URSUA VS CA

GR 112170
APRIL 10, 1996

FACTS:
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then asked him to get a copy of
the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman. His lawyer asked him that because the law
firms messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the Ombudsman.

Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he feels uncomfortable asking
for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case. Perez then told him than he can go
there as Oscar Perez so that he does not have to reveal his true identity.

At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as Oscar Perez. When he was handed a copy
of the complaint, he signed the receipt as Oscar Perez. However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn
that he was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua.
Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise
known as An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cesario Ursuas conviction is proper?

RTC: convicted
CA: convicted

HELD:
SC: No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict application of C.A. No. 142, as
amended, in this case only leads to absurdity something which could not have been intended by the
lawmakers.

Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to use a name or an alias
other than his registered name or that which he was baptized. Under the law, what makes the use of alias
illegal is the fact that it is being used habitually and publicly in business transactions without prior
authorization by competent authority. In this case, Ursua merely used the name Oscar Perez once, it was not
used in a business transaction, the use of the name was with the consent of Oscar Perez himself, and even if he
used a different name, in this instance, he was not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the
Ombudsman. When he was requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the
complaint is a public record open to the public.

In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name
other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar
Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of
the law is to punish evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursuas act, said law need not
be applied.
 PEOPLE VS ANDAYA
GR 183700
OCTOBER 13, 2014

FACTS:
Accused Pablito Andaya was charged for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, otherwise known as
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for selling shabu. The RTC and CA found him guilty of the
crime charged.

SPO2 Delfin Alea testified that at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of December 16, 2002, their asset who was
conducting surveillance of Pablito Andaya in Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City, arrived at their station.
Said asset reported that he had arranged to buy shabu from Pablito. A team composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1
Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto Villar and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a
buy-bust. Two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills both duly marked X were recorded in the police blotter. Upon
reaching the designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and occupied different
positions where they could see and observe the asset. The asset knocked on the door of Pablitos house.
Pablito came out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset gave Pablito the marked money. The asset
received something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal signifying consummation of the transaction was
given. The team members approached Pablito and the asset, introduced themselves as police officers and
arrested accused.

Accused Andaya alleges that the Prosecutions non-presentation of the confidential informant who was the
poseur buyer was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

ISSUE:
Is the non-presentation of the confidential informant fatal to the prosecutions case?

HELD:
YES, the non-presentation of the confidential informant is tantamount to saying that the prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. A buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of
entrapment of the drug pusher. The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that
the suspect is arrested in flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of
committing, or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private
person. Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the State,
and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt.

Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur buyer himself. It
is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal
from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the
transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not
present the confidential informant/ poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction
between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue against that, except that none of
the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the
poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of
the supposed transaction

The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those instances could be
excused because there were poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused. In this case, however, it
was different, because the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same. Without the
poseur buyers testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Andaya. The members of the buy-bust team
could not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that they had seen from their positions the poseur buyer
handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave something to the poseur buyer.
Moreover, the arresting members of the buy-bust team interpreted the signal from the anonymous poseur
buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction. Their interpretation, being necessarily subjective
without the testimony of the poseur buyer, unfairly threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should not allow that
threat to perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to confront
and test the credibility of the poseur buyer who supposedly gave it.
Hence, the prosecution failed to prove accused Andayas guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

DELA CRUZ VS PEOPLE

GR 200748
JULY 23, 2014

CC: violation of Section 15, Article II of RA 9165 (use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE commonly
known as Shabu )

FACTS:
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION:
The agents and special investigators of NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon and Charito Escobido
claiming that Ariel, live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male
persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs.

An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were
instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office.
In the said police office, they met James who demanded from them 100,000, later lowered to 40,000, in
exchange for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI to file a complaint.
While at the NBI, Charito even received calls supposedly from James instructing her to bring the money as
soon as possible.

The special investigators at the NBI verified the text messages received by the complainants. A team was
immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch.
The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder,
which was made part of the amount demanded by James and handed by Corazon.
Petitioner was subjected to forensic examination and was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It
yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE

The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while eating at
the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office,
he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the
PNP and not by the NBI. His request was denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the
taking of his urine sample, to no avail.

RTC: GUILTY
CA: AFFIRMED; GUILTY

ISSUE: WON the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal (NO)

RULING:
SC: ACQUITTED

LOWER COURTS CONTENTION: a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract
urine because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony against
himself. Extracting urine from ones body is merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a
custodial investigation.
 The elements of Section 15 were established:
1. the accused was arrested;
2. the accused was subjected to drug test; and
3. the confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.

1. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for
unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.

A drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others, the importation,
sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation, manufacture and
possession of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof
during parties, social gatherings or meetings; ETC.

To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under
Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused here was arrested in the alleged
act of extortion. The drug testing done against him has no any legal basis.

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC and
the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioners urine for purposes of drug
testing was merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.

2. The drug test was a violation of petitioners right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for
a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile,
because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.

PEOPLE VS MORILLA
GR 189833
FEBRUARY 5, 2014
FACTS:
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION:

CC: Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang and Ruel Dequilla were charged of illegal transport of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu)

On October 13, 2001, two vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van driven by Morilla,
left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which was ahead of the ambulance was able to pass the
checkpoint set up by the police officers. However, the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers.
Through the untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry of the
contents, Morilla replied that the sacks contained narra wooden tiles.

Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further inspection. When it
was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to
request Morilla to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police officers that he was with Mayor Mitra in
an attempt to persuade them to let him pass. His request was rejected by the police officers and upon inspection,
the contents of the sacks turned out to be sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

This discovery prompted the operatives to chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to
overtake the van and Mayor Mitra was asked to stop. They then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain view,
the operatives noticed that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Thus, Mayor
Mitra was also requested to open the door of the vehicle for inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to
settle the matter but the same was rejected. Upon examination, the contents of the sacks were likewise found to
contain sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE:

Mayor Mitra testified that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that he was merely
requested to transport them to Manila on board his Starex van. He explained that he only accommodated the
request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat. It likewise dismissed the defense of
ambulance driver Morilla of lack of knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought
that he was just transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other
passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as
he was merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.

RTC: convicted Morilla and Mayor Mitra of illegal transport of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) beyond
reasonable doubt, in conspiracy with each other. Accused Willie Yang and Ruel Dequilla are hereby ACQUITTED
for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt

CA: affirmed RTC; it upheld the finding of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to
transport several sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their respective vehicles. The
singularity of their intent to illegally transport methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla
agreed to drive the ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra, who drove the lead
vehicle, the Starex van.

ISSUE:
WON the Morilla and Mayor Mitra were guilty as charged

RULING:
YES. Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs
on board their vehicles. Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means to carry or convey from
one place to another. It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the
lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of transporting
methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law.
The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of
criminal intent, motive or knowledge.