act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper
WHEN THE USE OF ALIASES VIOLATES
THE LAW
By: jlp | April 8, 2015 in Criminal Law, Immigration Law
1 Reply | Related posts at the bottom of article
Iqbals alleged use of aliases violates law solon, states the caption of
a news article, referring to the allegation of Davao City Representative
Carlo Nogales that the use of an alias by MILF Spokesman Mohagher
Iqbal, apparently not his real name, in official documents violates the
Revised Penal Code and the Anti-Alias law which prohibit the use of
pseudonyms in public documents. It might be helpful to have a summary
of the laws the penalize the use of aliases.
What is an alias?
An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by
him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to
his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or
substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his
fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known
by several different names and these are known as aliases.
What is the objective of the law?
The objective and purpose of Commonwealth Act No. 142 (An Act to
Regulate the Use of Aliases, full text below), according to the Supreme
Court, have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883 (An Act to Regulate the
Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names,
Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce And
Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and
for other purposes,), amended by Act No. 4147. This law was made
primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting
scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion
in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using
fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully
maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they
possessed a thousand and one names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the
judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.
Is the use of an alias automatically penalized?
Under C.A. 142, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging
to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that
the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from
that day forth does not fall within the prohibition.
What are the relevant laws on false names?
We point to the summary of these laws, contained in President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyos Executive Order No. 306 (Instituting Measures to
Promote Lawful Use of Government-Issued Identity Documents and
Prevent Violations of Laws Involving False Names and Identities):
(a) the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2002 (Republic Act [RA] No. 9160,
as amended), which requires banks and other covered institutions to
established and record the true identity of their clients based on official
documents;
(b) the Revised Penal Code (Act of 3815, as amended) which penalizes
the public use of a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime,
evading the execution of a judgment, or causing of damage (1st paragraph,
Art 178), the concealment of a persons true name and other personal
circumstances (2nd paragraph, Art. 178), and the Act of defrauding
another by using a fictitious name (4th paragraph, Art. 315);
(c) the Civil Code of the Philippines (RA No. 386, as amended), which
prohibits the use of different names and surnames, except for pen and
stage names (Art. 379 and 380);
(d) the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 (Commonwealth Act No. 613 as
amended), which penalizes any individual who shall be evade the
immigration laws by appearing under an assumed or fictitious name (Sec.
45);
Page 1 of 17
(e) the Tax Reform Act of 1997 (RA8424), as amended, which made it
unlawful for any person to enter any false or fictitious name in a taxpayers
books of accounts or records;
(f) Presidential Decree No. 1829, which penalizes any individual who shall
knowingly or willfully obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension
of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by
publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime
evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true
name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose (Sec. 1[d]);
and
(g) Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by RA No. 6085, which
penalizes any person who shall use any name different from the one with
which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or
with which he was baptized for the first time, or with which he was
registered in the Bureau of Immigration, or such substitute name as may
have been authorized by a competent court (Sec. 1);
Rep. Nograles speaks of two laws the Revised Penal Code and the
anti-alias law. Both provisions carry the penalty of imprisonment. The
pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code is Article 178, which reads:
Art. 178. Using fictitious name and concealing true name. The
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not to exceed 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who shall publicly use a fictitious name for the
purpose of concealing a crime, evading the execution of a judgment or
causing damage.
Any person who conceals his true name and other personal circumstances
shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not to exceed 200 pesos.
The anti-alias law, on the other hand, is Commonwealth Act No.
142 (An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases), as amended by Republic
Act No. 6085, which provides:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio
or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of
the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or,
in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of
immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births
have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been
baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor
in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a
change of name, and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth
the persons baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil
registry, if different, his immigrants name, if an alien, and his pseudonym,
if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the use of the desired alias. The judicial authority for
the use of alias the Christian name and the alien immigrants name shall
be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any
name or names other, than his original or real name unless the same is or
are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
Sec. 3. No person having been baptized with a name different from that
with which he was registered at birth in the local civil registry, or in case of
an alien, registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry, or any person
who obtained judicial authority to use an alias, or who uses a pseudonym,
shall represent himself in any public or private transaction or shall sign or
execute any public or private document without stating or affixing his real
or original name and all names or aliases or pseudonym he is or may have
been authorized to use.
Sec. 4. Six months from the approval of this act and subject to the
provisions of section 1 hereof, all persons who have used any name and/or
names and alias or aliases different from those authorized in section one
of this act and duly recorded in the local civil registry, shall be prohibited to
use such other name or names and/or alias or aliases.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of
from one year to five years and a fine of P5,000 to P10,000.
Source: Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112170, 10 April 1996.
Page 2 of 17
SUPREME COURT No. ADD-02-280.10 Thereafter, the BOI Commissioner issued a Mission
Manila Order11 to verify petitioners immigration status. The Mission Order was
later recalled12 and the Law and Investigation Division endorsed the
FIRST DIVISION records to the Board of Special Inquiry which directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.13
G.R. No. 180364 December 3, 2014
The BOI Ruling
TZE SUN WONG, Petitioner,
vs. In a Judgment14 dated October 2, 2002,the BOI Board of Commissioners
KENNY WONG, Respondent. ordered the deportation of petitioner on the grounds of: (a) illegal use of
alias, i.e., Joseph Wong, which was the name appearing in his drivers
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May license application; and (b) misrepresenting himself as a Filipino citizen in
15, 2007 and the Resolution3 dated October 23, 2007 of the Court of the same application, in violation of Section 37 (a) (7) and (9) 15 of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92607, affirming the deportation of Commonwealth Act No. 613,16 otherwise known as "The Philippine
petitioner Tze Sun Wong (petitioner). Immigration Act of 1940" (Immigration Act), in relation to Sections 1, 2, and
317 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6085.18 Aside from pointing out the
misrepresentations made by petitioner, the BOI took judicial notice of the
The Facts
fact that drivers license applications require the personal appearance of
the applicant in order to prevent fraud. Thus, by allowing someone to apply
Petitioner is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the Philippines in 1975 for him, he actively involved himself in the preparation and issuance of a
and subsequently acquired a permanent resident status in 1982. As the fraudulent drivers license. By the same account, he cannot then aver that
records would show, he studied, married, and continued to reside in the he was without any participation in the entry of his supposed Philippine
country, and even owned a company called Happy Sun Travel and Tours.4 citizenship in his drivers license.19

On September 12, 2000, respondent Kenny Wong (respondent), owner Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration20 which was eventually denied
and proprietor of San Andres Construction Supply, filed a Complaint by the BOI in a Resolution21 dated December 4, 2002. As such, petitioner
Affidavit5 against petitioner before the Bureau of Immigration (BOI), filed an appeal before the Secretary of Justice.
alleging that the latter had misrepresented, in his drivers license
application, that he was a Filipino citizen. Respondent also averred that
The Secretary of Justice Ruling
petitioner and his business partner, Tina Yu, issued post-dated checks in
the amount of 886,922.00 which, however, bounced to his damage and
prejudice. Thus, taking cue from the foregoing acts, respondent prayed In a Resolution22 dated March 22, 2004, Acting Secretary of Justice Ma.
that petitioner be investigated by the BOI for violation of immigration laws. 6 Merceditas N. Gutierrez affirmed the ruling of the BOI, holding that since it
undisputedly appears on the faceof petitioners drivers license that he is a
Filipino citizen under the name of Joseph Wong, he cannot then raise the
In his Counter-Affidavit7 dated September 28, 2000, petitioner denied
defense that it was not his doing but that of a stranger who merely helped
respondents claim of misrepresentation, stating that when he applied for
him.23 It was further pointed out that petitioners use of the alias "Joseph
a drivers license, it was another person who filled up the application form
Wong" was illegal since said name is notregistered in the BOI and does
for him. However, said person entered the wrong information, particularly,
not fall under the recognized exceptions where use of alias may be
on his name, birth year, and nationality.8
allowed.24
Finding probable cause, the Special Prosecutor filed with the BOI the
applicable deportation charges9 against petitioner, docketed as BSI-D.C.
Page 3 of 17
Petitioner moved for reconsideration25 and raised the argument that the
Judgment of the BOI was null and void since only two
commissioners26 participated in the decision-making process. Secretary of
Justice Raul M. Gonzalez rendered a Resolution27 dated September 9,
2005, rejecting petitioners argument on the basis of Section 8 of the
Immigration Act which simply requires that "[i]n any case coming before
the [BOI] Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall
prevail[,]" as in this case. It was added that when petitioner sought to
reconsider said Judgment, all four (4) commissioners 28 decided in favor of
his deportation.29
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari30 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision31 dated May 15, 2007, the CA denied32 the certiorari petition.
Preliminarily, it found that petitioner chose the wrong remedy considering
that the decisions of the BOI Board of Commissioners are directly
appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 33 The CA also
observed that even on the assumption that the Secretary of Justice was
given the authority to countermand the BOI Judgment under the
Administrative Code, no countermand was made, and hence, the same
should have already attained finality.34 On the substantive aspects, the CA
affirmed the ruling of the Secretary of Justice that petitioner should be
deported for violating the abovementioned rules. 35
Petitioner sought reconsideration36 but was denied in a Resolution37 dated
October 23, 2007, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
denied petitioners petition for certiorari.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The Court first discusses the propriety of petitioners recourse before the
CA.
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court clearly states that decisions of any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (except
to judgments or final ordersissued under the Labor Code of the Philippines)
shall be appealed to the CA under this rule.
RULE 43
Appeals From the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to
the Court of Appeals Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals
from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasijudicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among
these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board,
National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian
Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions
Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission,
Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The statutory basis of the CAs appellate jurisdiction over decisions
rendered by quasi-judicial agencies (except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court inaccordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree
No. 442) in the abovementioned respect is Section 9 (3) of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129,38 as amended:39
Section 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission,
the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling withinthe appellate jurisdiction of the
Page 4 of 17
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948.
xxxx
Notably, in Cayao-Lasam v. Spouses Ramolete,40 it was clarified that the
enumeration of the quasi-judicial agencies under Section 1, Rule 43 is not
exclusive:
The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The phrase "among these
agencies" confirms that the enumeration made in the Rule is not exclusive
to the agencies therein listed.41
Thus, although unmentioned in the enumeration, the Court, in the case of
Dwikarna v. Hon. Domingo42 (Dwikarna), held that the decisions rendered
by the BOI Board of Commissioners may be appealable to the CA via Rule
43 in the event that a motion for reconsideration therefrom is denied:
If petitioner is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Commissioners
of the Bureau of Immigration, he can move for its reconsideration. If his
motion is denied, thenhe can elevate his case by way of a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.43 (Emphasis supplied)
It bears elucidation that the availability of a Rule 43 appeal to the CA from
the BOI Board of Commissioners as ruled in Dwikarna presupposes the
presence of any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies,44 considering that the Secretary of Justice may
still review the decisions of the aforesaid body. In Caoile v. Vivo 45 (Caoile),
it was held: [S]ince the Commissioners of Immigration are under the
Department of Justice46 and, in this case, they followed the Secretarys
Order setting aside the individual actions of the former Commissioners, the
aggrieved parties should have exhausted their administrative remedies by
appealing to the Secretary before seeking judicial intervention. 47
Citing Caoile, the Court, in the more recent case of Kiani v. The Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation,48expounded on the procedure:
Under Section 8, Chapter 3, TitleI, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the
power to deport aliens isvested on the President of the Philippines, subject
to the requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner is
vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.49 Thus, a party aggrieved by a
Deportation Order issued by the [Board of Commissioner (BOC)] is
proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Conformably with [the] ruling of the Court in
[Commissioner] Domingo v. Scheer(see 466 Phil. 235, 264-284 [2004]),
such party may file a motion for the reconsideration thereof before the
BOC. The Court ruled therein that "there is no law or rule which provides
that a Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC in the exercise of
its authority becomes final after one year from its issuance, or that the
aggrieved party is barred from filing a motion for a reconsideration of any
order or decision of the BOC." The Court, likewise, declared that in
deportation proceedings, the Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory
manner and that the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration
of a decision or final order under Rule 37 of said Rules.
In case such motion for reconsideration is denied by the BOC, the
aggrieved party may appeal to the Secretary of Justice and, if the latter
denies the appeal, to the Office of the President of the Philippines [(OP)].
The party may also choose to file a petition for certiorariwith the CA under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on the ground that the Secretary of Justice
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal, the remedy of appeal not being
adequate and speedy remedy. In case the Secretary of Justice dismisses
the appeal, the aggrieved party may resort to filing a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as amended.50
Thus, to recap, from the denial of the BOI Board of Commissioners motion
for reconsideration, the aggrieved party has three (3) options: (a) he may
file an appeal directly to the CA via Rule 43 provided that he shows that
any of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b) absent any of
the exceptions, he may exhaust the available administrative remedies
within the executive machinery, namely, an appeal to the Secretary of
Justice and then to the OP, and thereafter, appeal the OPs decisions via
Rule 43;51 or (c) he may directly resort to certiorari before the CA strictly on
jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why any of the
Page 5 of 17
aforementioned remedies cannot be taken as "adequate and speedy."
Anent the last of these options, the Court, inRigor v. CA,52 had this to say:
For a writ of certiorarito issue, a petitioner must not only prove that the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without orin excess of jurisdiction. He must also show that he has no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against
whathe perceives to be a legitimate grievance. A recourse affording prompt
relief from the injurious effects of the judgment or acts of a lower court or
tribunal is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" remedy. 53
Case law explains that "[a] remedy isplain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment,
order, or resolution of the lower court or agency." 54 In this relation, it has
been recognized that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be
deemed proper "when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and
injury to a party, x x x where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and
insufficient, x x x and x x x in case of urgency." 55
In this case, petitioner instituted anadministrative appeal before the
Secretary of Justice and thereafter sought direct recourse to the CA via
certiorari, thereby leap-frogging other available remedies, the first being a
subsequent administrative appeal to the OP and, eventually, an appeal of
the OP decision to the CA via Rule 43. While these remedies remained
available to him, the Court deems that they would not afford him speedy
and adequate relief in view of the plain imminence of his deportation, by
virtue of the issuance of a warrant of deportation. 56 The urgency of such
circumstance therefore justified his direct resort to certiorari.
This notwithstanding, the Court nonetheless denies the petition on
substantive grounds.
It must be highlighted that the case under consideration essentially calls
for the Court to determine whether the CAs dismissal of petitioners
certioraripetition before it was correct.
"In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with
jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the
respondent tribunal committed not merelya reversible error but a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction in issuing the
impugned order. Showing mere abuse ofdiscretion is not enough, for the
abuse must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such
as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction."57
Petitioners certiorari petition before the CA basically revolves on his denial
of the acts of misrepresentation imputed against him, claiming that the
same do not warrant his deportation. However, the commission of said acts
involves factual matters that have already been established during the
proceedings before the BOI Board of Commissioners. In this regard, it is
crucial to point out that "[t]he Bureau is the agency that can best determine
whether petitioner violated certain provisions of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. By reason of
the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over
matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally
accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts."58 As petitioner has not
sufficiently demonstrated any cogent reason to deviate from the BOI Board
of Commissioners findings, courts are wont to defer to its judgment.
Besides, petitioners defenses anent what had actually transpired during
the relevant incidents surrounding his drivers license application
apparently constitute mere self-serving allegations barren of any
independent proof. While he blamed the unnamed fixer filling up the
erroneous details in his application, his version of the story remained
uncorroborated. The lack of testimony on the part of the fixer leaves much
to be desired from petitioners theory.
Moreover, the Courts review of the present case is via a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which generally bars any question
pertaining to the factual issuesraised. The well-settled rule is that questions
of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only
to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in
evidence of the trial courts judgment or the appellate courts
Page 6 of 17
misapprehension of the adduced facts.59 None of these exceptions was, of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful
however, convincingly shown toattend in this case. or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. 63

Now, on the matter of the alleged nullity of the BOI Board of
Commissioners Judgment due to the fact that it had been signed only by
two (2) commissioners, suffice it to state that Section 8 of the Immigration
Act simply requires that in any case coming before the BOI Board of
Commissioners, the decision of any two (2) members shall prevail:
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
Sec. 8. Decision of the Board. - The board of Commissioners, hereinafter
referred to in this Act, shall be composed of the Commissioner of
Immigration and the two Deputy Commissioners. In the absence of a
member of the Board, the Department Head shall designate an officer or
employee in the Bureau of Immigration to serve as a member thereof. In
any case coming before the Board of Commissioners, the decision of any
two members shall prevail.
In particular, the presumption that the Judgment had been deliberated by
the BOI Board of Commissioners as a collegial body stands. In any event,
the lack of any concurrence or dissension from the two (2) other
commissioners missing on the face of the October 2, 2002 Judgment has
already been placated by their eventualsigning of full concurrence in the
subsequent Resolution dated December 4, 2002 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated May 15, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 23, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92607 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner argues that the foregoing rule only refers to the number of votes
necessary to constitute the decision of the Board, insisting that deliberation
should still bemade by all commissioners as a collegial body.60

Petitioners argument is correct in theory since deliberation by all members

of the collegial body is evidently what the rule contemplates, with the votes
of only two (2) members being sufficient for a decision to prevail.
Unfortunately, however, petitioner has not shown any proof that
deliberations were not conducted by all commissioners before the
questioned Judgment was made. The rule is well-settled that he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence.61 Thus, once more, his self-serving assertion cannot begiven
credence. This is especially so in light of the presumption of regularity,
which herein ought to prevail due to the absence of any clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Bustillo v. People 62 states:

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative

evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
1wphi1

however, prevails until itis overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support

Page 7 of 17
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996]
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CONSTRUED WITH
REFERENCE TO THE INTENDED SCOPE AND PURPOSE. - Time and
again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of
the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in
construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind
and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope
and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice,
or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
2. ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO
REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); PURPOSE IS TO REGULATE
THE USE OF ALIASES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTION. - The objective
and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883,
An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other
than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for
Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14
November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28
November 1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made
primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting
scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the
crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be
successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly,
claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus
penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil
register.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN
ACT TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); ALIAS, DEFINED. - An
alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him
publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his
real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or
substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his
fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known
by several different names and thse are known as aliases.
4. ID.; ID.; USE OF FICTITIOUS NAME IN A SINGLE TRANSACTION
WITHOUT INTENDING TO BE KNOWN BY THIS NAME IN ADDITION
TO HIS REAL NAME, NOT A VIOLATION THEREOF. - The use of a
fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a
single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does
not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. - This is so in the case at bench. It is not
disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the
Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of
his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first
place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of
his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a
respondent. There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias
name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or
was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real
name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an
isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his
real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of
the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the
complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could
not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence
open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other
provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept
of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The
confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and
its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the
legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
Page 8 of 17
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Indeed, our mind
cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on
a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
Wherefore, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A PENAL STATUTE LIKE
COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED, CONSTRUED STRICTLY
AGAINST THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. - As C.A.
No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the
State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to
establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe,
and the discretion of the court limited.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A.
No. 6085, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases.[1]
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the
Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman
in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery,
dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by
petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to
report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of
mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.[2]
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote
the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be
furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then
asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the
Ombudsman because his law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to
attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the
Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was
reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the
respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to
worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required
to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.[3]
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he
was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors
logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name
Oscar Perez after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative
Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of
Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida
Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which
he acknowledged by writing the name Oscar Perez. [4]
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an
acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They
conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person
who introduced himself as Oscar Perez was actually petitioner Cesario
Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida
reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that
petitioner be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the
presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a
demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove
that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local
civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document
from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of
accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the
validity of his conviction.
Page 9 of 17
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating
Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085. He was
sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day
of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of
one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of
P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as. he reasserts
his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R. A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is
Oscar Perez his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which
connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also
known. He claims that he has never been known as Oscar Perez and
that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the
express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an
essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by
R. A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to
prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in
the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred
in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the
wrong law.[5]
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the
light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose. [6] The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of
the lawmakers.[7]
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended,
which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding
circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions
thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No.
142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its
amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of
Aliases. It provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall
use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by
which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as
may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise
the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for
authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain
judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had
for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and
the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been obtained,
specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was
granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the
proper civil register x x x.
The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved
on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television,
radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use
of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any
name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the
office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first
time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of
immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births
have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been
baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor
in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a
change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth
the persons baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil
Page 10 of 17
registry, if different, his immigrants name, if an alien, and his pseudonym,
if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use
of alias, the christian name and the alien immigrants name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any
name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or
are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in
Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of
Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of
the Bureau of Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement, Providing
Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was
approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147,
approved on 28 November 1934.[8] The pertinent provisions of Act No.
3883 as amended follow -Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to
use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or
business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public
or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business
transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than
his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the
place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business,
any sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without first
registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or
style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of
any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such
contract agreement, business transaction, or business x x x.
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was
made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of
adopting scores of different names and aliases which created
tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost
bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious
reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who,
rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one
names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name,
unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and
recorded in the civil register.[9]
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic[10] the Court had occasion to explain the
meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview
of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioners use of alias Kheng Chiau
Young in addition to his real name Yu Cheng Chiau would add to more
confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert
Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its
use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both
names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer,
knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had
encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices
which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of
his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using
and sticking only to his real name Yu Cheng Chiau.
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as
shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the
abovementioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition,
because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no
necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual
Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as
business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he
believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his
name following the Occidental method, he can easily file a petition for
change of name, so that in lieu of the name Yu Kheng Chian, he can,
abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau
Young.
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner
has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the
aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of
Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth
or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is
commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him
but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are
known as aliases.[11] Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different
name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign
or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to
his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
Page 11 of 17
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the
Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of
his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first
place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of
his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a
respondent.There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not
an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had
used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition
to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by
petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally
required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself
properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to
get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of
public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone
under the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law,

such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as
amended under which he is prosecuted.The confusion and fraud in
business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes
seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar
and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A.
No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will
avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and
injurious consequences.[12]Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute,
it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
accused.[13] The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for
the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the
court limited.[14] Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that
petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the
act done by him.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming

that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.

SO ORDERED.
Page 12 of 17
G.R. No. 162205 March 31, 2014
REVELINA LIMSON, Petitioner,
vs.
EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 31, 2003, 1 whereby the
Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Revelina Limson' s petition for
certiorari assailing the denial by the Secretary of Justice of her petition for
review vis-a-vis the adverse resolutions of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City (OCP) of her charges for falsification
and illegal use of aliases against respondent Eugenio Juan Gonzalez.
Antecedents
The antecedents as found by the CA are as follows:
On or about December 1, 1997, Limson filed a criminal charge against
Gonzalez for falsification, before the Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong
City.
Vice Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, who penned the decision
under review, pursuant to the raffle of May 8, 2013.
The charge for [sic] falsification of [sic] Limson is based on Limsons
assertion that in the records of the Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC), a certain EUGENIO GONZALEZ is registered as an architect
and that Gonzalez, who uses, among others, the name EUGENIO JUAN
GONZALEZ, and who pretends to be said architect. Registered [sic] with
the PRC, is an impostor and therefore, guilty [sic] of falsification x x x."
Gonzalez filed his Counter-Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail that
his full name is EUGENIO (first given name) JUAN (second given name)
GONZALEZ (fathers family name) y REGALADO (mothers family
name). He alleges that in his youth, while he was still in grade school and
high school, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y REGALADO
and/or EUGENIO GONZALEZ and that thereafter, he transferred to the
University of Santo Tomas and therein took up architecture and that upon
commencement of his professional practice in 1943, he made use of his
second name, JUAN. Consequently, in his professional practice, he has
identified himself as much as possible as Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez,
because the surname GONZALEZ was and is still, a very common
surname throughout the Philippines and he wanted to distinguish himself
with his second given name, JUAN, after his first given name, EUGENIO.
Gonzalez supposed [sic] his allegations with various supporting
documents x x x.
After receiving pertinent Affidavits and evidentiary documents from
Limson and Gonzalez, respectively, the Prosecutor dismissed the
criminal charge against Gonzalez, finding that indeed EUGENIO JUAN R.
GONZALES [sic] is the architect registered in the PRC. Said Resolution
was issued on March 30, 1998 x x x.
Limson elevated the Resolution of the Prosecutor x x x to the Secretary
of Justice. Before the Secretary of Justice, she utilized the basic
arguments she had raised before the Prosecutors Office, with slight
variations, in assailing said adverse Resolution of the Prosecutor.
After Opposition by Gonzalez, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the
appeal of Limson. The Secretary of Justice affirmed and even expanded
the findings of the Prosecutor x x x.
Not content with said Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, Limson filed
a motion for reconsideration therefrom; which, after Opposition by
Gonzalez, was dismissed by the Secretary of Justice, on September 15,
2000 x x x. Said dismissal was with finality.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, on or about September 25, 2000, Limson
filed a new letter complaint against Gonzalez, with the Secretary of
Justice. She alleged the same basic facts, evidence, and charges, as
already resolved by the Prosecutor and affirmed with finality, by the
Secretary of Justice; but adding the accusation that because Gonzalez
used various combinations of his name, in different signature, on the [sic]
different occasions, Gonzalez had also violated Republic Act No. 6085
(the Anti-Alias Law). Limson, in said letter complaint of September 25,
2000, suppressed from the Secretary of Justice, the extant before-
mentioned Resolutions, already decreed and adverse to her.
Page 13 of 17
The Secretary of Justice referred this letter complaint of Limson x x x to
the Prosecutors Office of Mandaluyong City for investigation.
This new investigation was docketed as I.S. No. 01-44001-B and
assigned to Honorable Susante J. Tobias x x x.
After submission of Affidavits, Counter-Affidavits and other pertinent
pleadings, and evidences [sic], by the respective parties, before the
Prosecutor, the Prosecutor rendered a Resolution, dismissing the new
complaint x x x which Resolution reads as follows:
After a careful evaluation of the letter complaint of Revelina Limson
dated September 25, 2000 addressed to the Secretary of Justice and
endorsed to this Office x x x and the evidence adduced by the contending
parties, we find the issues raised in the aforesaid letter to be a rehashed
(sic) of a previous complaint filed by the same complainant which has
already been long resolved with finality by this Office and the Department
of Justice more particularly under I.S. No. 97-11929.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant case
be considered closed and dismissed.
Not content with said Resolution x x x, Limson filed a motion for
reconsideration; [sic]which was again opposed by Gonzalez and which
was denied by the Prosecutor x x x.
Not agreeable to said Resolution x x x, Limson filed a Petition for Review
with the Secretary of Justice x x x, to which x x x Gonzalez filed an
Answer/Opposition x x x.
The Secretary of Justice denied said Petition for Review of Limson, on
April 3, 2002 x x x as follows:
Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70 dated
July 3, 2000, provides that the Secretary of Justice may, motu propio,
dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error
in the assailed resolution or when issued [sic] raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. We carefully examined the petition
and its attachments and we found no such error committed by the
prosecutor that would justify the reversal of the assailed resolution which
is in accord with the evidence and law on the matter.
Moreover, there was no showing that a copy of the petition was furnished
the Prosecution Office concerned pursuant to Section 5 of said
Department Circular.2
Although Limson sought the reconsideration of the adverse resolution of
April 3, 2002, the Secretary of Justice denied her motion for
reconsideration on October 15, 2002.
Decision of the CA
Limson assailed on certiorari the adverse resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice in the CA, claiming that the Secretary of Justice had thereby
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for misappreciating her evidence establishing her charges of
falsification and violation of the Anti-Alias Law against respondent.
On July 31, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing
the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the instant Petition is
perforce DENIED. Accordingly, the Resolutions subject of this petition are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.3
On January 30, 2004, the CA denied Limsons motion for
reconsideration.
Issues
In her petition for review, Limson avers the following errors, namely:
I
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
DO NOT CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. MOREOVER,
THERE WAS A MISAPPRECIATION AND/OR MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS AND THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO NOTICE CERTAIN
RELEVANT POINTS WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A
DIFFERENT CONCLUSION
Page 14 of 17
 II
THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS A FINDING
BASED ON SPECULATION AND/OR SURMISE AND THE
INFERENCES MADE WERE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN.4
Limson insists that the names "Eugenio Gonzalez" and "Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez y Regalado" did not refer to one and the same individual; and
that respondent was not a registered architect contrary to his claim.
According to her, there were material discrepancies between the
graduation photograph of respondent taken in 1941 when he earned his
degree in Architecture from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, 5 and
another photograph of him taken for his drivers license in 1996, 6 arguing
that the person in the latter photograph was not the same individual
depicted in the 1941 photograph. She submits documents showing that
respondent used aliases from birth, and passed himself off as such
persons when in fact he was not. She prays that the decision of the CA
be set aside, and that the proper criminal cases for falsification of public
document and illegal use of alias be filed against respondent
In his comment,7 respondent counters that the petition for review should
be denied due course for presenting only factual issues; that the factual
findings of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice, and the CA should remain
undisturbed; that he did not commit any falsification; that he did not use
any aliases; that his use of conflicting names was the product of
erroneous entry, inadvertence, and innocent mistake on the part of other
people; that Limson was motivated by malice and ill will, and her charges
were the product of prevarication; and that he was a distinguished
architect and a respected member of the community and society.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
To start with, the petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It
urges the Court to undo the findings of fact of the OCP, the Secretary of
Justice and the CA on the basis of the documents submitted with her
petition. But the Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and
weigh evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court explicitly
requires the petition for review on certiorari to raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. Accordingly, the petition for review of
Limson is outrightly rejected for this reason.
Secondly, Limson appears to stress that the CA erred in concluding that
the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of the evidence submitted to the OCP. She would now have
us reverse the CA.
We cannot reverse the CA. We find that the conclusion of the CA about
the Secretary of Justice not committing grave abuse of discretion was
fully warranted. Based on the antecedents earlier rendered here, Limson
did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of Justice
had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the OCP of her
charges against respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice were quite exhaustive in their exposition of the
reasons for the dismissal of the charges. And, even assuming that the
Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should have shown to the CA that
either arbitrariness or capriciousness or whimsicality had tainted the
error. Yet, she tendered no such showing. She should be reminded,
indeed, that grave abuse of discretion meant either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the Secretary of Justice evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when
the Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers,
acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.8
Thirdly, the discrepancy between photographs supposedly taken in 1941
and in 1996 of respondent did not support Limsons allegation of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice. It is really
absurd to expect respondent, the individual depicted on the photographs,
to look the same after 55 long years.
And, fourthly, on the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court
observes that respondents aliases involved the names "Eugenio
Gonzalez", "Eugenio Gonzales", "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez", "Eugenio
Juan Gonzalez y Regalado", "Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez", "Eugenio J.
Gonzalez", and per Limson "Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez." But
these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an
erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one
Page 15 of 17
instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second
names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or
inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is
significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within
the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such names were not different
from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used
the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the
public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in
law.
An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by
him publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to
the real name by which he was registered at birth or baptized the first
time, or to the substitute name authorized by a competent authority; a
mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly
designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but
sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are
known as aliases.9 An alias is thus a name that is different from the
individuals true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different
from his true name.
In Ursua v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court tendered an enlightening
discourse on the history and objective of our law on aliases that is worth
including here, viz:
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the
light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
1wphi1
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of
the lawmakers.
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended,
which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding
circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions
thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A.
No.142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its
amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of
Aliases. It provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall
use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by
which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name
as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for
authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain
judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be
had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name
and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been
obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such
authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be
recorded in the proper civil register x x x.
The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved
on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television,
radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the
use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use
any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in
the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the
first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the
bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose
births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have
not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within
which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority
therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial
authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure
such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias
shall set forth the persons baptismal and family name and the name
recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrants name, if an alien,
and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien
immigrants name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and
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no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real
name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil
registry.
The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in
Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of
Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of
the Bureau of Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement, Providing
Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was
approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147,
approved on 28 November 1934. The pertinent provisions of Act No.
3883 as amended follow Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person
to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or
business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public
or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business
transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than
his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the
place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business,
any sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without first
registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or
style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of
any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such
contract agreement, business transaction, or business x x x.
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was
made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of
adopting scores of different names and aliases which created
tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost
bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious
reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese
who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and
one names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias
name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial
proceedings and recorded in the civil register.
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic the Court had occasion to explain the
meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview
of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioners use of alias 'Kheng Chiau
Young' in addition to his real name 'Yu Cheng Chiau' would add to more
confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert
1wphi1
Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its
use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by
both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a
customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had
encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government
offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the
grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by
simply using and sticking only to his real name 'Yu Cheng Chiau.'
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines,
as shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of
the abovementioned court, argues the more against the grant of his
petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be
no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the
usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well
as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if
he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write
his name following the Occidental method, 'he can easily file a petition for
change of name, so that in lieu of the name 'Yu Kheng Chian,' he can,
abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name 'Kheng Chiau
Young.' (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 31, 2003; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
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