Secs.
44 and 87, Judiciary Act (g) Over all crimes and offenses
of 1948 (Rep. Act No. 296)
Section 44. Original
jurisdiction. - Courts of First
Instance shall have original
jurisdiction:
(a) In all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigation is
not capable of pecuniary
estimation
(b) In all civil actions which
involve the title to or
possession of real property, or
any interest therein, or the
legality of any tax, impost or
assessment, except actions of
forcible entry into and detainer
of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is
conferred by this Act upon
justice of the peace courts and
municipal courts;
(c) In all cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest,
or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to more
than two thousand pesos;
(d) In all actions in admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction,
irrespective of the value of the
property in controversy or the
amount of the demand;
(e) In all matters of probate,
both of testate and intestate
estates, appointment of
guardians, trustees and
receivers, and in all actions for
annulment of marriage, and in
all such special cases and
proceedings as are not
otherwise provided for;
(f) In all criminal cases in
which the penalty provided by
law is imprisonment for more
than six months, or a fine of
more than two hundred pesos;
(c) All criminal cases arising
committed on the high seas or under the laws relating to:
beyond the jurisdiction of any
country, or within any of the (1) Gambling and management
navigable waters of the or operation of lotteries;
Philippines, on board a ship or
water craft of any kind (2) Assaults where the intent to
registered or licensed in the kill is not charged or evident
Philippines in accordance with upon the trial;
the laws thereof. The
jurisdiction herein conferred (3) Larceny, embezzlement and
may be exercised by the Court estafa where the amount of
of First Instance in any money or property stolen,
province into which the ship or embezzled, or otherwise
water craft upon which the involved, does not exceed the
crime or offense was committed sum or value of two hundred
shall come after the pesos;
commission thereof: Provided,
That the court first lawfully (4) Sale of intoxicating liquors;
taking cognizance thereof shall
have jurisdiction of the same to
(5) Falsely impersonating an
the exclusion of all other courts
officer;
in the Philippines; and
(6) Malicious mischief;
(h) Said courts and their judges,
or any of them, shall have the
power to issue writs of (7) Trespass on Government or
private property; and
injunction, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo
(8) Threatening to take human
warranto and habeas corpus in
life
their respective provinces and
districts, in the manner
provided in the Rules of Court. Said justices of the peace and
judges of municipal courts may
also conduct preliminary
Section 87. Original
investigations for any offense
jurisdiction to try criminal
alleged to have been committed
cases. - Justices of the peace
within their respective
and judges of municipal courts
of chartered cities shall have municipalities and cities,
without regard to the limits of
original jurisdiction over:
punishment, and may release,
or commit and bind over any
(a) All violations of municipal
person charged with such
or city ordinances committed
offense to secure his
within their respective
appearance before the proper
territorial jurisdictions;
court.
(b) All offenses in which the
penalty provided by law is Justices of the peace in the
imprisonment for not more than capitals of provinces may, by
assignment of the respective
six months, or a fine of not
district judge in each case, have
more than two hundred pesos,
like jurisdiction as the Court of
or both such fine and
First Instance to try parties
imprisonment;
charged with an offense
committed within the province
in which the penalty provided
by law does not exceed
imprisonment for two years and
four months, or a fine of two
thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, and, in
the absence of the district
judge, shall have like
jurisdiction within the province
as the Court of First Instance to
hear applications for bail.
o Secs. 20 and 32 (2\, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (1980), as
Section 20. Jurisdiction in
criminal cases. Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter
Section 32. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in criminal cases. Except in
cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all violations
of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their
respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature,
value, or amount
thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses
involving damage to property
through criminal negligence
they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof. (as
amended by R.A, No. 7691)
Dazon v. Yap, G.R. No.
157095,15 January 2010
MA. LUISA G. DAZON,
PETITIONER, VS.
KENNETH Y. YAP AND
PEOPLE OF THE
The primordial function of the
Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) is
the regulation of the real estate
trade and business. Though the
agency's jurisdiction has been
expanded by law, it has not
grown to the extent of
encompassing the conviction
and punishment of criminals.
The present Petition for Review
on Certiorari assails the Orders
of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City,
Branch 54 dated October 2,
2002 and January 13,2003,
which granted the Motion to
Withdraw Information filed by
the public prosecutor and
denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by
petitioner, respectively.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Kenneth Y. Yap
was the president of Primetown
Property Group, Inc.,
(Primetown) the developer of
Kiener Hills Mactan
Condominium, a low-rise
condominium project. In
November 1996, petitioner Ma.
Luisa G. Dazon entered into a
contract[1] with Primetown for
the purchase of Unit No. C-108
of the said condominium
project. Petitioner made a
downpayment and several
installment payments, totaling
P1,114,274.30.[2] Primetown,
however, failed to finish the
condominium project. Thus, on
March 22, 1999, petitioner
demanded for the refund of her
payments from Primetown,
pursuant to Section 23[3] of
Presidential Decree (PD) No.
957 (1976), otherwise known as
"The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers'
Protective Decree". Primetown
failed to refund petitioner's
payments.
On October 26,2000,
[4]
petitioner filed a criminal
complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu
City against respondent as
president of Primetown for
violation of Section 23 in
relation to Section 39[5] of PD
957. Subsequently, after a
finding of probable cause, an
Information[6] was filed with the
RTC of Lapu-Lapu City
docketed as Criminal Case No.
015331-L.
Meanwhile, respondent, in
connection with the resolution
finding probable cause filed a
Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 14,2002, the DOJ
rendered a Resolution[8]ordering
the trial prosecutor to cause the
withdrawal of the Information.
Hence, the prosecutor filed a
Motion to Withdraw
Information[9] with the RTC.
The RTC disposed of the matter
as follows:
Wherefore, in view of the
foregoing, the Motion to
Withdraw Information filed by
[the] public prosecutor is
hereby granted. Accordingly,
the information' filed against
the herein accused is ordered
withdrawn and to be
transmitted back to the City
Prosecutor's Office of Lapu-
Lapu City.
Furnish copies of this order to
Prosecutor Rubi, Attys. Valdez
and Pangan.
[10]
SO ORDERED. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was
denied.[11]
Issue
Hence, the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari raising
the following issue: ''Whether
or not a regional trial court has
jurisdiction over a criminal
action arising from violation of
PD 957".[12]
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner contends that
jurisdiction is conferred by law
and that there is no law
expressly vesting on the
HLUKB exclusive jurisdiction
over criminal actions arising
from violations of PD 957.
Respondent's Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand,
contends that there is no error
of law involved in this case and
that petitioner failed to give due
regard to the hierarchy of courts
by filing the present petition
directly with the Supreme
Court instead of with the Court
of Appeals. He further argues
that the real issue is not of
jurisdiction but the existence of
probable cause. The Secretary
of Justice, according to
respondent, found no probable
cause to warrant the filing of
the Information, hence its
directive to cause the
withdrawal of the Information.
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
The DOJ Resolution dated
June
14, 2002 which ordered the
withdrawal of the information
was based on the finding that
the HLURB, and not the
regular court, has jurisdiction
over the case.
Both the respondent[13] and the
OSG[14] agree with the
petitioner that the regular courts
and not the HLURB have
jurisdiction over the criminal
aspect of PD 957. The parties,
however, disagree on the basis
of the directive of the DOJ for
the withdrawal of the
Information. Was it, as argued
by petitioner, lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC or was
it, as argued by respondent,
lack of probable cause? We
perused the DOJ Resolution
dated June 14, 2002 and we
find that the basis of the
resolution was, not that there
was lack of probable cause but,
the finding that it is the
HLURB that has jurisdiction
over Hie case. Pertinent
portions of the said DOJ
Resolution provide:
The petition is impressed with
merit.
A perusal of the allegations in
the complaint-affidavit would
show complainant's grievance
against respondent was the
failure of the latter's firm to
refund the payments she made
for one of the units in the
aborted Mactan condominium
project in the total amount of
P1,114,274.30.
As early as in the case of Solid
Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177
SCRA 72, the Supreme Court
had ruled that the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) has exclusive
jurisdiction over cases
involving real estate business
and practices under PD 957.
This ruling is reiterated in
several subsequent cases, to
name a few of them, Union
Bank of the Philippines-versus-
HLURB, G.R. No. 953364,
June 29, 1992; C.T. Torres
Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191
SCRA 286; Villaflor vs. Court
of Appeals, 280 SCRA 297;
Marina Properties Coip. vs.
Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA
273; and Raet vs. Court of
Appeals, 295 SCRA 677. Of
significant relevance is the
following pronouncement of
the Supreme Court in Raet vs.
Court of Appeals (supra), as
follows:
xxx The contention has merit.
The decision in the ejectment
suit is conclusive only on the
question of possession of the
subject premises. It does not
settle the principal question
involved in the present case,
namely, whether there was
perfected contract of sale
between petitioners and private
respondent PVDHC involving
the units in question. Under
8(100) of E.O. No. 648 dated
February 7, 1981, as amended
by E.O. No. 90 dated December
17, 1986 this question is for the
HLURB to decide. The said
provision of law gives that
agency the power to
Hear and decide cases of
unsound real estate business
practices; claims involving
refijnd filed against project
owners, developers, dealers,
brokers, or salesmen; and cases
of specific performance.
This jurisdiction of the HLURB
is exclusive. It has been held to
extend to the determination of
the question whether there is a
perfected contract of sale
between condominium buyers
and [the] developer x x x.
In fine, the Rule of Law
dictates that we should yield to
this judicial declaration
upholding the jurisdiction of
the HLURB over cases of this
nature.
Hence, there is a need for the
Court to make a definite ruling
on a question of law - the
matter of jurisdiction over the
criminal aspect of PD 957.
Jurisdiction over criminal
actions
arising from violations of PD
957
is vested in the regular courts.
Jurisdiction is" conferred by
law and determined by the
material averments in the
complaint as well as the
character of the relief sought.15
The scope and limitation of the
jurisdiction of the HLURB are
well-defined.'6 Its precusor, the
National Housing Authority
(NHA),17 was vested under PD
957 with exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the real estate trade
and business,18 specifically the
registration of subdivision or
condominium projects and
dealers, brokers and salesmen
of subdivision lots or
condominium units, issuance
and suspension of license to
sell; and revocation of
registration certificate and
license to sell. Its jurisdiction
was later expanded under PD
1344 (1978) to include
adjudication of certain cases, to
wit:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its
functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided
for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing
Authority shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the
following nature:
a) Unsound real estate business
practices;
b) Claims involving refund and
any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and
c) Cases involving specific
performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman. (Italics supplied)
It is a settled rule of statutory
construction that the express
mention of one thing in the law
means the exclusion of others
not expressly mentioned. This
rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius[19]. Where a
statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction,
be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that
the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in
a statute had the intention been
not to restrict its meaning and
to confine its terms to statute
had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to
confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.
[20]
Noticeably, cases that are
criminal in nature are not
mentioned in the enumeration
quoted above. The primordial
function of the HLURB, after
all, is the regulation of the real
estate trade and business and
not the conviction and
punishment of criminals. "It
may be conceded that the
legislature may confer on
administrative boards or bodies
quasi-judicial powers involving
the exercise of judgment and
discretion, as incident to the
performance of administrative
functions. But in so doing, the
legislature must state its
intention in express terms that
would leave no doubt, as even
such quasi-judicial prerogatives
must be limited, if they are to
be valid, only to those
incidental to or in connection
with the performance
of administrative duties, which
do not amount to conferment of
jurisdiction over a matter
exclusively vested in the
courts".[21]
Administrative agencies being
tribunals of limited jurisdiction
can only wield such powers as
are specifically granted to them
by their enabling statutes. PD
957 makes the following
specific grant of powers to the
NHA (now HLURB) for the
imposition
of administrative fines, and it
also mentions penalties for
criminal cases, to wit:
Sec. 38. Administrative
Fines.- The Authority may
prescribe and impose fines not
exceeding ten thousand pesos
for violations of the provisions
of this Decree or any rule or
regulation thereunder. Fines
shall be payable to the
Authority and enforceable
through writs of execution in
accordance with the provisions
of the Rules of Court (Italics
supplied)

Sec. 39. Penalties.- Any person
who shall violate any of the
provisions of this Decree and/or
any rule or regulation that may
be issued pursuant to this
Decree shall, upon conviction,
be punished by a fine of not
more than twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos and/or
imprisonment of not more than
ten years: Provided, That in the
case of corporations,
partnership, cooperatives, or
associations, the President,
Manager or Administrator or
the person who has charge of
the administration of the
business shall be criminally
responsible for any violation of
this/Decree and/or the rules and
regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto,
Having limited, under Section
38 of PD 957, the grant of
power to the former NHA, now
HLURB, over the imposition of
fines to those which do not
exceed ten thousand pesos, it is
clear that the power in relation
to criminal liability mentioned
in the immediately succeeding
provision, to impose, upon
conviction, fines above ten
thousand pesos
and/or imprisonment, was not
conferred on it. Section 39,
unlike Section 38,
conspicuously does not state
that it is the MIA that may
impose the punishment
specified therein.
Not having been specifically
conferred with power to hear
and decide cases which are
criminal in nature, as well as to
impose penalties therefor, we
find that the HLURB has no
jurisdiction over criminal
actions arising from violations
of PD 957.
On the other hand, BP Big. 129
states:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in
Criminal Cases. - Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter.
Based on the above-quoted
provision, it is the RTC that has
jurisdiction over criminal cases
arising from violations of PD
957.
In the present case, the
affidavit-complaint[23] alleges
the violation of Section 23
oFTD 957 and asks for the
institution of a criminal action
against respondent Yap, as
President of Primetown. The
Office of the City Prosecutor
found probable cause for the
filing of an'Information for the
subject offense. The DOJ made
no reversal of such finding of
probable cause. Instead, it
directed the withdrawal of the
information on the erroneous
premise that it is the HLURB
which has jurisdiction over the
case. However, as above-
discussed, and contrary to the
resolution of the Secretary of
Justice, it is not the HLURB but
the RTC that has jurisdiction to
hear the said criminal action.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed
October 2, 2002 and January
13, 2003 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Lapu-
Lapu City, Branch 54,
are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said Court
is DIRECTED to proceed with
the arraignment of the
respondent and to hear the case
with dispatch.
o Palana v. People, G.R. No.
L49995,28 September 2O07
ISIDRO PABLITO M.
PALANA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES Respondent.
For review is the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 21879 dated
September 17, 2001,1 affirming
the September 23, 1997
Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch
63, in Criminal Case No. 91-
5617 convicting petitioner
Isidro Pablito Palana with
violation of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known
as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
On August 19, 1991, petitioner
was charged with violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information
which reads as follows:
That on or about September
1987, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly make or draw and
issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply
on account or for the value the
check described below:
Check 326317P
:
No. R
Drawn : Asian
Against Savings
Bank
 Paseo de
Roxas
Branch
In the
590,000
amount :
.00
of
Postdat February
: for the loan, thereby rejecting
ed 15, 1988
Payabl Dr. Alex
:
e to B. Carlos
said accused well knowing that
at the time of issue, he did not
have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for
the payment in full of the face
amount of such check when
presented for payment within
(90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for the
reason Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds and despite
receipt of notice of such
dishonor, the accused failed to
pay said payee the face amount
of said check or make
arrangement for full payment
within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice.2
On January 30, 1992, the case
was archived due to petitioners
non-apprehension despite the
issuance of a warrant for his
arrest.3 On June 27, 1995, the
warrant of arrest was recalled
and set aside4 after petitioner
posted the required bail. He
was arraigned on July 25, 1995
when he pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged.5
Private complainant Alex B.
Carlos testified that sometime
in September 1987, petitioner
and his wife borrowed money
from him in the amount of
590,000.00. To secure the
payment of the loan, petitioner
issued a postdated check for the
same amount in favor of the
complainant.6 However, when
the check was presented for
payment, it was dishonored by
the bank for insufficiency of
funds. Subsequent demand
notwithstanding, petitioner
failed to make good the said
dishonored check.7
Petitioner alleged that the
amounts given to him by
private complainant was an
investment by the latter who
was his business partner. He
argued that the subject check
was not issued in September
1987 to guarantee the payment
of a loan since his checking
account was opened only on
December 1, 1987.8 He claimed
that private complainant cajoled
him to issue a check in his
favor allegedly to be shown to a
textile supplier who would
provide the partnership with the
necessary raw materials.
Petitioner alleged that when the
check was issued sometime in
February 1988,9 complainant
knew that the same was not
funded.10
After trial on the merits, the
Regional Trial Court rendered
on September 23, 1997 a
Decision11 finding petitioner
guilty as charged, the
dispositive portion of which
reads:
Wherefore, this court finds the
accused Isidro Pablito M.
Palana guilty as charged and
sentences him to a prison term
of Six (6) months and to
indemnify the private
complainant the sum of
590,000.00 plus legal interest
from filing of this case until full
payment.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was
dismissed by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the
trial courts decision in toto.12
Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found that the
check was issued as a guaranty
petitioners "investment
theory". In ruling against the
existence of a partnership
between them, the trial court
noted that the so-called
partnership venture, Palanas
General Merchandising, was
registered on December 1, 1987
only in the name of
petitioner.13 The Court of
Appeals also held that the act of
lending money does not
necessarily amount to an
investment of capital.
Hence, the instant petition
raising the following issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDING OF THE LOWER
COURT DISREGARDING
THE DEFENSE OF THE
ACCUSED THAT THE
ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT ASIAN BANK
CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A
CONSIDERATION OR FOR
VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED
WAS ONLY TRICKED BY
THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE
THE SAID CHECK AS A
MEANS OF BINDING THE
ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS
INVESTMENT IN THE
PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS
THEN SUFFERING FROM
BUSINESS REVERSALS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT AT THE TIME
THE ACCUSED WAS
ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25,
1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT WAS ALREADY IN
EFFECT.14
The issues to be resolved are:
1) whether petitioner was guilty
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and
2) whether the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the
case.
Petitioners argument that it is
the Metropolitan Trial Court
and not the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction
over the case pursuant to R.A.
7691 is without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that
jurisdiction to try a criminal
action is determined by the law
in force at the time of
the institution of the
action15 and not during the
arraignment of the accused. The
Information charging petitioner
with violation of B.P. Blg. 22
was filed on August 19, 1991.
At that time, the governing law
determinative of jurisdiction is
B.P. Blg. 12916 which provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in
criminal cases. Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance by the latter.
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Criminal Cases. Except in
cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts and
the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
1 (2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment
of not exceeding four years
and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand
pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of
other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to
property through criminal
negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction
where the imposable fine does
not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
punishable with imprisonment
of not less than 30 days but not
more than one year or by a fine
of not less than but not more
than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no
case exceed 200,000.00, or
both fine and imprisonment17 at
the discretion of the court. In
the present case, the fine
imposable is 200,000.00
hence, the Regional Trial Court
properly acquired jurisdiction
over the case.18 The
Metropolitan Trial Court could
not acquire jurisdiction over the
criminal action because its
jurisdiction is only for offenses
punishable with a fine of not
more than 4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of
B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
and the Metropolitan Trial
Court"19 on June 15, 1994
cannot divest the Regional Trial
Court of jurisdiction over
petitioners case. Where a court
has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final
determination of the cause is
not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal
unless the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to
operate on actions pending
before its enactment. Indeed,
R.A. No. 7691 contains
retroactive provisions.
However, these only apply to
civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage.
Neither from an express
proviso nor by implication can
it be construed that R.A. No.
7691 has retroactive application
to criminal cases pending or
decided by the Regional Trial
Courts prior to its
effectivity.20 The jurisdiction of
the RTC over the case attached
upon the commencement of the
action by the filing of the
Information and could not be
ousted by the passage of R.A.
No. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts,
the application of which to
criminal cases is prospective in
nature.21
After a careful review of the
records, this Court sustains
petitioners conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The
elements of the offense
penalized under B.P. Blg. 22
are as follows: (1) the accused
makes, draws, or issues any
check to apply on account or
for value; (2) the accused
knows at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the check
is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
Each element of the offense
was duly proven by the
prosecution. Petitioner admitted
that at the time he issued the
subject check, he knew that he
does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee
bank for payment of such
check. Consequently, when the
check was presented for
payment, it was dishonored by
the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds.
Thereafter, he received demand
letters to pay the amount of the
check from private complainant
but he did not comply with it.22
In ruling that the amount of the
check was for consideration or
value, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals upheld
private complainants claim that
the check was issued as a
guaranty for the loan and
rejected petitioners
"investment theory". The issue
as to whether the amount of the
subject check represents the
amount of the money loaned by
private complainant to
petitioner or as an investment in
the alleged partnership is a
factual question involving the
credibility of witnesses. Where
the issue is one of credibility,
the appellate court will not
generally disturb the findings of
the lower court considering that
it is in a better position to settle
that issue since it had the
advantage of hearing the
witnesses and observing their
conduct during the trial, which
circumstances carry great
weight in assessing their
credibility. In the present case,
we see no reason to reverse the
finding of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of
Appeals that the amount of the
subject check was a loan and
not an investment.23
Upon issuance of a check, in
the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it is presumed that the
same was issued for valuable
consideration, which may
consist either in some right,
interest, profit or benefit
accruing to the party who
makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or
some responsibility, to act, or
labor, or service given, suffered
or undertaken by the other side.
Since it was established that
petitioner received money from
private complainant in various
amounts,24 petitioner cannot
now claim that the checks were
not issued for value.25
The allegation that the check
was intended to be shown to
potential suppliers is not a valid
defense. In Cueme v.
People,26 the Court held thus:
The allegation of petitioner that
the checks were merely
intended to be shown to
prospective investors of her
corporation is, to say the least,
not a defense. The gravamen of
the offense punished under B.P.
Blg. 22 is the act of making or
issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon
its presentment for payment.
The law has made the mere act
of issuing a bad check malum
prohibitum, an act proscribed
by the legislature for being
deemed pernicious and inimical
to public welfare. Considering
the rule in mala prohibita cases,
the only inquiry is whether the
law has been breached.
Criminal intent becomes
unnecessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public
policy, and the defenses of good
faith and absence of criminal
intent are unavailing.
The checks issued, even
assuming they were not
intended to be encashed or
deposited in a bank, produce
the same effect as ordinary
checks. What the law punishes
is the issuance of a rubber
check itself and not the purpose
for which the check was issued
nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. This is
not without good reasons. To
determine the purpose as well
as the terms and conditions for
which checks are issued will
greatly erode the faith the
public reposes in the stability
and commercial value of
checks as currency substitutes,
and bring about havoc in the
trading and banking
communities. Besides, the law
does not make any distinction
as to the kind of checks which
are the subject of its provisions,
hence, no such distinction can
be made by means of
interpretation or application.
What is important is the fact
that petitioner deliberately
issued the checks in question
and those checks were
dishonored upon presentment
for payment.
Hence, the agreement
surrounding the issuance of a
check is irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of
the petitioner.27
The alleged inconsistency in
the date of issuance of the
subject check is likewise
immaterial.1wphi1 Issuance,
as defined under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, is the first
delivery of the check.28 In the
case at bar, the Information
alleged that the check was
postdated February 15, 1988
although issued in or about
September 1987. During trial,
petitioner testified that the
Checking Account was opened
only on December 1, 1987 and
that the check was issued
sometime in February 1988.
The rule is that a variance
between the allegation in the
information and proof adduced
during trial shall be fatal to the
criminal case if it is material
and prejudicial to the accused
so much so that it affects his
substantial rights.29 In a Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
prosecution for violation of B.P.
22, the time of the issuance of
the subject check is material
since it forms part of the second
element of the offense that at
the time of its issuance,
petitioner knew of the
insufficiency of funds. However,
it cannot be said that petitioner
was prejudiced by such
variance nor was surprised by
it. Records show that petitioner
knew at the time he issued the
check that he does not have
sufficient funds in the bank to
cover the amount of the check.
Yet, he proceeded to issue the
same claiming that the same
would only be shown to
prospective suppliers, a defense imprisonment, petitioner is
which is not valid. ordered to pay a fine of
200,000.00.
Moreover, there is no merit in
petitioners allegation that o Morales v. Court of Appeals,
private complainant knew that G.R. No' 126623,12
the check is not funded. Both
the trial court and the Court of ERNESTO MORALES y
Appeals found that the subject DELA CRUZ, petitioner,
check was issued as guaranty vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
for payment of the loan hence, HON. ALFREDO J.
was intended to apply for GUSTILO, as Presiding
account or for value. As such, it Judge of RTC, Pasay City,
was incumbent upon petitioner Branch 116 and PEOPLE OF
to see to it that the check is THE
duly covered when presented
for payment. The key issue in this case is
whether, in light of R.A. No.
Pursuant to Supreme Court 7659 1 as interpreted in People
Administrative Circular No. 12- v. Simon, 2 and R.A. No.
2000, as clarified by 7691, 3 Regional Trial Courts
Administrative Circular No. 13- have jurisdiction over
2001, the alternative penalty of violations of R.A. No. 6425,
fine may be imposed in lieu of otherwise known as the
imprisonment considering that Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
the prosecution failed to prove as amended, when the
or allege that petitioner is not a imposable penalty is not more
first-time offender.30 Hence, in than six (6) years.
lieu of imprisonment, a fine of
200,000.00 shall be imposed The petitioner was charged with
upon petitioner.31 the violation of Section 15 in
relation to Section 20 of R.A.
WHEREFORE, the assailed No. 6425, as amended by R.A.
decision of the Court of No. 7659, in an information
filed before the Regional Trial
21879 dated September 17, Court (RTC) of Pasay City on
2001, finding petitioner 13 March 1996. The accusatory
ISIDRO PABLITO M. portion of the said information
PALANA guilty of violating reads as follows:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is
AFFIRMED with That on or about the 11th day of
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is March 1996, in Pasay, Metro
ordered to pay private Manila, Philippines, and within
complainant the amount of the jurisdiction of this
590,000.00, representing the Honorable Court, the above-
value of the check, with six named accused, Ernesto
(6%) percent interest from date Morales y De la Cruz, without
of filing of the Information authority of law, did then and
until the finality of the decision, there wilfully, unlawfully and
the amount of which, inclusive feloniously sell and deliver to
of the interest, is subject to another 0.4587 grams of
twelve percent (12%) interest, Metamphetamine
from finality of the decision Hydrochloride (shabu), a
until fully paid. In lieu of regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 96-8443 and
raffled to Branch 116 of the
said court.
Upon his arraignment, the
petitioner entered a plea of not
guilty. 5 Subsequently, on 30
April 1996, the petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss6 on the
ground that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to try the case
considering that pursuant to
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659 as
construed in People v.
7
Simon, the penalty imposable
for the offense charged should
not exceed prision
correccional or six (6) years
and under R.A. No. 7691 it is
the Metropolitan Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the
case.
In its Order 8 of 9 May 1996,
the RTC denied the motion. It
held:
It is true that under the
aforementioned provision,
cases punishable with penalties
of not more than six (6) years
are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts. However, the
exceptions are "cases falling
within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. . ." Under Section
39 of Republic Act No. 6425,
the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, the Court of First
Instance now the Regional Trial
Court and the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court,
which no longer exist, "shall
have concurrent original
jurisdiction over all cases
involving offenses punishable
under this Act." It is therefore
clear that this case, which is a
violation of Republic Act No.
6425, although punishable by a
penalty of less than six (6)
years, falls within the
jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court.
His motion for the
9
reconsideration of the order
having been denied, 10 the
petitioner filed with respondent
Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. 11 The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
40670.
In its Comment 12 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 40670, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) agreed
with the petitioner that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to try the
criminal case. It, however,
asserted that the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction
over the special civil action
for certiorari, as the same
involved only the question of
jurisdiction of an inferior court,
hence, cognizable by the
Supreme Court alone pursuant
to Section 9 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, in connection with
Section 5(2)(c), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution and
Section 17 of Republic Act No.
5440. The OSG then
recommended that the case be
elevated to the Supreme Court
for disposition, or that the
Court of Appeals grant the
petition and set aside the
challenged order of the RTC
should it rule that it had
jurisdiction over petition.
In its Resolution 13 of 8 August
1996, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of
jurisdiction over the action.
Explaining its ruling, it
declared:
In his Comment to the petition,
the Solicitor General, inter alia,
contended that this Court has
no jurisdiction over the petition
for it properly falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
We fully agree.
Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court
shall have the following
powers; . . .
(2) Review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of
lower courts in: . . .
(c) All cases in which the
jurisdiction of any lower court
is in issue. . . .
Section 17 of R.A. 5446
otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 says that
the Supreme Court has
exclusive jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on certiorari final
judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in all cases in
which the jurisdiction of any
inferior court is on issue. It is
hereby stressed that the issue in
the petition at bench is purely a
question of jurisdiction which
is resolvable on the basis of the
records.
After the denial 14 on 13
September 1996 of his motion
for reconsideration, 15 the
petitioner came to this Court
via this petition for review
wider Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising the following
issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS HAS
JURISDICTION TO
ENTERTAIN A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT WHERE THE ISSUE
IS THE JURISDICTION OF
RESPOND NT RTC JUDGE
TO TRY THE ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425;
AND.
II. WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT RTC
JUDGE/COURT HAS
JURISDICTION TO TRY
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SECTION 15, IN RELATION
TO SECTION 20, ART. III OF
R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED,
INVOLVING ONLY 0.4587
GRAMS OF SHABU.
As to the first, the petitioner
insists that respondent Court of
Appeals has concurrent original
jurisdiction with this Court over
petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
involving decisions or orders of
Regional Trial Courts pursuant
to Section 9(1) 16 of B.P. Blg.
129 in relation to Section
5(1) 17 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. He cites De Jesus
v. Court of Appeals 18 wherein
this Court held that the original
jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals under Section 9 of B.P.
Blg. 129 is concurrent with that
of the Supreme Court, and with
that of Regional Trial Courts
for writs enforceable within
their respective regions. The
petitioner further maintains that
Section 5(2)(c) of Article VIII
of the Constitution and Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended by R.A. No. 5440,
relied upon by the Court
Appeals are not applicable
inasmuch as they relate to
the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court and not to an original
action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
As regards the second issue, the
petitioner asserts that the RTC
below has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged considering
that only 0.4587 grams of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) is
involved. In light of Section 20
of R.A. No. 7659, 19 as
interpreted in People
v. Simon 20 and further
explained in People
v. Santos 21 and Ordoez
v. Vinarao, 22 the imposable
penalty therefor would not
exceed prision correccional,
whose maximum period is six
(6) years. Hence, under R.A.
No. 7691 exclusive original
jurisdiction therein is vested in
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In its Comment on the petition,
the OSG submits that all
violations of R.A. No. 6425, as
further amended by R.A. No.
7659, which are punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six
years now fall under the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts. Since on the basis
of the quantity of the regulated
drug involved in this case the
penalty imposable does not
exceed prision correccional, it
is the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasay City which has
jurisdiction over the case. It
disagreed with the opinion of
the RTC that violations of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, still fall
within the jurisdiction of the
RTC because the latter's
jurisdiction thereon mandated
by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425
has been preserved by the
exception provided for in the
opening sentence of Section 32
of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691. It
submits that Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425 was repealed by
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7691,
which provides:
Sec. 6. All laws, decrees, and
orders inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act shall be
considered amended or
modified accordingly.
In support of its submission, it
cites this Court's resolution
in Gulhoran v. Escao, Jr. 23
The OSG further contends that
respondent Court of Appeals
was correct in dismissing the
petition for certiorari for lack
of jurisdiction in view of
Section 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129;
Sec. 5(2)(c) of Article VIII of
the Constitution; and Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended by R.A. No. 5440.
Nevertheless, it prays that this
petition "be given due course
and that Criminal Case No. 96-
8443 be remanded to the proper
metropolitan trial court for
further proceedings."
We resolved to give due course
to this petition.
The Court of Appeals erred in
holding that it had no
jurisdiction over petitioner's
special civil action
for certiorariunder Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
Under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg.
129, the Court of Appeals has
concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Section 5(1) of
Article VIII of the Constitution
and Section 17(1) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, and with
the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 21(7) of
B.P. Blg. 129 to issue writs
of certiorari, mandamus,
prohibition, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto. 24 These are
original actions, not modes
of appeals.
Since what the petitioner filed
in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 was
a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65,
the original jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals thereon is
beyond doubt.
This error of the Court of
Appeals was due to its
misapplication of Section 5(2)
(c) of Article VIII of the
Constitution and of that portion
of Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 vesting upon the
Supreme Court exclusive
jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm
on certiorari as the law or rules
of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in all cases in
which the jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue. It
forgot that this constitutional
and statutory provisions pertain
to the appellate
not original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, as correctly
maintained by the petitioner.
An appellate jurisdiction refers
to a process which is but a
continuation of the original suit,
not a commencement of a new
action, such as that of a special
civil action for certiorari. The
general rule is that a denial of a
motion to dismiss or to quash in
criminal cases is interlocutory
and cannot be the subject of an
appeal or of a special civil
action for certiorari.
Nevertheless, this Court has
allowed a special civil action
for certiorari where a lower
court has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in
denying a motion to dismiss or
to quash. 25 The petitioner
believed that the RTC below
did so; hence, the special civil
action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals appeared to
be the proper remedy.
The next most logical step then
is for us to simply set aside the
challenged resolutions and to
direct the Court of Appeals to
resolve on the merits the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
40670. But, that would further
delay the case. Considering the
special importance of the lone
legal issue raised, which can be
resolved on the basis of the
pleadings heretofore filed, and
the fact that this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction over
petitioner's special action in
CA-G.R. SP No. 40670, we
deem it more practical and in
the greater interest of justice
not to remand the case to the
Court of Appeals but, instead,
to take direct cognizance
thereof and resolve it once and
for all. 26
We now address the second
issue.
Applying by analogy the ruling
in People v. Simon, 27 People
v. De Lara, 28 People
29
v. Santos, and Ordoez
v. Vinarao, 30 the imposable
penalty in this case which
involves 0.4587grams of shabu
should not exceed prision
correccional. We say
by analogy because these cases
involved marijuana, not
methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu). In
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by Section 17 of R.A.
No. 7659, the maximum
quantities of marijuana and
methamphetamine
hydrochloride for purposes of
imposing the maximum
penalties are not the same. For
the latter, if the quantity
involved is 200 grams or more,
the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000 to P10
million shall be imposed.
Accordingly, if the quantity
involved is below 200 grams,
the imposable penalties should
be as follows:
a) reclusion temporal if the
quantity involved is
from 134 to 199 grams;
b) prision mayor if the
quantity involved is
from 66 to 133 grams;
c) prision correccional if the
quantity involved is 65
grams or below.
Clearly, the penalty which may
be imposed for the offense
charged in Criminal Case No.
96-8443 would at most be
only prision
correccional whose duration is
from six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Does it
follow then that, as the
petitioner insists, the RTC has
no jurisdiction thereon in view
of the amendment of Section 32
of B.P. Blg. 129 by R.A. No.
7691, which vested upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts'
exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of
fine and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other
penalties? This section 32 as
thus amended now reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Criminal Cases. Except in
cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Court and of
the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such
offender or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to
property through criminal
negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.
The exception in the opening
sentence is of special
significance which we cannot
disregard. By virtue thereof, the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in criminal cases does
not cover those cases which by
provision of law fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan regardless
of the prescribed penalty.
Otherwise put, even if such
cases are punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six
years (i.e., prision
correccional, arresto mayor,
or arresto menor), jurisdiction,
thereon is retained by the
Regional Trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan, as the case may
be.
over the general law.
The aforementioned exception
refers not only to Section 20 of
B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts in criminal cases,31 but
also to other laws which
specifically lodge in Regional
Trial Courts exclusive
jurisdiction over specific
criminal cases, e.g., (a) Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. Nos. 1289
and 4363 on written defamation
or libel; (b) Decree on
intellectual Property (P.D. No.
49, as amended), which vests
upon Courts of First Instance
exclusive jurisdiction over the
cases therein mentioned
regardless of the imposable
penalty; and (c) more
appropriately for the case at
bar, Section 39 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by P.D. No.
44, which vests on Courts of
First Instance, Circuit Criminal
Courts, and the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts
concurrent exclusive original
jurisdiction over all cases
involving violations of said Act.
Jurisdiction is, of course,
conferred by the Constitution or
by Congress. Outside the cases
enumerated in Section 5(2) of
Article VIII of the Constitution,
Congress has the plenary power
to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts. 32 Accordingly,
Congress may, by law, provide
that a certain class of cases
should be exclusively heard and
determined by one court. Such
would be a special law and
must be construed as an
exception to the general law on
jurisdiction of courts, namely,
the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended, or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. In
short, the special law prevails
R.A. No. 7691 can by no means
be considered another special
law on jurisdiction but merely
an amendatory law intended to
amend specific sections of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. Hence, it does not have
the effect of repealing or
modifying Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code; Section 57
of the Decree on Intellectual
Property; and Section 39 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended by
P.D. No. 44. In a manner of
speaking, R.A. No. 7691 was
absorbed by the mother law, the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980.
That Congress indeed did not
intend to repeal these special
laws vesting exclusive
jurisdiction in the Regional
Trial Courts over certain cases
is clearly evident from the
exception provided for in the
opening sentence of Section 32
of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691. These special
laws are not, therefore, covered
by the repealing clause (Section
6) of R.A. No. 7691.
Neither can it be successfully
argued that Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended by P.D.
No. 44, is no longer operative
because Section 44 of B.P. Blg.
129 abolished the Courts of
First Instance, Circuit Criminal
Courts, and Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts.
While, indeed, Section 44
provides that these courts were
to be "deemed automatically
abolished" upon the declaration
by the President that the
reorganization provided in B.P.
Blg. 129 had been completed,
this Court should not lose sight
of the fact that the Regional
Trial Courts merely replaced
the Courts of First Instance as
clearly borne out by the last
two sentences of Section 44, to
wit:
Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease
to hold office. The cases
pending in the old Courts shall
be transferred to the appropriate
Courts constituted pursuant to
this Act, together with the
pertinent functions, records,
equipment, property and
necessary personnel.
In short, there was a change in
name only from Courts of
First Instance to Regional Trial
Courts. The Interim Rules and
Guidelines Relative to the
Implementation of B.P. Blg.
129 promulgated by this Court
on 11 January 1983 also
provides that the reference to
the courts of first instance in
the Rules of Court shall be
deemed changed to the regional
trial courts.
Consequently, it is not accurate
to state that the "abolition" of
the Courts of First Instance
carried with it the abolition of
their exclusive original
jurisdiction in drug cases vested
by Section 39 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by P. D. No.
44. If that were so, then so must
it be with respect to Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 57 of the Decree on
Intellectual Property. On the
contrary, in the resolution of 19
June 1996 in Caro v. Court of
Appeals 33 and in the resolution
of 26 February 1997 in Villalon
v. Baldado, 34 this Court
expressly ruled that Regional
Trial Courts have the exclusive
original jurisdiction over libel
cases pursuant to Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code. In
Administrative Order No. 104-
96 this Court mandates that:
LIBEL CASES SHALL BE
TRIED BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS HAVING
JURISDICTION OVER THEM
TO THE EXCLUSION OF
THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT.
It likewise provides that
jurisdiction over cases
involving violations of
intellectual property rights are
"confined exclusively to the
Regional Trial Courts."
The same Administrative Order
recognizes that violations of
RA. No. 6426, as amended,
regardless of the quantity
involved, are to be tried and
decided by the Regional Trial
Courts therein designated as
special courts. As to the latter,
this Court in its Resolution of
15 April 1997 in A.M. No. 96-
11-421-RTC, 35 resolved as
follows:
. . . to AMEND Administrative
Order No. 104-96, dated
October 21, 1996, with respect
only to the violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended, if the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Thus, if the imposable
penalty is below reclusion
perpetua the drug related cases
will be raffled among the
regular courts as ordinary
criminal cases.
Thereafter, in Circular No. 31-
97 dated 15 May 1997, the
Court Administrator directed
Judges of "special courts for
Kidnapping, Robbery,
Carnapping, Dangerous Drugs
and other Heinous Crimes" to
comply with the aforesaid
amendment to Administrative
Order No. 104-96. To avoid any
further confusion or
misunderstanding, we hereby
declare that the term "regular
courts" found in the above
amendment refers exclusively
to the Regional Trial Courts and
was not intended to include
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In view of the foregoing, the
Court hereby abandons the
resolution in Gulhoran
v. Escao 36 where, through the
Second Division, we ruled, in
effect, that Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, was
repealed by virtue of the
repealing clause of R.A. No.
7691.
The RTC then did not commit
any error in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 96-8443.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED, but only insofar as
the issue of jurisdiction of
respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 is
concerned. The Resolutions of
8 August and 13 September
1996 of the Court of Appeals
are SET ASIDE, while the
challenged orders in Criminal
Case No. 96-8443 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 116, are
AFFIRMED. The trial court is
hereby DIRECTED to proceed
with the trial of Criminal Case
No. 96-8443 with all reasonable
dispatch.
o People v. Hon. Eduarte, G.R.
No. 88232,25 February 1990
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.HON. HENEDINO P.
EDUARTE, in his capacity as
Acting Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Br. 22, Cabagan,
Isabela; ELVINO AGGABAO
and VILLA SURATOS,
Assailed in this petition is the
order of the Regional Trial
Court of Cabagan, Isabela,
Branch 22, dismissing the
criminal information for
concubinage filed against
private respondents, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedent facts are as
follows:
Upon complaint by Alma T.
Aggabao, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Cabagan,
Isabela filed on July 25, 1986
with the Regional Trial Court of
Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22,
an information against private
respondents Elvino Aggabao
and Villa Suratos for the crime
of concubinage [Annex "A" to
the Petition; Rollo, p. 17.]
allegedly committed
September 1983. Upon being
arraigned, private respondents
entered a plea of not guilty
[Annex "B" to the Petition;
Rollo, p. 19]. The complainant
was represented before the trial
court by a private prosecutor.
During the trial, private
respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. They argued that
concubinage, under Art. 334 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
is punishable with prision
correccional in its minimum
and medium periods, which is
equivalent to imprisonment of
six (6) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2)
months, well within the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Court,
and not of the Regional Trial
Court. The prosecution filed an
opposition to the motion
contending that the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the crime of concubinage
because destierro, the
imposable penalty on the
concubine [Art. 334, RPC] has
a duration of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years
[Art. 27, RPC]. The trial court
sustained private respondent's
position and granted the motion
to dismiss.
Private prosecutor, together
with the assistant provincial
prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela,
filed on June 16, 1989 the
instant petition assailing the
order of the trial court granting
the motion to dismiss the
criminal information against
private respondents. In a
resolution dated July 17, 1989,
this Court denied the petition
due to late payment of docket
and legal research fees and for
lack of merit. The Solicitor
General filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of
in
the Court denying the petition.
Subsequently, the private
prosecutor filed a separate
motion for reconsideration. In
these motions, the Solicitor
General and the private
prosecutor submitted additional
arguments to support their
position that the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the
crime of concubinage.
At the outset, it must be stated
that the petition is defective
since it was not filed by the
Solicitor General. Instead, it
was filed by the private
prosecutor and the assistant
provincial prosecutor of Ilagan,
Isabela, with the offended party,
Alma T. Aggabao, being named
co-petitioner of the People of
the Philippines. The Court has
already ruled that while it is the
fiscal who represents the
People of the Philippines in the
prosecution of offenses before
the trial courts, when such
criminal actions are brought to
the Court of Appeals or to the
Supreme Court, it is the
Solicitor General who must
represent the People of the
Philippines, not the fiscal [City
Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,
G.R. No. 83996, October 21,
1988, 166 SCRA 614] nor the
private prosecutor, even with
the conformity of the assistant
provincial prosecutor [People v.
Dacudao, G.R. No. 81389,
February 21, 1989].
Nevertheless, considering that
the Solicitor General has
intervened in this case by filing
a motion for reconsideration of
the Court resolution dated July
17, 1989 denying the petition,
the Court has decided to forego
technicalities and to resolve the
issues raised. Moreover, since it
is now apparent that the only
petitioner in this case is the
People of the Philippines as
represented by the Solicitor
General, payment of the legal
fees is not necessary in
accordance with Rule 141, Sec.
16 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Petitioner first contends that
private respondents are
estopped from raising the issue
of jurisdiction after the
prosecution has rested its case
and the defense has started to
present its evidence.
Furthermore, petitioner
complains that "it took two (2)
years and six (6) months before
anyone to take (sic) notice of
the jurisdictional infirmity
[Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 12].
Hence, according to petitioner,
private respondents are barred
from raising the issue of
jurisdiction, estoppel having
already set in.
The contention is without merit.
In our legal system, the
question of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the
proceedings [Rule 117, Sec. 8,
Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure; U.S. v. Castanares,
18 Phil. 210 (1911)]. It is true
that in Vera v. People, G.R. No.
L-31218, February 18, 1970, 31
SCRA 711 and in People v.
Munar, G.R. No. L-37642,
October 22, 1973, 53 SCRA
278, cases cited by the Solicitor
General and private prosecutor
in their pleadings, the Court
held that jurisdiction cannot be
raised for the first time on
appeal. However, these cases
can readily be distinguished
from the case at bar by the fact
that the issue of jurisdiction
was raised only on appeal. In
the instant case, the private
respondents made the
jurisdictional challenge pending
the trial and before the trial
court has rendered any
judgment on the merits.
Moreover, the ruling in Vera v.
People and People v.
Munar that jurisdiction may not
be raised for the first time on
appeal, is the exception rather
than the general rule.
The doctrine in those cases was
first enunciated in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-
21450, April 15, 1968, 23
SCRA 29, 35-36, where the
Court stated that:
. . . a party can not invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean,
136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In
the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question
whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the
subject- matter of the action or
of the parties is barred from
such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court
is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason
that such a practice can not be
tolerated obviously for
reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been
held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse
decision on the meats, it is too
late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the
court ... And in Littleton vs.
Burges, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court
said that it is not right for a
party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, G.R.
No. L-34362, November 19,
1982, 118 SCRA 399 [See also
Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 68544,
October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA
211], the Court held that the
ruling in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy is an exception to
the general rule that the lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal.
The Court stated further
that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the
presence of laches. The Court
said:
A rule that had been settled by
unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the
subject-matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been
qualified by recent
pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case
of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the
holding in said case had been
applied to situations which
were obviously not
contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which
justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-
waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored
and, instead a blanket doctrine
had been repeatedly upheld that
rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the
general rule, virtually
overthrowing altogether the
time-honored principle that the
issue of jurisdiction is not lost
by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of
lack of jurisdiction of the court
that rendered the questioned
ruling was held to be barred by
estoppel by laches. It was ruled
that the lack of jurisdiction
having been raised for the first
time in a motion to dismiss
filed almost fifteen (15) years
after the questioned ruling had
been rendered, such a plea may
no longer be raised for being
barred by laches. As defined in
said case, laches is "failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert
has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.
The circumstances of the
present case are very different
from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy No
judgment has yet been rendered
by the trial court in this case.
And as soon as the accused
discovered the jurisdictional
defect, they did not fail or
neglect to file the appropriate
motion to dismiss. Hence,
finding the pivotal element of
laches to be absent, the Court
holds that the ruling in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, Vera v.
People and People v.
Munar does not control the
present controversy. Instead,
the general rule that the
question of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, must apply.
Private respondents are not
estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
Having disposed of the
procedural issue, the Court will
now proceed with the main
issue of whether or not the
Regional Trial Court has
original jurisdiction over the
crime of concubinage.
The crime of concubinage is
penalized by Art. 334 of the
Revised Penal Code which
reads as follows:
Art. 334. Concubinage. Any
husband who shall keep a
mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman
who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other
place shall be punished
by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the
penalty of destierro. (Emphasis
supplied.)
According to Sec. 32 of B.P.
Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (hereinafter
referred to as the inferior
courts) shall exercise
"[e]xclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment
of not exceeding four years and
two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos,
or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of
other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof . . ."
On the other hand, the
"Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, or body. . ." [Sec. 20.
B.P. Blg. 129].
The penalty imposable on the
husband who commits
concubinage
is prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods,
which ranges from six (6)
months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months.
Hence, as regards the husband,
there is no question that
concubinage is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of the inferior courts. The
problem concerns the
concubine upon whom the
imposable penalty is destierro.
The Solicitor General and the
private prosecutor point out that
the duration of destierro, which
is between six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years
[Art. 27, RPC], is beyond the
jurisdiction of the inferior
courts to impose. Thus, they
conclude that either (1) the
Regional Trial Courts and the
inferior courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over the crime of
concubinage [Solicitor
General's Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 11; Rollo,
p. 521; or (2) the Regional Trial
Courts and the inferior courts
have "split jurisdiction," the
latter having jurisdiction over
the crime as regards the
husband and the former as
regards the concubine [Private
Prosecutor's Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 3; Rollo, p.
58].
These propositions are both
untenable. It has already been
held by the Court in Uy Chin
Hua v. Dinglasan, 86 Phil. 617
(1950) and People v. Santos, 87
Phil. 687 (1950) that a crime
punishable with the penalty
of destierro is within the
jurisdiction of the inferior
courts. This is so because in the
scale of penalties outlined in
Art. 71, destierro comes
after arresto mayor. * And
since under the Judiciary Act of
1948 [Republic Act No. 296],
crimes punishable with arresto
mayor are within the
jurisdiction of the inferior
courts, it follows that crimes
punishable with destierro are
also within the jurisdiction of
such courts. In explaining its
conclusion that destierro is
lighter than arresto mayor and
therefore cognizable by the
inferior courts, the Court, in Uy
Chin Hua v.
Dinglasan, supra at p. 619,
stated the following:
Destierro is not a higher
penalty than arresto mayor.
Arresto mayor means
imprisonment or complete
deprivation of liberty,
whereas destierro means
banishment or only a court shall have original
prohibition from residing
within a radius of 25 kilometers
from the actual residence of the
accused for a specified length
of time. The respective
severities of arresto
mayor and destierro must not
be judged by the duration of
each of these penalties, but by
the degree of deprivatin of
liberty involved. Penologists
have always
considered destierro lighter
than arresto mayor. Such
criterion is reflected both in the
old Spanish Penal Code and in
our Revised Penal Code. In the
graduated scale of article 71 the
lawmaker has placed destierro
below arresto mayor. There is,
therefore, no basis in fact or in
law for holding that destierro is
a higher penalty than arresto
mayor and that an offense
penalized with destierro falls
under the jurisdiction of the
court of first instance.
The Court is well-aware of the
fact that Uy Chin Hua v.
Dinglasan and People
v. Santos were decided under
the Judiciary Act of 1948
pursuant to which justices of
the peace and judges of
municipal courts of chartered
cities had original jurisdiction
over "all offenses in which the
penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for not more than
six months" [Sec. 87 (b)] while
Courts of First Instance had
original jurisdiction "in all
criminal cases in which the
penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six
months" [Sec. 44 (f)]. There
being no mention in said Act of
crimes for which the penalty is
not imprisonment, these
aforecited cases were decided
on the premise that "there exists
a gap in the law as to which
jurisdiction over offenses
penalized with destierro or
banishment" [Uy Chin Hua v.
Dinglasan, supra, at p. 620].
Under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980
(B.P. Blg. 129), the inferior
courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all
offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding
four (4) years and two (2)
months [Sec. 32 (2)] while the
Regional Trial Courts shall
have exclusive original
jurisdiction" in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body" [Sec. 20].
Ostensibly, Sec. 20 of B. P. Blg.
129 would grant to the
Regional Trial Courts
jurisdiction over crimes
punishable with destierro, such
as concubinage, since destierro
is not an offense punishable
with imprisonment of not
exceeding four (4) years and
two (2) months. However, the
Court, after a careful reading of
B.P. Blg. 129, is of the
considered opinion that there
was no intention to overturn the
doctrine laid down in Uy Chin
Hua v. Dinglasan and People v.
Santos. It is quite evident that
among the important factors
considered in the allocation of
jurisdiction between the
Regional Trial Courts and the
inferior courts are the gravity of
both the offense and the
imposable penalty. It is not,
therefore unreasonable to state
that the legislature granted to
the Regional Trial Courts
jurisdiction over crimes whose
penalties are harsher than those
vested in the inferior courts.
And since it is already a settled
rule that destierro, by its nature,
is a lighter penalty than
imprisonment [Uy Chin Hua v.
Dingalasan, supra], it follows
that even under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980,
jurisdiction over crimes
punishable with destierro is
vested not in the Regional Trial
Courts but in the inferior
courts.
More particularly in this case,
the crime of concubinage has
two penalties, one for the
husband and another for the
concubine. The penalty for the
husband, prision correccional i
n its minimum and medium
periods, which ranges from six
(6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2)
months, is unquestionably
within the jurisdiction of the
inferior courts. Considering that
Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
Code states that "[t]he offended
party [in the crime of
concubinage] cannot institute
criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty
parties," it is clearly in the
interest of the orderly
administration of justice that
the concubine be tried with the
erring husband before the
inferior courts. The legislature
could not have intended to
allow the absurd situation
wherein the inferior court has
jurisdiction over the crime of
concubinage only as regards the
husband while the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the same crime with respect to
the concubine.
In fine, the Court, after a
careful consideration of the
pertinent laws, as well as the
jurisprudence on the matter,
holds that the crime of
concubinage is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of the inferior courts. The
Regional Trial Courts have no
original jurisdiction over the
said crime. Hence, the court a
quo committed no reversible
error in dismissing the criminal
information against private
respondents. At any rate,
considering that the dismissal
of the case by the court a
quo on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is not a bar to
another prosecution for the
same offense [Rule 117, Secs. 6
and 7, Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure] and
considering further that the
crime has not yet prescribed
[See Art. 90, RPC], the
offended wife is not precluded
from initiating the filing of
another criminal information
against private respondents
before the proper court.
WHEREFORE, the Court
Resolved to DENY the petition
for lack of merit. The
reimbursement of the legal fees
paid by the private prosecutor
for the filing of this petition is
hereby ORDERED.
o Mobilia Products v.
Umezawa, G'R. No. 1'49357,4
March
MOBILIA PRODUCTS,
INC., Petitioners, vs.
HAJIME UMEZAWA,
G.R. No. 149403. March 04,
2005
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs. HON. JUDGE
RUMOLDO R.
FERNANDEZ and HAJIME
UMEZAWA,
Before the Court are two
consolidated petitions: a share of stock.
petition for review
on certiorari filed by the
People of the Philippines,
docketed as G.R. No. 149403
of the Resolution1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 52440 which reversed its
decision and granted the
petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus filed
by respondent Hajime
Umezawa; and the petition for
review on certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 149357 filed by
petitioner Mobilia Products,
Inc. (MPI), the intervenor in the
CA, assailing the same
Resolution of the appellate
court.
The Antecedents
The antecedents were amply
summarized by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) in
the petition at bar, to wit:
Mobilia Products, Inc. is a
corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of
quality furniture which caters
only to the purchase orders
booked and placed through
Mobilia Products Japan, the
mother company which does all
the marketing and booking.
After orders from customers are
booked at the mother company
in Japan, the same are coursed
through Mobilia Philippines for
implementation and production,
after which, the ordered items
are shipped to Japan through
the mother company.
Mobilia Products Japan sent
Hajime Umezawa to the
Philippines in order to head
Mobilia Products, Inc. as
President and General Manager.
To qualify him as such and as a
Board Director, he was
entrusted with one nominal
Sometime in the last week of
January 1995, Umezawa, then
the President and General
Manager of Mobilia Products,
Inc., organized another
company with his wife Kimiko,
and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi,
to be known as Astem
Philippines
Corporation, without the
knowledge of the Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer
Susumo Kodaira and the
other members of the Board
of Directors of Mobilia.
The said company would be
engaged in the same business as
Mobilia. Spouses Umezawa
recruited Justin Legaspi, former
Production Manager of
Mobilia, to act as Manager and
one Yoshikazu Hayano of
Phoenix Marble Corporation to
serve as investors [sic].
Pending formal organization,
Spouses Umezawa, Justin
Legaspi and Yoshikazu Hayano
wanted to accelerate the market
potentials of Astem by
participating in the
International Furniture Fair
1995 held at the Word Trade
Centre of Singapore on March
6 to 10, 1995.
One of the requirements of such
Fair was that the furniture
exhibits must arrive and be
received at Singapore not later
than February 23, 1995.
Pressed for time, with less than
one month to prepare and while
Astem had yet no equipment
and machinery, no staff and no
ready personnel, Umezawa,
with grave abuse of the
confidence reposed on him as
President and General Manager
of Mobilia Products, Inc., and
in conspiracy with his wife, his
sister Mitsuyo Yaguchi,
Yoshikazu Hayano and Justin
Legaspi, all with intent to gain
for themselves and for their
company Astem Philippines
Corporation, stole prototype
furniture from petitioner
Mobilia so that the said pieces
of furniture would be presented
and exhibited as belonging to
Astem in the International
Furniture Fair 95 in Singapore.
In order to avoid detection,
Umezawa contacted Henry
Chua, the owner of Dew Foam,
one of the suppliers of Mobilia,
for that the latter to load several
pieces of prototype furniture
into a Dew Foam truck and
store them at the Dew Foam
warehouse. The first batch of
furniture was stolen on
February 8, 1995, when Mr.
Henry Chua, upon the request
of respondent Umezawa,
caused to be loaded into his
Dew Foam truck two prototype
sofa models worth
500,000.00, after which, the
same were spirited from the
Mobilia compound, then
transported and stored in Henry
Chuas warehouse.
Again, on February 18, 1995,
Umezawa, with grave abuse of
confidence and taking
advantage of his position as
President and General Manager,
unlawfully stole expensive
furniture from Mobilias factory
worth 2,964,875.00. In order
to avoid detection, the said
furniture were loaded in the
truck belonging to Dew Foam,
with respondent Umezawa
personally supervising the
loading, the carting and
spiriting away of the said
furniture. Thus, taking
advantage of his position as
General Manager, he managed
to have the said furniture taken
out of the company premises
and passed the company guard
without any problem and
difficulty.
Further, on February 19, 1995,
around 1 oclock in the
afternoon, respondent
Umezawa again loaded into his
motor vehicle, and took away
from company premises under
the same irregular and unlawful
circumstances, an expensive
three-seater sofa worth
255,000.00.
The taking out of the said
furniture was effected in
violation of the standard
procedures established by
petitioner corporation which
requires that every shipment or
taking out of the furniture be
checked and reviewed by
Mobilias Production, Planning,
Inventory Costing and Control
(PPICC) Division. All the
foregoing furniture were
transported to and stored at
Henry Chuas warehouse. After
sometime, the foregoing
furniture were photographed for
slide photos at Photo Folio at
the Reclamation Area, Cebu
City and then finally catalogued
for use in the Singapore Fair for
the use of Astem and its
supposed owners, namely:
spouses Umezawa, Hayano and
Legaspi. The foregoing
furniture models were finally
shipped for exhibition at the
International Furniture Fair 95
in Singapore as furniture
belonging to Astem Philippines
Corporation.
Sometime in March 1995,
based on orders booked for
Astem, Umezawa, with
unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence reposed on him as
the President and General
Manager of petitioner Mobilia,
ordered and caused the
manufacture of eighty-nine (89)
pieces of furniture with a total
value of 17,108,500.00. The
said pieces of furniture were
made with Mobilia supplies,
materials and machineries, as
well as with Mobilia time and
personnel, all of which were
under the administration and
control of Umezawa as
President and General Manager.
The said materials and supplies,
the time and labor, were
supposed to be used for the
manufacture and production of
quality furniture for the
EXCLUSIVE USE of Mobilia.
However, Umezawa, in
violation of his duty to apply
the same for the use of Mobilia
and the duty to account for the
same, converted their use for
the benefit of Astem or for the
use and benefit of Umezawa,
his wife and sister, Yoshikazu
Hayano and Legaspi, much to
the damage and prejudice of
Mobilia Products.
The same furniture could also
have been taken out of the
company premises by
Umezawa and cohorts for
shipment and delivery to Astem
customers had it not been for
the timely discovery of the
previous theft. 2
The Board of Directors of MPI,
consisting of its Chairman
Susumo Kodaira and members
Yasushi Kato and Rolando
Nonato, approved a Resolution
on May 2, 1995 authorizing the
filing of a complaint against
Umezawa for two counts of
qualified theft allegedly
committed on February 18 and
19, 1995. Attached to the
complaint was the Joint
Affidavit of Danilo Lallaban,
George del Rio and Yasushi
Kato. The case was docketed as
I.S. No. 95-275.
On May 15, 1995, the public
prosecutor filed an Information
for qualified theft against
Umezawa with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-
Lapu City. The accusatory
portion of the Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No.
013231-L, reads:
That during or about the period
comprised between the 18th
and 19th day of February 1995,
in the City of Lapu-Lapu,
Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, while being
then the President and General
Manager of Mobilia Products,
Inc., a corporation engaged in
the manufacture and export of
furniture, holding office and
doing business in the Mactan
Export Processing Zone, Lapu-
Lapu City, with grave abuse of
the confidence reposed upon
him by his employer, with
intent to gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry
away from the corporations
factory in Mactan Export
Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu
City, expensive pieces of
furniture, to wit:
1) 1 set, Model No. 3, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
208,125.00
2) 1 set, Model No. 8, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
315,000.00
3) 1 set, Model No. 5, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
108,000.00
4) 1 set, Model No. 4, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
277,500.00
5) 1 set, Model No. 6, 1-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
146,250.00
6) 1 set, Model No. 2, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
225,000.00
7) 1 set, Model No. 1, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
275,000.00
8) 1 piece, Model Table No. 2,
Italian marble table, worth - - -
-----------------
93,750.00
9) 1 piece, Model Table No. 4,
Italian marble table, worth - - -
-----------------
105,000.00
10) 2 pieces, Model Pedestal
No. 6, Italian marble pedestal,
worth - - - - - - - - - - - - -
150,000.00
11) 1 piece, Model Column
Standard No. 11, Italian marble
worth - - - - - - - - - - - -
93,750.00
12) 1 piece, Model Table No. 1,
Italian marble table, worth - - -
-----------------
105,000.00
13) 1 piece, Model High Table
No. 10, Italian marble, worth - -
-----------------
187,500.00
14) 1 piece, Model Table No. 8,
Italian marble table, worth - - -
-----------------
187,500.00
15) 1 piece, Model Table No. 7
Italian marble table, worth - - -
-----------------
187,500.00
16) 1 piece, Model Table No. 5
Italian marble table, worth - - -
-----------------
112,500.00
17) 1 piece, Model Table No. 9,
Italian marble table, worth - - -
-----------------
187,500.00
18) 3-seater sofa, worth- - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - 255,000.00
with an aggregate value of
3,219,875.00, Philippine
currency, without the consent of
his employer, to the damage
and prejudice of Mobilia
Products, Inc., in the said
amount of 3,219,875.00.
Contrary to law.3
On motion of the prosecution,
the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment
covering the properties of
Umezawa.
Umezawa then filed an
Omnibus Motion to quash the
information filed against him,
the discharge of the writ of
attachment issued by the trial
court, and to set the case for
preliminary investigation. MPI,
the private complainant therein,
opposed the motion.
In the meantime on July 21,
1995, MPI filed another
criminal complaint for qualified
theft against Umezawa, his wife
Kimiko Umezawa, Mitsuyo
Yaguchi, Justin Legaspi,
Yoshikazu Hayano and Henry
Chua allegedly committed in
March 1995, with the Office of
the City Prosecutor. The case
was docketed as I.S. No. 95-
442.
On July 25, 1995, the trial court
issued an Order in Criminal
Case No. 013231-L denying the
omnibus motion. On joint
motion of Umezawa and the
public prosecutor, the trial court
ordered a reinvestigation of the
case. Conformably, the public
prosecutor conducted a consent of his employer, and
reinvestigation of Criminal
Case No. 013231-L jointly with
I.S. No. 95-442.
On September 25, 1995,
Umezawa filed a petition with
the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), docketed
as SEC Case No. 002919, for
the nullification of the
Resolution issued by the three
alleged members of MPI Board
of Directors, authorizing the
filing of criminal complaints
against him in behalf of the
corporation.
On January 3, 1996, the public
prosecutor issued a Joint
Resolution finding probable
cause for qualified theft and
one count of estafa against
Umezawa, and dismissing the
case against the other accused.
The Prosecutor maintained his
finding of probable cause
against Umezawa in Criminal
Case No. 013231-L.
On February 20, 1996, the
public prosecutor filed an
Information for qualified theft
with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu
City against Umezawa,
docketed as Criminal Case No.
013423-L. The accusatory
portion reads:
That on the 8th day of February
1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu,
Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, while being the
President and General Manager
of Mobilia Products, Inc., a
corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of
quality furniture, whose
principal place of business is at
the Mactan Export Processing
Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, with
intent to gain, without the
with grave abuse of confidence,
did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away from
the corporations factory the
following expensive pieces of
furniture, to wit:
1) 1 set, Model No. 2, 2-seater
German
leather sofa, all valued at... .
225,000.00
2) 1 set, Model No. 1, 2-seater
German
leather sofa, all valued at. . . . . .
. . 275,000.00
with an aggregate value of
500,000.00 Philippine
Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of Mobilia Products,
Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Another Information for estafa
was thereafter filed against the
same accused, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013424-L.
The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in March 1995,
in the City of Lapu-Lapu,
Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, by means of
unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence reposed upon him
as the President and General
Manager of Mobilia Products,
Inc., did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate and
convert to his own personal use
and benefit the amount of
Seventeen Million One
Hundred Eight Thousand Five
Hundred (17,108,500.00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency,
which was the total value of the
furnitures ordered and
manufactured by the accused or
at his instance using Mobilia
supplies, materials and
machineries, as well as time
and personnel which were
supposed to be for the exclusive
use of Mobilia Products, Inc.
but were converted for the use
and benefit of the accused and
Astem Philippines Corporation,
a company or firm engaged in
the same business as that of
Mobilia Products, Inc., which
is, [in] the manufacture and
production of quality furniture
for export, owned by the
accused, to the damage and
prejudice of Mobilia Products,
Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On April 25, 1996, Umezawa
filed a motion for the
suspension of the proceedings
on the ground of the pendency
of his petition with the SEC in
Case No. 002919. The trial
court, however, issued an Order
on May 21, 1996, denying the
said motion. It held that the
filing and the pendency of a
petition before the SEC did not
warrant a suspension of the
criminal cases.
On September 25, 1998,
Umezawa was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty.
On September 30, 1998,
Umezawa filed anew a Joint
Motion to Quash the
Informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 013231-L and 013423-L,
on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did not
constitute the felony of
qualified theft. Umezawa
claimed that based on the Joint
Affidavit of the witnesses for
the prosecution submitted
during the preliminary
investigation, Yasushi Kato and
George del Rio, MPI Vice-
President and the head of the
Upholstery Department,
respectively, the appropriate
charge should be estafa and not
qualified theft. Umezawa
further claimed that for their
failure to object to and resist his
alleged delictual acts, the said
witnesses were as guilty as he
was and should have been
included in the Information. He
also asserted that there was,
likewise, no allegation in the
Informations as to who was the
owner of the articles stolen;
hence, there was no offended
party. He noted that the
Informations merely alleged
that MPI was his employer. He
further posited that there was
no valid charge against him
because the resolution
authorizing the filing of the
cases against him was approved
by a mere minority of the
members of the MPI Board of
Directors.6
Umezawa, likewise, filed a
Motion to Quash7 the
Information in Criminal Case
No. 013424-L on the ground
that the facts alleged in the
Information did not constitute
the felony of estafa. He posited
that the Information did not
contain any allegation that any
demand was made for him to
return the goods. Furthermore,
the owner of the said articles
was not specified. He noted that
as gleaned from the Joint
Affidavit of the witnesses for
the prosecution, there was no
lawful private complainant. He
reiterated that the MPI board
resolution authorizing the filing
of the charge against him was
not approved by the majority of
the members of its board of
directors. Umezawa also
alleged that the charge for
estafa with abuse of confidence
was already included in the
charge for qualified theft,
where it was alleged that he
committed theft with abuse of
confidence; hence, the charge
for estafa should be quashed,
otherwise, he would be placed
in double jeopardy. The motion
was duly opposed by the
prosecution.
On January 29, 1999, the trial
court issued a Joint
Order8 dismissing the cases for
lack of jurisdiction. It held that
the dispute between the private
complainant and the accused
over the ownership of the
properties subject of the
charges is intra-corporate in
nature, and was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the
SEC. It ruled that Umezawa, as
a member of the board of
directors and president of MPI,
was also a stockholder thereof.
While Umezawa claimed to be
the bona fide owner of the
properties subject of the
Informations which he
appropriated for himself, the
private complainant disputes
the same; hence, according to
the trial court, the conflicting
claims of the parties should be
resolved by the SEC. The
private and public prosecutors
received their respective copies
of the Joint Order on February
2, 1999.
The MPI, through the private
prosecutor, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the joint
order of the court and for the
reinstatement of the cases on
February 15, 1999. The MPI
relied on the following
grounds:
a. The Honorable Court has
jurisdiction and must exercise it
over these cases;
b. The above-entitled case is
not an intra-corporate
controversy;
and
c. The accused could not claim
ownership nor co-ownership of
the properties of private
complainant corporation.9
The MPI maintained that the
trial court had jurisdiction over
the cases and cited Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
902-A, which provides the rules
on cases over which the SEC
has original and exclusive
jurisdiction. A copy of the
motion was served on the
public prosecutor for his
approval. However, the public
prosecutor did not affix his
conformity to the motion, and
instead opted to appear before
the trial court during the
hearing of the same. During the
hearing, both the public and
private prosecutors appeared. In
support of his motion, the
private prosecutor argued that
the trial of the case must be
done in the presence of and
under the control and
supervision of the public
prosecutor.10
The trial court denied the
motion in an Order dated April
19, 1999. It held that the SEC,
not the trial court, had
jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies. It also ruled that
the motion of the private
complainant was pro forma, it
appearing that the public
prosecutor had not approved
the same.
The public prosecutor received
a copy of the Order on April 20,
1999. On April 26, 1999, the
People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, filed a
petition
for certiorari and mandamus wi
th the CA against Presiding
Judge Rumuldo R. Fernandez
and Umezawa, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 52440. The CA
allowed the MPI to intervene as
petitioner, and admitted its
petition- in-intervention.
The People of the Philippines, amounting to excess or lack of
as the petitioner therein, raised jurisdiction.
the following issues:
On September 2, 1999, the CA
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS rendered judgment granting the
THE LEGAL AND petition and nullifying the
MINISTERIAL DUTY OF assailed Orders of the RTC. It
THE REGIONAL TRIAL ruled that the issue of
COURT TO TAKE ownership of the properties
COGNIZANCE AND subject of the Informations was
JURISDICTION OF THESE not an intra-corporate dispute.
SUBJECT CRIMINAL It held that Umezawa, although
CASES; president and general manager
of the MPI and a stockholder
WHETHER OR NOT THE thereof, was not a joint owner
SECURITIES AND or co-owner of the personal
EXCHANGE COMMISSION properties subject of the
HAS JURISDICTION OVER charges. It also held that the
THE CRIMINAL CASES dispute between a private
AGAINST RESPONDENT corporation and any of its
HAJIME UMEZAWA; stockholders relative to the
ownership of properties does
WHETHER OR NOT not ipso facto negate the
RESPONDENT JUDGE jurisdiction of the RTC over the
COMMITTED GRAVE criminal cases under B.P. Blg.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION 129, as amended. It also
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR declared that the material
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION averments of the Informations
IN DISMISSING THE sufficiently charged qualified
CRIMINAL CASES AND theft and estafa.
DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR Umezawa filed a motion for the
RECONSIDERATION.11 reconsideration of the decision
of the CA. In a complete volte
The People asserted that the face, the appellate court issued
controversy involving the a Resolution on August 8, 2001,
criminal cases was not between granting the motion and
Umezawa and the other reversing its decision. It
stockholders of MPI, but one affirmed the ruling of the RTC
between him as the accused that the dispute between
therein and the People of the Umezawa and the other
Philippines. It averred that stockholders and officers over
under Section 20(b) of Batas the implementation of the
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the MPIs standard procedure is
RTC has exclusive jurisdiction intra-corporate in nature; hence,
over the cases against within the exclusive jurisdiction
Umezawa. It also alleged that of the SEC. Citing Section 5(a)
in dismissing the criminal cases (b) of P.D. No. 902-A, and the
against Umezawa on the ruling of this Court in Alleje v.
ground that it had no Court of Appeals,12 the
jurisdiction over the crimes appellate court ruled that based
charged, the RTC committed on the material allegations of
grave abuse of its discretion the Solicitor General in the
petition before the CA, the SEC
had exclusive jurisdiction over
the conflicting claims of the
parties. It likewise affirmed the
ruling of the RTC that the
absence of any allegation in the
Information that the MPI was
the owner of the properties
subject of the Information is
fatal.
The petitioner MPI filed the
instant petition for review on
certiorari, raising the following
issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE
SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION
HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CRIMINAL CASES
AGAINST UMEZAWA.
WHETHER OR NOT ALL
THE NECESSARY
ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIMES OF QUALIFIED
THEFT AND ESTAFAARE
SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED
IN THE INFORMATIONS.
EVEN
ASSUMING ARGUENDO TH
AT THE FACTS ALLEGED
DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN
OFFENSE THE CORRECT
RULING IS NOT TO
DISMISS THE CASE BUT TO
ORDER AMENDMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT THE
STATE HS LOST ITS RIGHT
TO APPEAL.
WHETHER OR NOT THE
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF
UMEZAWA IS PRO FORMA.13
The People of the Philippines
filed a separate petition for
review on certiorari, contending
that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS the crimes charged in the said
COMMITTED SERIOUS Informations; (c) whether the
ERRORS OF LAW AND Informations sufficiently charge
GRAVE ABUSE OF the felonies of qualified theft
DISCRETION IN FINDING and estafa; and (d) if in the
THAT THE PETITION FOR affirmative, whether all the
MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI elements of qualified theft and
AND INJUNCTION WAS estafa are alleged in the
FILED OUT OF TIME AND Informations.
THAT PETITIONER HAS
LOST ITS RIGHT TO On the first issue, the CA held
APPEAL; that the Public Prosecutor failed
to file a motion for the
2. THE COURT OF APEALS reconsideration of the trial
COMMITTED SERIOUS courts January 29, 1999 Joint
ERRORS OF LAW IN Order dismissing the cases, that
RULING THAT NOT ALL is, within fifteen days from
THE ELEMENTS OF receipt of a copy of the said
QUALIFIED THEFT AND order on February 2, 1999;
ESTAFA ARE PRESENT; neither did the People appeal
the said Order within the period
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS therefor. Thus, according to the
COMMITTED BLATANT CA, the People filed its petition
AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF for certiorari, prohibition
LAW IN FINDING THAT THE and mandamus assailing the
SECURITIES AND January 29, 1999 Joint Order of
EXCHANGE COMMISSION the trial court only on April 26,
(SEC) HAS JURISDICTION 1999, well beyond the 60-day
OVER THE SUBJECT period therefor. The appellate
CRIMINAL CASES; court, likewise, held that the
filing of the motion for
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS reconsideration of the said Joint
COMMITTED SERIOUS Order by the private prosecutor
ERRORS OF LAW AND without the conformity of the
GRAVE ABUSE OF Public Prosecutor did not toll
DISCRETION IN GIVING the period for the People to file
DUE COURSE TO THE PRO- its motion for reconsideration
FORMA MOTION FOR thereof, or to appeal therefrom,
RECONSIDERATION OF or to file a petition
UMEZAWA.14 for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus. It ruled that, having
The two petitions were lost its right to appeal in due
consolidated in the Second course, the People was
Division of the Court. proscribed from filing a petition
for certiorari, prohibition or
The threshold issues for mandamus. The CA declared
resolution are the following: (a) that the motion for
whether or not the petition reconsideration filed by
for certiorari of the People of petitioner MPI of the Joint
Order of the RTC is pro forma,
the Philippines in the CA
assailing the January 29, 1999 the public prosecutor not
having signified his written
Joint Order of the trial court
was time-barred; (b) whether conformity thereto.
the RTC has jurisdiction over
On the other hand, the
petitioner People of the
Philippines insists that while
the public prosecutor did not
expressly conform to the
motion for reconsideration of
the January 29, 1999 Joint
Order of the trial court filed by
the private prosecutor, through
the public prosecutors
presence during the hearing of
the said motion, his supervision
and control over the private
prosecutor during the said
hearing, he in effect adopted
and conformed to the said
motion for reconsideration.
In his comment on the
petitions, respondent Umezawa
maintains that the motion for
reconsideration of the joint
order of the trial court filed by
the private prosecutor did not
interrupt the period within
which the People could appeal,
citing the ruling of this Court
in Cabral v. Puno.15 The
respondent posits that the
finding of the trial court, which
was affirmed by the CA, that
the public prosecutor did not
conform to the motion for
reconsideration of the private
prosecutor, is binding on this
Court. The respondent also
avers that the petitioner has no
personality to file the petition.
Moreover, he insists that
whether the public prosecutor
conformed to the private
prosecutors motion for
reconsideration is a question of
fact which is not proper in a
petition for review on certiorari.
The Courts Ruling
The contention of the petitioner
People of the Philippines is not
correct. All criminal actions
commenced by complaint or
information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control
of the public
prosecutor.16 When the civil
action for civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the offended party may
intervene, by counsel, in the
prosecution of the
17
offense. In Ramiscal, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan,18 we held that
under Section 16, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party
may intervene in the criminal
action personally or by counsel,
who will then act as private
prosecutor for the protection of
his interests and in the interest
of the speedy and inexpensive
administration of justice. A
separate action for the purpose
would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-
consuming for both parties and
further delay the final
disposition of the case. The
multiplicity of suits must be
avoided. With the implied
institution of the civil action in
the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one
composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating
the civil. The prime purpose of
the criminal action is to punish
the offender in order to deter
him and others from
committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from
society, reform and rehabilitate
him or, in general, to maintain
social order.19
The intervention of the private
offended party, through
counsel, and his prosecution of
the case shall be under the
control and supervision of the
public prosecutor until the final
termination of the case. A
public prosecutor who has been
entrusted by law with the
prosecution of criminal cases is
duty-bound to take charge
thereof until its final
termination, for under the law,
he assumes full responsibility
for his failure or success since
he is the one more adequately
prepared to pursue it to its
termination.20 The prosecution
of offenses is a public function.
Indeed, the sole purpose of the
civil action is the resolution,
reparation or indemnification of
the private offended party for
the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the
accused. 21 Under Article 104 of
the Revised Penal Code, the
following are the civil liabilities
of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in
civil liability. The civil
liability established in Articles
100, 101, 102 and 103 of this
Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage
caused;
3. Indemnification for
consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party,
through counsel, has asserted
his right to intervene in the
proceedings, it is error to
consider his appearance merely
as a matter of tolerance.22
The public prosecutor may turn
over the actual prosecution of
the criminal case, in the
exercise of his discretion, but
he may, at any time, take over
the actual conduct of the trial.
However, it is necessary that
the public prosecutor be present
at the trial until the final
termination of the case;
otherwise, if he is absent, it
cannot be gainsaid that the trial
is under his supervision and
control.23
In a criminal case in which the
offended party is the State, the
interest of the private
complainant or the offended
party is limited to the civil
liability arising therefrom.
Hence, if a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, a
reconsideration of the order of
dismissal or acquittal may be
undertaken, whenever legally
feasible, insofar as the criminal
aspect thereof is concerned and
may be made only by the public
prosecutor; or in the case of an
appeal, by the State only,
through the OSG. The private
complainant or offended party
may not undertake such motion
for reconsideration or appeal on
the criminal aspect of the
case.24 However, the offended
party or private complainant
may file a motion for
reconsideration of such
dismissal or acquittal or appeal
therefrom but only insofar as
the civil aspect thereof is
concerned.25 In so doing, the
private complainant or offended
party need not secure the
conformity of the public
prosecutor. If the court denies
his motion for reconsideration,
the private complainant or
offended party may appeal or
file a petition
for certiorari or mandamus, if
grave abuse amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction is
shown and the aggrieved party
has no right of appeal or given
an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The public and private
prosecutors are not precluded,
whenever feasible, from filing a
joint motion for the
reconsideration of the dismissal
of the case or the acquittal of
the accused, on the criminal
and civil aspects of the cases.
In the present case, only
petitioner MPI, through
counsel, filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the trial
courts Joint Order dated
January 29, 1999, praying for
the reinstatement of the cases
insofar as the civil aspect
thereof is concerned. The
public prosecutor did not
approve nor conform to the said
motion. Although petitioner
MPI provided ample space for
the said conformity of the
public prosecutor, the latter did
not do so; he merely appeared
during the hearing of the said
motion with the private
prosecutor when the latter
presented his oral arguments in
support of the said motion.
The fact that the public
prosecutor did not conform to
the said motion, however, does
not mean that the same is pro
forma. It must be stressed that
the propriety and efficacy of the
motion, insofar as the civil
aspect of the cases is
concerned, is not dependent
upon the conformity of the
public prosecutor. Hence, the
filing of the joint motion for
reconsideration effectively
suspended the running of the
period for petitioner MPI to
assail the joint order in the
CA via an appeal or a special
civil action
for certiorari or mandamus und
er Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
However, since the public
prosecutor did not file any
motion for the reconsideration
of the joint order nor conform
to the motion of petitioner MPI,
insofar as the criminal aspect of
the cases is concerned, the
period for the State to assail the
said joint order was not
suspended. Only the motion for
reconsideration filed by the
public prosecutor of the joint
order of dismissal of the cases
could have tolled the period
within which the State could
appeal, insofar as the criminal
aspect of the cases was
concerned. The bare fact that
the public prosecutor appeared
for the State during the hearing
of the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner
MPI does not amount to or
constitute his adoption of the
said motion as that of the State.
As ruled by this Court
in Cabral v. Puno:26
While it is true that the
offended party, Silvino San
Diego, through the private
prosecutor, filed a motion for
reconsideration within the
reglementary fifteen-day
period, such move did not stop
the running of the period for
appeal. He did not have the
legal personality to appeal or
file the motion for
reconsideration on his behalf.
The prosecution in a criminal
case through the private
prosecutor is under the
direction and control of the
Fiscal, and only the motion for
reconsideration or appeal filed
by the Fiscal could have
interrupted the period for
appeal.27
We agree with the ruling of the
CA that the petition for
certiorari filed by the petitioner
People of the Philippines with
the CA on April 26, 1999 was
filed beyond the 60-day period
as provided in Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, 28 it
appearing that the public
prosecutor received a copy of
the joint order of the trial court
on February 2, 1999, and, thus,
had only until April 3, 1999
within which to file the said
petition.
Even then, the Court still holds
that the CA erred in dismissing
the petition of the People of the
Philippines simply because the
public prosecutor erred in not
himself filing a motion for
reconsideration of the joint
order of the trial court, on his
perception that by being present
during the hearing of the
motion for reconsideration of
petitioner MPI, he thereby
adopted the said motion as that
of the States. The settled rule is
that the State is not estopped by
the mistakes of its officers and
employees. Indeed, in Cruz, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court
declared:
Estoppel does not lie against
the government because of the
supposedly mistaken acts or
omissions of its agents. As we
declared in People v.
Castaeda, "there is the long
familiar rule that erroneous
application and enforcement of
the law by public officers do
not block subsequent correct
application of the statute and
that the government is never
estopped by mistake or error on
the part of its agents."
The Court also held in Chua v.
Court of Appeals:30
While ordinarily, certiorari
is unavailing where the appeal
period has lapsed, there are
exceptions. Among them are (a)
when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy
dictates; (b) when the broader
interest of justice so requires;
(c) when the writs issued are
null and void; or (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. 31
On the second issue, the
petitioners assert that the CA
erred in holding that the dispute
between it and the respondent is
intra-corporate in nature; hence,
within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the SEC. As gleaned from
the material allegations of the
Informations, the RTC had
exclusive jurisdiction over the
crimes charged. Petitioner MPI
further avers that even if there
is no allegation in the
Informations identifying it as
the owner of the personal
properties described in the
Informations, its ownership of
the properties can be inferred
from the other allegations. The
petitioners maintain that even if
the Informations are deficient,
the remedy is the amendment of
the Informations and not the
dismissal of the cases.
For his part, the respondent
avers that the assailed
Resolution of the CA is correct,
and that it is the appellate
courts decision which is
erroneous.
We agree with the petitioners.
According to Section 20 of B.P.
Blg. 129
SEC. 20. Jurisdiction in
criminal cases. Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter.
Section 32 thereof was later
amended by Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7691, as
follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Criminal Cases. Except in
cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court and
of the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all violations
of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their
respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to
property through criminal
negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.
Case law has it that in order to
determine the jurisdiction of the
court in criminal cases, the
complaint or Information must
be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the
facts set out therein and the
prescribed period provided for
by law are within the
jurisdiction of the court, and
where the said Information or
complaint is filed. It is settled
that the jurisdiction of the court
in criminal cases is determined
by the allegations of the
complaint or Information and
not by the findings based on the
evidence of the court after
trial.32 Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by
the law in force at the time of
the filing of the Information or
complaint. Once jurisdiction is
vested in the court, it is retained
up to the end of the litigation.
Indeed, in People v.
Purisima,33 this Court held that:
In criminal prosecutions, it is
settled that the jurisdiction of
the court is not determined by
what may be meted out to the
offender after trial or even by
the result of the evidence that
would be presented at the
trial, but by the extent of the
penalty which the law
imposes for the misdemeanor,
crime or violation charged in
the complaint. If the facts
recited in the complaint and
the punishment provided for by
law are sufficient to show that
the court in which the
complaint is presented has
jurisdiction, that court must
assume jurisdiction.
In Criminal Case No. 013231-
L, the value of the properties
subject of qualified theft is
3,219,875.00, while in
Criminal Case No. 013423-L,
the value of the property was
pegged at 255,000.00. Under
Article 309 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for
theft when the value of the
stolen property exceeds
22,000.00 is as follows:
1. The penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 20,000 pesos; but if the
value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph and one year of
each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory
penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.
Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code further provides for
the penalty for qualified theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The
crime of theft shall be punished
by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those
respectively specified in the
next preceding article, if
committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property
stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists
of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish
taken from a fishpond or
fishery or if property is taken
on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
On the other hand, in Criminal
Case No. 013424-L for estafa,
the amount of the fraud
involved is 500,000.00, and
under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for such crime is
1st. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory
penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
Patently, then, based on the
material allegations of the
Informations in the three cases,
the court a quo had exclusive
jurisdiction over the crimes
charged.
The bare fact that the
respondent was the president
and general manager of the
petitioner corporation when the
crimes charged were allegedly
committed and was then a
stockholder thereof does not in
itself deprive the court a quo of
its exclusive jurisdiction over
the crimes charged. The
property of the corporation is
not the property of the
stockholders or members or of
its officers who are
stockholders. 34 As the Court
held in an avuncular case:35
... Properties registered in the
name of the corporation are
owned by it as an entity
separate and distinct from its
members. While shares of stock
constitute personal property,
they do not represent property
of the corporation. The
corporation has property of its
own which consists chiefly of
real estate (Nelson v. Owen,
113 Ala., 372, 21 So. 75;
Morrow v. Gould, 145 Iowa, 1,
123 N.W. 743). A share of stock
only typifies an aliquot part of
the corporations property, or
the right to share in its proceeds
to that extent when distributed
according to law and equity
(Hall & Faley v. Alabama
Terminal, 173 Ala., 398, 56 So.
235), but its holder is not the
owner of any part of the capital
of the corporation (Bradley v.
Bauder, 36 Ohio St., 28). Nor is
he entitled to the possession of
any definite portion of its
property or assets (Gottfried v.
Miller, 104 U.S., 521; Jones v.
Davis, 35 Ohio St., 474). The
stockholder is not a co-owner
or tenant in common of the
corporate property (Harton v.
Johnston, 166 Ala., 317, 51 So.,
992) "36
As early as the case of Fisher v.
Trinidad,37 the Court already
declared that "[t]he distinction
between the title of a
corporation, and the interest of
its members or stockholders in
the property of the corporation,
is familiar and well-settled. The
ownership of that property is in
the corporation, and not in the
holders of shares of its stock.
The interest of each stockholder
consists in the right to a
proportionate part of the profits
whenever dividends are
declared by the corporation,
during its existence, under its
charter, and to a like proportion
of the property remaining, upon
the termination or dissolution
of the corporation, after
payment of its debts."38
We also agree with the ruling of
the CA in its decision that the
SEC (now the Regional Trial
Court) had no jurisdiction over
the cases filed in the court a
quo. The appellate courts
reliance in the assailed
Resolution issued by the Board
of Directors of the petitioner
corporation, on Section 5(b) of
P.D. No. 902, has no factual
and legal basis.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A
provides that the SEC39 shall
have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving the following:
(a) devices or schemes
employed by, or any acts of, the
board of directors, business
associates, its officers or
partners, amounting to fraud
and misrepresentation which
may be detrimental to the
interest of the public and/or of
the stockholders, partners,
members of association or
organizations registered with
the Commission, and
(b) controversies arising out of
intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among
stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all
of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of
which they are stockholders,
members or associates,
respectively.
In Fabia v. Court of
40
Appeals, the Court explained
that Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-
A should be taken in
conjunction with Section 6 of
the law. It then proceeded to
explain:
In synthesis, Sec. 5 of PD 902-
A mandates that cases involving
fraudulent actions and devices
which are detrimental to the
interest of stockholders,
members or associates and
directors of the corporation are
within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the
SEC. Taken in conjunction with
Sec. 6 of the same law, it will
be gathered that the fraudulent
acts/schemes which the SEC
shall exclusively investigate
and prosecute are those "in
violation of any law or rules
and regulations administered
and enforced by the
Commission" alone. This
investigative and prosecutorial
powers of the SEC are further
"without prejudice to any
liability for violation of any
provision of The Revised Penal
Code."
From the foregoing, it can thus
be concluded that the filing of
the civil/intra-corporate case
before the SEC does not
preclude the simultaneous and
concomitant filing of a criminal
action before the regular courts;
such that, a fraudulent act may
give rise to liability for
violation of the rules and
regulations of the SEC
cognizable by the SEC itself, as
well as criminal liability for
violation of the Revised Penal
Code cognizable by the regular
courts, both charges to be filed
and proceeded independently,
and may be simultaneously
with the other.41
Thus, the filing of a petition in
the SEC for the nullification of
the Resolution of May 2, 1995
issued by the Chairman and two
members of the Board of
Directors of petitioner MPI,
which authorized the filing of
criminal cases against
respondent Umezawa, was not
a bar to his prosecution for
estafa and qualified theft for his
alleged fraudulent and delictual
acts. The relationship of the
party-litigants with each other
or the position held by
petitioner as a corporate officer
in respondent MPI during the
time he committed the crime
becomes merely incidental and
holds no bearing on
jurisdiction. What is essential is
that the fraudulent acts are
likewise of a criminal nature
and hence cognizable by the
regular courts.42 Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that
respondent Umezawa was the
president and general manager
of petitioner MPI and a
stockholder thereof, the latter
may still be prosecuted for the
crimes charged. The alleged
fraudulent acts of respondent
Umezawa in this case constitute
the element of abuse of
confidence, deceit or fraudulent
means, and damage under
Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code on estafa.43
We agree with the
encompassing disquisitions of
the CA in its decision, to wit:
A dispute involving the
corporation and its stockholders
is not necessarily an intra-
corporate dispute cognizable
only by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Nor
does it ipso facto negate the
jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court over the subject
cases. The Supreme Court
citing the case of Viray v. Court
of Appeals (G.R. No. 92481,
191 SCRA 308 [1990]) in Torio
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
107293, March 2, 1994, 230
SCRA 626) held:
"It should be obvious that not
every conflict between a
corporation and its
stockholders involves corporate
matters that only the SEC can
resolve in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers."
As the Supreme Court further
ruled in the Torio case that "a
contrary interpretation would
distort the meaning and intent
of P.D. 902-A, the law re-
organizing the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The
better policy in determining
which body has jurisdiction
over a case would be to
consider not only the
relationship of the parties but
also the nature of the questions
raised in the subject of the
controversy.44
On the last issue, we find and
so hold that the Informations
state all the essential elements
of estafa and qualified theft. It
was adequately alleged that
respondent Umezawa, being the
President and General Manager
of petitioner MPI, stole and
misappropriated the properties
of his employer, more
specifically, petitioner MPI. As
expostulated by the CA in its
decision:
In any event, the allegations
in the informations, if
hypothetically admitted, are
sufficient to bind Umezawa to
the charges of qualified theft
and estafa. As aptly ruled by the
court a quo in its Order of July
25, 1995, all the elements of the
offense of qualified theft are
present. There is no basis for
claiming otherwise.
Furthermore, the private
offended party, as well as the
subject matter of the felonious
taking and the ownership
thereof, have been adequately
indicated or identified leaving
no room for any doubt on these
matters. Considering that the
motions to quash of September
30, 1998 are fundamentally
rehash of the motion to quash
filed on May 29, 1995 and the
culpable acts subject of the new
informations are virtually the
same as the first information
filed against Umezawa, there is
no conceivable reason why the
court a quo abandoned its
previous stand and controverted
itself in regard the sufficiency
of the informations.
In our considered view, and as
the court a quo had correctly
held in its Order of May 26,
1996, "even a SEC ruling
voiding the resolution
authorizing the filing of
criminal charges versus the
accused Hajime Umezawa can
have no bearing on the validity
of the informations filed in
these three criminal cases as
pointed out by private
complainant, the public
offenses of qualified theft and
estafa can [be] prosecuted de
officio." The resolution of the
office of the prosecutor on the
preliminary investigation as
well as the re-investigation
conducted on the letter-
complaint filed by private
complainant company
sufficiently established prima
facie case against the accused
and the legality or illegality of
the constitution of the board
which authorized the filing of
the complaint does not
materially affect either the
informations filed against
Umezawa or the pending
criminal proceedings. As
petitioners contend, the action
is now between the People of
the Philippines and herein
private respondent.45
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petitions
are GRANTED. The Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA- accomplices or accessories with
G.R. SP No. 52440 dated the public officers or employees
August 8, 2001 is REVERSED including those employed in
and SET ASIDE. The Decision government-owned or
of the Court of Appeals dated controlled corporations, they
September 2, 1999 is shall be tried jointly with said
AFFIRMED. public officers and employees.
o Sec, 4, Presidential Decree Where an accused is tried for
No. 1606, as amended by Rep. any of the above offenses and
Act the evidence is insufficient to
establish the offense charged,
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The he may nevertheless be
Sandiganbayan shall have convicted and sentenced for the
jurisdiction over: offense proved, included in that
which is charged.
(a) Violations of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, Any provision of law or the
otherwise, known as the Anti- Rules of Court to the contrary
Graft and Corrupt Practices notwithstanding, the criminal
Act, and Republic Act No. action and the corresponding
1379; civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the
(b) Crimes committed by public offense charged shall at all
officers and employees times be simultaneously
including those employed in instituted with, and jointly
government-owned or determined in the same
controlled corporations, proceeding by, the
embraced in Title VII of the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the
Revised Penal Code, whether criminal action being deemed
simple or complexed with other to necessarily carry with it the
crimes; and filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of
such action shall be recognized;
(c) Other crimes or offenses
Provided, however, that, in
committed by public officers or
cases within the exclusive
employees, including those
jurisdiction of the
employed in government-
Sandiganbayan, where the civil
owned or controlled
action had therefore been filed
corporations, in relation to their
separately with a regular court
office.
but judgment therein has not
yet been rendered and the
The jurisdiction herein criminal case is hereafter filed
conferred shall be original and with the Sandiganbayan, said
exclusive if the offense charged civil action shall be transferred
is punishable by a penalty to the Sandiganbayan for
higher than prision consolidation and joint
correccional, or its equivalent, determination with the criminal
except as herein provided; in action, otherwise, the criminal
other offenses, it shall be action may no longer be filed
concurrent with the regular with the Sandiganbayan, its
courts. exclusive jurisdiction over the
same notwithstanding, but may
In case private individuals are be filed and prosecuted only in
charged as co-principals,
the regular courts of competent
jurisdiction; Provided, further,
that, in cases within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the regular
courts, where either the
criminal or civil action is first
filed with the regular courts, the
corresponding civil or criminal
action, as the case may be, shall
only be filed with the regular
courts of competent
jurisdiction.
Excepted from the foregoing
provisions, during martial law,
are criminal cases against
officers and members of the
armed forces in the active
service.
o Sec. 7(b), Rep. Act No. 1-
L25, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 9282
Section 7. Section 7 of the
same Act is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA
shall exercise:
"a. Exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by
appeal, as herein provided:
"1. Decisions of the
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds
of internal revenue taxes, fees
or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or
other laws administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue;
"2. Inaction by the
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds
of internal revenue taxes, fees
or other charges, penalties in
relations thereto, or other
matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue
Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, where the
National Internal Revenue
Code provides a specific period
of action, in which case the
inaction shall be deemed a
denial;
"3. Decisions, orders or
resolutions of the Regional
Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved
by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate
jurisdiction;
"4. Decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs in
cases involving liability for
customs duties, fees or other
money charges, seizure,
detention or release of property
affected, fines, forfeitures or
other penalties in relation
thereto, or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or
other laws administered by the
Bureau of Customs;
"5. Decisions of the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals
in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases
involving the assessment and
taxation of real property
originally decided by the
provincial or city board of
assessment appeals;
"6. Decisions of the Secretary
of Finance on customs cases
elevated to him automatically
for review from decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs
which are adverse to the
Government under Section
2315 of the Tariff and Customs
Code;
"7. Decisions of the Secretary
of Trade and Industry, in the
case of nonagricultural product,
commodity or article, and the
Secretary of Agriculture in the
case of agricultural product,
commodity or article, involving
dumping and countervailing
duties under Section 301 and
302, respectively, of the Tariff
and Customs Code, and
safeguard measures under
Republic Act No. 8800, where
either party may appeal the
decision to impose or not to
impose said duties.
"b. Jurisdiction over cases
involving criminal offenses as
herein provided:
"1. Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all criminal
offenses arising from violations
of the National Internal
Revenue Code or Tariff and
Customs Code and other laws
administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue or the Bureau
of Customs: Provided, however,
That offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph
where the principal amount o
taxes and fees, exclusive of
charges and penalties, claimed
is less than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) or where there
is no specified amount claimed
shall be tried by the regular
Courts and the jurisdiction of
the CTA shall be appellate. Any
provision of law or the Rules of
Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of
civil liability for taxes and
penalties shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with,
and jointly determined in the
same proceeding by the CTA,
the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily
carry with it the filing of the
civil action, and no right to
reserve the filling of such civil
action separately from the
criminal action will be
recognized
"2. Exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in criminal
offenses:
. Over peals from the
judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in tax cases originally
decided by them, in their
respected territorial jurisdiction.
"b. Over petitions for review of
the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax
cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in their respective jurisdiction.
"c. Jurisdiction over tax
collection cases as herein
provided:
"1. Exclusive original
jurisdiction in tax collection
cases involving final and
executory assessments for
taxes, fees, charges and
penalties: Provided, however,
That collection cases where the
principal amount of taxes and
fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties, claimed is less than
One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be tried
by the proper Municipal Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court
and Regional Trial Court.
"2. Exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in tax collection
cases:
. Over appeals from the
judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial On 7 February 2009, petitioner
Courts in tax collection cases filed two (2) Informations1
originally decided by them, in before the Regional Trial Court
their respective territorial (RTC) of Iloilo City against
jurisdiction. petitions for private respondent John Rey
review of the judgments, Prevendido for Violation of
resolutions or orders of the Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of
Regional Trial Courts in the
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
Exercise of their appellate
or the Comprehensive
jurisdiction over tax collection
cases originally decided by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, The cases were raffled to
Municipal Trial Courts and Branch 36, a designated special
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, court pursuant to R.A. 9165,
in their respective jurisdiction." presided by Judge Victor E.
Gelvezon. Soon after, however,
Sec. 90, Rep. Act No.9165 Judge Gelvezon disclosed that
Coreen Gemarino, the
o Peoplev. Hon. Azarraga, Philippine Drug Enforcement
G.R.Nos. L87717 Agency (PDEA) operative who
&187L27,L2
conducted the entrapment
PEOPLE OF THE operation against private
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, respondent, had close family
vs.HON. JOSE D. ties with him. Thus, in order to
AZARRAGA and JOHN preserve the integrity of the
REY PREVENDIDO, court, Judge Gelvezon issued
Respondents. an Order2 dated 17 February
2009 inhibiting himself from
In the present Petition for trying the case. The cases were
Prohibition with Prayer for then reassigned to the other
Temporary Restraining special court, Branch 25,
Order/Preliminary Mandatory presided by Judge Evelyn E.
Injunction under Rule 65 of the Salao.
Rules of Court, petitioner
On 24 February 2009, Judge
questions the legality of
Salao also issued an Order3
Chapter V, Section 9 of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC or the whereby she inhibited herself
"Guidelines on the Selection for the reason that Coreen
and Appointment of Executive Gemarino was a cousin; thus,
Judges and Defining Their the cases were endorsed to the
Powers, Prerogatives and Office of the Executive Judge
Duties" issued by this Court on for reassignment.
27 January 2004, in relation to Citing Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M.
Section 90 of the No. 03-8-02-SC, Executive
Comprehensive Dangerous Judge Antonio M. Natino
Drugs Act of 2002.
ordered the Clerk of Court to
forward the entire records of
the cases to Branch 37 presided
The antecedent facts are as over by public respondent, the
follows: pairing judge of Branch 36,
which was the special court that
originally handled the cases.4
On 16 March 2009, however, as
soon as public respondent
proceeded with the cases,
Prosecutor Kenneth John
Amamanglon filed a Motion to
Transfer Case to a Branch of
Competent Jurisdiction.5 He
questioned the jurisdiction of
public respondent to hear the
cases, citing Sec. 90 of R.A.
9165. Prosecutor Amamanglon
also claimed that, as the
prosecutor assigned to Branch
37, he was not among the
prosecutors who had been
designated to handle cases
exclusively involving violations
of R.A. 9165.
On the same day, respondent
judge denied the motion on
three grounds, to wit:
1. This motion ought not to
have been filed in this court for
lack of legal basis;
2. This court is not without
jurisdiction to hear the instant
case;
3. The matter about the
appearance of Trial Prosecutor
Kenneth John Amamanglon
should have been addressed to
the Department concerned.6
Respondent judge thus set the
hearing on the Motion for
Admission to Bail7 filed on 10
February 2008. He directed the
city prosecutor to assign an
assistant city prosecutor to
handle the case effective 20
March 2009.
Prosecutor Amamanglon,
however, moved for a
reconsideration8 of respondent
judges Order, contending that
the trial court needed a special
designation from this Court in
order to have jurisdiction over
the cases. Thus, Prosecutor
Amamanglon concluded, absent
the special designation,
respondent court should remand
the cases to the Office of the
Executive Judge for re-raffling
to another court specially
designated pursuant to R.A.
9165. To support its contention,
petitioner further cited this
Courts 11 October 2005
Resolution in A.M. No. 05-9-
03-SC, which clarified whether
drug courts should be included
in the regular raffle.
Respondent judge denied the
Motion for Reconsideration in
its Order dated 20 March
2009.9 He held that A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC should be deemed
to have modified the
designation of special courts for
drug cases. He declared that,
under the circumstances
enumerated in A.M. No. 03-8-
02-SC, Branch 37 itself became
a special court. He further ruled
that A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC was
inapplicable.
On 23 March 2009, the city
prosecutor endorsed the
assailed Orders of respondent
judge to the Office of the
Solicitor General for the
appropriate review and filing of
the necessary action.10 Thus,
on 24 March 2009, petitioner
filed the present petition before
this Court.
On 27 March 2009, while the
Petition for Prohibition was
pending, respondent judge
issued an Order11 inhibiting
himself from hearing the case
after private respondent alleged
that the former was biased for
the prosecution. The cases were
thereafter transferred to Branch
35, also a regular court,
presided by Judge Fe Gallon-
Gayanilo.
Absent a temporary restraining
order from this Court, the trial
court proceeded to hear the
cases.
The present petition raises two
(2) issues, to wit:
I. WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE
DRUG CASES IN CRIMINAL
CASE NOS. 09-68815/16
DESPITE HIS ASSIGNMENT
TO A REGULAR COURT
II. WHETHER OR NOT A.M.
NO. 03-8-02-SC IS IN
CONFORMITY WITH
SECTION 90 OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9165, MANDATING
THE DESIGNATION OF
SPECIAL COURTS TO
EXCLUSIVELY TRY AND
HEAR DRUG CASES12
At the outset, it is an
established policy that parties
must observe the hierarchy of
courts before they can seek
relief directly from this Court.
The rationale for this rule is
twofold: (a) it would be an
imposition upon the limited
time of this Court; and (b) it
would inevitably result in a
delay, intended or otherwise, in
the adjudication of cases, which
in some instances, had to be
remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or
as better equipped to resolve
the issues because this Court is
not a trier of facts.13 It is only
for special and compelling
reasons that this Court shall
exercise its primary jurisdiction
over the extraordinary remedy
of writ of prohibition. However,
in the case at bar, since it is
only the Supreme Court itself
that can clarify the assailed
guidelines, petitioner is
exempted from this rule.
The petition, however, must
fail.
The crux of the matter in the
present case is whether or not
this Court violated Sec. 90 of
R.A. 9165 when it issued A.M.
03-8-02-SC, particularly Chap.
V, Sec. 9, which prescribes the
manner in which the executive
judge reassigns cases in
instances of inhibition or
disqualification of judges
sitting in special courts.
Petitioner insists that should
respondent judge (now Judge
Fe Gallon-Gayanilo of Branch
35) continue hearing and trying
the case, it "would result in the
circumvention of the legislative
conferment of jurisdiction to a
court to exclusively try and
hear drug offenses only."14
Contrary to the assertion of
petitioner, this Court did not
commit any violation of R.A.
9165 when it issued the assailed
guidelines. Rather, it merely
obeyed Article VIII, Sec. 5(5)
of the 1987 Constitution, which
mandates that the rules
promulgated by this Court
should provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, in
conformity with the right of all
persons to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.15 As this Court stated
in San Ildefonso Lines v. Court
of Appeals,16 there must be a
renewed adherence to the time-
honored dictum that procedural
rules are designed not to defeat,
but to safeguard, the ends of
substantial justice.
Petitioner grounds its assertion
on Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165, which
states:
Jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court shall designate special
courts from among the existing
Regional Trial Courts in each
judicial region to exclusively
try and hear cases involving
violations of this Act. The
number of courts designated in
each judicial region shall be
based on the population and the
number of cases pending in
their respective jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
Trial of the case under this
Section shall be finished by the
court not later than sixty (60)
days from the date of the filing
of the information. Decision on
said cases shall be rendered
within a period of fifteen (15)
days from the date of
submission of the case for
resolution.
Petitioner interprets the above
provision to mean that a court
must be specifically designated
by the Supreme Court as a
special court. But what is Chap.
V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC if not an express
designation of a special court?
Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-
8-02-SC provides:
Raffle and re-assignment of
cases in special courts where
judge is disqualified or
voluntarily inhibits
himself/herself from hearing
case. (a) Where a judge in a
court designated to try and
decide
xxx xxx xxx
(3) cases involving violations
of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
or ...
is disqualified or voluntarily
inhibits himself/herself from
hearing a case, the following
guidelines shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) Where there are more than
two special courts of the same
nature in the station, the
Executive Judge shall
immediately assign the case by
raffle to the other or another
special court of the same
nature. In case the Presiding
Judge of the other special court
is also disqualified or inhibits
himself/herself, the case shall
be forwarded to the pairing
judge of the special court which
originally handled the said case.
If the pairing judge is also
disqualified or inhibits
himself/herself, the case shall
be raffled to the other regular
courts. At the next raffle, an
additional case shall be
assigned to the disqualified or
inhibiting judge/s to replace the
case so removed from
his/her/their court... (Emphasis
supplied.)
Under R.A. 9165, Congress
empowered this Court with the
full discretion to designate
special courts to hear, try and
decide drug cases. It was
precisely in the exercise of this
discretionary power that the
powers of the executive judge
were included in Chap. V, Sec.
9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC vis-
-vis Sec. 5(5) of Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
in cases of inhibition or
disqualification, the executive
judge is mandated to assign the
drug case to a regular court in
the following order: first, to the
pairing judge of the special
court where the case was
originally assigned; and,
second, if the pairing judge is
likewise disqualified or has
inhibited himself, then to
another regular court through a
raffle. Under these exceptional
circumstances, this Court
designated the regular court,
ipso facto, as a special court
but only for that case. Being a
"designated special court," it is
likewise bound to follow the
relevant rules in trying and
deciding the drug case pursuant
to R.A. 9165.
Petitioner also contends that the
legislative intent of R.A. 9165
is "to make use of the expertise
of trial judges in complicated
and technical rules of the
special drug law." Thus,
petitioner suggests that in
instances in which all the
judges of special courts have
inhibited themselves or are
otherwise disqualified, the
venue for the affected drug
cases should be transferred to
the nearest station that has
designated special courts.
Petitioners suggestion is ill-
advised. To subscribe to this
suggestion is to defeat the
purpose of the law.
Undoubtedly, petitioners
unwarranted suggestion would
entail the use of precious
resources, time and effort to
transfer the cases to another
station. On the other hand, the
assailed guidelines provide for
a much more practical and
expedient manner of hearing
and deciding the cases. To
reiterate, over and above
utilizing the expertise of trial
judges, the rationale behind
Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165 and Chap.
V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC is to effect an efficient
administration of justice and
speedy disposition of cases, as
well as to breathe life into the
policy enunciated in Sec. 2 of
R.A. 9165, to wit:
Declaration of policy. It is the
policy of the State to safeguard
the integrity of its territory and
the well-being of its citizenry
particularly the youth, from the
harmful effects of dangerous
drugs on their physical and
mental well-being, and to
defend the same against acts or
omissions detrimental to their
development and preservation.
In view of the foregoing, the
State needs to enhance further
the efficacy of the law against
dangerous drugs, it being one
of today's more serious social
ills.
Toward this end, the
government shall pursue an
intensive and unrelenting
campaign against the
trafficking and use of
dangerous drugs and other
similar substances through an
integrated system of planning,
implementation and
enforcement of anti-drug abuse
policies, programs, and
projects. The government shall
however aim to achieve a
balance in the national drug
control program so that people
with legitimate medical needs
are not prevented from being
treated with adequate amounts
of appropriate medications,
which include the use of
dangerous drugs.
It is further declared the policy
of the State to provide effective
mechanisms or measures to re-
integrate into society
individuals who have fallen
victims to drug abuse or
dangerous drug dependence
through sustainable programs
of treatment and rehabilitation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As a matter of fact, this Court
also issued similar guidelines
with regard to environmental
cases,17 election cases
involving elective municipal
officials,18 and cases that
involve killings of political
activists and members of
media.19 Foremost in its mind
is the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Petitioner further points out that
this Court issued A.M. No. 05-
9-03-SC to define the phrase
"to exclusively try and hear
cases involving violations of
this Act" to mean "...[c]ourts
designated as special courts for
drug cases shall try and hear
drug-related cases only, i.e.,
cases involving violations of
RA 9165, to the exclusion of
other courts." Hence, petitioner
submits, drug cases should not
be assigned to regular courts
according to the procedure
provided in A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC; in other words, the two
issuances contradict each other.
Again, this Court disagrees.
Petitioner underestimates the
rule-making power of this
Court. Nothing in A.M. No. 05-
9-03-SC or in A.M. No. 03-8-
03-SC suggests that they
contradict each other. In fact,
both were issued with a
common rationale, that is, to
"expeditiously resolve criminal
cases involving violations of
R.A. 9165," especially in the
light of the strict time frame
provided in Sec. 90 of R.A.
9165. Both provide for the
guidelines regarding the
assignment of drug cases to
special courts. Thus, A.M. No.
05-9-03-SC provides for the
exemption of special courts
from the regular raffle under
normal circumstances, while
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provide
for the assignment of drug
cases to special courts except
under special circumstances
that would warrant
reassignment to a regular court.
Moreover, the exemption of
special courts from the regular
raffle was not established as an
ironclad rule.1avvphi1 A.M.
No. 05-9-03-SC does in fact
allow special courts to acquire
jurisdiction over cases that are
not drug cases. In the interest of
justice, executive judges may
recommend to the Supreme
Court the inclusion of drug
courts in the regular raffle, and
this Court has the discretion to
approve the recommendation,
as the Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, Executive
Judges and presiding judges of
special courts for drug cases
shall hereby observe the
following guidelines:
xxx xxx xxx
4. If, in the opinion of
Executive Judges, the caseload
of certain drug courts allows
their inclusion in the regular
raffle without adversely
affecting their ability to
expeditiously resolve the drug
cases assigned to them and their
inclusion in the regular raffle The sentence, however, shall be Dangerous Drugs Act, as
becomes necessary to suspended without need of amended;
decongest the caseload of other application pursuant to
branches, the concerned Ptesidential Decree No. 603, j) Violations of Republic Act
Executive Judges shall otherwise known as the "Child No. 7610, otherwise known as
recommend to this Court the and Youth Welfare Code"; the "Special Protection of
inclusion of drug courts in their Children Against Child Abuse,
jurisdiction in the regular raffle. b) Petitions for guardianship, Exploitation and
custody of children, habeas Discrimination Act," as
The concerned drug courts shall
corpus in relation to the latter; amended by Republic Act No.
remain exempt from the regular
7658; and
raffle until the recommendation
c) Petitions for adoption of
is approved. (Emphasis
children and the revocation k) Cases of domestic violence
supplied.) thereof; against:

d) Complaints for annulment of 1) Women - which are acts of

In conclusion, the two sets of
guidelines are examples of this
Courts foresight and prudence
in the exercise of its rule-
making power. These
guidelines were issued to
prevent or address possible
scenarios that might hinder the
proper administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Petition for
Prohibition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
o Secs. 5(a), (j), and (k), Rep.
Act No. 8369
Section 5. Jurisdiction
offamily Courts. - The Family
Courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or
more of the accused is below
eighteen (18) years of age but
not less than nine (9) years of
age but not less than nine (9)
years of age or where one or
more of the victims is a minor
at the time of the commission
of the offense: Provided, That if
the minor is found guilty, the
court shall promulgate sentence
and ascertain any civil liability
which the accused may have
incurred.
marriage, declaration of nullity
of marriage and those relating
to marital status and property
relations of husband and wife
or those living together under
different status and agreements,
and petitions for dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains;
e) Petitions for support and/or
acknowledgment;
f) Summary judicial
proceedings brought under the
provisions of Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as
the "Family Code of the
Philippines";
g) Petitions for declaration of
status of children as abandoned,
dependent o neglected children,
petitions for voluntary or
involuntary commitment of
children; the suspension,
termination, or restoration of
parental authority and other
cases cognizable under
Presidential Decree No.603,
Executive Order No. 56, (Series
of 1986), and other related
laws;
h) Petitions for the constitution
of the family home;
i) Cases against minors
cognizable under the
gender based violence that
results, or are likely to result in
physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering
to women; and other forms of
physical abuse such as battering
or threats and coercion which
violate a woman's personhood,
integrity and freedom
movement; and
2) Children - which include the
commission of all forms of
abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, violence, and
discrimination and all other
conditions prejudicial to their
development.
If an act constitutes a criminal
offense, the accused or batterer
shall be subject to criminal
proceedings and the
corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of
the above matters should arise
as an incident in any case
pending in the regular courts,
said incident shall be
determined in that court.
o Sec. 21-, Rep. Act No.
1OL75
JURISDICTION
Section 21. Jurisdiction.
The Regional Trial Court shall
have jurisdiction over any
violation of the provisions of
this Act. including any violation
committed by a Filipino
national regardless of the place
of commission. Jurisdiction
shall lie if any of the elements
was committed within the
Philippines or committed with
the use of any computer system
wholly or partly situated in the
country, or when by such
commission any damage is
caused to a natural or juridical
person who, at the time the
offense was committed, was in
the Philippines.
There shall be designated
special cybercrime courts
manned by specially trained
judges to handle cybercrime
cases.
B. The People of the
Philippines
o Sec. 2, Rule 1-10 (unless
otherwise specified, citation of
a Rule
refers to the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure)
o Sec. 4, Rule l-10
o Presidential Decree No. l-
275, as amended
o People v. Hon. Garfin, G.R.
No. L53176,29 March 2004
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.HON. ZEIDA AURORA B.
GARFIN, In her capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC,
Branch 19, of the City of
Naga and SERAFIN
SABALLEGUE, respondents.
For determination in this
petition is a question in
procedural law - - - whether an
information filed by a state
prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of
the city or provincial prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor should
be dismissed after the accused
has entered his plea under the
information.
Petitioner comes before us with
a petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court,
seeking to declare as null and
void the Orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Naga
City, Branch 19 dated February
26, 20021 and April 3,
2
2002 which dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction the case of
People vs. Serafin Saballegue,
Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-
0597, and denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are
undisputed.
On June 22, 2001, private
respondent was charged with
violation of Section 22(a) in
relation to Sections 19(b) and
28(e) of Republic Act No.
8282, otherwise known as the
"Social Security Act," in an
information which reads:
The undersigned State
Prosecutor of the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor,
Legazpi City, accuses
SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, as
proprietor of Saballegue
Printing Press with business
address at 16 San Mateo St.,
Peafrancia Ave., Naga City for
Violation of Section 22(a) in
relation to Sections 19(b) and
28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise
known as the Social Security
Act of 1997, committed as
follows:
That on or about February 1990
and up to the present, in the
City of Naga, Philippines,
within the functional
jurisdiction of SSS Naga
Branch and the territorial
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named
accused, while being the
proprietor of Saballegue
Printing Press, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally refuse and fail and
continuously refuse and fail to
remit the premiums due for his
employee to the SSS in the
amount of SIX THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-
THREE PESOS (6,533.00),
Philippine Currency,
representing SSS and EC
premiums for the period from
January 1990 to December
1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty
per month for late remittance in
the amount of ELEVEN
THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED FORTY-THREE
PESOS and 28/100
(11,143.28) computed as of 15
March 2000, despite lawful
demands by letter in violation
of the above-cited provisions of
the law, to the damage and
prejudice of the SSS and the
public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Legazpi City for Naga City. 22
June 2001.
(sgd.) ROMULO SJ.
TOLENTINOState Prosecutor
Special Prosecutor on SSS
Cases in Region V3
The information contains a
certification signed by State
Prosecutor Romulo SJ.
Tolentino which states:
I hereby certify that the
required investigation in this
case has been conducted by the
undersigned Special Prosecutor
in accordance with law and
under oath as officer of the
court, that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the
offense has been committed,
that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and that the filing
of the information is with the
prior authority and approval of
the Regional State Prosecutor.4
The case was raffled to Branch
19 of the Regional Trial Court
of Naga City presided by
respondent judge Hon. Zeida
Aurora B. Garfin. On
September 24, 2001, accused
Serafin Saballegue pleaded not
guilty to the charge and the case
was set for pre-trial.5 Three
days thereafter, the accused
filed a motion to dismiss6 on
the ground that the information
was filed without the prior
written authority or approval of
the city prosecutor as required
under Section 4, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Court.7
The People, through State
Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an
opposition,8 against which the
accused filed a rejoinder.9The
People filed a reply to the
rejoinder10 on December 21,
2001. A rejoinder to the
reply11 was filed by the accused
on January 21, 2002.
After considering the
arguments raised, the trial court
granted the motion to dismiss in
its first questioned Order dated
February 26, 2002, to wit:
After considering the respective
arguments raised by the parties,
the Court believes and so
resolves that the Information
has not been filed in accordance
with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule
112 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, thus:
Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x
No complaint or information
may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor
without the prior written
authority or approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.
Expresio unius est exclusio
alterius.
The Information will readily
show that it has not complied
with this rule as it has not been
approved by the City
Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the
defendants plea to the
Information is not a waiver to
file a motion to dismiss or to
quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. By express
provision of the rules and by a
long line of decisions, questions
of want of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the
proceedings (People vs.
Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750).
The Supreme Court in Villa vs.
Ibaez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on
lack of authority of the officer
who filed the information and
on jurisdiction at the same time,
pertinent portions run as
follows:
The defendant had pleaded to
the information before he filed
a motion to quash, and it is
contended that by his plea he
waived all objections to the
information. The contention is
correct as far as formal
objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear
implication, if not by express
provision of section 10 of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, and
by a long line of uniform
decisions, questions of want of
jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings.
Now, the objection to the
respondents actuations goes to
the very foundations of
jurisdiction. It is a valid
information signed by a
competent officer which,
among other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over
the person of the accused and
the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with
this view, an infirmity of the
nature noted in the information
cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by
express consent.
Prosecutor Tolentino also
contends that having been duly
designated to assist the City
Prosecutor in the investigation
and prosecution of all SSS
cases by the Regional State
prosecutor as alter ego of the
Secretary of Justice in Region
V, then that authority may be
given to other than the City
Prosecutor. The Court finds this
contention to be devoid of
merit. The Regional State
Prosecutor is not the alter ego
of the Secretary of Justice but a
mere subordinate official and if
ever the former files cases, it is
by virtue of a delegated
authority by the Secretary of
Justice. Potestas delegada non
potesta delegare (sic) what
has been delegated cannot be
redelegated.
In his opposition, the state
prosecutor also attached a
memorandum dated June 22,
2001 by Regional State
Prosecutor Santiago M.
Turingan addressed to
Provincial Prosecutor and City
Prosecutors of Region V
directing them to inhibit and to
append the following
NOTATION after the
certification in the Information
for filing.
NOTATION: The herein
City/Provincial Prosecutor is
inhibiting from this case and
the Special Prosecution Team
on SSS Cases in Region V is
authorized to dispose of the
case without my approval in
view of the request for
inhibition of the SSS Regional
Manager as granted by the
Regional State Prosecutor.
A perusal of the Information,
however, would readily show
that nowhere in the Information
has the City Prosecutor of Naga
City appended the above-
quoted notation/inhibition. At
most, the authority of the
special prosecutor is only for
the conduct of preliminary
investigations and the
prosecution of cases after they
are filed. The Court, however,
believes that the filing of this
Information must be in
conformity with the Rules on
Criminal Procedure,
particularly Section 4 of Rule
112.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered and for lack of
jurisdiction, the Court hereby
resolves to DISMISS this case
without pronouncement as to
cost.
SO ORDERED.12
A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the People
contending that as a special
prosecutor designated by the
regional state prosecutor to
handle SSS cases within
Region V, State Prosecutor
Tolentino is authorized to file
the information involving
violations of the SSS law
without need of prior approval
from the city
prosecutor. 13 Letters of
commendation from Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito
Zuo14 and Secretary Hernando
Perez15 were offered as proof to
show that State Prosecutor
Tolentinos authority to file the
information was recognized. In
response, the defense pointed
out in its opposition that the
motion for reconsideration
lacked a notice of hearing,
hence it is pro forma or a mere
scrap of paper. 16
On April 3, 2002, respondent
judge issued the second
questioned Order which reads:
Acting upon the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by State
Prosecutor Romulo SJ.
Tolentino, Special Prosecutor
on SSS cases in Region V, and
it appearing that the same has
failed to comply with the
requirement of notice
prescribed in Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
the same is hereby DENIED for
being a mere scrap of paper.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, this petition by the
People through Regional State
Prosecutor Santiago Turingan
and State Prosecutor Romulo
SJ. Tolentino. Petitioner
attributes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the
part of respondent judge, viz:18
1. RESPONDENT JUDGE
DISMISSED THE
INFORMATION WITHOUT
THE REQUIRED
SUPPORTING FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASES;
2. RESPONDENT JUDGE
DELIBERATELY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED
THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN FAVOR OF
THE PROSECUTION
WITHOUT THE REQUIRED
SUFFICIENCY OF
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE. THE
WORD "MAY" IN SEC. 4,
RULE 112 OF THE RULES
OF COURT IS NOT
MANDATORY;
3. RESPONDENT JUDGE
COMMITTED GRAVE
ERROR IN DELIBERATELY
IGNORING THE
JUDICIALLY KNOWN
INHIBITION OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR AND THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE
ON THE MATTER;
4. RESPONDENT JUDGE
GRAVELY ABUSED HER
DISCRETION IN
INTERFERING WITH THE
PURELY EXECUTIVE
FUNCTION OF FILING AN
INFORMATION BY RULING
ON THE AUTHORITY OF
THE FILING OFFICER TO
FILE THE INFORMATION.
The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed its
comment19 in compliance with
this Courts Resolution dated
September 23, 2002.20 It opines
that the dismissal of the
information is mandated under
Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Private respondent contends
that:21 1) the instant petition
was filed out of time; 2) the
special State Prosecutor is only
authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation and
prosecution of SSS cases and
not to sign the information; and
3) the City Prosecutor did not
expressly inhibit himself from
handling SSS cases nor signing
the information.
We shall first resolve the
procedural issues. Respondent
contends that the motion for
reconsideration filed on April 1,
2002 is late because it was filed
eighteen days after March 14,
2002, the date when petitioner
received the first questioned
order. Respondent has
overlooked that the 15th day
after March 14 is a Good
Friday. Hence, petitioners last
day to file the motion for
reconsideration was on the next
working day after Good Friday,
April 1.22
Next, respondent argues that
having been considered as a
mere scrap of paper, the motion
for reconsideration of the
petitioner did not toll the
running of the reglementary
period. Respondent, however,
erroneously assumes that the
present case is an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45. As
stated at the outset, this is an
original petition for certiorari
and mandamus under Rule 65.
Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court is clear. It provides that
"(a) pro forma motion for new
trial or reconsideration shall not
toll the reglementary period of
appeal." (emphases supplied)
Hence, the same provision has
no application in the case at bar.
The reckoning date is the
receipt of the second
questioned Order and not the
receipt of the first. Section 4,
Rule 65, as amended by En
Banc Resolution A.M. No. 00-
2-03-SC, September 1, 2000,
provides, viz:
Sec. 4. When and where
petition filed.-- The petition
may be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution.
In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the
sixty (60)- day period shall be
counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.
xxxxxxxxx
As shown by the records,
petitioner received the first
questioned order dated
February 26, 2002 on March
14, 2002.23 A motion for
reconsideration was timely filed
on April 1, 200224 which was
dismissed for lack of notice of
hearing in an Order dated April
3, 2002.25 This second
questioned order was received
by petitioner on April 11,
2002.26 A motion for extension
of time to file a petition for
review on certiorari was filed
on April 18, 2002.27 A motion
for leave to file and admit the
instant petition for certiorari
and mandamus was filed on
May 29, 2002.28Having been
filed within the reglementary
period, petitioners motion for
leave to file the instant petition
was granted in this Courts
Resolution dated July 15,
2002.29
We now come to the other
issue: whether the prior written
authority and approval of the
city or provincial prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor is
necessary in filing the
information at bar.
Petitioner takes the unbending
view that the approval of the
city or provincial prosecutor is
no longer required. It is
contended that the Regional
State Prosecutor has already
directed the city or provincial
prosecutor to inhibit from
handling SSS cases.30 Petitioner
cites the letter of Regional State
Prosecutor Santiago M.
Turingan to SSS Regional
Director in Naga City dated
June 6, 199731 and copies of
Regional Orders No. 97-024-
A32 and 2001-03333 dated July
14, 1997 and September 28,
2001, respectively, showing the
designation of State Prosecutor
Tolentino as special prosecutor
for SSS cases in Region V.
Petitioner relies on Galvez, et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al.34 and Sanchez v. Demetriou,
et al.35 to prop up its contention
that given the designation of
State Prosecutor Tolentino, the
city prosecutor need not
participate in the filing and
prosecution of the information
in the case at bar.
We disagree. Under Presidential
Decree No. 1275, the powers of
a Regional State Prosecutor are
as follows:
Sec. 8. The Regional State
Prosecution Office: Functions
of Regional State Prosecutor. -
The Regional State Prosecutor
shall, under the control of the
Secretary of Justice, have the
following functions:
a) Implement policies, plans,
programs, memoranda, orders,
circulars and rules and
regulations of the Department
of Justice relative to the
investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases in his region.
b) Exercise immediate
administrative supervision over
all provincial and city fiscals
and other prosecuting officers
of provinces and cities
comprised within his region.
c) Prosecute any case arising
within the region.
d) With respect to his regional
office and the offices of the
provincial and city fiscals
within his region, he shall:
1) Appoint such member of
subordinate officers and
employees as may be
necessary; and approve
transfers of subordinate
personnel within the
jurisdiction of the regional
office.
2) Investigate administrative
complaints against fiscals and
other prosecuting officers
within his region and submit his
recommendation thereon to the
Secretary of Justice who shall,
after review thereof, submit the
appropriate recommendation to
the Office of the President:
Provided, that where the
Secretary of Justice finds
insufficient grounds for the
filing of charges, he may render
a decision of dismissal thereof.
3) Investigate administrative
complaints against subordinate
personnel of the region and
submit his recommendations
thereon to the Secretary of
Justice who shall have the
authority to render decision
thereon. (emphases supplied)
The power of administrative
supervision is limited to "the
authority of the department or
its equivalent to generally
oversee the operations of such
agencies and to insure that they
are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically
but without interference with
day-to-day activities; or require
the submission of reports and
cause the conduct of
management audit,
performance evaluation and
inspection to determine
compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the
department; to take such action
as may be necessary for the
proper performance of official
functions, including
rectification of violations,
abuses and other forms of
maladministration; and to
review and pass upon budget
proposals of such agencies but
may not increase or add to
them."36 This is distinguished
from the power of "supervision
and control" which includes the
authority "to act directly
whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation
to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; determine
priorities in the execution of
plans and programs; and
prescribe standards, guidelines,
plans and programs."37
The Regional State Prosecutor
is clearly vested only with the
power of administrative
supervision. As administrative
supervisor, he has no power to
direct the city and provincial
prosecutors to inhibit from
handling certain cases. At most,
he can request for their
inhibition. Hence, the said
directive of the regional state
prosecutor to the city and
provincial prosecutors is
questionable to say the least.
Petitioner cannot lean on the
cases of Galvez and Sanchez.
In those cases, the special
prosecutors were acting under
the directive of the Secretary of
Justice. They were appointed in
accordance with law. Nowhere
in P.D. No. 1275 is the regional
state prosecutor granted the
power to appoint a special
prosecutor armed with the
authority to file an information
without the prior written
authority or approval of the city
or provincial prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor. P.D. No.
1275 provides the manner by
which special prosecutors are
appointed, to wit:
Sec. 15. Special Counsels. -
Whenever the exigencies of the
service require the creation of
positions of additional counsel
to assist provincial and city
fiscals in the discharge of their
duties, positions of Special
Counsels may be created by
any province or city, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, and with salaries
chargeable against provincial or
city funds. The Secretary of
Justice shall appoint said
Special Counsels, upon
recommendation of the
provincial or city fiscal and
regional state prosecutors
concerned, either on permanent
or temporary basis.
Special Counsel shall be
appointed from members of the
bar and shall be allowed not
more than the salary rate
provided in this Decree for the
lowest rank or grade of
assistant fiscal in the province
or city where assigned.
(emphases supplied)
Under Department Order No.
318,38 "Defining the authority,
duties and responsibilities of
regional state prosecutors," then
Acting Secretary of Justice
Silvestre H. Bello III ordered
the appointed regional state
prosecutors (which included
Regional State Prosecutor
Turingan for Region V) to,
among others, "(i)nvestigate
and/or prosecute, upon the
directive of the Secretary of
Justice, specific criminal cases
filed within the region."
(emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, there is no
pretense that a directive was
issued by the Secretary of
Justice to Regional State
Prosecutor Turingan to
investigate and/or prosecute
SSS cases filed within his
territorial jurisdiction. A bare
reading of the alleged letter of
commendation by then
Secretary Hernando Perez
would show that it does not
amount to a directive or even a
recognition of this authority. In
fact, while the letter of
Secretary Perez commends the
efforts of Regional State
Prosecutor Turingan in
successfully prosecuting SSS
cases, it also negates his
authority to prosecute them.
Secretary Perez called the
Regional State Prosecutors
attention to DOJ Circular No.
27, series of 2001, which states
that all important cases of the
SSS should be referred to the
Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel.39 Thus,
Regional State Prosecutor
Turingan cannot be considered
a special prosecutor within the
meaning of the law.
Petitioner argues that the word
"may" is permissive. Hence,
there are cases when prior
written approval is not required,
and this is one such instance.
This is too simplistic an
interpretation. Whether the
word "may" is mandatory or
directory depends on the
context of its use. We agree
with the OSG that the use of the
permissive word "may" should
be read together with the other
provisions in the same section
of the Rule. The paragraph
immediately preceding the
quoted provision shows that the
word "may" is mandatory. It
states:
Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x
Within five (5) days from his
resolution, he (investigating
prosecutor) shall forward the
record of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in
cases of offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on
the resolution within ten (10)
days from their receipt thereof
and shall immediately inform
the parties of such action.
(emphasis supplied)
Having settled that the prior
authority and approval of the
city, provincial or chief state
prosecutor should have been
obtained, we shall now resolve
the more important issue:
whether the lack of prior
written approval of the city,
provincial or chief state
prosecutor in the filing of an
information is a defect in the
information that is waived if
not raised as an objection
before arraignment.
We hold that it is not.
The provisions in the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure that demand
illumination are Sections 3 and
9 of Rule 117 in relation to
paragraph 3, Section 4 of Rule
112, to wit:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.
The accused may move to
quash the complaint or
information on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do
not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed
the information had no
authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed
form;
(f) That more than one offense
is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments
which, if true, would constitute
a legal excuse or justification;
and
(i) That the accused has been
previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express
consent.
Section 9. Failure to move to
quash or to allege any ground
therefor.The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of
a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he
did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of
this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph
3 provides, viz:
No complaint or information
may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor
without the prior written
authority or approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.
(emphasis supplied)
Private respondent and the
OSG take the position that the
lack of prior authority or
approval by the city or
provincial prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor is an infirmity
in the information that
prevented the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the
case. Since lack of jurisdiction
is a defect that may be raised as
an objection anytime even after
arraignment, the respondent
judge did not err in granting the
motion to dismiss based on this
ground. As basis, they cite the
case of Villa v. Ibaez, et
al.40 where we held, viz:
The defendant had pleaded to
an information before he filed a
motion to quash, and it is
contended that by his plea he
waived all objections to the
informations. The contention is
correct as far as formal
objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear
implication, if not by express
provision of section 10 of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court (now
Section 9 of Rule 117), and by
a long line of uniform
decisions, questions of want of
jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceeding.
Now, the objection to the
respondents actuations goes to
the very foundation of the
jurisdiction. It is a valid
information signed by a
competent officer which,
among other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over
the person of the accused and
the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with
this view, an infirmity in the
information cannot be cured by
silence, acquiescence, or even
by express consent.41 (emphasis
supplied)
The case of Villa is authority
for the principle that lack of
authority on the part of the
filing officer prevents the court
from acquiring jurisdiction over
the case. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by
law while jurisdiction over the
case is invested by the act of
plaintiff and attaches upon the
filing of the complaint or
information.42 Hence, while a
court may have jurisdiction
over the subject matter, like a
violation of the SSS Law, it
does not acquire jurisdiction
over the case itself until its
jurisdiction is invoked with the
filing of the information.
In the United States, an
information has been held as a
jurisdictional requirement upon
which a defendant stands trial.
Thus, it has been ruled that in
the absence of probable cause,
the court lacks jurisdiction to
try the criminal offense.43 In our
jurisdiction, we have similarly
held that:
While the choice of the court
where to bring an action, where
there are two or more courts
having concurrent jurisdiction
thereon, is a matter of
procedure and not jurisdiction,
as suggested by appellant, the
moment such choice has been
exercised, the matter becomes
jurisdictional. Such choice is
deemed made when the
proper complaint or
information is filed with the
court having jurisdiction over
the crime, and said court
acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, from
which time the right and
power of the court to try the
accused attaches. (citations
omitted) It is not for the
defendant to exercise that
choice, which is lodged upon
those who may validly file or
subscribe to the complaint or
information under sections 2
and 3 of Rule 106 of the Rules
of Court. 44 (emphasis
supplied)
A closer look at Villa would be
useful in resolving the issue at
hand. In that case, Atty.
Abelardo Subido, Chief of the
Division of Investigation in the
Office of the Mayor of Manila,
was appointed by the Secretary
of Justice as special counsel to
assist the City Fiscal of Manila
in the cases involving city
government officials or
employees. Pursuant to his
appointment, Atty. Subido filed
an information against Pedro
Villa for falsification of a
payroll. Atty. Subidos authority
to file the information was
challenged on the ground that
he was disqualified for
appointment under Section
1686 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as
amended by Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 144, to
wit:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel
to assist fiscal. The
Secretary of Justice may
appoint any lawyer, being either
a subordinate from his office or
a competent person not in the
public service, temporarily to
assist a fiscal or prosecuting
attorney in the discharge of his
duties, and with the same
authority therein as might be
exercised by the Attorney
General or Solicitor General.45
We held, viz:
subject to orders by, mutually
independent superiors having,
possibly, antagonistic interests.
Referring particularly to the
case at hand for illustration,
Attorney Subido could be
recalled or his time and
attention be required elsewhere
by the Secretary of Interior or
the City Mayor while he was
discharging his duties as public
prosecutor, and the Secretary of
Justice would be helpless to
stop such recall or interference.
An eventuality or state of
affairs so undesirable, not to
say detrimental to the public
service and specially the
administration of justice, the
Legislature wisely intended to
avoid.
The application of the 1951
Villa ruling is not confined to
instances where the person who
filed the information is
disqualified from being a
special prosecutor under
Section 1686 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as
amended, but has been
extended to various cases
where the information was filed
by an unauthorized officer as in
the case at bar. In Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,46 the
Court held that it is a
fundamental principle that
when on its face the
information is null and void for
lack of authority to file the
same, it cannot be cured nor
resurrected by amendment. In
that case, the Presidential
Commission on Good
Government (PCGG)
conducted an investigation and
filed an information with the
Sandiganbayan against
petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr.
charging him with graft and
corruption. The petitioner
sought to quash the information
on the ground that the crime
charged did not constitute a
"Marcos crony related crime"
over which the PCGG had
authority to investigate and file
an information. The Court
found that the crime alleged in
the information was not among
those which PCGG was
authorized to investigate under
Executive Orders No. 1 and 14
of then President Corazon
Aquino and ruled that the
information was null and void.
Of similar import is Romualdez
v. Sandiganbayan, et al.47 where
we ruled that the information
having been filed by an
unauthorized party (the PCGG),
the information was fatally
flawed. We noted that this
defect is not a mere remediable
defect of form, but a defect that
could not be cured.1awphi1.net
In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,48 we also reiterated the Villa
ruling. The accused in that case
was apprehended in Mabalacat,
Pampanga for illegal possession
of firearms and was brought to
Angeles City where the
headquarters of the arresting
officers was located. The City
Prosecutor of Angeles City
filed an information in the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City. We invalidated the
information filed by the City
Prosecutor because he had no
territorial jurisdiction, as the
offense was committed in
Mabalacat, Pampanga and his
territorial jurisdiction was only
in Angeles City. We held that an
information, when required by
law to be filed by a public
prosecuting officer, cannot be
filed by another.49 Otherwise,
the court does not acquire
jurisdiction.50 It is a valid
information signed by a
competent officer which,
among other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over
the person of the accused and
the subject matter thereof. The
accuseds plea to an
information may be a waiver of
all formal objections to the said
information but not when there
is want of jurisdiction.
Questions relating to lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceeding. An
infirmity in the information,
such as lack of authority of the
officer signing it, cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence,
or even by express consent.51
Despite modifications of the
provisions on unauthorized
filing of information contained
in the 1940 Rules of Criminal
Procedure under which Villa
was decided, the 1951 Villa
ruling continues to be the
prevailing case law on the
matter.52
The 1940 Rules of Court
provided in Rule 113, Section
10 that, if the defendant fails to
move to quash the complaint or
information before he pleads
thereto, he shall be taken to
have waived all objections
which are grounds for a motion
to quash except (1) "when the
complaint or information does
not charge an offense" or (2)
"the court is without
jurisdiction of the same."
(emphasis ours) Among the
enumerated grounds for a
motion to quash under Section
2 of the same Rule was "(t)hat
the fiscal has no authority to
file the information." With only
the above two exceptions
provided by the 1940 Rules, the
Court nevertheless made the
Villa ruling that if the filing
officer lacks authority to file
the information, jurisdiction is
not conferred on the court and
this infirmity cannot be cured
by silence or waiver,
acquiescence, or even by
express consent.
The 1940 Rules of Court was
amended in 1964. With only
minimal changes introduced,
the 1964 Rules of Court
contained provisions on
unauthorized filing of
information similar to the
above provisions of the 1940
Rules.53
Then came the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Lack of
authority of the officer who
filed the information was also a
ground for a motion to quash
under these rules. The 1985
Rules also provided for waiver
of the grounds for a motion to
quash under Rule 117, Section
8, but enumerated the following
exceptions to the waiver: (a) the
facts charged do not constitute
an offense; (b) the court trying
the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged or the
person of the accused; (c) the
criminal action or liability has
been extinguished; and (d) the
accused has been previously
convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted, or acquitted of
the offense charged.
Apparently, the want of
jurisdiction under the 1985
Rules refers to jurisdiction over
the offense and the person, and
not over the case as in Villa
where the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case for
lack of authority of the officer
who filed the information. Still,
despite the enumeration, the
Court continued to apply the
Villa ruling as shown in the
afore-cited Cruz and Cudia
cases.
The 1985 Rules was amended
in 2000. The 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure
also provide for lack of
authority of the filing officer as
among the grounds for a motion
to quash and the waiver of
these grounds. Similar to the
1985 Rules, the Revised Rules
enumerate the exceptions from
the waiver, namely: (a) that the
facts charged do not constitute
an offense; (b) that the court
trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense
charged; (c) that the criminal
action or liability has been
extinguished; and (d) that the
accused has been previously
convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without
his express consent. Under the
regime of the 2000 Revised
Rules, we reiterated the Villa
ruling in the above-cited
Romualdez case. With the
enumeration of the four
exceptions, which was almost a
replica of the enumeration in
the 1985 Rules, the 2000 Rules
did not intend to abandon Villa.
The Villa ruling subsisted
alongside the enumerated
exceptions under the 1985
Rules, and it remains to do so
under the enumerated
exceptions under the 2000
Rules. Neither the Rationale of
the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure nor the
Minutes of the Meeting of the
Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court evinces any
intent to abandon the doctrine
enunciated in Villa.
In sum, we hold that, in the
absence of a directive from the
Secretary of Justice designating
State Prosecutor Tolentino as
Special Prosecutor for SSS
cases or a prior written
approval of the information by
the provincial or city
prosecutor, the information in
Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-
0597 was filed by an officer
without authority to file the
same. As this infirmity in the
information constitutes a
jurisdictional defect that cannot
be cured, the respondent judge
did not err in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is
DENIED. The respondent
courts orders dated February
26, 2002 and April 3, 2002 are
AFFIRMED. Criminal Case
No. RTC 2001-0597 is
DISMISSED without prejudice
to the filing of a new
information by an authorized
officer.
o Chapter 2, Title lll, Book lV,
Administrative Code of 1987
Department Proper
SECTION 5. The Department
Proper.The Department
Proper shall be composed of the
Office of the Secretary and the
Undersecretaries, Technical and
Administrative Service,
Financial Management Service,
Legal Staff and the Office of
the Chief State Prosecutor.
SECTION 6. Undersecretaries.
The Secretary shall be
assisted by three (3)
Undersecretaries. The Secretary
is hereby authorized to
delineate and assign the
respective functional areas of
responsibility of the
Undersecretaries, provided, that
such responsibility shall be
with respect to the mandate and
objectives of the Department;
and provided, further, that no
Undersecretary shall be
assigned primarily
administrative responsibilities.
Within his functional area of
responsibility, an
Undersecretary shall have the
following functions:
(1) Advise and assist the
Secretary in the formulation
and implementation of the
Departments policies, plans,
programs and projects;
(1) Assist the Secretary in the
performance of his duties as
Attorney General of the
Philippines and as ex-officio
legal adviser of government-
owned or controlled
corporations or enterprises and
their subsidiaries;
(2) Prepare and finally act for
and in behalf of the Secretary
on all queries and/or requests
for legal advice or guidance
coming from private parties,
and minor officials and
employees of the government;
(3) Maintain and supervise the
operation of the Department
Law Library as well as its
personnel; and
(4) Perform such other
functions as are now or may
hereafter be provided by law or
assigned by the Secretary.
and/or otherwise hereinafter
provided; and
(4) Perform such other
functions as may be provided
by law or assigned by the
Secretary.
SECTION 9. Provincial/City
Prosecution Offices.The
Provincial and City Fiscals
Office established in each of
the provinces and cities
pursuant to law, is retained and
renamed Provincial/City
Prosecution Office. It shall be
headed by a Provincial
Prosecutor or City Prosecutor,
as the case may be, assisted by
such number of Assistant
Provincial/City Prosecutors as
fixed and/or authorized by law.
The position titles of Provincial
and City Fiscal and of Assistant
Provincial and City Fiscal are
hereby abolished.

(2) Oversee the operational
activities of the Department;
(3) Coordinate the programs
and projects of the Department
for efficient and effective
administration;
(4) Serve as deputy for the
Secretary;
(5) Perform, when so
designated, the powers and
functions of the Secretary,
during the latters absence or
incapacity; and
(6) Perform such other
functions as may be provided
by law or assigned by the
Secretary to promote efficiency
and effectiveness in the
delivery of frontline services.
SECTION 7. Legal Staff.
The Legal Staff shall have the
following functions:
SECTION 8. Office of the All provincial/city prosecution
Chief State Prosecutor.The offices shall continue to
Office of the Chief State discharge their functions under
Prosecutor shall have the existing law.
following functions:
All provincial and city
(1) Assist the Secretary in the prosecutors and their assistants
performance of powers and shall be appointed by the
functions of the Department President upon the
relative to its role as the recommendation of the
prosecution arm of the Secretary.
government;
(2) Implement the provisions of
laws, executive orders and r Sec.24and 35, Rep. Act
rules, and carry out the policies, No.6975
plans, programs and projects of
the Department relative to the Section 24. Powers and
investigation and prosecution of Functions. The PNP shall
criminal cases; have the following powers and
functions:
(3) Assist the Secretary in
exercising supervision and (a) Enforce all laws and
control over the National ordinances relative to the
Prosecution Service as protection of lives and
constituted under P.D. No. 1275 properties;
(b) Maintain peace and order
and take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety;
(c) Investigate and prevent
crimes, effect the arrest of
criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in
their prosecution;
(d) Exercise the general powers
to make arrest, search and
seizure in accordance with the
Constitution and pertinent laws;
(e) Detain an arrested person
for a period not beyond what is
prescribed by law, informing
the person so detained of all his
rights under the Constitution;
(f) Issue licenses for the
possession of firearms and
explosives in accordance with
law;
(g) Supervise and control the
training and operations of
security agencies and issue
licenses to operate security
agencies, and to security guards
and private detectives, for the
practice of their professions;
and
(h) Perform such other duties
and exercise all other functions
as may be provided by law.
In addition, the PNP shall
absorb the office of the
National Action Committee on
Anti-Hijacking (NACAH) of
the Department of National
Defense, all the functions of the
present Philippine Air Force
Security Command
(PAFSECOM), as well as the
police functions of the Coast
Guard. In order to perform its
powers and functions
efficiently and effectively, the
PNP shall be provided with
adequate land, sea, and air
capabilities and all necessary
material means of resources.
Section 35. Support Units.
The PNP shall be supported by
administrative and operational
support units. The
administrative support units
shall consist of the Crime
Laboratory, Logistic Unit,
Communications Unit,
Computer Center, Finance
Center and Civil Security Unit.
The operational support units
shall be composed of the
Maritime Police Unit, Police
Intelligence Unit, Police
Security Unit, Criminal
Investigation Unit, Special
Action Force, Narcotics units,
Aviation Security Unit, Traffic
Management Unit, the Medical
and Dental Centers and the
Civil Relations Unit. To
enhance police operational
efficiency and effectiveness, the
Chief of the PNP may
constitute such other support
units as may be necessary
subject to the approval of the
Commission: Provided, That no
support unit headed by a chief
superintendent or a higher rank
can be created unless provided
by law.
Administrative Support Units.
(1) Crime Laboratory. There
shall be established a central
Crime Laboratory to be headed
by a Director with the rank of
chief superintendent, which
shall provides scientific and
technical investigative aid and
support to the PNP and other
government investigative
agencies.
It shall also provide crime
laboratory examination,
evaluation and identification of
physical evidences involved in
crimes with primary emphasis
on their medical, chemical,
biological and physical nature.
There shall be likewise be
established regional and city
crime laboratories as may be
necessary in all regions and
cities of the country.
(2) Logistic Unit. Headed by
a Director with the rank of
chief superintendent, the
Logistics Unit shall be
responsible for the
procurement, distributions and
management of all the logistical
requirements of the PNP
including firearms and
ammunition.
Communications Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
the Communications Unit shall
be responsible for establishing
an effective police
communications network.
Computer Center. Headed by
a Director with the rank of
chief superintendent, the
Computer Center shall be
responsible for the design,
implementation and
maintenance of a database
system for the PNP.
(5) Finance Center. Headed
by a Director with the rank of
chief superintendent, the
Finance Center shall be
responsible for providing
finance services to the PNP.
(6) Civil Security Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
the Civil Security Unit shall
provide administrative services
and general supervision over
organization, business
operation and activities of all
organized private detectives,
watchmen, security guard
agencies and company guard
houses.
The unit shall likewise
supervise the licensing and
registration of firearms and
explosives.
The approval applications for
licenses to operate private
security agencies, as well as the
issuance of licenses to security
guards and the licensing of
firearms and explosives, shall
be decentralized to the PNP
regional offices.
(b) Operational Support Units.
(1) Maritime Police Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
the Maritime Police Unit shall
perform all police functions
over Philippine territorial
waters and rivers.
(2) Police Intelligence Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
the Police Intelligence Unit
shall serve as the intelligence
and counterintelligence
operating unit of the PNP.
(3) Police Security Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
Police Security Unit shall
provide security for
government officials, visiting
dignitaries and private
individuals authorized to be
given protection.
(4) Criminal Investigation Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
the Criminal Investigation Unit
shall undertake the monitoring,
investigation and prosecution of
all crimes involving economic
sabotage, and other crimes of
such magnitude and extent as to
indicate their commission by
highly placed or professional
criminal syndicates and
organizations.
This unit shall likewise
investigate all major cases
involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code and
operate against organized crime
groups, unless the President
assigns the case exclusively to
the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
(5) Special Action Force.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
the Special Action Force shall
function as a mobile strike
force or reaction unit to
augment regional, provincial,
municipal and city police forces
for civil disturbance control,
counterinsurgency, hostage-
taking rescue operations, and
other special operations.
(6) Narcotics Unit. Headed by
a Director with the rank of
chief superintendent, the
Narcotics Unit shall enforce all
laws relative to the protection
of the citizenry against
dangerous and other prohibited
drugs and substances.
(7) Aviation Security Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
the Aviation Security Unit, in
coordination with airport
authorities, shall secure all the
country's airports against
offensive and terroristic acts
that threaten civil aviation,
exercise operational control and
supervision over all agencies
involved in airport security
operation, and enforce all laws
and regulations relative to air
travel protection and safety.
(8) Traffic Management Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
the Traffic Management Unit
shall enforce traffic laws and
regulations.
(9) Medical and Dental Centers.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
the Medical and Dental Centers
shall be responsible for
providing medical and dental
services for the PNP.
(10) Civil Relations Units.
Headed with a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
the Civil Relations Unit shall
implement plans and programs
that will promote community
and citizens' participation in the
maintenance of peace and order
and public safety.
r Republic Act No. 757, as
amended
o Cabarrus, Jr. v. BernaS A.C.
No. 4634, 24 September L997
JESUS CABARRUS,
JR., complainant, vs.JOSE
ANTONIO S.
BERNAS, respondent.
On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus
Cabarrus, Jr. filed an
administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Jose
Antonio Bernas for alleged
violations of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code and Code
of Professional Responsibility.
In his complaint-
affidavit1 dated August 12,
1996, complainant alleged as
follows:
A. That on April 16, 1996,
respondent Ramon B. Pascual,
Jr., subscribed under oath
before Marie Lourdes T. Sia
Bernas, a notary public in
Makati City, wife of lawyer
Jose Antonio Bernas, a
verification and certification of
non-forum shopping which was
appended to a complaint for
reconveyance of property and
damages, denominated as Civil
Case No. 65646, filed before
the Regional Trial Court in
National Capital Region, RTC,
which case was raffled to RTC
Branch 159 in Pasig City. A
photocopy of said complaint is
hereto attached and marked as
Annexex (sic) A, A-1, A-3, A-4,
A-5 and A-6;
B. That as basis for the instant
complaint for falsification of
public document, I am hereto
quoting verbatim, the test (sic)
of Annex A-6, the verification
and certification of non-forum
shopping which states:
Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under
oath, depose and states:
He is the plaintiff in this case,
and certify that he cause the
preparation of the foregoing
pleading, the content of which
are true to his personal
knowledge and that he has not
commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same
issues in any court, including
the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency. If he should
learn that a similar action of
(sic) proceeding has been filed
or is pending before the
Supreme Court or any other
Tribunal agency, he undertake
to report to (sic) that fact within
Five (5) days from notice to
this notice (sic) to this
Honorable Court. Emphasis
supplied.
C. That the cause of action
relied upon by the respondent
in Civil Case No. 65646 is
fraud, facilitated by forgery as
gleaned from paragraphs 15,
16, and 22;
D. That contrary to the tenor,
import and meanoing (sic) of
the allegation under 1-B of the
instant complaint, respondent
and his counsel Jose Antonio
Bernas caused the preparation
and filing of a criminal
complaint for falsification of a
public document on April 11,
1996, (three days before the
filing of the aforecited Civil
Case) at the AOED of the
National Bureau of
Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic)
Ave., a xerox copy of said
complaint is hereto attached
and marked as Annex "B".
D-1. That as stated in Annex
"B", the gravaman of the
affidavit complaint of the
respondent is forgery, the same
legal issue in Civil Case No.
65646;
D-2. That as early as August 14,
1995, respondent counsel, Jose
Antonio Bernas filed a written
complaint at the NBI for the
same cause of action which was
reiterated in another letter
submitting to the NBI standard
specimen signatures dated
October 1995, copies of said
letter complaint are hereto
attached and marked as
Annexes (sic) "C".
E. That respondent Ramon B.
Pascual, Jr., on the basis of
Annexes A, B, C, D, inclusive
of submarkings knowingly
subverted and perverted the
truth when he falsify certified
(sic) and verified under oath in
the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping, that:
He has not commenced any
other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in
any court, including the
Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other Tribunal
or agency." Where verification-
certification was placed under
oath and was conveniently
notarized by the wife of the
counsel of respondent in both
cases at Branch 159 of the RTC
in Pasig and at the NBI, an
agency within the ambis (sic)
and purview of the circulus
(sic) of the Supreme Court
prohibiting forum shopping.
F. That Jose Antonio Bernas,
the counsel on record of the
respondents in Civil Case No.
65646 is the same lawyer who
instigated a criminal complaint
at the NBI for forgery and
respondents themselves
conspired and confabulated
with each other in facilitating
and insuring the open, blatant
and deliberate violation of Art.
172 of the Revised Penal Code
which states:
Art. 172. Falsification by
private individual and use of
falsified documents. The
penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of
not more than P5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who
shall commit any of the
falsifications enumerated in the
next preceding article in any
public or official document or
letter of exchanged (sic) or any
other kind of commercial
document; and
2. Any person who, to the
damage of a third party, or with
the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the
acts of falsification enumerated
in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall
knowingly introduce in
evidence in any judicial
proceeding or to the damage of
another or who, with the intent
to cause such damage, shall use
any of the false documents
embraced in the next preceding
article, or in any of the
foregoing subdivisions of this
article, shall be punished by the
penalty next lower in degree.
G. That Atty. Jose Antonio
Bernas should be disbarred for
having instigated, abetted and
facilitated the perversion and
subversion of truth in the said
verification and certification of
non-forum shopping. Contrary
to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02,
Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers, the
pertinent provisions of which
are herein below quoted and a
copy of said code is hereto
attached and marked as Annex
"E";
CANON 1. A. LAWYER
SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
or decietful (sic) conduct.) at
defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the
legal system.
CANON 3. A. LAWYER IN
MAKING KNOWN HIS
LEGAL SERVICES SHALL
USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST,
FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION
OF (sic) STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
Rule 3.01 A lawyer shall
not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualified
(sic) or legal services.
CANON 10. A LAWYER
OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
In his Comment,2 respondent
Jose Antonio Bernas avers that
he has not committed forum
shopping because the criminal
action is not an action that
involves the same issue as those
in a civil action and both suits
can exist without constituting
forum shopping so long as the
civil aspect has not been
prosecuted in the criminal case.
He emphasized that forum
shopping only exists when
identical reliefs are issued by
the same parties in multiple
fora.
In his Supplemental
Comment,3 respondent further
contends that neither he or his
client Pascual has commenced
any criminal action. Pascual
merely requested the NBI to
assist in the investigation or
prosecution, and left it to the
NBI to determine whether the
filing of an endorsement to the
prosecutor, who would
determine probable cause,
would be appropriate. It was
only upon request of the NBI
that he assisted Ramon Pascual
in drafting an affidavit-
complaint for falsification of
public documents against
complainant. Likewise,
respondent by counsel reiterates
that the letter transmitted to the
NBI cannot constitute an action
or proceeding because the
NBI's functions are merely
investigatory and informational
in nature. NBI has no
prosecutorial functions or
quasi-judical powers and is
incapable of granting relief or
remedy. The NBI cannot be an
agency contemplated by the
circular.
The core issue to be resolved
here is whether respondent
Atty. Bernas transgressed
Circular No. 28-91, Revised
Circular No. 28-91, and
Administrative Circular No. 04
- 94 on forum shopping.
After a careful scrutiny of the
records, we find the
administrative complaint bereft
of merit and should be
dismissed.
There is forum-shopping
whenever, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another.
Therefore, a party to a case
resorts to forum shopping
because "by filing another
petition involving the same
essential facts and
circumstances, . . . ,
respondents approached two
different fora in order to
increase their chances of
obtaining a favorable decision
or action.4 In this case, there is
no forum shopping to speak of.
Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr.
Pascual, Jr., merely requested
the assistance of the NBI to
investigate the alleged fraud
and forgery committed by Mr.
Jesus Cabarrus.5 The filing of a
civil case for reconveyance and
damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City does
not preclude respondent to
institute a criminal action. The
rule allows the filing of a civil
case independently with the
criminal case without violating
the circulars on forum
shopping. It is scarcely
necessary to add that Circular
No. 28-91 must be so
interpreted and applied as to
achieve the purposes projected
by the Supreme Court when it
promulgated that Circular.
Circular No. 28-91 was
designed to serve as an
instrument to promote and
facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and
should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal
of all rules of procedure
which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as
possible.6
Adjunct to this, Act No. 157 7,
specifically section 1 hereof
provides, viz:
Sec. 1. There is hereby created
a Bureau of Investigation under
the Department of Justice
which shall have the following
functions:
(a) To undertake investigation
of crimes and other offenses
against the laws of the
Philippines, upon its initiative
and as public interest may
require;
(b) To render assistance,
whenever properly requested in
the investigation or detection of
crimes and other offenses;
(c) To act as a national
clearing house of criminal and
other informations for the
benefit and use of all
prosecuting and law-
enforcement entities of the
Philippines, identification
records of all persons without
criminal convictions, records of
identifying marks,
characteristics, and ownership
or possession of all firearms as investigation of crimes upon its
well as of test bullets fired own initiative and as public
therefrom; welfare may require. It renders
assistance when requested in
(d) To give technical aid to all the investigation or detection of
prosecuting and law- crimes which precisely what
enforcement officers and Atty. Bernas sought in order to
entities of the Government as prosecute those persons
well as the courts that may responsible for defrauding his
request its services; client.
(e) To extend its services, The courts, tribunals and
whenever properly requested in agencies referred to under
the investigation of cases of Circular No. 28-91, Revised
administrative or civil nature in Circular No. 28-91 and
which the Government is Administrative Circular No. 04-
interested; 94 are those vested with
judicial powers or quasi-
(f) To undertake the instruction judicial powers and those who
and training of representative not only hear and determine
number of city and municipal controversies between adverse
peace officers at the request of parties, but to make binding
their respective superiors along orders or judgments. As
effective methods of crime succinctly put it by R.A. 157,
investigation and detection in the NBI is not performing
order to insure greater judicial or quasi-judicial
efficiency in the discharge of functions. The NBI cannot
their duties; therefore be among those
forums contemplated by the
(g) To establish and Circular that can entertain an
maintain an up-to-date action or proceeding, or even
scientific crime laboratory and grant any relief, declaratory or
to conduct researches in otherwise.
furtherance of scientific
knowledge in criminal WHEREFORE, premises
investigation; considered, the instant
complaint is hereby
(h) To perform such other DISMISSED.
related functions as the
Secretary of Justice may assign o Atty. Dizon v. Atty.
from time to time. Lambino, A.C. No. 5968, 9
August 2006
Explicitly, the functions of the
National Bureau of ATTY. ORLANDO V.
Investigations are merely DIZON, Complainant,
investigatory and informational vs. ATTY. MARICHU C.
in nature. It has no judicial or LAMBINO, Respondent.
quasi-judicial powers and is
incapable of granting any relief ATTY. MARICHU C.
to a party. It cannot even LAMBINO, Complainant,
determine probable cause. It is vs. ATTY. ORLANDO V.
an investigative agency whose DIZON, Respondent.
findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes
The killing during a rumble on
December 8, 1994 of
University of the Philippines
(UP) graduating student Dennis
Venturina, the chairperson of
the UP College of Public
Administration Student
Council, drew the then
Chancellor of UP Diliman
Roger Posadas to seek the
assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Acting on the request of
Chancellor Posadas, Atty.
Orlando Dizon, then Chief of
the Special Operations Group
(SOG) of the NBI, together
with his men, repaired to the
Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain,
head of the UP Security Force
on December 12, 1994.
As two student-suspects in the
killing, Francis Carlo Taparan
and Raymundo Narag, were at
the time in the office of Col.
Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested
to take them into his custody.
Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal
Counsel of UP Diliman, who
repaired to the Office of Col.
Bentain, advised against Atty.
Dizons move, however, he not
being armed with a warrant for
their arrest.
Chancellor Posadas and Vice
Chancellor for students Rosario
Torres-Yu, who also repaired to
the office of the colonel, joined
Atty. Lambino in opposing the
turn-over of the suspects to
Atty. Dizon, despite the latters
claim that under its Charter the
NBI was authorized to make
warrantless arrests.
The suspects lawyer, one Atty.
Villamor, later also showed up
at the office of Col. Bentain and
after what appeared to be a
heated discussion between Atty.
Dizon and the UP officials, the
students were allowed to go
back to their dormitories, with
Atty. Villamor undertaking to
accompany them to the NBI the
following morning.
The two student-suspects were
eventually indicted in court.
Hence, spawned the filing of a
complaint by Atty. Dizon
against Atty. Lambino before
the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for violation
of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility, docketed
as CBD Case No. 346.
Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a
criminal complaint also against
Atty. Lambino, together with
Chancellor Posadas and Vice
Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col.
Bentain, before the
Ombudsman, for violation of
P.D. 1829 which makes it
unlawful for anyone to obstruct
the apprehension and
prosecution of criminal
offenses.
Atty. Lambino in turn charged
Atty. Dizon before the IBP with
violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,
specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01,
1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules
6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8,
Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD
Case No. 373.
The administrative cases were,
on motion of Atty. Lambino,
consolidated. Before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), the issues were defined
as follows:
1. Whether the act of Atty.
Lambino in refusing to turn
over the suspected students to
the group of Atty. Dizon
constitutes violation of Code of
Professional Responsibility.
2. Whether the act of Atty.
Dizon in trying to arrest the
student-suspects constitutes
violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
By Report and
Recommendation submitted to
the Board of Governors of the
IBP on June 20, 2005, CBD
Investigating Commissioner
Siegfrid B. Mison
recommended the dismissal of
the complaint against Atty.
Lambino in light of a finding
that she "acted within her
official duties as she
safeguarded the rights of the
students in accordance with the
schools substitute parental
authority" and "within the
bounds of the law as the NBI
agents had no warrants of
arrest."
With respect to the complaint
against Atty. Dizon, the
Commissioner recommended to
reprimand him for violating the
Code of Professional
Responsibility in "recklessly
tr[ying] to arrest" the suspects
without warrant.
The IBP Board of Governors,
by Resolution of October 22,
2005, adopted and approved the
Commissioners Report. The
IBP thereupon transferred to
this Court its Notice of
Resolution, together with the
records of the cases which this
Court noted by Resolution of
February 1, 2006.
As earlier stated, the issue
against Atty. Lambino is
whether she violated the
Canons of Professional Ethics
in "refusing to turn over the
suspected students to the group
of Atty. Dizon."
When the complaint of Atty.
Dizon before the Ombudsman
against Chancellor Posadas,
Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and
Atty. Lambino was elevated on
Certiorari and Prohibition, this
Court addressing in the
negative the two issues raised
therein, to wit:
(1) Whether the attempted
arrest of the student suspects by
the NBI could be validly made
without a warrant; and (2)
Whether there was probable
cause for prosecuting petitioner
for violation of P.D. No. 1829.
x x x,1
held that the objection of the
said UP officials to the arrest of
the students "cannot be
construed as a violation of P.D.
No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without
rendering it
2
unconstitutional," they having
"a right to prevent the arrest [of
the students] at the time
because their attempted arrest
was illegal."3
Indeed, Atty. Lambino was
legally justified in advising
against the turn over of the
suspects to Atty. Dizon, there
being no basis for him to effect
a warrantless arrest. Atty.
Dizons administrative
complaint against her must then
be dismissed.
Respecting the complaint
against Atty. Dizon, this Court,
also in Posadas v. Ombudsman,
held that "[f]or the failure of the
NBI agents to comply with the
constitutional and procedural
requirements, . . . their attempt
to arrest [the two student-
suspects] without a warrant was
illegal."4
In the main, Atty. Dizon
invoked Section 1 (a) of
Republic Act 157 (The NBI
Charter) which empowers the
NBI "to undertake
investigations of crimes and
other offenses against the laws
of the Philippines, upon its own
initiative and as public interest
may require"5 and to make
arrests. The invocation does not
impress. Said section does not
grant the NBI the power to
make warrantless arrests. The
NBI Charter clearly qualifies
the power to make arrests to be
"in accordance with existing
laws and rules."
Members of the investigation
staff of the Bureau of
Investigation shall be peace
officers, and as such have the
following powers:
(a) To make arrests, searches
and seizures in accordance
with existing laws and rules.6
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
By persisting in his attempt to
arrest the suspected students
without a warrant, Atty. Dizon
violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER
SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
xxxx
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system. (Emphasis
supplied).
WHEREFORE, CBD Case No.
346 against Atty. Marichu C.
Lambino is DISMISSED.
Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in
CBD Case No. 373, found
guilty of violation of Canon 1
of Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and
is REPRIMANDED and
WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar infraction
shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the National Bureau
of Investigation, and the
Department of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
o Sec. 11 (3), Ll (4), & L5,
Rep. Act No. 6770
The Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall be composed
of the Special Prosecutor and
his prosecution staff. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor
shall be an organic component
of the Office of the
Ombudsman and shall be under
the supervision and control of
the Ombudsman.
(4) The Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall, under the
supervision and control and
upon the authority of the
Ombudsman, have the
following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea
bargaining agreements; and
(c) To perform such other
duties assigned to it by the
Ombudsman.
The Special Prosecutor shall
have the rank and salary of a
Deputy Ombudsman.
Section 15. Powers, Functions
and Duties. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions
and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on
its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient.t has primary
jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any
investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation
of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at
its own instance, any officer or
employee of the Government,
or of any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, as
well as any government-owned
or controlled corporations with
original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse
or impropriety in the
performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned
to take appropriate action
against a public officer or
employee at fault or who
neglect to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by
law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance
therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21 of this
Act: provided, that the refusal
by any officer without just
cause to comply with an order
of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure,
or prosecute an officer or
employee who is at fault or
who neglects to perform an act
or discharge a duty required by
law shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said
officer;
(4) Direct the officer
concerned, in any appropriate
case, and subject to such
limitations as it may provide in
its rules of procedure, to furnish
it with copies of documents
relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his
office involving the
disbursement or use of public
funds or properties, and report
any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for
appropriate action;
(5) Request any government
agency for assistance and
information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities,
and to examine, if necessary,
pertinent records and
documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered
by its investigation of the
matters mentioned in
paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4)
hereof, when circumstances so
warrant and with due prudence:
provided, that the Ombudsman
under its rules and regulations
may determine what cases may
not be made public: provided,
further, that any publicity
issued by the Ombudsman shall
be balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes of
inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government,
and make recommendations for
their elimination and the
observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue
subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum, and take testimony in
any investigation or inquiry,
including the power to examine
and have access to bank
accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of
Court and under the same
procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein;
(10) Delegate to the Deputies,
or its investigators or
representatives such authority
or duty as shall ensure the
effective exercise or
performance of the powers,
functions, and duties herein or
hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the
proper action for the recovery
of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after February
25, 1986 and the prosecution of
the parties involved therein.
The Ombudsman shall give
priority to complaints filed
against high ranking
government officials and/or
those occupying supervisory
positions, complaints involving
grave offenses as well as
complaints involving large
sums of money and/or
properties.
C. The Accused
o Secs. 14 & 16-D, Chapter 5,
Title lll, Book lV,
Administrative
Code of 1987, as amended by
Rep. Act No.9406
Public Attorneys Office
SECTION 14. Public
Attorneys Office (PAO).The
Citizens Legal Assistance
Office (CLAO) is renamed
Public Attorneys Office (PAO).
It shall exercise the powers and
functions as are now provided
by law for the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office or may
hereafter be provided by law.
SECTION 15. Organizational
Structure.The PAO shall
consist of the following
constituent units:
(1) Office of the Chief Public
Attorney and two (2) Deputy
Chief Public Attorneys;
(2) Five (5) line divisions in the
Central Office, namely:
Administrative, Financial and
Management, Special and
Appealed Cases, Legal
Research and Statistics, and
Field Services Divisions; and
(3) Regional and
Provincial/District Offices.
SECTION 16. The Chief
Public Attorney and Other PAO
Officials.The PAO shall be
headed by a Chief Public
Attorney and shall be assisted
by two (2) Deputy Chief Public
Attorneys. Each PAO Regional
Office established in each of
the administrative regions of
the country shall be headed by
a Regional Public Attorney who
shall be assisted by an Assistant
Regional Public Attorney.
The Chief Public Attorney,
Deputy Chief Public Attorneys,
Regional Public Attorneys and
Assistant Regional Public
Attorneys shall be appointed by
the President upon the
recommendation of the
Secretary.
D. The Offended Party
The issue here is whether the
Sec. 12, Rule L10
Section 12. Name of the
offended party. The
complaint or information must
state the name and surname of
the person against whom or
against whose property the
offense was committed, or any
appellation or nickname by
which such person has been or
is known. If there is no better
way of identifying him, he must
be described under a fictitious
name.
(a) In offenses against property,
if the name of the offended
party is unknown, the property
must be described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the of
the person against whom or
against whose properly the
offense was committed is
thereafter disclosed or
ascertained, the court must
cause the true name to be
inserted in the complaint or
information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a
juridical person, it is sufficient
to state its name, or any name
or designation by which it is
known or by which it may be
identified, without need of
averring that it is a juridical
person or that it is organized in
accordance with law. (12a)
o Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 11-9063, 27 January
1997
JOSE G. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and ADELA
TEODORA P. SANTOS,
Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in affirming the
trial court's order granting the
motion to quash the
information for bigamy based
on prescription.
On 28 August 1991, petitioner
Jose G. Garcia filed with the
(Quezon City Prosecutor's
Office an "Affidavit of
Complaint"1 charging his wife,
private respondent Adela
Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia
Santos," with Bigamy,
Violation of C.A. No. 142, as
amended by R.A. No. 6085,
and Falsification of Public
Documents. However, in his
letter of 10 October 1991 to
Assistant City Prosecutor
George F. Cabanilla, the
petitioner informed the latter
that he would limit his action to
bigamy.2
After appropriate proceedings,
Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla
filed on 8 January 1992 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of (Quezon City an
information,3 dated 15
November 1991, charging the
private respondent with Bigamy
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or before the 2nd day
of February, 1957, in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, being previously
united in lawful marriage with
REYNALDO QUIROCA, and
without the said marriage
having been dissolved, (or
before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively
dead by a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings), did
then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second marriage with
JOSE G. GARCIA, which
marriage has [sic] discovered in
1989, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended
party in such amount as may be
awarded under the provisions
of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The information was docketed
as Criminal Case No. Q-92-
27272 and assigned to Branch
83 of the said court. On 2
March 1992, the private
respondent filed a Motion to
Quash alleging prescription of
the offense as ground therefor.
She contended that by the
petitioner's admissions in his
testimony given on 23 January
1991 in Civil Case No. 90-
52730, entitled "Jose G. Garcia
v. Delia S. Garcia," and in his
complaint filed with the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) on
16 October 1991, the petitioner
discovered the commission of
the offense as early as 1974.
Pursuant then to Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code
(RPC),4 the period of
prescription of the offense
started to run therefrom. Thus,
since bigamy was punishable
by prision mayor,5 an afflictive
penalty6 which prescribed in
fifteen years pursuant to Article
92 of the RPC, then the offense
charged prescribed in 1989, or
fifteen years after its discovery
by the petitioner.
The private respondent
quoted7 the petitioner's
testimony in Civil Case No. 90-
52730 as follows:
the private respondent?
A That she has been married
previously in case I don't know
it. But she said she has been
previously married, in fact I
saw her husband Rey, a few
days ago and they said, "Baka
magkasama pa silang muli."
A'ITY. EVANGELISTA:
Q When did Eugenia R.
Balingit told [sic] that private
respondent was already married
to another man?
A That was when I told her that
we are Separating now. I told
her in tagalog, "na
maghihiwalay na kami ni Delia
ngayon." "Ang unang tanong
niya sa akin, "si Rey ba ang
dahilan," ang alam ko po, Rey
ang dating boyfriend niya, kaya
ang sabi ko, "hindi po, Mario,
ang panga!an," napabagsak po
siya sa upuan, sabi niya, "hindi
na nagbago."
Q When was that when you
came to know from Eugenia
Balingit, the judicial guardian,
that private respondent was
already married to another man
when she married you?
A That was when the affair was
happening and I found out.
Q What year?
A 1974.8
The portion of the complaint
filed on 16 October 1991 before
the CSC which the private
respondent alluded to, reads as
follows:
5. At the time the respondent
married the herein complainant
she never informed him that she
was previously married to a
certain REYNALDO
QUIROCA" on December 1,
1951 wherein she used the
name of "ADELA SANTOS"
which was part of her true
name "ADELA TEODORA P.
SANTOS" as per her genuine
Baptismal Certificate issued by
the Parish of San Guillermo,
Bacolor, Pampanga, a copy of
the said Baptismal Certificate is
hereto attached as ANNEX
"D";
6. . . .
7. These facts were discovered
only by the herein complainant
in the year 1974 where they
separated from each other
because of her illicit relations
with several men continued use
of her alias name "DELIA",
without proper authority from
the Courts; and committing a
series of fraudulent acts; her
previous marriage to a certain
"Reynaldo Quiroca" is
evidenced by a certification
issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, a copy of
which is hereto attached as
ANNEX "F",9
In its 29 June 1992 order, 10 the
trial court granted the motion to
quash and dismissed the
criminal case, ruling in this
wise:
This court believes that since
the penalty prescribed under
Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code for the offense of
bigamy is prision mayor, which
is classified as an afflictive
penalty under Article 25 of the
same Code, then said offense
should prescribe in fifteen (15)
years as provided in Article 92
of the Code. The complainant
having discovered the first
marriage of the accused to one
Reynaldo Quiroca in 1974
when he was informed of it by
one Eugenia Balingit, the
offense charged has already
prescribed when the
information was filed in this
case on November 15, 1991.
The argument presented by the
prosecution that i was difficult
for the complainant to obtain
evidence of the alleged first
marriage, hence, the
prescriptive period should be
counted from the time the
evidence was secured will not
hold water. Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code
specifically provides, thus:
"The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is
discovered. . . ."
it did not state "on the day
sufficient evidence was
gathered," thus this Court
cannot change the requirements
of the law.
The petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the above
order on 26 August 1992,11 to
which he filed "numerous"
supplements thereto, focusing
on the private respondent's
many trips abroad which the
petitioner claimed suspended
the running of the prescriptive
period. These trips were
enumerated in the
certification12 issued by
Associate Commissioner
Ramon M. Morales of the
Bureau of Immigration (BID),
which reads as follows:
This is to certify that the name
GARCIA/DELIA/S. appears in
the Bureau's files of Arrivals
and Departures as having the contended therein that: (a) the
following travel records: trial court erred in quashing the
information on the ground of
Departed for HKG on 06/03/77 prescription; and (b) the
aboard PR counsel for the accused was
Arrived from HKG on 07/02/77 barred from filing the motion to
aboard PA quash the information against
Arrived from SYD on 07/09/77 the accused.14 As to the first,
aboard PR the petitioner argued that
Arrived from GUM on bigamy was a public offense,
06/14/80 aboard PA hence "the offended party is not
Arrived from MEL on 07/17/81 the first or second (innocent)
aboard PR spouse but the State whose
Arrived from TYO on 05/20/83 law/policy was transgressed."
aboard PA He tried to distinguish bigamy
Departed for HKG on 09/22/83 from private offenses such as
aboard PR adultery or concubinage "where
Arrived from SIN on 09/28/83 the private complainant
aboard PR is necessarily the offended
Departed for TYO on 04/30/84 party," thus, the prescriptive
aboard PA period for the former should
Arrived from SFO on 07/03/84 commence from the day the
aboard PA State, being the offended party,
Departed for TYO on 11/19/84 discovered the offense, which
aboard PA in this case was on 28 August
Departed for TYO on 08/05/85 1991 when the petitioner filed
aboard PA his complaint before the
Departed for TYO on 11/1 7/86 Prosecutor's Office. The
aboard UA petitioner added that the
Arrived from LAX on 12/12/87 "interchanging use" in Article
aboard UA 91 of the RPC of the terms
Departed for LAX on 11/30/87 "offended party," "authorities,"
aboard UA and "their agents" supports his
Departed for CHI on 11/14/88 view that the State is the
aboard UA offended party in public
offenses.
The trial court disallowed
reconsideration of its 29 June Additionally, the petitioner
1992 order, finding "no urgent referred to the general rule
or justifiable reason to disturb stated
or set [it] aside." As to the in People v. Alagao15 "that in
sojourns abroad of the private resolving the motion to quash a
respondent as shown in the criminal complaint or
certification, the trial court held information[,] the facts alleged
that the same "is not that kind in the complaint or information
of absence from the Philippines should be taken as they are."
which will interrupt the period The information in this case
of prescription of the offense mentioned that the bigamy was
charged. . ."13 discovered in 1989. He
admitted, however, that this
The petitioner then appealed to rule admits of exceptions, such
the Court of Appeals which as when the ground for the
docketed the appeal as CA- motion to quash is prescription
G.R. CR No. 14324. He of the offense, as provided in
Section 4 of the old Rule 117 of
the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Nonetheless, he
advanced the view that this
exception is no longer available
because of the implied repeal of
Section 4, as the amended Rule
117 no longer contains a similar
provision under the rule on
motions to quash; and that
granting there was no repeal,
the private respondent failed to
introduce evidence to "support
her factual averment in her
motion to quash," which is
required by Rule 117. He
further asserted that the factual
bases of the motion to
quash, viz., the petitioner's
testimony in Civil Case No. 90-
52730 and his complaint filed
with the CSC are not
conclusive because the
testimony is hearsay evidence,
hence inadmissible, while the
complaint is vague, particularly
the following portion quoted by
the private respondent:
7. These facts where discovered
only by the herein complainant
in the year 1974 when they
separated from each other
because of her illicit relations
with several men continued use
of her alias name "DELIA",
without proper authority from
the Courts; and committing a
series of fraudulent acts; her
previous marriage to a certain
"Reynaldo Quiroca" is
evidenced by a certification
issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, a copy of
which is hereto attached a
ANNEX "F";
The petitioner alleged that the
phrase "These facts" in said
paragraph 7 does not clearly
refer to his discovery of the
private respondent's first
marriage. Moreover, he doubted
whether the term "discovered"
in the said paragraph was used
in the sense contemplated by extinguish[ed]' by the
law. At best, the petitioner prescription of the crime, which
theorized, the discovery only is a mode of extinguishing
referred to the "initial, criminal liability." Thus,
unconfirmed and prescription is not deemed
uninvestigated raw, hearsay waived even if not pleaded as a
information" which he received defense.18
from Balingit.
Undaunted, the petitioner is
Finally, the petitioner reiterated now before us on a petition for
that the prescriptive period was review on certiorari to annul
interrupted several times by the and set aside the decision of the
private respondent's numerous Court of Appeals and to compel
trips abroad. the respondent court to remand
the case to the trial court for
As regards his second further proceedings. He submits
contention, the petitioner the following assignment of
argued that the counsel for the errors:
private respondent had already
stated that he represented only I
Delia S. Garcia and not Adela
Teodora P. Santos. BIGAMY IS A PUBLIC
Consequently, the private OFFENSE, CONSEQUENTLY,
respondent's counsel could not PRESCRIPTION SHOULD
ask for the quashal of the HAVE BEEN COUNTED
information in favor of Adela FROM THE TIME THE
Teodora P. Santos alias Delia STATE DISCOVERED ITS
Santos. The petitioner opined COMMISSION;
that the counsel for the private
respondent should have sought II A MOTION TO QUASH
a dismissal of the case in favor
of Delia Garcia alone. CANNOT ALSO GO
BEYOND WHAT IS STATED
The Court of Appeals gave IN THE INFORMATION;
credence to the private
respondent's evidence and III
concluded that the petitioner
discovered the private
BY THEMSELVES, THE
respondent's first marriage in FACTUAL BASES OF THE
1974. Since the information in
MOTION TO QUASH ARE
this case was filed in court only NOT ALSO CONCLUSIVE;
on 8 January 1992, or eighteen
years after the discovery of the
IV
offense, then the 15-year
prescriptive period had
certainly lapsed.16 It further ASSUMING THE
held that the quashal of an PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
information based on STARTED IN 1974, SAID
prescription of the offense PERIOD HOWEVER WAS
could be invoked before or after INTERRUPTED SEVERAL
arraignment and even on TIMES.
appeal,17 for under Article 89(5)
of the RPC, the criminal We notice that except for the
liability of a person is "totally first two pages of the petition,
the deletion of a few
paragraphs, the substitution of
the term "petitioner" for
"appellant," and the deletion of
the contention on the' counsel
for the private respondent being
barred from filing a motion to
quash, the herein petition is a
reproduction of the Appellant's
Brief filed by the petitioner
with the Court of Appeals.
Verily then, the instant petition
is a rehash of an old tale.
However, the Court of Appeals
failed to sufficiently address
several issues raised by the
petitioner, most probably
prompting him to seek redress
from this Court.
We resolved to give due course
to the petition and required the
parties to submit their
respective memoranda. The
Office of the Solicitor General
was the last to submit a
Memorandum for the public
respondent. Both the private
and public respondents ask for
the dismissal of this petition
and the affirmance of the
challenged decision.
Petitioner's position is
untenable. Denial then of this
petition is all it merits.
We shall take up the assigned
errors in seriatim.
It is true that bigamy is a public
offense. But, it is entirely
incorrect to state, as the
petitioner does, that only the
State is the offended party in
such case, as well as in other
public offenses, and, therefore;
only the State's discovery of the
crime could effectively
commence the running of the
period of prescription therefor.
Article 91 of the RPC provides
that "[t]he period of
prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities,
or their agents. . . ." This rule
makes no distinction between a
public crime and a private
crime. In both cases then, the
discovery may be by the
"offended party, the authorities,
or their agents."
Article 91 does not define the
term "offended party." We find
its definition in Section 12,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
as "the person against whom or
against whose property, the
offense was committed.19 The
said Section reads as follows:
Sec. 12. Name of the offended
party. A complaint or
information must state the
name and surname of the
person against whom or against
whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation
or nickname by which such
person has been or is known,
and if there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious
name.
More specifically, it is
reasonable to assume that the
offended party in the
commission of a crime, public
or private, is the party to whom
the offender is civilly liable, in
light of Article 100 of the RPC,
which expressly provides that
[e]very person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly
liable."20 Invariably then, the
private individual to whom the
offender is civilly liable is the
offended party.
This conclusion is strengthened
by Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal
and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly
instituted with a criminal
action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal
action.
Such civil action includes
recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the
accused. . . .
It is settled that in bigamy, both
the first and the second spouses
may be the offended parties
depending on the
circumstances. 21
The petitioner even admits that
he is the offended party in
Criminal Case No. (Q-92-
27272. The information
therein,22 which he copied in
full in the petition in this case,
describes him as the "offended
party" who suffered "damage
and prejudice . . . in such
amount as may be awarded
under the provisions of the
Civil Code."23
The distinction he made
between public crimes and
private crimes relates not to the
discovery of the crimes, but to
their prosecution. Articles 344
and 360 of the RPC, in relation
to Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, are clear on this
matter.
II
The petitioner's contention that
a motion to quash cannot go
beyond the information in
Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272
which states that the crime was
discovered in 1989, is palpably
unmeritorious. Even People
v. Alaga,24 which he cites,
mentions the exceptions to the
rule as provided in paragraphs
(f) and (h) of Section 2, and
Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule
117, viz., (a) extinction of
criminal liability, and (b)
double jeopardy. His additional
claim that the exception of
extinction can no longer be
raised due to the implied repeal
of the former Section 4, 25 Rule
117 of the Rules of Court
occasioned by its non-
reproduction after its revision,
is equally without merit. No
repeal, express or implied, of
the said Section 4 ever took
place. While there is no
provision in the new Rule 117
that prescribes the contents of a
motion to quash based on
extinction of criminal liability,
Section 2 thereof encapsulizes
the former Sections 3, 4, and 5
of the old Rule 117. The said
Section 2 reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Foms and contents.
The motion to quash shall be in
writing signed by the accused
or his counsel. It shall specify
distinctly the factual and legal
grounds therefor and the court
shall consider no grounds other
than those stated therein, except
lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged. (3a, 4a, 5a).
(underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
It is clear from this Section that
a motion to quash may be based
on factual and legal grounds,
and since extinction of criminal
liability and double jeopardy
are retained as among
the grounds for a motion to
quash in Section 3 of the new
Rule 117, it necessarily follows
that facts outside the
information itself may be
introduced to grove such
grounds. As a matter of fact,
inquiry into such facts may be
allowed where the ground
invoked is that the allegations
in the information do not
constitute the offense charged.
Thus, in People v. De la
Rosa,26 this Court stated:
As a general proposition, a
motion to quash on the ground
that the allegations of the
information do not constitute
the offense charged, or any
offense for that matter, should
be resolved on the basis alone
of said allegations whose truth
and veracity are hypothetically
admitted. However, as held in
the case of People vs. Navarro,
75 Phil. 516, additional facts
not alleged in the information,
but admitted or not denied by
the prosecution may be invoked
in support of the motion to
quash. Former Chief justice
Moran supports this theory.27
In Criminal Case No. 92-
27272, the trial court, without
objection on the part of the
prosecution, allowed the private
respondent to offer evidence in
support of her claim that the
crime had prescribed.
Consequently, the trial court,
upon indubitable proof of
prescription, correctly granted
the motion to quash. It would
have been, to quote De la Rosa,
"pure technicality for the court
to close its eyes to [the fact of
prescription) and still give due
course to the prosecution of the
case" a technicality which
would have meant loss of
valuable time of the court and
the parties.
As noted by Dr. Fortunato
Gupit, Jr., consultant of the
Rules of Court Revision
Committee, the aforequoted
Section 2 of the new Rule 117
on "factual and legal grounds"
of a motion to quash is based
on the De la Rosa case.28
III
The petitioner likewise claims
that the factual bases of the
private respondent's motion to
quash are inconclusive. The
petitioner cannot be allowed to
disown statements he made
under oath and in open court
when it serves his purpose. This
is a contemptible practice
which can only mislead the
courts and thereby contribute to
injustice. Besides, he never
denied having given the
pertinent testimony. He did,
however, term it vague in that it
was not clear whether the prior
marriage which Eugenia
Balingit disclosed to him was
that entered into by the private
respondent with Reynaldo
Quiroca. It is immaterial to
whom the private respondent
was first married; what is
relevant in this case is that the
petitioner was informed of a
prior marriage contracted by
the private respondent.
Neither may the petitioner be
heard to cast doubt on the
meaning of his statements in his
sworn complaint filed before
the CSC. We find no hint of
vagueness in them. In any
event, he has not denied that he
in fact discovered in 1974 that
the private respondent had been
previously married.
Finally, the petitioner draws our
attention to the private
respondent's several trips
abroad as enumerated in the
certification of the Bureau of
Immigration, and cites the
second paragraph of Article 91
of the RPC, viz.: "[t]he term of
prescription shall not run when
the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago." We
agree with the Court of Appeals
that these trips abroad did not
constitute the "absence"
contemplated in Article 91.
These trips were brief, and in
every case the private
respondent returned to the
Philippines. Besides, these were
made long after the petitioner
discovered the offense and.
even if the aggregate number of
days of these trips are
considered, still the information
was filed well beyond the
prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit and the challenged
decision of 13 February 1995 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 14324 is
AFFIRMED.
o Senador vs. People, G.R.
No. 20L62O,6 March 2013
RAMONCITA O.
SENADOR, Petitioner,
vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and
CYNTHIA JAIME,
This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45
seeking the reversal of the May
17, 2011 Decision1 and March
30, 2012 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR. No. 00952.
In an Information dated August
5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita
O. Senador (Senador) was
charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32
in Dumaguete City with the
crime of Estafa under Article
315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code,3 viz:
That on or about the 10th day
of September 2000 in the City
of Dumaguete, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
said accused, having obtained
and received from
one Cynthia Jaime various
kinds of jewelry valued in the
total amount of
705,685.00 for the purpose of
selling the same on
consignment basis with express
obligation to account for and
remit the entire proceeds of the
sale if sold or to return the same
if unsold within an agreed
period of time and despite
repeated demands therefor, did,
then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail
to remit proceeds of the sale of
said items or to return any of
the items that may have been
unsold to said Cynthia Jaime
but instead has willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the same to
his/her own use and benefit to
the damage and prejudice of
said Cynthia Jaime in the
aforementioned amount of
705,685.00.4 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Upon arraignment, petitioner
pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecutions evidence
sought to prove the following
facts: Rita Jaime (Rita) and her
daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime
(Cynthia), were engaged in a
jewelry business. Sometime in
the first week of September
2000, Senador went to see Rita
at her house in Guadalupe
Heights, Cebu City, expressing
her interest to see the pieces of
jewelry that the latter was
selling. On September 10,
2000, Ritas daughter-in-law
and business partner, Cynthia,
delivered to Senador several
pieces of jewelry worth seven
hundred five thousand six
hundred eighty five pesos (PhP
705,685).5
In the covering Trust Receipt
Agreement signed by Cynthia
and Senador, the latter
undertook to sell the jewelry
thus delivered on commission
basis and, thereafter, to remit
the proceeds of the sale, or
return the unsold items to
Cynthia within fifteen (15) days
from the delivery.6 However, as
events turned out, Senador
failed to turn over the proceeds
of the sale or return the unsold
jewelry within the given
period.7
Thus, in a letter dated October
4, 2001, Rita demanded from
Senador the return of the unsold
jewelry or the remittance of the
proceeds from the sale of
jewelry entrusted to her. The
demand fell on deaf ears
prompting Rita to file the
instant criminal complaint
against Senador.8
During the preliminary
investigation, Senador tendered
to Rita Keppel Bank Check No.
0003603 dated March 31, 2001
for the amount of PhP
705,685,9 as settlement of her
obligations. Nonetheless, the
check was later dishonored as it
was drawn against a closed
account.10
Senador refused to testify and
so failed to refute any of the
foregoing evidence of the
prosecution, and instead, she
relied on the defense that the
facts alleged in the Information
and the facts proven and
established during the trial
differ. In particular, Senador
asserted that the person named
as the offended party in the
Information is not the same
person who made the demand
and filed the complaint.
According to Senador, the
private complainant in the
Information went by the name
"Cynthia Jaime," whereas,
during trial, the private
complainant turned out to be
"Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia
Jaime was never presented as
witness. Hence, citing People v.
Uba, et al.11 (Uba) and United
States v. Lahoylahoy and
Madanlog
(Lahoylahoy),12 Senador would
insist on her acquittal on the
postulate that her constitutional
right to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against
her has been violated.
Despite her argument, the trial
court, by Decision dated June
30, 2008, found Senador guilty
as charged and sentenced as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds
RAMONCITA SENADOR
guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ESTAFA under
Par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of four (4) years and
one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to
indemnify the private
complainants, RITA JA[I]ME
and CYNTHIA JAIME, the
following: 1) Actual Damages
in the amount of 695,685.00
with interest at the legal rate
from the filing of the
Information until fully paid; 2)
Exemplary Damages in the
amount of 100,000.00; and 3)
the amount of 50,000 as
Attorneys fees.
Senador questioned the RTC
Decision before the CA.
However, on May 17, 2011, the
appellate court rendered a
Decision upholding the finding
of the RTC that the prosecution
satisfactorily established the
guilt of Senador beyond
reasonable doubt. The CA
opined that the prosecution was
able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the following
undisputed facts, to wit: (1)
Senador received the pieces of
jewelry in trust under the
obligation or duty to return
them; (2) Senador
misappropriated or converted
the pieces of jewelry to her
benefit but to the prejudice of
business partners, Rita and
Cynthia; and (3) Senador failed
to return the pieces of jewelry
despite demand made by Rita.
Further, the CAfinding that
Uba13 is not applicable since
Senador is charged with estafa,
a crime against property and
not oral defamation, as in
Ubaruled:
WHEREFORE, the June 30,
2008 Judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 32,
Dumaguete City, in Criminal
Case No. 16010, finding
accused appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Estafa is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Senador filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was
denied in a Resolution dated
March 30, 2012. Hence, the
present petition of Senador.
The sole issue involved in the
instant case is whether or not an
error in the designation in the
Information of the offended
party violates, as petitioner
argues, the accuseds
constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against
her, thus, entitling her to an
acquittal.
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be
emphasized that variance
between the allegations of the
information and the evidence
offered by the prosecution does
not of itself entitle the accused
to an acquittal,14 more so if the
variance relates to the
designation of the offended
party, a mere formal defect,
which does not prejudice the
substantial rights of the
accused.15
As correctly held by the
appellate court, Senadors
reliance on Uba is misplaced.
In Uba, the appellant was
charged with oral defamation, a
crime against honor, wherein
the identity of the person
against whom the defamatory
words were directed is a
material element. Thus, an
erroneous designation of the
person injured is material. On
the contrary, in the instant case,
Senador was charged with
estafa, a crime against property
that does not absolutely require
as indispensable the proper
designation of the name of the
offended party. Rather, what is
absolutely necessary is the
correct identification of the
criminal act charged in the
information.16 Thus, in case of
an error in the designation of
the offended party in crimes
against property, Rule 110, Sec.
12 of the Rules of Court
mandates the correction of the
information, not its dismissal:
SEC. 12. Name of the offended
party.The complaint or
information must state the
name and surname of the
person against whom or against
whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation
or nickname by which such
person has been or is known. If
there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious
name.
(a) In offenses against property,
if the name of the offended
party is unknown, the property
must be described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the
person against whom or against
whose property the offense was
committed is thereafter
disclosed or ascertained, the
court must cause such true
name to be inserted in the
complaint or information and
the record. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear from the above
provision that in offenses
against property, the materiality
of the erroneous designation of
the offended party would
depend on whether or not the
subject matter of the offense
was sufficiently described and
identified.
Lahoylahoy cited by Senador
supports the doctrine that if the
subject matter of the offense is
generic or one which is not
described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged,
then an erroneous designation
of the offended party is material
and would result in the
violation of the accuseds
constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against
her. Such error, Lahoylahoy
teaches, would result in the
acquittal of the accused, viz:
The second sentence of section
7 of General Orders No. 58
declares that when an offense
shall have been described with
sufficient certainty to identify
the act, an erroneous allegation
as to the person injured shall be
deemed immaterial. We are of
the opinion that this provision
can have no application to a
case where the name of the
person injured is matter of
essential description as in the
case at bar; and at any rate,
supposing the allegation of
ownership to be eliminated, the
robbery charged in this case
would not be sufficiently
identified. A complaint stating,
as does the one now before us,
that the defendants "took and
appropriated to themselves with
intent of gain and against the
will of the owner thereof the
sum of 100" could scarcely be
sustained in any jurisdiction as
a sufficient description either of
the act of robbery or of the
subject of the robbery. There is
a saying to the effect that
money has no earmarks; and
generally speaking the only
way money, which has been the
subject of a robbery, can be
described or identified in a
complaint is by connecting it
with the individual who was
robbed as its owner or
possessor. And clearly, when
the offense has been so
identified in the complaint, the
proof must correspond upon
this point with the allegation, or
there can be no
conviction.17 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Lahoylahoy, the subject
matter of the offense was
money in the total sum of PhP
100. Since money is generic
and has no earmarks that could
properly identify it, the only
way that it (money) could be
described and identified in a
complaint is by connecting it to
the offended party or the
individual who was robbed as
its owner or possessor. Thus,
the identity of the offended
party is material and necessary
for the proper identification of
the offense charged. Corollary,
the erroneous designation of the
offended party would also be
material, as the subject matter
of the offense could no longer
be described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged.
The holdings in United States v.
Kepner,18 Sayson v.
People,19 and Ricarze v. Court
of Appeals20 support the
doctrine that if the subject
matter of the offense is specific
or one described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged,
then an erroneous designation
of the offended party is not
material and would not result in
the violation of the accuseds
constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against
her. Such error would not result
in the acquittal of the accused.
In the 1902 case of Kepner, this
Court ruled that the erroneous
designation of the person
injured by a criminal act is not
material for the prosecution of
the offense because the subject
matter of the offense, a warrant,
was sufficiently identified with
such particularity as to properly
identify the particular offense
charged. We held, thus:
The allegation of the complaint
that the unlawful
misappropriation of the
proceeds of the warrant was to
the prejudice of Aun Tan may
be disregarded by virtue of
section 7 of General Orders,
No. 58, which declares that
when an offense shall have
been described in the complaint
with sufficient certainty to
identify the act, an erroneous
allegation as to the person
injured shall be deemed
immaterial. In any event the
defect, if defect it was, was one
of form which did not tend to
prejudice any substantial right
of the defendant on the merits,
and can not, therefore, under
the provisions of section 10 of
the same order, affect the
present proceeding.21 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Sayson, this Court upheld
the conviction of Sayson for
attempted estafa, even if there
was an erroneous allegation as
to the person injured because
the subject matter of the
offense, a check, is specific and
sufficiently identified. We held,
thus:
In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this
Court laid down the rule that
when an offense shall have
been described in the complaint
with sufficient certainty as to
identify the act, an erroneous
allegation as to the person
injured shall be deemed
immaterial as the same is a
mere formal defect which did
not tend to prejudice any
substantial right of the
defendant. Accordingly, in the
aforementioned case, which
had a factual backdrop similar
to the instant case, where the
defendant was charged with
estafa for the misappropriation
of the proceeds of a warrant
which he had cashed without
authority, the erroneous
allegation in the complaint to
the effect that the unlawful act
was to the prejudice of the
owner of the cheque, when in
reality the bank which cashed it
was the one which suffered a
loss, was held to be immaterial
on the ground that the subject
matter of the estafa, the
warrant, was described in the
complaint with such
particularity as to properly
identify the particular offense
charged. In the instant suit for
estafa which is a crime
against property under the
Revised Penal Code, since the
check, which was the subject-
matter of the offense, was
described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged,
it becomes immaterial, for
purposes of convicting the
accused, that it was
established during the trial
that the offended party was
actually Mever Films and not
Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank
of America as alleged in the
information." 22 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Ricarze, We reiterated the
doctrine espousing an
erroneous designation of the
person injured is not material
because the subject matter of
the offense, a check, was
sufficiently identified with such
particularity as to properly
identify the particular offense
charged.23
Interpreting the previously
discussed cases, We conclude
that in offenses against
property, if the subject matter
of the offense is generic and
not identifiable, such as the
money unlawfully taken as
in Lahoylahoy, an error in the
designation of the offended
party is fatal and would result
in the acquittal of the
accused. However, if the
subject matter of the offense
is specific and identifiable,
such as a warrant, as in Kepner,
or a check, such as
in Sayson and Ricarze, an
error in the designation of the
offended party is immaterial.
In the present case, the subject
matter of the offense does not
refer to money or any other
generic property. Instead, the
information specified the
subject of the offense as
"various kinds of jewelry
valued in the total amount of
705,685.00." The charge was
thereafter sufficiently fleshed
out and proved by the Trust
Receipt Agreement24signed by
Senador and presented during
trial, which enumerates these
"various kinds of jewelry
valued in the total amount of
PhP 705,685," viz:
Thus, it is the doctrine
elucidated in Kepner, Sayson,
and Ricarze that is applicable to
the present case, not the ruling
in Uba or Lahoylahoy. The
error in the designation of the
offended party in the
information is immaterial and
did not violate Senadors
constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against
her.
Lest it be overlooked, Senador
offered to pay obligations
through Keppel Check No.
0003603, which was
dishonored because it was
drawn against an already closed
account. The offer indicates her
receipt of the pieces of jewelry
thus described and an implied
admission that she
misappropriated the jewelries
themselves or the proceeds of
the sale. Rule 130, Section 27
states:
In criminal cases. except those
involving quasi-offenses
(criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be
compromised. an offer of
compromise by the accused
may he received in evidence as
implied admission of guilt.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Taken together, the C A did not
err in affirming petitioner's
conviction for the crime of
estafa.1wphi1
In light of current
jurisprudence,25 the Court,
however, finds the award of
exemplary damages
excessive.1wphi1 Art. 2229 of
the Civil Code provides that
exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good.
Nevertheless, "exemplary
damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish
another, but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a
negative incentive to curb
socially deleterious
26
actions." On this basis, the
award of exemplary damages in
the amount of PhP 100,000 is
reduced to PhP 30,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision
dated May 17, 2011 and
Resolution dated March 30,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in
C A-G.R. CJ.C No. 00952,
finding Ramoncita Senador
guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ESTAFA under
par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, are hereby
AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the
award of exemplary damages
he reduced to PhP 30,000.
SO ORDERED.
lll. Venue (18 July 2015)
. Rule L10, Sec.15, RCP
Section 15. Place where action
is to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, the
criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory
where the offense was
committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is
committed in a train, aircraft, or
other public or private vehicle
while in the course of its trip,
the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court
of any municipality or territory
where such train, aircraft or
other vehicle passed during
such its trip, including the place
of its departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is
committed on board a vessel in
the course of its voyage, the
criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court
of the first port of entry or of
any municipality or territory
where the vessel passed during
such voyage, subject to the
generally accepted principles of
international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside
the Philippines but punishable
under Article 2 of the Revised
Penal Code shall be cognizable
by the court where the criminal
action is first filed. (15a)
Sec.18, B.P.129r Presidential
Decree No. 1069 (Extradition
Law)
Section 18. Costs and
Expenses; By Whom
Paid. Except when the relevant
extradition treaty provides
otherwise, all costs or expenses
incurred in any extradition
proceeding and in
apprehending, securing and
transmitting an accused shall be
paid by the requesting state or
government. The Secretary of
Justice shall certify to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs the
amounts to be paid by the
requesting state or government
on account of expenses and
costs, and the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs shall cause the
amounts to be collected and
transmitted to the Secretary of
Justice for deposit in the
National Treasury of the
Philippines.
o Treas v People, G.R. No.
195002, 25 January 2012
HECTORTREAS, Petitioner
vs.PEOPLE Respondent.
Where life or liberty is affected
by its proceedings, courts must
keep strictly within the limits of
the law authorizing them to
take jurisdiction and to try the
case and render judgment
thereon.1
This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to annul and
set aside the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision dated 9 July
20102 and Resolution dated 4
January 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of
the Case
The pertinent facts, as found by
the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in December 1999,
Margarita Alocilja (Margarita)
wanted to buy a house-and-lot
in Iloilo City covered by TCT
No. 109266. It was then
mortgaged with Maybank. The
bank manager Joselito Palma
recommended the appellant
Hector Treas (Hector) to
private complainant Elizabeth,
who was an employee and
niece of Margarita, for advice
regarding the transfer of the
title in the latters name. Hector
informed Elizabeth that for the
titling of the property in the
name of her aunt Margarita, the
following expenses would be
incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorneys fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary
Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous
Expenses.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave
P150,000.00 to Hector who
issued a corresponding receipt
dated December 22, 1999 and
prepared [a] Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage.
Subsequently, Hector gave
Elizabeth Revenue Official
Receipt Nos. 00084370 for
P96,000.00 and 00084369 for
P24,000.00. However, when
she consulted with the BIR, she
was informed that the receipts
were fake. When confronted,
Hector admitted to her that the
receipts were fake and that he
used the P120,000.00 for his
other transactions. Elizabeth
demanded the return of the
money.
To settle his accounts, appellant
Hector issued in favor of
Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce
check No. 0042856 dated
November 10, 2000 in the
amount of P120,000.00,
deducting from P150,000.00
the P30,000.00 as attorneys
fees. When the check was
deposited with the PCIBank,
Makati Branch, the same was
dishonored for the reason that
the account was closed.
Notwithstanding repeated
formal and verbal demands,
appellant failed to pay. Thus,
the instant case of Estafa was
filed against him.3
On 29 October 2001, an
Information was filed by the
Office of the City Prosecutor
before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), both of Makati City.
The Information reads as
follows:
That on or about the 23rd day
of December, 1999, in the City
of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 which
money was given to her by her
aunt Margarita Alocilja, with
the express obligation on the
part of the accused to use the
said amount for expenses and
fees in connection with the
purchase of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-109266,
but the said accused, once in
possession of the said amount,
with the intent to gain and
abuse of confidence, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his
own personal use and benefit
the amount of P130,000.00 less
attorneys fees and the said
accused failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja
and Margarita Alocilja in the
aforementioned amount of
P130,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During arraignment on 26 April
2002, petitioner, acting as his
own counsel, entered a plea of
"Not Guilty." Allegedly due to
old age and poor health, and the
fact that he lives in Iloilo City,
petitioner was unable to attend
the pre-trial and trial of the
case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC
rendered a Decision5 finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of
Estafa under section 1,
paragraph (b), of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
with the dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, judgment is rendered
finding accused Hector Trenas
guilty of the crime of Estafa
with abuse of confidence as
penalized under Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, and
which offense was committed
in the manner described in the
aforementioned information. As
a consequence of this judgment,
accused Hector Trenas is
sentenced to suffer a penalty of
Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor to Seventeen
(17) Years and Four (4) Months
of Reclusion Temporal.
Moreover, he is ordered to
indemnify private complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of
P130,000.00 with interest at the
legal rate of 12% per annum,
reckoned from the date this
case was filed until the amount
is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.6
We note at this point that
petitioner has been variably
called Treas and Trenas in the
pleadings and court issuances,
but for consistency, we use the
name "Treas", under which he
was accused in the Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner
filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,7 which was
denied by the RTC in a
Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8
On 25 September 2008,
petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal before the RTC.9 The
appeal was docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July
2010, the CA rendered a
Decision10 affirming that of the
RTC. On 4 August 2010,
petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated 4 January
2011.11
On 25 January 2011, petitioner
filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for
Review on Certiorari12 before
this Court. He asked for a
period of 15 days within which
to file a petition for review, and
the Court granted his motion in
a Resolution dated 9 February
2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner
filed his Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court,
with the following assignment
of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN RULING THAT
AN ACCUSED HAS TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE
OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF
JURISDICTION APPEARS IN
THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN RULING THAT
DEMAND MADE BY A
PERSON OTHER THAN THE
AGGRIEVED PARTY
SATISFIES THE
REQUIREMENT OF
DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE
THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13
On the first issue, petitioner
asserts that nowhere in the
evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that
150,000 was given to and
received by petitioner in Makati
City. Instead, the evidence
shows that the Receipt issued
by petitioner for the money was
dated 22 December 1999,
without any indication of the
place where it was issued.
Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage
prepared by petitioner was
signed and notarized in Iloilo
City, also on 22 December
1999. Petitioner claims that the
only logical conclusion is that
the money was actually
delivered to him in Iloilo City,
especially since his residence
and office were situated there
as well. Absent any direct proof
as to the place of delivery, one
must rely on the disputable
presumption that things
happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life. The
only time Makati City was
mentioned was with respect to
the time when the check
provided by petitioner was
dishonored by Equitable-PCI
Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada
Branch in Makati. Petitioner
asserts that the prosecution
witness failed to allege that any
of the acts material to the crime
of estafa had occurred in
Makati City. Thus, the trial
court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an
accused is not required to
present evidence to prove lack
of jurisdiction, when such lack
is already indicated in the
prosecution evidence.
As to the second issue,
petitioner claims that the
amount of P150,000 actually
belongs to Margarita. Assuming
there was misappropriation, it
was actually she not Elizabeth
who was the offended party.
Thus, the latters demand does
not satisfy the requirement of
prior demand by the offended
party in the offense of estafa.
Even assuming that the demand
could have been properly made
by Elizabeth, the demand
referred to the amount of
P120,000, instead of P150,000.
Finally, there is no showing that
the demand was actually
received by petitioner. The
signature on the Registry
Return Receipt was not proven
to be that of petitioners.
On 30 May 2011, this Court
issued a Resolution directing
the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file the
latters Comment on the
Petition. On 27 July 2011, the
OSG filed a Motion for
Extension, praying for an
additional period of 60 days
within which to submit its
Comment. This motion was
granted in a Resolution dated
12 September 2011. On 23
September 2011, the OSG filed
a Motion for Special Extension,
requesting an additional period
of five days. On 29 September
2011, it filed its Comment on
the Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG
asserts that the RTC did not err
in convicting petitioner as
charged. The OSG notes that
petitioner does not dispute the
factual findings of the trial
court with respect to the
delivery of 150,000 to him,
and that there was a
relationship of trust and
confidence between him and
Elizabeth. With respect to his
claim that the Complaint should
have been filed in Iloilo City,
his claim was not supported by
any piece of evidence, as he did
not present any. Further,
petitioner is, in effect, asking
the Court to weigh the
credibility of the prosecution
witness, Elizabeth. However,
the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight, unless
tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or
circumstance, which is not the
case here.
With respect to the second
issue, the OSG stresses that the
defense of "no valid demand"
was not raised in the lower
court. Nevertheless, the demand
letter sent to Elizabeth suffices,
as she is also one of the
complainants alleged in the
Information, as an agent of
Margarita. Moreover, no proof
was adduced as to the
genuineness of petitioners
signature in the Registry Return
Receipt of the demand letter.
The OSG, however, submits
that the Court may recommend
petitioner for executive
clemency, in view of his
advanced age and failing
health.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is impressed with
merit.
Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises
questions of law, the resolution
of the Petition requires a review
of the factual findings of the
lower courts and the evidence
upon which they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. In many
instances, however, this Court
has laid down exceptions to this
general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals and the
trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(3) When the inference made
by the Court of Appeals from
its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse
of discretion in the appreciation
of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in
making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary
to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is premised
on misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals
failed to notice certain relevant
facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a
different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact
are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation
of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are
contradicted by the evidence on
record.14
In this case, the findings of fact
of the trial court and the CA on
the issue of the place of
commission of the offense are
conclusions without any
citation of the specific evidence
on which they are based; they
are grounded on conclusions
and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision,
ruled on the commission of the
offense without any finding as
to where it was committed:
Based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution
through private complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is
convinced that accused Trenas
had committed the offense of
Estafa by taking advantage of
her trust so that he could
misappropriate for his own
personal benefit the amount
entrusted to him for payment of
the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax.
As clearly narrated by private
complainant Luciaja, after
accused Trenas had obtained
the amount of P150,000.00
from her, he gave her two
receipts purportedly issued by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
for the fraudulent purpose of
fooling her and making her
believe that he had complied
with his duty to pay the
aforementioned taxes.
Eventually, private complainant
Luciaja discovered that said
receipts were fabricated
documents.15
In his Motion for
Reconsideration before the
RTC, petitioner raised the
argument that it had no
jurisdiction over the offense
charged. The trial court denied
the motion, without citing any
specific evidence upon which
its findings were based, and by
relying on conjecture, thus:
That the said amount was given
to [Treas] in Makati City was
incontrovertibly established by
the prosecution. Accused
Treas, on the other hand, never
appeared in Court to present
countervailing evidence. It is
only now that he is suggesting
another possible scenario, not
based on the evidence, but on
mere "what ifs". x x x
Besides, if this Court were to
seriously assay his assertions,
the same would still not warrant
a reversal of the assailed
judgment. Even if the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage was executed on 22
December 999 in Iloilo City, it
cannot preclude the fact that the
P150,000.00 was delivered to
him by private complainant
Luciaja in Makati City the
following day. His reasoning
the money must have been
delivered to him in Iloilo City
because it was to be used for
paying the taxes with the BIR
office in that city does not
inspire concurrence. The
records show that he did not
even pay the taxes because the
BIR receipts he gave to private
complainant were fake
documents. Thus, his
argumentation in this regard is
too specious to consider
favorably.16
For its part, the CA ruled on the
issue of the trial courts
jurisdiction in this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that
the court will not entertain
evidence unless it is offered in
evidence. It bears emphasis that
Hector did not comment on the
formal offer of prosecutions
evidence nor present any
evidence on his behalf. He
failed to substantiate his
allegations that he had received
the amount of P150,000.00 in
Iloilo City. Hence, Hectors
allegations cannot be given
evidentiary weight.
Absent any showing of a fact or
circumstance of weight and
influence which would appear
to have been overlooked and, if
considered, could affect the
outcome of the case, the factual
findings and assessment on the
credibility of a witness made by
the trial court remain binding
on appellate tribunal. They are
entitled to great weight and
respect and will not be
disturbed on review.17
The instant case is thus an
exception allowing a review of
the factual findings of the lower
courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
The overarching consideration
in this case is the principle that,
in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense
committed outside its limited
territory. In Isip v. People, 18 this
Court explained:
The place where the crime was
committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an
essential element of
jurisdiction. It is a fundamental
rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have
been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients should
have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of
a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information.
And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take
cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In a criminal case, the
prosecution must not only
prove that the offense was
committed, it must also prove
the identity of the accused and
the fact that the offense was
committed within the
jurisdiction of the court.
In Fukuzume v. People,19 this
Court dismissed a Complaint
for estafa, wherein the
prosecution failed to prove that
the essential elements of the
offense took place within the
trial courts jurisdiction. The
Court ruled:
More importantly, we find
nothing in the direct or cross-
examination of Yu to establish
that he gave any money to
Fukuzume or transacted
business with him with respect
to the subject aluminum scrap
wires inside or within the
premises of the Intercontinental
Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in
Makati for that matter. Venue in
criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. x x x
In the present case, the criminal
information against Fukuzume
was filed with and tried by the
RTC of Makati. He was
charged with estafa as defined
under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
the elements of which are as
follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the
Information as having been
committed in Makati. However,
aside from the sworn statement
executed by Yu on April 19,
1994, the prosecution presented
no other evidence, testimonial
or documentary, to corroborate
Yu's sworn statement or to
prove that any of the above-
enumerated elements of the
offense charged was committed
in Makati. Indeed, the
prosecution failed to establish
that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu in the
amounts of P50,000.00 on July
12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July
22, 1991, P50,000.00 on
October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18,
1991 was given in Makati.
Neither was there proof to show
that the certifications
purporting to prove that
NAPOCOR has in its custody
the subject aluminum scrap
wires and that Fukuzume is
authorized by Furukawa to sell
the same were given by
Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On
the contrary, the testimony of
Yu established that all the
elements of the offense charged
had been committed in
Paraaque, to wit: that on July
12, 1991, Yu went to the house
of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that
with the intention of selling the
subject aluminum scrap wires,
the latter pretended that he is a
representative of Furukawa
who is authorized to sell the
said scrap wires; that based on
the false pretense of Fukuzume,
Yu agreed to buy the subject
aluminum scrap wires; that Yu
paid Fukuzume the initial
amount of P50,000.00; that as a
result, Yu suffered damage.
Stated differently, the crime of
estafa, as defined and penalized
under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
was consummated when Yu and
Fukuzume met at the latter's
house in Paraaque and, by
falsely pretending to sell
aluminum scrap wires,
Fukuzume was able to induce
Yu to part with his money.
From the foregoing, it is
evident that the prosecution
failed to prove that Fukuzume
committed the crime of estafa
in Makati or that any of the
essential ingredients of the
offense took place in the said
city. Hence, the judgment of the
trial court convicting Fukuzume
of the crime of estafa should be
set aside for want of
jurisdiction, without prejudice,
however, to the filing of
appropriate charges with the
court of competent jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the prosecution
failed to show that the offense
of estafa under Section 1,
paragraph (b) of Article 315 of
the RPC was committed within
the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Makati City.
That the offense was committed
in Makati City was alleged in
the information as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day
of December, 1999, in the City
of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)20
Ordinarily, this statement would
have been sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the RTC of
Makati. However, the Affidavit
of Complaint executed by
Elizabeth does not contain any
allegation as to where the
offense was committed. It
provides in part:
4. THAT on 23 December 1999,
[Elizabeth] personally entrusted
to ATTY. HECTOR TREAS
the sum of P150,000.00 to be
expended as agreed and ATTY.
HECTOR TREAS issued to
me a receipt, a photo copy of
which is hereto attached as
Annex "B",
5. THAT despite my several
follow-ups with ATTY.
HECTOR TREAS, the latter
failed to transfer the title of
aforesaid property to MRS.
MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He
also failed to pay the capital
gains tax, documentary stamps
and BIR-related expenses.
What ATTY. HECTOR
TREAS accomplished was
only the preparation of the
Deed of Sale covering aforesaid
property. A copy of said Deed
of Sale is hereto attached as
Annex "C",
6. THAT in view of my
persistent follow-ups, ATTY.
HECTOR TREAS issued to
me a check for refund of the
sum given to him less the
attorneys fee of P20,000.00
and the sum of P10,000.00
allegedly paid to BIR or in the
net sum of P120,000.00. x x x
7. THAT when said check was
deposited at EQUITABLE PCI
BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch
at Makati City, the same was
dishonored by the drawee bank
for the reason: ACCOUNT
CLOSED. x x x21
Aside from the lone allegation
in the Information, no other
evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the
offense or any of its elements
was committed in Makati City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of
the RPC, the elements of estafa
are as follows: (1) that money,
goods or other personal
property is received by the
offender in trust or on
commission, or for
administration, or under any
other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to
return the same; (2) that there
be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such
receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) there is
demand by the offended party
to the offender.22
There is nothing in the
documentary evidence offered
by the prosecution23 that points
to where the offense, or any of
its elements, was committed. A
review of the testimony of
Elizabeth also shows that there
was no mention of the place
where the offense was allegedly
committed:
Q After the manager of
Maybank referred Atty. Treas
to you, what happened next?
A We have met and he
explained to the expenses and
what we will have to and she
will work for the Deed of Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount
when you got to the expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND.
Q What was the amount quoted
to you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of
this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown
of this ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is
for his Attorneys fee, NINETY
THOUSAND is for the capital
gain tax TWENTY FOUR
THOUSAND is intended for
documentary sum (sic) and
TEN THOUSAND PESOS is
for other expenses for BIR.
Q And did you give him this
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?
A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt
issued by Atty. Treas for this
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, will you be able
to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a
document, madam witness,
already identified during the
pre-trial as exhibit "B". This
appears to be a receipt dated
December 22, 1999. Will you
please go over this document
and inform this court what
relation has this to the receipt
which you said Atty. Treas
issued to you?
A This is the receipt issued by
Atty. Hector Treas.
Q Now, after the amount of
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND was given to
Atty. Treas by you, what
happened next?
A We made several follow-ups
but he failed to do his job.24
Although the prosecution
alleged that the check issued by
petitioner was dishonored in a
bank in Makati, such dishonor
is not an element of the offense
of estafa under Article 315, par.
1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone
allegation in the information,
there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence which
even mentions that any of the
elements of the offense were
committed in Makati. The rule
is settled that an objection may
be raised based on the ground
that the court lacks jurisdiction
over the offense charged, or it
may be considered motu
proprio by the court at any
stage of the proceedings or on
appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction
over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be
conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or
otherwise. That jurisdiction is
conferred
by the sovereign authority that
organized the court and is given
only by law in the manner and
form prescribed by law.26
It has been consistently held by
this Court that it is unfair to
require a defendant or accused
to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court
has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense or it is
not the court of proper
venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule
110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure of 2000
provides that "[s]ubject to
existing laws, the criminal
action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where
the offense was committed or
where any of its essential
ingredients occurred." This
fundamental principle is to
ensure that the defendant is not
compelled to move to, and
appear in, a different court from
that of the province where the
crime was committed as it
would cause him great
inconvenience in looking for
his witnesses and other
evidence in another
place.28 This principle echoes
more strongly in this case,
where, due to distance
constraints, coupled with his
advanced age and failing
health, petitioner was unable to
present his defense in the
charges against him.
There being no showing that
the offense was committed
within Makati, the RTC of that
city has no jurisdiction over the
case.29
As such, there is no more need
to discuss the other issue raised
by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees
it fit to note that the Code of
Professional Responsibility
strongly militates against the
petitioners conduct in handling
the funds of his client. Rules
16.01 and 16.02 of the Code
provides:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall
account for all money or
property collected or received
for or from the client.1wphi1
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall
keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own
and those others kept by him.
When a lawyer collects or
receives money from his client
for a particular purpose (such as
for filing fees, registration fees,
transportation and office
expenses), he should promptly
account to the client how the
money was spent.30 If he does
not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the
client. His failure either to
render an accounting or to
return the money (if the
intended purpose of the money
does not materialize)
constitutes a blatant disregard
of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.31
Moreover, a lawyer has the
duty to deliver his client's funds
or properties as they fall due or
upon demand.32 His failure to
return the client's money upon
demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in
him by the client.33 It is a gross
violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in
the legal profession and
deserves punishment.34
In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this
Court ruled that the issuance of
checks which were later
dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer's unfitness
for the trust and confidence
reposed on him, shows lack of
personal honesty and good
moral character as to render
him unworthy of public
confidence, and constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action.
This case is thus referred to the
Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for the
initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against petitioner.
In any case, should there be a
finding that petitioner has failed
to account for the funds
received by him in trust, the
recommendation should include
an order to immediately return
the amount of 130,000 to his
client, with the appropriate rate
of interest from the time of
demand until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision
dated 9 July 2010 and the
Resolution dated 4 January
2011 issued by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32177 are SET ASIDE on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 137, Makati
City. Criminal Case No. 01-
2409 is DISMISSED without
prejudice. This case is
REFERRED to the IBP Board
of Governors for investigation
and recommendation pursuant
to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.
o Lopez v. Cityludge, G.R.
No. L-25795, 29 October 1966
ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ,
AURORA MEJIA
VILLASOR, ROY P.
VILLASOR,
vs.THE CITY JUDGE,
CESAR L. PARAS,
TRINIDAD T. LAZATIN,
and TERRA
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
In the month of February 1964,
petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as
administrator of the intestate
estate of the spouses Manuel
M. Mejia and Gloria Lazatin
(Special Proceedings No.
48181 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila), together
with his co-petitioners Angelina
Mejia Lopez and Aurora Mejia
Villasor and other heirs of said
spouses, entered into a contract
with respondent Trinidad T.
Lazatin for the development
and subdivision of three parcels
of land belonging to said
intestate estate. Subsequently
Lazatin transferred his rights
under the contract to the Terra
Development Corporation.
Months later, petitioners and
other co-heirs filed an action in
the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City (Civil Case No.
Q-8344) for the rescission of
said contract for alleged gross
and willful violation of its
terms. Thereafter, Lazatin and
the Terra Development
Corporation, in turn, filed with
the Fiscal's Office of the City of
Angeles a complaint against
petitioners for an alleged
violation of the provisions of
Article 172 in relation to those
of Article 171, paragraph 4, of
the Revised Penal Code. After
conducting a preliminary
examination in connection
therewith, the City Fiscal of
Angeles filed with the Court of
said City an information
charging petitioners with the
crime of falsification of a
private document upon the
allegation that they made it
appear in the contract
mentioned heretofore that
Aurora M. Villasor was the
"guardian" of the minor George
L. Mejia and that Angelina M.
Lopez was similarly the
"guardian" of the minor
Alexander L. Mejia, when in
truth and in fact they knew that
they were not the guardians of
said minors on the date of the
execution of the document
(Criminal Case No. C-2268).
Upon petition of the parties
thus charged, the City Fiscal of
Angeles reinvestigated the case
on March 7, 1965 to give them
an opportunity to present
exculpatory evidence, and after
the conclusion of the
reinvestigation the parties
charged moved for the
dismissal of the case mainly on
the ground that the City Court
of Angeles had no jurisdiction
over the offense because the
private document that contained
the alleged false statement of
fact was signed by them outside
the territorial limits of said city.
As the resolution of this motion
to dismiss was delayed and in
the meantime the City Court
had set Criminal Case No. C-
2268 for arraignment, the
defendants secured from said
court several postponements of
the arraignment.
Finally, in view of the City
Fiscal's continued failure to act
on the motion to dismiss the
case, petitioners filed on
November 26, 1965 with the
City Court a motion to quash
upon the ground that said court
had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. The
complainants in the case
with the conformity of the City
Fiscal filed an opposition
thereto, and on February 3,
1966 the respondent judge
denied said motion to quash
and reset the arraignment of all
the defendants on March 5 of
the same year. In view thereof,
petitioners filed the present
action for certiorari and
prohibition.
Upon the foregoing facts the
only question to be resolved is
whether or not the City Court
of Angeles City has jurisdiction
to try and decide Criminal Case
No. C-2268 for alleged
falsification of a private
document by the parties named
in the information.
It is clear that petitioners are
not charged with having used a
falsified document, in violation
of the last paragraph of Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code.
The charge against them is that
of having falsified a private
document by knowingly and
willfully stating therein that
Aurora M. Villasor and
Angelina M. Lopez were the
"guardians" of their minor
brothers George and Alexander,
respectively, when in fact they
knew that, at the time they
made such written statement, it
was Carolina M. de Castro who
was the judicial guardian of
said minors.
It is settled law in criminal
actions that the place where the
criminal offense was committed
not only determines the venue
of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction (U.S. vs.
Pagdayuman 5 Phil. 265). Thus,
under the provisions of Section
86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
municipal courts have original
jurisdiction only over criminal
offenses committed within their
respective territorial
jurisdiction.
In the present case, it is the
claim of petitioners a claim
supported by the record that
Angelina M. Lopez and Aurora
M. Villasor signed the private
document wherein they are
alleged to have made a false
statement of fact, the first
within the territorial jurisdiction
of Makati, and the second
within the territorial jurisdiction
of Quezon City, both within the
province of Rizal.
We now come to consider the
question of when and where is
the offense of falsification of a
private document deemed
consummated or committed.
Upon this point, We have ruled
clearly and definitely in U.S.
vs. Infante, 36 Phil. 146, that
the crime of falsification of a
private document defined and
penalized by Article 304 of the
Penal Code (now paragraph 2,
Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code) is consummated
when such document is actually
falsified with the intent to
prejudice a third person,
whether such falsified
document is or is not thereafter
put to the illegal use for which
it was intended.
Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36
Phil. p. 207, We said:
. . . The contention of counsel
would seem to be that the
information was defective, in
that it fails to set forth
expressly the place where
improper and illegal use was
made of the falsified document,
an allegation which counsel for
appellant insists was absolutely
essential for the proper
determination of the court
clothed with jurisdiction over
the alleged offense. But under
the definition of the crime of
falsification of a private
document as set forth in Article
304 of the Penal Code, the
offense is consummated at the
time when and at the place
where the document is falsified
to the prejudice of or with the
intent to prejudice a third
person, and this whether the
falsified document is or is not
put to the improper or illegal
use for which it was intended. It
is evident, therefore, that the
place where the crime is
committed is the place where
the document is actually
falsified, and that the improper
or illegal use of the document
thereafter is in no wise a
material or essential element of
the crime of falsification of a
private document; . . . .
Applying the above ruling to
the facts before Us, it would
appear that if the private
document subject of the
information was falsified by the
persons therein charged, the act
of falsification the signing of
the document and the
coetaneous intent to cause
damage was committed and
consummated outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Angeles, and that
whether the falsified private
document was thereafter put or
not put to the illegal use for
which it was intended, or was
signed by the other contracting
party within the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of
Angeles is in no wise a material
or essential element of the
crime of falsification of the
private document, nor could it
in any way change the fact that
the act of falsification charged
was committed outside the
territorial jurisdiction of
Angeles City. Thus, that the
City Court of Angeles has, no
jurisdiction over the offense
charged is beyond question.
Respondents, however, contend
that the motion to quash filed
by the defendants necessarily
assumes the truth of the
allegation of the information to
the effect that the offense was
committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City and
that they may not be allowed to
disprove this at this early stage
of the proceedings. This is not
exactly the law on the matter at
present. It was the law
applicable to a demurrer
now obsolete to an
information. The motion to
quash now provided for in Rule
117 of the Rules of Court is
manifestly broader in scope
than the demurrer, as it is not
limited to defects apparent
upon the face of the complaint
or information but extends to
issues arising out of extraneous
facts, as shown by the
circumstance that, among the
grounds for a motion to quash,
Section 2 of said Rule provides
for former jeopardy or
acquittal, extinction of criminal
action or liability, insanity of
the accused etc., which
necessarily involve questions of
fact in the determination of
which a preliminary trial is
required.
In the present case, the portion
of the record of the
reinvestigation which was
submitted to the respondent
judge for consideration in
connection with the resolution
of the motion to quash filed by
the defendants shows beyond
question that the offense
charged was committed far
beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City.
On the propriety of the writs
prayed for, it may be said that,
as a general rule, a court of
equity will not issue a writ of
certiorari to annul an order of a
lower court denying a motion to
quash, nor issue a writ of
prohibition to prevent said
court from proceeding with the
case after such denial, it being
the rule that upon such denial
the defendant should enter his
plea of not guilty and go to trial
and, if convicted, raise on
appeal the same legal questions
covered by his motion to quash.
In this as well as in other
jurisdictions however, this is no
longer the hard and fast rule.
The writs of certiorari and
prohibition, as extra-ordinary
legal remedies, are, in the
ultimate analysis, intended to
annul void proceedings; to
prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of legal
authority and to provide for a
fair and orderly administration
of justice. Thus, in Yu Kong
Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385,
We took cognizance of a
petition for certiorari and
prohibition although the
accused in the case could have
appealed in due time from the
order complained of, our action
in the premises being based on
the public welfare and the
advancement of public policy.
In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo, 43
Phil. 304, We also admitted a
petition to restrain the
prosecution of certain
chiropractors although, if
convicted, they could have
appealed. We gave due course
to their petition for the orderly
administration of justice and to
avoid possible oppression by
the strong arm of the law. And
in Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63
Phil. 627, the petition for
certiorari challenging the trial
court's action admitting an
amended information was
sustained despite the
availability of appeal at the
proper time.
More recently, We said the
following in Yap vs. the Hon.
D. Lutero, etc., G.R. No. L-
12669, April 30, 1959:
Manifestly, the denial, by
respondent herein, of the
motion to quash the
information in case No. 16443,
may not be characterized as
"arbitrary" or "despotic", or to
be regarded as amounting to
"lack of jurisdiction". The
proper procedure, in the event
of denial of a motion to quash,
is for the accused, upon
arraignment, to plead not guilty
and reiterate his defense of
former jeopardy, and, in case of
conviction, to appeal therefrom,
upon the ground that he has
been twice put in jeopardy of
punishment, either for the same
offense, or for the same act, as
the case may be. However,
were we to require adherence to
this pretense, the case at bar
would have to be dismissed and
petitioner required to go
through the inconvenience, not
to say the mental agony and
torture, of submitting himself to
trial on the merits in case No.
16443, apart from the expenses
incidental thereto, despite the
fact that his trial and conviction
therein would violate one of his
constitutional rights, and that,
on appeal to this Court, we
would, therefore, have to set
aside the judgment of
conviction of the lower court.
This would, obviously, be most
unfair and unjust. Under the
circumstances obtaining in the
present case, the flaw in the
procedure followed by
petitioner herein may be
overlooked, in the interest of a
more enlightened and
substantial justice.
Indeed, the lack of jurisdiction
of the City Court of Angeles
over the criminal offense
charged being patent, it would
be highly unfair to compel the
parties charged to undergo trial
in said court and suffer all the
embarrassment and mental
anguish that go with it.
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring that
the offense charged in the
information filed in Criminal
Case No. C-2268 of the City
Court of Angeles City is not
within the jurisdiction of said
court and that, therefore, said
court is hereby restrained and
prohibited from further
proceedings therein. Costs
against the private respondents.
. llusorio v. Bildner, G.R. No.
173935-38, 23 December 2008
ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs. MA. ERLINDA I.
BILDNER, LILY F.
RAQUEO, SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, MA. CRISTINA
A. ILUSORIO, AND
AURORA I.
MONTEMAYOR
Respondents Ma. Erlinda
Bildner and Lily Raqueo were
charged by Erlinda K. Ilusorio
(petitioner) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Pasig City with
perjury arising from their filing,
on behalf of Lakeridge
Development Corp.(LDC), of a
petition in the Makati City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
issuance of new owners
duplicate copy of Certificate of
Condominium Title (CCT) No.
21578 covering a condominium
unit in Makati. The Information
reads:
On or about November 4, 1999,
in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, conspiring
and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding
one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and
falsely subscribe and swear to
a Petition for Issuance of a
New Owners Duplicate Copy
of Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21578 before
Rafael Arsenio S. Dizon, a
notary public in and for Pasig
City, duly appointed, qualified
and acting as such, and in
which Petition said accused
subscribed and swore to, among
other things, facts known to
them to be untrue, that is: That
the Petitioners claim that the
title was lost, which fact was
material matter and required by
law to be stated in said Petition,
when in truth and in fact as the
said accused very well knew at
the time they swore to and
signed the said petition for
Issuance of a New Owners
Duplicate Copy of
Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578, that said
statement appearing in
paragraph 4 of said Petition:
"4. Pending registration of the
mortgage document with the
Registry of Deeds of Makati
City, the petitioners had their
respective offices, renovated
and by reason thereof,
documents were moved from
their usual places and
thereafter, sometime in the
early part of the second quarter
of this year, when petitioners
were ready to have the
mortgage documents
registered, the said owners
duplicate copy of CCT No.
21578 could no longer be
located at the places where
they may and should likely be
found despite earnest and
diligent efforts of all the
petitioners to locate the
same;"
was false and untrue because
the said title was in the
possession of the complainant,
Erlinda K. Ilusorio, and the
above false statement was
made in order to obtain a
New Owners Duplicate Copy
of Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21578, to the
damage and prejudice of
complainant Erlinda K.
Ilusorio.
Contrary to law. 1 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Three similarly worded
Informations for perjury were
also filed against
respondents Sylvia Ilusorio, Ma
. Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora
Montemayor also before
the Pasig City MeTC arising
from their filing of three
petitions, also on behalf of
LDC, before the Tagaytay City
RTC for issuance of new
owners duplicate copy of
Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 17010,2 170113 and
170124 covering properties
located in Tagaytay City.
As the purported corporate
officers of LDC, respondents
filed the above-mentioned
petitions for issuance of new
owners duplicate copies of
titles over properties located in
Makati City and Tagaytay City
after the owners copies thereof
could no longer be found
"despite earnest and diligent
efforts" to locate the same.
Petitioner, alleging that she,
as bona fide chairman and
president of LDC,5 has in her
possession those titles, filed her
opposition to respondents
petitions.6 Respondents
forthwith amended their
respective petitions,7 the
amendments reading, according
to petitioner, as follows:
4. On November 4, 1999, in the
belief that the aforesaid owners
duplicate copy of CCT No.
21578 had been lost and can no
longer be recovered, the
petitioners filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati
City a petition for the
cancellation and issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of
CCT No. 21578 in lieu of the
lost copy;
5. However, after the
jurisdictional facts and
evidence had been presented
before the said court, the
above-named respondents,
through their counsel, filed
their opposition to the petition
on the ground that the said
owners duplicate copy of
Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578 allegedly is not
lost and is actually in their
possession and, thereafter, in a
subsequent hearing held on
February 10, 2000, said
respondents, through counsel,
presented before this
Honorable Court the
duplicate copy of said CCT
No. 21578;
6. The owners duplicate copy
of CCT No. 21578, pursuant to
law, should be in the actual
possession of the registered
owner thereof and it is
indubitable that LAKERIDGE
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION is the
registered owner entitled to the
possession and control of the
evidence of ownership of all
corporate properties;
7. The respondents have no
authority nor legal basis to take
and continue to have possession
of said CCT No. 21578, not one
of them being a corporate
officer of LAKERIDGE
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, the
registered owner of said
property;
. The respondents, in the
absence of any authority or
right to take possession of CCT
No. 21578, should be ordered
by this Honorable Court to
surrender the owners duplicate
copy thereof, which they
continue to hold without legal
and/or justifiable reasons, not
only for the purpose of causing
the registration of the mortgage
thereof in favor of the
mortgagee/petitioner, Ma.
Erlinda I. Bildner, but also for
the reason that it is the
corporation, as owner of the
property, who [sic] is entitled to
possession and control and
therefore, said CCT must,
pursuant to law, be kept at the
corporations principal place of
business.
(Underscoring in the original;
emphasis supplied)
Using as bases the contents of
the original petitions filed in
the Makati and Tagaytay
RTCs,8 petitioner filed charges
of falsification of public
documents and perjury against
respondents before the Pasig
City Prosecutors Office.9
By Resolution of April 6, 2000,
Investigating Prosecutor
Edgardo Bautista, with the
imprimatur of the City
Prosecutor, dismissed the
falsification charges but found
probable cause to indict
respondents for perjury.10 Four
informations for perjury were
accordingly filed before
the MeTC Pasig, one against
respondents Ma. Erlinda I.
Bildner and Lily F. Raquero;
another against respondents
Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria
Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora
Montemayor; still another
against respondents Sylvia K.
Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A.
Ilusorio and Aurora
Montemayor; and the last
against respondents Sylvia K.
Ilusorio, Maria Cristina Ilusorio
and Aurora Montemayor,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
121496, 121497, 121498 and
121499, respectively.
After the consolidation of the
Informations, respondents
moved for their quashal on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction
due to improper venue, lack of
bases of the charges as
the original petitions had
already been withdrawn, and
privileged character of the
pleadings.11
Branch 72 of the Pasig City
MeTC, by Order12 of June 13,
2001, ruled that venue was
properly laid, viz:
To determine the correct venue
(territorial jurisdiction)[,] the
vital point is the allegations
[sic] in the complaint or
information of the situs of the
offense charged. If the
complaint or information
alleges that the crime was
committed in the place where
the court has jurisdiction, then
that court has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case.
(Colmenares vs. Villar, 33
SCRA 186). In other words,
what is important is the
allegation in the complaint that
the crime was committed in the
place which is within the
courts jurisdiction (Mediante
vs. Ortiz, 19 SCRA 832).
In the instant cases, the
information [sic] allege that the
offenses were committed in
Pasig City. Hence, pursuant to
the aforecited doctrinal rulings,
this court has the venue or
territorial jurisdiction over
these cases. (Underscoring
supplied)
Nonetheless, finding that
respondents petitions are
privileged, the MeTC,
citing Flordelis v. Judge
Himalalaon13 and People v.
Aquino, et al.,14 granted the
Motions to Quash, viz:
However, the Court finds the
third ground[-privileged
character of the pleadings]
meritorious. In the case of
Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, (84
SCRA 477) which is also a
prosecution for Perjury, the
Supreme Court held:
Moreover, it is likewise clear
that any statement contained in
an appropriate pleading filed in
court that is relevant to the
issues in the case to which it
relates is absolutely priveleged
[sic] and it is the law that the
same may not be made the
subject of a criminal
prosecution. (People vs.
Aquino, 18 SCRA 555.)"
Similarly, the alleged perjurious
statements in the instant cases
are contained in a Petition filed
before the Regional Trial
Courts of Makati and Tagaytay
Cities which are relevant to the
case the same being for the
issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of a certificate
of title alleged to be lost.
As the facts charged herein do
not constitute an offense and/or
the information contains
averments which, if true, would
nonetheless constitute a legal
excuse or jurisdiction [sic],
quashal of the Information[s] is
thus in order.
(Underscoring in the original;
emphasis supplied)
Reconsideration of the quashal
of the Informations having been
denied,15 petitioner appealed to
the Pasig City RTC Branch 263
of which, by Decision16 of
January 25, 2006, affirmed the
ruling of the MeTC. After the
denial of her motion for
reconsideration,17 petitioner
filed with this Court the present
petition for review
on certiorari,18 contending that:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED
IN RELYING ON THE CASES
OF FLORDELI[S] VS.
HIMALALOAN (84 SCRA
477) AND PEOPLE VS.
AQUINO (18 SCRA 555) [IN
HOLDING] THAT
STATEMENTS MADE IN
PLEADINGS, EVEN IF
PERJURIOUS OR FALSE,
ARE ABSOLUTELY
PRIVILEGED AND NOT
SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION.
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner is of the view
that People v. Aquino19 cited by
the RTC does not apply in the
present controversy as that case
involved a libel case and "there
is no authority which states that
the rules on absolute privileged
statements in pleadings apply to
both crimes of perjury and
libel."20
Neither, petitioner posits, does
the also cited case of Flordelis
v. Himalaloan21 apply wherein
the Court sustained the quashal
of the therein information for
perjury as the answer to the
complaint containing the
alleged false allegations did not
have to be under oath.
In their Comment, respondents
initially burrow into the
petitions alleged procedural
crack by underscoring the
apparent disregard by petitioner
of the established policy of
judicial hierarchy of courts,
pointing out that the petition
should have been first filed
with the Court of Appeals.22
On the merits, respondents
reiterate, in the main, the
congruent rulings of the MeTC
and RTC that allegations made
by the parties or their counsel
in a pleading are privileged in
nature. Moreover, they contend
that since they had amended the
original petitions, there were no
more bases for the charges of
perjury."23
A word first on the procedural
question raised by respondents.
The present petition is one for
review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, not a
special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
(APPEAL FROM THE
REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS), Section 2(c)
provides that in all cases where
only questions of law are
raised, the appeal "shall be to
the Supreme Court by petition
for review in accordance with
Rule 45."24 Indubitably, the
issue tendered in this case is
a question of law, hence, there
is no violation of the principle
of hierarchy of courts.
On the merits, the Court denies
the petition on the ground that,
contrary to the lower courts
ruling, venue of the
Informations was improperly
laid in Pasig.
The allegations in each of the
Informations indicate Pasig as
the situs of the offense charged
where respondents petitions
were notarized. Albeit the
Informations referred to
the "subscribed and sworn"
petitions of respondents as
bases of the charges, there is no
mention therein that those
petitions were filed in Makati
City and Tagaytay City. The
Complaint-Affidavits,25 which
initiated the criminal actions,
reflect such jurisdictional
details. Consider this
allegation:
6. On November 4, 1999, MA.
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and
LILY F. RAQUENO allegedly
representing
LAKERIDGE filed a verified
Petition for Issuance of a New
Owners Duplicate Copy of
Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578 before the
Regional Trial Court
of Makati City x x x x,
(Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
as well as this:
06. On November 10, 1999,
AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR,
SYLVIA ILUSORIO, and MA.
CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO
allegedly representing
LAKERIDGE filed three (3)
verified Petitions for Issuance
of a New Owners Duplicate
Copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 17010, 17011 and
17012 before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch
18, Tagaytay City x x x x.
(Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
The allegation in each of the
four similarly-worded
Informations that perjury was
committed in Pasig is neither
controlling nor sufficient to
show that the Pasig MeTC has
jurisdiction over them. The
purported perjurious petition
quoted in each of the
Informations in fact indicates
that, with respect to the CCT of
the Registry of Deeds of Makati
the TCTs of the Registry of
Deeds of Tagaytay, venue of the
criminal action arising
therefrom is in Makati and
Tagaytay, respectively.
Perjury is committed as
follows:
Article 183, Revised Penal
Code.
False Testimony in other cases
and perjury in solemn
affirmations. The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in
its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person
who, knowingly making
untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions
of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath, or
make an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a alleged
competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires.
x x x x26 (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
There are thus four elements to
be taken into account "in
determining whether there is
a prima facie case" of
perjury, viz:
(a) that the accused made a
statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a
material matter; (b) that the
statement or affidavit was made
before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and
administer oath; (c) that in the
statement or affidavit, the
accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a
falsehood; and (d) that the
sworn statement or affidavit
containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a
legal purpose.27(Citation
omitted)
It is the deliberate making of
untruthful statements upon any
material matter, however,
before a competent person
authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law
so requires,28 which is
29
imperative in perjury
Venue, in criminal cases, being
jurisdictional,30 the action for
perjury must be instituted and
tried in the municipality or
territory where the deliberate
making of an untruthful
statement upon any matter was
made, in this case, in Makati
and Tagaytay.31
It was in Makati and Tagaytay
where the intent to assert an
falsehood became
manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement finds
relevance or materiality in
deciding the issue of whether
new owners duplicate copies
of the CCT and TCTs may
issue.
Whether the perjurious
statements contained in the four
petitions were subscribed and
sworn in Pasig is immaterial,
the gist of the offense of perjury
being the intentional giving of
false statement. So United
States v. Caet 32teaches, viz:
It is immaterial where the
affidavit was subscribed and
sworn, so long as it appears
from the information that the
defendant, by means of such
affidavit, "swore to" and
knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at
issue in a judicial proceeding
pending in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province. The
gist of the offense charged
is not the making of the
affidavit in Manila, but
the intentional giving of false
evidence in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province by
means of such
affidavit.33 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
While the Court finds that,
contrary to the MeTC and RTC
ruling, venue of the
Informations was improperly
laid, and on that score the Court
denies the present petition as
priorly stated, it is confronting
the sole issue raised by
petitioner whether the
questioned petitions of
respondents are, as the MeTC
held and which the RTC
affirmed, absolutely privileged
on the basis of Flordelis and
Aquino.
The issue had already been
addressed by the Court in Choa
v. People,34 in this wise:
Sison and Aquino both involve
libel cases. In Sison, this Court
categorically stressed that the
term "absolute privilege" (or
"qualified privilege") has an
"established technical
meaning, in connection
with civil actions for libel and
slander." x x x x.
The Flordelis case is likewise
not in point.
There, Flordelis was charged
with perjury for having alleged
false statements in his
verified answer. This Court
held that no perjury could be
committed by Flordelis because
"an answer to a complaint in an
ordinary civil action need not
be under oath," thus, "it is at
once apparent that one element
of the crime of perjury is
absent x x x, namely, that the
sworn statement complained
of must be required by
law." 35 (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Verily, both the MeTC and the
RTC misappreciated this
Courts rulings
in Flordelis and Aquino as
respondents petitions-bases of
the subject Informations for
perjury are required by law to
be under oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is,
on the ground that the
Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig has no jurisdiction over
the Informations for perjury
against respondents, DENIED.
. lJnion Bank v. People, G.R.
No. L92565,28 February 2012
UNION BANK OF THE,
PHILIPPINES and DESI
TOMAS, Petitioners,
vs.PEOPLE
We review in this Rule 45
petition, the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch
65, Makati City (RTC-Makati
City) in Civil Case No. 09-
1038. The petition seeks to
reverse and set aside the RTC-
Makati City decision
dismissing the petition for
certiorari of petitioners Union
Bank of the Philippines (Union
Bank) and Desi Tomas
(collectively, the petitioners).
The RTC found that the
Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 63, Makati City
(MeTC-Makati City) did not
commit any grave abuse of
discretion in denying the
motion to quash the
information for perjury filed by
Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for
perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
making a false narration in a
Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The Information
against her reads:
RPC by falsely declaring under
That on or about the 13th day
of March 2000 in the City of
Forum Shopping in the second
Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful
statements under oath upon a
material matter before a
competent person authorized to
administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused
stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affid
avit of merit of a complaint for
sum of money with prayer for a
writ of replevin docketed as
[Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,]
Pasay City, that the Union Bank
of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or
agency, accused knowing well
that said material statement was
false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.2
The accusation stemmed from
petitioner Union Banks two (2)
complaints for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of
replevin against the spouses
Eddie and Eliza Tamondong
and a John Doe. The first
complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-0717, was filed
before the RTC, Branch 109,
Pasay City on April 13, 1998.
The second complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No.
342-000, was filed on March
15, 2000 and raffled to the
MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.
Both complaints showed that
Tomas executed and signed the
Certification against Forum
Shopping. Accordingly, she was
charged of deliberately
violating Article 183 of the
oath in the Certificate against
complaint that she did not
commence any other action or
proceeding involving the same
issue in another tribunal or
agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to
Quash,3 citing two grounds.
First, she argued that the venue
was improperly laid since it is
the Pasay City court (where the
Certificate against Forum
Shopping was submitted and
used) and not the MeTC-
Makati City (where the
Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that
has jurisdiction over the perjury
case. Second, she argued that
the facts charged do not
constitute an offense because:
(a) the third element of perjury
the willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood was not
alleged with particularity
without specifying what the
other action or proceeding
commenced involving the same
issues in another tribunal or
agency; (b) there was no other
action or proceeding pending in
another court when the second
complaint was filed; and (c) she
was charged with perjury by
giving false testimony while the
allegations in the Information
make out perjury by making a
false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied
the Motion to Quash, ruling
that it has jurisdiction over the
case since the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was
notarized in Makati City.4 The
MeTC-Makati City also ruled
that the allegations in the
Information sufficiently
charged Tomas with
perjury.5 The MeTC-Makati
City subsequently denied
Tomas motion for
reconsideration.6
The petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari before the RTC-
Makati City to annul and set
aside the MeTC-Makati City
orders on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. The
petitioners anchored their
petition on the rulings in United
States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v.
Bildner8 which ruled that venue
and jurisdiction should be in the
place where the false document
was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for
certiorari, the RTC-Makati City
held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners
stance is concerned[,] the more
recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou
v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 &
179438, March 30, 2009)
however, reaffirms what has
been the long standing view on
the venue with respect to
perjury cases. In this particular
case[,] the high court reiterated
the rule that the criminal action
shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was
committed, or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.
It went on to declare that since
the subject document[,] the
execution of which was the
subject of the charge[,] was
subscribed and sworn to in
Manila[,] then the court of the
said territorial jurisdiction was
the proper venue of the criminal
action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of
jurisprudence on the matter, it
is not amiss to state that the city
court of Makati City has
jurisdiction to try and decide
the case for perjury inasmuch
as the gist of the complaint
itself which constitute[s] the
charge against the petitioner
dwells solely on the act of
subscribing to a false
certification. On the other hand,
the charge against the accused
in the case of Ilusorio v.
Bildner, et al., based on the
complaint-affidavits therein[,]
was not simply the execution of
the questioned documents but
rather the introduction of the
false evidence through the
subject documents before the
court of Makati City.9 (emphasis
ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled
that the MeTC-Makati City did
not commit grave abuse of
discretion since the order
denying the Motion to Quash
was based on jurisprudence
later than Ilusorio. The RTC-
Makati City also observed that
the facts in Ilusorio are
different from the facts of the
present case. Lastly, the RTC-
Makati City ruled that the Rule
65 petition was improper since
the petitioners can later appeal
the decision in the principal
case. The RTC-Makati City
subsequently denied the
petitioners motion for
reconsideration. 10
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we
reverse the RTC-Makati City
decision and quash the
Information for perjury against
Tomas. The petitioners contend
that the Ilusorio ruling is more
applicable to the present facts
than our ruling in Sy Tiong
Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They
argued that the facts in Ilusorio
showed that the filing of the
petitions in court containing the
false statements was the
essential ingredient that
consummated the perjury. In Sy
Tiong, the perjurious statements
were made in a General
Information Sheet (GIS) that
was submitted to the Securities
and Exchange Commission
(SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared
the petitioners view. In his
Manifestation and Motion in
lieu of Comment (which we
hereby treat as the Comment to
the petition), the Solicitor
General also relied on Ilusorio
and opined that the lis mota in
the crime of perjury is the
deliberate or intentional giving
of false evidence in the court
where the evidence is material.
The Solicitor General observed
that the criminal intent to assert
a falsehood under oath only
became manifest before the
MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the
issue of what the proper venue
of perjury under Article 183 of
the RPC should be Makati
City, where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where
the Certification was presented
to the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition and hold
that the MeTC-Makati City is
the proper venue and the proper
court to take cognizance of the
perjury case against the
petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal
Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction in criminal cases. It
determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to
be instituted, but also the court
that has the jurisdiction to try
and hear the case. The reason
for this rule is two-fold. First,
the jurisdiction of trial courts is
limited to well-defined
territories such that a trial court
can only hear and try cases
involving crimes committed
within its territorial
jurisdiction.12 Second, laying
the venue in the locus criminis
is grounded on the necessity
and justice of having an
accused on trial in the
municipality of province where
witnesses and other facilities
for his defense are available.13
Unlike in civil cases, a finding
of improper venue in criminal
cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining
the venue where the criminal
action is to be instituted and the
court which has jurisdiction
over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110
of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the
criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court
or municipality or
territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.
[emphasis ours]
The above provision should be
read in light of Section 10, Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure which
states:
Place of commission of the
offense. The complaint or
information is sufficient if it
can be understood from its
allegations that the offense was
committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at
some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless
the particular place where it
was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense
charged or is necessary for its
identification.
Both provisions categorically
place the venue and jurisdiction
over criminal cases not only in
the court where the offense was
committed, but also where any
of its essential ingredients took
place. In other words, the venue
of action and of jurisdiction are
deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states
that the offense was committed
or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at a place
within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, contains the
requirement for a Certificate
against Forum Shopping. The
Certificate against Forum
Shopping can be made either by
a statement under oath in the
complaint or initiatory pleading
asserting a claim or relief; it
may also be in a sworn
certification annexed to the
complaint or initiatory
pleading. In both instances, the
affiant is required to execute a
statement under oath before a
duly commissioned notary
public or any competent person
authorized to administer oath
that: (a) he or she has not
theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best
of his or her knowledge, no
such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of
the present status thereof; and
(c) if he or she should thereafter
learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed
or is pending, he or she shall
report that fact within five days
therefrom to the court wherein
his or her aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been
filed. In relation to the crime of On this basis, we find that the
perjury, the material matter in a allegations in the Information
Certificate against Forum sufficiently support a finding
Shopping is the truth of the that the crime of perjury was
required declarations which is committed by Tomas within the
designed to guard against territorial jurisdiction of the
litigants pursuing simultaneous MeTC-Makati City.
remedies in different fora.14
The first element of the crime
In this case, Tomas is charged of perjury, the execution of the
with the crime of perjury under subject Certificate against
Article 183 of the RPC for Forum Shopping was alleged in
making a false Certificate the Information to have been
against Forum Shopping. The committed in Makati City.
elements of perjury under Likewise, the second and fourth
Article 183 are: elements, requiring the
Certificate against Forum
(a) That the accused Shopping to be under oath
made a statement under before a notary public, were
oath or executed an also sufficiently alleged in the
affidavit upon a Information to have been made
material matter. in Makati City:
(b) That the statement That on or about the 13th day
or affidavit was made of March 2000 in the City of
before a competent Makati, Metro Manila,
officer, authorized to Philippines and within the
receive and administer jurisdiction of this Honorable
oath. Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there
(c) That in the willfully, unlawfully and
statement or affidavit, feloniously make untruthful
the accused made a statements under oath upon a
willful and deliberate material matter before a
assertion of a competent person authorized to
falsehood. administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused
(d) That the sworn stated in the
statement or affidavit Verification/Certification/Affid
containing the falsity is avit x x x.16
required by law or
made for a legal We also find that the third
purpose.15(emphasis element of willful and
ours) deliberate falsehood was also
sufficiently alleged to have
Where the jurisdiction of the been committed in Makati City,
court is being assailed in a not Pasay City, as indicated in
criminal case on the ground of the last portion of the
improper venue, the allegations Information:
in the complaint and
information must be examined [S]aid accused stated in the
together with Section 15(a), Verification/Certification/Affid
Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised avit of merit of a complaint for
Rules of Criminal Procedure. sum of money with prayer for a
writ of replevin docketed as
[Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,]
Pasay City, that the Union Bank
of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or
agency, accused knowing well
that said material statement was
false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)
Tomas deliberate and
intentional assertion of
falsehood was allegedly shown
when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping before
a notary public in Makati City,
despite her knowledge that the
material statements she
subscribed and swore to were
not true. Thus, Makati City is
the proper venue and MeTC-
Makati City is the proper court
to try the perjury case against
Tomas, pursuant to Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as all the essential
elements constituting the crime
of perjury were committed
within the territorial jurisdiction
of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred
to the En Banc primarily to
address the seeming conflict
between the division rulings of
the Court in the Ilusorio case
that is cited as basis of this
petition, and the Sy Tiong case
that was the basis of the
assailed RTC-Makati City
ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy
Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the
perjury charge in Ilusorio
involved false statements
contained in verified petitions
filed with the court for the
issuance of a new owners
duplicate copies of certificates
of title. The verified petitions
containing the false statements
were subscribed and sworn to
in Pasig City, but were filed in
Makati City and Tagaytay City.
The question posed was: which
court (Pasig City, Makati City
and/or Tagaytay City) had
jurisdiction to try and hear the
perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the
action were in Makati City and
Tagaytay City, the places where
the verified petitions were filed.
The Court reasoned out that it
was only upon filing that the
intent to assert an alleged
falsehood became manifest and
where the alleged untruthful
statement found relevance or
materiality. We cited as
jurisprudential authority the
case of United States. v.
Caet18 which ruled:
It is immaterial where the
affidavit was subscribed and
sworn, so long as it appears
from the information that the
defendant, by means of such
affidavit, "swore to" and
knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at
issue in a judicial proceeding
pending in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province. The
gist of the offense charged is
not the making of the affidavit
in Manila, but the intentional
giving of false evidence in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Province by means of such
affidavit. [emphasis and
underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured
statements were made in a GIS
which was subscribed and
sworn to in Manila. We ruled
that the proper venue for the
perjury charges was in Manila
where the GIS was subscribed
and sworn to. We held that the
perjury was consummated in
Manila where the false
statement was made. As
supporting jurisprudence, we
cited the case of Villanueva v.
Secretary of Justice19 that, in
turn, cited an American case
entitled U.S. v. Norris.20 We
ruled in Villanueva that
Perjury is an obstruction of
justice; its perpetration well
may affect the dearest concerns
of the parties before a tribunal.
Deliberate material falsification
under oath constitutes the crime
of perjury, and the crime is
complete when a witness'
statement has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A
Background
To have a better appreciation of
the issue facing the Court, a
look at the historical
background of how the crime of
perjury (specifically, Article
183 of the RPC) evolved in our
jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms
of false testimonies. The first is
false testimony for and against
the defendant in a criminal case
(Articles 180 and 181, RPC);
the second is false testimony in
a civil case (Article 182, RPC);
and the third is false testimony
in other cases (Article 183,
RPC). Based on the
Information filed, the present
case involves the making of an
untruthful statement in an
affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions,
however, are not really the
bases of the rulings cited by the
parties in their respective
arguments. The cited Ilusorio
ruling, although issued by this
Court in 2008, harked back to
the case of Caet which was
decided in 1915, i.e., before the
present RPC took effect.21 Sy
Tiong, on the other hand, is a
2009 ruling that cited
Villanueva, a 2005 case that in
turn cited United States v.
Norris, a 1937 American case.
Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy
Tiong is entirely based on
rulings rendered after the
present RPC took effect.22
The perjurious act in Caet
consisted of an information
charging perjury through the
presentation in court of a
motion accompanied by a false
sworn affidavit. At the time the
Caet ruling was rendered, the
prevailing law on perjury and
the rules on prosecution of
criminal offenses were found in
Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the
Philippine Commission, and in
Subsection 4, Section 6 of
General Order No. 5823 for the
procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697
reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having
taken oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in
any case in which a law of the
Philippine Islands authorizes an
oath to be administered, that he
will testify, declare, depose, or
certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration,
disposition, or certificate by
him subscribed is true, willfully
and contrary to such oath states
or subscribes any material
matter which he does not
believe to be true, is guilty of
perjury, and shall be punished
by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos and by
imprisonment for not more than
five years; and shall moreover,
thereafter be incapable of
holding any public office or of
giving testimony in any court of
the Philippine Islands until such
time as the judgment against
him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the
necessary changes, from
Sections 539224 and 539325 of
the Revised Statutes of the
United States.26 Act No. 1697
was intended to make the mere
execution of a false affidavit
punishable in our jurisdiction.27
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6
of General Order No. 58
provided that the venue shall be
the court of the place where the
crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by
the Court in Caet, perjury was
committed by the act of
representing a false document
in a judicial proceeding.28 The
venue of action was held by the
Court to be at the place where
the false document was
presented since the presentation
was the act that consummated
the crime.
The annotation of Justices
Aquino and Grio-Aquino in
their textbook on the
RPC29 interestingly explains the
history of the perjury
provisions of the present RPC
and traces as well the linkage
between Act No. 1697 and the
present Code. To quote these
authors:30
Art. 180 was taken from art.
318 of the Old Penal Code and
art. 154 of Del Pans Proposed
Correctional Code, while art.
181 was taken from art. 319 of
the old Penal Code and Art. 157
of Del Pans Proposed
Correctional Code. Said arts.
318 and 319, together with art.
321 of the old Penal Code, were
impliedly repealed by Act 1697,
the Perjury Law, passed on
August 23, 1907, which in turn
was expressly repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1916,
Act 2657. In view of the
express repeal of Act 1697, arts.
318 and 321 of the old Penal
Code were deemed revived.
However, Act 2718 expressly
revived secs. 3 and 4 of the
Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the
Revised Penal Code repealed
Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury
under Acts 1697 and 2718
includes false testimony,
whereas, under the Revised
Penal Code, false testimony
includes perjury. Our law on
false testimony is of Spanish
origin, but our law on perjury
(art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of
Act 1697) is derived from
American statutes. The
provisions of the old Penal
Code on false testimony
embrace perjury committed in
court or in some contentious
proceeding, while perjury as
defined in Act 1697 includes
the making of a false affidavit.
The provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on false testimony
"are more severe and strict than
those of Act 1697" on perjury.
[italics ours]
With this background, it can be
appreciated that Article 183 of
the RPC which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon
any person, who knowingly
makes untruthful statements
and not being included in the
provisions of the next
preceding articles, shall testify
under oath, or make an
affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent
person authorized to administer
an oath in cases in which the
law so requires. [emphasis
supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two
punishable acts (1) falsely
testifying under oath in a
proceeding other than a
criminal or civil case; and (2)
making a false affidavit before
a person authorized to
administer an oath on any
material matter where the law
requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong
decided under Article 183 of
the RPC essentially involved
perjured statements made in a
GIS that was subscribed and
sworn to in Manila and
submitted to the SEC in
Mandaluyong City. Thus, the
case involved the making of an
affidavit, not an actual
testimony in a proceeding that
is neither criminal nor civil.
From this perspective, the situs
of the oath, i.e., the place where
the oath was taken, is the place
where the offense was
committed. By implication, the
proper venue would have been
the City of Mandaluyong the
site of the SEC had the charge
involved an actual testimony
made before the SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the
presentation in court of a
motion supported and
accompanied by an affidavit
that contained a falsity. With
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as
basis, the issue related to the
submission of the affidavit in a
judicial proceeding. This came
at a time when Act No. 1697
was the perjury law, and made
no distinction between judicial
and other proceedings, and at
the same time separately
penalized the making of false
statements under oath (unlike
the present RPC which
separately deals with false
testimony in criminal, civil and
other proceedings, while at the
same time also penalizing the
making of false affidavits).
Understandably, the venue
should be the place where the
submission was made to the
court or the situs of the court; it
could not have been the place
where the affidavit was sworn
to simply because this was not
the offense charged in the
Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the
Caet case as its authority, in a
situation where the sworn
petitions filed in court for the
issuance of duplicate
certificates of title (that were
allegedly lost) were the cited
sworn statements to support the
charge of perjury for the
falsities stated in the sworn
petitions. The Court ruled that
the proper venue should be the
Cities of Makati and Tagaytay
because it was in the courts of
these cities "where the intent to
assert an alleged falsehood
became manifest and where the
alleged untruthful statement
finds relevance or materiality in
deciding the issue of whether
new owners duplicate copies
of the [Certificate of
Condominium Title] and
[Transfer Certificates of Title]
may issue."31 To the Court,
"whether the perjurious
statements contained in the four
petitions were subscribed and
sworn in Pasig is immaterial,
the gist of the offense of perjury
being the intentional giving of
false statement,"32citing Caet
as authority for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may
have partly led to the present
confusion on venue because of
its very categorical tenor in
pointing to the considerations
to be made in the determination
of venue; it leaves the
impression that the place where
the oath was taken is not at all a
material consideration,
forgetting that Article 183 of
the RPC clearly speaks of two
situations while Article 182 of
the RPC likewise applies to
false testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would
have made perfect sense had
the basis for the charge been
Article 182 of the RPC, on the
assumption that the petition
itself constitutes a false
testimony in a civil case. The
Caet ruling would then have
been completely applicable as
the sworn statement is used in a
civil case, although no such
distinction was made under
Caet because the applicable
law at the time (Act No. 1697)
did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were
to be used, as what in fact
appears in the Ilusorio ruling,
then only that portion of the
article, referring to the making
of an affidavit, would have
been applicable as the other
portion refers to false testimony
in other proceedings which a
judicial petition for the issuance
of a new owners duplicate
copy of a Certificate of
Condominium Title is not
because it is a civil proceeding
in court. As a perjury based on
the making of a false affidavit,
what assumes materiality is the
site where the oath was taken as
this is the place where the oath
was made, in this case, Pasig
City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue
of criminal cases has been
subject to various changes from
the time General Order No. 58
was replaced by Rules 106 to
122 of the Rules of Court on
July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule
106 of the Rules of Court
provided for the rule on venue
of criminal actions and it
expressly included, as proper
venue, the place where any one
of the essential ingredients of
the crime took
place.1wphi1 This change was
followed by the passage of the
1964 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure,34 and the
2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which all
adopted the 1940 Rules of
Criminal Procedures expanded
venue of criminal actions. Thus,
the venue of criminal cases is
not only in the place where the
offense was committed, but
also where any of its essential
ingredients took place.
In the present case, the
Certification against Forum
Shopping was made integral
parts of two complaints for sum
of money with prayer for a writ
of replevin against the
respondent spouses Eddie
Tamondong and Eliza B.
Tamondong, who, in turn, filed
a complaint-affidavit against
Tomas for violation of Article
183 of the RPC. As alleged in
the Information that followed,
the criminal act charged was for
the execution by Tomas of an
affidavit that contained a
falsity.
Under the circumstances,
Article 183 of the RPC is
indeed the applicable provision;
thus, jurisdiction and venue
should be determined on the
basis of this article which
penalizes one who "make[s] an
affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent
person authorized to administer
an oath in cases in which the
law so requires." The
constitutive act of the offense is
the making of an affidavit; thus,
the criminal act is
consummated when the
statement containing a falsity is
subscribed and sworn before a
duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations,
we hold that our ruling in Sy
Tiong is more in accord with
Article 183 of the RPC and
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. To
reiterate for the guidance of the
Bar and the Bench, the crime of
perjury committed through the
making of a false affidavit
under Article 183 of the RPC is
committed at the time the
affiant subscribes and swears to
his or her affidavit since it is at
that time that all the elements
of the crime of perjury are
executed. When the crime is
committed through false
testimony under oath in a
proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, venue is at
the place where the testimony
under oath is given. If in lieu of
or as supplement to the actual
testimony made in a proceeding
that is neither criminal nor
civil, a written sworn statement
is submitted, venue may either
be at the place where the sworn
statement is submitted or where
the oath was taken as the taking
of the oath and the submission
are both material ingredients of
the crime committed. In all
cases, determination of venue
shall be based on the acts
alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime
committed.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, we hereby DENY
the petition for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.
o People v. Grospe, G.R. No. L-
74053-54, 20 January 1988
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and SAN
MIGUEL
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATHANIEL M. GROSPE,
Presiding Judge, Branch 44,
Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga and MANUEL
PARULAN, respondents.
-HERRERA, J.:
A special civil action for
certiorari seeking to set aside
the Decision of respondent
Presiding Judge of Branch 44,
Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, dismissing Criminal
Case No. 2800 for Violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, and Criminal Case
No. 2813 for Estafa, for being
"bereft of jurisdiction to pass
judgment on the accused on the
basis of the merits of these
cases."
Respondent-accused, Manuel
Parulan, is an authorized
wholesale dealer of petitioner
San Miguel Corporation (SMC,
for short) in Bulacan.
In Criminal Case No. 2800 of
the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, he was charged with
Violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22 for
having issued a check on 13
June 1983 for P86,071.20) in
favor of SMC but which was
dishonored for having been
drawn against 'insufficient
funds and, in spite of repeated
demands, for having failed and
refused to make good said
check to the damage and
prejudice of SMC.
In Criminal Case No. 2813 of
the same Court, Respondent-
accused was charged with
Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code for having made
out a check on 18 June 1983 in
the sum of P11,918.80 in favor
of SMC in payment of beer he
had purchased, but which check
was refused payment for
"insufficient funds" and, in
spite of repeated demands, for
having failed and refused to
redeem said check to the
damage and prejudice of SMC.
The two cases were tried
jointly, the witnesses for both
prosecution and defense being
the same for the two suits.
Based on the facts and the
evidence, Respondent Judge
arrived at the following
"Findings and Resolution:"
From the welter of evidence
adduced in these two , this
Court is convinced that the two
checks involved herein were
issued and signed by the
accused in connection with the
beer purchases made by him on
various occasions at the
Guiguinto, sales office of SMC
at Guiguinto, Bulacan and
which checks he handed and
delivered to the sales
Supervisor of SMC, Mr. Ruben
Cornelio, who holds office in
that municipality. The Court
finds it rather difficult to
believe the claim and testimony
of the accused that these checks
which he admittedly signed and
which he delivered to Mr.
Cornelio in blank were filled up
without his knowledge
particularly the amounts
appearing therein which in the
case of the check involved in
Criminal Case No. 2800
amounted to P86,071.20, and,
in the case of the check
involved in Criminal Case No.
2813, amounted to Pl1,918.80.
The accused had been engaged
in business for some time
involving amounts that are
quite considerable, and it is
hard to believe that he will
agree to this kind of
arrangement which placed or
exposed him to too much risks
and uncertainties.
But even as this Court is
convinced that the accused had
issued these checks to the
representative of SMC on the
occasions testified to in these
cases by the witnesses for the
prosecution which two checks
were subsequently dishonored
due to lack of funds resulting in
damage to SMC, the offended
party herein, this Court, after
considering the totality of the
evidence and the circumstances
that attended the issuance of
these two checks until they
were both dishonored by the
drawee bank, the Planters
Development Bank, at Santa
Maria, Bulacan, has come to
the conclusion that it is bereft
of jurisdiction to pass judgment
on the accused on the basis of
the merits of these cases.
which he reasoned out, thus:
Deceit and damage are the two
essential elements that make up
the offenses involving
dishonored checks. And in
order that this Court may have
jurisdiction to try these cases, it
must be established that both or
any one of these elements
composing the offenses charged
must occur or take place within
the area over which this Court
has territorial jurisdiction. Here,
however, it is clear that none of
these elements took place or
occurred within the
jurisdictional area of this Court.
As gleaned from the evidence,
the two checks involved herein
were issued by the accused at
Guiguinto, Bulacan. They were
delivered and handed to
Supervisor Ruben Cornelio of
San Miguel Corporation in his
capacity as the representative of
the company holding office in
that municipality where the
transactions of the accused with
SMC took place. It was before
Supervisor Cornelio at
Guiguinto, Bulacan that false
assurances were made by the
accused that the checks issued
by him were good and backed
by sufficient funds in his bank,
the Planters Development
Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan,
only to turn out later on that
this was not so.
The other element of damage
pertaining to the offenses
charged in these cases was
inflicted on the offended party,
the SMC, right at the moment
the checks issued by the
accused were dishonored by the
Planters Development Bank,
the drawee bank, at Santa
Maria, Bulacan which received
them from the BPI, San
Fernando, Pampanga branch for
clearing purposes. The
argument advanced by the
prosecution in its memorandum
filed herein that the two checks
were deposited by SMC at the
BPI, San Fernando, Branch,
San Fernando, Pampanga,
where it maintained its
accounts after receiving these
checks from its Guiguinto Sales
Office which bank later on
made the corresponding
deductions from the account of
SMC in the amounts covered
by the dishonored checks upon
receiving information that the
checks so issued by the accused
had been dishonored by the
drawee bank at Santa Maria,
Bulacan, is inconsequential. As
earlier stated, the element of
damage was inflicted on the
offended party herein right at
the moment and at the place
where the checks issued in its
favor were dishonored which is
in Santa Maria, Bulacan.
Respondent Judge then
decreed:
WHEREFORE, and in view of
all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing
these cases for lack of
jurisdiction.
The bail bond posted by the
accused in these cases are
ordered cancelled.
This Petition for certiorari
challenges the dismissal of the
two criminal cases on the
ground that they were issued
with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Respondent-accused adopts the
contrary proposition and argues
that the order of dismissal was,
in effect, an acquittal not
reviewable by certiorari, and
that to set the order aside after
plea and trial on the merits,
would subject Respondent-
accused to double jeopardy.
Upon the attendant facts and
circumstances we uphold the
Petition.
The principal ground relied
upon by Respondent Judge in
dismissing the criminal cases is
that deceit and damage, the two
essential elements that make up
the offenses involving
dishonored checks, did not
occur within the territorial
jurisdiction of his Court in
Pampanga, but rather in
Bulacan where false assurances
were given by Respondent-
accused and where the checks
he had issued were dishonored.
The People maintain, on the
other hand, that jurisdiction is
properly vested in the Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga.
At the outset, it should be
pointed out, as the Solicitor
General has aptly called
attention to, that there are two
dishonored checks involved,
each the subject of different
penal laws and with different
basic elements: (1) On June 13,
1983, Respondent-accused
issued Planters Development
Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan
Branch) [PDB] Check No.
19040865 in the sum of
P86,071.20 in favor of SMC,
which was received by the
SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto,
Bulacan. The check was
forwarded to the SMC Regional
Office at San Fernando,
Pampanga, where it was
delivered to and received by the
SMC Finance Officer, who then
deposited the check with the
Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI), San Fernando Branch,
which is the SMC depository
bank. On July 8,1983, the SMC
depository bank received a
notice of dishonor of the said
check for "insufficiency of
funds" from the PDB, the
drawee bank in Santa Maria,
Bulacan. This dishonored check
is the subject of the charge of
Violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) in
Criminal Case No. 2800 of the
lower Court (hereafter, the
Bouncing Checks Case).
(2) On June 18, 1983,
Respondent-accused likewise
issued PDB Check No.
19040872 in the amount of
P11,918.80 in favor of SMC,
which was received also by the
SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto,
Bulacan, as direct payment for
the spot sale of beer. That check
was similarly forwarded by the
SMC Supervisor to the SMC
Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga, where it
was delivered to the Finance
Officer thereat and who, in turn
deposited the check with the
SMC depository bank in San
Fernando, Pampanga. On July
8,1983, the SMC depository
bank received a notice of
dishonor for "insufficiency of
funds" from the drawee bank,
the PDB, in Santa Maria,
Bulacan. This dishonored check
is the subject of the prosecution
for Estafa by postdating or
issuing a bad check under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case No, 2813 of the
lower Court (briefly, the Estafa
Case).
In the crime of Estafa by
postdating or issuing a bad
check, deceit and damage are
essential elements of the
offense (U.S. vs. Rivera, 23
Phil. 383-390) and have to be
established with satisfactory
proof to warrant conviction.
For Violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law, on the other hand,
the elements of deceit and
damage are not essential nor
required. An essential element
of that offense is knowledge on
the part of the maker or drawer
of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds
(Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez,
Nos. L-63419, etc., December
18, 1986; 146 SCRA 323;
Dingle vs. IAC, G.R. No.
75243, March 16, 1987,148
SCRA 595). The Anti-Bouncing
Checks Law makes the mere
act of issuing a worthless check
a special offense punishable
thereunder (Cruz vs. IAC, No.
I,66327, May 28,1984,129
SCRA 490. Malice and intent in
issuing the worthless check are
immaterial, the offense
being malum prohibitum (Que
vs. People of the Philippines,
et. al., G.R. Nos. 75217-18,
September 21, 1987). The
gravamen of the offense is the
issuance of a check, not the
non-payment of an obligation
(Lozano vs. Hon.
Martinez, supra).
A. With the distinction
clarified, the threshold question
is whether or not venue was
sufficiently conferred in the
Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga in the two cases.
Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which
has been carried over in Section
15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure,
specifically provides:
SEC. 14. Place where action is
to be instituted
(a) In all criminal prosecutions
the action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the
municipality or province
wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof
took place.
In other words, a person
charged with a transitory crime
may be validly tried in any
municipality or province where
the offense was in part
committed. In transitory or
continuing offenses in which
some acts material and essential
to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one
province and some in another,
the Court of either province has
jurisdiction to try the case, it
being understood that the first
Court taking cognizance of the
Case will exclude the others
(Tuzon vs. Cruz. No. L-27410,
August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA
235). However, if an the acts
material and essential to the
crime and requisite of its
consummation occurred in one
municipality or territory, the
Court of that municipality or
territory has the sole
jurisdiction to try the case
(People vs. Yabut, L-42902,
April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624).
Estafa by postdating or issuing
a bad check, may be a
transitory or continuing offense.
Its basic elements of deceit and
damage may arise
independently in separate
places (People vs.
Yabut, supra). In this case,
deceit took place in San
Fernando, Pampanga, while the
damage was inflicted in
Bulacan where the cheek was
dishonored by the drawee bank
in that place (See People vs.
Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may,
therefore, be entertained by
either the Bulacan Court or the
Pampanga Court.
For while the subject check was
issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it
was not completely drawn
thereat, but in San Fernando,
Pampanga, where it was uttered
and delivered. "What is of
decisive importance is the
delivery thereat The delivery of
the instrument is the final act
essential to its consummation
as an obligation" (People vs.
Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in
People vs. Yabut, supra). For
although the check was
received by the SMC Sales
Supervisor at Guiguinto,
Bulacan, that was not the
delivery in contemplation of
law to the payee, SMC. Said
supervisor was not the person
who could take the check as a
holder, that is, as a payee or
indorsee thereof, with the intent
to transfer title thereto. The rule
is that the issuance as well as
the delivery of the check must
be to a person who takes it as a
holder, which means "the payee
or indorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it, or
the bearer, thereof" (Sec. 190,
Negotiable Instruments Law,
cited in People vs.
Yabut, supra.) Thus, said
representative had to forward
the check to the SMC Regional
Office in San Fernando,
Pampanga, which was
delivered to the Finance Officer
thereat who, in turn, deposited
it at the SMC depository bank
in San Fernando, Pampanga.
The element of deceit,
therefore, took place in San
Fernando, Pampanga, where the
rubber check was legally issued
and delivered so that
jurisdiction could properly be
laid upon the Court in that
locality.
The estafa charged in the two
informations involved in the
case before Us appears to be
transitory or continuing in
nature. Deceit has taken place
in Malolos, Bulacan, while the
damage in Caloocan City,
where the checks were
dishonored by the drawee
banks there. Jurisdiction can,
therefore, be entertained by
either the Malolos court or the
Caloocan court. While the
subject checks were written,
signed, or dated in Caloocan
City, they were not completely
made or drawn there, but in
Malolos, Bulacan, where they
were uttered and delivered.
That is the place of business
and residence of the payee. The
place where the bills were
written, signed or dated does
not necessarily fix or determine
the place where they were
executed. What is of decisive
importance is the delivery
thereof. The delivery of the
instrument is the final act
essential to its consummation
as an obligation (People vs.
Larue, 83 P. 2d 725). An
undelivered bill or note is
inoperative. Until delivery, the
contract is revocable (Ogden,
Negotiable Instruments, 5th ed.,
at 107). And the issuance as
well as the delivery of the
check must be to a person who
takes it as a holder, which
means "(t)he payee or indorsee
of a bill or note, who is in
possession of it, or the bearer
thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable
Instruments Law). Delivery of
the check signifies transfer of
possession, whether actual or
constructive, from one person
to another with intent to
transfer title thereto (Bailey,
Brady on Bank Checks, 3rd ed.
at 57-59; Sec. 190, Negotiable
Instruments Law). Thus, the
penalizing clause of the
provision of Art. 315, par. 2(d)
states: "By postdating a check,
or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check,"
Clearly, therefore, the element
of deceit thru the issuance and
delivery of the worthless
checks to the complainant took
place in Malolos, Bulacan,
conferring upon a court in that
locality jurisdiction to try the
case.
In respect of the Bouncing
Checks Case, the offense also
appears to be continuing in
nature. It is true that the offense
is committed by the very fact of
its performance (Colmenares
vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May
29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and
that the Bouncing Checks Law
penalizes not only the fact of
dishonor of a check but also the
act of making or drawing and
issuance of a bouncing check
(People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II,
No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523).
The case, therefore, could have
been filed also in Bulacan. As
held in Que vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-
18, September 11, 1987 "the
determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place
of the issuance of the check".
However, it is likewise true that
knowledge on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds,
which is an essential ingredient
of the offense is by itself a
continuing eventuality, whether
the accused be within one
territory or another (People vs.
Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos.
66003-04, December 11, 1987).
Accordingly, jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the offense
also lies in the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga
And, as pointed out in
the Manzanilla case,
jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in
the Information, which are
controlling (Arches vs.
Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193,
cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-
27410, August 28, 1975, 66
SCRA 235). The Information
filed herein specifically alleges
that the crime was committed in
San Fernando, Pampanga, and,
therefore, within the
jurisdiction of the Court below.
B. The dismissal of the subject
criminal cases by Respondent
Judge, predicated on his lack of
jurisdiction, is correctable by
Certiorari. The error committed
is one of jurisdiction and not an
error of judgment on the merits.
Well-settled is the rule that
questions covering
jurisdictional matters may be
averred in a petition for
certiorari, inclusive of matters
of grave abuse of discretion,
which are equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction (City of Davao vs.
Dept. of Labor, No. L-19488,
January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA
111, 115). An error of
jurisdiction renders whatever
order of the Trial Court nun and
void.
C. The present petition for
certiorari seeking to set aside
the void Decision of
Respondent Judge does not
place Respondent-accused in
double jeopardy for the same
offense. It will be recalled that
the questioned judgment was
not an adjudication on the
merits. It was a dismissal upon
Respondent Judge's erroneous
conclusion that his Court had
no "territorial jurisdiction" over
the cases. Where an order
dismissing a criminal case is
not a decision on the merits, it
cannot bar as res judicata a
subsequent case based on the
same offense (People vs.
Bellosillo, No. L-18512,
December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA
835, 837).
The dismissal being null and
void the proceedings before the
Trial Court may not be said to
have been lawfully terminated.
There is therefore, no second
proceeding which would
subject the accused to double
jeopardy.
Since the order of dismissal
was without authority and,
therefore, null and void, the
proceedings before the
Municipal Court have not been
lawfully terminated.
Accordingly, there is no second
proceeding to speak of and no
double jeopardy. A continuation
of the proceedings against the
accused for serious physical
injuries is in order. (People vs.
Mogol, 131 SCRA 306, 308).
In sum, Respondent Judge had
jurisdiction to try and decide
the subject criminal case, venue
having been properly laid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of
Respondent Judge of February
17, 1986 is hereby set aside and
he is hereby ordered to
reassume jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and
2813 of his Court and to render
judgment of either conviction
or acquittal in accordance with
the evidence already adduced
during the joint trial of said two
cases.
o lsip v. People, G.R. No.
170298,26 )une2007
MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner,
vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Before us is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which seeks to set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 26 October 2004
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275
entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip
and Marietta M. Isip" to the
extent that it affirmed with
modifications petitioner
Manuel S. Isips conviction for
Estafa in Criminal Case No.
136-84 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch XVII,
Cavite City, and its Amended
Decision2 dated 26 October
2005 denying his Partial
Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedents are the
following:
Petitioner was charged with
Estafa in Criminal Case No.
136-84 before Branch XVII of
the RTC of Cavite City, under
the following information:
That on or about March 7,
1984, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, received from
Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven
carat diamond (mens ring),
valued at 200,000.00, for the
purpose of selling the same on
commission basis and to deliver
the proceeds of the sale thereof
or return the jewelry if not sold,
on or before March 15, 1984,
but the herein accused once in
possession of the above-
described articles, with intent to
defraud and with grave abuse of
confidence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert the same
to his own personal use and
benefit and notwithstanding
repeated demands made by
Leonardo A. Jose for the return
of the jewelry or the delivery of
the proceeds of the sale thereof,
failed to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of the aforesaid
Leonardo A. Jose in the
abovestated amount of
200,000.00, Philippine
Currency.3
Petitioners wife, Marietta M.
Isip, was indicted before the
same court for seven counts of
Violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law. The
cases were docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 146-84,
147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-
84, 156-84 and 157-84. The
accusatory portion of the
information in Criminal Case
No. 146-84 reads:
That on or about March 27,
1984, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, knowing fully
well that her account with the
bank is insufficient, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly
issue Pacific Banking
Corporation Check No. 518672
in the amount of 562,000.00,
in payment for assorted pieces
of jewelry, received from
Leonardo A. Jose, which check
upon presentation with the
drawee bank for payment was
dishonored for insufficiency of
funds and notwithstanding
repeated demands made by
Leonardo A. Jose for the
redemption of the said check,
accused refused and still
refuses to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of the aforesaid
Leonardo A. Jose in the above-
stated amount of 562,000.00,
Philippine Currency.4
The six other Informations are
similarly worded except for the
date when the offense was
committed, the number and
amount of the check. The
pertinent data in the other
informations are as follows:
Crim. Case No. Date of Commission
147-84 17 March 1984
148-84 30 March 1984
149-84 12 March 1984
155-84 25 March 1984
156-84 29 March 1984
157-84 1 April 1984
The spouses Isip were likewise
charged before the same court
with five (5) counts of Estafa.
The cases were docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84. The Estafa charged in
Crim. Case No. 256-84 was
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about March 20,
1984, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and
mutually helping one another,
received from one Leonardo A.
Jose the following pieces of
jewelry, to wit: one (1) set
dome shape ring and earrings
valued at 120,000.00, with the
obligation of selling the same
on commission basis and
deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return them if not
sold, on or before March 21,
1984, but the herein accused,
once in possession of the said
jewelry by means of false
pretenses, with intent to defraud
and with grave abuse of
confidence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert them to
their own personal use and
benefit and paid the same with
Check Nos. 518646 and
518669, dated March 29, 1984 Sometime in 1982, appellant
and April 1, 1984, respectively, spouses Manuel and Marietta
in the amount of 90,000 and Isip were introduced to
25,000, respectively, which complainant Atty. Leonardo
upon presentation with the bank Jose. The introduction was
was dishonored for made by complainants father,
insufficiency of funds and Nemesio, business associate of
notwithstanding repeated the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips
demands made by Leonardo A. were then engaged in the buy
Jose for the redemption of the and sell of pledged and
said check, failed to do so, to unredeemed jewelry pawned by
his damage and prejudice in the gambling habitus (pp. 8-16,
abovestated amount of tsn, June 8, 1993).
120,000.00, Philippine
Currency.6 Needing a bigger capital to
finance the growing operation,
Except for the description and the Isips convinced
value of the pieces of jewelry complainant to be their
involved, date of receipt and capitalist, a proposition to
agreed date of return, and the which complainant acceded to
number, date and amount of the (p. 14, ibid).
checks issued in payment
thereof, the four other Thus, the operation went
informations are similarly smoothly that was before
worded. The specifics thereof February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn,
are as follows: ibid).
Crim. Case No. Value of Date of
On February 3, 1984, at
Jewelry Receipt
complainants residence in
257-84 Caridad, Cavite City, appellant
spouses
150,000 03-07-84 received from
260-84 complainant a 6 carat mens
95,000 ring valued at 200,000.00 with
03-20-84
261-84 the condition that they are
going to sell said jewelry x x x
562,000 03-20-84
on commission basis for
378-84
200,000.00 and if they are not
200,000 02-03-84
able to sell the same, they have
to return the ring if sold on or
before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn,
When arraigned on the charges, October 15, 1993).
petitioner and Marietta Isip
pleaded not guilty. There being
On March 3, 1984, the Isips did
only one complainant in all the
not return the ring or the
cases, joint trial of the cases
proceeds thereof. Instead,
followed.
Marietta Isip issued two (2)
personal checks dated March
The versions of the prosecution 17 and 30, 1984, respectively,
and the defense, as taken by the for 50,000.00 each as partial
Court of Appeals in the parties payment for the jewelry. The
respective briefs, are the receipt of the jewelry was
following: acknowledged by Marietta Isip
with Manuel acting as a witness
i) Prosecution Version. (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).
This particular mens ring is the
subject of Criminal Case No.
378-84 for Estafa while Check
Nos. 518644 and 518645
(Pacific Banking Corp.) dated
March 17 and 30, respectively,
are the subject of Criminal Case
Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.
In the morning of March 7,
1984, the Isip couple went
again to complainants
residence in Caridad, Cavite
City where complainant
delivered one (1) Choker Pearl
with 35 pieces of south sea
pearls with diamond worth
150,000.00. The condition
was that the proceeds be turned
over to complainant on or
before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-
29, tsn, ibid). March 30, 1984
came, but instead of turning
over the proceeds or return the
Choker Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a
check dated March 12, 1984 for
150,000.00 (RCBC check No.
030086) as payment (p. 34,
ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal
Case No. 254-84 for Estafa
against the spouses and
Criminal Case No. 149-84 for
violation of BP 22 against
Marietta Isip.
In the afternoon of the same
day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to
complainants residence in
Cavite City and got from the
latter a mens ring (7 carats)
worth 200,000.00. Mr. Isip
signed a receipt with the
condition that he return the ring
or deliver the proceeds, if sold,
on or before March 15, 1984.
March 15, 1984 came, but Mr.
Isip sought an extension which
fell due on April 7, 1984. April
7, 1984 came and went by, but
Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46,
tsn, ibid). The above is the
subject matter of Criminal Case
No. 136-84 for Estafa against
Manuel Isip.
On March 20, 1984, the Isips
went again to Cavite City and
got from complainant one (1)
Dome shaped ring with
matching earring with
diamonds valued at
120,000.00. As with their
previous agreement, the item
was to be returned or the
proceeds of the sale be
delivered on March 21, 1984
(pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The
following morning, however,
Mrs. Isip issued two (2)
personal checks (Check Nos.
518646 and 518669 dated
March 29, 1984 for 90,000.00
and 25,000.00, respectively)
in payment for the Dome
shaped ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal
Case No. 256084 for Estafa
against the spouses Isip and
Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and
and (sic) 157-84 for Violation
of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
At noontime on the same day,
the Isip couple went back to the
residence of complainant and
got from him one (1) collar
heart shaped necklace and one
(1) baguette necklace worth
95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As
agreed upon, Marietta Isip
signed a receipt with the
condition that the jewelry or the
proceeds thereof be delivered to
complainant on March 27,
1984. The Isips defaulted and
instead, Mrs. Isip issued a
check (Check No. 518647)
dated March 27, 1984 in the
amount of 90,000.00 (pp. 3-5,
tsn, October 22, 1993).
The subject pieces of jewelry
are the subject of Criminal Case
No. 260-84 for Estafa against
the Isip couple and Criminal
Case No. 155-84 for Violation
of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
Again, in the early evening of
March 20, 1984, the Isips went
to complainant informing him
that Balikbayan doctors are
having a convention in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur saying that, that was
the most opportune time to sell
jewelries. Assorted pieces of
jewelry were delivered to Mrs.
Isip as reflected in a receipt
duly signed by her (Exhibit
O) acknowledging the value
thereof to the tune of
562,000.00.
Exhibit O contained the
promise that the jewelry or
proceeds thereof will be
delivered on March 27, 1984.
Inspite of the promise
contained in Exhibit O, Mrs.
Isip issued a postdated check
(Check No. 51867) dated
March 27, 1984 in the amount
of 562,000.00 as payment for
the assorted pieces of jewelry
(pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22,
1993).
This is the subject matter of
Criminal Case No. 261-84 for
Estafa against the couple and
Criminal Case No. 146-84
against Marietta Isip for
Violation of BP 22.
All of the checks covered by
the above transactions were
deposited on April 6, 1984 (p.
14, tsn, ibid), but all of them
bounced for being drawn
against insufficient funds.
Demand letters sent to the
couple proved futile (pp. 15-20,
ibid).
ii) Defense Version.
During all the times material to
these cases, complainant
Leonardo Jose, who had his
residence at Room 411, 4th
Floor, Plaza Towers
Condominium on (sic) 3375
Guerrero Street, Ermita,
Manila, but claims he had his
ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos
Street, Caridad, Cavite, was an
employee of the Bureau of
Customs, having been so since
1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the
other hand, appellants Manuel
S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and
Marietta M. Isip (Marietta
hereafter) are spouses, residents
at 3635 M. Arellano Street,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr.,
8/29/93, 4) and engaged in
various business undertakings
in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija,
Baguio City, Olongapo City
and Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9; Tr.,
10/2/95, 13) appellant
Manuel, in the brokerage and
trucking business; while
appellant Marietta, in that of
selling jewelry and financing,
as well as in PX goods, real
estate and cars, which she
started when she was still single
(Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95,
12). In 1982, at the casino in
Olongapo City, appellant
Marietta started obtaining
jewelry from losing or
financially-strapped players
which she repledged as security
for financing she obtained from
one Nemesio Jose, father of
complainant Leonardo Jose
(Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem,
14). After about a year, when
Nemesio Jose ran short of
capital, he referred appellants to
his son, complainant Leonardo
Jose, with address at the Plaza
Towers Condominium aforesaid
for needed financing (Tr., Idem,
13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19).
Beginning early 1983, at
complainants residence at
Plaza Tower Condominium in
Manila, appellant Marietta,
accompanied by her husband
who participated only as a
witness, started having
transactions with complainant
who, on different dates in
February, March and April,
1984, extended various
amounts to her for which
appellant Marietta pledged
jewelry which, in turn, were
agreed between her and
complainant to be sold on
commission and to turn over
the proceeds thereof or return
the jewelry to complainant (Tr.,
Idem, 16-18). In the course of
the transactions, appellant
Marietta had issued several
checks to complainant as
guarantee for the payment of
the subject jewelry which have
either been paid or redeemed,
had returned the unsold jewelry
to complainant and had
conveyed, by way of payment
for other jewelry, some
personal properties, like brass
and antics, and real properties
in Balanga, Bataan and
Mabalacat, Pampanga, to
complainant who caused the
same to be registered in the
names of his son, Christian
Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose
(Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-
A, 7, 7-A), with the result that
all the obligations of appellants
to complainant have already
been paid for or offset (Tr.,
Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36,
37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also,
all the checks that appellant
Marietta issued which were
initially dishonored have
already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95,
25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact,
complainant caused the
dismissal of some cases he filed
against appellants. Complainant
however failed to return some
of the redeemed and/or paid
checks issued to him by
appellant Marietta on the
pretext that he did not bring
them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20).
Inasmuch as appellant Marietta
incurred some default in
payment and complainant
suspected that she would not be
able to redeem the checks or
pay for the pledged jewelry,
complainant demanded that
appellants sign certain
documents to avoid any
misunderstanding, with threat
of prosecution before the
Cavite courts if they do not
comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr.,
3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to
maintain good relations with
complainant, appellant Marietta
signed the document
acknowledging obligations to
him in one sitting, which
appellant Manuel witnessed
(Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later,
appellants learned that,
although all the transactions
were entered into in Manila,
complainant filed the cases
herein before the Cavite
Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem,
23-24).7
On November 25, 1996, the
trial court rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion thereof
reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip
guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in
Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-
84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84,
156-84 and 157-84 and she is
hereby sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of One (1) year
of prision correctional (sic) in
each case; and of Estafa in the
following Crim. Cases: No.
256-84 where she is sentenced
to undergo imprisonment of,
from Twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the complainant
Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount
of 120,000.00 for the value of
the articles misappropriated;
Crim. Case No. 257-84 where
she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of
150,000.00; Crim. Case No.
260-84 where she is sentenced
to undergo imprisonment of,
from Eight (8) years and One
(1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to Seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of 95,000.00;
Crim. Case No. 261-84 where
she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years and One (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of
562,000.00; Crim. Case No.
378-84 where she is sentenced
to undergo imprisonment of,
from Twelve (12) years and
One (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the complainant
Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount
of 200,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
Likewise, accused Manuel Isip
is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos.
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and 378-84. However, in Crim.
Case No. 136-84, he is hereby
found guilty of Estafa and he is
hereby sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years and One (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose in the amount of
200,000.00 value of the
jewelry misappropriated, and to
pay the costs.8
In ruling the way it did, the
RTC found that the transactions
involved in these cases were
sufficiently shown to have
taken place at complainant Atty.
Leonardo Joses ancestral house
in Cavite City when the latter
was on leave of absence from
the Bureau of Customs where
he was connected. It said the
defense failed to substantially
prove its allegations that the
transactions occurred in
Manila, particularly in the
Towers Condominium, and that
complainant is a resident of
Bigasan, Makati. It added that
the testimony of Marietta Isip
that the money with which the
complainant initially agreed to
finance their transactions was
withdrawn from the Sandigan
Finance in Cavite City further
refuted the defenses claim that
the transactions happened in
Manila. The trial court likewise
found the defenses contention,
that the obligations were
already paid and set-off with
the turnover to complainant of
personal and real properties, to
be untenable for it is contrary to
human nature to demand
payment when the same had
already been made and the
alleged set-offs were for other
cases which were settled
amicably and subsequently
dismissed upon motion of the
City Prosecutors Office at the
instance of the complainant.
The trial court was convinced
that accused Marietta Isip
misappropriated the pieces of
jewelry involved in Criminal
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-
84, 261-84 and 378-84 and
violated Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 when she issued the checks
mentioned in Criminal Cases
No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84,
149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and
157-84. As to petitioner, the
trial court acquitted him in
Criminal Cases No. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84 finding him to have
acted as a mere witness when
he signed the receipts involved
in said cases, but found him
liable in Criminal Case No.
136-84 for misappropriating a
7-carat diamond mens ring
which he secured from the
complainant.
Aggrieved, petitioner and
spouse appealed to the Court of
Appeals assigning the
following as errors:
-I-
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN TAKING COGNIZANCE
OF AND DECIDING THE
CASES AGAINST
APPELLANTS AND IN NOT
DISMISSING THE SAME
UPON THE GROUND THAT
NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENTS OF THE
OFFENSES CHARGED
THEREIN WAS
COMMITTED WITH (SIC)
ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.
- II -
THE TRIAL COURT,
ASSUMING IT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASES BELOW, ERRD IN
NOT HOLDING THAT NO
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY
APPELLANT MARIETTA M.
ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
THE SUBJECT CHECKS
INASMUCH AS SAID
CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS
MERE GUARANTY FOR
OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.
- III -
THE TRIAL COURT,
ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT
LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME
OF ESTAFA HAD BEEN
INCURRED BY
APPELLANTS IN THE
PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT SUCH
INCIPIENT LIABILITY HAD
BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS
MADE AND/OR NOVATION
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
COMPLAINANT AND SAID
APPELLANTS.
- IV -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FINDING APPELLANTS
MANUEL S. ISIP AND
MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF
ESTAFA AND VIOLATION
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
22 RESPECTFULLY
IMPUTED UPON THEM AND
IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM
UPON THE GROUND THAT
THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR
OF ANY CRIME FOR THAT
MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
AND/OR THAT THE
LIABILITY INCURRED BY
THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY
CIVIL.9
Before the Court of Appeals
could have decided the case,
Marietta Isip died thereby
extinguishing her criminal and
civil liability, if any.
In a decision promulgated 26
October 2004, the Court of
Appeals disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite City (Branch
XVII)
1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is
AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that the
sentence imposed on accused-
appellant Manuel S. Isip shall
be two (2) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and
that the sum of 200,000.00 he
was ordered to pay to Leonardo
A. Jose shall bear interest at the
legal rate from filing of the
information until fully paid;
2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84,
147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-
84, 156-84 and 157-84 is
REVERSED and accused-
appellant Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged; and
3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84 is REVERSED and
accused-appellants Manuel S.
Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged, but ordering them to
pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly
and severally, the sums of
120,000.00, 150,000.00,
95,000.00, 562,000.00 and
200,000.00 representing the
amounts involved in said cases,
plus interest thereon at the legal
rate from filing of the
information until fully paid.10
The Court of Appeals upheld
the lower courts finding that
the venue was properly laid and
that the checks were delivered
by the two accused and/or that
the transactions transpired at
complainants ancestral home
in Cavite City, and that,
consequently, the offenses
charged took place within its
territorial jurisdiction. With
respect to the seven counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, the appellate court
acquitted Marietta Isip of the
charges on the ground that
since the checks involved were
issued prior to 8 August 1984,
the dishonor thereof did not
give rise to a criminal liability
pursuant to Ministry Circular
No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.
As to the Estafa cases (Criminal
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-
84, 261-84 and 378-84), the
Court of Appeals ruled that
since the checks issued by
Marietta Isip as payment for the
pieces of jewelry were
dishonored, there was no
payment to speak of. It also
found the defenses claim of
redemption/dacion en pago
that real and personal properties
were conveyed to complainant
who executed affidavits of
desistance and caused the
dismissal of some of the cases
to be unmeritorious. However,
the appellate court ruled that
though novation does not
extinguish criminal liability, it
may prevent the rise of such
liability as long at it occurs
prior to the filing of the
criminal information in court.
In these five cases, it ruled that
there was novation because
complainant accepted the
checks issued by Marietta Isip
as payment for the pieces of
jewelry involved in said cases.
Consequently, the Court of
Appeals acquitted Marietta and
petitioner,11 but held them liable
to complainant for the value of
the jewelry involved.
As regards Criminal Case No.
136-84 for estafa against
petitioner, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts ruling
of conviction. It found
petitioners claims that he did
not receive the jewelry worth
200,000.00 mentioned in the
information; that the receipt he
issued for said jewelry was
among those documents which
were forced upon him to sign
under threat of criminal
prosecution; and that he signed
the same to preserve his
friendship with complainant, to
be not persuasive.
On 17 November 2004,
petitioner, for himself and in
representation of his deceased
wife, Marietta Isip, filed a
Partial Motion for
Reconsideration insofar as it
affirmed his conviction in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 and
adjudged him civilly liable,
jointly and severally, with
Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases
No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84,
261-84 and 378-84.12
On 26 October 2005, the Court
of Appeals, taking into account
the death of Marietta M. Isip
prior to the promulgation of its
decision, rendered an Amended
Decision with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision
dated October 26, 2004 is
AMENDED in respect to par. 3
of the dispositive portion
thereof which shall now read as
follows:
"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84 is REVERSED,
accused-appellants Manuel S.
Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged and the civil aspect of
those cases DISMISSED."13
Petitioner is now before us
appealing his conviction in
Criminal Case No. 136-84. He
raises the following issues:
First WHETHER OR NOT
THE TRIAL COURT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE IMPUTED TO
PETITIONER AND FOR
WHICH HE WAS
CONVICTED;
Second WHETHER THE
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY
SHOWS THAT PETITIONER
RECEIVED THE SUBJECT
OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT
HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE
CITY; and
Third, WHETHER THE
INCIPIENT CRIMINAL
LIABILITY ARISING FROM
SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY,
WAS EXTINGUISHED BY
NOVATION.
On the first issue, petitioner
maintains that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the estafa
charge in Criminal Case No.
136-84 and it is pure
speculation and conjectural, if
not altogether improbable or
manifestly absurd, to suppose
that any of the essential
elements of the Estafa charged
in Criminal Case No. 136-84
took place in Cavite City. First,
he states that the residence of
the parties is immaterial and
that it is the situs of the
transaction that counts. He
argues that it is non sequitur
that simply because
complainant had an alleged
ancestral house in Caridad,
Cavite, complainant actually
lived there and had the
transactions there with him
when he and his late wife were
actual residents of Manila.
Mere convenience suggests that
their transaction was entered
into in Manila. He adds that the
source of the fund used to
finance the transactions is
likewise inconsequential
because it is where the subject
item was delivered and
received by petitioner and/or
where it was to be accounted
for that determines venue
where Estafa, if any, may be
charged and tried. Second, he
further argues that it does not
follow that because
complainant may have been on
leave from the Bureau of
Customs, the transactions were
necessarily entered into during
that leave and in Cavite City.
He asserts that there is no
competent proof showing that
during his leave of absence, he
stayed in Cavite City; and that
the transactions involved,
including the subject of
Criminal Case 136-84 covering
roughly the period from
February to April 1984,
coincided with his alleged
leave.
The concept of venue of actions
in criminal cases, unlike in civil
cases, is jurisdictional.14 The
place where the crime was
committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an
essential element of
jurisdiction.15 It is a In the instant case, petitioner
fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been
committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should
have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of
a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information.
And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take
cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.16
In the case at bar, we, like the
RTC and the Court of Appeals,
are convinced that the venue
was properly laid in the RTC of
Cavite City. The complainant
had sufficiently shown that the
transaction covered by Criminal
Case No. 136-84 took place in
his ancestral home in Cavite
City when he was on approved
leave of absence17 from the
Bureau of Customs. Since it has
been shown that venue was
properly laid, it is now
petitioners task to prove
otherwise, for it is his claim
that the transaction involved
was entered into in Manila. The
age-old but familiar rule that he
who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.18
failed to establish by sufficient
and competent evidence that
the transaction happened in
Manila. Petitioner argues that
since he and his late wife
actually resided in Manila,
convenience alone unerringly
suggests that the transaction
was entered into in Manila. We
are not persuaded. The fact that
Cavite City is a bit far from
Manila does not necessarily
mean that the transaction
cannot or did not happen there.
Distance will not prevent any
person from going to a distant
place where he can procure
goods that he can sell so that he
can earn a living. This is true in
the case at bar. It is not
improbable or impossible for
petitioner and his wife to have
gone, not once, but twice in one
day, to Cavite City if that is the
number of times they received
pieces of jewelry from
complainant. Moreover, the fact
that the checks issued by
petitioners late wife in all the
transactions with complainant
were drawn against accounts
with banks in Manila or Makati
likewise cannot lead to the
conclusion that the transactions
were not entered into in Cavite
City.
It is axiomatic that when it
comes to credibility, the trial
courts assessment deserves
great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and
influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly
the witnesses deportment and
manner of testifying, the trial
court is in a better position than
the appellate court to evaluate
properly testimonial
evidence.19 It is to be pointed
out that the findings of fact of
the trial court have been
affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. It is settled that when
the trial courts findings have
been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are
generally conclusive and
20
binding upon this Court. In
the case at bar, we find no
compelling reason to reverse
the findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, and to apply the
exception. We so hold that there
is sufficient evidence to show
that the particular transaction
took place in Cavite City.
On the second issue, petitioner
contends that the Court of
Appeals holding that the ring
subject of Crim. Case No. 136-
84 was delivered to and
received by petitioner is
seriously flawed. He argues that
assuming he signed the receipt
evidencing delivery of the ring,
not due to the threat of
prosecution but merely to
preserve his friendship with
complainant, the fact remains
that there is no showing that the
ring was actually delivered to
him. Petitioner insists there is
no competent evidence that the
ring subject of Criminal Case
No. 136-84 was ever actually
received by, or delivered to,
him.
We find his contentions
untenable. The finding of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner
received the ring subject of
Criminal Case No. 136-84 is
supported by the evidence on
record. The acknowledgment
receipt21 executed by petitioner
is very clear evidence that he
received the ring in question.
Petitioners claim that he did
not receive any ring and merely
executed said receipt in order to
preserve his friendship with the
complainant deserves scant
consideration.
Petitioner, an astute
businessman as he is, knows
the significance, import and
obligation of what he executed
and signed. The following
disputable presumptions weigh
heavily against petitioner,
namely: (a) That a person
intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary
act; (b) That a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns;
(c) That private transactions
have been fair and regular; and
(d) That the ordinary course of
business has been
followed 22Thus, it is presumed
that one does not sign a
document without first
informing himself of its
contents and consequences. We
know that petitioner understood
fully well the ramification of
the acknowledgment receipt he
executed. It devolves upon him
then to overcome these
presumptions. We, however,
find that he failed to do so.
Aside from his self-serving
allegation that he signed the
receipt to preserve his
friendship with complainant,
there is no competent evidence
that would rebut said
presumptions. It is clear from
the evidence that petitioner
signed the acknowledgment
receipt when he received the
ring from complainant in
Cavite City.
Petitioners argument that he
did not receive the subject
ring23 is further belied by the
testimony of his wife when the
latter testified that said ring was
borrowed by him on 7 March
1984.24 In all, the delivery of
the ring and the transaction
regarding the same occurred in
Cavite City.
Anent the third issue, petitioner
argues that, assuming gratia
argumenti that any criminal
liability was incurred by
petitioner respecting the ring
subject of Criminal Case No.
136-84, the same was incipient,
at best, and was effectively
extinguished by novation. The
personal and real properties
delivered/conveyed to
complainant were more than
sufficient to cover or offset
whatever balance remained of
the obligations incurred as
shown by the fact that
complainant executed
Affidavits of Desistance and
caused the dismissal of some of
the cases filed. He maintains
that the Court of Appeals did
not apply the rule of novation
as regards the ring subject of
Criminal Case No. 136-84
because it rejected his denial of
receipt of said ring and his
claim that he signed the receipt
supposedly covering the same
under threat of prosecution and
merely to preserve their good
relations. He claims the Court
should not have denied the
application of the rule of
novation on said case because
the rejected initial claim (that
he did not receive the ring and
that he signed the receipt to
preserve their good relations)
was but an alternative defense
and its rejection is not a reason
to deny the application of the
novation rule in said case.
We agree with the Court of
Appeals that novation25 cannot
be applied in Criminal Case
No. 136-84. The claim of
petitioner that the personal and
real properties conveyed to
complainant and/or to his
family were more than
sufficient to cover or offset
whatever balance remained of
the obligations incurred has no
basis. If it were true that the
properties delivered to
complainant were sufficient, the
latter would have caused the
dismissal of all, not some as in
this instance, the cases against
petitioner and his late wife.
This, complainant did not do
for the simple reason that the
properties conveyed to him
were not enough to cover all
the obligations incurred by
petitioner and his deceased
wife. Complainant testified that
the properties he received were
in settlement of cases other than
the cases being tried herein.26 In
particular, he said that
petitioner and his spouse settled
eight cases which were
subsequently dismissed when
they delivered properties as
payment.27 It follows then that
the obligations incurred by
petitioner and his spouse were
not yet settled when the
criminal cases herein tried were
filed.
His contention, that the Court
of Appeals did not apply the
rule of novation in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 because it
rejected or did not believe his
(alternative) defense of denial,
is untenable. The main reason
why the Court of Appeals did
not apply novation in said case
was that not all the elements of
novation are present. For
novation to take place, four
essential requisites have to be
met, namely, (1) a previous
valid obligation; (2) an
agreement of all parties
concerned to a new contract;
(3) the extinguishment of the
old obligation; and (4) the birth
of a valid new obligation. In
Criminal Case No. 136-84, only
the first element is extant. What
distinguishes this case from
Criminal Cases No. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84, where the Court of
Appeals applied the rule of
novation, was that there were
checks issued as payment,
though subsequently
dishonored, for the pieces of
jewelry involved. In Criminal
Case No. 136-84, it is very
clear that neither petitioner nor
his wife issued any check as
payment for the subject ring
that could have extinguished
his old obligation and brought
to life a new obligation.
From the allegations of the
information in Criminal Case
No. 136-84, it is clear that
petitioner was charged with
Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b), of the Revised
Penal Code. The elements of
estafa with abuse of confidence
are: (1) the offender receives
the money, goods or other
personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for
administration, or under any
other obligation involving the
duty to deliver, or to return, the
same; (2) the offender
misappropriates or converts
such money or property or
denies receiving such money or
property; (3) the
misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) the offended
party demands that the offender
return the money or
property.28 All these are present
in this case. Petitioner received
from complainant a seven-carat
diamond (mens ring), valued at
200,000.00, for the purpose of
selling the same on commission
basis and to deliver the
proceeds of the sale thereof or
return the jewelry if not sold.
Petitioner misappropriated or
converted said ring for his own
benefit and even denied
receiving the same. Despite
repeated demands from
complainant, petitioner failed to
return the ring or the proceeds
of the sale thereof causing
damage and prejudice to
complainant in the amount of
200,000.00.
As to the penalty imposed by
the Court of Appeals on
petitioner, we find the same to
be in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision
and amended decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 21275 dated 26 October
2004 dated 26 October 2005,
respectively, are AFFIRMED.
c Calme v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 116688, 30 August
1996
WENEFREDO
CALME, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS,
former 10th Division with
HON. ANTONIO M.
MARTINEZ as chairman and
HON. CANCIO C. GARCIA
and HON. RAMON
MABUTAS as
members, respondents
KAPUNAN, J.:p
Petitioner Wenefredo Calme
appeals from the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 28883 dated 10
December 1993 and its
resolution dated 14 July 1994
upholding the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Oroquieta City over
the information for murder filed
against him (Calme).
Petitioner and four other
persons were accused of killing
Edgardo Bernal by allegedly
throwing him overboard the
M/V "Cebu City," an interisland
passenger ship owned and
operated by William Lines,
Inc., while the vessel was
sailing from Ozamis City to
Cebu City on the night of 12
May 1991. Petitioner impugned
the Oroquieta RTC's
jurisdiction over the offense
charged through a motion to
quash which, however, was
denied by Judge Celso Conol of
RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta
City. Petitioner Calme's petition
for certiorari and prohibition
was denied due course and
dismissed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision dated 10
December 1993. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of
said decision was denied in the
Court of Appeals's resolution
14 July 1994. Hence, the
present appeal wherein the only
issue for resolution is whether
or not the Oroquieta court has
jurisdiction over the offense
charged against petitioner.
Petitioner asserts that, although
the alleged crime took place
while the vessel was in transit,
the general rule laid down in
par. (a) of Sec. 15 (now Section
14), Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court is the applicable
provision in determining the
proper venue and jurisdiction
and not Sec. 15(c) (now Section
14) thereof since the exact
location where the alleged
crime occurred was known.1
Petitioner thus claims that the
proper venue is Siquijor
because, according to the
Marine Protest filed by the
vessel's captain, Elmer
Magallanes, the ship was 8.0
miles off Minalonan Point,
Siquijor Island, when he (Capt.
Magallanes) received the report
that "a passenger jumped
overboard."2
Petitioner's contention is
unmeritorious. The exact
location where the alleged
offense was committed was not
duly established. The Marine
protest simply adverted that the
vessel was within the waters of
Siquijor Island when the
captain was informed3 of the
incident, which does not
necessarily prove that the
alleged murder took place in
the same area. In any case,
where the crime was actually
committed is immaterial since
it is undisputed that it occurred
while the vessel was in transit.
"In transit" simply means "on
the way or passage; while
passing from one person or
place to another. In the course
of transportation."4 Hence,
undoubtedly, the applicable
provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15
(now Section 14), Rule 110
which provides that "(w)here an
offense is committed on board a
vessel in the course of its
voyage, the criminal action may
be instituted and tried in the
proper court of the first port of
entry or of any municipality or
territory through which the
vessel passed during such
voyage subject to the generally
accepted principles of
international law."
Petitioner further contends that
even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110
governs, Oroquieta City would
still be excluded as a proper
venue because the reckoning
point for determining the venue
under the aforementioned
paragraph is the first port of
entry or the
municipalities/territories
through which the ship
passed after the discovery of
the crime, relying on Act No.
400.5
We disagree. Obviously, Act
No. 400 was amended by Sec.
15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court in that under the
former law, jurisdiction was
conferred to the CFI of any
province into which the ship or
water craft upon which the
crime or offense was committed
shall come after the
commission thereof, while the
present rule provides that
jurisdiction is vested "in the
proper court of the first port of
entry or of any municipality or
territory through which the
vessel passed during such
voyage . . . ." This is the
applicable provision and since
it does not contain any
qualification, we do not qualify
the same. We fully concur with
the findings of the Court of
Appeals, thus:
To support his arguments,
petitioner relies on Act 400,
which according to him is the
spirit behind the present Sec.
15(c), Rule 110. The said Act
specifically provides, among
other things, that for crimes
committed within the navigable
waters of the Philippine
Archipelago, on board a ship or
water craft of Philippine
registry, jurisdiction may be
exercised by the Court of First
Instance in any province in
which the vessel shall come
after the commission of the
crime.
Petitioner's reliance on Act 400
is erroneous. The provision of
said Act vesting jurisdiction in
the province where the vessel
shall come after the
commission of the crime is not
carried in the present Rule.
It is a basic rule in statutory
construction that where the
provisions of the law or rule is
clear and unequivocal, its
meaning must be determined
from the language employed. It
must be given its literal
meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation (Globe
Mackay Cable and Radio Corp.
vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA [7]01;
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista,
207 SCRA 561).
The words of Sec. 15(c) being
clear, there is no reason to rely
on Act 400 in determining its
true meaning, regardless of
whether said Act was indeed
the moving spirit behind it. In
fact, it does not seem that
the provision of Act 400 was
carried into the present rule, as
it is now worded.6
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the petition for
review is hereby DENIED.
. People v. Panlilio, G.R. Nos.
L135!9-20,29 March 1996
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
DANILO PANLILIO y by law, to pay complainant the
FRANCISCO, defendant-
appellant.
Danilo Panlilio y Francisco was
charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, with kidnapping
under Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code (Crim. Case No.
2351-V-93) and violation of
P.D. 532 known as the "Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974" (Crim.
Case No. 2352-V-93). In the
first, case, the Information
alleged that on or about 17
March 1993 in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, the accused
kidnapped Leah Marie Jordan y
Villato and detained her for
more than an hour. In the
second case, the Information
alleged that on the same
occasion, with intent to gain
and by means of force and
intimidation, the accused took a
pair of gold earrings worth
P700.00 from the same
complaining witness while they
were walking along St. Jude
St., Malinta, Valenzuela, a
public highway.
Ranged against the denial and
alibi of the accused, the trial
court found the testimony of
Leah Marie positive and
convincing hence its joint
decision of 15 June 1993
convicting the accused in both
cases as charged. In the
kidnapping case the accused
was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to pay the costs,
while in the highway robbery
he was sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term from
ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum
to thirteen (13) years and two
(2) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, with the
accessory penalties prescribed
value of the pair of earrings and
to pay the costs.1
The evidence shows that at
about eleven-forty in the
morning of 17 March 1993
Leah Marie Jordan y Villato, a
10-year old student, was
waiting for her younger sister
outside the premises of St. Jude
School in Malinta, Valenzuela.
There she was approached by
Danilo Panlilio who inquired if
she knew a certain "Aling
Rosa." After she replied that
she did not know her and that
she was only there to fetch her
younger sister, Danilo suddenly
poked a knife, which was
concealed inside a hat, at the
right side of her neck, handed
her an empty cigarette pack
with a note and ordered her to
give it to "Aling Ester." When
she told him that she did not
know where to find "Aling
Ester," he said that he would
lead her to the place where
"Aling Ester" could be found.
While Danilo and Leah Marie
were walking side by side the
former continued to poke his
knife at the latter's neck. He
told her to be quiet otherwise
he would kill her. Then they
both boarded a passenger
jeepney with the knife still
effectively serving as a
contrivance to keep her mute.
Aside from the driver they were
the only passengers on board
the jeepney. While in the
jeepney Danilo forcibly took
Leah Marie's pair of earrings.
Upon reaching Navotas Danilo
and Leah Marie alighted from
the jeepney. He dragged her
towards a vacant lot where,
according to him, every girl he
brought there was made to
choose between rape and death.
Upon hearing this, she
struggled hard to free herself
from his hold. Luckily, at this
juncture, she saw policemen
coming towards their direction
so she shouted for help. One of
the policemen fired a warning
shot which prompted Danilo to
run away. The policemen
pursued him until they caught
up with him and brought him
together with Leah Marie to the
Navotas Police Station for
investigation.
Meanwhile, policemen from
Valenzuela went to the house of
Leah and informed her parents
that their daughter was in the
Navotas Police Station. The
couple then rushed to the
Station where they saw Leah
and brought her to the
Valenzuela Police Station to file
a complaint against Panlilio.
The mother of Leah noticed
that the earrings of Leah were
missing. When asked about her
earrings Leah told her mother
that Panlilio forcibly took them
from her.
The version of the appellant is
that on the day of the incident
he left his residence at Barrio
Magdaragat, Tondo, Manila, at
past ten o'clock in the morning
to go to Waywan Missionary at
San Rafael Village, Tondo,
Manila. However he defecated
first on a vacant lot in Navotas
before proceeding. Then he saw
a young girl in the area and
warned her not to pass through
the garbage because she might
sink. It was at this point when
policemen arrived and readily
accused him of being the rapist
in the area.
The accused contends in this
appeal that the trial court erred
(1) in not dismissing the case
for highway robbery on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction;
and, (2) in finding that for the
crimes charged his guilt has
been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Appellant argues that the
robbery, according to the
complaining witness herself,
was perpetrated in Navotas 2 so
that the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela has no jurisdiction
over the case. He also claims
that the prosecution failed to
present evidence that she
indeed owned any pair of
earrings. It is his thesis that it is
simply incredible that a knife
was continually poked at her
neck all the way from St. Jude
School in Malinta to Navotas
for an hour or so without
anyone noticing, otherwise, she
could have shouted and asked
for help; but she did not.
Furthermore, he claims that
Leah Marie could have only
been coached into testifying
that she was alone outside the
school premises in a feeble
attempt to explain the puzzling
situation that nobody came to
her rescue when he allegedly
abducted her at knifepoint in
broad daylight during school
dismissal time when parents,
guardians and others usually
converge to fetch their children
or wards. Under the
circumstances, we are urged to
consider as more credible the
version of the defense.
Section 2, par. (e), of P.D. 532
defines the crime of highway
robbery/brigandage as the
"seizure of any person for
ransom, extortion or other
unlawful purposes, or the
taking away of the property of
another by means of violence
against or intimidation of
person force upon things or
other unlawful means,
committed by any person on
any Philippine Highway," and
under Sec. 2, par. (c), of the
same decree, "Philippine
Highway" is "any road, street,
passage, highway and bridge or
other parts thereof or railway or
railroad within the Philippines
used by persons, or vehicles, or
locomotives or trains for the
movement or circulation of
persons or transportation of
goods, articles, or property or
both." We correlate these
provisions with Sec. 15, par.
(b), of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court which provides that
"[w]here an offense is
committed on a railroad train,
in an aircraft, or in any other
public or private vehicle while
in the course of its trip, the
criminal action may be
instituted and tried in the court
of any municipality or territory
where such train, aircraft or
other vehicle passed during
such trip, including the place of
departure and
arrival (emphasis supplied).
With the foregoing as
guideposts we are now asked:
Did the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela have jurisdiction
over the highway robbery?
In her direct examination the
complaining witness testified
that when she and the accused
alighted from the jeepney in
Navotas he forcibly took her
pair of earrings.3 However,
during the cross-examination
she changed her testimony thus
Q So you want to impress to the
Court that even in front of St.
Jude he already asked you to
remove your earrings?
A Not yet. When we were
already aboard the jeep, that
was the time when he told me
to remove my
earrings 4 (emphasis supplied).
But thereafter she clung to the
same statement for the entire
course of her cross-examination
which appears to be her correct
narration of events
Q And it was there that while
you were already in the vacant
lot that the accused told you to
remove your earrings, is that it?
A We were not yet there.
Q Where were you?
A when we boarded the jeep, he
instructed me to remove my
earrings5 (Emphasis supplied).
Q And it was there in the
Navotas area when he told you
to remove your earrings?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Where?
A From the time
we boarded the jeep.
Q That was the time when you
removed your earrings and
gave it to him?
A Yes, sir6 (Emphasis supplied).
The most candid witnesses
oftentimes make mistakes and
fall into confused and
inconsistent statements, but
such honest lapses do not
necessarily affect their
credibility.7 More importantly,
ample margin of error and
understanding should be
accorded to young witnesses
who much more than adults
would be gripped with tension
due to the novelty of testifying
before a court.8
But the testimony of
complainant that upon boarding
the jeepney the accused ordered
her to remove her earrings and
give them to him is material in
determining whether the
Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela had jurisdiction
over the highway robbery. Was
Valenzuela their place of
departure or the municipality
where their jeepney passed
during the trip? Here lies the
problem. The complainant was
uncertain of their place of
departure
Q If you will be requested to
point to the place where you
boarded, you could point the
place where you bearded the
jeepney?
A No, sir, I cannot. I do not
know that place because I was
(just) instructed to board.9
Q You want to impress the
Court that you boarded a
passenger jeepney and you do
not know the place where you
boarded the jeep?
A No, sir.10
Q When you were already
traveling from the place, is (sic)
that in Valenzuela where you
boarded the jeep?
A I do not know, sir.11
Neither did Leah Marie
mention the place or places
where their vehicle passed. We
could have relied on the
evidence that St. Jude School is
in Malinta, Valenzuela, in order
to establish the fact that they
also boarded the jeepney in
Valenzuela. Yet, her other
testimony is damaging
Q So you want to impress that
from St. Jude you were led by
the accused to a place where
there was a passenger jeepney?
A Yes, sir.
Q You walked or you took a
tricycle because that is the
means of transportation
available in the place?
A We did not board a tricycle.
We just walked.
Q And from St. Jude, how long
did it take you to walk or
negotiate the distance?
A A long time because, as a
matter of fact, I got tired.12
From the foregoing, it would
seem that the prosecution failed
to establish the precise place
where the highway robbery was
supposedly committed other
than Navotas. Hence, we agree
with the defense that the
Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela had no jurisdiction
over the Offense of highway
robbery, although based on a
different ground.
As regards the charge of
kidnapping, Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code provides
Art. 267. Kidnapping and
serious illegal detention.
Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another,
or in any other manner deprive
him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion
perpetuato death:
1. If the kidnapping or
detention shall have lasted
more than five days.
2. If it shall have been
committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical
injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have
been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or
detained shall be a minor,
female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death
where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the
circumstances abovementioned
were present in the commission
of the offense.
The poking by appellant of a
knife at the complainant could
have indeed passed unnoticed
because, as mentioned
distinctly in her testimony, the
knife was concealed in a
hat, 13 and that she did not shout
for help because all along he
was poking his knife at
her 14 and telling her not to
resist or shout otherwise she
would be killed.15
The testimony of Leah Marie
that she was alone in the
vicinity of St. Jude School
waiting for her sister is not hard
to believe. It is highly probable
that she arrived there too early
or way beyond dismissal time.
Anyway, it is clear that the
arguments raised by accused-
appellant pertain to the
credibility of the complainant,
and the appraisal by the trial
court of her credibility is
entitled to great respect from
the appellate courts which do
not deal with live witnesses but
only with the cold pages of a
written record. 16 Hence the
appellant's denial and alibi were
properly rejected by the court a
quo. They were inherently
weak and could not prevail over
the positive testimony of
complainant that the accused
detained her and took her
earrings against her will.17
WHEREFORE, the decision
finding the accused-appellant
Danilo Panlilio y Francisco
guilty of kidnapping in Crim.
Case No. 2351-V-93 and
imposing upon him a prison
term of reclusion perpetua, and
to pay the costs, is AFFIRMED.
As regards Crim. Case No.
2352-V-93 for highway
robbery, the case is
DISMISSED on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, without prejudice
to its refiling with the court of
proper jurisdiction.