G.R. No.

92013 July 25, 1990

Salvador H. Laurel, petitioner, vs. Ramon Garcia, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, Raul Manglapus, as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and Catalino Macaraig, as Executive Secretary, respondents.
_______________________________________________________________________
Facts: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under
the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the
Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition.

Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property.
Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any
such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated
prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians
alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both
the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and
disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs Court of Appeals

Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and some co-workers were
in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard
her cry for help and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-
assigned her to work in their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia
Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and
eventually sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying with
males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted
hence the Prince absolved her and sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada. Morada
then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law should be the law of Saudi
Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines contention is correct.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismiss with
petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked the court to make a determination of Saudia
Airliness rights hence a submission to the courts jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the complaint of Morada, she is bringing
the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file
it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in personam (case at
bar) in the place where she resides or where the defendant resides. Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case
here because if shell file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil
Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign element involved, is the so called
locus actus or where an act has been done. In the case at bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was
summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she
was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into appearing before a court trial which led to her
wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation,
misery, and suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said
as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).

ISAE vs. QUISUMBING

G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad,
from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School
hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2)
local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25%
more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign
and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate
bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which
favored the School. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of work.
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well
the manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of
the constitution mandates to afford labor full protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that
labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties
of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-
hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups
were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-
hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain
benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former
from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise
of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.

G.R. No. L-11759 March 16, 1917

CAYETANO LIM and MARCIANO LIM, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee.
Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for appellants.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The real question raised on this appeal is whether the Insular Collector of Customs may lawfully deny entry into the
Philippine Islands to two children aged 8 and 14 years, respectively, under and by authority of the Chinese Immigration,
Laws, it appearing that the children arrived at the Port of Manila accompanied by and in the custody of their mother, a
Filipino woman; that they were born in China, out of lawful wedlock; and that their father was a Chinese person.
It is contended, on behalf of the Insular Collector of Customs, that these children being Chinese persons are denied the
right of entrance into the Philippine Islands under the express terms of the Chinese immigration laws. On the other
hand, it is urged on behalf of the children that they are entitled to enter, regardless of the provisions of the Chinese
immigration laws, since the admitted facts, as it is said, disclose that they are citizens of the Philippine Islands; and for
the further reason, that their mother, who is entitled to their custody and charged with their maintenance and
education, is clearly entitled to take up her residence in the Philippine Islands and should not be required, to that end, to
abandon her minor children.
Without discussing or deciding any of the contentions of the parties as to the rights of citizenship of these children,
actual or inchoate, we are of opinion that by analogous reasoning to that upon which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the wives and minor children of Chinese merchants domiciled in the United States may enter that
country without certificates, these children must be held to be entitled to enter the Philippine Islands with their mother,
for the purpose of taking up their residence here with her, it appearing that she is natural guardian, entitled to their
custody and charged with their maintenance and education. (U. S. vs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 459.)
In the case just cited the court said:
While the literal construction of the section would require a certificate, as therein stated, from every Chinese
person, other than a laborer, who should come into the country, yet such a construction leads to what we think
an absurd result, for it requires a certificate for a wife of a merchant, among others, in regard to whom its would
be impossible to give the particulars which the statute requires shall be stated in such certificate.
"Nothing is better settled," says the present Chief Justice, in Lau Ow Bew vs. United States (144 U. S., 59) "than
that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if
possible, so as to avoid and unjust or an absurd conclusion.
The purposes of the sixth section, requiring the certificate, was not to prevent the persons named in the second
article of the treaty from coming into the country, but to prevent Chinese laborers from entering under the
guise of being one of the classes permitted by the treaty. It is the coming of Chinese laborers that the act is
aimed against.
It was said in the opinion in the Lau Ow Bew case, in speaking of the provisions that the sole evidence
permissible should be the certificate: "This rule of evidence was evidently prescribed by the amendment as a
means of effectually preventing the violation or evasion of the prohibition against the coming of Chinese
laborers. It was designed as a safeguard to prevent the unlawful entry of such laborers, under the pretense that
they belong to the merchant class or to some other of the admitted classes."
It was also held in that case that although the literal wording of the statute of 1884, section six, would require a
certificate in the case of a merchant already domiciled in the United States and who had left the country for
temporary purposes, animo revertendi, yet its true and proper construction did not include his case, and the
general terms used in the act were limited to those persons to whom Congress manifestly intended to apply
them, which would be those who were about to come to the United States for the first time, and not to those
Chinese merchants already domiciled in the United States who had gone to China for temporary purposes only,
with the intention of returning. The case of Wan Shing vs. United States (140 U. S., 24), was referred to, and
attention called to the fact that the appellant therein was not a merchant but a laborer, who had acquired no
commercial domicile in this county, and was clearly within the exception requiring him to procure and produce
the certificate specified in the act. The rule was approved, and the differences in the two cases pointed out by
the Chief Justice.
To hold that a certificate is required in this case is to decide that the woman cannot come into this country at all,
for it is not possible for her to comply with the act, because she cannot in any event procure the certificate even
by returning to China. She must come in as the wife of her domiciled husband or not at all. The act was never
meant to accomplish the result of permanently excluding the wife under the circumstances of this case, and we
think that, properly and reasonably construed, it does not do so. If we hold that she is entitled to come in as the
wife, because the true construction of the treaty and the act permits it, there is no provision which makes the
certificate the only proof of the fact that she is such wife.
In the case of the minor children, the same result must follow as in that of the wife. All the reasons which favor
the construction of the statute as exempting the wife from the necessity of procuring a certificate apply with
equal force to the case of minor children of a member or members of the admitted classes. They come in by
reason of their relationship to the father, and whether they accompany or follow him, a certificate is not
necessary in either case. When the fact is established to the satisfaction of the authorities that the person
claiming to enter, either as wife or minor child, is in fact the wife or minor child of one of the members of the
class mentioned in the treaty as entitled to enter, them that person in entitled to admission without the
certificate.
We are not advised of any provision of Chinese law which differentiates the status of infant children, born out of lawful
wedlock, from that of similar children under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. We assume, therefore, that in
China as well as in the Philippine Islands such children have the right to look to their mother for their maintenance and
education, and that she is entitled to their custody and control in fulfilling the obligations towards them which are
imposed upon her, not only by the natural impulses of love and affection, but also by the express mandate of the law.
And it having been held on the highest authority that the general terms of the Act were limited to those to whom
Congress manifestly intended to apply them as set forth in the foregoing opinion, and that "nothing is better settled
than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible,
so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion," we are of opinion that the Chinese Immigration Laws should not be
construed so as to exclude infant children of a Filipino mother, born out of lawful wedlock, seeking entrance to the
Philippine Islands for the purpose of taking up their residence with her in her native land.
It has been suggested that such a ruling opens the door to fraud and evasion, but we are not much impressed with the
force of this suggestion, knowing as we do that the immigration authorities have been furnished by the law with
peculiarly effective machinery for its enforcement, well calculated to defeat any attempt to make an unauthorized or
improper use of so manifestly reasonable an exception from the literal construction and application of its general
provisions.
Some confusion seems to have arisen in the court below as to the precise nature and effect of the somewhat inartificial
pleadings upon which these proceedings were submitted. The case appears to have been submitted upon an answer to
an order to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue upon the petition filed on behalf of the infant
children. In the form in which the answer is couched, there is much in the contention of the appellee that the trial court
should have treated the answer as in substance and effect a demurrer to the petition, admitting the truth of the facts
alleged therein, but praying judgment as to whether it sets forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and to
justify the issuance of the writ. We are inclined to think, however, that the understanding of the parties and of the court
below was that the answer should be treated rather as in the nature of a return to a writ of habeas corpus, accepting as
true the allegations of the petition but maintaining the legality of the detention upon the facts thus submitted. Without
considering at this time whether in habeas corpus proceedings the respondent may, without consent of court, demur to,
instead of answering an order to show cause why the writ should not issue, and without considering or deciding the
course which should be pursued where a respondent attempts to file a demurrer to a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in lieu of the return prescribed by the statute to the writ when actually issued; we treat the answer to the order
to show cause in the case at bar as we think the parties and the court below understood it should be treated, that is to
say, as in substance and effect the return which the Insular Collector desired to make to the writ of habeas corpus issued
or assumed to have been issued in response to the petition on behalf of the children held in custody by him.
We conclude, therefore, that, it appearing that the respondent Collector of Customs is detaining the petitioners under
an erroneous construction of the immigration laws, and it appearing from the facts disclosed by the administrative
proceedings that these children are entitled to admission into the Philippine Islands, the order entered in the court
below should be reversed, and in lieu thereof an order should be entered directing the discharge of these children from
the custody of the Insular Collector of Customs, with the costs in both instances, de officio. So ordered.

Transportation Case Digest: Sweet Lines, Inc. V. Teves (1978)

Lessons Applicable: Contract of Adhesion (Transportation)
Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro bought tickets for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu
Since many passengers were bound for Surigao, M/S "Sweet Hope would not be proceeding to Bohol
They went to the proper brancg office and was relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" where they were forced to agree "to
hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." and they were exposed to
the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits and their tickets were not
honored so they had to purchase a new one
They sued Sweet Lines for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental who dismissed the compalitn for improper venue
A motion was premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets -dismissed
instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction
ISSUE: W/N a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru condition printed at the back of passage
tickets to its vessels that any and all actions arising out of the contract of carriage should be filed only in a particular
province or city

HELD: NO.petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Restraining order LIFTED and SET ASIDE
contract of adhesion
not that kind of a contract where the parties sit down to deliberate, discuss and agree specifically on all its terms,
but rather, one which respondents took no part at all in preparing
just imposed upon them when they paid for the fare for the freight they wanted to ship
We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and
unenforceable for the following reasons
circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship
will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers in different s of the country who, under Condition No.
14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu
subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions
philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his
witnesses and to promote 21 the ends of justice

HSBC VS. SHERMAN

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION (HSBC) vs. SHERMAN et al
G.R. No. 72494
August 11, 1989
FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (COMPANY), a company incorporated in
Singapore applied with and was granted by HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of
Singapore dollars 200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under said
overdraft facility.
As a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by HSBC to it through the aforesaid overdraft
facility, in 1982, both private respondents and a certain Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such time,
executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly
and severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and
may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of
Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee.
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment and inasmuch as the private respondents still
failed to pay, HSBC filed A complaint for collection of a sum of money against private respondents Sherman and Reloj
before RTC of Quezon City.
Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The trial court denied the
motion. They then filed before the respondent IAC a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or prayer
for a restraining order. The IAC rendered a decision enjoining the RTC Quezon City from taking further cognizance of the
case and to dismiss the same for filing with the proper court of Singapore which is the proper forum. MR denied, hence
this petition.
ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee stipulation regarding jurisdiction?
HELD: YES
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the
absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To
be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on
technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary
trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to
harass private respondents.
**
In the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., where the stipulation was [i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction
shall be vested in the Court of Davao City. We held:
Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to venue does not
preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, ROC, in the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed
upon by the parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the
exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons
and things within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling
sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign military units stationed in or
marching through State territory with the permission of the latters authorities. This authority, which finds its source in
the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take
hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought
before them
NOTES:
The respondent IAC likewise ruled that:
In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not authorized by law to exercise
jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may still refuse to entertain the case by applying the principle of forum non
conveniens.
However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non conveniens
depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, the
IAC should not have relied on such principle.

PHILSEC VS. CA
PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al
G.R. No. 103493
June 19, 1997
FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA)
and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent
Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendors
Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and
AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by means of a
promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488,
Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their
possession belonging to Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the note became due and
demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United
States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by
petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint For Sum of Money with Damages
and Writ of Preliminary Attachment against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the
allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court of
Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its
true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in
the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably
tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non
conveniens, even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum
non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court?
HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati
NO
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof
to the contrary. Rule 39, 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S.
court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial
court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the
U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then
being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered
would constitute res judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non
conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety
of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a
matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.

CASE DIGEST: US vs Look Chow, 18 Phil 573

Subject Matter: Applicability of the provisions of Art 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively,
went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The defendant
stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the intention of selling them as
contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had already been searched several times for opium he ordered
two other chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hong Kong, and that it was
bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu.

Issue:
Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in its port.

Held:
Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by
the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality. However,
the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present case, a can
of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the penal law in force
at the place of the commission of the crime. Only the court established in the said place itself has competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either
from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may
result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the
property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it
is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in
person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-
Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the
Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was
necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this
requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment
by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the
bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after
the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate
all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of
the action.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the
authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to
the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes
its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made
effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken
into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and
held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found
in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without
taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to
exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which
is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain
proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon
which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in
the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to
the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of
the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus
designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action
becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to
the principles governing actions in rem.

Lazaro Rayray vs Chae Kyung Lee

Article 45
Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was able to secure a marriage license which is a
requirement in Korea prior to marrying. They lived together until 1955. Rayray however later found out that Lee
had previously lived with 2 Americans and a Korean. Lee answered by saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a woman
to have more than one partner and that it is legally permissive for them to do so and that there is no legal impediment
to her marriage with Rayray. Eventually they pursued their separate ways. Rayray later filed before lower court of
Manila for an action to annul his marriage with Lee because Lees whereabouts cannot be determined and that his
consent in marrying Lee would have not been for the marriage had he known prior that Lee had been living with other
men. His action for annulment had been duly published and summons were made known to Lee but due to her absence
Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in default. The lower court denied Rayrays action stating that since the marriage
was celebrated in Korea the court cannot take cognizance of the case and that the facts presented by Rayray is not
sufficient to debunk his marriage with Lee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rayrays marriage with Lee is null and void.
HELD: The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over the case. As far as marriage
status is concerned, the nationality principle is controlling NOT lex loci celebracionis. The lower court is however correct
in ruling that Rayrays evidence is not sufficient to render his marriage with Lee null and void. Rayray said that the police
clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow her to marry after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men
which is considered bigamous in Philippine law. The SC ruled that the police clearance is wanting for it lacks the
signature of the person who prepared it and there is no competent document to establish the identity of the same. Also,
through Rayray himself, Lee averred that it is ok in Korea for a person who cohabited with other men before to marry
another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is aware that if it were a previous marriage that is concerned then
that could be a legal impediment to any subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot be given credence in claiming that his
consent could have been otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior to the marriage because he would lie to
every opportunity given him by the Court so as to suit his case.

Far East International Import and Export Corporation vs Nankai Kogyo Co. Ltd. etal
GR NO. L-13525 November 30, 1962
Facts: On December 26, 1956, the Far East International Import & Export Corporation, Far East for short, organized
under Philippine Laws, entered into a Contract of Sale of Steel Scrap with the Nankai Kogyo Co., Ltd., Nankai for short, a
foreign corporation organized under Japanese Laws with address at Osaka, Japan. The buyer sign in Japan and the seller
in Manila, Philippines. Upon perfection of the contract and after having been informed of the readiness to ship and that
the Export License was to expire on March 18, 1957, Nankai opened a letter for credit (No. 38/80049) with the China
Banking Corporation, issued by the Nippon Kangyo, Ltd., Tokyo, Japan, in the amount of $312,500.00 on January 30,
1957. On March 15, 1957, only four (4) days before the expiration of the Far East licence, three (3) boats sent by Nankai
arrived in the Philippines, one to load in Manila, the other two at Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union, and Tacloban,
Leyte, respectively. On March 19, 1957, the expiration of the export license, only 1,058.6 metric tons of scrap steel was
loaded on the SS Mina (loading in Manila). The loading was accordingly stopped. The boat at Poro Point was also
unloaded of the 200 metric tons, for the same reason. An agreement was reached whereby the Far East would seek an
extension of the license. However, the untimely death of President Magsaysay and the taking over by President Garcia
changed the picture, for the latter and/or his agents refused to extend the license. The two boats sailed to Japan
without any cargo, the third (SS Mina) only 1,058.6 metric tons. As repeated requests, both against the shipping agent
and the buyers (Nankai), for the issuance of the of Bill Lading were ignored, Far East filed on May 16, 1957, the present
complaint for Specific Performance, damages, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directed against Nankai and
the shipping company, to issue and deliver to the plaintiff, a complete set of negotiable of Lading for the 1,058.6 metric
tons of scrap and a writ of preliminary injunction against the China Banking Corporation and the Nankai to maintain the
Letter Credit. The lower court issued on May 17, 1957 an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction, after Far East had
posted a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant-
appellant.
Held: Yes. It is true that the defendant entered a Special Appearance, wherein it contested the jurisdiction of the
Philippines Courts to take cognizance of the case on grounds contained in the various pleadings presented by it. The
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction had been overruled because it did not appear indubitable.
Subsequently, however, the defendant filed its Answer and invoked defenses and grounds for dismissal of complaint
other than lack of jurisdiction, which circumstance vested upon the Court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
Even though the defendant objects to the jurisdiction of the court, if at the same time he alleges any non-jurisdictional
ground for dismissing the action, the Court acquires jurisdiction over him. Even though he does not intend to confer
jurisdiction upon the court, his appearance for some other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction subjects him to
jurisdiction of the court.Even though he does not wish to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, he cannot ask the court
to act upon any question except the question of jurisdiction, without conferring jurisdiction upon the court.
Thus though a Special appearance to object to the jurisdiction is not a submission, if it is followed by a motion to dismiss
or to quash the motion invokes the jurisdiction of Court to decide the issue raised by the motion; and a decision of that
issue binds the defendant. Therefore if the decision of the motion is based upon a finding of facts necessary to
jurisdiction, this finding binds the defendant and the court acquires jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case.
Undoubtedly if after his objection to the jurisdiction is wrongly overruled, a defendant files a cross complaint demanding
affirmative relief, he cannot thereafter claim that the court had no jurisdiction over him.
Not only did appellant allege non-jurisdictional grounds in its pleadings to have the complaint dismissed, but it also went
into trial on the merits and presented evidence destined to resist appellees claim. Verily, there could not be a better
situation of acquired jurisdiction based on consent. Consequently, the provision of the contract wherein it was agreed
that disputes should be submitted to a Board of Arbitration which may be formed in Japan (in the supposition that it can
apply to the matter in dispute payment of the scrap), seems to have been waived with appellants voluntary
submission. Apart from the fact that the clause employs the word may.
The appellant alleges that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction, because it was not doing business in the
Philippines and the requirement of summons had not been fulfilled. It is difficult to lay down any rule of universal
application to determine when a foreign corporation is doing business. Each case must turn upon its own peculiar facts
and upon the language of the statute applicable. But from the proven facts obtaining in this particular case, the
appellants defense of lack of jurisdiction appears unavailing.
In the instant case, the testimony of Atty. Pablo Ocampo that appellant was doing business in the Philippines
corroborated by no less than Nabuo Yoshida, one of appellants officers, that he was sent to the Philippines by his
company to look into the operation of mines, thereby revealing the defendants desire to continue engaging in business
here, after receiving the shipment of the iron under consideration, making the Philippines a base thereof.

125 Phil. 458

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by plaintiff, William F. Gemperle, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing this case
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant Paul Schenker and for want of cause of action against his wife and
co-defendant, Helen Schenker, said Paul Schenker "being in no position to be joined with her as party defendant,
because he is beyond the reach of the magistracy of the Philippine courts."

The record shows that sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker hereinafter referred to as Schenker acting through his wife and
attorney-in-fact, Helen Schenker hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Schenker filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a
complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2796 thereof against herein plaintiff William F. Gemperle, for the
enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippine-Swiss Trading Co., Inc.
and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the
increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. Alleging that, in connection with said complaint, Mrs.
Schenker had caused to be published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant
and immaterial to said case No. Q-2796, aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit
of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his "honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into
public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman", Gemperle commenced the present
action against the Schenkers for the recovery of P300,000 as damages, P30,000 as attorney's fees, and costs, in addition
to praying for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker "to retract in writing the said defamatory expressions". In due course,
thereafter, the lower court rendered the decision above referred to. A reconsideration thereof having been denied,
Gemperle interposed the present appeal.

The first question for determination therein is whether or not the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person
of Schenker. Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not been actually served with summons
in the Philippines, although the summons addressed to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served personally upon her in
the Philippines. It is urged by plaintiff that jurisdiction over the person of Schenker has been secured through voluntary
appearance on his part, he not having made a special appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an
answer having been filed in this case, stating that "the defendants, by counsel, answering the plaintiff's complaint,
respectfully aver", which is allegedly a general appearance amounting to a submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
confirmed, according to plaintiff, by a P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in said answer; but, this counterclaim
was set up by Mrs. Schenker alone, not including her husband. Moreover, said answer contained several affirmative
defenses, one of which was lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, thus negating the alleged waiver of this
defense. Nevertheless, we hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of
the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and
attorney-in-fact of her husband in the aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest,
in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually
sued, on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly
in a case, like the one at bar, which is a consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.

Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs. Schenker is premised upon the alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, which cannot be sustained, it follows that the conclusion drawn therefrom is,
likewise, untenable.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the case remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings, with the costs of this instance against defendants-appellees. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 73531. April 6, 1993.

DOLORES DELOS SANTOS, NICOLAS DELOS SANTOS and RICARDO DELOS SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE CAMILO MONTESA, JR. and JUANA DELOS SANTOS, respondents.
Jose C. Patalinjug for petitioners.
Leonardo O. Mancao for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW CIVIL PROCEDURE; SUMMONS; DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE IN THE ACTION EQUIVALENT
TO SERVICE OF SUMMONS; CASE AT BAR. At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners
could elicit a favorable response from us in as much as the proof of service of the summons upon petitioners does not
indicate impossibility of personal service, a condition precedent for resorting to substituted service. Even then, and
assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory norms on service of summons have not been strictly complied with, still,
any defect in form and in the manner of effecting service thereof were nonetheless erased when petitioners' counsel
moved to re-examine the impugned decision and posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution
(Boticano vs. Chu. Jr., 145 SCRA 541 [1987]); 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1988 Fifth Rev. Ed., p. 136).
Indeed, such demeanor is tantamount to voluntary submission to the competencia of the court within the purview of
Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court since any mode of appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is
equivalent to service of summons, absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner was precisely to
protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant (Carballo vs. Encarnacion, 49 O.G. 1383; 1 Regalado,
supra, p. 144; Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746 [1918]; 1 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1989 Rev. Ed., p. 473
Sison, et al. vs. Gonzales, 50 O.G. 4756; 1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 467). Neither can We
treat the motion for reconsideration directed against the unfavorable disposition as a special appearance founded on
the sole challenge on invalid service of summons since the application therefor raised another ground on failure to state
a cause of action when conciliation proceedings at the barangay level were allegedly bypassed, nay, disregarded
(Republic vs. Ker and Co., Ltd., 64 O.G. 3761; Regalado, supra, p. 152).
2. ID APPEAL; ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE RAISED IN PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45;
CASE AT BAR The fact that petitioners are supposedly occupying a parcel of land other than the realty claimed by private
respondent deserves scant consideration since a clarification on a factual query of this nature is proscribed by the
second paragraph, Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Verily, counsel for petitioners' assertion in the
notice of appeal filed with respondent judge that the grievance to be elevated to this Court will focus "fully on a
question of law" (p. 32 Rollo) is a self-defeating posture and operates as a legal bar for us to dwell into the truth or
falsehood of such factual premise (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 2(a), Rule 131, Revised
Rules on Evidence).
3. ID; JUDGMENT; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL; PREVAILING PARTY MOVING FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
OBLIGED TO SERVE COPY OF MOTION ON ADVERSE PARTY'S COUNSEL. Petitioners argue next that execution pending
appeal was ordered without any prior notice to them (p. 3, Petition; p. 7, Rollo). This notion is also devoid of substance
since it erroneously suggests that the court is duty-bound to notify petitioners of the immediate enforcement of the
appealed decision. A contrario, it is the prevailing party moving for execution pending appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court who is obliged to serve a copy of such motion on the adverse party's counsel, which, on the
face of the subject motion, was effected by personal delivery (p. 23, Rollo; Lao vs. Mencias, 21 SCRA 1021 [1967]; 2
Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 Ed., p. 288).
DECISION
MELO, J p:
In the suit for desahucio initiated below by herein private respondent against petitioners, the court of origin ordered
petitioners to vacate the lot in question to pay P5,000.00 per year as reasonable rental from 1985 until possession is
surrendered, and to pay P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit (pp. 37-38, Rollo). Upon appeal, Branch
XIX of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region stationed in Malolos and presided over by herein respondent
judge, granted private respondents motion for execution pending appeal on account of petitioners' failure to post a
supersedeas bond (p. 21, Rollo). To set aside the proceedings below, the petition at hand was instituted anchored on the
supposition that petitioners were deprived of their day in court.
Petitioners' mental distress started when private respondent, who supposedly owns Lot 39 of the Cadastral survey of
Bustos with an area of 5,358 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title No. U-7924 a portion of which
petitioners entered and occupied, lodged the complaint geared towards petitioners' eviction. Summons was served
through the mother of petitioners when the process server was unable to locate Dolores, Nicolas, and Ricardo delos
Santos in Talampas, Bustos, Bulacan. For failure of petitioners to submit the corresponding answer, judgment was
rendered pursuant to the rules on summary procedure (pp. 2-3, Decision; pp. 37-38, Rollo).
Upon learning of said decision, petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal thesis that they were never served
notice of the conciliation meeting at the barangay level, as well as the summons. They insist that private respondent was
referring to a different piece of realty because petitioners actually occupied Lot No. 3568 owned by Nicolas delos Santos
under Original Certificate of Title No. F-10418. Moreover, petitioners advanced the proposition that Dolores' husband
should have been impleaded. All of these arguments were to no avail. As indicated earlier, execution pending appeal
was ordered due to petitioners' failure to post a supersedeas bond.
To stave off the impending eviction of petitioners, this Court issued a restraining order on April 28, 1986 directed against
the reviewing authority and private respondent until further orders (p. 52, Rollo).
At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners could elicit a favorable response from us in as
much as the proof of service of the summons upon petitioners does not indicate impossibility of personal service, a
condition precedent for resorting to substituted service. Even then, and assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory
norms on service of summons have not been strictly complied with, still, any defect in form and in the manner of
effecting service thereof were nonetheless erased when petitioners' counsel moved to re-examine the impugned
decision and posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution (Boticano vs. Chu. Jr., 145 SCRA 541
[1987]); 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1988 Fifth Rev. Ed., p. 136). Indeed, such demeanor is tantamount to
voluntary submission to the competencia of the court within the purview of Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
Court since any mode of appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is equivalent to service of summons, absent
any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner was precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of defendant (Carballo vs. Encarnacion, 49 O.G. 1383; 1 Regalado, supra, p. 144; Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil.
746 [1918]; 1 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1989 Rev. Ed., p. 473 Sison, et al. vs. Gonzales, 50 O.G. 4756; 1
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 467).
Neither can We treat the motion for reconsideration directed against the unfavorable disposition as a special
appearance founded on the sole challenge on invalid service of summons since the application therefor raised another
ground on failure to state a cause of action when conciliation proceedings at the barangay level were allegedly
bypassed, nay, disregarded (Republic vs. Ker and Co., Ltd., 64 O.G. 3761; Regalado, supra, p. 152).
The fact that petitioners are supposedly occupying a parcel of land other than the realty claimed by private respondent
deserves scant consideration since a clarification on a factual query of this nature is proscribed by the second paragraph,
Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Verily, counsel for petitioners' assertion in the notice of appeal filed
with respondent judge that the grievance to be elevated to this Court will focus "fully on a question of law" (p. 32 Rollo)
is a self-defeating posture and operates as a legal bar for us to dwell into the truth or falsehood of such factual premise
(Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 2(a), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence).
Petitioners argue next that execution pending appeal was ordered without any prior notice to them (p. 3, Petition; p. 7,
Rollo). This notion is also devoid of substance since it erroneously suggests that the court is duty-bound to notify
petitioners of the immediate enforcement of the appealed .appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court who is obliged to serve a copy of such motion on the adverse party's counsel, which, on the face of the subject
motion, was effected by personal delivery (p. 23, Rollo; Lao vs. Mencias, 21 SCRA 1021 [1967]; 2 Martin, Rules of Court
in the Philippines, 1973 Ed., p. 288).
In fine, petitioners may not press the idea that they were deprived of their day in court amidst the implicit forms of
waiver performed by their lawyer in submitting every conceivable defense for petitioners via the two motions for
reconsideration below.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order issued on April 28, 1986
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES et al. v. PIMENTEL, temporary administrator of ESTATE OF PIMENTEL, DECEASED, et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit

No. 061204. Argued March 17, 2008Decided June 12, 2008

A class action by and for human rights victims (Pimentel class) of Ferdinand Marcos, while he was President of the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), led to a nearly $2 billion judgment in a United States District Court. The Pimentel
class then sought to attach the assets of Arelma, S. A. (Arelma), a company incorporated by Marcos, held by a New York
broker (Merrill Lynch). The Republic and a Philippine commission (Commission) established to recover property
wrongfully taken by Marcos are also attempting to recover this and other Marcos property. The Philippine National Banc
(PNB) holds some of the disputed assets in escrow, awaiting the outcome of pending litigation in the Sandiganbayan, a
Philippine court determining whether Marcos property should be forfeited to the Republic. Facing claims from various
Marcos creditors, including the Pimentel class, Merrill Lynch filed this interpleader action under 28 U. S. C. 1335,
naming, among the defendants, the Republic, the Commission, Arelma, PNB (all petitioners here), and the Pimentel class
(respondents here). The Republic and the Commission asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, and moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), arguing that the action
could not proceed without them. Arelma and PNB also sought a Rule 19(b) dismissal. The District Court refused, but the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Republic and the Commission are entitled to sovereign immunity and are
required parties under Rule 19(a), and it entered a stay pending the Sandiganbayan litigations outcome. Finding that
that litigation could not determine entitlement to Arelmas assets, the District Court vacated the stay and ultimately
awarded the assets to the Pimentel class. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that dismissal was not warranted under
Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commission were required parties, their claim had so little likelihood of
success on the merits that the action could proceed without them. The court found it unnecessary to consider whether
prejudice to those entities might be lessened by a judgment or interim decree in the interpleader action, found the
entities failure to obtain a judgment in the Sandiganbayan an equitable consideration counseling against dismissing the
interpleader suit, and found that allowing the interpleader case to proceed would serve the Pimentel class interests.

Held:

1. Because Arelma and PNB also seek review of the Ninth Circuits decision, this Court need not rule on the question
whether the Republic and the Commission, having been dismissed from the suit, had the right to seek review of the
decision that the suit could proceed in their absence. As a general matter any party may move to dismiss an action
under Rule 19(b). Arelma and PNB have not lost standing to have the judgment vacated in its entirety on procedural
grounds simply because they did not appeal, or petition for certiorari on, the underlying merits ruling denying them the
interpleaded assets. Pp. 79.

2. Rule 19 requires dismissal of the interpleader action. Pp. 920.

(a) Under Rule 19(a), nonjoinder even of a required person does not always result in dismissal. When joinder is not
feasible, the question whether an action should proceed turns on nonexclusive considerations in Rule 19(b), which asks
whether in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.
The joinder issue can be complex, and the case-specific determinations involve multiple factors, some substantive,
some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests, Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U. S. 102 . Pp. 910.

(b) Here, Rule 19(a)s application is not contested: The Republic and the Commission are required entities. And this
Court need not decide the proper standard of review for Rule 19(b) decisions, because the Ninth Circuits errors of law
require reversal. Pp. 1019.

(1) The first factor directs the court to consider, in determining whether the action may proceed, the prejudice to
absent entities and present parties in the event judgment is rendered without joinder. Rule 19(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit
gave insufficient weight to the sovereign status of the Republic and the Commission in considering whether they would
be prejudiced if the case proceeded. Giving full effect to sovereign immunity promotes the comity and dignity interests
that contributed to the development of the immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461
U. S. 480 . These interests are concrete here. The entities claims arise from historically and politically significant events
for the Republic and its people, and the entities have a unique interest in resolving matters related to Arelmas assets. A
foreign state has a comity interest in using its courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. Its dignity is not enhanced if
other nations bypass its courts without right or good cause. A more specific affront could result if property the Republic
and the Commission claim is seized by a foreign court decree. This Court has not considered the precise question
presented, but authorities involving the intersection of joinder and the United States governmental immunity, see, e.g.,
Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371 , instruct that where sovereign immunity is asserted, and the
sovereigns claims are not frivolous, dismissal must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the absent
sovereigns interests. The claims of the Republic and the Commission were not frivolous, and the Ninth Circuit thus erred
in ruling on their merits. The privilege of sovereign immunity from suit is much diminished if an important and
consequential ruling affecting the sovereigns substantial interest is determined, or at least assumed, by a federal court
in its absence and over its objection. The Pimentel class interest in recovering its damages is not discounted, but
important comity concerns are implicated by assertion of foreign sovereign immunity. The error is not that the courts
below gave too much weight to the Pimentel class interests, but that they did not accord proper weight to the
compelling sovereign immunity claim. Pp. 1116.

(2) The second factor is the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by relief or measures
alternative to dismissal, Rule 19(b)(2), but no alternative remedies or forms of relief have been proposed or appear to be
available. As to the third factorwhether a judgment rendered without the absent party would be adequate, Rule
19(b)(3)adequacy refers not to satisfaction of the Pimentel class claims, but to the public stake in settling disputes
by wholes, whenever possible, Provident Bank, supra, at 111. Going forward with the action in the absence of the
Republic and the Commission would not further this public interest because they could not be bound by a judgment to
which they were not parties. As to the fourth factorwhether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action
were dismissed for nonjoinder, Rule 19(b)(4)the Ninth Circuit made much of the tort victims lack of an alternative
forum. But Merrill Lynch, not the Pimentel class, is the plaintiff as the stakeholder in the interpleader action. See 28 U. S.
C. 1335(a). The Pimentel class interests are not irrelevant to Rule 19(b)s equitable balance, but the Rules other
provisions are the relevant ones to consult. A dismissal on the ground of nonjoinder will not provide Merrill Lynch with a
judgment determining entitlement to the assets so it could be done with the matter, but it likely would give Merrill
Lynch an effective defense against piecemeal litigation by various claimants and inconsistent, conflicting judgments. Any
prejudice to Merrill Lynch is outweighed by prejudice to the absent entities invoking sovereign immunity. In the usual
course, the Ninth Circuits failure to give sufficient weight to the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission
would warrant reversal and remand for further determinations, but here, that error plus this Courts analysis under Rule
19(b)s additional provisions require the actions dismissal. Pp. 1720.

464 F. 3d 885, reversed and remanded.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito,
JJ., joined, in which Souter, J., joined as to all but Parts IVB and V,and in which Stevens, J., joined as to Part II. Stevens,
J., and Souter, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.

G.R. No. L-1403 October 29, 1948

VICENTE CALUAG and JULIANA GARCIA Petitioners, vs. POTENCIANO PECSON and ANGEL H. MOJICA, Judges of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and LEON ALEJO, Respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioners on the ground that the respondent judge acted
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the court in rendering the resolution dated April 1, 1947, which declares the
petitioners guilty of contempt of court for not complying or performing the order of the court of January 7, 1947, in case
No. 5486 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, requiring the petitioners to execute a deed of sale in favor of plaintiff
over one-half of the land pro indiviso in question, within ten days from the receipt of copy of said resolution, and which
orders that the petitioners be imprisoned until they perform the said act. virtual law library
The first ground on which the petition is based is that the judgment of the court which the petitioners are ordered to
perform has not yet become final. This ground is unfounded. From the pleadings and annexes it appears that the
judgment of the lower against the petitioners was appealed to the Court of Appeals and was affirmed by the latter in its
decision promulgated on May 30, 1944; that the petition to appeal to the Supreme Court by certiorari filed by the
petitioners was denied on July 24, 1944; that a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was also denied on
August 21, 1944; that the record of the case, having been destroyed during the liberation, was reconstituted; that on
September 24, 1945, the Deputy Clerk of this Court wrote a letter to and notified the petitioners of the resolution of the
Court declaring said record reconstituted, together with the copies of the decision of the Court of Appeals and
resolutions of the Supreme Court during Japanese occupation of June 24 and August 21, 1944; and that on October 23,
1946, the clerk of Court of First Instance of Bulacan notified the attorneys for both parties of the said decision of the
Court of Appeals and resolutions of the Supreme Court. There can be no question, therefore, that the judgment of the
Court of First Instance above-mentioned, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, has become final and executory.
The other two grounds alleged by the petitioners in support of the present petition for certiorari are: that plaintiff's
action abated or was extinguished upon the death of the plaintiff Fortunato Alejo, because his right of legal redemption
was a personal one, and therefore not transferable to his successors in interest; and that, even assuming that it is a
personal one and therefore transferable, his successors in interest have failed to secure the substitution of said
deceased by his legal representative under section 17, Rule 3. These reasons or grounds do not deserve any serious
consideration, not only because they are without merits, but because the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, having
jurisdiction to render that judgment, the latter cannot be disobeyed however erroneous it may be (Compaia General
de Tabacos vs. Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Mfg. Co., 33 Phil., 503; Golding vs. Balatbat, 36 Phil., 941). And this Court
cannot in this proceeding correct any error which may have been committed by the lower court.
However, although not alleged, we may properly take judicial notice of the fact that the respondent Judges have acted
without jurisdiction in proceeding against and declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt of court.
The contempt supposed to have been committed by the petitioners is not a direct contempt under section 1, Rule 64,
for it is not a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. It is
an indirect contempt or disobedience of a lawful order of the court, under section 3, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court.
According to sections 4 and 5 of said rule, where a contempt under section 3 has been committed against a superior
court or judge the charge may be filed with such superior court, and the accused put under custody; but if the hearing is
ordered to be had forthwith, the accused may be released from custody upon filing a bond in an amount to be fixed by
the court for his appearance to answer the charge. From the record it appears that no charge for contempt was filed
against the petitioners nor was a trial held. The only proceeding had in this case which led to the conviction of the
defendants are: the order of January 7, 1947, issued by the lower court requiring the defendants to execute the deed of
conveyance as direct in the judgment within ten days from the receipt of the copy of said order, with the admonition
that upon failure to do so said petitioners will be dealt with for contempt of court; the motion of March 21, 1947, filed
by the attorney for the respondent Leon Alejo, administrator of the estate of Fortunato Alejo, that the petitioners be
punished for contempt; and the resolution of the court of April 1, 1947, denying the second motion for reconsideration
of March 17, 1947, of the order of January 7, 1947, filed by the petitioners, and ordering the petitioners to be
imprisoned in the provincial jail until they have complied with the order of the court above mentioned.
It is well settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is something more than the general power
conferred by law upon a court to take cognizance of cases of the general class to which the particular case belongs. It is
not enough that a court has power in abstract to try and decide the class of litigations to which a case belongs; it is
necessary that said power be properly invoked, or called into activity, by the filing of a petition, complaint or other
appropriate pleading. A Court of First Instance has an abstract jurisdiction or power to try and decide criminal cases for
homicide committed within its territorial jurisdiction; but it has no power to try and decide a criminal case against a
person for homicide committed within its territory, unless a complaint or information against him be filed with the said
court. And it has also power to try civil cases involving title to real estate situated within its district; but it has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a dispute or controversy between two persons over title of real property located in his
province, unless a proper complaint be filed with its court. So, although the Court of First Instance of Bulacan has power
conferred by law to punish as guilty of indirect contempt a party who disobeys its order or judgment, it did not have or
acquire jurisdiction of the particular case under consideration to declare the petitioners guilty of indirect contempt, and
order their confinement until they have executed the deed of conveyance in question, because neither a charge has
been filed against them nor a hearing thereof held as required by law.
The respondent Judge Angel Mojica acted not only without jurisdiction in proceeding against and declaring the
petitioners guilty of contempt, but also in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the confinement of the petitioners, because
it had no power to impose such punishment upon the latter.
The respondent judge has no power under the law to order the confinement of the petitioners until they have compiled
with the order of the court. Section 9, Rule 39, in connection with section 7 of Rule 64, provides that if a person is
required by a judgment or order of the court to perform any other act than the payment of money or sale or delivery of
real or personal property, and said person disobeys such judgment or order while it is yet in his power to perform it, he
may be punished for contempt and imprisoned until he performs said order. This provision is applicable only to specific
acts other than those provided for or covered by section 10 of the same Rule, that is, it refers to a specific act which the
party or person must personally do, because his personal qualification and circumstances have been taken into
consideration in accordance with the provision of article 1161 of the Civil Code. But if a judgment directs a party to
execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any specific act which may be
performed by some other person, or in some other way provided by law with the same effect, as in the present case,
section 10, and not said section 9 of Rule 39 applies; and under the provision of said section 10, the court may direct the
act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party, by some other person appointed or designated by the court, and the
act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party himself.
It is also well settled by the authorities that a judgment may be void for want of power to render the particular
judgment, though the court may have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. A wrong decision made
within the limits of the court's authority is erroneous and may be corrected on appeal or other direct review, but a
wrong, or for that matter a correct, decision is void, and may be set aside either directly or collaterally, where the court
exceeds its jurisdiction and power in rendering it. Hence though the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the particular case has been submitted properly to it for hearing and decision, it will overstep its jurisdiction
if it renders a judgment which it has no power under the law to render. A sentence which imposes upon the defendant
in a criminal prosecution a penalty different from or in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to
impose for the offense of which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction, as to the excess
in the latter case. And a judgment of imprisonment which the court has no constitutional or statutory power to impose,
as in the present case, may also be collaterally attacked for want or rather in excess of jurisdiction. virtual law library
In Cruz vs. Director of Prisons (17 Phil., 269, 272, 273), this Court said the following applicable to punishment imposed
for contempt of court:
. . . The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes a punishment in excess of the power of the court to
impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the
weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts
are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has
served out so much of the sentence as was valid. (Ex parte Erdmann, 88 Cal., 579; Lowrey vs. Hogue, 85 Cal., 600;
Armstrong vs. People, 37 Ill., 459; State vs. Brannon, 34 La Ann., 942; People vs. Liscomb, 19 Am. Rep., 211; In re Taylor,
7 S. D., 382, 45 L. R. A., 136; Ex parte Mooney, 26 W. Va., 36, 53 Am. Rep., 59; U. S. vs. Pridgeon, 153 U. S., 48; In
re Graham, 138 U. S., 461.)
In the present case, in view of the failure of the petitioners to execute the deed of conveyance directed in the judgment
of the court, the respondent may, under section 10, Rule 39, either order its execution by some other person appointed
or designated by the court at the expense of the petitioners, or enter a judgment divesting the title of the petitioner
over the property in question and vesting it in Leon Alejo, administrator of estate of the deceased Fortunato Alejo, and
such judgment has the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
In view of the foregoing, the order of the court of April 7, 1947, ordering the confinement of the petitioners in the
provincial jail until they have complied with the order of the court, is set aside without costs. So ordered.