CRIMINAL SECTION 3, RULE 111

PROCEDURE
TITLE: G.R. No. 151452
Date: July 29, 2005
SPOUSES SANTOS vs. PIZARDO Ponente: TINGA, J.:
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA
C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, and VIRON
LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.,
SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners respondents
FACTS:
Case timeline:

Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide
and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit
bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three
(3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans
passengers.

After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to
file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial
court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.

On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their
reservation to file a separate civil action.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already prescribed
(4 years for action based on quasi-delict.

In this instant case, Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex
delicto and is not based on quasi delict.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the action has prescribed
RATIO:
NO.

A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners claim that
the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of
negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were
pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the
cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party
has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code
and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.

At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex
quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
 Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision
convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.

We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.

Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription,
but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering
petitioners allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration
of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing the present action and denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
NOTES: