We shall examine the provision of the law invoked in relation to the duties of the appellee under the

position in question. Section 1 of Republic Act 1080, as amended by Republic Act 1844 provides
among others, as follows

This litigation calls for application or interpretation of section 117 of Act No. 2874, which for
convenience is herein quoted:

Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, for a period
of five years from the date of the conveyance.

When a legal heir of the homesteader acquires title to the homestead, and subsequently sells it, may
the said heir invoke the above section to establish his right to repurchase such homestead? That is
the question squarely raised in this expediente

We are not advised of any previous ruling of this Court on the matter. However, the solution of the
question is not hard to seek, if the notice is carefully analyzed in the light of the purposes of the
Public Land Act.

It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of
the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent
intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five
years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of
the homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the
statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right of
repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This section 117 is
undoubtedly a complement of section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would,
therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase
exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by
his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of the statute.

It should be noted that neither one of the following enactments makes non-payment of fees an
offense nor provides for punishment for violation. The judgment itself is bereft of any criminal
sanction. The surcharge imposed by Section 5 B.05 for late or non-payment of monthly rentals is not
a penalty under criminal law but an additional amount added to the usual charge. It is more of an
administrative penalty, which should be recoverable only by civil action.

There being no offense defined nor punishment prescribed, a criminal action will not lie, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court was without criminal jurisdiction over the matter. Criminal jurisdiction is
the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment provided by law. 2

ACCORDINGLY, the criminal complaint against petitioner is hereby ordered dismissed, without
prejudice to the right of the Municipal Government of Masinloc, Zambales, to collect, in a civil action
if need be, the unpaid rentals and surcharge due from petitioner.

It should be noted that neither one of the following enactments makes non-payment of fees an
offense nor provides for punishment for violation. The judgment itself is bereft of any criminal
sanction. The surcharge imposed by Section 5 B.05 for late or non-payment of monthly rentals is not
a penalty under criminal law but an additional amount added to the usual charge. It is more of an
administrative penalty, which should be recoverable only by civil action.
There being no offense defined nor punishment prescribed, a criminal action will not lie, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court was without criminal jurisdiction over the matter. Criminal jurisdiction is
the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment provided by law. 2

ACCORDINGLY, the criminal complaint against petitioner is hereby ordered dismissed, without
prejudice to the right of the Municipal Government of Masinloc, Zambales, to collect, in a civil action
if need be, the unpaid rentals and surcharge due from petitioner.

The tax ordinance imposes a tax on persons, firms, and corporations engaged in the business of:

1. distribution of soft-drinks

2. manufacture of soft-drinks, and

3. bottling of softdrinks within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Iloilo.

There is no question that after it transferred its plant to Pavia, Iloilo province, Iloilo Bottlers, Inc. no
longer manufactured/bottled its softdrinks within Iloilo City. Thus, it cannot be taxed as one falling
under the second or the third type of business. The resolution of this case therefore hinges on
whether the company may be considered engaged in the distribution of softdrinks in Iloilo City, even
after it had transferred its bottling plant to Pavia, so as to be within the purview of the ordinance.

Iloilo Bottlers, Inc. disclaims liability on two grounds: First, it contends that since it is not engaged in
the independent business of distributing soft-drinks, but that its activity of selling is merely an
incident to, or is a necessary consequence of its main or principal business of bottling, then it is NOT
liable under the city tax ordinance. Second, it claims that only manufacturers or bottlers having their
plants inside the territorial jurisdiction of the city are covered by the ordinance.

The second ground is manifestly devoid of merit. It is clear from the ordinance that three types of
activities are covered: (1) distribution, (2) manufacture and (3) bottling of softdrinks. A person
engaged in any or all of these activities is subject to the tax.

The first ground, however, merits serious consideration. It is a basic canon of statutory construction
that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated
and harmonious whole.33Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts. Every part
thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment.3434 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 461, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS
Farming Corporation, 569 SCRA 154, 183 (2008) and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Urgello, 520 SCRA 515, 535 (2007).