G.R. No. 152613 & No.

152628 June 23, 2006

APEX MINING CO., INC.
vs.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., the mines adjudication board, provincial
mining regulatory board (PMRB-DAVAO), et al.
x--------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 152619-20 June 23, 2006
BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE
vs.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, APEX MINING CO., INC., et al.
x--------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 152870-71 June 23, 2006
THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, et al.
vs.
SOUTHEAST MINADANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION

FACTS
On 27 February 1931, Governor General Dwight F. Davis issued Proclamation No. 369, establish-
ing the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve consisting of approximately 1,927,400 hectares.
The disputed area, a rich tract of mineral land, is inside the forest reserve located at Monkayo,
Davao del Norte, and Cateel, Davao Oriental, consisting of 4,941.6759 hectares.2 This mineral
land is encompassed by Mt. Diwata, which is situated in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel.
It later became known as the "Diwalwal Gold Rush Area."
On 21 November 1983, Camilo Banad and his group, who claimed to have first discovered traces
of gold in Mount Diwata, filed a Declaration of Location (DOL) for six mining claims in the area.
Camilo Banad and some other natives pooled their skills and resources and organized the Balite
Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (Balite). On 12 December 1983, Apex Mining Corporation
(Apex) entered into operating agreements with Balite.
On 2 February 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) filed 16 DOLs or mining claims for ar-
eas adjacent to the area covered by the DOL of Balite. After realizing that the area encompassed
by its mining claims is a forest reserve within the coverage of Proclamation No. 369 issued by
Governor General Davis, MMC abandoned the same and instead applied for a prospecting permit
with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
On 1 July 1985, BFD issued a Prospecting Permit to MMC covering an area of 4,941.6759
hectares, an area within the forest reserve under Proclamation No. 369. The permit embraced the
areas claimed by Apex and the other individual mining claimants. On 11 November 1985, MMC
filed Exploration Permit Application No. 84-40 with the BMG. On 10 March 1986, the BMG issued
to MCC Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP 133).
MMC then filed before the BMG a Petition for the Cancellation of the Mining Claims of Apex and
Small Scale Mining Permits. It alleged that the areas covered by its EP 133 and the mining claims
of Apex were within an established and existing forest reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve) under Proclamation No. 369 and that pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 463, acquisi-
tion of mining rights within a forest reserve is through the application for a permit to prospect with
the BFD and not through registration of a DOL with the BMG.
BMG dismissed MMCs petition declaring null and void MMCs EP 133 and sustaining the validity
of Apex mining claims over the disputed area. The DENR reversed BMGs decision. The Office of
the President affirmed DENRs decision. Finally, The Supreme Court rendered a decision against
Apex holding that the disputed area is a forest reserve; hence, the proper procedure in acquiring
mining rights therein is by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the BFD and not through a
registration of DOL with the BMG.
On 27 December 1991, then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. issued Department Adminis-
trative Order No. 66 (DAO No. 66) declaring 729 hectares of the areas covered by the Agusan-
Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-scale mining purposes. As a
result, several mining entities filed applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA).
On 5 January 1994, Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association (MISSMA) filed before
the BMG a Petition for Cancellation of EP 133 and for the admission of their MPSA Application.
The Petition was known as RED Mines Case.
On 16 February 1994, MMC assigned EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation
(SEM), a domestic corporation which is alleged to be a 100% -owned subsidiary of MMC.
Both Balite and SEM then filed an MPSA application. BMG rejected Balites application and ac-
cepted SEMs application and designated it as MPSA Application No. 128 (MPSAA 128).
After publication of SEMs application, several mining corporations and small-scale miners filed
before the BMG their adverse claims or oppositions. To address the matter, the DENR constituted
a Panel of Arbitrators (PA). The PA rendered a resolution in RED Mines Case declaring EP 133
valid and subsisting. It dismissed the claims of the oppositors for their failure to submit the sketch
plan containing the technical description of their respective claims, which was a mandatory re-
quirement for an adverse claim that would allow the PA to determine if indeed there is an overlap-
ping of the area occupied by them and that covered by MPSAA 128. The adverse claimants ap-
pealed to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). The MAB held that mere technicality of failure to
submit a sketch plan is not a ground to dismiss the claims and declared EP 133 as expired due to
its non-renewal, but approved MPSAA 128 excluding the area designated by DAO No. 66 as non-
forest lands open for small-scale mining. Both parties appealed. The CA then consolidated the
cases and affirmed in toto the decision of the PA, declaring null and void the MAB decision. It ar-
gued that the transfer of EP 133 is valid, since SEM is an agent of MMC.
Hence, the instant Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed by Apex, Balite and MAB.
During the pendency of these Petitions, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 297 dated 25 November 2002. This proclamation excluded an area of 8,100 hectares located
in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, and proclaimed the same as mineral reservation and as environ-
mentally critical area. Subsequently, DENR Administrative Order No. 2002-18 was issued declaring
an emergency situation in the Diwalwal gold rush area and ordering the stoppage of all mining op-
erations therein.

ISSUES
I. Whether EP 133 as well as its transfer to SEM is valid.
II. Whether the DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO No. 66; and
III. Whether the subsequent acts of the executive department such as the issuance of Proclama-
tion No. 297, and DAO No. 2002-18 can outweigh Apex and Balites claims over the Diwalwal Gold
Rush Area.

RULING
I. No, EP 133 has expired. Its subsequent transfer to SEM does not validate its continued exis-
tence because SEM is not an agent of MMC as contemplated for a valid transfer of the vested
property right to explore.
Presidential Decree No. 463, otherwise known as the Mineral Resources Development Decree,
which governed the old system of exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources
through "license, concession or lease" prescribed that A mining lease contract or any interest
therein shall not be transferred, assigned, or subleased without the prior approval of the
Secretary. The same provision is reflected in Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which is the new law governing the exploration, development and
utilization of the natural resources, which provides that An exploration permit may be transferred
or assigned to a qualified person subject to the approval of the Secretary upon the recommenda-
tion of the Director.
Absent the prior approval of the Secretary of DENR, the assignment of EP 133, was, therefore,
without legal effect for violating the mandatory provision of Presidential Decree No. 463.
The condition stipulating that the permit is for the exclusive use of the permittee or its duly autho-
rized agent is not without any reason. Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or individ-
uals possessing the resources and capability to undertake mining operations. Without such a con-
dition, non-qualified entities or individuals could circumvent the strict requirements under the law
by the simple expediency acquiring the permit from the original permittee.
Agency is distinct from assignment. In agency, the agent acts not on his own behalf but on behalf
of his principal. While in assignment, there is total transfer or relinquishment of right by the as-
signor to the assignee. The assignment in this case is not a mere grant of authority to SEM, as an
agent of MMC, to use the permit. It is a total abdication of MMCs rights over the permit. Hence, the
assignment in question did not make SEM the authorized agent of MMC to make use and benefit
from EP 133.
MMC never renewed its permit prior and after its expiration. With the expiration of EP 133 on 6 July
1994, MMC lost any right to the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. SEM, on the other hand, has not ac-
quired any right to the said area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence, both
MMC and SEM have not acquired any vested right over the 4,941.6759 hectares which used to be
covered by EP 133.

II. None, the DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest reserves.
Commonwealth Act No. 137, otherwise known as "The Mining Act" which was approved on 7 No-
vember 1936 provides that Lands within reservations for purposes other than mining, which, after
such reservation is made, are found to be more valuable for their mineral contents than for the
purpose for which the reservation was made, may be withdrawn from such reservations by the
President with the concurrence of the National Assembly, and thereupon such lands shall revert to
the public domain and be subject to disposition under the provisions of this Act.
A similar provision can also be found in Presidential Decree No. 463 dated 17 May 1974, with the
modifications that (1) the declaration by the President no longer requires the concurrence of the
National Assembly and (2) the DENR Secretary merely exercises the power to recommend to the
President which forest reservations are to be withdrawn from the coverage thereof.
Therefore, DAO No. 66 was issued not in accordance with the laws. Inescapably, DAO No. 66, de-
claring 729 hectares of the areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-
forest land open to small-scale mining operations, is null and void.

III. Yes.
Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State assumed a more dynamic role in the explo-
ration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the country.43 With this policy, the
State may pursue full control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the
countrys natural mineral resources. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may en-
ter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or cor-
porations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 empowers the President, when the national interest so re-
quires, to establish mineral reservations where mining operations shall be undertaken directly by
the State or through a contractor.
Proclamation No. 297 excluded an area of 8,100 hectares located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley,
and proclaimed the same as mineral reservation and as environmentally critical area.
To implement the intent and provisions of Proclamation No. 297, the DENR Secretary issued DAO
No. 2002-18 dated 12 August 2002 declaring an emergency situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush
Area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein
Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of
the State through the executive branch. It is now up to the Executive Department whether to take
the first option, i.e., to undertake directly the mining operations of the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
The State can also opt to award mining operations in the mineral reservation to private entities in-
cluding petitioners Apex and Balite, if it wishes. The exercise of this prerogative lies with the Exec-
utive Department over which courts will not interfere.
G.R. No. 163101 February 13, 2008
BENGUET CORPORATION
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES -MINES ADJUDICATION
BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION

FACTS
On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to Pur-
chase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims re-
spectively named as Bonito-I, Bonito-II, Bonito-III, and Bonito-IV, with a total area of 288.8656
hectares, situated in Barangay Luklukam, Sitio Bagong Bayan, Municipality of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte. The mining claims were covered by MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly
filed by J.G. Realty as claimowner and Benguet as operator.
In the RAWOP, Benguet obligated itself to perfect the rights to the mining claims and/or otherwise
acquire the mining rights to the mineral claims. Within 24 months from the execution of the RA-
WOP, Benguet should also cause the examination of the mining claims for the purpose of deter-
mining whether or not they are worth developing with reasonable probability of profitable produc-
tion.
On February 9, 1999, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the
President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP on the ground of
Benguets failure to perform the obligations set forth in the RAWOP, i.e., to undertake development
works within 2 years from the execution of the Agreement, and non-payment of royalties.
Benguet then argued that the royalties due to J.G. Realty were in fact in its office and ready to be
picked up at any time; that, previously, the practice by J.G. Realty was to pick-up checks from
Benguet representing such royalties but it starting August 1994, J.G. it refused to collect such
checks from Benguet; and that it should submit the disagreement to arbitration rather than unilat-
erally terminating the RAWOP.
On June 7, 2000, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP
with the Legaspi City Panel of Arbitrators (POA). The POA declared the RAWOP cancelled and
without effect and ordered Benguet excluded from the joint MPSA Application over the mineral
claims denominated as "BONITO-I", "BONITO-II", "BONITO-III" and "BONITO-IV".
Benguet filed a Notice of Appeal with the MAB. The MAB upheld POAs decision. Hence, Benguet
filed the instant petition.

ISSUE
Whether the controversy should have first been submitted to arbitration before the POA took cog-
nizance of the case.

RULING
Yes, however, Benguet is already estopped from questioning the POAs jurisdiction.
Secs. 11.01 and 11.02 of the RAWOP pertinently provide that Any disputes, differences or dis-
agreements between BENGUET and the OWNER with reference to anything whatsoever pertain-
ing to this Agreementbe referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one
to be selected by BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER and the third to be selected
by the aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed. and No action shall be instituted in court as
to any matter in dispute as hereinabove stated, except to enforce the decision of the majority of the
Arbitrators.
Sec. 2 of RA 876 elucidates the scope of arbitration: Two or more persons or parties may submit
to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy existing between them at the time of
the submission and which may be the subject of an action, or the parties to any contract may in
such contract agree to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them. Such
submission or contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as ex-
ist at law for the revocation of any contract. Clearly, a contractual stipulation that requires prior re-
sort to voluntary arbitration before the parties can go directly to court is not illegal and is in fact
promoted by the State.
Also, in accordance with Secs. 6 and 7 of RA 876, in the event a case that should properly be the
subject of voluntary arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on
motion of the defendant, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such contrac-
tual provision for arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial
agency shall then order the enforcement of said provision. It bears stressing that the lower court
has not lost its jurisdiction over the case. After the special proceeding of arbitration has been pur-
sued and completed, then the lower court may confirm the award made by the arbitrator.
Therefore, POA has indeed no jurisdiction over the dispute which is governed by RA 876, the arbi-
tration law.
However, Benguet is already estopped from questioning the POAs jurisdiction. As it were, when
J.G. Realty filed the DENR Case, Benguet filed its answer and participated in the proceedings be-
fore the POA. Secondly, when the adverse March 19, 2001 POA Decision was rendered, it filed an
appeal with the MAB and again participated in the MAB proceedings. When the adverse March 17,
2004 MAB Resolution was issued, Benguet filed a petition with the Supreme Court pursuant to
Sec. 79 of RA 7942 impliedly recognizing MABs jurisdiction. In this factual milieu, the jurisdiction of
POA and that of MAB can no longer be questioned by Benguet at this late hour. What Benguet
should have done was to immediately challenge the POAs jurisdiction by a special civil action for
certiorari when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute.

G.R. No. 148267 August 8, 2002

ARMANDO C. CARPIO
vs.
SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS
Sulu Resources Development Corporation filed a petition for Mines Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA), covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Armando C. Carpio filed an opposition/adverse
claim thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be cov-
ered by respondents claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and extract the quarry
resources on his properties.
The Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolu-
tion upholding Carpios opposition/adverse claim and ordered the exclusion of properties of CAR-
PIO from the area of Sulus MPSA. The MAB reversed POAs decision. Carpio then went to the CA
through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43, seeking a reversal of the MAB Decision.
The CA ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board
(MAB); that the adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely administrative in nature and
that under Section 79 of RA 7942, "the findings of fact by the MAB as well as its decision or order
shall be final and executory. Hence this petition.

ISSUE
Whether appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines Adjudication Board should be
made directly to the Supreme Court.

RULING
No.
The findings of fact of the MAB, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over decisions or orders of
the panel of arbitrators, are conclusive and binding on the parties; its decisions or orders on these
are final and executory. But petitions for certiorari may be filed with the appropriate courts.
"Section 9 of BP Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), now incorporated in Section
4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, vested the then IAC with original jurisdiction to is-
sue writs of certiorari and prohibition, among other auxillary writs x x x." However, even though the
Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the Regional Trial Courts to issue a writ
of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to
this Court without initially seeking proper relief from the lower courts, in accordance with the hier-
archy of courts.
Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that "[n]o law shall be passed increas-
ing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its ad-
vice and consent." On the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the
MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a "petition for review by certiorari." This provision is obvi-
ously an expansion of the Courts appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not
consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
would unnecessarily burden it.
Thus, in Fabian v. Desierto, Sec 79 of RA 7942 was struck down as unconstitutional and it was
held that appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the CA, under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43.
The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are now re-
quired to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has
been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights
of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence,
it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43.
Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 12925 as amended by RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually
involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve ques-
tions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve them.
Lastly, judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from administra-
tive agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 169080 December 19, 2007

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION
vs.
MACROASIA CORPORATION (formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORA-
TION), BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING CORPORATION
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 172936
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION,
vs.
HON. ANGELO REYES, et al.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176226
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION and MACROASIA CORPORATION
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176319
MACROASIA CORPORATION
vs.
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION and CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION
CORPORATION,

FACTS
On September 24, 1973, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Min-
eral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract (V-1050) for a term
of 25 years up to September 23, 1998 for mining lode claims covering an area of 216 hectares at
Sitio Linao, Ipilan, Brookes Point, Palawan.
Infantas corporate name was changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation on January 26, 1994
and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation, on November 6, 1995.
Sometime in 1997, Celestial, the assignee of 144 mining claims covering areas contiguous to
Macroasias mining lode claims, filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and
other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050,
before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.
Celestial also holds an MPSA with the government which covers 2,835 hectares located at Ipilan/
Maasin, Brookes Point, Palawan and two pending applications covering another 4,040 hectares in
Barangay Mainit also in Brookes Point.
Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to seek cancellation of min-
ing lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and another entity, Lebach Mining Corpo-
ration (Lebach), in mining areas in Brookes Point.
POA found that Macroasia and Lebach not only automatically abandoned their areas/mining claims
but likewise had lost all their rights to the mining claims, thus cancelling Macroasias mining lease
contracts. It gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasias mining areas and gave Blue Ridge
priority right to Lebachs areas/mining claims. MAB affirmed the POA findings that Macroasia
abandoned its mining claims but found that it was Blue Ridge that had prior and preferential rights
over the mining claims of Macroasia, and not Celestial. Both Celestial and Macroasia moved for
reconsideration.
Before the MAB could resolve the motions for reconsideration, on March 16, 2001, Macroasia filed
its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration20 questioning the jurisdiction of the POA in canceling
mining lease contracts and mining claims. Macroasia averred that the power and authority to grant,
cancel, and revoke mineral agreements is exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary. MAB, in its
resolution held that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement
duly entered into by the DENR Secretary; that there was no abandonment by Macroasia; and that
no preferential right over the 7 mining lease contracts is accorded to Blue Ridge or Celestial. Ce-
lestial and Blue Ridge then went through divergent paths in their quest to protect their individual
interests.
The CA 12th Division affirmed the MAB Resolution which declared Macroasias seven mining lease
contracts as subsisting; rejected Blue Ridges claim for preferential right over said mining claims;
and upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral
agreements. Hence, Celestial filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The CA 10th Division reversed and set aside the MAB resolution. It cancelled Macroasias lease
contracts, gave preferential rights to Blue Ridge and held that PAO has jurisdiction over the cancel-
lation of mining lease agreements. Upon inquiry with the DENR, Blue Ridge discovered that some-
time in December 2005 two MPSAs, duly approved and signed by the DENR Secretary, had been
issued in favor of Macroasia. Thus Blue Ridges filing of this Petition for Certiorari. Celestial and
Macroasia filed separate petitions assailing the CA 10th Division decision giving preferential rights
to Blue Ridge. In all, there are four petitions.

ISSUE
I. Whether the DENR Secretary has the exclusive and primary jurisdiction to grant and cancel ex-
isting mining lease contracts; thus, the POA and MAB have no jurisdiction to cancel much less to
grant any preferential rights to other mining firms.
II. Whether a petition for the cancellation of a mining lease contract or privilege is a mining dispute
within the meaning of the law.

RULING
Yes, the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease con-
tracts or mineral agreements.
Only the petition of Macroasia is meritorious.
It is a well-established principle that in the interpretation of an ambiguous provision of law, the his-
tory of the enactment of the law may be used as an extrinsic aid to determine the import of the le-
gal provision or the law.
PD 463, The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974, provides that applications for lease
of mining claims were required to be filed with the Director of the Bureau of Mines, and if no ad-
verse claim was filed within (15) days after the first date of publication, the Secretary would then
approve and issue the corresponding mining lease contract. EO 279, issued on July 25, 1987 au-
thorized the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enter into, for and in behalf of the Government, joint
venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources. The contract or agreement was subject to the approval of the Pres-
ident. RA 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995, repealed the provisions of PD 463 inconsistent
with RA 7942. It provides that applications for mineral agreements are now required to be filed with
the Regional Director and that the proper filing gave the proponent the prior right to be approved
by the Secretary and thereafter to be submitted to the President. However, the foregoing enact-
ments are silent on the authority to cancel mineral agreements. Also, RA 7942 now provides for the
creation of quasi-judicial bodies (POA and MAB) that would have jurisdiction over conflicts arising
from the applications and mineral agreements.
The Panel of Arbitrators(POA) shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on
the following:
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;
(c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and
(d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.
The Mines Adjudication Board, on the other hand shall have appellate jurisdiction over POA deci-
sions. And the decision of the MAB can first be appealed, via a petition for review, to the CA be-
fore elevating the case to this Court.
Deduced from the foregoing, historically, the DENR Secretary has the express power to approve
mineral agreements or contracts and the implied power to cancel said agreements.
Moreover, this implied power of the DENR Secretary to cancel agreements could be based on the
following reasons:
1. Under under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, It is the
DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and regulates the use and development
of all mineral resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all
lands of public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands.
Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative
Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to
cancel said agreements.
2. To enforce PD 463, the CMAO containing the rules and regulations implementing PD 463 was
issued. It provides in Sec. 44 that: Before any mining lease contract is cancelled for any cause,
the mining lessee shall first be notified in writing of such cause or causes, and shall be given an
opportunity to be heard, and to show cause why the lease shall not be cancelled.
If, upon investigation, the Secretary shall find the lessee to be in default, the former may warn the
lessee, suspend his operations or cancel the lease contract
Since the aforequoted Sec. 44 of the CMAO implementing PD 463 was not repealed by RA 7942
and DENR AO 96-40, not being contrary to any of the provisions in them, then it follows that Sec.
44 serves as basis for the DENR Secretarys authority to cancel mineral agreements.
3. Under Sec. 9 of RA 7942, the MGB was given the power of direct supervision of mineral lands
and resources, and that the Director shall recommend to the DENR Secretary the granting of min-
eral agreements to duly qualified persons and shall monitor the compliance by the contractor of the
terms and conditions of the mineral agreements. Corollary to the power of the MGB Director to
recommend approval of mineral agreements is his power to cancel or recommend cancellation of
mining rights covered by said agreements under Sec. 7 of DENR AO 96-40, containing the revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7942. As the MGB is under the supervision of the
DENR Secretary, then the logical conclusion is that it is the DENR Secretary who can cancel the
mineral agreements and not the POA nor the MAB.
4. It is clear from said lease contracts that the parties are the Republic of the Philippines repre-
sented by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now DENR Secretary) as lessor,
and Infanta (Macroasia) as lessee. Paragraph 18 of said lease contracts provides:
Whenever the LESSEE fails to comply with any provision of [PD 463, and] Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 137, 466 and 470, [both as amended,] and/or the rules and regulations promulgated thereun-
der, or any of the covenants therein, the LESSOR may declare this lease cancelled..
5. Sec. 77 of RA 7942 lays down the jurisdiction of POA, supra. The phrase "disputes involving
rights to mining areas" refers to any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an application for min-
eral agreement. The POA therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse claim, protest, or
opposition to a pending application for a mineral agreement filed with the concerned Regional Of-
fice of the MGB. It is clear from the provision that the the power of the POA to resolve any adverse
claim, opposition, or protest relative to mining rights under Sec. 77(a) of RA 7942 is confined only
to adverse claims, conflicts and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights.
POAs jurisdiction is confined only to resolutions of such adverse claims, conflicts and oppositions
and it has no authority to approve or reject said applications. Such power is vested in the DENR
Secretary upon recommendation of the MGB Director. Clearly, POAs jurisdiction over "disputes
involving rights to mining areas" has nothing to do with the cancellation of existing mineral agree-
ments.

Therefore, DENR Secretary, by virtue of his powers as administrative head of his department in
charge of the management and supervision of the natural resources of the country under the 1987
Administrative Code, RA 7942, and other laws, rules, and regulations, can cancel a mineral
agreement for violation of its terms, even without a petition or request filed for its cancellation, pro-
vided there is compliance with due process. Since the cancellation of the mineral agreement is ap-
proved by the DENR Secretary, then the recourse of the contractor is to elevate the matter to the
OP pursuant to AO 18, Series of 1987 but not with the POA.

II. No,
A dispute is defined as "a conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a
right, claim or demand on one side; met by contrary claims or allegations on the other."51 It is syn-
onymous to a cause of action which is "an act or omission by which a party violates a right of an-
other."
A petition for the cancellation of an existing mineral agreement covering an area applied for by an
applicant based on the alleged violation of any of the terms thereof, is not a "dispute" involving a
mineral agreement under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942. It does not pertain to a violation by a party of the
right of another. The applicant is not a real party-in-interest as he does not have a material or sub-
stantial interest in the mineral agreement but only a prospective or expectant right or interest in the
mining area. He has no legal right to such mining claim and hence no dispute can arise between
the applicant and the parties to the mineral agreement.

The chronology of events reveals the following:

1. January 10, 2005 petitioner Celestial filed its petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 with
the CA.
2. April 15, 2005 the CA through its Twelfth Division rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
87931 affirming the November 26, 2004 MAB Resolution.
3. July 12, 2005 respondent Blue Ridge filed its petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 with
the CA. It is clear that the Blue Ridge petition was filed with the CA three months after the decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 was promulgated.
4. May 18, 2006 the CA through its Special Tenth Division rendered its Decision setting aside the
November 26, 2004 and July 12, 2005 Resolutions of the MAB and reinstating the October 24,
2000 MAB Decision.
From these facts, the CA Special Tenth Division should have ordered the consolidation of the peti-
tion in CA-G.R. SP No. 90828 by CA-G.R. SP No. 87931 pursuant to the Internal Rules of the CA,
the latter having the earlier docket number. Had it done so, then the occurrence of the conflicting
decisions could have been prevented. The CA Special Tenth Division should have abided by our
ruling in Nacuray v. NLRC, where we held, "Consequently, a division cannot and should not review
a case already passed upon by another Division of this Court.
G.R. No. 162331 November 20, 2006
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO.
vs.
WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD., WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES,
INC.

FACTS
On 22 March 1995, the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio FTAA for the purpose of large
scale exploration, development, and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in an
initial contract area of 99,387 hectares located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department
Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under various Mineral Production
Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and
Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called the Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the Tam-
pakan Option Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the Tampakan Companies on 25
April 1991, for purposes of exploration of the mining claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato. The Op-
tion Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the Tam-
pakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights and interests in the
mining claims covering the area subject of the agreement.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the Columbio FTAA, and
on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with petitioner Lepanto over its entire
shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of the Tampakan Companies right of
first refusal to purchase the subject shares.
On 28 August 2000, Lepanto sought the approval of the Sale and Purchase Agreement from the
DENR Secretary, particularly Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB). However, the Tampakan
Companies sought to exercise its right of first refusal. Lepanto then assailed the Tampakan Com-
panies exercise of its right of first refusal, and filed a case for Injunction, Specific Performance,
Annulment of Contracts and Contractual Interference with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
against WMC Resources, WMC Resources, WMC Philippines, and the Tampakan Companies
(WMC, et al.). The case reached the Supreme Court and was dismissed with finality on the ground
of forum shopping, because Lepanto lodged the complain before the RTC pending action by the
Secretary of the DENR through the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) on its approval of the
Sale and Purchase Agreement.
On 10 January 2001, contending that the Sale and Purchase Agreement between Lepanto and
WMC Philippines had expired due to failure to meet the necessary preconditions for its validity,
WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed another Sale and Purchase Agreement,
where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate vehicle which would acquire
the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA activities. Subsequently, WMC Resources
and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Shares of Stocks. The DENR
Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines,
Inc.
Lepanto then filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office of the
President. The Office of the President dismissed the petition ruling that FTAA may be transferred
provided that the Secretary consents to the same. The CA dismissed the appeal of Lepanto.
Hence, the instant Petition.

ISSUE
Whether Sec 40 of RA No. 7942 Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the Presi-
dent of the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements apply to the
Columbio FTAA. (retroactive application of RA No. 7942)

RULING
No.
Section 40 of RA 7942 provides that: A financial or technical assistance agreement may be as-
signed or transferred, in whole or in part, to a qualified person subject to the prior approval of the
President: Provided, that the President shall notify Congress of every financial or technical as-
sistance agreement assigned or converted in accordance with this provision within thirty (30) days
from the date of approval."
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that: "Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein
otherwise provided. Further, Section 10, Article III of the Philippine Constitution enjoins Congress
from passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts.
The Columbio FTAA was entered into by the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines on 22
March 1995, undoubtedly before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 took effect on 14 April 1995. It
should also be taken in to consideration that the FTAA was granted in accordance with Executive
Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991, which does not con-
tain any similar condition on the transfer or assignment of financial or technical assistance agree-
ments.
In order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provision to this ef-
fect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law.
In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication in the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively,
therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply only prospectively.
Even assuming arguendo that RA 7942 be made to apply to the Columbio FTAA, the lack of presi-
dential approval will not be fatal as to render the transfer illegal, especially in the instant case be-
cause the alleged lack of presidential approval has been remedied when Lepanto appealed the
matter to the Office of the President which approved the Order of the DENR Secretary granting the
application for transfer of the Columbio FTAA to Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
Further, it has been held in La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos that when the trans-
feree of an FTAA is another foreign corporation, there is a logical application of the requirement of
prior approval by the President of the Republic and notification to Congress in the event of as-
signment or transfer of an FTAA On the other hand, when the transferee of the FTAA happens to
be a Filipino corporation, the need for such safeguard is not critical; hence, the lack of prior ap-
proval and notification may not be deemed fatal as to render the transfer invalid.
Also, if Lepanto was indeed of the mind that Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is ap-
plicable to the Columbio FTAA, thus necessitating the approval of the President for the validity of
its transfer or assignment, it would seem contradictory that petitioner sought the approval of the
DENR Secretary, and not that of the President, of its 12 July 2000 Sale and Purchase Agreement
with WMC Resources.
On last note, the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the obligation of contract does not
prohibit every change in existing laws, and to fall within the prohibition, the change must not only
impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Substantial
impairment exists if a law changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time
or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or autho-
rizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms.
Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the President with respect
to assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would
be tantamount to an impairment of the obligations under said contract as it would effectively restrict
the right of the parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA.

G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS
Petitioners Loney, et al. are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resi-
dent Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"),
a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the
base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out
of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tail-
ings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,
Marinduque with violation of Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of P.D. No. 1067 or the Water
Code of the Philippines, Section 86 of P.D. No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of
1976, Section 1088 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and Article 36510 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. Loney, et
al. moved to quash the informations.
The MTC issued a Consolidated Order granting the Motion to Quash the Informations for violation
of PD 1067 and PD 984 but maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of
the RPC. It held that the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of the three (3) spe-
cial laws. Loney, et al. were then arraigned. Susequently, thy filed a petition for certiorari with the
RTC assailing the portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of
RA 7942 while the respondent appealed with the same court the quashal of the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The RTC ruled in favour of the respondent and ordered the rein-
statement of the Informations holding that "A single act may offend against two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under
one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x. The CA affirmed RTCs decision.
Contention of Loney, et al.: They should be charged with one offense only Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all the charges filed against them "proceed from
and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping
of mine tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other
charges since the element of "lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness
and imprudence" is common among them.

ISSUE
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should
stand.

RULING
No, there is no duplicity of charges in the present case.
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one of-
fense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states: Duplicity
of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. It is a ground to quash the
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in
preparing his defense.
In the present case, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Informa-
tion charging only one offense.
It has been ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one of-
fense.The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."
A comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC shows that in
each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required
of the others.
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of
mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from
the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper permit to
dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD
984, RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the RPC. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code
even in the absence of actual pollution, or even if it has complied with the terms of its Environmen-
tal Compliance Certificate, or further, even if it did take the necessary precautions to prevent dam-
age to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual
pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be
exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful viola-
tion and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Envi-
ronmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the containment
of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or
neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved that Marcopper had done everything to ensure
containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that
they cannot be prosecuted under PD 1076, RA 7942 and the RPC because violation of the Envi-
ronmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Pe-
nal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and impru-
dence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required un-
der the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit,
or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the
terms of the ECC. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mala prohibita in contrast
with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.
A mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot ab-
sorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes
the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are
the special laws enacting them.

G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006

PICOP RESOURCES, INC.
vs.
BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION, and THE MINES ADJUDICATION
BOARD

FACTS
In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI) entered into a
Mines Operating Agreement (Agreement) with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation
(Banahaw Mining) whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, develop-
ment, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCI's 18 mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.
Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bu-
reau of Mines. A Mines Temporary Permit was issued in favour of Banahaw Mining authorizing it to
extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the
temporary permit was subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June
28, 1991.
A portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in PICOPs, a TLA holder, logging con-
cession in Agusan del Sur. Banahaw Mining and PICOP then entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each other's right to the area concerned, PICOP al-
lowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims.
In 1991, Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Shar-
ing Agreements (MPSA). While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, decided to sell/assign
its rights and interests over 37 mining claims in favor of Base Metals Mineral Resources Corpora-
tion (Base Metals). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as
claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. CMMCI,
approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of Base Metals, thereby recognizing
private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims.
Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to
substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application. On
November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the MGB an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to
private respondent Base Metals' application. The Panel of Arbitrators denied approval of the MPSA
applications of Base Metals on the ground that PICOP did not consent to the assignment of mining
claims to Base Metals as embodied in the MOA between PICOP and Banahaw. Base Metals ap-
pealed to MAB which reversed the POAs decision and reinstated the MPSAs. The CA upheld
MABs decision and ruled that the Presidential Warranty issued by Pres Marcos merely confirmed
the TLA granted to PICOP and did not grant the latter the exclusive possession, occupation and
exploration of the concession areas covered.
Contention of PICOP: its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are within the
Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen.
Dwight Davis, hence it is closed to mining; that to allow mining over a forest or forest reserve
would allegedly be tantamount to changing the classification of the land from forest to mineral land.

ISSUE
I. Whether mining is prohibited in forest reserves; Whether mining applications within forest lands
require the prior consent of a TLA(forest right) holder.

RULING
No
Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942 on Areas Closed to Mining Applications does not disallow mining applica-
tions in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as watershed forest reserves: (f) Old growth
or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness areas. Moreover, Sec. 18 al-
lows mining even in timberland or forest land subject to existing rights and reservations. Sec. 47 of
PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include the public forest, the permanent
forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations provided that in case the area is within forest con-
cessions, notice has to be served upon licensees and a prior approval of the Director. It does not
require that the consent of existing licensees be obtained but that they be notified before mining
activities may be commenced inside forest concessions.
Also, DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98 provides that timber or forest lands, military and other
government reservations, forest reservations, forest reserves other than critical watershed forest
reserves, and existing DENR Project Areas within timber or forest lands, reservations and re-
serves, among others, are open to mining applications subject to area status and clearance. In the
instant case, area status clearances or land status certifications have been issued to Base Metals
relative to its mining right application.
Sec 19 of RA 7942 also prohibits mining in wilderness areas. Sec. 5(a) of RA 7586, NIPAS Act
provides that all areas or islands in the Philippines proclaimed, designated or set aside, pursuant
to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as national park, game
refuge, bird and wildlife sanctuary, wilderness area, strict nature reserve, watershed, mangrove
reserve, fish sanctuary, natural and historical landmark, protected and managed landscape/
seascape as well as identified virgin forests before the effectivity of this Act shall be a part of pro-
tected areas.
However, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a protected
wilderness area pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive or-
der as required by RA 7586.
G.R. No. 139548 December 22, 2000
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION
vs.
ALBERTO G. BUMOLO in his own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Benito Cachili, Conchita
Bumolo, Patricio Dumlao, Jacinto Aliguyon, Alfonso Maddawat, Toledo Gillao, Jose Tigo
and Peter Cabiggat Bumolo, DALTON PACIFIC RESOURCES, INC., OROPHILIPPINES VEN-
TURES INC., and the MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD (MAB)

FACTS
Marcopper registered its mining claims in Pao, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from 2 Feb-
ruary 1982 to 12 October 1982. Bumolo, et al. registered their mining claims in the same area from
28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which claims were subsequently converted into Mineral Pro-
duction Sharing Agreements (MPSA).
On 12 March 1982 Marcopper entered into Option Agreements over the mining claims with re-
spondent Bumolo, et al. and with one Rosario Camma on the other, for herself and as attorney-in-
fact of the rest. Under the Agreements, Marcopper was granted the exclusive and irrevocable right
to explore the mining claims for three (3) years with provision for extension. It then filed Prospect-
ing Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on the alleged
ground that a portion of the area covered by the mining claims was within the Magat River Forest
Reservation under Proc. 573 of 26 June 19691 and with the DAR on account of alleged coverage
of the other portion within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11
September 1975.2
Marcopper informed Bumolo and Camma that it was terminating the Agreements since its conduct
of a systematic exploration program disclosed that the area was relatively weak and of limited ton-
nage which did not justify further drilling for big tonnage of low grade gold exploration target.
On 15 July 1991 DENR Regional Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected Marcoppers PPA
on the ground that the Memorandum of 8 July 1991 endorsed by the Regional Technical Director
for Mines revealed that the area covered was outside government reservation; that the prospect
claim was in conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been extensively explored in the
early 1980s. It appealed to MAB which affirmed the rejection of the PPA and the MPSA of Bumolo,
et. al, subject to compliance with R.A. 79426 and DAO No. 96-40, was given due course.
As regards the PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued a clearance to prospect for
six (6) months from 11 December 1995.
On 29 March 1999 Dalton Pacific Resources (Dalton) and Orophilippines Ventures, Inc. (OVI) filed
an Omnibus Motion for their joinder as parties on the ground that on 17 July 1992 they had entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement with Bumolo on his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of Cam-
ma, et al. granting the companies exclusive and irrevocable right to explore and operate the area
subject of the mining claims. Their motion was granted.
Contention of Marcopper: contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the Magat
River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical error committed by some-
body in the Engineering Section of the DENR by typing the latitude as "17" instead of "16" degrees;
if corrected, the river basin would cover exactly the basin on the ground making the area subject of
the PPA within the Magat River Forest Reservation.

ISSUE
Whether the area is subject of a PPA.

RULING
No.
The issue deals with a factual matter. In this regard, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
which have acquired expertise in matters entrusted to their jurisdictions are accorded by this Court
not only respect but finality if supported by substantial evidence. In this instance, there is no rea-
son to disagree with MAB.
Notwithstanding the result of the systematic exploration program showing the area to be relatively
weak and Marcoppers termination of the Option Agreements with Bumolo and Camma, it still
showed interest when it filed a PPA over the area. This action was absurd.
The said rejection of the PPA is based on the Memorandum Report of the RTD for Mines which
cited that the area lies outside Magat Forest Reserve; that such being the case, a PPA is not the
proper instrument to avail in order to have the right to prospect over the area; and that filing of De-
clarations of Location (DOL) is the proper way.
Further, records would show that as early as May 31, 1989, the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims
which Marcopper has eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of claims was con-
firmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the region to be outside proclaimed watershed areas,
wilderness, national parks and existing government reforestation projects.
Then again for Marcopper to include the Bumolo group of claims in its PPA and thereby subject the
same to another round of prospecting is but ridiculous considering that the same company have in
the past conducted detailed investigation activities over the same areas and have accordingly de-
clared said claims to be relatively weak and indicate a quite limited tonnage potential to justify fur-
ther drilling for possible big tonnage low grade gold exploration target.
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat
River Forest Reservation has been adequately established by the following evidence: (a) confirma-
tion as early as 31 May 1989 by the Forest Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8
July 1991 Memorandum Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provid-
ed by the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement
of the maps to the office of the Regional Executive Director.
The allegation of "typographical error committed by somebody in the Engineering Section of the
DENR has no support.
Furthermore, MAB even fortified the bases for the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the
Lands Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the sketch plan of 11 November 1996
and as shown in the Land Use map of the CENRO of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered
under the PPA is indeed outside any government reservation.
Therefore, the filing of a PPA has no leg to stand on.

G.R. No. 135190April 3, 2002

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE HONOR-
ABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO
(PMRB-Davao)

FACTS
The case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Re-
serve known as the "Diwalwal Gold Rush Area." Located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of
Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit
No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal
area. Marcopper's acquisition of mining rights over Diwalwal under its EP No. 133 was subse-
quently challenged before this Court in "Apex Mining Co., Inc., et al. v. Hon. Cancio C. Garcia, et
al.," where Marcopper's claim was sustained over that of another mining firm, Apex Mining Corpo-
ration (Apex).
A petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing
Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Di-
rector, docketed as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94 entitled, "Rosendo Villaflor, et al. v. Marcopper
Mining Corporation. On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper
assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which
in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit. The MGB approved
and registered the MPSA application of SEM. This prompted oppositions from several mining cor-
porations and small scale miners. The Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) consolidated the RED
Mines Case with the other oppositions. These consolidated cases have reached the CA and are
still pending.
On April 1, 1997, Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed Resolution No. 26, Series
of 1997, authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners operating
in the Diwalwal mines. Thus, on May 30, 1997, SEM filed a complaint for damages before the RTC
of Makati City against the DENR Secretary and PMRB-Davao alleging that the illegal issuance of
the OTPs allowed the extraction and hauling of P60,000.00 worth of gold ore per truckload from
SEM's mining claim.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-0310 which provided,
among others, that The DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state
utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area, weighting the feasibility of en-
tering into management agreements or operating agreements. This prompted SEM to file a special
civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the CA against PMRB-Davao, DENR
Secretary and Balite which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for the nullification of the
Memorandum Order holding that the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would effectively
impair its vested rights under EP No. 133.
The CA upheld the validity of the Memorandum Order, holding that it did not conclusively adopt
direct state utilisation as official government policy and that SEMs rights under EP 133 are not
inviolable, being in the nature of a privilege granted by the State, the permit can be revoked,
amended or modified by the President when the national interest so requires. The CA declined to
rule on the validity of the OTPs.

ISSUE
I. Whether the direct state utilization espoused in the Memorandum Order would impair SEMs
vested rights under EP 133.

RULING
No.
The Memorandum Order did not conclusively adopt the direct state utilisation as a policy in re-
solving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was direct-
ed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else.
The vested rights claimed by SEM is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being
disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. It must likewise be pointed out that under no circum-
stances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly
held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege
granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so
requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country's
natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits,
mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the
purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the
State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accor-
dance with the demands of the general welfare.
Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which
the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place.
Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically provides: The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. Also, under Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
states: The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements
with contractors. From the foregoing, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control
and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral re-
sources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified enti-
ties.

G.R. No. L-49109 December 1, 1987

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC.
vs.
HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINES
JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ

FACTS
Santa Rosa alleges that it is the holder of 50 valid mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, acquired under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July 1902
(Philippine Bill of 1902).
On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting and
valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a
mining lease application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly
filed a mining lease application, but "under protest," on 13 October 1978, with a reservation anno-
tated on the back of its application that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until the va-
lidity of Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court.
On 10 October 1978, or three days before filing the disputed mining lease application, Santa Rosa
filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing Presidential Decree No. 1214 as
unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law; that it
already had a vested right over its mining claims even before Presidential Decree No. 1214.
Respondents allege that Santa Rosa has no standing to file the instant petition as it failed to fully
exhaust administrative remedies. They cite the pendency of petitioner's appeal, with the Office of
the President, of the ruling of the respondent Secretary of Natural Resources in DNR Case No.
4140, which upheld the decision of the Director of Mines finding that 44 out of Santa Rosas 50
mining claims were void for lack of valid "tie points" as required under the Philippine Bill of 1902,
and that all the mining claims had already been abandoned and cancelled, for it's non-compliance
with the legal requirements of the same Phil. Bill of 1902 and Executive Order No. 141.

ISSUE
I. Whether Santa Rosa had a vested right over its mining claim and thus could be impaired by the
implementation of PD 1214.
II. Whether PD 1214 is unconstitutional.

RULING
I. None.
True enough, the rulings in McDaniel v. Apacible and Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez recog-
nize the right of a locator of a mining claim as a property right. This right, however, is not absolute.
It is merely a possessory right, more so, in this case, where petitioner's claims are still unpatented.
They can be lost through abandonment or forfeiture or they may be revoked for valid legal
grounds.
II. No
PD 1214 is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public
domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of
which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that the
Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims
over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. Mere location does not mean absolute own-
ership over the affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or area
from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriat-
ing for themselves the minerals found therein.
Further, it is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV and Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution providing
that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong
to the State. and The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be un-
der the full control and supervision of the State, respectively.

G.R. No. L-69997 September 30, 1987

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC.
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS,
et al.

FACTS
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted mining patents on mineral claims locat-
ed at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu Albay, including four belonging to Ungay, two to one John
Canson, Jr., and two to Carlos Stilianopulos. Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and
Carlos Stilianopulos assigned their rights to their mining claims in favor of Ungay. The assignment
of rights and the mining patents were all recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay.
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the respective original certificates of titles
pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and
the petitioner.
From 1968 to 1974, six free patents belonging to Bolanos, et al. covering portions of the lots cov-
ered by the patents belonging to Ungay were granted by the Director of Lands and the correspond-
ing original certificates of titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Albay. Ungay
filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents against Bolanos, et al.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Ungay lacks personality to institute the
annulment proceeding, since the disputed properties form part of disposable land of the public do-
main and the action for reversion should be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. The IAC affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE
Whether the lands in question belong to the public domain

RULING
Yes
Article XIII, Section I of the 1935 Constitution provides: All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,..Natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated
Thus, the issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in
1962 in favor of Ungay granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals which may be
found on or under the surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the free patents by
the Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of Bolanos, et al. granted to them the ownership and the right
to use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to extract or
utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
There is no basis in the records that Ungay acquired the right to the mineral lands prior to the ef-
fectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus, the acquisition is within the purview of the 1935 Constitution
and that the titles issued in its favor must be construed as conveying only the right to extract and
utilize the minerals thereon. Although the original certificates of titles of Ungos were issued prior to
the titles of the Bolanos, et al., the former cannot prevail over the latter for the provisions of the
Constitution which governed at the time of their issuance prohibited the alienation of mineral lands
of the public domain.
Moreover, patents and land grants are construed favorably in favor of the Government, and most
strongly against the grantee. Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention of
the Government, is to be resolved in its favor.
One last note, the mineral lands over which it has a right to extract minerals remained part of the
inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in
his stead can bring an action for reversion.

G.R. No. 179674 July 28, 2009

PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION
vs.
MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES, MINES AND GEO-SCIENCES BUREAU DIRECTOR HORACIO C. RAMOS, RE-
GIONAL DIRECTOR SAMUEL T. PARAGAS, REGIONAL PANEL OF ARBITRATORS ATTY.
CLARO E. RAMOLETE, JR., ATTY. JOSEPH ESTRELLA and ENGR. RENATO RIMANDO, and
MONTAGUE RESOURCES PHILIPPINES CORPORATION

FACTS
On 31 March 2000, Pyros Application for MPSA with the MGB of the DENR, Regional Office No. 1,
San Fernando City in La Union, for the exploration, development and commercial utilization of cer-
tain pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was
approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.
On 12 September 2003, Montague filed an Application for Exploration Permit with MGB covering
the same properties covered by and during the subsistence of MPSA No. 153-2000-18 of Pyro. It
was granted and EP No. 05-001 was issued to Montague. Pyro then filed a Verified Protest/Oppo-
sition to the Application for Exploration Permit of Montague. Prior, however, to the filing of its Veri-
fied Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration Permit, Pyros MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was
cancelled per DENR Memorandum Order (DMO) No. 2005-0310 issued by the DENR Secretary
Michael Defensor on 1 February 2005. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of DMO No. 2005-
03, which the DENR Secretary denied.
The POA dismissed the Verified Protest/Opposition of Pyro holding that the POA had no authority/
jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 of Montague, the same being lodged with
the MGB, the issuing authority . The MAB dismissed the appeal. The CA also dismissed the peti-
tion.

ISSUE
Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 is-
sued by MGB to Montague.

RULING
None
Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators: the
panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:
a. Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
b. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;
c. Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and
d. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.
The phrase "disputes involving rights to mining areas" refers to any adverse claim, protest, or op-
position to an application for a mineral agreement.
As enunciated in Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation, The
power of the POA to resolve any adverse claim, opposition, or protest relative to mining rights un-
der Section 77 (a) of RA 7942 is confined only to adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating
to applications for the grant of mineral rights. x x x. Clearly, POAs jurisdiction over "disputes involv-
ing rights to mining areas" has nothing to do with the cancellation of existing mineral agreements.
Parenthetically, the "permit" referred to in Section 77(b) of the Mining Act pertains to exploration
permit, quarry permit, and other mining permits recognized in Chapters IV, VIII, and IX of the Min-
ing Act. An operating agreement, not being among those listed, cannot be considered as a "mineral
permit" under Section 77 (b).
Section 28 of DAO NO. 96-40 explicitly provides: The Director/concerned Regional Director may
cancel the Exploration Permit for failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the requirements
and for violation(s) of the terms and conditions under which the Permit is issued. According to
Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, "Director" means the Director of the MGB Central Office, while "Re-
gional Director" means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional Office.
As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily
includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same.

G.R. No. 164527 August 15, 2007

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS, INC., R-II HOLDINGS, INC., HARBOUR
CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC., and MR. REGHIS ROMERO II

FACTS
On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order No.1612 ap-
proving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Mani-
la Waste Management Plan (the Plan). NHA was ordered to "conduct feasibility studies and devel-
op low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost
housing projects."
At the time MO 161-A was issued by President Aquino, Smokey Mountain was a wasteland in Ba-
lut, Tondo, Manila, where numerous Filipinos resided in subhuman conditions, collecting items that
may have some monetary value from the garbage.
Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies of the Smokey Mountain low-cost
housing project which resulted in the formulation of the "Smokey Mountain Development Plan and
Reclamation of the Area Across R-10" or the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation
Project (SMDRP; the Project). The Project aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a
habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R-10, adjacent to the
Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the project.
On July 9, 1990, the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law (Republic Act No. [RA] 6957) was en-
acted. It authorized and empowered "[a]ll government infrastructure agencies, including govern-
ment-owned and controlled corporations and local government units x x x to enter into contract
with any duly pre-qualified private contractor for the financing, construction, operation and mainte-
nance of any financially viable infrastructure facilities through the build-operate-transfer or build
and transfer scheme."
On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 4159 approving and directing the imple-
mentation of the SMDRP. R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding for the right to become NHAs
joint venture partner in the implementation of the SMDRP. Subsequently, President Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 3915 on September 9, 1992 declaring reclamation of the area across R-10
placed under the administration and disposition of the National Housing Authority to develop, sub-
divide and dispose to qualified beneficiaries, as well as its development for mix land use (commer-
cial/industrial) to provide employment opportunities to on-site families and additional areas for port-
related activities. On March 19, 1993, the NHA and RBI entered into a Joint Venture Agreement17
(JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and the reclamation of the area
across R-10. The JVA covered a lot in Tondo, Manila with an area of 212,234 square meters and
another lot to be reclaimed also in Tondo with an area of 400,000 square meters (40ha).
President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 dated August 31, 199431 increasing the proposed
area for reclamation across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares.
The project also involves the construction and operation of an incinerator plant that will conform to
the emission standards of the DENR. On June 23, 1994, the Legislature passed the Clean Air Act.
35 The Act made the establishment of an incinerator illegal and effectively barred the implementa-
tion of the planned incinerator project.
As of February 28, 2001, "the estimated total project cost of the SMDRP has reached P8.65 billion
comprising of P4.78 billion in direct cost and P3.87 billion in indirect cost
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, filed the instant petition which
impleaded as respondents the NHA, RBI, R-II Holdings, Inc. (RHI), HCPTI, and Mr. Reghis
Romero II, raising constitutional issues.
The instant petition challenges the constitutionality and legality of the SMDRP involving several
hectares of government land and hundreds of millions of funds of several government agencies.
Among others, it sought to compel respondents to disclose all documents and information relating
to the projectincluding, but not limited to, any subsequent agreements with respect to the differ-
ent phases of the project, the revisions over the original plan, the additional works incurred there-
on, the current financial condition of respondent R-II Builders, Inc., and the transactions made re-
specting the project. Respondents argue that petitioner Chavez has no legal standing to file the
petition.

ISSUE
Whether Chavez has the requisite locus standi to file this case.

RULING
Yes.
The rule on locus standi states that only a person who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or entitled to the avails of the suit can file a complaint or petition.
However, in cases where issues of transcendental public importance are presented, there is no
necessity to show that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and per-
sonal injury as the requisite injury is assumed. The issues raised in this petition are averred to be
in breach of the fair diffusion of the countrys natural resources and the constitutional right of a citi-
zen to information which have been declared to be matters of transcendental public importance.
Moreover, the pleadings especially those of respondents readily reveal that public funds have been
indirectly utilized in the Project by means of Smokey Mountain Project Participation Certificates
(SMPPCs) bought by some government agencies.
Hence, petitioner, as a taxpayer, is a proper party to the instant petition before the court.
Moreover, the direct recourse of Chavez to the Supreme court is a justified deviation from the es-
tablished precept embodied in the hierarchy of courts because serious constitutional challenges
are made on the different aspects of the Project which affect the right of Filipinos to the distribution
of natural resources in the country and the right to information of a citizenmatters which have
been considered to be of extraordinary significance and grave consequence to the public in gener-
al.

G.R. No. 163663 June 30, 2006

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
vs.
JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA

FACTS
In 1994, Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202 was issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos
creating an Executive Committee to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste
disposal sites in San Mateo, Rizal and Carmona, Cavite under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
scheme.
Jancom International Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia (Jancom International) was
one of the bidders for the San Mateo Waste Disposal Site. It subsequently entered into a partner-
ship with Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name JANCOM Environmental Corporation (JANCOM)
On December 19, 1997, a Contract for the BOT Implementation of the Solid Waste Management
Project for the San Mateo, Rizal Waste Disposal Site4 (the contract) was entered into by the Re-
public of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management
through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Cabinet Office for Regional Development-NCR Chairman
Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta on one hand, and JANCOM represent-
ed by its CEO Jorge Mora Aisa and its Chairman Jay Alparslan, on the other.
Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the
San Mateo landfill. The Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee
(GMMSWMC) thereupon adopted a Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as
reasons therefor the passage of Republic Act 8749 (Clean Air Act of 1999), the non-availability of
the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees.
On March 14, 2000, Jancom Intl and JANCOM filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasig
City to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of the MMDA calling for bids for and au-
thorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management as illegal, unconsti-
tutional and void and to enjoin GMMSWMC and MMDA from implementing the Resolution and
making another award in lieu thereof. RTC granted the petition. CA affirmed. SC, in its 30 Jan 2002
decision, affirmed, declaring the contract valid and perfected, albeit ineffective and unimple-
mentable pending approval by the President.
Jancom Intl and JANCOM filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion dated July 29, 2002 praying,
among others, that: an alias writ of execution be issued prohibiting and enjoining petitioners and
their representatives from calling for, accepting, evaluating, approving, awarding, negotiating or
implementing all bids, awards and contracts involving other Metro Manila waste management
projects intended to be pursued or which are already being pursued. The RTC granted the Om-
nibus Motion in part, declaring null all such bids or contracts entered into by respondent MMDA
with third parties covering the waste disposal and management within the Metro Manila after Au-
gust 14, 2000. It also issued an Alias Writ of Execution declaring the GMMSWMC Resolution void.
The CA affirmed.

ISSUE
Whether the contract, unsigned by the President, be executed.

RULING
No.
Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on Execution upon judgments or final orders provides that
Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of
the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfectedOnce a judgment becomes final, it is basic that the prevailing party is entitled
as a matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which is the trial courts ministerial duty,
compellable by mandamus.
However, a writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, substantially
to every essential particular thereof. It may not thus vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to en-
force,50 nor go beyond its terms. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which
gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity.
The Supreme Courts 30 Jan 2002 decision states that although the contract is a perfected one,
it is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President.
Moreover, Article 19 of the contract itself provides: This Contract shall become effective upon ap-
proval by the President of the Republic of the Philippines..
In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect ordered the enforcement of the contract
despite this Courts unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected, the contract shall
become effective only upon approval by the President.
Indubitably, the alias writ of execution varied the tenor of this Courts judgment, went against es-
sential portions and exceeded the terms thereof.

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L.
HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

FACTS
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996, the EMB
of the NCR, a study of the Asian Development Bank, the Manila Observatory and the DENR on the
high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered ve-
hicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants,
Henares, et al. attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollu-
tion and related environmental hazards.
They allege that allege the particulate matters (PM) complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and
liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combus-
tions have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality
of life. They particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when
these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen
(NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other
compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation
and leaf bleaching in plants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO),
when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the
necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be
lethal to people with weak hearts.
They then filed a petition to the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respon-
dents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use com-
pressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
They refer to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 2002, stating that in four of the coun-
try's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer PM which
can penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430
million. The study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused the following:
Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140 million.
Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about US$120 million.
Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila (averaging twice a year in
Davao and Cebu, and five to six times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million.
This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, when compared with the findings of a similar study
done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.
To counter the detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, they propose the use of CNG. Accord-
ing to Henares, et al., CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although contain-
ing small amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless and odorless and considered the clean-
est fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to
90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent
and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sul-
fur dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more
methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming.
Asserting their right to clean air, Henares, et al., contend that the bases for their petition for a writ
of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 414 of Republic
Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
The Solicitor General, for respondents explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct reme-
dy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an
act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Further, the Sol Gen also observed that Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence of
CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative
fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel; that it is the
DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC; that it is
the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 2616 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set
the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for im-
proved efficiency and reduced emissions.

ISSUE
I. Whether Henares, et al. have personality to bring the petition.
II. Whether mandamus should issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alterna-
tive fuel.
RULING
I. Yes
There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before the Supreme Court.
This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover,
as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in
the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised.
We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to
the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to Henares, et al.
for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The consequences
of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of
motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the le-
gal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.

II.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases:
(1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifi-
cally enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the per-
formance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3)
in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that the person should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The writ neither confers powers
nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform
a duty already imposed.
In Sec 21(a) of RA No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999, it is specifically provided that
when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on respondent
DOTC. Sec 21(b) state that The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and
LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the control and management of air pollution from motor ve-
hicles
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission
standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are con-
cerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor
vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely
the LTFRB.
Henares, et al. invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for
issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an
alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any
kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Nat-
ural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004, rec-
ognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the
potential to produce substantially lower pollutants. Section 1(1.2) of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its
objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the com-
ponents of the program is the development of CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in
strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of CNG-powered PUVs. It also designated the
DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR,
through the EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5,
Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual
shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and
Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in present day
major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly opened routes To a certain extent, the
instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by Henares, et al.,
i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty.
Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of mo-
tor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Sec-
tion 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to
operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed
on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the sta-
tistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as
fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic
measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that
Henares, et al. are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respon-
dents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility
vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statuto-
ry remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial
recourse by mandamus is taken.

G.R. No. 146360 May 20, 2004

AZUCENA O. SALALIMA
vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

FACTS
Azucenas husband, Juancho S. Salalima, was employed for twenty-nine years as a route helper
and subsequently as route salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Incor-
porated. In 1989, during an annual company medical examination, Juancho was diagnosed with
minimal pulmonary tuberculosis. His illness remained stationary until October 1994 when Juancho
was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital to undergo section biopsy. He on February 16, 1995
due to Cancer of the Lungs.
A claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626 as amended was filed by his surviving wife, Azu-
cena, with the SSS. The SSS denied the claim on the ground that Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs
(Cancer of the Lungs) had no causal relationship with Juanchos job as a route salesman.
She then brought the case to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed
the decision of the SSS relying upon the Quality Assurance Medical Report prepared by Dr. Ma.
Victoria M. Abesamis for the SSS stating that Juanchos exposure to smog and dust is not associ-
ated with the development of lung cancer.
She elevated the case to the CA arguing that Juanchos route as a salesman exposed him to all
kinds of pollutants, not to mention the daily hazards and fatigue that came with his tasks. She fur-
ther cited Republic Act No. 8749 (Clean Air Act which provides for a comprehensive pollution con-
trol policy that mainly concentrates on the prohibition of leaded gasoline due to its scientifically
proven deleterious effect on the health of individuals and likewise avers that that while the cause
of her husband Juanchos death was Adenocarcinoma of the lungs, he nonetheless suffered from
two listed occupational diseases, namely pulmonary tuberculosis and pneumonia, prior to his un-
timely demise, which she insists justifies her claim for death benefits. The CA affirmed ECCs deci-
sion.

ISSUE
Whether the death of Juancho Salalima from Cancer of the Lungs justifies Azucenas claim for
death benefits.

RULING
Yes
P.D. No. 626 amended Title II of Book IV on the ECC and State Insurance Fund of the Labor Code.
Under the provisions of the law as amended, for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the claimant must prove that: (a) the sickness must be the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees Compensation, or (b) the risk of con-
tracting the disease was increased by the claimants working conditions.
Under the present law, Adenocarcinoma of the lungs (cancer of the lungs) which was the immedi-
ate cause of Juanchos death as stated in his death certificate, while listed as an occupational dis-
ease, is compensable only among vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers. This, however, would
not automatically bar petitioners claim for as long as she could prove that Juanchos risk of con-
tracting the disease was increased by the latters working conditions.
Dr. Pablo S. Santos, Coca-Colas Head of Medical Services, stated in his report that while Juan-
chos job does not expose him to any chemical material used within the plant, consideration must
be given to smog and dust as factors in the development of his lung cancer. On the other hand, Dr.
Ma. Victoria M. Abesamis of the Social Security System declared in her report that Juanchos ex-
posure to smog and dust is not associated with the development of lung cancer.
ECC and SSS failed to take into consideration Juanchos medical history in their assessment of
the claim for benefits filed by petitioner. For a considerable stretch of Juanchos stay at Coca-Cola,
he was found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. Several months before his demise, he
was diagnosed with Adenocarcinoma of the lungs. A little over two weeks before his death, Juan-
cho was afflicted with pneumonia. The obvious deduction is that Juancho, from the time he ac-
quired pulmonary tuberculosis until his passing away, was predisposed to varied lung diseases.
In light of Juanchos continued exposure to detrimental work environment and constant fatigue, the
possibility that Juanchos Adenocarcinoma of the lungs developed from the worsening of his pul-
monary tuberculosis is not remote.
The degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means,
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. The com-
bination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound in his work environment verily contributed to the
worsening of his already weak respiratory system. His continuous exposure to these factors may
have led to the development of his cancer of the lungs.

G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.
x----------------------x
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, movants-intervenors.
x----------------------x
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, movant-intervenor.

FACTS
SJS, et al. filed a petition for mandamus to compel Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
which reclassified the area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St.,
Mayo St., and F. Manalo Street from Industrial II to Commercial I and directed the owners and op-
erators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their
businesses. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of
the oil companies.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the DOE entered into a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) with the oil companies. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No.
97. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the va-
lidity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special
business permits to the oil companies.
The Supreme Court ruled that Mayor Atienza had the ministerial duty under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including
Ordinance No. 8027 and that the Resolutions did not hinder the enforcement of the ordinance. Af-
ter the decision, the oil companies and DOE filed motions for reconsideration in intervention posit-
ing the fact that the oil companies filed cases assailing the validity of the ordinance, which cases
were consolidated and the RTC ruled in their favour, issuing writs of preliminary prohibitory injunc-
tion and preliminary mandatory injunction; that in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordi-
nance No. 8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance
of 2006 which reclassified the area covering the Pandacan Terminals to "High Density Residential/
Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD); that the oil companies filed complaints assailing Ordinance No. 8119
and that the RTC ruled in their favour.
Then, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim on February 20,
2007.24 In an order dated April 23, 2007, the joint motion was granted and all the claims and coun-
terclaims of the parties were withdrawn.
Even if the intervention of the oil companies and DOE came too late in the day, the SC still allowed
it in the interest of justice and that their intervention will enable the court to rule on the constitution-
ality of Ordinance No. 8027 instead of waiting for the RTCs decision.

ISSUE
I. Whether the injunctive writs are legal impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027.
II. Whether mandamus lies to compel Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
III. Whether Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional And Valid.

RULING

I. No
There are two requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) the right to be protected
exists prima facie and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be
proven that the violation sought to be prevented will cause an irreparable injustice.
It is a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity and, as such, cannot be re-
strained by injunction.63 Nevertheless, when the validity of the ordinance is assailed, the courts
are not precluded from issuing an injunctive writ against its enforcement. However, we have de-
clared that the issuance of said writ is proper only when: ... the petitioner assailing the ordinance
has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge,
the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought.
RTC Judge Reynaldo G. Ros, in his order, stated his basis for issuing the injunctive writs stated
that: as a lawful business, the oil companies have a right, to continue their operation in the Panda-
can Terminal and the right to protect their investments; that the enactment, therefore, of City Ordi-
nance No. 8027 passed by the City Council of Manila reclassifying the area where the Pandacan
Terminal is located from Industrial II to Commercial I and requiring the oil companies to cease and
desist from the operation of their business has violated those rights deprived them of their huge
investments they put up therein;and that therefore, before the Court determines whether the Ordi-
nance in question is valid or not, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and a Writ of Mandatory Injunction
be issued to prevent serious and irreparable damage to the oil companies.
Nowhere in the judges discussion shows that he was convinced that the oil companies had made
out a case of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the presumption of validity
of the ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless and until the courts declare
the contrary in clear and unequivocal terms. The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be un-
constitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined. The presumption is
all in favor of validity.
The ordinance reclassified the subject area from industrial to commercial. Prima facie, this power
is within the power of municipal corporations; There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the
power to divide its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and
unwholesome trades and occupations are to be established exclusively in the latter zone.
Therefore, the injunctive writs issued in the Manila RTCs May 19, 2003 order had no leg to stand
on.

II. Yes.
Indeed, [the] Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative [or executive
departments] of the government in the legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere
ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some officer thereof.
Since Mayor Atienza has the duty to implement the ordinance, he may be compelled by man-
damus to perform his duty in view of his failure to do so.

III. Yes.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure pre-
scribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contra-
vene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The City of Manila Has The Power To Enact Ordinance No. 8027 in the exercise of its police pow-
er. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law).
LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies, in
this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the city.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Develop-
ment of the City of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance:
(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products
which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and
fuel oil among others;
(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacaang Palace and
(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring
communities.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants
of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived as a terrorist target. In the af-
termath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism continued such that it became imperative for
governments to take measures to combat their effects.
The Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Unfair, Oppressive Or Confiscatory Which Amounts To Taking
Without Compensation. In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of
property interests to promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation
is necessary only when the states power of eminent domain is exercised. Further, the oil compa-
nies are not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Mani-
la merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it established.
The Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Partial And Discriminatory. The law may treat and regulate one
class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distin-
guish one class from another. Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks
to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the
surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist target.
In view of the foregoing, Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and Mayor Atienza is ordered to en-
force it.

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127,
Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN

FACTS
Laguna Lake Development Authority received a complaint seeking to stop the operation of the
open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects
on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding
area. LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, after which, it was found that the City Government
of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Envi-
ronmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No.
1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850. Further, the water col-
lected from the leachate and the receiving streams indicates the presence of bacteria which could
considerably affect the quality of the receiving waters. This prompted LLDA to issue a Cease and
Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan to completely halt, stop and desist from
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction.
It sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and en-
hance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdic-
tion.

ISSUE
I. Whether the LLDA, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized
by the City Government of Caloocan.
II. Whether the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Re-
public Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws.

RULING
I. Yes, LLDA has authority.
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control,
if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Envi-
ronmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which is a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
under the Office of the DENR Secretary. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases gen-
erally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law
provides for another forum.
In the instant case, LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared na-
tional policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila,
Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan. Thus, it obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of
the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding areas.

II. Yes, LLDA has the power to issue a cease and dessist order. The cease and desist order issued
by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Ca-
marin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850
cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. Republic Act
No. 4850 expressly authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinu-
ance or pollution.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly con-
ferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need
not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may
well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents
into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted
litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including
multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take
several years.(Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al.)

G.R. No. 119619 December 13, 1996

RICHARD HIZON, et al.
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS
In September 1992, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received re-
ports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response to these reports, the
city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and apprehen-
sion of violators of the laws on fishing.
On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to
the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by "muro ami" within
the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. They immediately proceeded to the area
and found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B
Robinson.They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat. In the course of their inspec-
tion, the police saw two foreigners in the captain's deck. SP03 Enriquez examined their passports
and found them to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live
lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. They
checked the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless,
SP03 Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further
investigation.
The following day, the boat captain was directed to get random samples of fish from the fish cage
of F/B Robinson for laboratory examination. As instructed, the boat engineer delivered to the Mar-
itime Office four (4) live lapu-lapu fish inside a plastic shopping bag filled with water. The Maritime
Officer received the fish and in the presence of the boat engineer and captain, placed them inside
a large transparent plastic bag without water. He sealed the plastic with heat from a lighter. The
specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) sub-office in the city for ex-
amination "to determine the method of catching the same for record or evidentiary purposes."
They were received at the NBI office at 8:00 in the evening of the same day. On October 5, 1992,
the specimens arrived in Manila and immediately brought to the NBI Head Office. On October 7,
1992, NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples and found
that they contained sodium cyanide.
In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint at
bar against Hizon, et al charging them with a violation of P.D. 704. As defense, Hizon, et al.
claimed that they are legitimate fishermen catching fish by the hook and line method. The RTC
found the 31 petitioners guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment for a minimum of eight (8)
years and one (1) day to a maximum of nine (9) years and four (4) months. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.

ISSUE
Whether the statutory presumption of guilt under Sec 33 of PD 704 prevails against the constitu-
tional presumption of innocence.

RULING

The offense of illegal fishing under Sec 33 of PD 704 is committed when a person catches, takes
or gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine
waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates
a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poiso-
nous substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the
possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious
or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Under these instances, the
boat owner, operator or fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
In 1916, the Supreme Court hald that the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so
by statute. The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well-defined
limitations, has the right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof
shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of
showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or inten-
tion.
The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is generally
conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute
prima facie evidence of the guilt of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused
provided there is a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed.
To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other must not be arbi-
trary and unreasonable. In fine, the presumption must be based on facts and these facts must be
part of the crime when committed. P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved
and hence is not constitutionally impermissible.
However, the statutory presumption is merely prima facie and at no instance can the accused be
denied the right to rebut the presumption. Whether Hizon, et al. successfully rebutted the presump-
tion, the answer is in the affirmative. After a reexamination of another set of random lapu-lapu fish
from the same tank, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI in Manila conducted three
(3) tests on the specimens and found the fish negative for the presence of sodium cyanide.
The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission
raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodi-
um cyanide.
The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports petitioners' claim that they
did not use the poison in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by the ordinary and le-
gal way, i.e., by hook and line on board their sampans. This claim is buttressed by the prosecution
evidence itself. The apprehending officers saw petitioners fishing by hook and line when they came
upon them in the waters of Barangay San Rafael. Further, in the first examination, the time interval
from the taking of the fish samples and their actual examination fail to assure the impartial mind
that the integrity of the specimens had been properly safeguarded.
Lastly, "Muro ami" is made with "the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in the
water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net." This method of fishing needs approximately two
hundred (200) fishermen to execute. What the apprehending officers instead discovered were
twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line and found nothing on the
boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing.

G.R. No. 68166 October 13, 1997

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL

FACTS

Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, applied for land registration with an area of 146,611 sq meters
before the CFI of Balanga, Bataan.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land; it directly
adjoined his land. His registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west
by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay.
Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five
(25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was
denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the public do-
main. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1958, gave due
course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be cer-
tified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes. Secretary of Natural Resources
affirmed the grant. Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similar-
ly affirmed the grant.
During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Pascual filed a
complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by
Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of
the subject property. The case was decided adversely against Pascual. On appeal, ejectment case
and the land registration case were consolidated. During the pendency of the trial of the consoli-
dated cases, both the parties died, and thus substituted by their heirs. The court a quo rendered
judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it
cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings. The IAC ordered the issuance of the corre-
sponding decree of registration in the name of private respondents and the reversion to private re-
spondents of the possession of the portion of the subject property included in Navarro's fishpond
permit.

ISSUE
Whether the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally ac-
crues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land. (whether
or not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action
of the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is ac-
cretion but if formed by the action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.)

RULING

The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and
the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought soil and
sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner
Sulpicio Pascual in 1948.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is de-
posited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; the owner of such
estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral own-
ers, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters.
The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian
owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but is not automatically registered property,
hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The title of Pascuals own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay. Pas-
cual's land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers
whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. Manila Bay is
obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled that a bay is part of the sea. The disput-
ed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such,
the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866.

The combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan trees, the withdrawal
of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its former foreshore, and the
regular torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the
northern boundary of petitioners' own tract of land.
Therefore, the disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an
arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended
for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved
for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through ex-
press authorization granted in due form by a competent authority." Only the executive and possibly
the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so
gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of
establishment of special industries or for coast guard services.
G.R. No. 110286 April 2, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
RENERIO P. VERGARA, ERNESTO T. CUESTRA, JR., PEDRO G. DAGAO and BERNARDO
P. CUESTRA, accused. RENERIO P. VERGARA

FACTS
In the morning of 04 July 1992, authorities on board, "Bantay-Dagat," a pumpboat, on "preventive
patrol" along the municipal waters fronting barangays Baras and Candahug of Palo, Leyte chanced
upon a blue-colored fishing boat at a distance of approximately 200 meters away. The boat, 30 feet
long, had on board appellant Renerio Vergara, et al. and was on parallel course toward the general
direction of Samar. Momentarily, the team saw Vergara throw into the sea a bottle known in the
locality as "badil" containing ammonium nitrate and having a blasting cap on top which, when ignit-
ed and thrown into the water, could explode. The explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and
various species of fish within a certain radius. Approximately three seconds after appellant had
thrown the "badil" into the sea, the explosion occurred. Vergara and Cuesta dove into the sea with
their gear while Dagao and Cuesta, Jr., stayed on board to tend to the air hose for the divers.
The authorities approached and boarded the fishing boat. Moments later, Vergara and Cuesta sur-
faced, each carrying a fishnet or "sibot" filled with about a kilo of "bolinao" fish scooped from under
the water. Having been caught red-handed, the four accused were apprehended and taken by the
patrol team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later to the police station in Palo, Leyte.
An information for a violation of Section 33 of P.D. No. 704 was filed against Vergara, et al. The
trial court found the accused guilty.
Defense: It was another unidentified group of fishermen who threw the bottle of explosives.

ISSUE
Whether Vergara, et al. are guilty for violation of PD 704.

RULING
Yes.
The defense is not tenable. The detailed testimonial evidence of the prosecution is of more weight.
Furthermore, fish samples from the catch showed ruptured capillaries, ruptured and blooded ab-
dominal portion, and crushed internal organs indicating that explosives were indeed used.
Sections 33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058, read:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegal-
ly caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or
gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine wa-
ters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as
defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere pos-
session of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be
punishable as hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of
the Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for re-
search, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substance or electricity to catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in specified area:
Provided further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with
accepted scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall
not be construed as the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this sec-
tion: Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or
other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.
Sec. 38. (1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25)
years in the case of mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; by imprisonment
ranging from twenty (20) years to life imprisonment, if the explosive is actually used: Provided,
That if the use of the explosive results in 1) physical injury to any person, the penalty shall be im-
prisonment ranging from twenty-five (25) years to life imprisonment, or 2) in the loss of human life,
then the penalty shall be life imprisonment to death.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING