TROPICAL HOMES, INC. vs.

National Housing Authority

right to appeal is not natural right nor part of DP
XPN: where it is granted by statutein which case it should be exercised in the manner and
accordance with the provisions of law
FACTS:
tropical homes entered into contract with cordova
sold lot ina subdivision in Paranaque
in the contractautomatic cancellation upon default in payment
letter-- cancelled the contract due to non-payment for 7 months
cordovaletter-- asked for refund of total payment
referred to NHApursuant to PD957
NHAordered tropical homes to REFUND cordova
then PD!1344Passed-- provided for exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving real
estate business and limiting appeal to president
pet-- availed of the decreefiled complaint to President
Cordovafiled motion for execution NHA granted
President FAILED to act on the Appeal of tropical homes
TH-- filed this petitionalleged:
deprived access to court
manner of appeal is violative of DP
HELD:
Appealable only to the President of the Philippines
Pet-- mode of review violates constitutional guarantee of due processWRONG!
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it
is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law.
Appeal, therefore, is a right of statutory and not constitutional origin.
The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not specifically provide for judicial review of NHA decisions affirmed
or reversed by the President, does not necessarily preclude judicial review.
The extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or quo warranto (Rules
65 and 66) are always available in proper cases where there is no appeal or other plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
SAJOT v. COURT OF APPEALS

facts;

tobias convicted in RTC-- estafa

filed before CAappellant's brief

filed also before RTC- notice of appeal thru atty cervo

TC-- elevated record to CA

CA- ordered for submission of appellant's brief within 30 days

petfiled petition for THIRD extension of time to file brief-GRANTED

there are three extensions

CA-- dismissed the appeal failure to file bried within 3rd extension

pet: learned of dismissal thru friend

counsel-- could not give plausible explanation for failure to file brief

pet-- filed urgent MR denied

new counsel: alleged that Atty Cervonever submitted brief due to utter and gross ignorance of
procedure-- denied, prohibited pleading

HELD:

appeal is essential part of judicial systemas to not deprive person of right to appeal but it corresponds
with it the appelee's right to fair play and justice

as purely statutory-must strictly comply with requisites

DP not denied by dismissing the appeal due to counsel's negligence.

TOBIAS himself is guilty of neglectaware of conviction and of requirement of filing brief

excuse-- relied on services of counsel because he was too busy--- no merit, flimsy

counsel's negligence is matched by his client's own negligence.

Even in trial before lower court-- petitioner never appeared, except during the arraignment

his lack of vigilance-- instant petition filed a motion to withdraw primarily on the ground of
irreconcilable professional relationship between atty temporal and petitioner

demands-- for him to give to his counsel letters and telegrams to aid atty temporal to formulate brief
never DID

paid checks drawn against closed accounts

ROQUE VS OMBUDSMAN

6 years pending -entitled to dismissal

facts:

petitioners were school division superintendednt of DECS in south cotabato and davao

an audit of 9.36 million allotment was made by COA

found some major deficiencies and violations fo Anti-GC

affidavits of complaints were filed before ombudsmand

ombudsmand mindanao-- found proper for PI

the same was approved by Desierto

information was filed before SB (1997)

pet-- filed instant petition---alleged that cases proper for PI issued on june 1991

then until nowmore than 6 years-- no resolution been issued by Ombudsmand and bno case has
been filed with the appropriate court

TRO was issued by SC-- cease and desist from further proceeding

issue:

undue and unjustifiable delayin violation of speedy disposition

held:

delay of almost 6 yearsclear showing of disregard of ombudsman dutyto promptly act on

complaints

violation of DP and to speedy disposition of cases / speedy trial

no explanation given why it took almost 6 years to resolve

inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman-- warranting the dismissal of said criminal
cases.

long delay in terminating the PI should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information.

HOWEVER-- an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected,

for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.

ANG TIBAY vs CIR

CIR cannot entirely ignore or disregard fundamental and essential requirements of DP even if it is not
bound by technical rules of legal evidence and technicalities

facts:
 toribio owns and operates Ang tibayleather company which supplies to army of Ph

alleged shortage of leathercaused the lay off of members of National Labor union inc (89)

NLU-- alleged that the claim of shortage was not supported, and that it was just a scheme adopted to
discharge members of Nlu and were no member of rival group dischargedULP

CIR favor of toribio and NBU

before SC-- invoked right for new trial-- newly discovered evidence

exhibits attachedNLU alleged that they are so inaccessible to respondents that even exercise of due
diligence not be expected to have obtained and offered as evidence to CIR

attached docsare of far reaching importance, effect of admission would mean modification and
reversal of judgment

pray for new trial present newly obtained evidence

held:

yes there should be new trial newly discovered eved or docs attache dto the petition with SC were
evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of trial that even with exercise of due diligence not be
expected to be obtained ; those are docs with far reaching importance

admin bodies are not strictly bound by rules of court- but make sure to comply with DP

admin bodies- cannot ignore fundamental and essential requirement of DP

1. right to hearing present his own case, adduce evidence

2. tribunal must consider evidencepresented

3. something to support its decision

4. evidence must be substantial

5. decision rendered on the evidence presented (presented at hearing or contained in records)

6. must act on its own independent consideration in consideration of law and facts

7. render decisionmanner parties know the carious issues and reasons for its decision

motion for new trial-- should be granted

DUMLAO, IGOT ,SALAPANTAN vs COMELEC

equal protection-- not forbid legal classification; it proscribes arbitrary and unreasonable classification

req of EP

FACTS:
 dumlao is former governor of Nueva Vizacaya
filed COC for said position 1980 election

Igot-- member of IBP; Salapantan-- assailed the validity of BP Blg 51,52, 53

unconstitutional

dumlao- section 4 of BP-- discriminatoryDQ of any retired elective provincial or municipal

officialreceived payment of retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law; shall
have been 65 yrs old at the commencement of office he seeks to be elected
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class
legislation.

IGOT and salapatan-- validity of sec 7-- terms of 6 yrs; sec 4-- DQ of any person who
committed any act of disloyalty to the state
held:

1. misjoinder of parties and actions-- different interests; contest completely different statutory provisions
2. NO VIOLATION OF EP

discriminatory against him personally- no merit

since there are also several candidates that are disqualified based on such provision

EP is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and real differentiationsone class

can be treated and regulated differently from another class

65 yrs old- validly classified as different from younger ones (public service)

subject to compulsory retirement VS not so compulsory retirable

retirees- may or may not reasonable in case of elective officials

there are those who retired below 65

It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good
local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which
he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

NEED FOR NEW BLOOD assumes relevance.

Inequality not result-- TIREDNESS-- retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like
to assume again.

Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.

 Equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.

proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable.

That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class.

Germane-- emergence of younger blood in LGU

provision therefore is valid

IGOTS-- granted

in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel

. An accusation-- is not synonymous with guilt.

challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a

candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal.

It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom
charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public
office.

the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted,
yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome
the prima facie evidence against him.

BILL OF ATTAINDER-- A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be

allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious

separate:

tehankee-- Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or
councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run
for the same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although
he may run for any other lesser office).

Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the
valid distinction?

CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES VS POEA

FACTS:

REQ OF EP-- (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
 Impairment of contractual obligation-- not absolute

restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights

no application to public subjects within the domain of general legislative powers of the state p-
ublic rights and welfare (police power)

facts:

petlicensed manning agencieshire and recruit fil seamen in behalf of foreign ship owner

seek to annul RESO no 1 of governing board of POEA

ground: POEA not have power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and
workmen's compensation of fil seamen working in ocean-going vessels ; onlyc ongress

even if there's power-- violate EP and non-impairment of obligation clauses

reso: amended and increased cmpensation and other benefits of POEA standard employment
contract for seafarers

death-- pay beneficiaries 50k US dollars; 7k US dollars each child under 21 not exceeding 4

if within warzone-- double compensation

apply to any fil seafarer on board any vessel

issue:

delegate power-- authority to promulgate such resolution

resoviolative of EP and non-impairment clause?

held:

yes-- there's authority-- delegated authority

rule making power of POEAimpermissible delegation of legislative power

the governing board of POEA has authority ; prescribe a standard of shipping contract

delegated-- determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law should be

specialization in legislation has become necessarysolutions expected from delegates who are
supposed to be expert in the particular field assigned to them

subordinate legislationif exercised by administrative bodies ; filling in the details

VIOLATION OF EPno

pet claim ---discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen
and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen.

reasonable classification
 (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in
terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and
accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

Non-impairment of contractNO

scuh right is not absolute

restricted to contracts with respect to property and some object of value

it has no application to statues relating to public subjects within the domain of general legislative powers
of state involving public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not
prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary
to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts
may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to
regulate and control them.

Freedom to contractnot absolute

subordinated to police power of state and subject to regulations, which may be changed from time to
time as necessity may provide

UNDER CIVIL CODE-- contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State
because they are not ordinary contracts but are impresses with public interest.

Reso-- been enacted under the police power of the state

PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS

doctrine:

EP-- Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement.

functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.

FACTS:

romeo jalosjos-- full-fledged member of congress; convicted and confined in Bilibid

statutory rape on two accounts and acts of lasciviousness on 6 accounts non-bailable

motion be allowed to fully discharge duties of congressmanattendance in legislative sessions and

committee meeting

argued: not deprive constitutents-- mandate of sovereign will

 sovereign electorate of ZDN chose him as representative

he has thereforeduty to perform; covenant his constituent

ISSUE: Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment?

HELD:

purpose of Epnot make any undue favoritism or hostility to any person; nor partiality be shown

NEVER BEEN AN EXCUSE-- performance of even essential duties of pub officialsto free a validly
imprisoned person

duties imposed by mandate of people --not meritorious

The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the
24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.

Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.

Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others
who are validly restrained by law.

Court cannot validate badges of inequality.

election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law

enforcement.

The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.

RE_ELECTION-- as he claimed to be renewal of his mandate-is hollow-- doctrine that a public official
cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election
to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts
which the re-elected official may have committed during his previous term

The administrative liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from his penal liability

STONEHILL VS DIOKNO

FACTS:
Upon application of the officers of the government named above, several judges issued, on
different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which
they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
 showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued
the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law
On March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the
present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents, their agents and /or
representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation
cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their
agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

Respondents answer: (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent;
and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the petitioners have legality of the first group of warrants
(2) WON the search warrants were valid.
(3) WON the articles can be used in evidence.

HELD:
(1) Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof.
Said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality
of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in
said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

(2) The warrants issued are in the nature of general warrants and are therefore null and void.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these
requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. No specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command
of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

3. The articles illegally seized through an invalid search warrant cannot be used in evidence.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not
be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned
Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.

The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime
by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Manlavi vs Gacott

FACTS:

judgment of 2 consolidated cases

crim-- filed motion to quash-- evid of prosecution was product of warrantless arrest, and illegal
search and seizure

granted-- admission of the prosecution that search and seizure was not covered by search
warrant , search warrant presented was issued after the fact

complainant-- confiscation of fish in the absence of search warrant was allowed under circular
issued by office of president

crim #2-- motion to quash on ground that info failed to charge offense of illegal possession of fish
caught by explosive element of profit

alleged: possession of illegally caguht fish

granted00info is fatally defective failed to allege two elements-- accused had knowledge that
fish were illegally caught; intended to dispose of or sell (profit)

prosecutionfiled MR

knowingly was substituted with wilfully

pd 704-- punishes separate acts of possessing, dealing, selling

MANLAVI-- senior police officercharged res with partiality and miscarriage of justice, knowingly
rendering unjust decision

that the quashal-- cannot be done without prior writtn approval of prosecutor

ISSUES:

1. Judge Gacott rendered an unjust decision with respect to the two criminal cases--no

2. complaint may be quashed without prior written approval of the provincial prosecutor

RULING:

1.No

complainant therein cannot justify the warrantless search and seizure by invoking Circular No. 130
(s. 1967) of the Office of the President.

circular pertains to the procedure in the confiscation of fish caught through the use of explosives.

Such confiscation may be exercised only by the Commissioner of fisheries or his representatives,
who can only take a sample of the fish for testing if the fish were caught through the use of
explosives.

It is only upon the determination that the fish were caught through the use of explosives when the
seizure of the entire catch may be authorized.
 arresting officers failed to show compliance with the procedure prescribed by the very circular they
invoke.

#2-- information suffers from infirmity for failure to allege the element "for profit." It is true that the
provision prohibits the separate acts of possessing, dealing in, selling or disposing of illegally caught
fish and aquatic products, but said acts must not only be done "knowingly" but also "for profit," an
essential element of the offense.

2. Yes.

Rule 112 of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure--NO complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written approval of the provincial or city fiscal
or chief state prosecutor.

In the case at bench, the accused moved for the quashal of the criminal cases after their
arraignment.

As a general rule, an accused can move for the quashal of the information on any ground before
arraignment. However, the rule admits of some exceptions such as where there is no offense
charged, for what controls is not the designation of the offense charged in the information but the
allegations of the constitutive elements of the offense.

Any ambiguity in the information shall be resolved in favor of the accused.

Well-settled is the rule that the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial capacity are not subject
to disciplinary power, unless when they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad
faith.