Dr
Bill
Nimmo
Room
1.09
Arts
Tower
Fuel CombusKon Chamber CO2, N2, H2O, O2 Composition M.W kmols kmol O2 kmol kmol kmol kmol Tot. Dry= 39.674
Reqd.Excess Air= 20 %
Coal feed = 5000 kg/hr
containing 8.5128 kmol of O2/ 100kg coal Burner Output (net) 40.3 MWatts thermal
3
and 32.024 kmol of N2/ 100kg coal 4
1
08/12/15
Rgas
=
R/M.W.
kJ
kg-1
K-1
(Tabulated
on
next
slide)
Water Vapour 462 18 2020 4.37
(Steam at 373K)
R
=
Ideal
gas
constant
=
8.314
kJ
Kmol-1
K-1
Nitrogen 297 28 1040 3.50
Helium 2079 4 5240 2.52
Argon 208 40 524 2.52
kerosene
Measurement
of
limi'ng
oxygen
These flame
temperature
calculations are
Related
to
iner'ng
is
the
limi'ng
oxygen
measurement.
This
is
the
oxygen
in
for 300K inlet the
air
plus
fuel
plus
inert
gas
mixture
that
occurs
when
a
stoichiometric
air temperature ame
will
not
propagate
an
explosion.
and 1 bar.
At 15% O2 the
The
limi'ng
oxygen
in
the
mixture
is:
peak temperature
Inert Gas
Is ~1800K which O2
=
20.9
(1-
inert)
% where
the
inert
gas
is
the
decimal
propor'on.
---- 0 Is still flammable.
------ 9.5
---- 19
If 1400K is the
---- 29 critical lean limit Limi'ng
oxygen
measurements
also
use
standard
ammability
equipment
temperature and
hence
the
values
of
limi'ng
oxygen
depend
on
the
method
used
as
well
then this shows as
on
the
inert
gas
used.
The
new
European
ammability
standard
means
the flammable that
all
the
historic
data
of
limi'ng
oxygen
for
dierent
gases
will
have
to
be
range narrows as repeated
on
the
new
equipment.
inerts are added.
2
08/12/15
Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000 Book, SiSon, Ludlow, Chemical Process Safety, 2000
I
O
A
G
Inert
-
Pure
Oxygen
-
Pure
Air
line
Book,
SiSon,
Ludlow,
Chemical
Process
Safety,
2000
Book,
SiSon,
Ludlow,
Chemical
Process
Safety,
2000
A
F
Fuel
-Pure
Scenario
1
-
In-Service
Oxygen
Concentra'on
In-Service
Oxygen
Concentra'on
for
Scenario
1
However,
if
inert
gas
is
added
to
the
B
vessel
containing
air
(moving
from
point
A
towards
point
I
on
the
Figure
)
un'l
The
concentraKon
of
oxygen
at
Point
G
is
the
in-service
oxygen
concentraKon
point
G
is
reached,
then
fuel
may
be
(ISOC)
for
the
fuel.
The
in-service
oxygen
concentraKon
is
dened
by
the
Stoichiometric
oxygen
concentraKon
at
the
intersecKon
of
a
line
from
the
pure
fuel
(point
F)
added
to
the
vessel
(moving
from
point
Line
C
G
on
a
line
towards
point
F)
and
the
that
is
tangent
to
the
ammable
region
with
the
oxygen/inert
axis.
Of
course,
composi'on
will
never
be
in
the
the
ISOC
is
the
limiKng
case
and
has
no
margin
for
safety.
If
inert
gas
is
added
to
the
vessel
such
that
the
oxygen
concentraKon
is
less
than
the
ISOC
(a
point
ammable
region.
K
between
points
G
and
I
on
the
oxygen/inert
axis),
then
fuel
can
be
safely
CombusKble
region
added.
J
L
N
D
M
I
O
A
G
Inert
-
Pure
Book,
SiSon,
Ludlow,
Chemical
Process
Safety,
2000
Oxygen
-
Pure
Air
line
Book,
SiSon,
Ludlow,
Chemical
Process
Safety,
2000
3
08/12/15
Scenario 2
3. The
composi'on
of
the
gas
in
the
vapor
space
of
a
vessel
containing
fuel
is
to
be
maintained
in
the
noncombus'ble
region
(liquid
fuels).
Scenario
2
Inert
gas
supply
Process
vessel
Triangular
Composi'on
Diagram
with
Typical
Triangular
Composi'on
Diagram
with
Typical
Combus'ble
Region
for
a
Gaseous
Fuel
Combus'ble
Region
for
a
Gaseous
Fuel
A
A
Scenario
2
-
Out-of-Service
Fuel
Concentra'on
F
Fuel
-Pure
F
Fuel
-Pure
Scenario
2
-
Out-of-Service
Fuel
However,
if
inert
gas
was
added
to
the
fuel
in
the
Concentra'on
vessel
(moving
from
point
F
towards
point
I
on
the
inert/fuel
axis)
un'l
point
J
is
reached,
then
a
combus'ble
composi'on
will
not
occur
should
air
B
If
a
vessel
that
contains
pure
fuel
is
to
B
inltrate
the
vessel.
The
fuel
concentra'on
at
point
J
be
taken
out
of
service,
it
is
most
likely
is
the
out-of-service
fuel
concentra'on
(OSFC)
for
the
to
be
surrounded
by
air.
The
danger
fuel.
Stoichiometric
Stoichiometric
arises
from
a
combus'ble
composi'on
If
sucient
inert
gas
is
added
to
the
fuel
in
Line
C
Line
C
that
would
be
created
by
the
the
vessel
such
that
the
concentra'on
is
inltra'on
of
air
(moving
from
point
F
that
of
point
J
and,
then,
air
inltrates
into
towards
point
A
on
the
air
line).
the
vessel,
the
concentra'on
in
the
vessel
K
K
will
move
along
the
line
from
point
J
CombusKble
region
CombusKble
region
towards
the
air
point
(point
A).
J
J
L
N
L
N
There
will
never
be
a
D
M
D
M
combus'ble
composi'on
in
the
I
I
vessel.
O
O
A
G
Inert
-
Pure
A
G
Inert
-
Pure
Oxygen
-
Pure
Air
line
Oxygen
-
Pure
Air
line
Book,
SiSon,
Ludlow,
Chemical
Process
Safety,
2000
Book,
SiSon,
Ludlow,
Chemical
Process
Safety,
2000
A
F
Fuel
-Pure
Scenario
2
-
Out-of-Service
Fuel
Concentra'on
There
are
three
common
scenarios
for
iner'ng/purging
opera'ons.
The
OSFC
is
dened
by
the
intersecKon
of
a
line
from
the
air
point
(point
A)
that
is
tangent
to
1. A
vessel
containing
air
is
to
be
placed
in
service
and,
ul'mately,
to
be
lled
with
B
the
ammable
region
with
the
inert/fuel
axis.
pure
fuel.
As
with
the
ISOC,
the
OSFC
is
a
limiKng
case
with
no
margin
for
error.
2. A
vessel
lled
with
pure
fuel
is
to
be
taken
out
of
service.
Stoichiometric
Line
C
In
pracKce,
the
fuel
composiKon
should
be
3. The
composi'on
of
the
gas
in
the
vapor
space
of
a
vessel
containing
fuel
is
to
be
reduced
to
a
value
below
the
OSFC
maintained
in
the
noncombus'ble
region
(liquid
fuels).
(between
points
J
and
I)
before
it
is
safe
K
for
air
to
inltrate
the
vessel.
CombusKble
region
J
L
M
N
Note
that
for
many
fuels,
the
D
OSFC
is
as
low
as
2-3
mole%.
I
O
A
G
Inert
-
Pure
Oxygen
-
Pure
Air
line
Book,
SiSon,
Ludlow,
Chemical
Process
Safety,
2000
Book,
SiSon,
Ludlow,
Chemical
Process
Safety,
2000
4
08/12/15
P
A
F
Fuel
-Pure
Scenario
3
-
Inert
the
Vapor
Space
(liquid
fuels
eg
kerosene)
The
composiKon
of
the
gas
in
the
vapor
space
of
a
Fuel
vapour
vessel
containing
fuel
is
to
be
maintained
in
the
B
noncombusKble
region
and
avoid
inltraKon
of
air.
Inlet
valve
Outlet
valve
Fuel Minimum Oxygen ConcentraKon in Fuel-Air-Diluent Gas Mixtures Book, SiSon, Ludlow,
N2d N2 CO2
(Volume
%)
H2Oc Ar CCl2F2 CCl3F
Chemical
Process
Safety,
2000
Flammability plots for all
Hydrogen
Hydrogenb
4 5.0
5.1
5.9e
7.6e
possible oxygen levels are of little
Carbon
monoxide
Methane
2.9
12
5.6
12.1
5.9
14.6
practical interest as the main interest is
Methaneb
Ethane 11.2
11.9
11.0
14.6
13.4
13.7
9.8
a
the
minimum
oxygen
in the inerting of flammable atmospheres
Propane
Propaneb
11.6 11.4
11.7
14.3
14.1
concentra'on
is
the
maximum
with air as the oxidant or pure oxygen and
Butane 12.3 12.1 14.5
concentra'on
of
oxygen
that
will
be
intermediate cases are of little interest.
n-Pentane 11.8
safe
in
any
unknown
mixture
of
Hexaneb 11.8 12.1 14.5
Ethylene 9.9 10.0 11.7
combus'ble
with
air
and
diluent
Propylene
2-Methylpropene
11.5
12
11.5
14.1
gas
Thus inerting data is more often given as
1-Butene
3-Methyl
Butene
11
11.5
b
values
extracted
from
graphs
c
temperature
adjusted
to
give
required
vapor
the proportion of inert gas added to air.
Cyclopropane
11.7 13.9
pressure
of
water
Butadiene 10.5 10.4 13.9
d
Mashuga,
C.
V.,
and
Crowl,
D.
A.,
Process
Acetylene 6.2
Safety
Progress,
17,
176
(1998).
Benzene 11.5 11.2 13.9
e
cannot
explain
large
dierence
in
values
from
Minimum
oxygen
Methyl
Alcohol 9.9
Ethyl
Alcohol 10.5
table
and
graph
Dimethyl
Ether 10.5
Lewis,
B.,
and
von
Elbe,
G.,
Combus4on,
Diethyl
Ether 10.2
Flames,
and
Explosions
of
Gases,
3rd
EdiKon,
Isobutyl
Formate 12.5
Academic
Press,
(1987).
Methyl
Acetate 11
Methyl
Ethyl
Ketone 11
Carbon
Disulde 5
Zabitakis
Natural
Gas 12
US Bureau of Mines
Gasolineb 11.6 12.2 15.0
18.4 18.7 Bulletin 627 , 1965
Jet
Propulsion-4 11.5
Methane
air
system
vs
inert
gas
Required
diluent
and
ammability
limit
ame
temperatures.
CO2
H2O
N2
Ar
21
%
O2,%
0
%
Note that the ranking CFCs
are
of the effectiveness banned
15
%
found experimentally
is the same as that
predicted. All
the
inerts
ex'nguish
Methane
%%
5
08/12/15
e.g For nitrogen many HCs require ~40% and then the limiting O2 is
12.5%.
For CO2 many HCs require ~25% and then the limiting O2 is 15.7%.
Clearly the limiting O2 depends on the inert used whereas the limit flame
Note that all HCs apart from Ethylene have
temperature does not.
similar limiting oxygen 13.4-14.6% for CO2
and 12.1-10.4% for N2 Lewis and Von Elbe, Combustion, Flames
And Explosion of Gases, 2nd Ed., 1968, p. 698
Academic Press
Examples
of
iner'ng
diagrams
for
a
range
of
fuels
Propane/air
Methane/Air
Coward and Jones, US Bureau of Mines, Bulletin No. 503, 1952 Coward and Jones, US Bureau of Mines, Bulletin No. 503, 1952
Also Lewis and Von Elbe, Combustion, Flames and Explosion of gases, 1968, p.696. Also Lewis and Von Elbe, Combustion, Flames and Explosion of gases, 1968, p.697.
6
08/12/15
Butane -Air
0.54 bar
27oC
CO2
N2
CO2 Inerting with
Nitrogen CO2 and N2 CFCs
Lewis and Von Elbe, 1968, Combustion, Flames and Explosions of Gases,
Academic Press. Also US Bureau of Mines Report Investigation No. 3871, 1946
CO/Air Ethylene/Air
7
08/12/15
Acetylene/Air Hydrogen/Air
The O2 concentration or
limiting O2 for acetylene is
thus
8
08/12/15
gate
hold
For
a
fuel
tank
to
explode
criteria
have
to
be
sa'sed.
ascent
ascent
descent
Fire
Triangle
1.
Air
(O2)
(in
or
out
from
vents
in
the
wing)
cruise
explosion
2. Fuel
in
sucient
quan'ty
(around
200
litres
of
avia'on
kerosene
in
empty
tank.
9
08/12/15
55 56
12,240 US Gals
4,420
1.98m
12,000
US
Gals
Access
US
Gals
Door
Blown
Explosion
1.22m
out
sec'on
500
US
Gals
6.48m
6.15m
Total
Fuel
46,320
US
Gals
Vol.
~
60
m3
Mass
Kerosene
~
48
tonnes
10
08/12/15
Air
vents
Air
Vents
Air
can
leave
the
CWT
at
lower
exterior
pressure
on
climbing
amer
take
-o
Air
can
enter
the
CWT
as
the
aircram
Fuel
tank
air
ven'ng
descends
into
higher
exterior
air
pressure
system
Vent
outlet
Fifed
with
a
ame
trap
61
TWA
ight
800
remained
on
the
ground
for
5
hours
in
New
York.
For
a
fuel
tank
to
explode
criteria
have
to
be
sa'sed.
ambient
temperature
of
22oC.
Fire
Triangle
The
air
condi'oning
was
on,
driven
by
the
Auxiliary
Power
Unit
1.
Air
(O2)
(in
or
out
from
vents
in
the
wing)
(APU).
This
dissipated
heat
into
the
CWT
and
it
has
been
2. Fuel
in
sucient
quan'ty
(around
200
litres
of
avia'on
kerosene
es'mated
that
this
heated
the
residual
fuel
in
the
CWT
to
~37
-
in
empty
tank.
50oC.
3.
Igni'on
source
(electrical
fault)
or
heat
The
bofom
oor
of
the
CWT
was
concave
and
the
residual
fuel
would
collect
in
the
centre.
Under
climb
condi'ons
at
a
6o
nose
However,
for
a
gas
or
dust
explosion
to
occur
we
need
correct
angle,
this
residual
fuel
would
have
collected
in
the
rear
of
the
stoichiometry
central
por'on
of
the
CWT.
63
64
11
08/12/15
Electrical
Wiring
in
the
CWT
and
the
Fault
that
Caused
the
Spark
that
Ignited
the
Explosion.
For
a
fuel
tank
to
explode
criteria
have
to
be
sa'sed.
www.planesafe.org
Electrical
wiring
in
the
fuel
tank
is
common
throughout
aircram
Fire
Triangle
design,
as
many
opera'onal
systems
need
to
pass
through
the
1.
Air
(O2)
(in
or
out
from
vents
in
the
wing)
tanks
or
take
readings
from
the
tanks.
The
power
input
into
such
things
as
electrically
driven
pumps,
quan'ty
measuring
and
2. Fuel
in
sucient
quan'ty
(around
200
litres
of
avia'on
kerosene
in
empty
tank.
indica'on
systems
are
kept
extremely
low
so
that
a
spark
cannot
be
crated
that
would
have
sucient
energy
to
cause
an
3.
Igni'on
source
(electrical
fault)
or
heat
explosion
of
the
fuel
vapour.
The
electrical
energy
is
10
'mes
below
the
minimum
igni'on
energy
(typically
0.25
mJ).
Electrical
equipment
in
fuel
tanks
are
also
bonded
to
the
aircram
However,
for
a
gas
or
dust
explosion
to
occur
we
need
correct
structure
so
that
no
charge
on
the
components
could
cause
an
stoichiometry
electrosta'c
spark.
69
70
12
08/12/15
75 76
13
08/12/15
Shepherd,
J.
Jet
A
Explosion
Experiments,
Cal.
Inst.
Tech,
Nov.
21,
1997
79
www.galicit.caltech.edu
Al'tude
only
required
for
lean
As
the
plane
climbed
and
gained
al'tude
the
pressure
dropped
<TWA
800
limit
igni'on.
This
is
and
this
was
transmifed
to
lower
pressure
in
the
centre
wing
Close
to
the
TWA
Flight
Pressure
Flammability
limits
approached
from
the
lean
side.
81
82
Conclusions
As
the
plane
climbs
the
ambient
pressure
decreases
and
this
The
plane
ew
in
from
Athens
where
the
centre
wing
tank
had
decreases
the
pressure
in
the
vapour
space
of
the
fuel
tank.
been
lled.
The
return
ight
was
to
Paris
and
the
centre
wing
This
reduces
the
mass
of
air
in
the
tank,
but
has
no
inuence
on
the
tank
needed
no
fuel
for
this
shorter
ight
and
it
was
nearly
mass
of
fuel
that
is
present
as
liquid
plus
vapour.
empty.
The
plane
was
delayed
on
the
ground
with
the
air
The
net
eect
is
that
the
overall
mixture
in
the
tank
becomes
richer
condi'oners
on
(ACM).
These
dissipated
heat
into
the
centre
as
the
aircram
climbs
and
at
a
par'cular
al'tude
for
a
given
star'ng
wing
tank.
The
external
temperature
was
21C
and
the
fuel
was
fuel
temperature
will
enter
the
ammable
range
from
the
lean
side.
es'mated
to
have
been
heated
to
around
37C
by
the
ACM.
The
reduc'on
in
air
pressure
as
the
aircram
climbs
makes
it
more
There
was
an
electrical
fault
thought
to
be
in
a
fuel
level
gauge,
likely
that
a
ammable
mixture
will
form
as
the
mass
of
air
is
but
this
did
not
ignite
the
vapour
on
the
ground.
reduced
so
that
less
fuel
needs
to
vaporise.
Outside
lean
ammability
limits.
The
eect
of
the
reduced
pressure
is
to
make
more
fuel
vaporise
and
so
there
are
two
factors
that
make
an
explosion
more
likely
at
al'tude.
83
84
14
08/12/15
gate
hold
Ques'on
ascent
Why
did
the
explosion
not
occur
on
the
trip
from
Athens?
ascent
descent
cruise explosion
89 90
15
08/12/15
If
all
the
pressure
rise
occurs
in
the
last
half
of
the
vessel
radius
then
the
@me
to
burn
this,
assuming
that
the
burning
velocity
Note
that
the
peak
pressure
only
achieves
the
adiaba'c
remains
constant
is:
theore'cal
value
if
there
are
no
heat
losses.
This
(D/4)/Ss
=
(D/4)
/
UL
E,
where
E
is
the
adiaba@c
expansion
ra@o
means
that
only
a
sphere
can
achieve
this
with
which
is
the
density
ra@o.
central
igni'on,
as
in
all
other
shapes
the
ame
will
Thus
KG
~
[Pm
UL
E
/
(D/4)]
V1/3
~
4
x
0.806
Pm
UL
E
touch
the
wall
before
all
the
mixture
has
burnt.
Note
that
V
=
/6
D3
Wall
Impingement
Now
for
methane
Pm
~
8bar,
UL
=
0.4
and
E
~
7
before
complete
combusKon
IgniKon
KG
~
4
x
0.806
x
8
x
0.4
x
7
~
72
bar
m/s
The
experimental
value
in
the
3.65m3
sphere
was
118
bar
m/s
which
is
signicantly
higher,
but
the
Bartknecht
value
for
KG
is
55
bar
m/s
(see
later).
93
94
16
08/12/15
Zabetakis
Sketch
the
varia'on
of
pressure
with
'me
for
a
spherical
vessel
US
Bureau
Mines
BylleKn
627,
1
965
constant
volume
explosion.
Explain
why
ini'ally
there
appears
to
be
lifle
pressure
rise
un'l
about
half
the
total
explosion
'me
has
A
cylinder
has
a
lower
elapsed.
peak
pressure
than
Dene
the
explosion
characterisa'on
parameter
KG
and
give
its
a
sphere
due
to
the
ame
contac'ng
the
recommended
value
for
methane/air.
wall
before
all
the
Es'mate
KG
from
the
burning
velocity
UL
in
a
spherical
vessel,
state
mixture
is
burnt.
The
your
assump'ons.
explosion
is
then
not
adiaba'c
due
to
heat
losses.
See
the
previous
slides
for
this
proof.
97 98
Explosion
Pressure
Rise
in
Closed
Vessels
Adiaba'c
closed
vessel
explosion
peak/ini'al
pressure
ra'os
Explosion
Pressure
Rise
in
Closed
Vessels
G.E.
Vanderstraeten
et
al.,
J.
Hazardous
Maaterials,
Vol.
56,
p.
237-246,
1997
Andrews
Checkel
et
al.,
J.
Loss
PrevenKon
Process
Ind.,
8,
215,
1995
PhD
1972
Bartknecht,
Explosions,
1993.
8
U.Leeds
Claessen
et
al.,
Proc.
5th
Int.
Symp.
Loss
Prev.,
Cannes,
1986
Spherical
bomb
8
litres
305mm
248mm
dia.
Pm/Pi
Dia.
Cylinder
L/D=1
4
Vessel
2
Equivalence
Ra'o
0.5
0.6
1
1.5
1
%
methane
in
air
Maximum
pressure/ini'al
pressure
ra'o
as
a
func'on
of
the
mixture
strength.
101
102
17
08/12/15
Cashdollar
et
al.,
J.
Loss
PrevenKon
in
the
Process
103
Industries
13,
327-340,
2000
105
18