SANCHEZ V PEOPLE

GR 179090
RA 7610

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information[6] dated August 29,
2001.

On September 2, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, the accused, with intent to abuse,
exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV], a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting
her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development
which acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art.
59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount
to be proved during the trial.

The RTC found LEONILO SANCHEZ y Aranas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating paragraph (a),
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610. The CA upheld the RTC decision finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Other Acts of Child Abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 and Presidential
Decree No. 603 with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed.

Issue:
WON accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating RA 7610 in relation to PD 603.

Held: Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child,
whether habitual or not, which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of
his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death
As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or
not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We have reviewed the records of the RTC
and the CA and we find no reason to deviate from the findings of both courts and their uniform
conclusion that appellant is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Other Acts of Child
Abuse.

REVALDO V PEOPLE
GR 170589
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in
violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code.
On June 17 1992, Revaldo, with intent of gain unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat
lumber with a total value of P1,730.52 without any legal document as required under existing forest
laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the
government. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The
RTC rendered judgment on 1997 convicting petitioner of the offense charged, he appealed and the
Court of Appeals ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the
lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers was illegal
and thus the items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues that
the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when they went to his house to verify the
report that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the corresponding license

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is admissible in court

HELD:
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When asked
whether he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner
merely replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and for his
furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber. There
was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without
the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically
admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not
have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his
dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation consummates
the crime. Therefore, the appealed decision convicting petitioner for violation of Section 68 (now
Section 77) of the Forestry Code is affirmed.

EVANGELISTA V PEOPLE
GR 163267
RA 8294

Facts:
There was an information saying that on January 30, 1996 at NAIA the accused feloniously have in
possession of the firearms without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority. RTC
ruled that Evangelista guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which the RTC granted. RTC then found the petitioner liable still
for the offense charged but modified the penalty of imprisonment.
CA's ruling: CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its decision. It ruled that the stipulations during
the trial are binding on petitioner.

Issue:
Whether CA gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from the charge of the illegal possession of
firearms.

Held:
Appeal is devoid of merit. Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt
that the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was
committed in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon
his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in
the Philippines.
In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the present charge
happened in Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai, petitioner, even in a situation between
life and death, firmly denied possession and ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there is no record
of any criminal case having been filed against petitioner in Dubai in connection with the discovered
firearms. Since there is no pending criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason that there was
no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation
applies.
Petition denied.

PEOPLE VS ESTRADA
GR 164368-69
PLUNDER

FACTS:
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent
Estrada, among other accused. In the Information, it was alleged that on February 4, 2000, then
President Estrada w/o having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his
position and committing the offense in connection to his office, in order to conceal the ill-gotten wealth
he acquired during his tenure and his true identity as the President of the Philippines represent himself
as Jose Velarde in several transactions and use and employ the said alias which is neither his registered
name at birth or his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued. At
the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the
Information for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury.
In its Joint Resolution, the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in the illegal
use of alias and perjury. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the People failed to present evidence that proved
Estradas commission of the offense.

Issue:
WON the Court gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim Case 26565 and is applying RA
1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under CA 142.

Held:
No. the Sandiganbayans position that the rule in the law of libel- that mere communication to a third
person is publicity- does not apply to violation of CA 142. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA
142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that
name. in other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must manifest. All of Estradas
representationsto these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of
publicity.
Petition was denied.

BATISTIS V PEOPLE
GR 181571
RA 8293 (LAW ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY)

FACTS:
On January 23, 2006, the Regional Trial Court in Manila convicted Juno Batistis for violations of Section
155 (infringement of trademark) and Section 168 (unfair competition) of the Intellectual Property
Code (Republic Act No. 8293).[1]

On September 13, 2007, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction for infringement of
trademark, but reversed the conviction for unfair competition for failure of the State to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Batistis now appeals via petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CAs affirmance of his
conviction for infringement of trademark.

The Court affirms the conviction, but it modify the penalty by imposing an indeterminate sentence,
conformably with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and pertinent jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
WON the accused violated Ra 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code.

HELD:
There is no question that Batistis exerted the effort to make the counterfeit products look genuine to
deceive the unwary public into regarding the products as genuine. The buying public would be easy to
fall for the counterfeit products due to their having been given the appearance of the genuine products,
particularly with the difficulty of detecting whether the products were fake or real if the buyers had no
experience and the tools for detection, like black light. He thereby infringed the
registered Fundadortrademark by the colorable imitation of it through applying the dominant features
of the trademark on the fake products, particularly the two bottles filled with Fundador brandy. His acts
constituted infringement of trademark as set forth in Section 155, supra.

COCA COLA V GOMEZ

GR 154491
UNFAIR COMPETITION

FACTS:
On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty bottles in
Pepsi's yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair competition under the
IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles must be confiscated to preclude their illegal use, destruction
or concealment by the respondents. In support of the application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn
statements of three witnesses.

Municipal Trial Court Executive Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga City, after taking the joint deposition of
the witnesses, issued Search Warrant at Pepsi's Naga yard for violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP
Code.

The respondents filed motions for the return of their shells and to quash the search warrant. They
contended that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrant; the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; and their Naga plant was in urgent need of the shells.
Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part of the evidence of the crime, arguing that Pepsi
used the shells in hoarding the bottles. It insisted that the issuance of warrant was based on probable
cause for unfair competition under the IP Code, and that the respondents violated R.A. 623, the law
regulating the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes, and other similar containers.
On May 8, 2002, the RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause and the non-commission of the
crime of unfair competition

ISSUE:
WON the act charged - alleged to be hoarding of empty Coke bottles - constitutes an offense under
Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code.
HELD:
The Court held that the "hoarding" - as defined and charged by the petitioner - does not fall within the
coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark,
trade name or service mark that the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper
authority from the petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to be fraudulently "passing off" their
products or services as those of the petitioner. The respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking
any representation or misrepresentation that would confuse or tend to confuse the goods of the
petitioner with those of the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the petitioner alleges is an act
foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as alleged, hoarding inflicts
unfairness by seeking to limit the opposition's sales by depriving it of the bottles it can use for these
sales.
In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law - R.A. No. 623.

PEOPLE V LADJAALAM

G.R. Nos. 136149-51.

FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in
violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by
Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. The following
information was provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of
appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming
from the second floor of the said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle
towards them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier
saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to
the roof of a neighboring house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief
chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellants house. Also found was a pencil
case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for
gunpowder nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and
ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm
or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other crime was committed. Furthermore, if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not
homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

PEOPLE V VALDEZ
GR 127663
RA 8294

FACTS:
Accused-appellant, Bernard Castro, and one John Doe were charged for the complex crime of Multiple
Murder with Double Frustrated Murder.
The Information states that on September 17, 1995, at Sitio Cabaoangan, barangay Nalsian in Manaoag,
Pangasinan, the said accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to
kill, and each armed with caliber .30 carbines wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, simultaneously attacked and fired their caliber
.30 carbines at Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta, Sandra Montano, William Montano
and Randy Tibule while they were on board a tricycle. They were hit in the different parts of their bodies
while on their way to a dance party which caused the instantaneous death of Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean
Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta and Sandra Montano, and inflicted fatal injuries to William Montano and
Randy Tibule, in the different parts of their bodies.
The RTC found accused ROLANDO VALDEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE
MURDER WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER and the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND
AMMUNITIONS.
ISSUE:
WON the conviction for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm under PD No. 1866 as amended by RA
No. 8294 is proper.

HELD:
It was recently held in the case entitled People vs. Molina (G.R.No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and
reiterated in People vs. Feloteo (G.R. No. 124212, September 17, 1998), that there can be no separate
conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 in view of
the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294.

The use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be considered as a special aggravating
circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder) because it will unduly
raise the penalty for the four counts of murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold
death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant
because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it
might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.

FAJARDO V PEOPLE
GR 190889
RA 8294

FACTS:
Petitioner Elenita Fajardo and one Zaldy Valerio were charged with violation of PD No. 1866, as
amended.

On August 28, 2002, in Kalibo, Aklan, the accused conspired and confederated and mutually helped one
another, without authority of law, permit or license feloniously have in their possession, custody, and -
control of two receivers of caliber .45 pistol, two pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five
pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen pieces live caliber .45 ammunition. These items
were confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted by members of the
Provincial Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office of Kalibo, Aklan.

The RTC found the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms. The CA concurred with the factual
findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of law, and held that the search warrant was void.

ISSUE:
WON accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms.

HELD:
Illegal possession of firearms; elements. Illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm,
is committed when the holder thereof: (1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof; and (2) lacks the
authority or license to possess the firearm. The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which
includes not only actual physical possession, but also constructive possession or the subjection of the
thing to ones control and management.

PEOPLE V ALMAZAN
GR 133442
RA 8294

FACTS:
The appellant was charged with murder in an Information stating that on May 14 1989, at around 9:00
oclock in the morning, at Barangay Calaba, in Bangued, Abra, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and while armed with a firearm (unrecovered), did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one LORETO APOLINAR several times, hitting him
on the head and other parts of his body, which caused his death shortly thereafter, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

ISSUE:
WON the accused can be convicted for the crime of illegal possession of unlicensed firearm under RA
No. 8294 amending PD No. 1866.

HELD:
Under Republic Act No. 8294 amending Presidential Decree No. 1866, the use of an unlicensed firearm
to commit homicide or murder is a special aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime. The
Information merely alleged that the appellant used a firearm to kill the victim. It did not allege that the
same was unlicensed. Neither was it proved by the prosecution that the appellant had no license to
possess the firearm. The appellants lack of license to possess the firearm is an essential element of the
circumstance.[57] Unless it is alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution, the use by the
appellant of an unlicensed firearm to commit murder is not aggravating. Besides, the crime was
committed before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Court and Rep. Act No. 8294. Hence, the
aggravating circumstance should not be appreciated against the appellant.