Executive Summary
In 2007, The Conference Board of Canada
published a report entitled A Resilient Canada:
Governance for National Security and Public
Safety. The report was drafted after a CBoC-
convened meeting of public and private sector
leaders identified a lack of clarity around
governance as the greatest threat to national
security and public safety. The report outlined
six principles for multi-party crisis response.
This document presents an overview of the
developments in Canada with respect to one
of these principles, communication and
transparency.
This briefing conceives of crisis communications as information flows
both within and between responding entities, as well as from these
entities to the media and the public. Along these two dimensions,
the briefing investigates the degree to which the communication and
transparency principle has been integrated into Government of Canada
policy, as determined via relevant, publicly available operational
guidelines and strategic documents. This information is supplemented
with findings from interviews with a small sample of Canadian-based
experts in the fieldincluding academics, media commentators, and
practitioners in the public and private sectorsas well as information
from open sources, to illustrate how communications and transparency
structures have played out in practice over the past five years.
Introduction
In 2007, The Conference Board of Canada published a report entitled A
Resilient Canada: Governance for National Security and Public Safety.
The report was developed with a group of public and private sector
leaders directly involved in Canadian national security and public safety,
who identified a lack of clarity around governance as the greatest
threat to national security and public safety in Canada.1 The significance
of ambiguous governance structures as a threat to national security and
public safety cannot be overstated: delayed or contradictory messaging
can cause a loss of valuable time during a crisis situation and can open
up gaps in response or lead to duplication of efforts.
In response to this problem, the 2007 report elaborated six key principles
for the governance of multi-party crisis response. (See box Principles
of Effective Response.) This briefing examines the degree to which
the communication and transparency principle has been adopted and
2 Through the Kanishka Project, the Government of Canada has invested $10 million
over five years to research terrorism and counter-terrorism. For more information on the
initiatives research themes, visit www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/r-nd-
flght-182/knshk/rsrch-thms-eng.aspx.
Despite stating that the plan will be republished annually,7 the FERP
was last amended in December 2010 and republished subsequently in
January 2011. Interviewees for this briefing presented differing opinions
on the FERPs effectiveness in terms of coordinating information flows.
One interviewee with decades of experience in federal departments
was unambiguous in his praise of the planIt absolutely works
which was contrasted with a more skeptical view from a municipal
emergency management (EM) professional: I dont know if theres
complete agreement on how the information flows and when. Maybe
agreement is there, but that could be communicated or shared with
the municipalities. This difference in opinion suggests that the FERP
works more effectively among federal agencies than across levels
of government.
Provincial/Territorial Level
At the provincial/territorial level, there is no standard method for
crisis communications across each province/territory, although each
province/territory maintains strong communications structures both
within the province and with the federal government. Generally, intra-
organizational communications structures are most clearly defined,
while communications with other provincial/territorial organizations
and the federal government tend to vary according to the nature of the
given emergency.
Municipal Level
At the municipal level, there is greater variation in communications
structures, with large urban centres being generally better equipped than
smaller cities and towns. At one end of the spectrum are cities such
as Calgary, which have practiced and tested contingency planseach
including a crisis communications annexin place. At the other end of
the spectrum, however, are the roughly 80 per cent of municipalities
according to the Calgary Emergency Management Agencys (CEMAs)
8 Greg Solecki (Calgary Emergency Management Agency), phone interview with author,
October 15, 2013.
9 Since approximately 85 per cent of critical infrastructure (CI) in Canada is owned or
operated by the private sector, such flows are inevitable.
10 Public Safety Canada, National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, 2. The 10 CI sectors
are energy and utilities; finance; food; transportation; government; information and
communication technology; health; water; safety; and manufacturing.
1. security sensitivity
2. institutional culture
3. partial information
4. jurisdictional confusion
1. Security Sensitivity
While issues remain around the sharing of sensitive information with
relevant players, interviewees discussed progress that has been made
in this area. For instance, most companies in critical infrastructure
industries have representatives who have been pre-approved for
secret clearance during the planning phase, so that they are eligible to
receive classified information during the crisis itself. At the more local
level, however, one interviewee identified a hesitance on the part of
police servicesmunicipal or the RCMPto share certain operational
information over concerns about security sensitivity. The result is that
the public does not have access to key information that could affect
them and the carrying out of their daily activities. For example, during
the 2011 royal tour, Calgary experienced difficulties when the RCMP did
not share information about timing and venue selection that resulted in
road closures and challenges for traffic and transit services. There is a
concern that sharing certain information might compromise operational
success, andin the case of criminal activitiesthat sharing sensitive
information might complicate criminal investigation or prosecution. When
business interests are involved, players in both the public and private
sectors are hesitant to share proprietary information that might have an
impact on competitive practices.
2. Institutional Culture
Even where no issues exist regarding sensitive information, institutional
stovepipes can impede effective communication. For example, the
2007 report documented the animosity between New York Citys
fire and police services that created a breakdown in the sharing of
evacuation orders during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
While interviewees stated that there is no hostility between first
responders themselves, one interviewee identified an institutional
culture among operational managers that impedes information flows
to communications officials. This problem exists due to the perception
among some operational managers that they are doing the real work
and that communications people need to get in line. The challenge
with managing public confidence, however, is that, even if an effective
response is under way, perception is all-important, thereby underlining
the crucial nature of the crisis communications effort.
3. Partial Information
Even when a lot of information is shared among players at the outset
of an emergency, nobody has a clear or complete picture of what is
happening; information is always incomplete. Compounding this reality
is the public sectors risk-averse institutional culture: public servants
are generally unaccustomed toand uncomfortable withmaking
public statements with little lead time and based on partial information.
However, as one interviewee put it: Crises unfold in real time, not
planning time or comfort-level time. This means that responders cannot
wait until they have a comprehensive understanding of the situation
before communicating with one another or the public, although there may
be a tendency for some actors to do just that.
4. Jurisdictional Confusion
Despite the fact that harmoniz[ing] federal emergency response efforts
with those of the provinces/territorial governments, non-governmental
organizations, and the private sector is the FERPs stated purpose,11
confusion remains about who is responsible under certain conditions.
For instance, during the 2009 H1N1 (swine flu) pandemic, there was
a communications breakdown regarding who could acquire and provide
Tamiflu vaccinations.
Community Relations
During a crisis, it is important that communicators have a strong
relationship with the community in need. The communications
surrounding the Lac-Mgantic train disaster in July 2013 was cited
by multiple interviewees as an example of poor communications,
predominantly because the Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway
(MM&A) failed to effectively approach and acknowledge the affected
community. The companys first news release was issued only in
English, despite Lac-Mgantic being a francophone town. It was then
reissued with a poor translation, seemingly completed via a digital
translation program: a slap in the face for a suffering community, as
one interviewee put it. In addition, the company chairman took four days
to arrive on the scene and, in the eyes of locals, appeared to act without
compassion when he finally did.
12 See the timeline provided in CBC News, Elliot Lake Mall Collapse: Tracking the
Rescue Effort.
13 See, for instance, Friscolanti, Elliot Lake: The First Rescuers.
14 In a blog post entitled The Communications Complaint, MacGillivray argues that, in a
crisis, the publics feelings are perhaps more significant than their objective reasoning. In
failing to effectively connect withand provide information tothe affected communities,
responders are unable to project confidence in their response, however effective it may in
fact be.
Canada, but not until 2012 (with the student protests in Montral) that the
surge in public organizations use of social media during crises became
more evident.16,17
Traditional media outlets are similarly playing a dual role with respect to social
media: they are using it both as a platform and as a source from which to draw
reporting. There is no longer a linear process of controlled information flows
from responding entities to the public.
Although 9-1-1 centres in Canada are not monitoring social media for calls for
assistance, social media does provide a new source of information for crisis
communicators and governments. It allows them to:
strong relations between the media and the responding EOC was also
highlighted as a best practice in a recent Conference Board of Canada
review of the 2013 Calgary flood.26
At the provincial and federal levels, both Albertas then-premier Alison Redford
and Prime Minister Stephen Harper pledged financial assistance in the early
days of the crisis and maintained a physical presence in the affected areas. At
the municipal level, however, there was disparity in responses. In the interviews
for this briefing, comparisons were frequently drawn between the responses
of Calgary and High River, the former as an example of effective crisis
communications by a well-prepared, larger city that improved resilience and
generated a speedy response and the latter as a case study that revealed the
problematic crisis communications in a much smaller municipality.
In Calgary, both the City and the Calgary Police Service were actively engaged
in online media efforts, providing frequently updated Google maps of evacuation
areas, blog posts, and tweets. At the onset of the crisis, the citys Twitter handle
doubled its following, reaching 41,000 registered followers by the second
In High River, it was the Calgary Police Service that first tweeted for boat
owners volunteer assistance. In terms of local leadership, there were a number
of different actors, each following separate agendas and contributing different
messages to the overall uncertainty. This stands in contrast to the general unity
of effort and clarity of messaging that was observed in Calgary.28 There was
particular frustration on the part of the towns 13,000 residentsall of whom
had been evacuatedwith respect to a lack of communication and clarity from
officials concerning the timeline for post-evacuation returns. In the lead-up to the
flood, High Rivers investment in emergency management had been quite low,
reflecting the limited resources of a town its size. As one interviewee familiar
with the situation noted, the municipality did not have a flood contingency plan
or response manual in place, nor did they have a practiced, general emergency
management model to follow. These structures had to be built on the spot,
and with efforts focused on establishing a minimally functioning emergency
operations centre (EOC) (an immense task under regular circumstances, and
further exacerbated by the EOCs flooding), no communications structures
were in place until representatives from out of town arrived to provide
assistance. Communications suffered, as did public confidence in the overall
response effort.
Exhibit 1
Crisis Communications as a Lens
COMMUNICATIONS
ROBUST
CRISIS EFFECTS
COMMUNICATIONS
WEAK
CRISIS EFFECTS
Occupy the public space as early as possible following crisis onset (e.g., via pre-
approved messaging or dark websites); do not postpone communications until
a complete picture of the crisis has emerged.
Optimize information flows within and across responding entities (emphasizing
interoperability), as well as with the public and media.
Transmit messages via the same communications platforms used by the public,
including social and traditional media.
Encourage responsible reporting practices among the media and provide
journalists with the information and access necessary to do so.
Ensure that communications are frequent, clear, and credible and provide timely
updates to show that authorities are in control of the situation.
Maintain transparency and coordinate government messaging to build credibility,
minimize confusion, and quickly dispel rumours and misinformation.
Employ communicators who have a strong relationship or affiliation with the
community in need and ensure linguistic compatibility.
Assess the effectiveness of crisis messaging (e.g., via social media monitoring)
and update processes accordingly.
Update crisis communications plans to reflect learning from previous crises and
to reflect advances in communications technologies.
Conclusion
This briefing considered both robust and weak crisis communications
occurring in Canada over the past five years. While on the whole, crisis
responders in Canada are attempting to clarify lines of communications,
structure, and command, social media has introduced new challenges
as well as opportunities for bolstered responsethat make comparisons
with crisis communications identified in the 2007 Conference Board
of Canada report difficult. Social media has radically altered the
communications landscape for emergency managers.
APPENDIX A
Emergency
Communications
and Communications
Technologies
While respondents in the interviews for this briefing did not identify any
such cases over the past five years, they did acknowledge that first
responders rely too heavily on Internet technology (e-mail in particular)
and cellular networks. One way that responding entities are working to
prevent challenges to this end is by maintaining telephone and Internet
connections with multiple network providers. While this approach is
duplicative, it has helped to prevent breakdowns in situations where
one network has broken down but others continue to operate. Alternate
technologies, such as radio technologies or facsimile that rely on
independent networks, are also important as a backup plan. To this
end, Public Safety Canada issued in June 2009 the Policy Principles for
Public Safety Radio Interoperability, to guide the departments actions
when considering radio use in public safety emergencies.
1 U.K. Department of Transport, Investigation Into the Kings Cross Underground Fire.
2 Public Safety Canada, Communications Interoperability Strategy for Canada, 3.
APPENDIX B
Bibliography
CBC News, Elliot Lake Mall Collapse: Tracking the Rescue Effort, June
26, 2012. www.cbc.ca/news/canada/elliot-lake-mall-collapse-tracking-the-
rescue-effort-1.1130615 (accessed August 5, 2014).
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 911 and the Trouble With Technology.
December 18, 2012. www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pubs/ccaps-spcca/tech-eng.
htm (accessed August 5, 2014).
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To cite this briefing: Tishler, Nicole. Communication and Transparency for the Governance of Crisis Response.
Ottawa: The Conference Board of Canada, 2014.
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