon the death of Lara, the property passed on to his children, and a grandson.
The co-heirs effected the transfer of the full exclusive ownership to one of the surviving and who was
the mother of herein respondent. Thereafter, with the agreement of the Lara-Mateo family, a deed of
sale covering the property was executed in favor of daughter Laura, who applied for land registration.
After the application was granted, Original Certificate of title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Lauras sole
name. In due course, the property now covered by OCT No.6386 was used as collateral to secure a
succession of loans. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of
the property after failed to redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T- 11749-A was issued in the name of China
Bank. Petitioner CDC and the China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on the purchase of
the property, with China Bank executing a deed of conditional sale for the purpose. In the meanwhile,
Felicidad died intestate. CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the MTC of Las Pinas City against
the respondents siblings and the other occupants of the property. Therein, the defendants maintained
that the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the action because the land was classified as agricultural;
that the Jurisdiction Belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); that
they have been in continuous and open possession of the land even before World War II and had
presumed themselves entitled to a government grant of land; and that CDCs title was invalid,
considering that the land have been registered before its being declared alienable. MTC ruled in favor of
CC. On appeal, RTC resolved against CDC but CA found favor in it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the title of Laura over the Subject land is indefeasible

HELD:

There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part of the public domain, has already been
placed under the Torrens system of land Registration. The Government is required under the Torrens
system of registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in
the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as
thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. The objective is to obviate possible conflicts of title
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens Certificate and to dispense, as a rule,
with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the registered owner full peace of mind,
in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right
over the covered land. The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No.
6386 in the name of Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became the registered owner by
purchase from China Bank. In all time, neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transaction
causing various transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration of the
land in 78 the name of Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire
LaraMateo family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the exclusive
registration in her sister Lauras name, allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting his claim of
ownership for the first time through this case. Making it worse for him is that he did so only after CDC
have commenced the ejectment case against his own siblings.
64. RENE ANTONIO vs. GREGORIO MANAHAN

G.R. No. 176091 August 24, 2011

FACTS:

Subject of the instant petition are two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated at Gitnang Bayan I, San
Mateo, Rizal with an aggregate area of 30906 square meters and registered in the name of the private
respondent Manahan under Original Certificate of Title #s. 9200 and 9150 of the Rizal Province Registry.
Manahan and Antonio entered into a leasehold agreement whereby the latter undertook to cultivate
the subject parcels for an annual rental of 70 cavans of dried, cleaned and good quality palay, each
weighing 44 kilos. Manahan filed complaints before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Council (MARO)
against Antonio, for such violations of the leasehold agreement as non-payment /remittance of the
stipulated rentals despite demands. Specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint,
Antonio averred, among others, that he remitted the stipulated rentals regularly, except for the year
1993 when Manahan refused to accept the same. Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of
Manahan. On appeal, DARAB ordered respondent to respect tenants peaceful possession and
cultivation of said land. However, DARAB subsequently set aside its initial ruling and reinstated PARADs
decision. CA likewise upheld the same.

ISSUE :

Whether or not tenant petitioner is justified to be ejected from his peaceful possession and cultivation
of the disputed land.

HELD:

An agricultural leasehold relationship is said to exist upon the concurrence of the following essential
requisites: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter
of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4)
the purpose of the relationship is to bring agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee. Once the tenancy relationship is established, the tenant is entitled to
security of tenure and cannot be ejected by the landlord unless ordered by the court for causes
provided by the law. In recognition and protection of the tenants right to security of tenure, the burden
of proof is upon the agricultural lessor to show the existence of the lawful causes for ejectment or
dispossession. The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in
order to be considered as ground for dispossession of an agricultural tenant. Perusal of the record
shows that Antonios failure to pay and/or incurrence of shortages from the stipulated annual lease
rentals of 70 Cavans of palay weighing 40 kilos cannot be considered willful and deliberate. The
foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, the court found Antonios dispossession, however, still
warranted by his repeated violations of the terms of the leasehold agreement which prohibited, among
other matters, the 80 cultivation of other plants on Manahans properties, the expansion of the tenants
dwelling as well as the non-synchronized plantings and harvests thereon. Fealty to the fact that R.A No.
3844 does not operate to take away completely every landowners rights to his land or authorize the
agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in derogation of the landowners rights
impelled the court to uphold Antonios dispossession. Although the agrarian laws afford the
opportunity for the landless to break away from vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the
kindness of others, a becoming modesty demands that this kindness should at least be reciprocated, in
whatever small way, by those benefited by them. Hence, the petition was denied.
65.) GALOPE vs. BUGARIN

G.R. No. 185669 February 1, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, while petitioner farms the land.
Parties respective contentions are as follows: (a) respondent complained that she lent the land to
petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she receives in return from petitioner is insignificant,
and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on her own; (b) petitioner countered that respondent
cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging
from P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest. Respondent filed a petition for recovery of
possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the DARAB, claiming that respondent lent the land
to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or monetary
consideration for the use of the land. It was also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose
Allingag who allegedly possesses the land. After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed
the petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of tenure. On appeal, the DARAB
disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that petitioner is not a de jure tenant. The DARAB ordered
petitioner to pay rentals and vacate the land. Petitioner appealed, but the CA affirmed DARABs ruling
that no tenancy relationship exists; that the elements of consent and sharing are not present; that
respondents act of lending her land without consideration cannot be taken as implied tenancy; and that
no receipts prove petitioners payment of rentals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties.

HELD:

The court found the petition impressed with merit and held that the CA and DARAB erred in ruling that
there is no tenancy relationship between the parties. The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy
relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject
matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Contrary also to the CA and DARAB
pronouncement, respondents act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals
therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An agricultural leasehold
relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of a written contract alone. Section 5of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural
leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement. Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy
relationship are present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject matter of
their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land.They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by
petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about
agricultural production. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in
cash. Respondents motion to supervise harvesting and threshing, processes in palay farming, further
confirms the purpose of their agreement. Lastly, petitioners personal cultivation of the landis conceded
by respondent who likewise never denied the fact that they share in the harvest.
66. LANDBANK vs. SUNTAY

G.R. No. 157903 December 14, 2011

FACTS:

Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro with a total area of
3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated 948.1911
hectares of Suntays land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed
the value of the expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total valuation of
P4,251,141.68.Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for determination of just
compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Region IV, DARAB,
docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00; his petition was assigned to RARAD Mias. After
summary administrative proceeding, RARAD Mias rendered a decision fixing the total just
compensation for the expropriated portion at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for reconsideration,
but RARAD Mias denied its motion. Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial determination of just
compensation in the RTC (Branch 46) in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court,
impleading Suntay and RARAD Mias. The petition essentially prayed that the total just compensation
for the expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67. Suntay filed a motion to dismiss mainly on
the ground that the petition had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required by
Section 11, Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB. After the RTC granted the motion to dismiss,
Land Bank appealed to the CA, which sustained the dismissal. As a result, Land Bank came to the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition for the determination of just
compensation.

HELD:

The Court has declared that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation
under Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL) pertains to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) as a Special Agrarian Court; that any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to convert the
original jurisdiction of the RTC into appellate jurisdiction is void for being contrary to the CARL; and that
what DARAB adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the
reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to
decide this question. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition. It bears stressing that
the petition is not an appeal from the RARAD final Decision but an original action for the determination
of the just compensation for respondents expropriated property, over which the RTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction. The procedure for the determination of just compensation cases under R.A. No.
6657, as summarized in Landbank v. Banal, is that initially, the Land Bank is charged with the
responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be
paid for their 84 taking under the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition arrangement. The
DAR, relying on the Land Banks determination of the land valuation and compensation, then makes an
offer through a notice sent to the landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay
him the purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the
certificate of title in favor of the government. In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply
thereto, the DAR adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested parties to
submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the Decision of
the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for the
determination of just compensation. In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider
several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.
67. LANDBANK vs. ARANETA

G.R. No. 161796 February 8, 2012

FACTS:

At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area of 1,645 hectares, more or less,
which was originally registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla (Doronilla) under Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 7924 of the Rizal Registry. On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation
1283, carving out a wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the
segregated area for townsite purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be. In 1978, the OSG filed
with the then CFI of Rizal an expropriation complaint against the Doronilla property. Meanwhile, on
1979, Doronilla issued a Certification; copy furnished the Agrarian Reform Office, among other agencies,
listing seventy-nine (79) "bona fide planters" he allegedly permitted to occupy a portion of his land. On
1987 or nine (9) years after it commenced expropriation proceedings, the OSG moved for and secured
the dismissal of the expropriation case. Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased,
acquired ownership of the subject Doronilla property by virtue of court litigation. A little over a week
later, he had OCT No. 7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
N-70860 in his name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disputed lots are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

HELD:

The primary governing agrarian law with regard to agricultural lands, be they of private or public
ownership and regardless of tenurial arrangement and crops produced, is now RA 6657. The provisions
of RA 6657 apply only to agricultural lands under which category the Doronilla property, during the
period material, no longer falls, having been effectively classified as residential by force of Proclamation
1637. It ceased, following Natalia Realty, Inc., to be agricultural land upon approval of its inclusion in the
LS Townsite Reservation pursuant to the said reclassifying presidential issuance. Before Proclamation
1637 came to be, there were already PD 27 tenant-farmers in said property. In a very real sense, the
"private rights" belong to these tenant-farmers. Since the said farmerbeneficiaries were deemed owners
of the agricultural land awarded to them as of October 21, 1972 under PD 27 and subsequently deemed
full owners under EO 228, the logical conclusion is clear and simple: the township reservation
established under Proclamation 1637 must yield and recognize the "deemed ownership rights"
bestowed on the farmer-beneficiaries under PD 27. Another way of looking at the situation is that these
farmer-beneficiaries are subrogated in the place of Doronilla and eventual transferee Araneta. Section 4
of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial agreement and commodity produced,
all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as
land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm
this limitation. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands
and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands. "Indeed, lands not devoted to
agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-
agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR.
68. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SEVERINO LISTANA

G.R. No. 168105 July 27, 2011

FACTS:

Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a 246.0561-hectare land located at Inlagadian, Casiguran,
Sorsogon, which was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. Petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) valued the 240.9066 hectares for acquisition at P5,871,689.03. Since the respondent
rejected the said amount, a summary proceeding for determination of just compensation was
conducted by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Respondent wrote LBP requesting the release
of payment of the cash portion of the "accepted x x x 151.1419 has with an equivalent valuation of
P5,607,874.69." Consequently, a Deed of Transfer was executed by respondent over the said portion of
his landholding in consideration of payment received from the transferee Republic of the Philippines
consisting of cash (P1,078,877.54) and LBP bonds (P2,747,858.60). DAR Provincial Adjudicator rendered
a decision P10,956,963.25 for the entire acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. Almost a year later,
petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, a petition for judicial determination of
just compensation. Petitioner argued that the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (PARADs)
valuation is unacceptable. The trial court issued the order dismissing the petition for having been filed
almost one year from receipt of the copy of the PARADs decision. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed
petitioners appeal from the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) dismissal of its petition for judicial
determination of just compensation for failure to adequately explain its failure to abide by the rules and
"its loss of appellate recourse cannot be revived by invoking the mantra of liberality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SAC may take cognizance of the petition for determination of just compensation
which is filed beyond the prescribed 15-day period or more than 100 days after the PARAD rendered its
valuation in a summary administrative proceeding.

HELD:

While a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian
reform adjudicators decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period
stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicators decision will attain finality. This rule is not only
in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a
belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land
valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as
to the true value of his property. Although the land valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are now
appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57
authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just
compensation. However, herein petitioner LBP admitted its "thoughtless" filing of the petition before
the SAC more than 100 days after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the PARADs
decision fixing the just compensation for the subject property. Petitioner did not offer any explanation
for its tardiness and neglect, and simply reiterated the great prejudice to the agrarian 88 reform fund
with the erroneous inclusion in the PARADs valuation of the 151.1419 hectares already conveyed to the
government.
69. RODRIGUEZ AND RODRIGUEZ vs. TERESITA V. SALVADOR

G.R. No. 171972 June 8, 2011

FACTS :

On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
petitioners Lucia and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title issued by virtue of Free Patent in the name of the Heirs of Cristino
Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador and that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land
by mere tolerance of her predecessors-ininterest, and that despite several verbal and written demands
made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land. Petitioners interposed the defense of
agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject
land with the consent and permission of respondents predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and
Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural
production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. Since there is a tenancy relationship
between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC. On September 10, 2003, the MTC
promulgated a Decision finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties,
and thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal,
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao, Cebu. On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision
remanding the case to the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship
exists between the parties. Petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that the purpose of a
preliminary hearing was served by the parties submission of their respective position papers and other
supporting evidence. On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC
Decision dated September 10, 2003. Respondent sought for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
respondent filed a Petition for review with the CA. On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in
favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties because petitioners
failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in- interest consented to the tenancy relationship.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioners-defendants are not tenants of the subject land.

HELD :

No. Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case. Agricultural tenancy exists when
all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared
between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. As correctly found by the CA, the element of
consent is lacking. Self-serving statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner;
independent evidence is necessary. Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of
harvest. Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an
agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by
substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy. In the instant case, petitioners failed to
prove consent and sharing of harvest between the parties. The MTC has jurisdiction over the 90 instant
case. No error can therefore be attributed to the CA in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of
respondents complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the remand of the case to the MTC for the
determination of the amount of damages due respondent is proper. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed August 24, 2005 Decision and the February 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA are AFFIRMED. This case is ordered REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu, to
determine the amount of damages suffered by respondent by reason of the refusal and failure of
petitioners to turn over the possession of the subject land, with utmost dispatch consistent with the
above disquisition.
70. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 132767 January 18, 2000

FACTS:

This is a case filed by the petitioner for judicial determination of just compensation. The petitioner in
this case owns four parcels of land located in Tagum, Davao which were taken by the Department of
Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the
Philippines and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), petitioner filed a
petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property which was filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao. However, the petition was dismissed on the ground that it was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. Petitioner also
contended that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just compensation for the taking
of lands under CARP because such jurisdiction is vested in the RTC.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the Special Agrarian Courts are considered appellate courts in the determination of just
compensation

HELD :

No. To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly Section 50 thereof, Rule XIII, Section 11 of
the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides: "Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of
Just Compensation. The decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination
and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to
the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration." As we held in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, this Rule is an acknowledgement by the DARAB that the power to decide
just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the Courts. It is error to
think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to
decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate
jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the
reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR,
as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter,
the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the
courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative
action. 92 Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period
provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the
case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
71. GERARDO RUPA SR. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MAGIN SALIPOT

G.R. No. 80129 January 25, 2000

FACTS :

Petitioner Gerardo Rupa Sr. filed an action for redemption with damages against Magin Salipot claiming
that he had been a tenant of a parcel of coconut land formerly owned by Vicente Lim and Patrocinia Yu
Lim for more than twenty (20) years now, sharing the harvests on a 50%- 50% basis. Also, that he is the
overseer over four parcels of coconut land owned by the Lim spouses. However, without any prior
written notice, the land tenanted by the petitioner was sold to Magin Salipot for P5,000.00 in January
1981. Petitioner averred that he only learned of the sale on February 16, 1981, and that he sought
assistance with the local office of Agrarian Reform for the redemption of the questioned property and
even deposited the amount of P5,000.00 with the trial court. However, the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that Rupa was not a tenant of the
subject property and thus, not entitled to a right of redemption over the same. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals finds, in substance, that there is no clear and convincing evidence to show that plaintiff was a
share tenant of the spouses Lim and that Rupa is bound by his admission in Criminal Case No. 532-U,
entitled People of the Philippines. vs. Mariano Luzong filed six months after the instant case wherein he
admitted that he was the overseer and administrator of the five parcels of land owned by the Lim
spouses. Thus, negating his claim of tenancy. The CA therefore affirmed on appeal the decision of the
lower court. Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the land

HELD :

A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the
aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latters consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce
or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Briefly stated, for this relationship to exist, it is
necessary that: 1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2.The subject is agricultural land; 3.
There is consent; 4. The purpose is agricultural production; 5. There is personal cultivation; and 6. There
is sharing of harvests In the case at bar, the fact that RUPA has been planting coconut seedlings and
minor crops in the vacant portions of the subject land as well as cleaning and gathering coconuts to
process them into copra is borne out by the records. Further indicating the tenancy relationship
between the landlord and RUPA is their agreement to share 50/50. The sharing arrangement taken
together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens
the claim of RUPA that indeed, he is a tenant.
72. RAYMUNDO T. MAGDALUYO vs .ATTY. ENRIQUE L. NACE

Adm. Case No. 3808 February 2, 2000

FACTS:

This is a case of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct of a lawyers professional responsibility.
Complainant alleged that he is the registered owner of parcels of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal. In 1991,
he conducted dialogues with squatters among them respondent living on said land and offered to
relocate them to another portion of the land. The squatters refused and they filed a complaint against
complainant before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) claiming that they are
tenants and thus could not be forcibly ejected. The squatters again including respondent also filed
a case against complainant before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo for the annulment or cancellation
of complainant's land titles. This time, they claimed to be owners, not mere tenants, of the land. They
traced their alleged ownership to an old Spanish title.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondent committed a falsehood and of forum-shopping violating his professional
responsibility as a lawyer

HELD:

Yes. Respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.2 He was, indeed, less than sincere in asserting two
conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he knew not to be his. What made
matters worse was his participation in bringing such claims to court, knowing them to be contradictory
and therefore cannot both be true, though both could be totally false. In this he is guilty of consenting to
if not actual commission of a falsehood before a court, again in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath to do no falsehood or consent to its
commission and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.
The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension,
disbarment,4 or other disciplinary action.5 Respondent's acts are clearly in violation of his solemn oath
as a lawyer that this Court will not tolerate.
73. EUDOSIA DAEZ et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 133507 February 17, 2000

FACTS:

Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan
being cultivated by the herein respondents. DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina denied the application
for exemption upon finding that the subject land is covered under LOI 474, the petitioner's total
properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law. The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T.
Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all affirmed the said Order and disregarded an
Affidavit executed by the respondents stating that they are not the tenants of the land. Their findings
were that the Affidavit was merely issued under duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (EPs)
were issued to the respondents. Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same
riceland under R.A. No. 6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the
subject riceland but denied the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to
prove actual tillage or direct management thereof. This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary
Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on appeal by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals again
reversed this Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the previous Decision of DAR Secretary Ernesto
D. Garilao. Hence, this Appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject landholdings, despite the
fact that a previous decision denying the petition for exemption had long become final and executor.

HELD:

It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the
same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent
institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia
Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the
same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory. The right of retention is a
constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate
the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the
landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the
landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to
return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process. The issuance of EPs and
CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby.
Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is
later found to be part of the landowner's retained area.
74. BAYANI BAUTISTA vs. PATRICIA ARANETA

G.R. No. 135829 February 22, 2000

FACTS:

In essence, the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three (3) hectare parcel of land
owned by Gregorio Araneta II since 1978. In April 1991, a group of armed security guards, allegedly,
were sent by herein defendant Patricia Araneta, successor of Gregorio Araneta II and warned plaintiff to
vacate and to stop cultivating the subject landholding. Plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the defendant from the continued employment of threats and harassments
against his person, for the issuance of a permanent preliminary injunction during the pendency of the
case, for the maintenance of status quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant of the land.
Defendant to summarize, denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and stated that the property
belonged to Consuelo A. de Cuesta Auxilum Christianorum Foundation Incorporated and leased to
defendant for the development of a bio-dynamic farm and ultimately for the establishment of a training
center for bio-dynamic agriculture in the Philippines and humid tropics in Asia. The land also does not
fall under CARL because it has more than 18% slope. During an ocular inspection, defendant learned of
the presence of the plaintiff. The former invited the latter to join the project but he declined and agreed
to leave the premises. However, the plaintiff changed his mind and refused to leave. Efforts at
conciliation did not push through and instead a Complaint for Peaceful Possession with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by the plaintiff.
The PARAD ruled in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bonafide tenant. On appeal,
the DARAB affirmed the said Decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
DARAB. Hence, this Appeal. Petitioner contends that in 1978, he entered into an oral tenancy agreement
with Gregorio Araneta II whom he has known and believed as the owner of the land. And that he
regularly delivered to Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino Tocio. Petitioner likewise
relies on the certification (ARPT and MARO) that he is a tenant on the landholding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding

HELD:

The Appeal lacks merit. "His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor is misplaced because they
do not prove that the landowner made him his tenant. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed, they only
show that petitioner is in possession of the land. The certifications do not disclose how and why he
became a tenant." In sum, respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricultural
leasehold agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. In the 1961 case of Lastimoza vs. Blanco, we
ruled that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder
who is either the 'owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec. 5 [b], Rep. Act No.
1199), and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the
tenancy. To rule otherwise, would be to pave the way for fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous
to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder." Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioner's argument that
he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on
the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding.
In Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers
that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts. This Court is
not necessarily bound by these findings especially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported
by substantial evidence.
75. HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 109992 March 7, 2000

FACTS:

The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution by the
Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989 and subsequently sold at public auction
on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos now substituted by his heirs and represented by his
widow Arsenia Garcia vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50. Private respondent Exequiel
Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary period. On April 1, 1992,
respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) docketed
as DARAB Case No. 369-BUL '92 praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent
from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become useless". The Provincial Adjudicator
Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an Order allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and directing
that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board. Then on April 27, 1992, private
respondent filed a Petition for Consignation before the RTC of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to
redeem his land. The petition was dismissed. Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992,
a Motion to intervene with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the
party who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season". On May 7, 1992 private respondent
filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Saleand Document, Redemption with Damages and
Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan. The DARAB suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for
intervention pending the resolution of the ownership issue. On July 8, 1992, intervenor this time filed
with the DARAB, a motion to withdraw intervenor's deposited share. The Motion was granted and
intervenor was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of the P174,650.00 harvests proceeds with
intervenor Antonio being recognized as the duly constituted tenant of the land. The Court of Appeals
affirmed these orders of the DARAB. Hence, the instant petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even when the question
of ownership is pending resolution with the Regional Trial Courts.

HELD:

Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides: SECTION 1. Primary,
Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act
No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied) "Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d)
of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as: (d)Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes 99 concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. Clearly, no agrarian dispute is
involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the ownership of the subject property. In
the case of Morta v. Occidental, et al., this Court held: For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there
must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold
over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all
matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure
related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. Petitioners
and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could
have brought this controversy under the ambit of agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has
no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's
petition for injunction in the first place. The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can
be harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As such, it is dependent on the
main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the
parties, necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can stand. This issue, after all,
can be resolved by the trial court, which has the jurisdiction to order the gathering of the mango fruits
and depositing the proceeds with it, considering that an action has already been filed before it on the
specific issue of ownership.
76. GAVINO CORPUZ vs. SPOUSES GERONIMO GROSPE AND HILARIA GROSPE

G.R. No. 135297 June 8, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) who, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a
total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and formerly owned by a
certain Florentino Chioco. On January 20, 1982, petitioner mortgaged the subject land in favor of
Virginia de Leon to pay for his wife's hospitalization. Upon the expiration of the contract, petitioner
again mortgaged the property to herein respondent Hilaria Grospe [wife of Geronimo Grospe] for a
period of four years (from December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500.00.
The parties even executed a "Kasunduan sa Pagpapahiram ng Lupang Sakahan" which allowed the
respondents to use and/or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage. Petitioner instituted
an action for recovery of possession with the DARAB in Cabanatuan City against the respondents
averring that the latter entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991
and destroyed the palay planted on the land. Respondents in their answer claimed that the petitioner
himself allowed them to take over the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter has paid
his loan. However, instead of paying his loan, petitioner had allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a
"Waiver of Rights" over the landholding in consideration in the amount of P54,394.00. Petitioner denied
waiving his rights and claimed that he and his children's signatures appearing on the waiver were
forgeries. The PARAD ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the
Samahang Nayon ng Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija which in turn, had passed Resolution Nos. 16
and 27 recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses who were the "most
qualified farmer(s)-beneficiaries". The DARAB affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Likewise, petitioners appeal and subsequent
reconsideration thereof were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the waiver executed by the petitioner null and void for being contrary to agrarian
laws.

2. Whether or not the petitioner abandon his rights as a beneficiary under PD 27.

3. Whether or not the petitioner, by voluntary surrender, forfeit his right as a beneficiary.

HELD:

1. YES. The court have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or
through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in
which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus, negating the government's program of
freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil. In Torres v. Ventura, the Court clearly held: " As such
[the farmer-beneficiary] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for himself.
Those rights over that particular property were granted by the 101 government to him and to no other.
To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make
any valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors. . . .
[T]he then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum Circular [No. 7, Series of 1979,
April 23, 1979]: Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many
farmerbeneficiaries of PD 27 have transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of their
farms/home lots to other persons or have surrendered the same to their former landowners. All these
transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and therefore, null and void."'

2. NO. The court ruled that abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right
or claim or to desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or
carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never
returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. In this case, the
mortgage expired after four years. Thus, the private respondents were obligated to return possession of
the landholding to the petitioner. At bottom, we see on the part of the petitioner no clear, absolute or
irrevocable intent to abandon. His surrender of possession did not amount to abandonment because
there was an obligation on the part of private respondents to return possession upon full payment of
the loan. However, the nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear
showing that he voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under the
present circumstances, may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the government, of his rights under the
agrarian laws.

3. YES. PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program shall not be
transferable except through hereditary succession or to the government, in accordance with the
provisions of existing laws and regulations. Section 8 of R.A. No. 3844 also provides that "[t]he
agricultural leasehold relation . . . shall be extinguished by: . . . (2) voluntary surrender of the
landholding by the agricultural lessee . . . ." In this case, the land was surrendered to the government,
not transferred to another private person. It was the government, through the DAR, which awarded the
landholding to the private respondents who were declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian
laws. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require court
approval as long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. Petitioner's
voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government
because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation of farm
holdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27. Under Memorandum Circular
No. 8-80 of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan shall, upon notice from the agrarian
reform team leader, recommend other tenant-farmers who shall be substituted to all rights and
obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer. Besides, these cooperatives are
established to provide a strong social and economic organization to ensure that the tenant-farmers will
enjoy on a lasting basis the benefits of agrarian reform.
77. JAIME P. CORPIN vs. AMOR S. VIVAR AND COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 137350 June 19, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan covered by
TCT No. T-299732 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Private respondent Amor S. Vivar is in
possession of said parcel of land. Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against the private
respondent with the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan. For failure to timely file his Answer
with Motion to Dismiss the court deemed the case submitted for judgment and rendered a decision
ordering private respondent to vacate the land in dispute. Private respondent appealed the case to the
Regional Trial Court and submitted documents to support his claim that he is a tenant of the petitioner's
lot. The Regional Trial Court in turn, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, petitioner
filed a Petition for Review of the said Decision with the Court of Appeals. The latter upheld the Regional
Trial Court's finding and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in ruling that there was a landlord-tenant relationship
between the parties.

HELD:

YES. In the case of Bayog vs. Natino which the appellate court cited, we held that the metropolitan
circuit trial court, which dismissed defendant's Answer for having been filed out of time and decided the
case based on the allegations in the complaint, should not have disregarded defendant's Answer and
should have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had
jurisdiction over the case. What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the
following: (1) Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel Torres, Chairman of the BARC of
Tabang; (2) Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ambrosio T.
Mendoza dated April 22, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent dated April 22, 1996.
Considering the foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby both parties may
present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal trial court's jurisdiction over the
case. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlordtenant relationship
between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents attached by private
respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court only on appeal and were not previously
presented to the municipal trial court, must be set aside due to insufficiency of evidence. The records of
the case must be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court and hear the issue of jurisdiction.
78. KSMP vs. DARAB Kooperatiba ng Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino, Inc. Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, et al.,

G.R. No. 139051 June 26, 2000

FACTS:

The case stemmed from the Order dated May 27, 1975 by then DAR Secretary Conrado Estrella granting
the request for conversion of 1,837.30 hectares of agricultural land situated in Nasugbu, Batangas into
residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes. In essence, the Order stated that the
subject land is not economically suited for agricultural cultivation and that if there are any tenant-tillers,
disturbance compensation should be paid to them in accordance with law. Fifteen (15) occupants
assisted by the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) claiming to be tenants of a forty-four (44) hectare
portion filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. But prior to such, former President
Ferdinand B. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 on November 27, 1975 declaring the Municipalities
of Maragondon and Ternate, Cavite and Nasugbu, Batangas as tourist zones more suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial and urban uses. In December 1989, apparently unaware of the conversion orders
and presidential proclamation, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago issued Notices of
Acquisition dated December 14-27, 1989. Private respondents, Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, filed their
objections to these Santiago notices. Thereafter, on January 22, 1991, Secretary Benjamin T. Leong who
succeeded Secretary Santiago ruled on the validity of the questioned Order issued on May 27, 1975 and
denied the Motion for Reconsideration holding that pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, Maragondon,
Ternate and Nasugbu are declared as tourist zones. On May 14, 1991, the private respondents filed a
Petition with the DARAB docketed as DARAB Case No. 0335 for the purpose of implementing the
Conversion Orders which in effect suggested the manner of invalidating the Santiago Notices as it was
contrary to the Leong Order of January 22, 1991. Petitioner KSMP filed a complaint-inintervention on
the aforementioned case. This was dismissed by the DAR. Subsequently, KSMP filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals docketed as G.R. No. 47813 imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the DARAB. The CA dismissed the same. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has the right to intervene and is a proper party-in-interest in the subject
controversy.

HELD:

The Supreme Court find no error with the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause is lost considering that
the Conversion Orders have long become final and executory. There was, therefore, no more case to
which it could intervene. The complaint-in-intervention was, therefore, correctly dismissed pursuant to
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner's insistence that there was no final disposition yet of the
conversion case, as in fact, DARAB Case No. 0335 was initiated by the private respondents is untenable.
A perusal of the records reveal that DARAB Case No. 0335 was filed by the private respondents for the
purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders particularly the fixing of the final disturbance
compensation to the legitimate farmer-occupants. The complaint-in-intervention, however, puts in issue
petitioner's alleged tenancy relationship and security of tenure which the DARAB does not have any
jurisdiction. Furthermore, petitioner, a juridical entity, has no personality to file the instant petition to
intervene in the case as the real parties-in-interest are the members thereof who were not even
recognized as the rightful tenants occupying the subject land. As observed by the DAR, "members of
petitioner are merely holding on to expectancy that they will become the beneficiaries assuming that
the land is still capable." The fact, however, remains that the land in question has already been excluded
from the purview of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by the Estrella and Leong Orders
which had long become final and executory.
79. BEJASA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Gr. No. 108941 July 6, 2000

FACTS:

On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her attorneyinfact,
having power of administration over the disputed land. On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a
new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a term of one year. On
December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an
"aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with aterm of one year. After the aryenduhan expired,
despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give
any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or share harvest. On February 15, 1988, the
Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for confirmation of
leasehold and home lot with recovery of damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan, and
the trial court ruled i favour of the Bejasas. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas.

HELD:

The elements of the tenancy relationship are: (1) There are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is sharing of harvests. Candelaria and the Bejasas, between them,
there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as land owner never gave her consent. Even assuming that
the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there
is no proof that they did.
80. DAR vs. PCSC

GR. No. 152640 June 15, 2006

FACTS:

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) seeks the nullification of the Order of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting PHILCOMSAT's application for the exemption of its 700
hectare land being subject to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The controversy involves a
parcel of land owned situated within the area which had been declared a security zone under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848. A Notice of coverage was sent to
PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the land in question shall be place under
CARP compulsory acquisition scheme PHILCOMSAT sought an exemption of the subject property from
CARP coverage insisting that the land will be utilize for the expansion of its operations. Respondent's
application was rejected by the Sec. Garilao citing the reason among others that the term "security
zone" is not embraced within the definition of lands used for national defense under Section 10 of R.A.
No. 6657.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone under P.D.
No. 1845, as amended by P.D. no. 1848, can be subjected to CARP

HELD:

No. The SC agree with the CA when it stated that the subject property is clearly within the scope of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law had it not been decreed by P.D. No. 1845 that it is a security zone.
The very purpose by which P.D. 1845 was passed declaring the area within a radius of three kilometers
surrounding the satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal a security zone is to protect and insure the safety
and interrupted operation of the modern media of international communications in the said property,
as indicated in the whereas clause of said law. Thus, to subject said security zone to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program of the government would negate the very purpose by which P.D. 1845, as
revised by P.D. 1848 was decreed. These laws have never been repealed. P.D. 1848 is also specific in
that occupation of the area, either by the owners or their bona fide tenants, require a prior written
permission or authority from the Ministry of the National Defense, now Department of National Defense.
It is therefore the Department of National Defense which will determine [x x x] who can occupy the
subject property, and not the Department of the Agrarian Reform. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
81. ICBMC vs. LADC Islanders Carp-farmers Beneficiaries Multi-purpose Cooperative Lapanday
Agricultural and Development Corporation

GR. No. 159089 May 3, 2006

FACTS:

On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreement for Islanders
Carp-Farmer Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. with Lapanday Agricultural and Development
Corporation. Almost three years after, petitioner, represented by its alleged chairman Manuel K. Asta
filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages, with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against respondent. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended complaint with
leave of court alleging that the persons, who executed the contract, were not authorized by it.
Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) has primary, exclusive and original jurisdiction. On August 21, 1996, respondent then
filed a case at the DARAB for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance, Injunction with Restraining Order,
Damages and Attorney's fees. The DARAB decided the case in favor of respondent declaring the Joint
Production Agreement as valid and binding. The RTC then issued its decision of October 18, 1999
dismissing the case. Finding the relationship between the parties to be agricultural leasehold, the CA
held that the issue fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Hence, the appellate court rules
that the RTC had correctly dismissed the Complaint filed by petitioner. Petitioner contends that, there
being no tenancy or leasehold relationship between the parties this case does not constitute an agrarian
dispute that falls within the DARAB's jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the controversy.

HELD:

Yes. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with the primary and exclusive jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. Through Executive Order 129-A the President of the Philippines created the DARAB and
authorized it to assume the powers and function of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian
reform cases. In the present case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly absent. Petitioner is
thus correct in claiming that the relationship between the parties is not one of tenancy or agricultural
leasehold. Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within the sphere of the
agrarian disputes. An agrarian dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangement--
whether leasehold, tenancy, and stewardship or otherwise - over lands devoted to agriculture. The
assailed Joint Production Agreement is a type of joint economic enterprise. Joint economic enterprises
are partnerships or arrangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) land
beneficiaries and investors to implement agribusiness enterprises in agrarian reform areas. Jurisdiction
over the present controversy lies with the DARAB. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
82. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. BERNARDO V. SALUDANES

GR No. 146581 December 13 2005

FACTS:

The instant case stemmed from twenty one (21) petitions for just compensation filed on April 6, 1999
by several landowners with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), herein petitioner and the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) was impleaded as respondents. The petitions involve several tracts of land forming part of a
banana plantation operated by the AMS Group of Companies, one of herein respondents. Pursuant to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the landowners offered to sell these parcels of
land to the government. The Special Agrarian Court consolidated the cases and named a panel of
Commissioners to receive and evaluate evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid to the
landowners. After trial, the Special Agrarian Court admitted and approved the Appraisal Report of the
Commissioners. On February 7, 2000, the said court rendered its joint Decision fixing, as it has
judiciously determined, the just compensation for the landholdings and the improvements of all the
herein petitioners in all these above captioned docketed agrarian cases. Petitioner LBP filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied by the Special Agrarian Court. The LBP filed with the same court a
Notice of Appeal. A few days after, the DAR also filed its Notice of Appeal. Both notices of appeal was
denied by the SAC.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the untimely filing of the petition for certiorari is exempted from the operation of
Section 4, Rule 65 by reasons of justice and equity.

HELD:

We deny the petition outright. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides; SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial
is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty day period shall be counted notice of
the denial of said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the act or
omission of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer, or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, if it involves the acts
or omissions of a quasi judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and recognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time shall be
granted except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days.
83. HEIRS OF JULIAN DELA CRUZ vs. HEIRS OF ALBERTO CRUZ

G.R. No. 162890 November 22 2005

Facts:

Sometime in 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in favor of Julian Dela Cruz, herein
petitioner, who was a tenant thereon. Such portion was identified as Lot No. 778 with an area of 3.362
hectares, subsequently, In September 1960, the Republic of the Philippines sold the said to Julian Dela
Cruz by virtue of an Agreement to Sell. On September 27, 1960, the DAR issued Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) No. AS-5323 in his favor as the qualified tenant of the landholding. Julian bound and
obliged himself to pay the amortizations over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the
property and made payments to the government for a period of almost 20 years. He died in 1979 and
was survived by his wife, Leonora Talaro-dela Cruz and their 10 children, including Mario and Maximino
dela Cruz. In May 1980, Leonora dela Cruz executed a private document, with the consent of her
children, sold the land in favor of Alberto, who took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over
a period of 10 years without any protest from Leonora and her children. He then filed an application to
purchase the property with the DAR. On June 27, 1991, the DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA No.
51750 over the property in favor of Alberto Cruz, and the certificate was registered with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA). On August 15, 1991, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. CLOA- 0- 3035 over the landholding in favor of Alberto Cruz. The title contained an
annotation prohibiting the beneficiary from selling or transferring the landholding within a period of 10
years from issuance, except to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). On October 10, 1996, Leonora and
her 10 children filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the
nullification of the following: the order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 issued
in favor of Alberto Cruz. On November 16, 1990, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an
Order approving the recommendation of the MARO. He directed the cancellation of Julians CLT and
declared that whatever rights Julian had over the landholding and payments made in favor of the
government under the Agreement to sell were forfeited. After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the
petition in a Decision dated July 9, 1997. It declared that the petitioners were the rightful allocates of
the property, and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA No. 51750 and TCT No. CLOA -0-3035 and issue
another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was ordered to vacate the property. The PARAD also
directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the said title and issue a new one over the
landholding in favor of the petitioners. Alberto appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the
ruling of the PARAD on June 19, 2000. The DARAB ruled that the rights of the petitioners as
farmersbeneficiaries could not be transferred or waived except through hereditary succession or to the
government, conformably with agrarian reform laws and that the private document Leonora executed
may be assailed by her children 109 by Julian, who were not privies thereto. The DARAB also ruled that
in executing the private document, Leonora failed to comply with DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8 In a
Decision dated March 31, 2003, the CA granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the petition of
the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz in the PARAD for lack of jurisdiction. The CA declared that there was no
tenancy relationship between respondent Alberto and the said heirs; hence, the DARAB had no
jurisdiction over the petition. It declared that the issue before the DARAB was the rightful ownership
over the landholding.

ISSUE :

1. Whether or not the DAR adjudication board has jurisdiction over the case.

2. Whether or not the CLOA awarded to Alberto Cruz may be cancelled.

HELD :

1. The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules
of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation
of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases,
they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been
issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs
by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to
parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the
DARAB. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court
from addressing the issue, especially where the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of
the complaint or petition. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses
or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction
should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the
nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. If the issues between the parties
are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such
dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB. The proceedings before a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral
attacks.

2. In the present case, the DAR Secretary approved CLOA No. 51750 in the name of Alberto in the
exercise of his administrative powers and in the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. The
approval was based on the Report of the MARO, the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO and the
recommendation of the DAR Director of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, over whom the
DAR Secretary has supervision and control. The DAR Secretary also had the authority to withdraw the
CLOA upon a finding that the same is contrary to law and DAR orders, circulars and memoranda. The
resolution of such issues by the DAR Secretary will entail the application and implementation of agrarian
reform laws, inclusive of P.D. No. 946 as well as the implementing orders, circulars and rules and
regulations issued by the DAR, and other agrarian reform laws, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 19,
Series of 1978 as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 14, Series of 1988, and DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 8, Series of 1980 will apply.
84. CREBA VS. SECRETARY OF DAR Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc.

G.R. No. 183409 June 18 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella organization of some 3,500 private corporations,
partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land and housing
development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and services in
the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning and development financing.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the duly appointive head of the DAR
whose administrative issuances are the subject of this petition. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued,
on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, and then subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Nonagricultural Uses, amending and updating the previous rules on land use
conversion. On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order,
i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion, which further
amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith.
The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to
nonagricultural uses or to another agricultural use, thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07,
particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To address the unabated
conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and
approval of all land use conversion applications. Petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, was made in violation of Section 65] of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to nonagricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such
as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGUs or by way of
Presidential Proclamations, to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or
after 15 June 1988. According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in
any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-
awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority. Thus, in issuing and
enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is
an actual slowdown of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage,
unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and
its members but more so of the whole nation.
ISSUE :

Whether the DAR Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion by
issuing and enforcing DAR AO # 01-02, as amended which regulate reclassified lands as some provisions
of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.

HELD :

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of
the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of
his quasi-legislative and administrative functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing
the aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of
rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No.
01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any judicial or quasi-judicial
functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative functions. Furthermore, as this Court has
previously discussed, the instant petition in essence seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No.
88. Thus, the adequate and proper remedy for the petitioner therefore is to file a Petition for
Declaratory Relief, which this Court has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It is beyond the
province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal
because certiorari is confined only to the determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare the aforesaid
administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the writ of
certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.
88. Jose Luis Ros Vs DAR

GR no. 132477 August 31, 2005

FACTS:

The case stems from a denial of the application for conversion before the Regional Office of Dar Region
7 disallowing the application for conversion filed by petitioners, owners/ developers of several parcels of
land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. The application was based on Municipal Ordinance No. 101
passed by the Mun. Council of Balamban, Cebu which reclassified such lands as industrial lands. Said
ordinance was approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu on April 3, 1995. Because of such disapproval,
petitioners filed with the RTC of Toledo City a complaint for Injunction with application of TRO and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction ruling that it is DAR which
has jurisdiction citing section 20 of the Local Government Code. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration. The trial court denied the same and the Court of Appeals ordered the Public
respondent to file their comments on the petition. Two sets of comments from Public respondents, one
from DAR provincial Office and another form the office of the solicitor general, were submitted, to
which petitioners filed their consolidated reply. Petitioners claim that local grants have the power to
reclassify portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in Section 20 of the Local
Government Code that if agricultural lands sought to be reclassified by the local government is one
which has already been brought under the coverage of the CARL and/or which has been distributed to
ARBs, then such reclassification must be confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its authority under Section
65 of the CARL, in order for the reclassification to become effective, that if the land sought to be
classified is not covered by CARL and not distributed to ARBs, then no confirmation from DAR is
necessary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to issue a writ of injunction against
the DAR?

HELD:

The petition lacks merit. The authority of DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by
Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local
Government Code. The code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of RA no 6657. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with
an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform case, jurisdiction is vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform, more specifically, in the DARAB.
89. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NATIVIDAD

GR No. 127198 May 16, 2005

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of
the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just
compensation for the States acquisition of private respondents properties under the land reform
program. On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the
determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which
were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named
as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as
corespondents the registered tenants of the land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the just compensation that was provided was proper.

HELD:

Landbanks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21,
1972, the time of effectively of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the
property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In office of the
President, Malacanang Manila vs CA, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on
the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation. In this case,
the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into
account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors value and the
volume and value of its produce. This court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the
amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by RA 6657 and
existing jurisprudence. Wherefore, the petition is DENIED, Costs against petitioner.
90. PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSOC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 142359 May 25, 2004

FACTS :

Petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 49363,which
set aside and reversed the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board(DARAB)
and reinstated the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Trece
Martirez City, which, in turn, ordered the dismissal of the complaint for Maintenance for Peaceful
Possession and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. (PBFAI).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL)?

HELD:

The contention of the petitioners has no merit. Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, agricultural
lands refer to lands devoted to agriculture as conferred in the said law and not classified as industrial
land. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it covers all private
lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. In executing the said deeds, the
members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence, they
have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same. DAR has jurisdiction over all
controversies involving the implementation of agrarian reform program.
91. VICENTE ADRIANO vs. ALICE TANCO, et al.

G.R. No. 168164 July 5, 2010

FACTS:

A Complaint was filed by Vicente before the regional office of DARAB in Region III averring that he is a
tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation of a land owned by respondent and has been
performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of the mango
trees which were then divided equally between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to improve
and establish his home within the premises. However, respondents denied having instituted any tenant
on their property. They stressed that Vicente is not a tenant but only a mere regular farm worker of the
respondent for the specific purpose of spraying the mango trees. The decision of PARAD was rendered
in favor of Vicente which was then affirmed by the DARAB. Respondents filed a Petition for Review to
the CA contending, among others, that Vicente was hired as a caretaker and, therefore, the nature of
their relationship is that of an employer-employee relationship; and, there is no proof that the parties
share in the harvest. Furthermore, respondents insisted that the agreed engagement of services of
Vicente for the specific purpose of spraying the mango trees was made upon the intercession of the
MARO, who emphasized that the same would not ripen into tenancy relationship. CA rendered a
Decision in favor of the respondents. Hence, the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).

ISSUE:

Whether the findings of the PARAD and the DARAB that Vicente is a bona fide tenant is supported by
substantial evidence.

HELD:

Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree,
expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a
result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land.
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure.[24] For tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential
requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the
parties.[25] All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy relationship,
and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.[26] The SC affirm the findings of the CA that the
essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring petitioner Vicente Adriano not a tenant of the
respondents and thus not entitled to security of tenure under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
is AFFIRMED.
92. NHA vs. DARAB National Housing Authority The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

G.R. No. 175200 May 4, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Mateo Villaruz, Sr. (Villaruz) was asked to work as a tenant of an Estates sevenhectare rice
field in order to prevent the land from falling into the hands of squatters. It had a house constructed on
the lot for Villaruz and engaged his daughter and son-in-law to serve as co-tenants. As it later turned out,
the Estate mortgaged Lot 916 to a bank, resulting in its foreclosure when the loan could not be paid.
Petitioner National Housing Authority (NHA) bought the lot. Later that year, the Department of Public
Works and Highways constructed roads and bridges that passed through a portion of the lot. As a result,
some plants and crops had to be cut down, prompting respondent Villaruz to demand payment of their
value. When the demand was not heeded, respondent Villaruz filed an action for damages and
disturbance compensation against petitioner NHA and the Estate before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
who as well dismissed the same. Later on, respondent Villaruz filed a complaint with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) seeking recognition as tenant beneficiary of the lot he tenanted
and praying that his possession of its three-hectare portion be maintained. After hearing, the PARAD
ruled in Villaruzs favor with respect to such portion provided he paid 25% of his net harvest to
petitioner NHA until a fixed rental could be set. But he could not be declared owner of the lot since it
had ceased to be private agricultural land, having been bought by the government. Petitioner NHA then
appealed the PARAD decision to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which
affirmed the same. Undaunted, the NHA appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered a
decision, affirming the questioned decisions of the PARAD and the DARAB. Hence, the present petition
for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all lands acquired by the National Housing Authority (NHA) for its resettlement and
housing efforts is beyond the scope of agrarian laws.

HELD:

YES. This Court ruled that P.D. 1472 exempts from land reform those lands that petitioner NHA acquired
for its housing and resettlement programs whether it acquired those lands when the law took effect or
afterwards. The language of the exemption is clear: the exemption covers "lands or property acquired x
x x or to be acquired" by NHA. Its Section 1 does not make any distinction whether the land petitioner
NHA acquired is tenanted or not. When the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be made. In
addition, Section 1 of P.D. 1472 provides that petitioner NHA shall not be liable for disturbance
compensation. Since only tenants working on agricultural lands can claim disturbance compensation,
the exemption assumes that NHA may have to acquire such kinds of land for its housing program. If the
exemption from payment of disturbance compensation applied only to untenanted lands, then such
exemption would be meaningless or a superfluity. Thus, petitioner NHA is not bound to pay disturbance
compensation to respondent Villaruz even if he was the tenant of Lot 916. The NHAs purchase of Lot
916 for development and resettlement transformed the property by operation of law from agricultural
to residential.
93. HEIRS OF LORENZO and CARMEN VIDAD and AGVID CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., vs. LBP

G.R. No. 166461 April 30, 2010

FACTS:

A parcel of land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657 or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Of the entire area, the government only acquired
490.3436 hectares. LBP who has the primary responsibility to determine the valuation and
compensation for all lands LBP computed the initial value of the land at P2,961,333.03 for 490.3436
hectares. The owners rejected the valuation and filed Petition for Review to Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) who dismissed said petition. As second petition for review asking
for re-evaluation was filed to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who issued to LBP and
Order re-compute the value of the land. LBP revalued the land atP4,158,947.13 for 402.3835 hectares
andP1,467,776.34 for 43.8540 hectares. Still, such was rejected by the petitioners. Case was then
instituted before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Tuguegarao (RARAD) for the purpose of
determining the just compensation for their land. In a decision dated 29 March 2000, the RARAD fixed
the just compensation for the land at P32,965,408.46. Petitioners manifested their acceptance thereof.
LBP moved for reconsideration but was denied by RARAD. Thus, filed a petition for determination of just
compensation with the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Petitioners moved to dismiss LBPs
petition on the ground of res judicata. SAC rendered a decision, based on LBPs evidence alone, fixing the
just compensation at P5,626,724.47 for the 446.2375 hectares of the land. Petitioners filed an appeal to
the CA questioning the authority of the SAC to give due course to the petition of LBP, claiming that the
RARAD has concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC over just compensation but was denied. Hence, the
Petition for Review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether the SAC can assume jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just compensation filed
by respondent after the RARAD had rendered its decision of 29 March 2000 and a writ of execution is
issued

HELD:

The procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA 6657, commences with LBP
determining the value of the lands under the land reform program. Using LBPs valuation, the DAR makes
an offer to the landowner through a notice sent to the landowner, pursuant to Section 16(a) of RA 6657.
In case the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR adjudicator conducts a summary administrative
proceeding to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees
with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special
Agrarian Court for final determination of just compensation. Contrary to petitioners argument, the
PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases.
The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature. WHEREFORE, petition is granted. The Court
of Appeals is directed to conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
recommended conclusions within forty-five (45) days from notice of this Decision. The Court of Appeals
is further directed to raffle this case immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
94. PVA vs. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 173085 January 19, 2011

FACTS:

In late 2003 respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), a government corporation,
filed several expropriation actions before the various branches of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City, for acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the SubicClark-Tarlac Expressway
Project. Ten of these cases were raffled to Branch 58 of the court 1 and it is these that are the concern
of the present petition. The defendants in Branch 58 cases were respondents Armando Simbillo,
Christian Marcelo, Rolando David, Ricardo Bucud, Pablo Santos, Agrifina Enriquez, Conrado Espeleta,
Catgerube Castro, Carlito Mercado, and Alfredo Suarez. They were the registered owners of the
expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform program.
Another defendant was Land Bank of the Philippines, the mortgagee of the lands by virtue of the loans it
extended for their acquisition. The lands in these cases were located in Porac and Floridablanca,
Pampanga. On learning of the expropriation cases before Branch 58, petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank
(PVB) filed motions to intervene in all the cases with attached complaints-in-intervention, a remedy that
it adopted in similar cases with the other branches. PVB alleged that the covered properties actually
belonged to Belmonte Agro-Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in 1976.
PVB had since foreclosed on the mortgages and bought the same at public auction in 1982.
Unfortunately, the bank had been unable to consolidate ownership in its name. But, in its order of
August 18, 2004, Branch 58 denied PVB's motion for intervention on the ground that the intervention
amounts to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in expropriation cases and that the intervention
would delay the proceedings in the cases before it. PVB filed its motion for reconsideration but Branch
58 denied the same, prompting the bank to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA).
On January 26, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It also denied
in a resolution dated June 2, 2006 5 PVB's motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, on April 3, 2006
Branch 58 issued separate decisions in all 10 cases before it, granting the expropriation of the subject
properties. The court noted the uncertainty as to the ownership of such properties but took no action to
grant BCDA's prayer in its complaint that it determine the question of ownership of the same pursuant
to Section 9, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled to intervene in the expropriation cases
before Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC. 120

HELD:

No, The Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 26,
2006 and its resolution dated June 2, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP 88144. PVB's point regarding the authority of
the court in expropriation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of the
lands involved in such cases is valid. But such rule obviously cannot apply to PVB for the following
reason,(1) At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its conflict with the farmer
beneficiaries who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs emanating from such titles were already pending before
Angeles City RTC Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. Branch 58 had no authority to
preempt Branch 62 of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were already pending before it.
Actually, PVB's remedy was to secure an order from Branch 58 to have the proceeds of the
expropriation deposited with that branch in the meantime, pending adjudication of the issues of
ownership of the expropriated lands by the DARAB. Section 9 above empowers the court to order
payment to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to be
settled. There is no reason why this rule should not be applied even where the settlement of such
questions is to be made by another tribunal.
95. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP.,

G.R. No. 179071 January 10, 2011

FACTS:

On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a Notice of
Coverage to petitioner with regards to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently
placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). On
December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), Davao Oriental,
and an Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT No. T-12637 and T-12639 from CARP
coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land are
exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for
grazing and habitat of petitioner's 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18
heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). That the
presence of livestock have already existed in the area prior to the Supreme Court decision on LUZ
FARMS vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. We were surprised however, why the management of the
corporation did not apply for Commercial Farm Deferment (CFD) before, when the two years
reglamentary period which the landowner was given the chance to file their application pursuant to R.A.
6657, implementing Administrative Order No. 16, Series of 1989. However, with regards to what venture
comes first, coconut or livestocks, majority of the farmworkers including the overseer affirmed that the
coconut trees and livestocks were simultaneously and all of these were inherited by his (applicant)
parent. In addition, the financial statement showed 80% of its annual income is derived from the
livestocks and only 20% from the coconut industry. On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots
1454-A & 1296 was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under
RP T-16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a
letter-affidavit addressed to the respondentSecretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage
of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that they needed the additional area for its livestock business.
The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997
denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly
shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its
application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The application
for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved. In the assailed Decision
dated 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the two (2)
parcels of land (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. T-12637 and T- 12639) located in Barrio Don
Enrique Lopez (the "Lopez lands") from coverage of the CARL. However, it upheld the Decisions of the
Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the application for exemption with respect to Lots
1454-A and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T-12635) in Barrio Limot (the "Limot lands"). These lots were
already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of the Philippines (RP T-16356). The DAR
and SNLABC separately sought a partial reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
but their motions for reconsideration were subsequently denied in the Court of Appeals Resolution
dated 08 June 2007.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Lopez and Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABC's
livestock business.

HELD:

The Petitions of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Salvador N. Lopez AgriBusiness Corp. are
dismissed, and the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the DAR Regional Director are hereby affirmed.
On the other hand, the Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for livestock and are
thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL, while, the Limot lands of SNLABC are not actually and
directly being used for livestock and should thus be covered by the CARL. In contrast, the Limot lands
were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to
exemption from CARP coverage. In any case, SNLABC admits that the title to the Limot lands has already
been transferred to the Republic and subsequently awarded to SNLABC's farm workers. This fact only
demonstrates that the land is indeed being used for agricultural activities and not for livestock grazing.
The confluence of these factual circumstances leads to the logical conclusion that the Limot lands were
not being used for livestock grazing and, thus, do not qualify for exemption from CARP coverage.
SNLABC's belated filing of the application for exemption of the Limot lands was a ruse to increase its
retention of its landholdings and an attempt to "save" these from compulsory acquisition.
96. ROXAS AND CO. vs. DAMBA-NSFW

GR 149548

FACTS:

Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987,
the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President.
This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.
The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the laws
effectivity, on May 6, 1988, Roxas & Co. filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later
placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 Roxas &
Co., through its President, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent
DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The
petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF
NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURISTZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed
its application for conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the
assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone,
reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries
in the three Haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993covering 513.983
hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption
from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP
1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994 which states that all lands already
classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need
conversion clearance from the DAR.

ISSUE :

Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to
non-agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage.

HELD :

PP 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three municipalities including
Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities
as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted
their use to non-agricultural purposes. The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain
areas in the sector comprising the three Municipalities that have potential tourism value" and mandated
the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its
purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those
potential tourism areas are. In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA, the Court made it clear that
the "power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence,
exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law lies with the Department of 124
Agrarian Reform, not with this Court." The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied,
by Order, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not
automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected municipalities from their original uses. A
proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area
declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the
zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable
lands within the zone shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural. Moreover, to view
these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces,
municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic
and sweeping exemption from CARP in the name of tourism development. The same would also
undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in local government units in conjunction with
pertinent agencies of government. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said
proclamations/issuances, assuming took effect before June 15, 1988,could not supply a basis for
exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP coveraged. To reiterate, PP 1520
merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as
tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use. A mere reclassification of an
agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that
process of conversion before one is permitted to use it for other purposes.
97. Mendoza vs Geronimo

GR 165676

This is a petition for review on certiorari] filed by petitioner Jose Mendoza to challenge the decision and
the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48642.

FACTS :

On June 27, 1988, the petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry. The
plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in Soledad, Sta.
Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34267. Sometime in 1988,
respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property by means of strategy and stealth, and
without their knowledge or consent. Despite the plaintiffs repeated demands, respondent Narciso
refused to vacate the subject property. On August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming,
among others, that his brother, respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiffs agricultural lessee and
he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household. After
several postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso. Without
conducting a hearing, and despite respondent Narcisos objection, the MTC issued an order on October
27, 1995, remanding the case to the DARAB, Cabanatuan City for further proceedings. On December 14,
1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno as additional defendant. The PARAD found that the
respondents were mere usurpers of the subject property, PARAD ordered the respondents to vacate the
subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual damages. Not satisfied, the
respondents filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, arguing that the case should have been dismissed
because the MTCs referral to the DARAB was void with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,
which repealed the rule on referral under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 316. The DARAB held that it
acquired jurisdiction because of the amended complaint that sufficiently alleged an agrarian dispute,
not the MTCs referral of the case. Thus, it affirmed the PARAD decision. The CA found that the MTC
erred in transferring the case to the DARAB since the material allegations of the complaint and the relief
sought show a case for forcible entry, not an agrarian dispute. It noted that the subsequent filing of the
amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon the DARAB. Thus, the CA set aside the DARAB
decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD :

Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in his answer,
this did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. It continued to have the
authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment
suit on its merits. After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the
defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost
entirely upon the whims of the defendant. In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary
conference, the MTC immediately referred the case to the DARAB. This was contrary to the rules.
Besides, Section 2 of P.D. No. 316, which required the referral of a land dispute case to the Department
of Agrarian Reform for the preliminary determination of the existence of an agricultural tenancy
relationship, has indeed been repealed by Section 76 of R.A. No. 6657 in 1988. The CA, therefore,
committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision. While we lament the lapse of time
this forcible entry case has been pending resolution, we are not in a position to resolve the dispute
between the parties since the evidence required in courts is different from that of administrative
agencies.
98. Estribillo vs DAR

GR 159674

FACTS :

Hacienda Maria Inc. herein private respondent requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be
placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefore, HMI allowed
petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under
Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved.
From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and Emancipation Patents (EPs) covering the entire
527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed with
RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of
277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice
or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefore. RARAD rendered
a decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not
devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and
petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal to the CA,
the same was dismissed. Petitioners contended that the EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of
one year from their registration.

ISSUE :

Whether or not Emancipation Patents (EPs) have become indefeasible one year after their issuance

HELD :

After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of
title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27, the
TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs.
The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title may no
longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.
99. NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., vs. Secretary of DAR and LBP Agrarian Reform,
and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

FACTS :

The case at bar is one of the consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988" The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5- hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228
as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27. The petitioners questioned P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and
229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. They
contended that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The
said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to
provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section
25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation. In connection with the determination of just
compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice and not by
the President of the Philippines. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the
executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The
equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian
problems on the owners only of agricultural lands.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the argument that EO No. 228, now EO No. 229, should be invalidated because it did not
provide for retention limits is tenable

HELD :

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution
is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact
is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits. Except as
otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm,
such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to
the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them
thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.
100. Planters Committee, Inc., et al., Vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

FACTS :

The case at bar is one of the consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988". The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of
1,400 planter members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229. The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as
decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the
President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to
enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim
legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still
have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and
equal protection. Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.

ISSUE :

Whether or not it is correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP

HELD :

Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as
the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to
redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative
and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
101. INOCENTES PABICO vs. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

FACTS :

The case at bar is one of the consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988". The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in
violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the
private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. The petitioner protested the
erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that
on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion
for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These
orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly affected the transfer of his land to
the private respondents.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation

HELD :

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but
the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial,
full, and ample. It bears repeating that the measures challenged in this petition contemplate more than
a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking
of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all
its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the
Constitution. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be
for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4)
the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures
before us.
102. Ernesto L. Natividad vs. Fernando Mariano, et al.

G.R. No. 179643 June 3, 2013

FACTS :

Ernesto Natividad purchased a 66,997 lot from Esperanza Yuson at a public auction in 1988. The lot was,
however, covered by a lease tenancy agreement under RA 6657 (CARL) between Yuzon and the
respondents Fernando and Andres Mariano and Dorotea Garcia. In 1998, Natividad filed with the PARAD
a petition for ejectment and payment of back lease rentals against Mariano, et al. Natividad alleged that
despite repeated verbal demands said tenants failed to pay him rentals. This prompted him to orally
demand that they vacate the lot and eventually his petition for ejectment. When Mariano, et al failed
to answer the summons and did not rebut Natividads petition, PARAD decided the case ex parte and
granted the petition for ejectment and ordered payment of back rentals in favor of Natividad. The first
petition for reconsideration filed by the respondents is on the ground of excusable negligence for
inexperience and lack of knowledge of agrarian reform laws and the DARAB implementing rules and
regulations. In their second petition, filed by the DAR Agrarian Legal Assistance, the respondents added
as justification their lack of sufficient financial means. Both petitions were denied by PARAD in view that
they filed beyond the prescribed reglementary period and the decision has become final and executory.
The case was raised to the DARAB, which reversed the decision of PARAD, and ordered Natividad to
maintain the respondents peaceful possession of the property. DARABs decision was later on affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the amended petition

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed with modification the decision of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals;
finding that: 1. For the broader interest of justice and equity, despite the Doctrine of Immutability of
Final Judgments (by PARAD), appellate courts did not err in re-opening, and ruling on the merits of the
case; 2. Review of the DAR implementing rules revealed that the petition of the respondents were well
within the prescribed reglementery period; 3. Natividad did not show evidence to prove he demanded
from respondents payment of lease rentals since 1988 when he acquired the land; demand was
considered made only in 1998 upon his petition; 132 4. The alleged non-payment of lease rentals did not
last for two (2) years; thus ejection is NOT YET DUE as required by the statute; 5. Natividads prolonged
inaction in making his demand led the respondents to consider Corazon and Laureano Yusons
representatives to still be the authorized payees of the lease.
103. DAR vs. TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY & Devt. Corp.,

G.R. No. 173386 February 11, 2014

FACTS :

Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, Frannie Greenmeadows Pastures, Inc., Isabel
Greenland Agri-based Resources, Inc., Isabel Evergreen Plantations, Inc., Michelle Farms, Inc., Isabel
Greenmeadows Quality Products, Inc., Ernesto Baricuatro, Claudio Villo, and Efren Nuevo (hereinafter,
Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al.) are the registered owners of a parcel of land
in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental. The landholding consists of a total area of 641. 7895 hectares - about
200 hectares thereof are devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) placed 479.8905 hectares of the said landholding under the coverage of RA 6657 between March
1995 and July 2000. Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) were subsequently issued in favor of the agrarian reform beneficiaries. On June 10, 2004,
Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, a Petition for Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining
Order3against the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the DAR, and the beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), docketed as Special Civil Action No. 04-02-V.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the regional trial court may exercise jurisdiction if the case also assails the
constitutionality of administrative orders, regulations and other related issuances implementing
Republic Act No. 6657

HELD :

The Court has no jurisdiction over the instant case. The Court stated in Cuenca that "in case of doubt,
the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that
demand the special competence of administrative agencies, 'even if the question[s] involved [are] also
judicial in character."' In the instant case, however, there is hardly any doubt that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Consequently, it did not have authority to perform any
of the following: order the admission of the amended petition of Trinidad Valley Realty and
Development Corporation, et al., decide the amended petition on the merits, or issue a permanent
prohibitory injunction. In any case, such injunction issued by the RTC is a nullity in view of the express
prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002
enjoining all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657.
104. DAR v. Paramount Holdings

G.R. No. 176838 June 13, 2013

FACTS :

The case stems from the petition docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0403-0009-02, filed with the Office of
the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) by the DAR through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO)
Felixberto Q. Kagahastian. The petition sought to nullify the sale to the respondents of several parcels of
land. The PARO argued that the properties were agricultural land yet their sale was effected without
DAR Clearance as required under Republic Act No. 6657(R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Allegedly, the PARO came to know of the transactions only
after he had received a directive from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to investigate the matter,
following the latter's receipt of a letter-request from persons who claimed to be the tenant-farmers of
the properties' previous owners. The respondents opposed the petition, contending that since the
matter involves an administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, the case is cognizable by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, not the DARAB. They also sought the petition's dismissal on the grounds
of prescription, litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping. On October 16, 2002, Provincial
Adjudicator Virgilio M. Sorita (PA Sorita) issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. The DAR's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the filing of an appeal with
the DARAB. The DARAB granted the appeal. Contrary to the findings of PA Sorita, the DARAB ruled that:
first, the failure of the parties to the sale to obtain the required clearance indicates that their
transactions were fraudulent; second, the PARO had the personality to file the petition even in the
absence of the Solicitor General's assistance, citing Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of 2001 (Circular
No. 2), and the policy of DAR to "acquire and distribute all lands covered by RA 6657[,] including those
subject of illegal transfers . . .";and third, the DARAB has the jurisdiction over the case, since its
jurisdiction under Circular No. 2 covers the cancellation of deeds of conveyance and corresponding
transfer certificates of title over agricultural lands. The denial of the respondents' motion for
reconsideration led to the filing of a petition with the CA. The CA rendered the assailed Decision. The CA
emphasized that the DARAB's jurisdiction over the dispute should be determined by the allegations
made in the petition. Since the action was essentially for the nullification of the subject properties' sale,
it did not involve an agrarian suit that is within the DARAB's jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction

HELD:

The Court of Appeals decision is affirmed. POLITICAL LAW: DARABs jurisdiction The jurisdiction of the
DARAB is limited under the law, as it was created under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A specifically to
assume powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under E.O. No.
229and E.O. No. 129-A. Significantly, it was organized under the Office of 135 the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform. The limitation on the authority of it to mere agrarian reform matters is only consistent with the
extent of DAR's quasi-judicial powers under R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 229. Not every sale or transfer of
agricultural land would warrant DARAB's exercise of its jurisdiction. The law is specific that the property
must be shown to be under the coverage of agrarian reform laws. As the CA correctly ruled: It is easily
discernable . . . that the cause of action of the [DAR] sufficiently established a suit for the declaration of
the sale of the subject landholdings null and void (in violation of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1989). Obviously, it does not involve an agrarian suit, hence, does not fall under the jurisdiction of the
DARAB. It must be emphasized that, "(t)here must be a tenancy relationship between the party litigants
for the DARAB to validly take cognizance of a controversy. Our finding on the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction
over the PARO's petition renders it needless for the Court to discuss the other issues that are raised in
the petition. In any case, the Court finds it worthy to discuss that the original petition remains
dismissible on the merits. Even during the proceedings before the PARAD, the respondents have raised
the pendency with the Regional Trial Court of Bin, Laguna of Civil Case No. B-5862, an appeal from the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Santa Rosa, Laguna in Civil Case No. 2478. The records indicate
that when the matter was elevated to the CA via the petition docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 68110, the
appellate court declared the subject properties to have long been reclassified from "agricultural" to
"industrial". The court ruled that there is no record of tenancy or written agricultural leasehold contract
with respect to the subject lands, nor are the same covered by Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D.
27. Thus, for being industrial in nature, the subject lands are outside the ambit of existing agricultural
tenancy laws. The Housing Land Use Regulatory Board has affirmed through a Certification dated May
22, 1991 that the zoning ordinance referred to was approved on December 2, 1981. Thus, the
respondents correctly argued that since the subject properties were already classified as "industrial"
long before the effectivity of the CARL, their sale could not have been covered by the CARP and the
requirement for a clearance. The petition is DISMISSED. Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
105. REPUBLIC vs. SALVADOR LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP., et al

(GR No. 178895 01/10/2011)

FACTS:

Respondent Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp. (SNLABC)s four parcels of land were placed under
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Respondent sought exemption
contending that the lands were devoted for livestock which is outside the coverage CARL. Upon
inspection, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) found that only two parcels of land, which
were known as Lopez Land, were exempted since it is used for grazing. Accordingly, it was sufficiently
established by testimonies of the people thereabouts and despite the presence of coconut trees on the
exempted parcels of land, it is still used primarily for raising livestock. The other two parcels of land,
which were known as Limot Land, were used both for coconut and rubber plantations and, therefore, is
covered by the CARL. Respondent appealed before the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture
which ruled that the four parcels of land were subject to the CARL. Respondent, then, appealed to the
Court of Appeals which later affirmed the findings of the MARO. Hence, both the DAR and respondent
SNLABC appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Limot land are under the coverage of CARL

HELD:

Yes, the Limot Land are under the coverage of CARL since it is the actual usage of the land and not its
classification which determines its eligibility for CARL. In Limot land, it is not enough that such land are
only used as seasonal extensions of grazing land. It is land actually devoted to coconut and rubber.
Hence, it cannot be exempted.
106. HACIENDA LUISITA INC. vs. PARC

(GR No. 171101 11/22/2011)

FACTS:

The petition filed by petitioner Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) was dismissed which unanimously voted by the
Supreme Court en banc. The court affirmed with modifications the resolutions made by respondent
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) revoking petitioners Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and
placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order absolute land distribution.
Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the
Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application
of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified
farmworkersbeneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose
the actual land distribution. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately
schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or
practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting,
their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over
their printed names. The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Court decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional.

HELD:

NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is NOT unconstitutional. The Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 since it was not raised at the earliest opportunity. The issue has
been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA
9700. It was clarified that in its decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of
RA 6657, but found that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the
resolution of the issue of constitutionality.
107. DEL ROSARIO vs DEL ROSARIO

(GR No. 181548 06/20/2012)

FACTS:

A parcel of land was formerly tenanted by the spouses Jose Del Rosario and Florentina De Guzman who
had three children, namely Monica, Candido and Gil Del Rosario. After the spouses Del Rosario died,
Monica and Gil agreed that the latter would facilitate the application for an Emancipation Patent in the
name of the former in exchange that one-third of the said land will be ceded to Gil. Upon the issuance of
Emancipation Patent No. 00733146 to respondent Monica, petitioners Candido and Gil claimed that
Monica refused to cede to Gil the one-third portion of the subject land pursuant to their agreement
despite repeated demands. Petitioners, then, filed with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) a complaint against Monica for amendment and partition of the subject land.
Monica contended that their father entrusted to her the cultivation of the subject land, that she was the
one listed in the files of the DAR as the tenant-beneficiary of the subject land and that she was the one
who was paying the amortizations over the same. PARAD, then, ruled in favor of petitioner. Respondent
appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which reversed the
decision. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a petition for revie with the Court of Appeals alleging that
the DARAB erred in ruling that they and Monica are not co-owners of the subject land. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners complaint for amendment and partition is under the jurisdiction of the
PARAD and the DARAB.

HELD:

No, petitioners complaint for amendment and partition is beyond the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the
DARAB. The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is limited only to all agrarian disputes and matters
or incidents involving the implementation of the CARP. In the said case, the complaint essentially sought
the enforcement of the agreement entered into by and between Gil and Monica and the recovery of
petitioners purported hereditary share over the subject land. Absolutely, the said complaint for
amendment and partition does not involve any agrarian dispute, nor does it involve any incident arising
from the implementation of agrarian laws.
108. ROSITA A. MONTANEZ, petitioner vs PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATOR (PARAD) et al,
respondents

G.R. No. 183142 September 17, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner was the owner of two (2) parcels of land with an aggregated land area of 35.5998 hectares,
both located at Negros occidental. In October, 1999, the DRA caused the publication of notice of land
coverage for Negros Occidental, and later, the DAR notified petitioner that her property, to the extent of
32.4257 hectares, has been placed under CARP and offered to compensate her the amount of
P5,592,301.62 based on the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), subject to price
adjustment to conform to the actual area coverage. Albeit petitioner rejected the offer, LBP issued in
her favor a certification of deposit, in cash and in bonds, corresponding to the amount afore stated. DAR
secured form Negros occidental Registry the cancellation of petitioners titles and issuance, in lieu
thereof, titles in the name of the Republic. Later on, the same day, CLOAs were issued. Evidently, such
notations on the CLOAs were erroneous, the aggregated land area stated in the CLOAs being larger than
what was reflected in the titles whence the CLOAS emanate. In an event, said CLOAs were registered in
the name of, and delivered to, individual respondents as CARP beneficiaries. Petitioner forthwith filed a
petition for DARAB for the annulment/cancellation of titles in view of the CLOAs, on the ground of
irregular and anomalous issuance thereof. However, said petition was denied. Therefrom, petitioner
went straight to CA via petition for certiorari under section 54, RA 6657. Public respondents sought the
dismissal on this recourse, on the ground on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. CA, on the
holding that the petitioner is entitled to rectification of technical error referred to above, but the DAR is
the proper office to effect the correction, rendered a decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

HELD:

The petitioner failed to observe the said doctrine. For the purpose of applying the rule on exhaustion,
the remedies available to the petitioner are clearly set out in the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedures,
Under Section 1.6, Rule II, the adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicatecasesinvolving the correction, cancellation, secondary and subsequent issuance of
CLOAs and EPs which are registered with the Land 140 Registration authority. According to the
succeeding Section 2 in relation to Rule XIV, the proper remedy from an adverse final resolution, order,
or resolution on the merits of the adjudicator is an appeal to the DARAB Proper which, among others,
require the filing of a notice of appeal and payment of an appeal fee, and from the decision of the
DARAB proper, an appeal may be taken to the CA pursuant to Rule XV. Given the above perspective, the
CA acted correctly and certainly within its sound discretion when it denied, in its amended decision,
petitioners petition for certiorari to nullify the PARADs decision. Under the grievance procedure set
forth in the DARAB rules of procedure, PARADs decision was appealable to the DARAB proper. The CAs
appellate task comes later-to review the case disposition of the DARAB when properly challenge.
109. AGUSTIN RIVERA, Petitioners vs NEMESIO DAVID, Respondent

G.R. No. 157307 February 27, 2006 (RIVERA vs DAVID)

FACTS:

Respondent Nemesio David, with the other heirs of Consolacion Suarez David, owned in common five
hectares of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47588-R in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Petitioner Agustin Rivera occupied 1.8 hectares of the land. Through counsel, the Davids demanded
that petitioner vacate the property. Rivera refused and instituted a complaint with an application for
injunction to maintain peaceful possession before the PARAB. In his Complaint, Rivera averred that he
was a duly instituted tenant. To support his averment, he submitted a certification from the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office together with the affidavits of two neighbors. Respondent David denied that
Rivera was his familys tenant. According to respondent, Rivera had been squatting on the property
since 1965 and had put up, without the Davids consent, a hollow blocks business and also a piggery in
the property. David sought the dismissal of the case before the PARAB alleging that the PARAB lacked
jurisdiction, considering that the property was not an agricultural land and the case involved the issue of
ownership. The PARAB required the parties to file their position papers. In his position paper, Rivera
averred that he occupied the land, at first, as a tenant; then, as an owner in 1957. He alleged that the
land became his own as disturbance compensation. He prayed that he be declared as a qualified
beneficiary of the agrarian reform program and he be awarded three hectares as mandated by law.
Initially, the PARAB held that David was guilty of laches or estoppel since he and his predecessors-
ininterest had allowed petitioner to retain the property. Further, the PARAB said it had more reasons to
believe that respondents predecessorsin-interest had given the land to the petitioner as the latter had
long occupied the property and developed it. It rendered judgment maintaining petitioner Rivera in
peaceful possession of the property without prejudice to his claim as qualified beneficiary of the
agrarian reform program. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the PARABs finding of estoppel and added
that the action to recover the property was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Respondent David
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged decisions
of both the PARAB and the DARAB are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, including the writs of execution issued
by the PARAB, and another is rendered DISMISSING the respondent Agustin Riveras complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in finding that the PARAB and the DARAB have no jurisdiction
over Riveras complaint

HELD:

The court of appeals erred in finding that the PARAB and the DARAB have no jurisdiction over Riveras
complaint. We note that because of petitioner Riveras death, his heirs are now substituted as
petitioners. At any rate, petitioner had insisted that the DAR had jurisdiction over the case for he had
sufficiently established before the PARAB and the DARAB that he was a tenant of respondents
predecessor-ininterest. He asserted that as tenant of respondents predecessor-in-interest, his tenancy
was intimately related to the issue of ownership and thus his case fell under the jurisdiction of the DAR.
Petitioner further contended that even though the tenancy relation no longer existed at the time the
complaint was filed, the DAR had not been deprived of its jurisdiction since under Section 1(e), Rule II of
the DARAB Rules of Procedure, it has jurisdiction over cases involving the alienation of agricultural lands
covered by the agrarian reform program. He added that the definition of agrarian dispute under Rep.
Act No. 6657 included any controversy relating to compensation of land acquired under the Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants, and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries. In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
Agustin Riveras complaint, not because the DAR had no jurisdiction over the case but because his
complaint lacks merit.
110. DEARBC, Petitioner Vs SANGUNAY, Respondent

G.R. No. 180013 January 31, 2011 (DEARBC vs SANGUNAY)

FACTS:

The property subject of this case is a portion of an entire landholding located in Sankanan, Manolo
Fortich, Bukidnon, with an area of 1,861,922 square meters, more or less, covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. AO-3 [Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)].The said landholding was awarded to
DEARBC, an agrarian cooperative and beneficiary under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Subsequently, DEARBC leased a substantial portion of the land to Del Monte Philippines, Inc.
(DMPI) under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657 through a Growers Contract dated February 21, 1989. On July 7,
1998, DEARBC filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Specific Performance with Damages with
the DARAB Region 10 Office against several respondents, among whom were Jesus Sangunay and Sonny
Labunos. On December 11, 1990, the Adjudicator ruled in favor of DEARB on the ground that the
respondents failed to present proof of ownership over the subject portions of the landholding.
According to the Adjudicator, their bare allegation of possession, even prior to the award of the land to
DEARBC, did not suffice as proof of ownership. Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the DARAB
Central Office before which Sangunay filed his position paper. He claimed that the subject property was
located along the Maninit River and was an accrual deposit. He inherited the land from his father in
1948 and had since been in open, public, adverse, peaceful, actual, physical, and continuous possession
thereof in the concept of an owner. In sum, Sangunay asserted that, as a qualified farmer-beneficiary, he
was entitled to security of tenure under the agrarian reform law and, at any rate; he had already
acquired the land by prescription. In its May 12, 2006 Decision, the DARAB dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. It ruled that the issue of ownership of the subject land classifies the controversy as a regular
case falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts and not as an agrarian dispute. DEARBC challenged
the DARAB Decision in the CA through a petition for review filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. In its Resolution dated June 27, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for procedural infirmities
in its verification, certification and attachments. So, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there existed an agrarian disputes between the parties

HELD:

Clearly, no agrarian dispute exists between the parties. The absence of tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, cannot be overlooked. In this case, no juridical tie of
landownership and tenancy was alleged between DEARBC and Sangunay or Labunos, which would so
categorize the controversy as an agrarian dispute. In fact, the respondents were contending for the
ownership of the same parcels of land. This set of facts clearly comprises an action for recovery of
possession. The claim of being farmerbeneficiaries with right of retention will not divest the regular
courts of jurisdiction, since the pleas of the defendant in a case are immaterial. Although the complaint
filed by DEARBC was similarly denominated as one for recovery of possession, it utterly lacks allegations
to persuade the Court into ruling that the issue encompasses an agrarian dispute. DEARBCs argument
that this case partakes of either a boundary dispute, correction of a CLOA, and ouster of an interloper or
intruder, as found under Section 1, Rule 11 of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, is unavailing.
Nowhere in the complaint was the correction or cancellation of the CLOA prayed for, much less
mentioned. DEARBC merely asserted its sole ownership of the awarded land and no boundary dispute
was even hinted at.
111. Heirs of the late Herman Rey Santos represented by his widow, Arsenia Garcia vda. De Santos vs.
CA (Case No. 111)

G.R. No. 109992 March 7, 2000

FACTS :

The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution by the
MTC of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989 and subsequently sold at public auction on September 20,
1990 with Herman Rey Santos now substituted by his heirs and represented by his widow, Arsenia
Garcia vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50. Private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to
exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary period. On April 1, 1992, respondent filed a
petition for injunction and damages with an application for the issuance of the preliminary injunction
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying that petitioner be
enjoined from preventing private respondent from gathering mango fruits. The Provincial Adjudicator
Erasmo SP. Cruz of DARAB issued an order allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and directing that
the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board. On April 27, 1992, private respondent
filed a petition for consignation before the RTC of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to redeem his land.
The petition was dismissed. Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992, a motion to
intervene with the DARAB claiming that he is affected in his rights and interest as the party who tended
and had the mango trees bear fruits this season. On May 7, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint
for annulment/cancellation of Sale and Document, Redemption with Damages and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan. The DARAB suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonios motion for intervention pending the
resolution of the ownership issue. On July 8, 1992, intervener filed with DARAB, a motion to withdraw
interveners deposited share. The motion was granted and intervener was allowed to withdraw
P87,300.00 out of the P174,650.00 harvest proceeds with the intervener Antonio being recognized as
the duly constituted tenant of the land. The CA affirmed these orders of the DARAB.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the PARAD/ DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even when the question
of ownership is pending resolution with the RTC?

HELD:

Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever
that could have brought this controversy under agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondents petition
for injunction in the first place. The issue on who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be
harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. In as much as the DARAB has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties, necessarily, the motion for
intervention loses the leg on which it stand. The issue, after all can be resolved by the trial court, which
has the jurisdiction over the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing the proceeds with it,
considering that an action has already been filed before it on the specific issue of ownership.
112. Edgardo Santos vs Land Bank of the Philippines, et al (Case No. 112)

G.R. No. 137431 September 7, 2000

FACTS :

Petitioners Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in Agrarian Case No. RTC 94-3206. On August 12, 1997, the
Regional Trial Court sitting as an Agrarian Court fixed the amount of P49,241,876.00 as the just
compensation for the irrigated and unirrigated ricelands owned by the petitioner with areas of 36.4152
and 40.7874 hectares, respectively. The properties were taken by the government pursuant to the Land
Reform Program as provided in Presidential Decree No. 27. A preliminary valuation in the amount of
P3,543,070.66 has been previously released by the Land Bank to the petitioner in cash and bonds. Hence,
the balance of P45,698,805.34 was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be paid in accordance with R.A.
No. 6657. The Land Bank released the amount of P3,621,023.01 in cash, Land Bank No. AR- 0002206 in
the amount of P4,128,024.81 to the petitioner and P948,857.52 to the Clerk of Court as commission fees.
Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution before the Regional Trial Court
praying that payment of the compensation be in the proportion of P8,629,179.36 in bonds and
P32,499,745 in cash. Before the motion could be resolved, petitioner moved to withdraw the same and
instead filed a motion for the release of the balance of the garnished amount in cash or certified check,
claiming that payment of the P41,128,024.81 in Land Bank bonds was not acceptable. Land Bank
opposed the motion contending that the judgment amount had already been satisfied. The Regional
Trial Court issued an Order on March 20, 1998 for the Land Bank to release the balance of
P41,128,024.81 from the garnished amount in cash or certified check. The Land Bank moved for
reconsideration. Petitioner on the other hand, filed a Motion to hold the Land Bank in contempt for its
refusal to release the balance of the garnished amount in cash or certified check. Respondent Regional
Court was presided over by a new judge who resolved the two motions in an Order dated April 24, 1998.
The new judge further ruled that by implication, both the Order dated March 20, 1997 and the Order
dated December 22, 1997 should be deemed reconsidered. The CA upheld the questioned April 24, 1998
Order of the Trial Court.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the basis of the determination of how much should be paid in cash and how much
should be paid in bonds. And in relation thereto, whether the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Villegas
Llaguno was proper?

HELD :

The April 24, 1998 Order was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 judgment which had
become final and executory. The reason is that the Order did not revise, correct, or alter the Decision.
Rather, the Order iterated and made clear the essence of the final judgment. It is clear from the August
12, 1997 judgment that the compensation was to be paid in the manner provided by RA 6657." Pursuant
to Section 18 of the same law, payment was to be in cash and bonds. Respondent bank was obliged to
follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution
and the Notice of Garnishment ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the
manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash
because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final judgment, to which
execution must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner demands, is not compatible with such judgment.
Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the final judgment
decrees payment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in conjunction with R.A. No.
6657. Since respondent bank had already given petitioner the entire adjudged amount in the required
proportion of cash and bonds, it must be deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule 39.
113. Jose Luis Ros, et al vs. DAR, et al (Case No. 113)

G.R. No. 132477 August 31, 2005

FACTS :

Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. By
virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municiapl Council of Balamban, Cebu, these lands
were reclassified as industrial lands. On April 3, 1995, the Provincial Board of Cebu approved Balambans
land use plan and adopted Balambans Municipal Ordninance No. 101. Petitioners secured all the
necessary permits and appropriate government certifications for the development of the subject lands,
as an industrial park. Petitioner Matthias Mendezona received a letter from Mr. Jose Llanes , Director of
the DAR Regional Office for Region 7, informing him that the DAR was disallowing the conversion of the
subject lands for industrial use and directed him to cease and desist from developing such lands.
Petitioners filed with the RTC of Toledo City a complaint for injunction with application for TRO and a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction but was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petioners then a filed a petition
for Review on Certiorari with TRO and WPI. This court RTC referred the petition to the CA. Petitioner
moved for a reconsideration of the said resolution but the same was denied. The CA affirmed the order
of dismissal issued by the RTC and the motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the DAR has the authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agriculture lands to
industrial uses.

HELD :

Yes. It is being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR. The authority of the
DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to nonagricultural uses has
not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. The Code explicitly provides that
nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A.
No. 6657. Section 5 (i) of E.O. No. 129-A, series of 1987, vests in DAR, exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and
other land uses. If the lad sought to be reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not distributed to
agrarian reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from DAR is necessary in order for the
reclassification to become effective as such case would not fall within the DARs conversion authority.
Wherefore, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC
of Toledo City is affirmed.
114. A CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) vs THE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010

FACTS :

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, entitled "Omnibus
Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to NonAgricultural Uses," which
consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. Subsequently, on 30
March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled "Revised Rules and
Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Nonagricultural Uses," amending and updating
the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit:
(1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural
purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and
fishpond the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized;
and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other nonagricultural uses on or after
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160
and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses. On 28 February 2002,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled
"2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and
DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02
covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural
use.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, which seek to regulate reclassified lands is in
violation of Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657.

HELD:

The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation of Sec. 65 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-awarded lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or
by way of Presidential Proclamations on or after 15 June 1988 is specious. In Department of Justice
Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, the DARs express power over land use conversion provided for under
Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have,
after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality
has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes. Any reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial
property, on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be cleared by
the DAR. Hence, the petition is dismissed.
115. APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC. vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164195 February 6, 2007

FACTS:

Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered owners of five parcels of
agricultural lands located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao Province. On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI
voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of land to the government. After the initial processing at the
DAR of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) application of AFC and HPI, it was referred to the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) for initial valuation. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI received separately a notice
of land acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the properties has been placed at
P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per hectare while HPIs properties were valued at P164,478,178.14. Both
AFC and HPI considered the valuations unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the
properties. On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination of just
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the lapse of more than three years
from the filing of the complaints, the DARAB failed and refused to render a decision on the valuation of
the land. Hence, two complaints for determination and payment of just compensation were filed by AFC
and HPI before Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City (acting as a Special Agrarian
Court), which were subsequently consolidated. The Special Agrarian Court determined judiciously and
fixed the just compensation for the 1,388.6027 hectares of lands and its improvements owned by the
plaintiffs. LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 5 October 2001 mainly on the ground that the trial
court based its valuation on the value of residential and industrial lands in the area forgetting that the
lands involved are agricultural. In an Order dated 5 December 2001, the trial court modified its decision.
LBP filed a Notice of Appeal dated 27 December 2001. The same was given due course in the Order of
the RTC dated 15 May 2002. In the same Order, the RTC set aside its Order dated 5 December 2001
granting execution pending appeal. This was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 12 February
2003. LBP filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 4 November 2002 and
12 February 2003 orders of the trial court. Court of Appeals found the petition of LBP meritorious. AFC
and HPI filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution
dated 21 June 2004. Hence this appeal has reached the Supreme Court.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the trial courts valuation of the subject landholdings has incorporated irrelevant or
immaterial factors and forgot that the lands involved are agricultural in nature.

HELD :

The plaintiffs properties are agricultural; however, it is simply beyond dispute that in going about the
task of appraising real properties, "all the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings,
its improvements and capabilities, may be shown and considered in estimating its value. Record shows
that all weather-roads network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, and among numerous
other improvements are permanently in place and not just a measly, but substantial amounts
investments have been infused. To exclude these permanent improvements in rendering its valuation of
said properties would certainly be less than fair. The Supreme Court affirmed the just compensation
awarded by the trial court.
116. ESTATE OF PASTOR M. SAMSON, represented by his heir ROLANDO B. SAMSON vs MERCEDES R.
SUSANO and NORBERTO R. SUSANO

G.R. No. 179024 May 30, 2011

FACTS :

Pastor M. Samson owned a 1.0138-hectare parcel of land located in Bagumbong, Caloocan City. Pastor
was approached by his friend Macario Susano (Macario) who asked for permission to occupy a portion
of the lot to build a house for his family. Since Pastor was godfather to one of Macarios children, Pastor
acceded to Macarios request. Macario and his family occupied 620 square meters of the lot and
devoted the rest of the land to palay cultivation. Macarios wife, Mercedes R. Susano, and their son,
Norberto R. Susano, insist that while no agricultural leasehold contract was executed by Pastor and
Macario, Macario religiously paid 15 cavans of palay per agricultural year to Pastor, which rent was
reduced by Pastor in 1986 to 8 cavans of palay per agricultural year. In 1973, Pastor subdivided the lot
into three portions. In separate instances, portions of these lots were subsequently sold without
Macarios knowledge. On November 1990, Macario received a letter from Pastors lawyer demanding
that he vacate the property within twenty (20) days. Aggrieved, Macario filed a complaint against Pastor
before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Valenzuela. On February 9, 1993, Macario died
and was succeeded by respondents in the possession and cultivation of the subject landholding. The
respondents maintained that they are the predecessor-in-interest of Macario, who is a bona fide
agricultural tenant; hence, they are entitled to the rights of pre-emption and redemption. And having
validly exercised their right of redemption through the deposit of the redemption price with the DAR,
they are allegedly now the owners of the subject land. That they have such right of redemption is
likewise due to the fact that the subject land is covered by the OLT Program.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the lot in this instant case was subject to the OLT program.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the subject land cannot be subject to the OLT program of P.D. No. 27 for
two reasons: first, the subject land is less than seven hectares; and second, respondents failed to show
that Pastor owned other agricultural lands in excess of seven hectares or urban land from which he
derived adequate income, as required by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. Moreover, the DAR
Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 is
explicit: Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or less shall not be covered by Operation
Land Transfer. The relation of the land owner and tenant-farmers in these areas shall be leasehold xxx