Rana Rassouli

The Islamic States Water Wars: Examining the Role of Hydro Hegemony as a State-
Building Measure in Establishing a Caliphate in Syria and Iraq

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Rana Rassouli

Abstract

This dissertation looks at the framework of hydro politics under the Islamic State
(IS). The group have seized several important dams on the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers as a part of its expansionist strategy and, since 2014, have used water as a
weapon in several ways. The Hydro Hegemonic framework, a state-centric
concept, is applied to IS - a non-state actor. The group have demonstrated that
they have gained a level of legitimacy amongst political actors and local
populations through carrying out state-like functions. Based on the case studies of
Iraq and Syria, IS has exploited hydro hegemonic principles to determine their
decisions on water allocation and distribution. The qualitative data that was used
for this research suggests that IS have exploited water and its infrastructure
towards state-building attempts. The framework of power that is applied to IS
include geographic, bargaining, ideational and material power. Ideational and
material power can be observed in the fact that the group has constructed a
discourse in their territories that they govern: speaking outside the discursive
hegemony will have consequences. The passivity of the Syrian government and
Iraqi troops in defeating IS only reinforces their legitimacy and works towards
their goal of territorial acquisition and financial endowments from their social and
political governance. However, the research serves as a basis for discussion about
how appropriate the framework is for understanding the subnational level and non-
state actors as hegemons. Furthermore, through the discussion and critical analysis
of hydro politics, it addresses the contradiction that the group views themselves
both as a quasi-government actor and a Jihadi organization. This will prove to be
problematic in the long-term as it does not conform to conventional methods of
viable state-building projects.

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Abbreviations

FSA Free Syrian Army

HH Hydro Hegemony (or Hydro Hegemonic framework)

ISIS / IS Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (or Islamic State)

ISW Institute for the Study of War (American think tank)

LWRG London Water Research Group

MENA Middle East and North Africa (region)

PKK Turkish Kurdish Nationalist organization

SDF Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces

T&E Tigris and Euphrates rivers

YPG Syrian Kurdish militias

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List of figures

Figure 1: Sites of Islamic State Water Manipulation22

Figure 2: Syria and Iraq in the HH framework57

Figure 3: ISs capabilities applied to the HH framework..58

Illustration 1: Pillars of Hydro Hegemony.30

Map 1: Areas in Syria and Iraq under the control of IS as of July 1, 201646

Map 2: Islamic State governance areas as of July 201449

Map 3: Map demonstrating a shrinkage of IS-controlled territory, 2015.60

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Contents

CHAPTER 1

Introduction.10

Part I:
Trouble on the Tigris and Euphrates: Historical Background..14

Part II
Water as a Political Instrument: Expanding the Caliphate on the T&E..18

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review.26

Theoretical Framework28

Methodology..33

CHAPTER 3

Findings..40

Bargaining Power..40

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Geographic Power44

Material and Ideational Power..50

Discussion.57

Conclusion..63

Bibliography..68

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The Islamic States Water Wars: the role of hydro hegemony in establishing a caliphate in
Syria and Iraq

Aims:
The aim of this dissertation is to highlight the importance of hydro politics in the ISs state-
building attempts on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers during the years of 2012 to 2017.

Hypothesis:

Through their strategic use of water and its infrastructure, this thesis suggests that it is possible to
apply the state-centric concepts of hydro hegemony to IS, a non-state actor. Through their
advancements on the four pillars of power (bargaining, geographic, material and ideational
power) they have gained a level of legitimacy to be accepted as bearing state-like qualities. More
significantly, these theories will help analyze the contradiction of how the group uses water as a
weapon and tool for governance simultaneously.

Research questions:

1) How can water be used as a political tool in the Islamic States strategy to establish and
expand a caliphate in Syria and Iraq?

2) How can the four pillars of hydro hegemony (geographic, material, bargaining and
ideational) be applied as a framework to a non-state actor?

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Chapter 1:
Introduction.

The greater Fertile Crescent, which comprises of Syria and Iraq, experienced the worst drought

on record from 2007-2010 (King, 2016). With the increasing demand for water, and due to the

increasing population and lack of ample supply and corrupt water policies, has only further

complicated problems caused by the drought conditions. The role of water has had different

sociopolitical impacts in both countries. In Iraq, the cycle of conflict and violence dates before

ISIS developed strong holds in the territory the roots of radicalization began to prosper during

the US invasion of 2003 and the previous drought. Syria, on the other hand, addresses more

environmental issues of climate change which caused larger geopolitical issues such as drought

conditions and human and food insecurity, ultimately depending the pre-existing ethnic and

sociopolitical fractures (King, 2016).

International headlines were made in late January 2016 that the Islamic State (IS) was using the

Taqba dam, Syrias largest dam, as a fulcrum of power as a shelter for senior officials and

hiding prisoners for them not to be killed by US airstrikes (Paletta, 2016). Whilst much of the

discourse surrounding water politics focuses on whether it is a source of conflict versus

cooperation, this thesis will aim to carve a deeper understanding of the consequences hydro-

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hegemony if it is used as a political instrument to confer bargaining power and earn legitimacy.

The Islamic States control over the dams in Syria and Iraq allows it to use water as both a

weapon and a tool for governance.

Water is a crucial resource for three particularly important reasons. Firstly, it can be used as a

weapon for coercion, secondly, it can be used as a form of political leverage, and thirdly, by

providing water services, it can be used to legitimize a governments rule. Jennifer Dyer, former

United States intelligence officer highlighted that if The Islamic State has any hope of

establishing itself on territory, it has to control some water... In Iraq, water and lines of strategic

approach are the same thing (Vidal, 2014).

Significance of study

Since its expansionist strategy, IS has used water as a tool in its broader aims of advancing and

establishing control over new land. Indeed, the group perhaps has more visibly targeted strategic

oil and natural gas fields in Iraq and Syria, but a more localized insight reveals the groups

movements around the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which holds a central role in its planning.

Recognizing the groups intentions to organize its new caliphate around the basin may prove

helpful in the long-term fight against them.

In 2012, the Islamic State emerged from the power vacuum created by the Syrian civil war and

made its presence known in the Western city of Aleppo. They were distinguishable with Syrias

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other rebel groups, which were primarily targeting the forces of Syrian President Bashar al Assad

for a regime change. The Islamic State was a terrorist organization with a clear agenda: it wanted

to establish an Islamic caliphate that would follow the truest form of Islam as decreed by the

Prophet Mohammed. Over the next year, the group remained streamlined and quickly formed a

path through Syria, towards Iraq, capturing the key towns of Maskana, Deir el-Zour, Raqqa and

al-Bukumal, all of which are positioned along the river (Cunningham, 2014).

Iraq did not look much different; the Islamic State easily captured river towns of Qaim, Rawah,

Ramadi and Fallujah, two of which (Rawah and Ramadi) were directly connected to two of

Iraqs major lakes, Haditha Dam Lake and Lake Tharthar. They simultaneously pursued this

whilst capturing Mosul and Tikrit and attempting to seize other towns and cities which were

located on their way. The goal in Iraq was Baghdad, which could help comprise of the caliphate

establishment in Syria and Iraq. Whilst their well-known oil and natural gas fields that were

annexed was a means to threaten and coerce military forces and make money, their stronghold on

bodies of water and water infrastructure worked to hold the entire region hostage

Summary

Sections I of this chapter aims to situate the historical background of the two countries with

deeper tensions that made them an ideal target for occupation and terrorism. Section II of this

chapter will demonstrate the alignment of ISs strategy using water as a political instrument to

meet their goals. The methodology will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. Chapter

2 will highlight the overarching conceptual and theoretical backbone in use and demonstrate the
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hydro hegemonic framework which will be used to apply to their activity in Syria and Iraq. It

will also provide an overview of other supporting literature in transboundary water contexts.

Chapter 3 will be divided into two sections: the findings and discussion. The findings section

will demonstrate the four pillars of power that is central to this dissertation (bargaining,

geographic, material and ideational) and apply it to the actions and strategies of IS, a non-state

actor. The discussion in the second half of this chapter will critically analyze the literature and its

state-centric approach and address the contradiction of the weaponization of water as both an

instrument of governance and tool for violence. The critique will also work to highlight any

information gaps in the literature and recommendations for the area of study. Finally, chapter 4

will make any concluding statements and provide a brief overview of the insights the dissertation

has demonstrated.

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Part I) Trouble on the Tigris and Euphrates:

Historical background

Iraq and Syria: bilateral relations

In 1966, Syria and Iraq began bilateral negotiations. The talks aimed to reconcile appropriate distribution

of the Euphrates. Historically, Iraq had made more use of the Euphrates river on a larger scale than Syria.

Further, Iraq wanted to secure more water for increased demand in the future. As the classic downstream

state, Iraq insisted on its claim to acquired rights to a fixed share of the rivers discharge (Lowi, 1995,

p.57). Syria argued in favor of potential needs rather than acquired rights, and three years later of

negotiations, Iraq had the rights 59%, despite the agreement never being formalized. However, when the

Keban and Tabqa dams became operational in 1971, the flow of water to Syria and Iraq decreased

dramatically. An additional 200 million cubic meters (mcm) was granted.

During this time, Syria also acquiesced to filling the reservoir with less water to preserve Iraqs

agricultural needs. In 1975, Iraq charged Syria with violation of the agreement by reducing the flow,

placing a rural population of three million at risk (Lowi, 1995). This was a direct result of Syrians filling

the reservoir that was newly constructed at Tabqa Dam. Iraq filed the complaint with the Arab League as

it had received less than half the volume of water it had received in the years prior; the newly constructed

Tabqa dam was a new source of tension and began to chip at inter-state relations between Syria and Iraq.

Amidst the background of political and ideological tensions that had been boiling since the Bath regime in

Baghdad in July of 1968, the charges Iraq had placed in Syria had quickly escalated to much more visible

and serious disputes. The overarching political rivalries prevented the technical issues from being

addressed and approached strategically. By 1975, third party involvement was administered to ease

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tensions between the two countries.

Members of the Arab league, Saudi Arabia and Egypt attempted to work as mediators to prevent the

escalation of the disputes. Syrian troops were present on the border between Iraq and Syria. In a de-

escalation effort, Saudi Arabia had devised a strategy where the water could be divided on a proportional

basis (Khatib, 2015). The agreement was never signed and the dispute remained unchanged. The political

rivalries between the two countries began at the Bath Party takeover of Iraq in 1968. The Bath Party had

been a power in Syria since 1963, but in 1966, the government of the old guard, or the founding fathers

of the party were expelled by dissenting younger members; two years later, the old guard rise to power

in Iraq. The threat which this posed was very real to the Syrian regime, was also struggling with an old

guard (thus, Pro-Iraqi) contingent at home (Lowi, 1995). Ultimately, the Bath party characterized the

hostile inter-state relations between the two nations, and prevented any real progress between technical

issues in addition to the already existing political ones.

Water became tied into the regional politics shortly after. The criticism of Syria on behalf of Iraq began

when Syria decreased the water flow to Iraq, and they were also accused of retaliation efforts towards Iraq

due to tensions over Syrias friendly relations with Israel. Hence, water politics began to fuel the fire to

inter-Arab tensions and created a complex web of conflict where negotiations became difficult, if not

impossible as they began to cut diplomatic and communicative ties with one another. The lack of third

party involvement also had an element of neglect from the international community where cooperation

was disregarded.

Downstream riparians be dammed.

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Turkey, despite not being a central theme of this thesis, should also be mentioned as the main, upstream

riparian of the trio. Regardless of its upstream position, it is also economically and militarily superior to

the downstream riparians. Turkeys water usage is to generate hydropower for its growing economy,

encourage development to its southeastern provinces and to appease the Kurdish population (Mulholland,

2015). Syria, despite having a geographic advantage in comparison to Iraq is still economically

disadvantaged compared to the two neighbors. Both Syria and Iraq would stand to benefit with a

cooperative agreement with Turkey. Hegemony, recognition and legitimacy characterize the inter-state

relations in the region. Further, Bathist rivalries between the two nations introduced the question of

credibility and legitimacy. Turkish economic and military superiority brought in the issue of regional

hegemony to the water discourse (Mulholland, 2015). When Turkeys East Anatolia project reaches

completion, it will remove 14-17 billion cubic meters (bcm) from the water system, which will challenge

Syrias hydropower capabilities and agricultural systems. Rural communities have already started to

abandon their once fertile farmlands because of water issues and domestic disputes in addition to the

coercion Islamic State, which will be elaborated on shortly. Iraq, on the other hand, is suffering without

one third of their previous water levels, which not only affects the drinking water supply but is also

causing the collapse of the agricultural economy further downstream, which will only have more

implications once the Islamic State becomes a more integral part of their water worries.

The perfect target

Water infrastructure can be targeted directly or indirectly through disease-causing agents

(Gleick, 2006). The damage is done by hurting civilians who are using the water supply, making

the water unusable, destroying purification and supply infrastructure. Water facilities such as

dams, reservoirs and pipelines are easily accessible to the public at various points throughout the

areas in which they are serving, which makes them vulnerable to hacking through computer

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control systems and manual intervention. An example which is often cited by scholars is the

contamination in the water systems of Milwaukee in the United States in 1993 which killed over

one hundred people and affected the health of 400,000 more with an outbreak of

Cryptosporidium (MacKenzie, 1994; Smith, 1994). The outbreak, which was not a terrorism-

related incident, sheds light on the vulnerability of water mechanisms to similar undetected,

intentionally caused contamination events or simply, what could happen if water systems were

in the hands of the wrong people.

However, it should be noted that terrorist attacks that ultimately fail and do not kill or injure

people still have fundamental political implications by affecting public perception, hindering

legitimacy of the current institutions and forcing inappropriate political responses. Wardlaw

(1989) significantly highlighted that societies respond differently to natural and human-caused

disasters: we often accept large casualties from natural disasters with a degree of sanguinity not

matched by responses to intentional acts of violence. Terrorism, on the other hand, destroys the

social safety net which is offered under a nation-state and sense of normality and introduces

substantial stress and uncertainty on both the individual and community level (Ursano, 2003).

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Part II) Water as a Political Instrument:

Expanding the caliphate on the T&E

This section aims to address the first research question: how water can be used as a political tool

for IS in establishing and expanding an Islamic caliphate. Going back in history, there have been

accounts in history of water being used for military and political instruments, dating back over

2,500 years (Gleick, 2004). Water resources are particularly sensitive targets as there is no

substitution for water, and where there is scarcity, any contamination or damage to the water

supply can have adverse effects where the community will suffer greatly. However, it is not only

a shortage which can harm a society, but also an overabundance of water, such as flooding,

which can also lead to great socio-economic damage and fatalities.

Defining terrorism in the context of water infrastructure:

Scholars have often noted that providing a working definition of terrorism is problematic and

generally challenging when attempting to deconstruct certain behaviors of a group (Hoffman,

1998; Wardlaw, 1989; Martin, 2006). In this piece of work, which assumes certain behaviors

would enable the Islamic State to operate as a quasi-government, it is important to make these

distinctions and have a nuanced understanding of the term and the appropriateness of its context.

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A review of the challenges defining the word terrorism in the context of water infrastructure is

provided by Gleick (2006: Chapter 1). As there are varying levels of terrorism in a modern-day

context, a working definition will be adopted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in

the US Code of Federal Regulations in Title 22, Section 2656, which states, Terrorism means

premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-

national groups of clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. Undoubtedly,

this focuses on the pursuit of political or social objectives, which can include religious, cultural,

economic or psychological factors.

Increasingly important in this discourse is the pursuit of targets. In traditional discussions,

terrorists target governments, political figures, objects of economic or social significance or

random civilians (Gleick, 2006). As Thornton (1964) noted, the relatively high efficiency of

terrorism derives from its symbolic nature. If the terrorist comprehends that he is seeking a

demonstration effect, he will attack targets with a maximum symbolic value. The question at

this point arises: are there any other resources with more symbolic power than water itself?

Lack of cooperation

Historically, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers have been a source of tension between Iraq, Iran,

Syria and Turkey. The lack of cooperation on behalf of all the states have resulted in a lack of

proper regulation on the consumption of the water resources. In general, most activities by

upstream nations in relation to the water resources have tendencies to have tensions with

countries that are place on the downstream level of the river or basin (Allan, 2000). With a lack

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of regional coordination and questionable level of security, it creates an ideal opportunity for

terrorists to take strong hold and use the infrastructure as a target and instrument of coercion.

The Islamic State not only have destroyed water-related infrastructure such as bridges, cables,

pipes, sanitation planets and installation materials, but they have used it for political agenda-

setting by violence and deliberately flooding towns, polluting, contaminating bodies of water and

destroying the local economies by disrupting water access, agriculture and electricity generation.

The demonstration of the control over the dam correspond with the level of control that can be

used towards political relationships and bargaining power an actor can have in the region

(Mezzofiore, 2016). Turkey can be used as an example whereby they used bargaining power

with water as an instrument for political leverage with the Syrian government in 1987, where

they only complied with the agreed flow-rate of the Euphrates from Turkey into Syria in

exchange for cooperation with Bashar Al-Asad against the Kurdish rebels from Turkey, which

were fleeing to Turkey as refugees (Future directions International, 2012). Khan (2016) has

highlighted a more recent example where Turkey was on the receiving end of a ransom from the

Islamic State where they held a Turkish consul member hostage in Iraq in exchange for

Turkeys cooperation for re-opening the flow of the Euphrates into the Islamic State-controlled

territory in Iraq.

The survival of the caliphate and water dependency

The Islamic State has been using water as a weapon and has made it strikingly clear for the

domestic and international populace, as published in their magazine, Dabiq, its either Islamic

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State or the flood (Dabiq, Issue 2, 1435 Ramadan). Following this, in April 2014, the Islamic

State closed the gates of the Nuaymiyah Dam near Fallujah to flood government forces

upstream, as far as the town of Abu Ghraib (Khan, 2016). Settlements, farms and villages in an

area of over 200 square miles were flooded, the closing of the gates ultimately deprived the

downstream Shiite population of southern Iraq of their water supply. Ultimately, 60,000 people

were displaced and 12,000 family homes were destroyed in the cities of Karbala, Najaf, Babylon

and Nasiriyah (Vidal, 2014). Shortly after, the Islamic State deprived 12,000 people in the city of

Amerli of necessities such as food, water and medicine for months (Karadsheh, 2014). They

continued to cut off water to Balad Ruz and lined the roads to the dam with improvised explosive

devices which probed the government to hire trucks to bring potable water to civilians as a

means of survival (Cunningham, 2014).

In 2014, the Islamic State focused the attention of local and international spectators as they

would probe a collapse in one of Iraqs largest dams the Mosul dam. Whether their threats

were intentional or implicated because of their battles occurring in the immediate area, it is

difficult to know. The destruction of the Mosul Dam was referred to as potentially catastrophic

by the U.S army (Paley, 2007) and would directly threaten the lives of 500,000 Iraqis. However,

the Islamic State no longer has a strong hold of the dam itself and there are efforts to maintain

the dam under the local governments control with varying estimates of the effects it can have in

the region and the severity of its disrepair (Mezzofiore, 2016).

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Ultimately, the creation of legitimacy is assisted through hydro-hegemonic control in creating a

territorial sovereign caliphate. The sophisticated system of governance includes a range of

administrative functions, which is why this thesis will not refer to the Islamic State simply as a

terrorist organization, but also recognize the potential of a semi-functioning quasi state in

relation to their ability to provide infrastructure projects, social services, necessities such as food,

electricity and water in addition to education, security and regulation of these services (Caris &

Reynolds, 2014). For the caliphate to be established, it requires basic provisions and services that

a state would provide; not only does this require law and social order, but water and electricity,

too. Water is the most critical component for creating the precursors that are necessary for social

stability and their rule. A resident in Mosul stated that if IS could only maintain services then

people would support them until the last second (Khan, 2016; Solomon, 2015). Figure 1

demonstrates water manipulation and areas under IS control in 2015.

Figure 1: Sites of Islamic State Water Manipulation (Stratfor, 2015)

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On one hand, IS acknowledge that these provisions and services are essential for building a state

and maintaining its power over the populace. So much so that they attempt to resolve any issues

and disruptions over the water access to maintain their hegemonic position, even if they are

militarily defeated by official government forces. This can be demonstrated when the group

blamed the water shortages on Turkey (Hage Ali, 2014), and by diverting the blame, ultimately,

IS shows that it understands that providing basic water services in a fundamental part of its state-

building attempts.

The Islamic State has had successes and failures in the strong hold of water resources and

managing them within their territory. When Raqqa was made the de facto capital city of the

Islamic State, it began running dam power plants in high capacity in order to ensure the access of

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electricity (Caris & Reynolds, 2014). However, the hydroelectric power that was required to be

run at high capacity at the Tabqa Dam required emptying the entire reservoir, which resulted in

the water levels to drop dramatically, by six meters, (Caris & Reynolds, 2014 ) of Lake Assad.

This caused major challenges for the Islamic State, having little hindsight to the issue, to try and

fix and refill the reservoir by rationing electricity from the dam. However, this created more

complications and resulted in black outs in the city of Aleppo which would range from 16 to 20

hours a day (Pearce, 2014). A more regional consequence which has been recorded, which also

creates another complication towards the issue, was the 50-meter level drop in the Euphrates

River in the summer of 2015 (Caris & Reynolds, 2014).

To maintain and keep the existing staff around the dams, the Islamic State has built wells and

implemented a sophisticated system of taxation on water (Ahram, 2015). They have also devised

a plan in relation to using local expertise and labor and recruiting followers from social media on

a global scale. Since the Tabqa Dam that is situated outside the city of Raqqa, suggesting that

they are aware of the lack of specialized knowledge and labor require to manage the supplies

(Massih, 2014). At this point in time, the regimes in Syria and Iraq continued to fund the

government allocated engineers and workers in the dams, which were operating under the

supervision of the Islamic State (Sly, 2015).

The way in which the Islamic State have approached water as both a weapon and an instrument

for political bargaining that is attempting to supply it as a basic provision guides the

contradiction in ISs strategy. In administrating one of the four forms of power which will be

elaborated on later. However, the strategies are incompatible with one another as they cannot

flood, contaminate and drown the populations water sources and farmland it hopes to govern.

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Ultimately, the Islamic State intends to use water to administer power over its territory and

afterwards govern new territories and provide water and electricity through managing water

infrastructure. However, in using it as a weapon, it is also damaging territory, losing credibility

and alienating the populations in which they hope to govern. This paradox suggests that the

power they administer may not necessarily be long-term, but it is rather used as a short-term

strategy to enhance their hegemonic capabilities. This will also be explored later in this thesis.

Aligning ISIS with hydro politics

It is important to navigate the purpose of Islamic State on a basic level to understand that it is not

simply a terrorist organization, although it will be referred to as such in this paper. Islamic state,

as Wood (2015) highlighted, is no mere collection of psychopaths, rather, they are a governing,

functioning body with an executive judiciary, religious and military councils which outsources

and creates funding and uses a taxation system. Further, it has constructed a socio-economic

system within a political framework which includes infrastructure and humanitarian projects

which regulates food, manages grocery shops and bakeries and micro-manages educational

facilities and security measures (Caris & Reynolds, 2014).

On a broader scale, it is becoming increasingly evident that the Islamic State have failed in

several areas to deliver clean water services, leading to widespread waterborne and poor

sanitation-related diseases (Fakhir, 2015). There are not wide-spread reports of ISIS delivering

water to the public effectively, but in this case, it has been somewhat successful in delivering

water to its controlled territories (Tomlinson, 2014). In some cases, the drudgery of water-related

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tasks (for example, fetching water, drawing water from wells, etc) has caused converts to the

Islamic State to become disillusioned, often leaving ISIS controlled territories, leaving the group

vulnerable in populating the areas they want to govern.

Methodology:

In this thesis, qualitative, inductive research is conducted. Due to the current situation in Iraq and

Syria and time restrictions, it is not possible to conduct fieldwork in the form of interviews or

otherwise. Therefore, the work in this thesis depends on the works of others, which has been

accessed online and through print books, journals and newspaper articles.

Primary resources will be obtained on the Council of Foreign Relations, Institute for the Study of

War and Combating Terrorism Centre websites. These will be used to illustrate a series of

relevant events, rather than establish a narrative or discourse. CNN, BBC, Al-Jazeera, The

Atlantic and The New York Times are a few news sources that will be useful in placing the

theoretical and conceptual components examined in the secondary resources and link them to

events that have occurred throughout ISISs history. These will include efforts of

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contamination/destruction of water infrastructure, mobilization of the group, public

announcements, sequence of events and territorial expansion to give a broader lens on the effect

and consequence of their actions. The mixture of scholarly literature, articles, news sources in

addition to primary resources will allow for a more streamlined approach for this piece of

research. The diverse array of data collection allows less room for error and fact-checking.

For the literature, the dominant discourse will be in relation to Zeitouns (2010) hydro political

typologies. This will seek to explain how their adoption of these four pillars has not only

legitimized their cause, but taken advantage of the already existing power asymmetries present in

Iraq and Syria. This has ultimately granted them political leverage in relation to their hegemonic

position in water resources, allowing them to have state-like functions and have more power in

operating like one than the present government institutions.

It is worth noting that the focus is on a relatively new and emerging theme in international

politics and water security discourses, thus rendering it a challenge to find sources that is

specifically on point with the questions at hand. The research is built upon the use and analysis

of secondary literature, reports, updates and newsletters. Moreover, two main bodies of materials

will be used: for the illustration of IS-related activities, I use documents from the Institute for the

Study of War which has extensive and in-depth materials on terrorism-related information.

Furthermore, there will be materials from the London Water Research Group (LWRG) which has

published expert-related work on critical hydro political theories and water politics in the Middle

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East (Zeitoun et. al). This will be used to inform the conceptual framework and thus the findings

will be materialized on that basis.

Regarding Syria and Iraq, it is important to avoid heavy judgments from hindsight. This means

accounting for the fact that the study of the Middle East has been fraught with controversies and

disputes over approaches, interpretations and methods, especially in relation to the Islamic State.

Imagery, essentializing and othering have heavily informed and influenced dominant paradigms

and knowledge production on the region and it is important to take note of this. In this

research, almost all the used sources emanate from European of American scholars, journalists

and news sources. Other sources cannot be and are not free of some built-in biases. Because of

this focus on these two countries, comparative research vis--vis other countries in the region

must, unfortunately, be left out.

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Literature Review:

Dam in Distress

Literature review.

Zeitoun and Warner (2006) published an article in Water Policy introducing the concept of

Hydro Hegemony a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts. The

Framework of Hydro Hegemony (FHH, or HH) was used as a platform to better inform who

gets how much of the water, how and why in trans-boundary water conflicts by bringing

multiple forms of power into the debate whilst understanding the various intensities and forms of

conflict (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, p.436). Hydro Hegemony is defined as hegemony at the

river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies such as resource capture,

integration and containment (2006, p.435). The actors defined as hegemons often make use of

various forms of power to maintain their positions and advance their interests. In 1974, Lukes

suggested a three-dimensional typology of power, Zeitoun and Warner, amongst other political

and social scientists have used this typology to inform their frameworks.

The first, and most obvious pillar is material power. This dimension includes economic and

military power in addition to technological capacity which is used to govern areas. The second

dimension, bargaining power, revolves around the ability to control the rules of the game

(Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, p. 442), influencing the agenda and what is and is not negotiable

with other actors. Appeals to the international community and international law is sometimes

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used in this form of power. The third dimension of power is the most challenging to grasp and

most difficult to counteract. Through ideational power, hegemons are able to influence ideas and

assumptions not only their own, but other actors and civilians alike. The third dimension is the

capacity to create, hold and destroy narratives, perceptions, and knowledge. (Farnum, 2013, p.

12). Bargaining and ideational power are sometimes referred to as soft power, a term which

was coined by Joseph Nye in 1990 and expanded upon in 2004. In contrast, the first dimension is

often called hard power. State actors are frequently engaged with each other in conflicts over

water and other natural resources, but these conflicts do not always take the form of armed

warfare.

The absence of military conquest, and even the presence of cooperation between actors does not

necessarily imply that conflict and hegemonic control over water resources is not taking place.

Nor are conflict and hegemony automatically negative. Certain forms of hydro-hegemony may

result in positive leadership in creating shared control over water resources, and may work out as

mutually beneficial. Zeitoun and Warners framework creates a structure for analyzing how

control over water resources is gained, maintained and could be changed. Illustration 1, as

demonstrated below, shows the three original pillars of hydro hegemony: the three dimensions of

power are combined as one pillar, with riparian position and exploitational potential as the other

two. Revisiting the framework in 2010, which is going to be used for this thesis, Casco and

Zeitoun suggest making distinctions for the three pillars as dimensions of their own, with the

addition of Geography as the fourth. The original pillar of riparian position is part of

geography; the infrastructure forming the exploitation potential is a part of material power

(2010). The authors use the revised pillars as an updated and more efficient way to demonstrate

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which is the hegemon in a transboundary context. The four pillars are used for each of the

riparians, with the longer pillars signifying greater control. Comparing the plots can indicate an

estimated understanding of which riparian is the hydro hegemon.

Illustration 1: the original and revised pillars of hegemony (Source: Cascao and Zeitoun, 2010)

The revision of their pillars is being used for the point of analysis for this thesis. Further, it

allows for a more nuanced analysis of power, which Zeitoun and Warners original study argues

is the prime determinant in many water conflicts (2010, p.451). There is not a huge deviation

from the original pillars, and is still state-centric, which essentially does not take into

consideration non-state actors in addition to national and transnational contexts. Multiple

scholars have suggested that other levels are fundamental in providing an understanding of

transboundary water conflicts (Farnum, 2013; Warner and Zawahiri, 2012; Selby, 2014).

Zawahri, 2012).

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The HH framework has helped identify existing power asymmetries, especially in context with

extreme symmetry such as the Tigris and Euphrates (Zeitoun, 2008) and Nile (Cascao, 2005)

river basins. The framework draws heavily on the Copenhagen Schools concept of regional

security complexes and its conflict-intensity spectrum, which also rangers from non-politicized

to violised. The authors emphasize the fact that conflict arises when there is an imbalance in

control over water and in most transboundary water basins, control is shared in principle but not

in practice (Cascao and Zeitoun, 2012, p. 31). From a realist point of view, this theoretical

approach assumes that state riparians will act to maximize their interest regarding water. In

regions where water is scarce, water is likely to become a source of competition in which the

actors will fight for control over its supply. This is not taking into consideration variables such as

already existing inter-state tensions, which could, of course, escalate to conflict quickly. Where

water is plentiful, on the other hand, riparians may compete for control over hydroelectric power

instead. Increasingly, this area of literature is seeing the want for control over water can be used

for other motivations such as attempts to achieve non-water related political goals, goals that go

beyond the water line. However, the framework is often successfully applied to cases where

water is scarce (Cascao and Zeitoun, 2012, p.32).

Zeitoun and Warner (2006) highlighted that riparian interaction often falls somewhere between

violent competition and collective collaboration (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). The intensity of

conflict over water is categorized further into three forms: water is shared with some level of

cooperation, control is held by the stronger riparian, and control is contested. In these

circumstances, the hegemon is present. The most notable situation in terms of competition and

control is likely to be the one in which the riparians share control of the water (Zeitoun and

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Warner, 2006, p.24). This would be classified as positive hegemonic leadership, where the

hegemon decides to use their position in a benevolent way. However., this benevolence does

not make the situation non-strategic, it is on the contrary, an expression of ideational power

employed in an attempt at maintaining a legitimized order. Negative forms of hegemony would

occur when a riparian state has demonstrated control over the water and its infrastructure used in

domination to determine the outcomes of water arrangements. Zeitoun (2008) highlights that

ideational or softer forms of power are the best way to ensure compliance within a basin.

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Theoretical framework

Scholarly material on hydro politics in the Middle East is often dominated by two polar

paradigms: a level of cooperation that will be achieved by water scarcity, or a conflict which

will escalate (Selby & Hoggman, 2014; Conker 2014; Warner & Zawahri, 2012). Notably,

Selby and Hoffman (2014) argued that water-related conflicts do not have to be discounted, but

those conflicts are ultimately shaped by political agendas and water alone cannot be the central

tenet of any conflict. Cascao and Zeitoun (2010) made an insightful observation in relation to

the association and placement of hydro politics with conflict or security issues has .led to an

impoverished debate and hindered understanding of hydropolitics as a dynamic and ongoing

process (Cascao and Zeitoun, 2010, p.29). When relating to hydro politics, the distinction

should be made that I refer to this field as the authoritative allocation of values in society with

respect to water (Conker, 2014, p.7).

Ultimately, the HH framework overlooks more obvious, overt forms of power and uses of force

such as military and material capacities, which is often the case with hydro-political theories in

relation to water conflict and cooperation mechanisms. Their hydro-hegemonic narrative

attempts to deconstruct the discourse that water disputes are mostly the entities of covert forms

of power often associated as hard and soft power (Cascao & Zeitoun, 2010). Hard power

often entails material resources and coercion, whereas soft power is known as less material and is

often non-violent and involves co-optative power manifestations. Despite the not being directly

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violent, it is not necessarily advantageous or positive based on general consensus, the power to

optative power manifestations. Although non-violent, soft power is not necessarily positive or

based on a general consensus, however, they have the leveraging power to maintain the

consensus in favor of the applier (Zeitoun et al., 2011); for instance, through persuasion and

discursive framing (Warner et al., 2013).

Applications to IS

Lukes (2005 in Zeitoun et al., 2011, p.161) raises the question of why it is not the supreme

exercise of power.. to have the desires you want them to have.. by controlling their thoughts and

desires?. In relation to the Hydro-Hegemonic framework that has been identified and developed

by Cascao and Zeitoun has been criticized for its state-centrism, which enabled the motivation

for this thesis to see if this theory can be aligned towards a non-state actor on a subnational level

of hydro politics in particular, the Islamic State. Observing the development, behavior and

power dispersion along the T&E river in Syria and Iraq, it made it more apparent that IS would

be a good candidate for a point of research as a non-state actor in combination of the hydro-

hegemonic framework, a group that is known for terrorism-related activities and violence. In

relation to literature surrounding violence and power of non state actors, is it cited that violence

is not the only face in dispersing control, but ideological principles and specifically, religious-

based ones are fundamental to consolidating power (Massih, 2014).

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Hegemony

As it has been clarified in the introduction of this chapter, hydro political literature has been

dominated by the discourse of water cooperation and water conflict. The interaction paradigm

introduced a new asset to the discourse and highlighted the significance of their interplay and

co-existence to help explain the power dynamics that is involved. In order to analyze these

power dynamics, this section of the thesis will employ the framework of Hydro-Hegemony and

explain how it relates to the research.

The idea of hegemony, as developed by Gramsci, assessed the downfall of the Communist

movement in his society in the early twentieth century in which the concept was created (Selby,

2007). Hegemony explains the behavior of a state and how it claims power over the population

and has a focus on the ideological, normative and cultural aspects of state-society relations

(Selby, 2007, p.4). Relating back to the concept of soft power which was highlighted by Cascao

& Zeitoun (2010) in the introduction of this chapter, can be compared to hydro-hegemonic

power as the success of a basin riparian imposing a discourse impeding changes to a convenient

status quo through persuasion, a soft power tactic (Warner, 2016).

Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner (2006) introduced the concept of Hydro-Hegemony as a

framework, using the concept of hegemony to critically assess power hierarchies and relations

between riparian states (such as between state and populations as Gramsci pointed out). The

theorists highlighted the framework provides a simple, yet comprehensive and testable

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structure.. an analytical tool for examining the option of riparians at the river basin level)

(Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, p.437).

Power and Hydro-Hegemony

Zeitoun and Warner (2006) claim that the balance of power ultimately determines riparian

interactions over shared resources (p.450). Power asymmetries can give a clearer idea of who

gets what, when, where and why and who is left out of that balance (Laswell 1936 in Cascao &

Zeitoun, 2010, p.27). In order to measure the power ratio of riparian states, there are four main

pillars to be observed: i)the geographic position, ii) the material power (including economic,

political and military power in addition to financial aids), iii) bargaining power; in specific, the

capability of actors to govern and use agenda-setting iv) ideational power, or power over ideas

in which the hegemon is able to control perceptions, distributional conformation of society and

in neighboring states and reinforcing their credibility and legitimacy (Cascao & Zeitoun, 2010,

pp.31,32). These dimensions form the four pillars of hydro hegemony, as displayed in figure 2.

This amount of power within each pillar determines the success of power and their control over

resources in the Middle East and North Africa (Aydlinli, 2015)

Strategies and tactics

The aims, strategies and tactics of riparian states which are in a threatening or politically unstable

situation is to assert a form of control over the water. This would include acts of flood-

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management or generating some sort of hydro power to obtain higher quality water. Riparians

can employ such strategies to gain access and control: research and capture, containment,

integration (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). Each strategy, of course, has many tactics which can be

used but asymmetries do not necessarily have to be played out by those tactics alone. There are

other variables such as structural inequalities, more specifically, the lack of control over

decisions and an inequitable allocation of the resources (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006, p.439). In

relation to the Islamic States violence, they can be seen in structural context that is beneficial for

the organization. To understand their strategies, information will mostly be gathered from

Zeitoun, Cascao and Warners work in the HH framework. The strategy specifically focuses on

powerful groups within a society that shift resource distribution in their favour (Homer-Dixon,

1999 in Zeitoun & Warner, 2006, p.444). Such examples can be seen in state-behavior which

consolidate control over transboundary rivers in addition to land grabbing or the construction of

hydraulic dams.

The second strategy that was mentioned earlier (containment) seems a more viable approach for

states that are hydro-hegemonic which are aware of the laws concerning transboundary water

resources and seek soft power/covert strategies in order to change the status quo. However,

during the research stage, it has also been revealed that non-state actors which are not aware of

any of the legal foundations and environmental laws may find containment a beneficial and

suitable tactic such as the Islamic States exercise of secret policing. Integration is cited as a

compliance-producing strategy through consensus (Schaap, 2016; Warner et al., 2013). To

realize the strategies, there are a variety of tactics which can be used which reflect the strength

and exploitational capacities of the hegemonic actor. A primary tactic is military force; and

36
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whilst it is rarely used in the context of water conflicts, but usually employed in war by an

aggressor.

Another tactic is covert action, the undercover operations aimed at weakening the political,

military or hydraulic apparatus of the competitor... (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006, p.446). Such

incentives are considered as the sticks when considering power, in order to aid compliance with

the hegemons state of affairs according to their preference; such an example can be seen with

the Islamic States agreement with the regime in relation to electricity. Further, IS has adopted

leaders of the local Sunni tribes as partners of cooperation, it appears that that is one of IS

preferred tactics, in addition to signing treaties. The so-called treaties are administered by the

Islamic State with parties that agree to sign them, which ultimately institutionalizes their status

quo. Similarly, with securitization, which legitimizes a state to take exceptional measures over

an issue by propelling it into the realm of security (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006, p.558).

Amidst these tactics, one of the most influential, which stands as a pre-requisite to many is the

concept of knowledge construction. This process manipulates discourse and often results in

actors securing support for their definition of reality (Hajer, 1997 in Zeitoun & Warner, 2006).

Knowledge construction can be used in multifaceted ways, but could result in a sanctioned

discourse which means that there are strict rules and regulations that are punishable upon those

who think outside the sanctioned discourse. Moreover, there is a tactic of coercion-pressure. This

sort of invisible persuasion comes in the form of coercion and threats that are more relevant to

hard power strategies (such as military action, economic sanctions and political isolations) but

also involves covert tactics such as espionage, smear campaigns and propaganda. This type of

37
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tactic is categorically defined as an associate of structural power, as it does not fit into other

power dimensions identified (Warner, 2016). The remainder of this thesis will be informed by

the observations made in the literature review and theoretical framework.

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Findings and discussion

This section aims to answer the second research question: how can the four pillars of hydro

hegemony (geographic, material, bargaining and ideational) be applied as a framework to a non-

state actor. This section of the dissertation will apply the concepts of the HH framework to the

actions and events of IS in Syria and Iraq and critically analyze how they have increased their

legitimacy to be accepted as a state-like entity, rather than just a Jihadist organization

Bargaining Power: ISs relationship with the Syrian government

Based on acquiring legitimacy, IS holds a firm and unusual relationship with the Syrian

government. The strategy is diverse and based on a concept of pragmatism, in addition to the

merger of socioeconomic operations, military, their media outreach and their control over water.

Their relationship with the Syrian government is a good indicator of how the president, Bashar

al-Assads regime indirectly facilitates ISs military activities. On the other hand, they help

validate the regimes discourse that they are fighting Islamic extremists, an approach which

Assad has been heavily reliant on since the uprising in 2011 to de-legitimize opposition forces in

Syria.

The Islamic State proves to be a useful entity as they serve as a tool to counter the regimes

enemies, making the regimes job easier for the fight against the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and

other groups such as the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra which was created purely to destroy

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the regime (Khatib, 2015). The Islamic State first appeared in areas where the regime had lost to

the opposition but which were far from the front lines (Khatib, 2015); opposition groups did not

have a big military presence in those areas, and were mostly focused on fighting the regime

elsewhere, which makes them a good target for IS. The regime was focused on mobilizing their

troops elsewhere, as Assad calculated that allowing the Islamic State to operate in them and fight

against Jabhat al-Nusra would weaken opposition forces, and once they were eventually defeated,

the regime would be able to control IS (Vinograd and Omar, 2014). Similarly, the Islamic State

did not focus on dismantling the regime, believing that it could easily overwhelm it in the future

with resources and terrorism-operations and rather, concentrated on building its state-within-a-

state (Interviewee in Khatib, 2015).

The regime was given more of a reason to not fight the Islamic State due to their absence of front

lines. They gave the militant group the ability to hold areas and recruit local and foreign fighters,

however, the lack of fighting also encouraged Syrians to move to IS-controlled territories in the

pursuit of security, rather than ideology. During this time, however, Syrian opposition was quite

heavily fragmented due to a weak military strategy and political tensions and disagreements

(Pizzi and Shabaan, 2013). The Islamic State devised their plan of having a strong hold of

resource-rich areas in mid-2014 in the northern area of Raqqa, which resulted in their financial

stability by selling oil, wheat, and mostly winning their bargaining power through their water

acquisition, which resulted in them becoming powerful enough to impose taxes in their

strongholds (Khatib, 2015).

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Assads regime has been a key economic partner for the Islamic State, which has been buying oil

from the group at discounted prices. Despite the militant group selling oil back to the FSA and

Jabhat al-Nusra (which they have largely benefitted from), the activity has become monitored

heavily on the Turkish-Syrian border and drastically decreased their black-market engagements

(Information Handling Services Markit press release, 2015). The Syrian government, on the other

hand, has remained a loyal client to buying their own oil back from the group. In June 2014,

Syrian government forces began to resist and eventually fight areas which were controlled by

ISIS, after the groups expansion in Iraq threatened to destabilize Shia areas close to Assads

ally, Iran (Khatib, 2015).

However, most of the engagement was targeted at the FSA. In November 2014, a report by

Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Center revealed that only 6 percent of the regimes attacks that

year were against the Islamic State (IHS Markit press release, 2014).

Despite otherwise turbulent exchanges such as the regimes bombing of Raqqa in late 2014, the

pragmatic relationship between the regime and IS continued. The Islamic State continued to

provide services such as electricity, controlling several important dams on the Syria-Iraq border

and the regime would continue to pay a majority of the salaries of the government employees

living in the IS-controlled areas (Ali, 2015). The passivity that the regime held towards the group

can also highlight the level of bargaining power they have in controlling the negotiation, agenda-

setting and legitimacy, where the regime communicates and deals with them as an inter-state

force, rather than recognizing them as insurgents or non-state actors.

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The regime did not stand in the way when IS fighters approached the Qalamun mountains on the

Lebanese-Syrian border to fight the FSA in 2014, nor did it interfere in early 2015 when IS took

over the Yarmouk refugee camp near Damascus and fought anti-regime groups during the attack

(Berger 2015;2016). The Islamic State has specifically avoided having front line battles with

Jabhat al-Nusra as it would present a zero-sum game for both parties, diverting them from their

main goals: building a caliphate and fighting the regime for the former.

However, in May 2015, IS initiated attacks on regime areas in Aleppo and engaged in military

disputes with Jaysh al-Fateh, a major ally of Jabhat al-Nusra (Ali, 2015). However, this does not

signal the end of the pragmatic relationship between the regime and the Islamic State, on the

contrary, it still shows their passivity towards them. Ultimately, it suggests that if the group

defeats other radical factions and the only remaining group is the Islamic State versus Assad, the

regime will surely be able to turn to the international community for support (Lanz, 2015; Pearce,

2014). Based on hope, this does not offer any solid reassurance for the regime, and IS, on the

other hand, seems to be relying on their strategic calculation that it will be able to topple and

overwhelm the regime, eventually.

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Geographic power: Battle over Borders

It has become increasingly evident throughout this dissertation that water and its infrastructure are

significant targets for the Islamic State. When non-traditional actors such as IS expand territorial

control and geographic power (as they did on a significant scale in 2014) it initiates new security

challenges with repercussions on water security. The Islamic State gained control over the Tishrin

Dam in Syria in November 2012, the Tabqa dam in February 2013 and again in January 2014 after

they gained control over Fallujah (Cockburn, 2015; Sly, 2016). In April 2014, they closed the

Fallujah gates to stop supplying water to downstream adversaries (Swain and Jagerskog, 2016).

After capturing the water supplies and essentially holding them hostage, they did not hesitate to

use water as a weapon which would increase the vulnerability of their enemies (Swain and

Jagerskog, 2016).

A more serious development which aided their territorial acquisition was the capturing of the

Mosul Dam on August 7, 2014, which created more hostilities and complications. The location of

the Dam plays a particularly important role, being located on the Tigris River, and has

approximately 11 billion cubic meters of flood storage capacity and is an essential component for

irrigation in the Nineveh province in Iraq. It generates 310 megawatts of energy daily (Cockburn,

2015). The fear was not only that the Islamic State could use the dam to flood Mosul with

catastrophic results, but that it would also threaten the capital, Baghdad. These actions prompted

a response from the United States, in support of Kurdish Peshmerga forces in joint retaliation with

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Iraqi security forces with airstrikes, which could take possession of the dam on August 18th

(Damluji, 2014).

The involvement of the international community and swift response of actions demonstrates a

situation where the strategic role of water has given the Islamic State leverage as a political actor

in addition to moving water into hard security considerations. The seizure of dams and control of

water infrastructure has seemed to be a trigger for the international community to intervene against

the Islamic State and to support the Iraqi army and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces (Jagerskog and

Swain, 2016).

The links with the literature are particularly apparent in this pillar of power. Map 1, as

demonstrated below, reveals the success of the position of the riparian (IS, in this case) and their

control of the water flow. Their hydro-hegemonic capabilities come to mind where the hegemon

on the river-basin level secures compliance using Lukes hard and ideational forms of power

(Zeitoun & Warner, 2006) to control access to water in other areas. In this case, the Islamic State

control exactly follows the Euphrates River streaming through Syria and Iraq, in addition to parts

of the Tigris river in Iraq. The weaponization is deployed for several outcomes: to consolidate

control, generate income and weaken the enemy by cutting off the supply or creating floods to gain

credibility and legitimacy over the already existing governing authority, namely. the Syrian

government.

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Map 1: Areas in Syria and Iraq under the control of IS as of July 1, 2016. Source: Institute for the

Study of War

There are three fundamental ways of using water as a weapon. Von Lossow (2016, pp.11-12)

highlighted the classifications which can be applied to the Islamic State: firstly, by creating a

shortage of water, secondly, an overabundance of water, and thirdly, bad water quality. IS has used

all three of these applications to have an impact on both the local and regional level.

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The Islamic State, in their conquest for hydro-hegemony, have limited and blocked entire water

supplies, partly to provide water to areas under its control and partly to threaten downstream

opponents. Whoever has control over the dam, can cause draughts over large areas of land

downstream, which has resulted in water and electricity black outs to targeted districts or entire

provinces. Qaraqosh, a predominantly Christian town in Northern Iraq, was in complete isolation

in June 2014, with an IS embargo which interrupted trade connections to the outside world

(Damluji, 2017; von Lossow, 2016). The seizure of the Ramadi Dam in 2015 saw the reduction of

outflow to the Euphrates by 50 percent (Tomlinson, 2016) by diverting the water into Lake

Habbaniya. The group then had control over the provinces of Babil, Karbala, Najaf and Qasidiya,

which majorly choked the supply to the Anbar Province. The occupation of the Fallujah, Mosul,

Samarra and Ramadi dams not only interrupted local water access, but also deprived the Shiite

areas that are lower down on the Tigris and Euphrates by diversion of the water.

The geographic power that is cited in the literature (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006) also considers the

riparian position, in which, the Islamic State had demonstrated their hegemonic capability further

upstream. The aftermath of the closure of the Fallujah Dam floodgates showed devastating

consequences in upstream areas and submerged Iraqi government facilities that were settled along

the banks. The water was diverted over an irrigation channel into a side valley, inundating areas

up to 100 kilometers away and submerged the town of Abu Ghraib under four meters of water

(Sly, 2014). Between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib, over 10,000 houses and 200 square kilometers of

fertile farmland used for agriculture was destroyed, devastating the seasons harvests and wiping

out livestock and ultimately displacing 60,000 locals (Harrison, 2016; Sly, 2014).

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The contamination and poisoning of water resources had also greatly affected the access to good

water quality. The practice of contamination is a more simplistic approach and devastating tactic

which can easily be exported to other regions (von Lossow, 2016). In December 2014, the group

contaminated drinking water with crude oil in the Balad district, south of Tikrit. The reports

demonstrated poisoned water supplies from Aleppo, Deir el-Zor, Raqqa and Baghdad (Tomlinson,

2016). The Islamic State had ordered their followers to poison the drinking water of its enemies

elsewhere, which had rapidly spread to other sources. Contamination and pollution of water

reserves can have a lasting adverse impact on the agricultural sector.

Similarly, during the conflict with Israel in 2006, up to 90% of the cultivation of water-intensive

and seasonal fruits and vegetables in Lebanon suffered losses due to destruction and contamination

of irrigation water (Strategic Foresight Group, Water and Violence, 2014, p.15). The short-term

effects on the economy are immediate, with a spike in water prices, agricultural deterioration, food

insecurity and inflation, power shortages and industrial losses (Khatib, 2015; von Lossow, 2016).

Additionally, in the long term, the resultant economic losses are disruption of traditional local

livelihoods, unemployment, mass migrations, rehabilitation expenses and rising local insecurity

all within the plan of the expansion of the caliphate.

What can be observed with their use of water geography is for a tool of expansion. By capturing

strategic dams and upstream portions of the T&E, they have gained control of nearby regions

which are dependent on the water bodies and for drinking water, irrigation and electricity supplies.

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The fundamental nature of these facilities has enabled the Islamic State to control territories which

they have not yet had physical access to.

Map 2: Islamic State governance areas as of July 2014. Source: Caris & Reynolds 2014

There have been over 44 recorded incidents over the past five years in Syria and Iraq, of which,

21 were conducted by the Islamic State, which shows the systematic and persistent use of water as

a weapon (King, 2015). During the periods of November 2012 to January 2016, the group had

strong holds and majority control over eight dams, including the Tabqa Dam, which has already

been stated as Syrias largest and most significant dam, supplying water to 5 million people (Von

Lossow, 2016). The Tishrin Dam, East of Aleppos district of Manbij, was until very recently at

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the hands of the Islamic State, but during December 2015 it was claimed from the U.S backed

Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (Von Lossow, 2015; Lund, 2015). The re-claiming of

the dam demonstrates who is ruling the North-West of Syria later in 2016. This also demonstrates

that the Manbij, a critical way point between Raqqa (the groups administrative headquarters) and

Turkish border, is still under control of the Islamic State, as this area was seized back in January

2014 and military forces have had a difficult time reclaiming it. The Manbij dam is a good

illustration of the way the group exploits existing divisions and economic needs (Turkmani,

2015, p.21) in the way it has prioritized the control over certain strategic resources which govern

standards of living, mainly food, water and electricity.

Material and ideational power: control through coercion and discourse

Material power (violence) is used to sanction unaccepted discourses and/or acts, thoughts and

speech outside the accepted discourse (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Material power is used as a

guidance and very much weaves itself into ideational power, which can be defined as the ability

to control perceptions of the distributional conformation of society, reinforcing legitimacy

(Schaap, 2016, p.31). The Islamic States material power can be manifested through a combination

of resource capture, administering public fear, seizing control of dams and economic and military

power. They have organized specific committees for the distribution of water services, but they do

not have the knowledge of expertise to manage the infrastructure effectively. The Tishrin Dam is

an example whereby the local populous were forcibly replaced by ISIS experts, or IS employees

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which carry out tasks which they are not specialized to do, but rather, given brief training for (Caris

and Reynolds, 2014).

One of the strategies that are employed that demonstrate the weaving of material and ideational

power is the limitations of water access. It has been revealed through interviews of civilians living

in IS-controlled areas that taps do not always provide enough water, where each family has access

to three days of water a week which is used for drinking water, food and hygiene. All families

under the IS-controlled territories pay a fixed amount for water, even if they do not receive it (von

Lossow, 2016; Schaap, 2016). This is where the distinction for living quality between regular

civilians and IS loyalists is very bold: loyalists are efficiently provided with running water and

electricity. Water is brought from the Euphrates and driven around territories and sold, and if

individuals want to sell the water, it is supervised by an IS member (Schaap, 2016).

Similarly, the same rules apply for electricity and meat; farmers have difficulty obtaining compost,

seeds and using water for their crops and many farmers are endangered working on their own lands

as they can be hit by bombs at any time (Lund, 2015). Further, ISs economic monopoly has

become increasingly apparent through the number of farmers that are leaving the areas as the

increasing costs of agriculture were overshadowing their general income, which was already being

taxed by IS.

As a point of analysis, it seems that IS loyalists have been provided with unconditional running

water and electricity, whereas non-loyalists have financial restrictions imposed on them to have

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access to these necessities. Those who do not agree with the discourse and status quo that the

Islamic State has placed on them are subject to heavier restrictions and higher costs (Vishwanath,

2016). It is apparent that IS have hegemony in the say of who gets what, when and how but also

who is left out. The question should arise at this point, how is it possible that electricity produced

by the Tishrin dam is transferred to Aleppo, but cannot reach other households in Manbij and

surrounding areas? This may indicate an agreement between the Islamic State and the Syrian

regime. Despite a lack of literature on such agreements, it is expected to be a sort of inducement

for compliance with the hegemons preferred state-of-affairs through incentives. In this case, it is

their hegemonic capabilities that is worth highlighting, rather than their motivations behind how

they use the resources.

When the hegemon already has full control over fundamental resources (water, electricity,

financial), there is not much more power that they require to provide loyalists with higher salaries,

better housing and consistent water and energy. This concept supports Cascao and Zeitouns idea

that strength and weaknesses in one dimension mutually reinforce or weaken the others (Cascao

and Zeitoun, 2010, p.39). Through material power, IS has increased its geographical power.

Together with these two categories, they have strengthened their ideational power, which includes

the groups potential to exploit their reputation, threaten and spread fear (Schaap, 2016). For

instance, a few months after IS had settled in Manbij, the civilians held a demonstration/strike by

closing all the shops and markets. In response, IS broke the locks of the shops and threatened

anyone who did not resume business as usual that they would be in a very dangerous position.

This confirms the violent image of the group, whilst implying that violence is used against those

who do not align with their definition of reality (Warner and Zawahiri, 2012). Violence is used

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as a warning against those who wish to divert from the sanctioned discourse; therefore, violence

does not necessarily need to be executed, rather, the threats and the images of violence work to

achieve the same outcome.

The Islamic State wanted to create a caliphate which establishes control of terrain through military

conquest and then reinforcing this control through governance (Caris & Reynolds, 2014, p.4).

Through their controlled territories, they distributed their presence by administering control in both

rural and urban areas by providing provisions and services which would demonstrate them to have

state-like qualities. Their governance can be divided into administrative and service-oriented

offices. The first are responsible for religious outreach and enforcement, courts and punishments,

educational programming and public relations. The service-oriented offices, on the other hand,

oversee water and electricity systems, humanitarian aid and bakeries (Schaap, 2016; Caris &

Reynolds, 2014). The areas which are in the IS strong-hold are part of an interconnected system

which include several water systems such as pumping stations, sewage systems and dams. The

seizure and control of the water systems are part of a larger strategy, in which territorial expansion

is the primary goal.. and the water weapon is an effective means for expanding control of territory

(King, 2015, p.25). Regardless of whether, how and to what extent water is deployed as a weapon

or as a tool for expansion, the very question of who controls this vital resource has a strong

psychological impact.

The psychological impact presents the basis of how they achieved ideational power in the

hegemonic principles: through the construction of knowledge and sanctioned discourse. Critical

water resources being in the hands of a radical and brutal militia with political and coercive

capacities is a frightening idea, not just against this backdrop (Hage, 2014; Ahram, 2014). The

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strategy of water as a weapon makes it possible to keep threat levels high, in addition to keeping

enemies and non-enemies on high alert in the long term without deploying the weapon a logic

like that of the atom bomb. If the Islamic State yields the control and has the material and ideational

capacities to yield hydro-hegemonic power on the Tigris and Euphrates, it has the potential to

inflict great damage. When the dams are destructed, the damage that is caused has long-term

impacts that could devastate settlements and their agriculture, and is also very difficult to calculate.

Extensive flooding, for example cannot be limited in its intensity or geographic spread. For

instance, very threat of using Iraqs largest reservoir to dry out a key agricultural region in the

Shiite Southeastern province was enough to have a psychological, nevertheless, ideational impacts

on the general population and other factions for them to obey the sanctioned discourse.

The Islamic State has taken advantage of the socio-economic issues that have prevailed in Syria

and Iraq. The prolonged brutality of the Syrian conflict and the grievances of Iraqs Sunni

population towards the Iraqi government has shown to be of benefit in the emergence of the Islamic

State for an exhausted population after years of war. Williams (2014) contended that similarly,

because of the regimes policies, peoples attention have been turned away from demands for

democracy, freedom of expression, movement, politics as large numbers of Syrians became

consumed with mere survival and the pursuit of basic needs- which IS capitalized on.

The presence of IS created a paradigm shift in appearing to be an organization which was restoring

order and boosted its appeal to local populations (Khatib, 2015). The groups occupation of

Raqqa and the other areas where it claimed early victories after those areas had been controlled by

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different opposition groups, a period that exposed residents to practices like taxation, looting,

occupation of houses and other forms of corruption. For instance, Schaap (2016) highlighted the

case of Hassan Jazra, a criminal who, due to his personal connections, had been acquitted by an

Islamic court set up by an Islamist opposition group in Aleppo. After the Islamic State had taken

control of the city in late 2013, Jazra and nine associates of his gang were executed by the Jihadi

group, which gained them a level of local popularity. Similarly, in Iraq, the group capitalized on

Sunni anger at the former, Shia prime minister Nouri al-Malikis systematic political and economic

exclusion of Sunni areas, which led to those regions, heavily populated by tribes, to feel detached

from the central state (de Chatel, 2014). As a result, the groups advance on Mosul in June 2014

was met with little resistance from the Iraqi army whose Sunni soldiers did not feel much of a

sense of belonging to Iraq as a state. For ordinary individuals, the ideational pillar they hold

through their yield of material power provokes thought for ordinary individuals in the Middle East

an opportunity to become extraordinary almost overnight. Their strong ties with the Sunni tribes

has only deepened sectarian tensions that have kept them afloat, particularly in Iraq (Harrison,

2016).

From the information discussed above, it is apparent that the Islamic State draw on their already

violent reputation to extort compliance and that their reputation be exploitation of both existing

power asymmetries and ideational power. The obedience of the civilians (and loyalists) living

under their governed areas give accounts of violence or threats of violence that is used as a scare

tactic to restore social order, which implies a disbelief that IS has any other way to extort

obedience. Further, it reinforces the idea that the group have effectively implanted their idea that

resistance or disobedience will be suppressed and dealt with through violence. The narrative of

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violence has been particularly observable from threats, public executions and what they have done

in the past (Williams, 2014), which are exploited in the form of active/passive threats. The

legitimization of these threats can be classified as ideational power through the provision of

material power, which are used as coercion-pressure tactics, such as secret police, their relationship

with the Syrian regime, and maintenance of hegemony on the river basin.

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Discussion
Between terror and state-building

Critical analysis of the literature

In Zeitoun and Warners (2006) hands, the hegemons themselves are always states; the

consequence of hegemony, whether it is positive or negative, is always experienced by states; and

trans-boundary conflicts are always understood as conflicts between state (or quasi-state, in the

case of the Palestinian Authority) actors. Hydro-hegemony, in turn, can involve either

enlightened leadership or oppressive domination or, something more commonly between the

two. Positively, hydro-hegemony can lead to beneficial water sharing and river basin management;

negatively, by contrast, it can involve rules of the game and forms of oppression, that are oriented

towards resource capture (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006), like the strategies of IS. Zeitoun and Warner

invoke a range of political theorists (Gramsci, 1971; Lustick, 2002; Robert Keohane, 1980, 1984)

in support of these distinctions.

Figure 2: Syria and Iraq in the HH framework (Cascao and Zeitoun, 2010, p. 18)

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Figure 2 demonstrates the state-centric version of how the authors (Cascao and Zeitoun, 2010)

envisioned the hydro hegemonic framework on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The distribution

of the four pillars of power is applied to the Islamic State in Figure 3, as shown below. This

chart was created for illustrative purposes for this dissertation to show the power imbalances and

distribution of said powers in an estimate. Based on the research of this dissertation, it shows

that IS has least power in the areas of bargaining, followed by geographic. Material and

ideational are their strongest points and demonstrated to have stronger, state-like capacities in

those areas.

Figure 3: ISs capabilities applied to the HH framework

State-centricity remains a central problem in the hydro-hegemonic framework. Selby (2007)

highlights that the state-centric view marginalizes the essential definition of hegemony as

described by Gramsci, a pre-cursor to the construction of the typologies that are being studied. It

is argued that a realist notion of hegemony is incompatible with todays ever-changing,

globalized world. In response, Warner (2016) acknowledged this critique and added that realism

does, in fact, focus on overt, hard power, hydro hegemony on the other hand, focuses on less

observable, covert and discursive forms of power.

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Although the selection of soft power may seem somewhat incompatible and irresponsible to

assign to a terrorist organization known for extreme acts of violence, the Islamic State is also a

group with aims, strategies and an ideological focus. Particularly, since they are using a

framework that is state-centric and is applicable to them to administer control. Stepping back

from the inter-state and transboundary river focus and allowing flexibility for

domestic/subnational groups using the HH framework, hydro-hegemony may have new

developments and points of analysis on water security by welcoming non-state actors into the

equation.

The aim of this thesis is that it should not simply be assumed, as Zeitoun and Warner do, that

hegemony and hydro-hegemony operate exclusively at an inter-state level. In the view of its

most famous theorist, Gramsci, hegemony was a matter of relations between state and society;

while for many contemporary Gramscians, hegemony is established and maintained at a trans-

national level, through classes, ideologies and institutions which have all transgressed nation-

state boundaries through the process of globalization. Only in mainstream schools of the

discipline of International Relations is hegemony understood as state-centric as invoked by

Zeitoun and Warner. Of course, that does not mean that this is necessarily problematic, but so

far, as the analysis shows, it is good reason to believe that the national, trans-national and non-

state actors should be included in the dimensions of hydro-hegemony and are just as significant

as international dimensions, if not, more so.

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A flawed caliphate?

An issue arises where ISIS simultaneously attempts to use water as both a weapon and provide it

as a service to citizens. The strategies that are employed by them are not only conflicting, but

dichotomous the situation of governance that the organization has placed themselves in is

extreme and dangerous to both the population and their own reputation in establishing a caliphate.

Drowning, contaminating the water supplies and flooding in juxtaposition to attempting to govern

the areas of land can only be successful for so long. The damage that this will cause to their own

will not be limited to agricultural deterioration, decaying support systems and threats to their

overall legitimacy. Additionally, other coinciding factors need to be examined such as the threat

of oil production in Syria and Iraq. Oil production requires 1.8 billion cubic meters of water

annually (Haykin, 2014), and as oil is one of their main sources of revenue, it endangers their

expansionist strategies and aims for territorial and political acquisition; without water, their plans

are a recipe for further destruction

Map 3: IS-controlled territory map in 2015. (Source: CNN website)

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Map 3, as demonstrated above, shows a loss in their geographical power in the year of 2014. The

analysis in 2015 demonstrates that territory held by IS has shrunk by 12 percent, with losses in

both Western Iraq and Northern Syria (Lister, 2016). However, the shrink in territory is not as

much of a concern as ISIS continues to demonstrate resilience and versatility (CNN, 2015). If

their geographic take-over and physical expansion is to fail or decline, the group still has coercive,

threatening and violent tactics that it has used in the past.

The contradiction

On one side of the argument, ISIS needs to provide electricity and water to the citizens to become

an established, functioning state. Whereas, to acquire their other goal of territorial acquisition, it

is weaponizing water to infiltrate or contaminate the systems, causing droughts or floods and

restricting access to it, ultimately, destroying the infrastructural backbone that is required for the

construction of this state. The water supplies in the Iraqi city of Mosul have been dried up and

contaminated by chlorine, rendering it inaccessible and undrinkable. On the other hand, in the

Syrian city of Raqqa, water and electricity are accessible, but only for four hours a day. Rather

than creating a blockade which would stop the project entirely, they place major restrictions on

water usage to fulfil their aim of territorial acquisition whilst simultaneously managing the water

supplies to achieve a means for state building, using it as political leverage.

The question of whether the Islamic State has become water secure is significant to understand

the larger implications of their strategy. IS has ready access to water resources, but this is not

necessarily the same thing as having water security. For the Islamic State and its territories to

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have security, they need to acquire the means from where it is flowing to where it is needed.

Additionally, they would need to use the water for industrial purposes to sustain their hydro-

hegemonic position and control of other resources, such as oil. Considering this, they have been

forced to become not just a disparate terrorist organization, but either appropriate or provide their

own water-related services, which include purification, sanitation, transport and logistics.

IS has become just as interested in taking over state functions and thus, a sustainable use of

resources; these conflicting objectives create the basis of the contradiction that was mentioned at

the start of this dissertation. The group has made it clear that they view themselves both as a

jihadist terrorist organization and as a state-like entity. On the other hand, it demonstrates short-

term strength and power in its acquisition and occupation of water and its infrastructure, spreads

fear and terror by drying out or flooding land, expanding its territory and administering their

version of the law. On the other hand, the devastating consequences they have created for

themselves by interfering with the infrastructure and supply will also affect their loyalists in the

civilian population. Ultimately, in the long run, such interferences reduce their credibility and

legitimacy in their own ranks; if IS exists as a state-like entity with a territory that it controls, the

feared worst-case scenario of a symbolic dam explosion or strategic short-term relationship with

the government during a time of civil disputes is not an option in the long run. Such a

development would, after all, would hinder the development and consolidation of the caliphate.

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Concluding remarks

Water under the bridge

This dissertation sought to answer the questions of how IS can use water as a political tool, and

how the four pillars of hydro hegemony can be applied as a framework to a non-state actor. As

the framework was criticized for being state-centric, this research focused on a non-state actor,

the Islamic State, with a focus on sub national districts in Iraq and Syria situated around the

Tigris and Euphrates rivers. As the analysis has shown, water is at the very heart of ISs

strategies and this was explained by drawing upon the HH-framework.

Their use of bargaining power highlighted a development to their legitimacy based on the Syrian

regimes passivity towards the group. ISs advancements on Iraq was met with little resistance

based on deeper tensions already existing in the country because of the marginalization of the

Sunni majority, which fragmented the military and civilian support towards the government.

Their pragmatic relationship with the Syrian regime works as mutually beneficial and developed

as such due to the groups military capabilities, level of authority and capacity to occupy the

water infrastructure which resulted in the regime buying oil and other resources from IS, which

worked out financially for the group. Assads priority is clearly not ISIS, but the extinguishing of

the FSA and al Nusra Front, factions which IS are slowly working to destroy. This approach

demonstrates the complexity of the domestic situation in Syria; the goals of the regime wanting

to devalue the opposition - even if it means strengthening ISIS. Assads only saving grace is

turning for the international community for help, and surely, they know the world will choose

Damascus over the black flag of ISIS. However, until then, IS have been state-building on Syrian

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and Iraqi soil and expanding their interests as well as the caliphate.

In relation to their geographic power, which is what instigated the shift in global attention that

classified water as a security issue, constructs the basis of their rise to hydro-hegemony. Their

territorial expansion is not only visually alarming, but equally strategic in their positioning. The

seizures of the Ramadi, Mosul, Tabqa and Fallujah dams entail a few of their territorial

acquisitions which gave them the power to control water and electricity in surrounding

provinces, which worked as an aid to their expansionist strategy and discredited the existing

government.

Corresponding with the literature, IS demonstrated their hegemonic capabilities further upstream

by controlling food, water, electricity and qualities of life of the civilians due to their riparian

positioning around the T&E. The water-dependent economies of Syria and Iraq still have the

potential to see devastating economic and agricultural losses due to the groups disruption and

quest for governance in these areas. Traditional local livelihoods, unemployment, mass migration

and rehabilitation expenses in addition to rising local insecurity are just a few problems that

would have to be dealt with from the already existing government, making space for the

expansion and establishment of the caliphate. Their short-comings in their geographic

acquisitions have already been demonstrated through the re-claiming of the Tishrin dam by the

US-backed SDF, which fragmented their state-building attempts. However, as a non-state actor

and internationally recognized coercive and violent tactics associated with terrorism, they have

other means to gain back territory and expand under the radar, which proves to be problematic

for state actors to completely gain their territories back.

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The findings have also discovered that material and ideational power were exploited most

frequently. As the analysis has shown, the dimensions are intertwined and material power

significantly reinforces ideational power. This can be explained by looking at the distribution of

their presence by administering control in both rural and urban areas by providing provisions and

services which would demonstrate them to have state-like qualities. Without their jihadist

reputation, the group perhaps had to use more material power to seize the Tishrin Dam and

Manbij district, for example. But as they invoked fear in the opposition forces, they withdrew. It

can be argued that the groups reputation from past attacks has become part of their existing

narrative and power imbalance, ready to be exploited in favor of the hegemon. When actively

exploited, this can be seen in the form of threats of flooding, destruction of the dams and the

deprivation of water, which they are using as an assistance for consolidating control as part of

their strategy. In this sense, the violence (or rather the threat and fear that it creates) can be seen

as processes of knowledge construction and sanctioned discourse. Together, they create the pillar

of ideational power. The knowledge discourse, to reiterate, is the idea that the strong implant

their ideas, even their self-serving ideology in the minds of the weak, so that the weak come to

sincerely believe that the value-judgments of the strong really are the universally right and true

ones (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, p.443).

Using water and its infrastructure as a weapon can be demonstrated in several ways, including

that of holding it hostage, destroying it, gives them leverage in having a psychological impact,

too. The idea of a violent fundamentalist militia controlling the most fundamental component of

any human civilization is enough to bring wide-spread obedience for the sanctioned discourse.

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For IS loyalists, they were provided unconditional electricity, running water and a level of

human security, which compelled civilians to become supportive of the group just for the sake of

these provisions, even if they did not necessarily agree with their ideas, at all. Their material and

ideational power informed their decisions to bring justice into their own hands, such as the case

of the execution of a well-renowned criminal and his gang-associates which were acquitted by an

Islamic court. They developed a level of sophistication to use their material power to impose

their state-like provisions and services which included taxation, regulation and enforcement of

their version of Sharia Law. Their harsh penalties and discouragement of disobeying their rules

was met with violence and lack of basic provisions (such as running water) was used as a

containment strategy towards the civilians.

What became increasingly evident throughout the research which was not forecasted, however,

was that their strategies barely focus on increasing support from local citizens by providing them

with accessible and reliable services, sustain agriculture and food and security for the proclaimed

caliphate. Instead, control over water was used in their larger plan of generating income to

sustain their state-building plans and consolidate control so there were restriction of movement

and freedom for the non-loyalist civilians. This corresponds with the aim of the dissertation,

which highlighted the importance of water in IS expansionist strategy under the HH framework.

Moreover, some interesting developments were also observed. Hydro hegemony is based on

constructivist theories, and this research shows that social reality is constructed, particularly in

discursive processes such as knowledge construction and sanctioned discourse used as a

precursor for the ideational and material powers.

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Most importantly, the underlying contradiction of this was identified, which revealed the

systemic use of water as both a weapon and tool for governance. This presents conflicting

objectives which was mentioned at the start of the dissertation. IS group has made it clear that

they view themselves both as a jihadist terrorist organization and as a state-like entity, but the

devastating consequences they have left for themselves is a legacy that no credible state would

want. Their developments, albeit seeing some success in their strategies, hinders the

development of any long-term caliphate. However, in the framework of hydro-hegemony

analysis, this research has departed from the state-centric vision of international basins and has

demonstrated that a non-state actor is capable of achieving hegemony under these four

classifications. Allowing access in hydro-hegemonic frameworks for non-state actors may be of

use for areas under geopolitical instability to pin point issues of water governance and emerging

threats in the future.

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Total word count: 17,300

Word count excluding bibliography: 1502

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