2.

LIST 3 CIVIL CASE WHICH INCLUDE CONTRACT LAW AND CLAIMANT WIN
1. Dee v Telegraph Media Group Ltd

Reference [2010] EWHC 924 (QB); [2010] EMLR 20

Court Queen's Bench Division

Judge Sharp J

Date of Judgment 28 Apr 2010

Summary
Libel Summary judgment Defamatory meaning Whether articles in newspaper to be
read together Justification Fair comment Whether real prospect of rebutting defences
Facts
C sued in respect of an article published in the Daily Telegraph under the heading Worlds
worst tennis pro wins at last. The article, on the front page, described C as having suffered
54 defeats in a row. It referred to the full story being published on S20, in the
sports supplement to the newspaper. No complaint was made about the article on S20.

It was common ground that C had in fact lost 54 straight matches in world ranking
tournaments. C had however participated in domestic Spanish tournaments in which he had
secured some victories, but those tournaments did not attract world ranking points. The
second article on S20 made reference to the Spanish tournaments. D applied for summary
judgment on the basis either that (i) the words complained of were not defamatory when
read with the second article, as they should be; or (ii) C had no real prospect of successfully
rebutting the defences of justification and/or fair comment that D relied upon.
Issue
(1) Whether, in determining meaning, the words complained of had to be read together with
the second article;

(2) Whether the words complained of were defamatory of C;

(3) Whether Ds defences of justification and/or fair comment were bound to succeed.

Held
(1) The words complained of had to be read together with the second article. Where one
newspaper article is spread out over a number of pages, the ordinary reasonable reader is to
be taken to have turned over the pages, and found and read what he was directed to on the
continuation pages. The key question in this context is whether the various items under
consideration where sufficiently closely connected as to be regarded as a single
 publication and this is so whether or not the items in the same publication are
continuation pages or different items of published material relating to the same subject
matter. Here there was an obvious clear link between the two stories.

(2) The words complained of were capable of suggesting want of skill or incompetence,
which is capable of being defamatory. It would not however be right to permit a claimant
generally to contend that the words complained of are defamatory on grounds which do not
emerge from pleaded meanings. The real complaint of the present pleading was one of
ridicule, essentially that C was made to look absurdly bad at tennis. Were the claim to
continue C would have to formulate a defamatory meaning which more precisely reflects his
complaint.

(3) As to the defences raised, it was first necessary to determine meaning. D had made it
plain that Cs string of defeats were suffered on the international circuit and that C had
played in the national Spanish tournaments. A reasonable and sensible reader would not
really think that the suggestion that D was the worlds worst tennis professional was an
objectively verifiable allegation independent of his record of losses in the 54 matches. The
facts were sufficient to justify any defamatory meaning that the words were capable of
bearing.

2. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.

1 Q.B. 256 (Court of Appeal 1893)

Summary

The Plaintiff, believing Defendants advertisement that its product would prevent influenza,
bought a Carbolic Smoke Ball and used it as directed from November 20, 1891 until January
17, 1892, when she caught the flu. Plaintiff brought suit to recover the 100, which the
Court found her entitled to recover. Defendant appealed.

Facts

The Defendant, the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company of London (Defendant), placed an
advertisement in several newspapers on November 13, 1891, stating that its product, The
Carbolic Smoke Ball, when used three times daily, for two weeks, would prevent colds and
influenza. The makers of the smoke ball additionally offered a 100 reward to anyone who
caught influenza using their product, guaranteeing this reward by stating in their advertisement
that they had deposited 1000 in the bank as a show of their sincerity. The Plaintiff, Lilli Carlill
(Plaintiff), bought a smoke ball and used it as directed. Several weeks after she began using the
smoke ball, Plaintiff caught the flu.
Issue

Lindley, L.J., on behalf of the Court of Appeals, notes that the main issue at hand is whether the
language in Defendants advertisement, regarding the 100 reward was meant to be an express
promise or, rather, a sales puff, which had no meaning whatsoever.

Held

Defendants Appeal was dismissed, Plaintiff was entitled to recover 100.

The Court acknowledges that in the case of vague advertisements, language regarding
payment of a reward is generally a puff, which carries no enforceability. In this case, however,
Defendant noted the deposit of 1000 in their advertisement, as a show of their sincerity.
Because Defendant did this, the Court found their offer to reward to be a promise, backed by
their own sincerity.

3. Irving v Balsara & Co (a firm)

Publisher Citation: [2002] All ER (D) 445 (Jul)

Court: Chancery Division
Judge:
Rimer J

Representation Gordon Wignall (instructed by Balsara & Co) for the defendant.
Jonathan Seitler (instructed by Lattey & Dawe) for the respondent.
Judgment Dates: 24 July 2002

Summary

Solicitor - Costs - Conditional fee agreement - Costs judge declaring conditional fee agreement
unenforceable - Whether costs judge in error.

Held

On an appeal against a decision of the costs judge by which he held that a conditional fee
agreement entered into by the defendant firm of solicitors was unenforceable, the court ruled that
the costs judge's decision was manifestly wrong, as conceded by counsel, and accordingly
allowed the appeal.