Jaime

Pudadera v. Magallanes
Fule v. CA
Claudel v. CA
Secuya v. de Selma
Abrigo v. De Vera
Carumba v. CA
Liao v. CA 2000
Naawan Community Rural Bank v. CA
Ruiz v. CA 2001
Valdevieso v. Damalerio
Dagupan Trading Co. v. Macam
Lichauco v. Berenguer
Hanapol v. Pilapil
Bautista v. Fule
Radiowealth Finance v. Palileo
Espiritu v. Valerio
Dischoso v. Roxas

https://www.scribd.com/document/332748980/Valdevieso-vs-Damalerio-ProvRem

https://www.scribd.com/document/191498432/Naawan-Community-Rural-Bank-Inc-vs-CA

https://www.scribd.com/document/115268832/Secuya-v-de-Selma

CARUMBA v CAFACTS: Canuto sold a parcel of land to Carumba by virtue of a Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Land. The sale was never registered. Thereafter, Canuto was sued for collection of money,
and the said land was levied upon and sold to Balbuena, who registered it. ISSUE: Who has a better
right, Carumba or Balbuena? HELD: CARUMBA. Art. 1544 does not apply in this case. Instead, the Rules
of Court are applicable. Balbuena, the later vendee, merely steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor
and acquires all the rights and interests of the latter. By the time the lot was sold through the
foreclosure proceedings, it was no longer owned by Canuto by virtue of a prior sale to Carumbawho
has a better right.

Spouses ABRIGO vs. DE VERA

NOVEMBER 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ

Spouses ABRIGO vs. DE VERA

G.R. No. 154409

June 21, 2004

FACTS: Villafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan and Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go covered by a
tax declaration. Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar and a Cave-Go, Villafania obtained a free patent
over the parcel of land involved.The said free patent was later on cancelled by a TCT.

On Oct 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the Spouses Abrigo.

On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house and lot to de Vera. De Vera registered the sale and as a
consequence a TCT was issued in her name.

De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against Spouses Abrigo before the MTC.

Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary
injunction, restraining order and damages Villafania.

The parties submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant (RTC) case that
neither of them can physically take possession of the property in question until the instant case is
terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.

The RTC rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said
Decision, Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the
house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Tigno-Salazar and Cave-
Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of
any demand. Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their
name

The RTC rendered the assailed Decision awarding the properties to Spouses Abrigo as well as damages.
Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and attorneys
fees.

Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].

In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence dismissed
the appeal of Private Respondent de Vera.Since Villafania had already transferred ownership to
Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void.The CA
also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award them
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

On reconsideration found Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The
appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus
be protected.

Hence, this Petition.9

ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the property.

HELD: DE VERA

The petition is denied, and the assailed decision affirmed.The present case involves what in legal
contemplation was a double sale. Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed property to Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently a second sale was executed
by Villafania with Respondent de Vera.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.

There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens
system.

In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property. Since
neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was
covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act 3344 For her part,
respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens system because, during the sale, Villafania had
presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.

Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind
the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens
system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article
1544 of the Civil Code.

More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right of a
party who had registered the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to
another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in
time principle was not applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the
time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the registration
of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be
upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.

Fule v. CA

Facts:

Gregorio Fule, a banker and a jeweller, offered to sell his parcel of land to Dr. Cruz in exchange for
P40,000 and a diamond earring owned by the latter. A deed of absolute sale was prepared by Atty.
Belarmino, and on the same day Fule went to the bank with Dichoso and Mendoza, and Dr. Cruz arrived
shortly thereafter. Dr. Cruz got the earrings from her safety deposit box and handed it to Fule who,
when asked if those were alright, nodded and took the earrings. Two hours after, Fule complained that
the earrings were fake. He files a complaint to declare the sale null and void on the ground of fraud and
deceit.

Issue:

Whether the sale should be nullified on the ground of fraud

Held:

A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is
the object of the contract and upon the price. Being consensual, a contract of sale has the force of law
between the contracting parties and they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective
contractual commitments. It is evident from the facts of the case that there was a meeting of the minds
between petitioner and Dr. Cruz. As such, they are bound by the contract unless there are reasons or
circumstances that warrant its nullification.

Contracts that are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the
contracting parties are: (1) those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
and (2) those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
The records, however, are bare of any evidence manifesting that private respondents employed such
insidious words or machinations to entice petitioner into entering the contract of barter. It was in fact
petitioner who resorted to machinations to convince Dr. Cruz to exchange her jewelry for the Tanay
property.

Furthermore, petitioner was afforded the reasonable opportunity required in Article 1584 of the Civil
Code within which to examine the jewelry as he in fact accepted them when asked by Dr. Cruz if he was
satisfied with the same. By taking the jewelry outside the bank, petitioner executed an act which was
more consistent with his exercise of ownership over it. This gains credence when it is borne in mind that
he himself had earlier delivered the Tanay property to Dr. Cruz by affixing his signature to the contract
of sale. That after two hours he later claimed that the jewelry was not the one he intended in exchange
for his Tanay property, could not sever the juridical tie that now bound him and Dr. Cruz. The nature and
value of the thing he had taken preclude its return after that supervening period within which anything
could have happened, not excluding the alteration of the jewelry or its being switched with an inferior
kind.

Ownership over the parcel of land and the pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings had been transferred to
Dr. Cruz and petitioner, respectively, upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. Said contract of
sale being absolute in nature, title passed to the vendee upon delivery of the thing sold since there was
no stipulation in the contract that title to the property sold has been reserved in the seller until full
payment of the price or that the vendor has the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment
the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period.

While it is true that the amount of P 40,000.00 forming part of the consideration was still payable to
petitioner, its nonpayment by Dr. Cruz is not a sufficient cause to invalidate the contract or bar the
transfer of ownership and possession of the things exchanged considering the fact that their contract is
silent as to when it becomes due and demandable.

Dagupan Trading vs. Macam

14 SCRA 99
May 1965

FACTS:

Sammy Maron and his seven brothers and sisters were pro-indiviso owners of a parcel of unregistered
land located in barrio Parayao, Binmaley, Pangasinan. In 1955, while their application for registration of
said land under Act No. 496 was pending, they executed, on June 19 and on September 21, two deeds of
sale conveying the property to herein respondent Rustico Macam who thereafter took possession of the
property and made substantial improvements upon it. On October 14, 1955, OCT No. 6942 covering the
land was issued in the name of the Marons, free from all liens and encumbrances.

On August 4, 1956, however, by virtue of a final judgment of the Municipal Court of Manila in a civil case
in favor of Manila Trading and Supply Co. (Manila Trading) against Sammy Maron, levy was made upon
whatever interest he had in the subject property. Thereafter, said interest was sold at public auction to
the judgment creditor Manila Trading. The corresponding notice of levy, certificate of sale and the
sheriff's certificate of final sale in favor of Manila Trading - because nobody exercised the right of
redemption - were duly registered, and on March 1, 1958, the latter sold all its rights and title in the
property to herein petitioner Dagupan Trading Company (Dagupan Trading).

On September 4, 1958, Dagupan Trading filed an action against Macam, praying that it be declared
owner of one-eighth portion of the subject property. The CFI of Pangasinan dismissed the said
complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision.

ISSUE:

Who has the superior right over the one-eight portion of the subject property?

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed both decisions of the lower courts. At the time of the levy, Sammy
Maron already had no interest on the one-eight portion of the property he and his siblings have
inherited because for a considerable time prior to the levy, said interest had already been conveyed
upon Macam "fully and irretrievably" - as the Court of Appeals held. Consequently, the subsequent levy
made on the property for the purpose of satisfying the judgment rendered against Sammy Maron in
favor of the Manila Trading Company was void and of no effect.

The unregistered sale and the consequent conveyance of title and ownership in favor Macam could not
have been cancelled and rendered of no effect upon the subsequent issuance of the Torrens title over
the entire parcel of land. Moreover, upon the execution of the deed of sale in his favor by Sammy
Maron, Macam had immediately taken possession of the land conveyed as its new owner and
introduced considerable improvements upon it himself. To deprive him, therefore, of the same by sheer
force of technicality would be against both justice and equity.