CHAPTER XIV

DUE PROCESS
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

1. In general:

1. PEOPLE vs. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321

FACTS: Delia Bonion was raped by Adulfo Terrobias as found by the Regional Trial Court of Catanduanes
(Then CFI). She was the maid of the parents of Terrobias and was ravaged by him while they were away. On
appeal, Terrobias argued that he was denied due process during the trial because the trial lasted for only four
days. Also, the CFI of Catanduanes was abolished after the case was tried but before the memoranda of the
parties were submitted and before it was decided by the Court.

ISSUE: Was the Constitutional Right of Terrobias violated?

HELD: No. He had presented all his evidence which was duly submitted by his counsel and the counsel did
not ask for additional time to present more evidence. He was also afforded his right to cross examine the
witnesses of the defense.Furthermore, the CFI that heard the case had the right and jurisdiction to decide the
case as the trial was concluded before the authority to try the case expired. Much less was the trial judge
divested of the authority to decide the case which he can do anytime after the trial of the case, under Section 51
of the Judiciary Act, the filing of memoranda not being a part of the trial, nor is the memorandum itself an
essential, much less an indispensable, pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. It is intended
primarily to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and the evidence, and should
not, therefore, be the cause for the loss of the authority of the judge who heard the case to decide it.

2. Presumption of innocence, 54 SCRA 56

The right means that the presumption must be overcome by evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
1. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt means that there is moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused
2. Accusation is not synonymous to guiltconviction should then be based on the strength of the evidence of
the prosecution and not the weakness of the defense

Rationale: There ought to be a balance between the machineries of the State and the accused.

1. If there is a REASONABLE CONNECTION between the fact presumed and the fact ultimately
proven from such fact. For example, an accountable public officer who fails to account for
funds or property that should be in his custody is presumed to be guilty of malversation of public funds; or
that persons in possession of recently stolen goods are presumed guilty of the offense in connection with
the goods

2. In cases of SELF-DEFENSE, the person who invokes the self-defense is presumed guilty. The burden
of proving the elements of self-defense is incumbent upon the accused

Read also:

1. PEOPLE VS. ANGUS, August 3, 2010

After all, mas vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.Courts should be
guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten (10) men who might be probably guilty of the
crime charged than to convict one (1) innocent man for a crime he did not commit.
FACTS: RTC Misamis Oriental Cagayan De Oro convicted Technical Sgt. Porferio Angus, Jr. of parricide for
killing his wife, Betty. The victim, Betty D. Angus, arrived at the Lanisi Patrol Base at around 7:00 p.m. on
January 9, 2002. Appellant fetched her at the gate and they proceeded to his bunker. Later, CAFGU members
Malaran and Carpio heard the two (2) arguing about accuseds relationship with another woman. Accused was
also seen go out of his bunker around midnight to get some rice, beef and vegetables for dinner. The following
day, Betty was found dead by Malaran and Jintapa, who was passing by the bunker of Angus. Angus
immediately tried to revive his wife. In the room, the noose was still hanging. Angus declared that his wife had
committed suicide.
Appellant argues that nobody really saw who killed the victim or when and how she was killed. He asserts that
the prosecution witnesses merely testified to have last seen Betty alive on the night of January 9, 2002.
Thereafter, they heard the couple arguing about a woman. The following morning Betty was found dead.
Although there was more than one (1) circumstance, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that
the combination thereof leads to the inevitable conclusion that he killed his wife.

ISSUE: Was the accuseds guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD: No. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by
presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own
evidence and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet its burden of
proof, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In such cases the presumption
prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of
guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious
process of reasoning towards a conviction.
While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice
in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to only one (1) fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
is the guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the possibility
of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind is required.
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction: (a)
there is more than one (1) circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven,
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, is the one (1) who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the accused.
The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes an unbroken chain
which leads to the conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty of killing his wife. The trial
court relied on the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio who heard the appellant and his wife arguing about the
latters illicit relationship with another woman, which supposedly proves motive for him to commit the crime.
However, granting that appellant and Betty had an argument on the night before her death, it would be too much
to presume that such an argument would drive appellant to kill his wife. Clearly, the motive is not convincing. If
at all, the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio merely show a suspicion of appellants responsibility for the crime.
Needless to state, however, suspicion no matter how strong can not sway judgment.

2. ERIBERTO MASANGKAY VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 164443, June 18, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Eriberto Masangkay (Eriberto), his common-law wife Magdalena Ricaros (Magdalena),
Cesar Masangkay (Cesar) and his wife Elizabeth Masangkay (Elizabeth), and Eric Dullano were the
incorporators and directors of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI) which was incorporated in June 1990.
Eriberto filed WITH (SEC) a Petition for the Involuntary Dissolution of MFI for violation of Section 6
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A. The named respondents were MFI, Cesar and Elizabeth. The said
petition was made under oath before a notary public.
Respondent Elizabeth A. Masangkay prepared or caused to be prepared a Secretary's Certificate which
states that at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the said corporation held at its principal office on
December 5, 1992, the following resolution by unanimous votes of the directors present at said meeting and
constituting a quorum was approved and adopted.
Said secretary's certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated because the alleged meeting of the
Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually materialize. Using the said falsified and spurious
document, respondents executed another fictitious document known as the "Deed of Exchange with
Cancellation of Usufruct.
The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of a land
(Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay is void. The aforementioned contract is indeed
simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of
his own property without any consideration at all. Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto
Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged guardian Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in
time of MFI.
HELD: The prosecution was unable to prove, by convincing evidence other than the minutes, that the
December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place. It merely presented, aside from the minutes, the testimony of
private complainant Cesar, who is a respondent in the corporate dissolution case filed by the petitioner and is
therefore not a neutral or disinterested witness. The prosecution did not present the testimony of the other
directors or participants in the alleged meeting who could have testified that the meeting actually occurred.
Neither did the prosecution offer any explanation why such testimony was not presented. It likewise failed to
present any evidence that might circumstantially prove that on December 5, 1992, the directors were physically
gathered at a single place, and there conferred with each other and came up with certain resolutions. Notably,
the prosecution failed to present the notice for the alleged meeting. The corporate secretary, Elizabeth, who was
presented by the petitioner, could not even remember whether she had sent out a prior notice to the directors for
the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting.
We recognize that perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws; that it is the policy of the law
that judicial proceedings and judgments shall be fair and free from fraud; that litigants and parties be
encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they do not However, it is also at the heart of every
criminal proceeding that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Petition granted.

3. PEOPLE VS. MALBOG, October 13, 2000

FACTS: The complainant, Estela Eng y Ulalan, was a nursing student. Since she was late for school, she and
her boyfriend, Salvador Bambilla went to Inawa Lodge-Inn and allegedly had sex. After such, the man
ejaculated between her thighs which stained her white uniform. The woman then commanded the man to buy a
new shirt. The man was out for 45 minutes then when he came back, they went home. They decided to elope
and set their rendezvous but the woman didnt appear in the meeting place. She then filed a rape case against
him. In the RTC, the accused was convicted.

HELD: The RTC erred on the decision. The complainant testified that the accused ejaculated between her
thighs; the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined the complainant indicated the probability that no
rape was committed. The medical certificate stated that there was no sign of external physical injuries on the
whole body of the complainant, no spermatozoa was found but there were erythema and healed lacerations. She
did not try to escape when the accused was out for 45 minutes, did not shout for help, waited for the accused to
return. These circumstances utterly show that the sex was consensual. Therefore, her accusation that she was
raped was contrary to human experience which gives the accused presumption of innocence. He was acquitted.
4. PEOPLE VS. TUMAMBING, GR No. 191261, March 2, 2011

FACTS: Jenny Tumambing was charged with rape. DK the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on
June 26, 2004 she went to sleep, leaving the lights on, at her cousins rented room. She was startled when
somebody entered the room after she had turned off the lights. The intruder, a man, poked a knife at DK and
threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He removed DKs clothes and undressed himself. He then
succeeded in ravishing her. When the man was about to leave, DK turned the light on and she saw his face. DK
recognized him as the same person who passed by her cousins room several times in the afternoon of the
previous day, June 25, 2004. Later, she identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her rapist.
Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June 26, 2004 he slept at the house of his
employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and woke up at 6:00 a.m. Tumambing swore that
he never left his employers house that night. Ledesma corroborated his story. Barangay officials summoned
Tumambing and he went, thinking that it had something to do with a bloodletting campaign. He was shocked,
however, when he learned that he had been suspected of having committed rape

ISSUE:Whether the court erred in finding that accused Tumambing raped DK despite several uncertainties in
the testimony of the victim.

HELD: In this case, the victims testimony is inconsistent. Although the victim categorically said on cross-
examination that she saw her attacker enter the room, she did not shout or raise an alarming call. Nor did she
try to escape. She just lay in bed. In fact, she maintained that position in bed even when her attacker was
standing before her and removing his clothes. She did not shout nor struggle when he penetrated her. There is
one thing that the victim appeared sure of, her rapist wore a yellow shirt. But this is inconsistent with her
testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her, bigla na lang po siyang lumabas x x x
sinundan ko siya ng tingin. Since the victim did not say that the man put his clothes back on, it seems a
certainty that he collected his clothes and carried this out when he left the room. Since the victim then turned
on the light for the first time, she had a chance to see him clearly. But, if this were so and he walked out naked,
why was she (the victim) so certain that he wore a yellow shirt? With such serious doubts regarding the true
identity of the victims rapist, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of accused.
A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the identification of the
author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed
has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offenders identity. The constitutional
presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of
uncertainties. By the nature of rape, the court has to rely on the sole testimony of the victim. For this reason,
the court is always reminded to subject her testimony to a most rigid and careful scrutiny. It cannot afford to
overlook details that are essential to an understanding of the truth.

5. PEOPLE VS. QUINTAL, GR No. 184170, February 2, 2011

FACTS:Vicente and 15 year old Jerwin Quintal, 16 year old Felipe Quintal and Larry Panti were charged with
rape. The victim was a 16 year old girl AAA. Of all the accused, only Felipe and Jerwin were arrested. The
Victim testified that in August 2002, as she was leaving a wake around 10 pm, she noticed that her schoolmate
Jerwin was following her. Jerwin and Felipe invited AAA to a birthday party and she agreed to go with them.
But she was directed to a ricefield were the four accused took turn raping her. AAA reported the incident 2 days
later. Jerwins parents accompanied him and there were talks of Jerwin proposing a marriage to AAA and that
Jerwin confessed the crime in writing. For the defense, Jerwin claimed that AAA was his girlfriend and that
they had sexual intercourse before. In 2006 all the accused were convicted but the conviction of Jerwin and
Felipe was suspended as they were minors.

ISSUE:Whether there was sufficient evidence for conviction.

HELD:No. The credibility of the witnesses of the prosecution as well as inconclusive medical findings, tend to
create doubt if AAA was indeed raped. The courts relied largely on the testimony of AAA that she was raped.
The Supreme Court doubted the credibility of AAAs testimony, which was inconsistent with what she told the
Brgy. Tanods:

First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and Felipe. However, when the two allegedly
invited her to go with them to a party, she readily accepted the invitation and in fact, went with them. Moreover,
AAA was seen playing cards with Jerwin and his group in the wake, as testified by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and
Federico.

Second, AAA recounted that the nipa hut where she was brought by the accused was very dark. And yet, AAA
readily identified Vicente and Larry inside the hut, as two of those who raped her. Incidentally, it was unclear
how AAA was able to identify Vicente and Larry because she was never asked, not by the prosecution nor the
defense, on how she came to know the two accused.
Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that there was a round-the-clock abrasion in the labia
minora. This is not at all conclusive nor corroborative to support the charge of rape. At most, this indicates that
AAA had sexual intercourse. We find the medical finding lacking in relation to the testimony of AAA on how
she was ravished by four men. Although a medical examination is not an indispensable element in a prosecution
of rape, it could have corroborated an otherwise vague and dubious testimony of the victim. In fact, Dr. Tatad
admitted that he only examined AAAs private parts based on her statement that she was raped.
Furthermore, in her sworn statement before the police, AAA related that her mouth was injured. She also
testified in court that her hands and feet were tied to a post by a nylon string. Naturally, AAA would have
sustained injuries in her hands and feet. But all these injuries were never examined by the medico-legal officer
nor did AAA allege the existence of those injuries.

Fourth, AAAs belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in this case, especially when it appears that
she really had no intention at all to inform her mother, not until the latter actually asked her why she was
walking in an unusual manner.:

Fifth, BBB allegedly went to the Barangay Kagawad and the Tanod, who happens to be her cousin, to report the
rape incidents. However, when Fernando and Eddie testified, they claimed that they were initially informed by
BBB about a marriage proposal by Jerwins parents. It was only during the meeting that they learned about the
alleged rape.

Sixth, to fuel further suspicion as to whether a rape incident actually transpired, BBB never bothered to ask
AAA about the whole incident. She accepted AAAs testimony hook, line and sinker. In the same breadth, it can
be recalled that Eddie, the Barangay Tanod, testified that BBB dictated to him what was written in the yellow
paper which contained the supposed admissions of rape by the accused. Eddie did not appear to have asked or
interrogated the accused about the incident. Likewise, Dr. Tatad merely examined AAAs private parts on the
basis of her claim that she was raped.

Seventh, in an unusual twist, records show that AAA was seen visiting Jerwin in jail for at least six times. These
incidents are documented in a logbook presented in court by the defense and which was not refuted by the
prosecution.

The combination of all the circumstances is more than sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to whether the
rape was committed and whether the accused were the perpetrators.
6. PEOPLE VS. PAILANO, GR No. 43602, January 31, 1989
FACTS:Crime:Pailano, 69 years old, dragged Anita Ibaez, 15 years old, threatened her wuth a scythe and
raped her.
Version of Pailano: Anita enticed him into having sexual intercourse with him.
Medical examination of the complainant was made more than two months afterwards, there naturally
could not be any finding of the bruises, cuts and scratches that usually attend forcible rape. But there was the
tell-tale hymeneal laceration in the complainant that even the accused-appellant could not dispute.
HELD:Given the choice between the separate accounts of Anita and the Pailano, the court inclines in favor of
Pailano as it is more believable. Anita never spoke of any difficulty on the part of Pailano in violating her. She
simply said he removed her panty and entered her. Considering his age and the emotional pressures of the
moment, Pailano could not have accomplished the crime so easily as Anita has narrated it. Pailano did not
hesitate to testify, at the risk of his manly pride, that he did not easily have an erection during the tryst with
Anita and that it took some fondling from her before his organ could respond. This was a hard and humiliating
fact but it had to be admitted.
Leonardo Filomeno said he saw Pailano and Anita coupling on the day in question. Natividad Madrigal said she
saw Anita and Pailano caressing each other, with the girl in fact assuming the more aggressive role.
The statutory presumption of sanity (because Anita was alleging that she was insane at that time) and the
constitutional presumption of innocence have not been overcome. Anita took no action but to merely tell her
mother about the incident. It was only two-and-a-half months later that her mother decided to complain to the
authorities, but then it was already suspiciously late. The only possible explanation for her delay is that the
liaison between Anita and Pailano had already become a scandal by that time and she must have thought she
could redeem Anita's honor by initiating the criminal complaint. The delay blunts the charge of rape.
Accused is acquitted.

7. MALILLIN VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008

FACTS: The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing
else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the
innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.
Junie Malilin was accused of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride/ shabu in a police
raid in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. Delfin Licup as well a Junie himself, his wife
Sheila and his mother, Norma allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic
sachets containing residual morsels of shabu.
Bolanos, leader of raiding team, testified that the raid was with valid search and seizure that upon
entering the premises. On cross examination, Bolanos admitted that during the search, he was explaining its
progress to Junies mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search being conducted
by Esternon.
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found behind the door of
the bedroom and not inside the cabinet. On cross, he admitted that it was he alone who conducted the search
because Bolanos was standing behind him in the living room portion of the house and that Junie handed to him
the things to be searched.

Defense: focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by the police operatives. Norma and
Sheila positively declared that Junie was not in the house for the entire duration of the search because he was
sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer.
RTC: the fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioners animus
possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge - things which a person possesses or over which he exercises
acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him.Junies failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to
fabricate charges against him.
HELD: Although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on
appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied in a case under appeal.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession
of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not
authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its
existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.Identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Mere
fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt.
More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police officers from the commencement of
the search of petitioners house until the submission of the seized items to the laboratory for analysis - prior to
the discovery of the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby store.
Given the deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in the implementation
of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced. The
presumption of regularity is merely just that a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from
petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody
before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the
guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever maybe the reputation of the accused, for the law
presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to
culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
Junie Malillin y Lopez is ACQUITTED.
8. PEOPLE VS. DELOS SANTOS, 355 SCRA 415

Facts:

Glen Delos Santos, driver of Isuzu Elf Truck, was convicted by the Trial Court with the crimes of multiple
murder, frustrated murder, and multiple attempted murder for accidentally bumping members of PNP during an
endurance run on October 5, 1995 (2:00 am) in Cagayan de Oro.
The trial court and the OSG believed that GLENN intentionally rammed and hit the jogging trainees. This was
premised on the assumption that despite the first bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead
of applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks or skid marks along the traffic scene. But they
also theorize that Glenn might have slept on the steering wheel which led to the ramming incident.

However, the defense posits an accident; that Glenn did not intend to ram the members of the PNP but that he
was blinded by the light of an incoming truck; that because the area was a curve, he was unable to easily
swerve away from the PNP members.
Issue:

Is he guilty of malicious intent or reckless imprudence only?

Held:

From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a product of
reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on GLENNs part.
First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the incident was very dark, as
there was no moon. And according to PAG-ASAs observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de
Oro City covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there
was absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for the
moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway.
Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and black
and green combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had
neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals.

Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other hand, the jogging trainees
were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as GLENNs vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the
same direction as GLENNs truck such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind.

Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENNs testimony that he had been momentarily
blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck
rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other
vehicle when he plowed into the group of police trainees.
Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a
cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same; and more so if the one on the road is
a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife
and three very young children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with
his truck.

It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations -- one
consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the accused, and the other consistent with his
guilt or graver responsibility -- the Court should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the
accused.
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons killed and seriously
injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence
that GLENN had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them
with intent to kill.

9. PEOPLE VS. SATURNO, 355 SCRA 578

FACTS:

Saturno was charged with Multiple murder for killing three persons. This happened when Saturno allegedly
went to Valdezs residence. He went to the latters bedroom and shot him. Other companions of Valdez were
brought to the room and hog-tied. Lucila, the wife of Valdez, was the primary witness of the incident. She
testified that on June 23, 1989, at around 7:00 in the morning, Rodelito Valdez, Benigno Andres, Jose Lopez,
Jr., Protacio Pasalusdos, Florencio Bulatao and Matias Andres were having a drinking spree at Rodelito Valdezs
house at Agupalo Este, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Matias Andres only had a few drinks and proceeded to the farm.
Benigno Andres left around lunchtime. Lucila Valdez, Rodelitos wife, heard Benigno say that he was going to
Muoz, so she asked him to buy her a kilo of pinapaitan (cow meat) and oil. At around 1:00 in the afternoon, all
the others were already dead drunk and went to sleep.

At around 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Lucila heard a tricycle park near their house. There were four
passengers, and the last one to alight was Benigno Andres. Thinking that he was delivering her pinapaitan, she
went down to meet him. However, one of the men (wearing a light brown jacket and a fatigue cap) met her
downstairs and asked for her husband Rodelito. She told him that Rodelito was dead drunk and could not be
awakened. The man did not heed her and went straight to their house. Lucila followed him inside. He woke up
Rodelito, who was sleeping in the bedroom, and asked for his gun. When Rodelito answered that he did not
have a gun, the man shot him. Lucila, who was carrying her one-year old child, started to cry for help but the
man ordered her to be quiet and to stay in the corner of the room.

The mans companions brought Jose Lopez, Jr. and Protacio Pasalusdos to the bedroom and hog-tied them.
Florencio Bulatao arrived later and was also hog-tied. Lucila, who was covering her face and trembling in fear,
sensed that those who were hog-tied were separately brought downstairs. Every time a body was brought
downstairs, she would hear gunshots. When she tried to open her eyes again, she saw that the man in light
brown jacket was still there and was pointing his gun at her. She closed her eyes and heard two gunshots. When
she looked again, the man was no longer there. She realized that the two shots were aimed at her husband

The reason why he was implicated was because Sgt. Pillonar told Mrs Lucila Valdez that he was the suspect. At
first, Mrs. Valdez could not truly identify the culprits identity. The latter answered that she does not know
Saturno, that Saturnos tricycle was not the same tricycle used by his husbands assailants. However, after Sgt.
Pillonar brought her to his office, Lucila said that he eventually recognized Saturno. There was a picture taken
which showed Lucila pointing at Saturno, a gun, a light brown jacket and a fatigue cap which were later
identified as belonging to Saturno. Lucilas testimony revealed, however, that she initially pointed at a fatigue
cap and a jacket inside the camp office, but the soldier on duty laughed at because those belonged to him.

On the part of Saturno, he went to the PC Station because Sgt. Pillonar ask him to. He brought his tricycle so he
can have a ride home. When he was asked of his involvement in the crime and he denied the allegations,
Pillonar and his men tortured him to admit.

He was firm to say that he was not in the place of the crime on the day of the crime because he went home due
to sickness. His colleagues testified that they allowed him to go home because he appeared sick.

Issue:

Were the testimonies sufficient to prove Saturnos guilt?

Held:

No. It is a basic rule that the guilt of an accused be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Before he is convicted,
there must be moral certainty of guilt. A certainty that satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to
act upon it that he is guilty of that crime charged. Under our criminal justice system, the overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.

The task of the prosecution is two fold. One is to prove that the crime has been committed; and that the accused
is responsible thereof. Thus, the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence with evidence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused.

The fatigue cap and light brown jacket was the basis for implicating Saturno. However, these were not offered
as evidence in trial. The jacket was never seen after it was submitted for examination.

Moreover, the identification of the appellant as assailant can no way be considered positive and credible. In the
case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove the fact of the killing but failed to prove Saturno perpetrated it.
They failed to discharge the burden of proof needed to pronounce guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Although
alibi is a weak defense, it may be considered in light of all the evidence for it may be sufficient to acquit the
accused. Appellants alibi was given credence due to the unreliable identification of the perpetrators.

So, if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations -- one consistent with the innocence or
lesser degree of liability of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver responsibility -- the
Court should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the accused.

10. PEOPLE vs. REY BERNARDINO y MOLINA

[G.R. No. 83810. January 28, 1991.]

Facts:

1. Rey Bernardino was selling marijuana at Malaya St., Malanday, Marikina.

2. A team consisting of Patrolmen Roberto Jocson, Isidro Mariano, Romeo Caviso and Mateo Garcia proceeded
to the said place to look for their quarry. They brought with them a ten peso bill previously marked on its four
corners with the initials of Pat. Wilson Balauitan

3. Jocson approached Bernardino and asked if he could "score," meaning if he could buy marijuana. Bernardino
left and returned after a while, bringing with him three sticks of marijuana, which he gave to Jocson. Jocson
paid him the marked bill and scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal. The other policemen then moved in
and arrested Bernardino

Issue:

Whether his guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt

Held:

The argument that the accused-appellant would not have sold marijuana to a total stranger is at best conjectural
and in any case not convincing. Drug pushers have become increasingly casual about their activities and less
cautious about isolated transactions like the one at bar. Bernardino evidently considered the sale an ordinary
transaction and Jocson an ordinary user.

Pat. Balauitans testimony that the accused-appellant verbally admitted the sale of the marijuana to Jocson is, of
course, inadmissible as violative of the constitutional rights of the accused, who was not properly informed
thereof. Nevertheless, even if that testimony were discarded, the rest of the prosecution evidence would still
suffice to sustain his conviction.

11.People vs. Flores

Facts:
1. Ernesto Flores was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling marijuana described and
penalized under Article II, Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended after he sold and delivered fifteen (15) dried
marijuana stalks to a poseur-buyer in the amount of ten pesos (Pl0.00) along E. de los Santos Avenue,
Balintawak, Quezon City

2. On 20 August 1980, at about 5:00 p.m., Sgt. Angel Nieves and CIC Godofredo Fider, both of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit, (CANU) conducted a "test-buy" operation in Balintawak, Quezon City in
connection with the government drive against violators of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, also known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act. They were assisted by Annalisa Santos, a confidential informer who acted as the
buyer. After Santos was given P10.00 to buy marijuana, they all went to an alley in the vicinity of the squatters'
area near the Cloverleaf interchange. The CANU agents waited out of sight as Santos bought five sticks of the
illegal drug. The CANU agents then left with the informer, but did not arrest the pusher.

The next day, the agents planned a "buy-bust' operation in order to nab the culprit. Sgt. Nieves, with CIC Fider
and Pfc. Wilfredo Tamondong, again gave two P5.00 bills to the confidential informer to purchase marijuana in
the same place. From a distance, Sgt. Nieves followed the confidential informer into the interior of the squatter's
area. He saw her talking to a young boy. The boy left, and the confidential informer, Annalisa Santos, waited
beside a store. Sgt. Nieves approached the store and talked to the storeowner in the pretext of looking for a
boarding house. While there, he saw the accused arrive and give the marijuana stalks to Santos, who in turn
gave the two P5.00 bills to him. Sgt. Nieves then introduced himself as a CANU agent and then arrested the
accused. He confiscated the two (2) five peso bins and the 15 marijuana stalks which were turned over to the
NBI for laboratory examination and were later confirmed to be marijuana as attested to by NBI Forensic
Chemist Nelly Carriaga.

Held:

This Court is aware of the principle that it is the prosecution's prerogative to weigh and determine the evidence
to be presented, we consider the non-presentation of Santos as witness to be fatal to the prosecution's case.
Being the only alleged eyewitness other than Nieves, Santos could have corrected the material inconsistencies
in the latter's testimony and, more importantly, could have positively testified on the fact necessary for
conviction: that FLORES was indeed selling marijuana to her when apprehended.

As has been oft repeated, every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account
and the proof against him must survive the test of reason. Only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime
has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts
of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions and
the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble paint." It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself [People v. Aminnudin G.R. No. 74869, July 6, 1988].
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and judgment is entered ACQUITTING the
accused-appellant of the offense charged.

11.b. Aguirre Vs. People

FACTS:
Petitioner Yolanda Aguirre filed the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision, dated November 25, 1999, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20436 which affirmed
her conviction for violation of the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg. 22).She likewise assails the
Resolution, dated May 31, 2000, of the appellate court denying her motion for reconsideration.
At her arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Since they involved substantially similar
facts, the cases were consolidated. Trial ensued. The prosecution presented Dinah Wei, the private complainant,
who basically testified that she knew petitioner because she (private complainant) used to supply rice to
petitioner. Some time in 1992, petitioner and private complainant had a transaction where petitioner would buy
rice from private complainant in the amount of P600,000.00. The purchase price was payable by petitioner
within fifteen (15) days. In payment thereof, petitioner issued to private complainant the subject checks: BPI
Family Bank Check No. 5102557 (Exhibit A), BPI Family Bank Check No. 5102554 (Exhibit B) and BPI
Family Bank Check No. 5102553 (Exhibi C)
When private complainant presented the checks for payment, however, they were dishonored. The back of the
checks each bore the stamp account closed (Exhibits A-1, B-1 and C-1, respectively).Private complainant
immediately went to petitioner to inform her about the dishonor and demanded that she pay the amounts of the
checks. Despite her promise, petitioner never paid private complainant.
When it was her turn to adduce evidence, petitioner continuously moved for the postponement of the hearings.
Thereafter, the trial court declared petitioner to have waived her right to present evidence in her defense. On
July 15, 1996, the trial court then rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. CA
affirmed RTCs decision.

Issue:
Whether there is violation of due process.
Held:
A careful review of the records of the case evidently show that the trial court duly afforded accused-appellant
her right to present evidence. The trial court in view of the absence of either appellant or her counsel granted the
motions of her counsel for continuance to enable the defense to present its evidence. The prosecution rested its
case as early as April 20, 1995 but accused-appellant continuously requested postponement of hearing. It was
only on February 9, 1996, when the trial court was constrained to declare the right of the accused to present
evidence as deemed waived, forfeited or abandoned due to the non-appearance of appellant or her counsel.
Accused-appellant did not file any motion or pleading to have said order reconsidered. As aptly pointed out by
the Solicitor General, if it were true that appellant wanted to present her evidence, she should have taken
advantage of the ample opportunity to present, to be heard and to testify in open court with the assistance of her
counsel. She cannot now claim that she was denied her right to be present and present her evidence.
The essential requirements of due process in this jurisdiction are well-established:
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial authority to hear and determine the matter
before it;
(2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or property which is the
subject of the proceeding;
(3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Applying the above test, the Court finds that petitioner in this case cannot feign denial of due process because
she had been given the opportunity to present her side.
The liability of petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had been duly established by the trial court in this wise:
After a careful and judicious study of the evidence adduced in this case, the prosecution was able to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the commission of violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in
the above-entitled criminal cases. It has been duly established that accused Yolanda Aguirre issued those three
(3) BPI Family Checks (marked as Exhibits A, B and C) in payment of her obligation to pay the rice which
private complainant sold to her. When presented for payment all of said checks were all dishonored for reason
of accounts closed as shown in the validations at the back of said checks pointing to the fact that the same were
dishonored for account closed (marked as Exhibits A-1, B-1 and C-1). Despite demands from the accused by
private complainant, Dinah Wei, for the former to replenish said dishonored checks, the said accused simply
promised to pay her said amounts covered by those bum checks but she did not pay Dinah Wei after all.
Clearly then the accused in issuing those checks which consequently bounced or dishonored for reason of their
having accounts closed violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 which provides among other things:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit xxx, shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court. xxx.
And the Supreme Court had ruled and held that what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act
of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 301). All the
elements, therefore, of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are all present in the instant criminal cases and
for which the accused is solely liable, to wit: [a] the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to
account or for value; [2] the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment;
and [3] subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. (Navarro vs.
Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 639).
Significantly, petitioner does not question the foregoing findings and conclusions of the trial court. In
any case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the settled rule that factual findings of the trial court
are binding on the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence on record and carry more weight
when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this case.

12. People Vs. Guinto

Facts:
Emmanuel Guinto and Federico Valencia were charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for
having sold 28.83 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops. After trial, they were found guilty by Judge Eutropio
Migrio of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The trial court found that on October 7, 1986, a team of the Narcotics Command conducted a "buy-bust"
operation against the two accused-appellants at Hulo, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The team leader was Sgt.
Salvador Aladano, who acted as the poseur-buyer and dealt directly with Guinto, to whom he gave the marked
money for the marijuana he was pretending to buy. Guinto left to get the narcotic and returned with Valencia.
Upon receipt of the marijuana, Aladano gave the pre-arranged signal and the rest of the team then arrested the
two accused-appellants.
The above findings were based on the sworn narration of Pat. Benjamin Vitug, whom the trial court
found to be "positive, clear and convincing in his testimony" and without any motive for framing the accused-
appellants, and the exhibits submitted by the prosecution. Among these were a receipt for the seized marijuana,
signed by Valencia; the dried marijuana, fruiting tops themselves; and the chemistry report thereon by Capt.
Nelly Cariaga of the PC Crime Laboratory who explained and confirmed her findings when she testified at the
trial.
Both Guinto and Valencia denied the charge against them and were corroborated by Socorro Valencia,
the latter's wife. Guinto claimed that in the evening of October 7, 1986, while he was cooking, Sgt. Aladano and
Pat. Vitug entered his yard and arrested him after their companion, Boni Sapatero, pointed to him as a
marijuana seller. There was no warrant of arrest. He was handcuffed and taken to a waiting vehicle and they
then proceeded to look for Valencia, whom the agents also arrested in his house. Valencia said his house was
searched without warrant, but the peace officers found nothing. The two were later taken to Camp Crame,
where they were investigated without the assistance of counsel and detained. Guinto and Valencia were forced
to sign a paper they were not allowed to read, which turned out to be the receipt for the marijuana later offered
as Exhibit "A."
The trial judge expressed disbelief, pointing out that while Valencia and his wife swore that they had
visitors when the Narcom agents entered their house, none of the visitors was presented at the trial for
corroboration. He noted that while the wife testified that the officers knocked on their door, the husband
disagreed, saying they just "barged in" The couple also differed on the number of Narcom agents composing the
team, the husband saying there were five while the wife said there were six of them. These claimed defects
were considered substantial enough by the trial court to justify rejection of the evidence for the defense.
RTC: Both are quilty.
Issue:
Whether there is violation of due process.
Held:
There seems to be a misconception here. The trial court apparently believed it was for the defense to
prove that the accused-appellants were innocent, not for the prosecution to prove that they were guilty. Settled
is the rule that innocence is presumed; it is guilt that must be proved. Yet the decision emphasized the supposed
shortcomings of the defense (as trivial as they were) while accepting in one brief paragraph the testimony of
Pat. Vitug as the correct account of the commission of the crime.
The decision did not observe that the case for the prosecution had its own flaws too, and more serious at
that than those it noted in the defense evidence. The Citizens Legal Assistance Office specifies many of these
defects in its well-prepared brief for the accused-appellants. The Office of the Solicitor General adds its own
criticism of the prosecution evidence and also prays for the reversal of the judgment.
It is significant that the principal protagonist from the Narcom team in the buy-bust operation, the agent
who posed as the buyer and allegedly dealt directly with Guinto and Valencia, was not presented at all at the
trial. This was Sgt. Salvador Aladano, whose silence is not a little intriguing. One may well ask why he did not
testify when he was the person on top of the operation, so to speak, and actually negotiated with the accused-
appellants. He was the logical witness, but he was never called to the stand.
In People v. Rojo, decided only last year, this Court held that the failure of the prosecution to present the
alleged buyer of the marijuana was a fatal flaw in the case against the accused.
In the recent case of People v. Turla 24 Justice Teodoro Padilla wrote thus of a similar matter:
 The Court agrees with counsel for the accused-appellant that the Receipt for Custody (Exh. B) is
inadmissible in evidence, as it was signed by the accused during custodial investigation without the assistance
of counsel of his choice and without having been first informed of his constitutional right to silence and to
counsel. The said Receipt is a declaration against interest and a tacit admission of the came charged, since
mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. The Receipt is in the same category as
extrajudicial confessions outlawed by the Constitution.
Coming back to the decision, we find the following perplexing observation:
Emmanuel Guinto testified that the Narcom team did not find anything when they searched the house of
the accused Federico Valencia. Yet, the defense did not explain where the Narcom team was able to let the
28.83 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, Exhibit E.
This is nothing if not amazing. The trial court was actually asking the defense where the narcotics agents
got the marijuana if it was not from Valencia's house. By some strange process of reasoning, the judge was
saying that because of their denials, the accused-appellants were now under obligation to explain where else the
narcotics team might have gotten the marijuana. This is really incredible. Even this Court is non-plused.
Illogically, the trial court was in effect asking the accused-appellants: "Where did the agents get the marijuana if
it was not from Valencia's house?" The only logical and common sense answer to such a queer question would
be: "How should we know?"
The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is protected by the constitutional presumption of
innocence which the prosecution must overcome with contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt. This Court
has repeatedly declared that even if the defense is weak, the case against the accused must fail if the
prosecution is even weaker, for the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense
but on the strength of the prosecution. Indeed, if the prosecution has not sufficiently established the guilt of
the accused, he has a right to be acquitted and released even if he presents naught a shred of evidence.
In People v. Tempongkon this Court, applying the above principles, declared:
The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of
this Court. The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond doubt and so cannot be affirmed in this
appeal. The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the Solicitor General and the
private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant raped the complainant. The appellant
may have been lying, and there is evidence of this, but we are not prepared to accept, to the point of moral
certainty, that the complainant was telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify
our condemning the appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are whispers of doubt that he is
guilty.
So too must it be in the case before us. The accused-appellants have been condemned for life by an
improvident sentence based on uncertain evidence clearly insufficient to sustain their conviction. It is their guilt
and not their innocence that has been presumed. It is their innocence and not their guilt that should have been
pronounced. In these circumstances, only one thing that has to be done if the Constitution is to be observed and
justice is to be served: Guinto and Valencia must be released at once.

13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOVENIANO SOLIS y CABUG, et al.,
accused-appellants.
Crime: Accused-appellants were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide

FACTS:
-Joveniano Solis told Benhur Lomo and Joel Cabug, both his cousins, of the plan to rob and kill Johnny Sai
Tung, brother-in-law of Mrs. Rita Kho, owner of the Swine Country Farm. Piggery farm is owned by the
spouses Kho King and Rita Kho that after the death of Kho King, Mrs. Rita Kho continues the business.
-Johnny Sai Tung, helps in managing the piggery business and was keeping the proceeds of the sale. Joveniano
Solis is the foreman in the Swine Country Farm and Benhur Lomo is a laborer in the said piggery farm. Joel
Cabug also worked with the said farm but left his employment and is working at E.S. Second hand Cartoons at
Grace Park, Caloocan City at the time of the incident in question.
-No date was agreed when to carry out the plan. Around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of August 4, 1984,
Joveniano Solis ordered Benhur Lomo to enter the Bodega located at the lower portion of the house where Sai
Tung lives; that he will wait inside the bodega and allow them (Joveniano and companions) to enter by opening
the main door of the house.
-At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning the following day, there was a knock on the door of the bodega,
Benhur opened the front door; Joveniano Solis, Danilo Vidal and Joel Cabug entered. There was no electric
lights because the current was already cut off and he barking of the dogs sent Johnny Sai Tung to come down
the stairs focusing a flashlight on them.
-Johnny Sai Tung saw Benhur Lomo and asked him why he was there. Lomo did not answer. Sensing danger
Johnny ran upstairs. Joel Cabug ran after Johnny and overtook him mid-way on the stairs and stabbed the body
and pulled Johnny on the waist. Danilo Vidal approached and hit Johnny on the head several times with a pipe
and stabbed Johnny on different parts of the body.
-Benhur, Danilo and Joel went up to the house to the room of Johnny while Joveniano stood guard and ordered
Benhur to take money inside the drawer. Joveniano gave Benhur his share of P780.00. Demy Paranada was
found dead at the farrowing section of the farm.
-The post-mortem findings show that the cause of death of Johnny Kho Sai Tung and Demetrio Paranada as
hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds of the chest.

HELD:
In the case at bar, their alibis become significant and strong in the face of the unreliability of the prosecution's
evidence against them. We entertain serious doubts on the voluntariness of the statements given by appellant
Bahia in his extra-judicial confession. These doubts remain considering the absence of corroborative and
convincing evidence to convict the said appellants. In line with the constitutional presumption of innocence,
these doubts must necessarily be resolved in favor of the accused, it being preferable to acquit a guilty person
rather than convict an innocent one (People v. Robles, L-30060, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 107).
-The evidence on record fully sustains the trial court's finding that Joveniano, Cabug and Vidal are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. It is the nature of this crime that
the homicides or murders and physical injuries, irrespective of their numbers, committed on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery are merged in the composite crime of "robbery with homicide."
-As testified to by state witness Lomo, Joveniano had planned three weeks before the incident to rob the house
of Johnny Sai Tung because he wanted to kill Sai Tung. Joveniano then had sufficient time to reflect on the act
he was about to commit and to desist, if he wanted to, from carrying out his evil design, but he did not. As
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "(w)hile evident premeditation is inherent in crimes against
property, it may be considered in robbery with homicide if there is evident premeditation to kill besides
stealing.
-The other appellants Bahia, Eguac and Roger, should be acquitted of the charge on ground of reasonable doubt

14. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GORGONIO CAPILITAN, accused-
appellant.

Crime: Rape

...the constitutional presumption of innocence to which every person accused of a criminal offense, including
the appellant in this case, is entitled. The positive Identification by the complaining witness of the appellant as
the man who raped her, together with the medical evidence of her violation.
The trial court... convicted the accused, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The appellant now asks to reverse
his conviction, contending that it is not supported by the evidence of record.

FACTS:
-June 1981, ten o'clock in the evening, the complaining witness is Emma Segales, at that time 14 yrs old and
living with her aunt Grace Navarete and her husband Rogelio. Emma was then with the couple's two children,
who were asleep.
-Grace had left the day before for Tacloban City and Rogelio was drinking with a neighbor in the latter's house.
According to Emma, appellant Gorgonio Capilitan entered their room and turned off the fluorescent lights.
Then she felt his weight on her and a knife at her throat with which Gorgonio threatened her. He pulled off her
panty and his own shorts and then forcibly mounted her. She felt pain and blood in her vagina as he penetrated
her. She could not resist or cry out because of the weapon he was holding. After ejaculating, Gorgonio touched
her breast and kissed her.

Soon as appellant escaped, Emma iisays she sounded an alarm and shouted for help, saying she had been raped
by Gorgonio. Emma was examined by Dr. Lydia Perez of the Abuyog General Hospital, where she was taken
by her uncle Rogelio. Dr. Perez later testified that she found semen and blood in Emma's vagina. The presence
of semen led her to conclude that the girl was no longer a virgin although there was no laceration but only a
distension of her hymen.

For his defense, Gorgonio invoked alibi and that he has sore eyes. He testified that at the time of the alleged
rape, he was in his house with his family and never went out that night because his eyes were swollen.

HELD:
..the Court is not persuaded that it should affirm the appellant's conviction. The reason is that he can rely on the
constitutional rule that the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. We have repeatedly
stressed that in this jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt and that this has still to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. That strict standard is not deemed satisfied simply because the accused has submitted
an implausible defense.

..At the time of her testimony, Emma Segales was only 15 years old and had never before appeared in a court
proceeding. This might explain certain minor inaccuracies that we may dismiss outright as not impairing the
essential credibility of her narration. At the same time, however, we must bear in mind that she was testifying
on a traumatic and unusual experience that she is not likely to forget easily. Hence, we must also be on guard
against those inconsistencies that may reasonably suggest that the narration is fabricated or untrue.

It is possible that the accused-appellant really raped the complaining witness, but the Court is not persuaded to
the point of moral certainty, which is the high standard of proof required for conviction. The defense may be
weak, but the prosecution is even weaker; and the rule is that conviction must rest not on the weakness of the
defense but on the strength of the prosecution.

So often has it been said that it is better for one hundred criminals to go free than for one innocent man to be
convicted. That is the reason why we require the constitutional presumption of innocence to be offset only by
the most persuasive of proofs that will establish the guilt of the accused beyond the whisper of a doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-appellant ACQUITTED,... It is so

ordered.

15. Alonso vs. IAC, 151 SCRA 552

FACTS:

Every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence must be considered. Suspicion no matter how strong
should not sway judgment, for well-established is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; that appellants need not prove their innocence because that is
presumed; that the presumption of innocence is a conclusion of law in favor of the accused, whereby his
innocence is not only established but continues until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof
which the law has created that is, his innocence; that conscience must be satisfied that defendant has been
proven guilty of the offense charged. Only by proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty, "a
certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it" may the
presumption of innocence be overcome.

Bartolome Alonzo was a clerk typist in the Olongapo Fire Department. He was designated as its finance officer.
Among his duties was the preparation of vouchers and payrolls. Complainant Wilfredo Cadua was employed as
a fireman from March 1, 1973 to July 31, 1975 with a monthly salary of P250.00.

The information alleges that accused Bartolome G. Alonzo (l) with intent to defraud, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare or cause the preparation of an official voucher pertaining to the
salary of Wilfredo Cadua for a total of P166.67; (2) that he wrote, imitated, forged, falsified the signature, and
signed for Wilfredo Cadua without the latter's knowledge, permission and consent; (3) that he presented the said
voucher for payment and received the amount of P166.67; (4) once in possession of the said amount (P166.67),
that he then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the said amount; and (5) that, despite repeated demands, the accused refused and
continued to refuse to remit the abovementioned amount.

The evidence adduced by the prosecution is, therefore, entirely different from what the information alleges.

The prosecution evidence tends to show that (l) the accused was designated as finance officer of the
Olongapo City Fire Department and among his duties was the preparation of vouchers and payrolls; (2) on a
date not specified in the records, the accused gave their office messenger, Rogelio Pangilinan, a voucher for the
salary of Wilfredo Cadua for the month of October, 1974 so that the messenger could have it signed by all those
having a hand in the approval of vouchers; (3) after the voucher was approved, Pangilinan returned the voucher
to the accused who instructed him to encash the voucher; (4) Paymaster Aida Pineda of Olongapo City paid the
proceeds of the voucher to Pangilinan who presented the voucher for payment after she required Pangilinan to
sign as witness to the payment; (6) Aida Pineda gave Pangilinan the full amount of P166.67; (7) after he
received the proceeds of the voucher from the paymaster, Pangilinan gave the entire amount of P166.67 to the
accused in the presence of his co employees in the afternoon of October 30, 1974 (Decision of the trial court,
pp. 3032, appellant's brief).

*It was only four months after this incident that Wilfredo Cadua filed a complaint against the accused.

HELD:

In the instant case, there is no direct evidence showing that Bartolome G. Alonzo himself forged Cadua's
signature on the original voucher. Nobody actually saw him affix the alleged signature. Even Rogelio
Pangilinan who was responsible for routing the voucher to all those who had a hand in approving the same
could not categorically state that he saw the accused forge complainant's signature.

With the above admission, it is clear that the filing of the complaint was merely an afterthought arising from the
non renewal of the complainant's appointment by the Fire Chief who is related to the accused. When the
accused informed the complainant that he had nothing to do with the nonrenewal of the latter's appointment, the
complainant executed an affidavit of desistance. It is true that an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is
not looked upon with favor. It may, however, create serious doubts as to the liability of the accused.

In this particular case, it corroborates the appellant's explanation about the filing of the criminal charges.

Considering all the foregoing, we are constrained to rule that the evidence on record cannot sustain a verdict of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment of the respondent court is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

16. P vs. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205

FACTS:

This case involves first cousins. Salvacion Pablo (15yo) while seated on a bed alone, sewing her shorts with
only her panties and blouse on was approached by the accused Ernesto Lopez. He then sat near her. Shortly
thereafter he pushed her down, touching her breasts in the process. Then he placed himself on top of her, with
one of his hands being pressed against her throat, thus rendering ineffectual her resistance to his efforts to have
sexual intercourse. The act of coition then took place which took time.

On cross-examination, in what could have been an unguarded moment, there was an admission by her that the
urgencies of the flesh on the part of both of them did find release and satisfaction. She was, from her own
account, equally serene, no tears shed, not even a word of recrimination.
However, she got pregnant. Marriage was opposed by the mother of the accused because they were first cousins
despite of the willingness on both of them.

ISSUE: WON the guilt of accused was established based on the testimony of the rape victim herself

HELD: NO.

According to the SC, presumption of innocence; Necessity of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.The
accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence. That is a mandate of the fundamental law. It may be
noted that ever, when the previous Organic Act did not so provide, a defendant, according to the early case of
United States vs. Asiao, decided in 1902, with Justice Torres as ponente, must be presumed to be innocent
until [his] guilt is proven by satisfactory testimony and even in case there is a reasonable doubt as to [his]
innocence [he is ] entitled to acquittal.

Criminal law: Rape; Necessity of allowing compulsion resorted to or coercion, being employed.Where the
offense charged is rape through force, there must be a showing of compulsion being resorted to and coercion
being employed. The element of voluntariness must be lacking. If there be an indication of willingness, even if
half hearted, the complaint must be dismissed.

1. Salvacion's act runs counter to the usual behavior of a rape victim. --> she did not tell her father immediately
the incident nor reported the same to the police authorities. she only did so after 4 months, only when her aunt
noticed her being pregnant.

2. Though in rape case, the single testimony of the rape victim is the strongest evidence, it should be
corroborated by physical acts:

ex. finger grips, contusions on her throat, face, body, arms and thighs as well as thorn in her garments
particularly the panties worn by the victim to prove force and violence.

In the case at bar, none of such acts were introduced.

note: no torn on her panties because she removed it freely -- meaning she did not resist

She did not object when he saw him inside her room with just her panties and blouses on. - no sign of
apprehension, no covering of the lower part of her body.

-did not make any outcry for succor.

-Act was not in hurry - appellant first removed his pants instead of just unbuttoning the same

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of October 9, 1975, convicting the accused Ernesto Lopez of the
crime of rape is reversed, without prejudice to the appropriate action for support of the child that was the result
of the sexual act committed on January 14, 1972. No costs.

17. People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Quiazon

(Presumption of innocence)

FACTS:
Virginia Salazar dela Cruz charged petitioner Antonio Quiazon of abduction with rape alleging that
Quiazon whom she never met before suddenly grabbed her while she was in the public place of San Jose City
and forced to her to board a tricycle. She claims that her niece, Victoria Bengano supposedly cried for
help. The complainant claims her mouth was covered by Quiazon when the accused grabbed her, so she was
not able to shout. She then alleged that she was initially brought to Quiazons house then she was forced to
travel with him to Cabanatuan City, then to Baliuag, Bulacan, then to San Vicente Tarlac, and finally to Barrio
Armenia, Tarlac, Tarlac where she was able to report to the authorities that she was abducted and raped by
Quiazon.
Quiazons version is that he and Virginia met in a bus while travelling to San Jose, Nueva Ecija.
According to him, Virginia was being friendly to him during the ride and whether he could visit her in her
house. She denied his request but quickly added that they could just see each other in the public market of San
Jose City. After two days, Quiazon and Virginia did meet and continued trysts since then. Quizon stated that
each time he and Virginia met they will have sexual intercourse. However it turns out that Virginia was
married. Virignia had earlier introduced herself to the accused as a widow. Antonio did not know that Virginia
was in fact married, until sometime during the first week of May, 1973 when they were eating at the restaurant.

Since they loved each other they continued their relationship. Because of their love for each other, and
[because they] were afraid that people may have already seen them together, they went to Barrio Isla in
Cabanatuan City. From Barrio Isla, they went to Baliuag, Bulacan and there stayed in the house of an old couple
for more than a week. From Baliuag, Bulacan the accused and the complainant went to Tarlac, Tarlac and
stayed in the house of a relative of the accused, Doc Quiazon, at Romulo Blvd.
While they were in Barangay Armenia at Tarlac, a P.C. soldier, Sgt. Daton, stopped them because he
noticed that they were new in the place. Sgt. Daton asked Virginia where she was from, and why she happened
to be in Barrio Armenia. She answered that she was from San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and pointed to Antonio
Quiazon as her companion. When they arrived at the P.C. Headquarters , Virginia was asked who her husband
was, and she answer that her husband is Sgt. Gaudencio de la Cruz, an army man. It was then when the P.C.
soldiers became interested in asking her why she was in Tarlac. The complainant answered that she was brought
there by the accused and that Antonio abducted and raped her. In Cabanatuan City the accused Antonio was
detained in jail, by virtue of the complaint brought by Virginia against him. When he was in jail, Virginia
visited him and brought him cigarettes and tupig. She apologized to him and told him that she did not want what
had happened to him, but she had to do it because she was afraid of her husband.
ISSUE: WON QUIAZON should be convicted.
HELD: Quiazon should be aquitted. Several circumstances argue against the credibility of Virginia Salazar de la
Cruz, as well as the probability of her story. The complainant alleges that on July 3, 1973 the accused, whom
the complainant had never met before, suddenly grabbed her while she was in the public market of San Jose
City and forced her to board a tricycle. Then he took her to the house of his parents where he ravished her. The
abduction occurred in broad daylight, or at about 10:00 in the morning. The improbability of the complainant's
charge is immediately visible from the time and locus where the crime was supposed to have been committed.
The public market is hardly the plan for a person intending to commit abduction, to pick as the place to commit
the crime. Especially so, at 10:00 in the morning, as in this case, when the market place was at its busiest and
the smallest incident could easily cause a commotion.
When they reached the house of the accused, the complainant met the father of the accused sitting on the
stairs of the house. Again, she could have asked for his help, but she did not, Even without her shouting, the
mere sight of her struggling to be free, and resisting the accused, would have been enough to lead the father of
the accused to intervene and suspect that his son had done something wrong.
Several other incidents show that the complainant's claim that she was constantly in fear of the accused
so she submitted to sexual intercourse with him, is without basis. The circumstances which she described as
accompanying her trip to Cabanatuan City, then to Baliuag, Bulacan, then to San Vicente Tarlac, and finally to
Barrio Armenia, Tarlac, Tarlac, show that the complainant was free from restraint. There is no evidence that she
was subjected to constant threats or that violence was inflicted upon her by the accused.
It is precisely because of such notorious lack of any persuasive force in the testimony of complainant
that appellant could rely on the constitutional presumption of innocence. Only if the judge below and the
appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime has been committed precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that
it amounted to a crime. Moral certainty is required
The accusation that appellant committed abduction with rape is thus devoid of any factual foundation.

18. P vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450

FACTS: Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva was forcibly taken by appellants Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda, Edgardo
Aquino and Rogelio Canal while she was heading home. De la Riva was on driving her car and was with her
maid when the abduction happened. Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left
arm and was able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car of the appellants. De la Riva
begged appellants to release her but to no avail. She was blindfolded and was led to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay
City. In the hotel, de la Rivera was raped by the four appellants.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes,
told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression
that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men for a
hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was released without being
harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they would simply
post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la Riva
again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be carried into the car.
Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to
prevent her from being seen by others. The accused then dropped her off in front of the Free Press Building not
far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the
complainant had just come from the studio.
Three of the appellants pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Caal) and claimed that that nothing
happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the De la Riva agreed to do for them for fee of
P1, 000.00 and that Pineda who pleaded guilty was the sole author of the crime.
ISSUE: WON appellants are guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
HELD:
Yes. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss
De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in
dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose
and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the
latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile
being exchanged among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This
testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to
establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that they
were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been clearly
established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves
the fact of rape, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the
fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen
is not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched
herself within that period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day after the
incident, and the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence
of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the
emission of semen, but penetration (People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions
on the cervix were caused by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her
alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman, who is
single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital organ by puncturing the
same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay her
the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an
instrument in the genital organ would not result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
 Two of the appellants Jose and Caal bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case from
the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court a quo was
able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted.
For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and
unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair
trial."
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose,
Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a
consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and
severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of
40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs

19. P vs. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634

FACTS:
Josan Poblador is a young man in his early twenties who was accused of raping a woman (Angelina Baylon) in
her middle forties. She already had 11 children, some of them young girls above the age of puberty. The crime
happened in a room in her house likewise occupied by another man, with her husband, and other members of
the family in the immediate vicinity.

Josan Poblador and Jason Mateus were travelling to Josans second cousins home when their jeep broke down
in the middle of the night. They had to seek shelter in the house of Dominador and Angelina Baylon. The
prosecution presented that Poblador and Mateus were both armed with guns that night, and they were looking
for Nenet Baylon who is the girl who Poblador wanted to marry. Nenet wasnt there because she was in Iloilo
City. So Poblador settled for Angelina Baylon; he pointed a gun at her and forced her to have sexual intercourse
with him. At some point, they had to stop because Angelina had to urinate. And after urinating, they went at it
again. All throughout the incident, she did not give any outcry because this would cause dishonor to their family
if the neighbors heard her. This all happened while Dominador was in the living room. He did nothing to stop
the crime. Also, during the course of the commission of the crime, Poblador let Angelina nurse her 11-month
old baby. The next morning, the Baylons were told not to report the crime to the authorities or they would be
killed. But they reported it to Mayor Nerio Salcedo of Concepcion, Iloilo. He merely advised them to relax as it
would not happen again. And the complaint was filed only after 2 years after the commission of the offense.

The case of People v. Mirasol was compared to the present case because it had similar facts. A young man of 24
years old attempted to have forcible intercourse with a 36 year old woman. In this case, the man was still
acquitted, with the court saying that they have found it "inexplicable why he had to set his eyes precisely on the
complainant and not on [the daughter] who, by reason of her youth and virginity, should excel her mother in
point of exciting the lust ... . " But in Pobladors case, the lower court convicted him of the crime of rape.
Apparently, he could not quite convince the lower court that he was entitled to acquittal even if the evidence of
the prosecution was weak. He was relying on the presumption of innocence.

ISSUE: Is Poblador entitled to acquittal?

HELD:
Yes he is. The evidence of the prosecution leaves so many questions in mind. There was a failure to live up to
the moral certainty as to the guilt of an accused being shown to justify his conviction. The Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza described the evidence of the prosecution as fantastic. the fact that the previous relationship
between the appellant and the Baylons was characterized by respect and deference on the part of the former;
that if it were a case of the former's wanting to satisfy his carnal desire, he could have, as he testified, gone to
Iloilo City, and there indulged such proclivity; that if he had committed an outrage on the Baylons, the husband
certainly would have refrained from helping appellant push his jeep to make it start; that it was rather strange
that the Baylons failed to report such occurrence at the earliest possible opportunity, the complaint being filed
with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo City on August 26, 1974, or almost two years after the perpetration of the
alleged offense. The recommendation, considering the above, had to be one acquittal.

Copied directly from the case: The tenor of this opinion is not to be misinterpreted. It goes no further than to
accept the plea of the Solicitor General after a careful study of the record that the accused is entitled to acquittal,
his guilt not having been shown beyond reasonable doubt. He is thus entitled to the protection afforded by the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The motivation that led the Baylons to testify as they did is
immaterial. It suffices to state that what they said could not be given credence. There are indications that
appellant had displeased one or more individuals of influence. That could have led, as he asserted, to the filing
of this complaint. The matter, however, need not be pursued. It could be that there are puzzles still unresolved.
That may very well be, but for the disposition of this appeal, the inquiry is necessarily limited to the quantum of
proof that must exist. That is all that is relevant to the decision reached.

20. Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by Patricio Dumlao,
Romeo Igot, and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. seeking to enjoin respondent COMELEC from implementing certain
provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his
oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a
taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.

For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory
provisions:

Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove
mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of
March 1980.

.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.

Sec. 4. ...

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for
any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

ISSUE: Is BP 51, Sec. 4 constitutional?

HELD:
No, it is not. It contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence.

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective
"except in a clear case."

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the
ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one
is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold
office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted,
yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will
prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence
against him.

3. Presumption of innocence in the order of trial

Read:

3. Presumption of innocence in the order of trial

3.1 ALEJANDRO V PEPITO,96 SCRA 322

FACTS:
During arraignment, Alejandro entered a plea of not guilty to the Crime of Homicide. Respondent Judge
Gerardo Pepito issued an order stating that the accused admits in open court that he killed the deceased but that
he acted in self-defense hence the defense counsel should first prove evidence in self-defense and then
prosecution to present its evidence to disprove the same.

Alejandro moved for reconsideration contending that the Court action was violative of Section 3, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court, which establishes the sequence in the presentation of evidence by the parties in criminal
cases, first by the prosecution and then by the defense, and not vice versa. Additionally, petitioner claimed that
the procedure adopted by respondent Judge is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused in the sense that
the same would give rise to the presumption that the prosecution had already established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt when what is only on record is the accuseds admission that he had killed the victim in
self defense.

ISSUE:
That respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
requiring defense counsel to present first its evidence of self-defense and the prosecution to present its evidence
to disprove the same; that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law available to him

HELD:

Enshrined in our Constitution as a protection to accused persons in criminal cases is the requirement that no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. That requirement simply
requires that the procedure established by law shall be followed. Section 3 of Rule 119 prescribes the order of
trial in criminal cases, to wit:
SEC. 3. Order of Trial - The plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial must proceed in the following
order:
(a) The fiscal on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in support of the charges.
(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense.
(c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of
justice, permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question.
(d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded, unless the case is submitted to the court
without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal
may conclude the same. The argument by either attorney may be oral or written, but only the written arguments,
or such portions of the same as may be in writing, shall be preserved in the record of the case.

Respondent Judge to have followed the sequence of trial set forth. That procedure observes, in the words of
Chief Justice Fernando, the "mandate of reason and the guarantee of fairness with which due process is
Identified". The procedure outlined safeguards and protects the fundamental right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. That right is founded on the principle of justice and is intended
not to protect the guilty but to prevent as far as human agencies can, the conviction of an innocent person, the
form of a trial is also a matter of public order and interest; the orderly course of procedure requires that the
prosecution shall go forward and present all of its proof in the first instance. In People vs. Balicasan shows
fidelity to that procedure:
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the court should have taken anew
defendant's plea and then proceeded with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court. In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court not only erred in
procedure but also deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.

3.2 SACAY V SANDIGANBAYAN July 10,1986

FACTS:
Sacay was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two separate crimes of homicide in both cases, the Sacay
entered a plea of Not Guilty after which, upon motion of the prosecution and without objection from the
accused, joint trial was held.

Sacay was a Patrolman in the Western Police District, Masinop Street, Tondo, Manila. he was on duty on April
12, 1979, the date of the riot incident in Don Bosco Compound in Tondo, Manila, he admitted having shot with
a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver Antonio Tepace and Paterno N. Lerma who were among the rioters,
but invoked self-defense and fulfillment of duty to justify his act of shooting said deceased.

As correctly stated by, respondent Court: "Having admitted the two gun-shot killings charged, the accused
assumed the burden of showing legal justification therefore. He has to substantiate the justifying circumstance
invoked, He 's called upon to spell out and describe, convincing how, he acted in complete self-defense and/or
due fulfillment of official duty, as claimed by him; otherwise, he must suffer all the consequences of his
malefaction. And he has to rely on the qualitative and quantitative strength of his own evidence; not on the
weakness of the prosecution; for even it were weak it could not be disbelieved after he had admitted the killings.

The Sandiganbayan, giving credence to the lone testimony of the prosecution witness and finding the version of
the defense too incredible and repugnant to human experience, convicted the accused as charged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has convincingly established that he acted in self-defense and/or in fulfillment of
duty. Relative thereto, petitioner also claims that he has been deprived of procedural due process.
HELD:
The ruling in Alejandro v Pepito is not applicable in the case at bar inasmuch as the accused did not object to
the procedure followed. In the above-cited case of Alejandro vs. Pepito, this Court also stated in the case of U.S.
vs. Gaoiran, relied upon by the prosecution and the trial Court, the defense had produced its proofs before the
prosecution presented its case, and it was held that no substantial rights of the accused were prejudiced. There is
one radical difference, however, since in that case, no objection was entered in the Court below to the procedure
followed in the presentation of proof. In this case, the change in order of trial made by respondent Judge was
promptly and timely objected to by the defense.

This procedure is now expressly sanctioned in Section 3(e), Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides:

When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly.

Established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken into account, The
evidence against him must survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway
judgment. In brief, We are not morally certain of the guilt of petitioner.

3-a. Presumption of innocence in drugs cases/obligations of arresting officers/Chain of Evidence Rule

PEOPLE VS. UMIPANG, April 25, 2012

Facts: The prosecution and the defense presented two different accounts of what happened.

According to the prosecution: PO2 Gasid, a policeman who was part of a buy-bust operation, posed as a buyer.
Together with their confidential informant, they approached Sammy Umipang (accused) near a store in
Maharlika Village, Taguig, at 6PM and straightly asked him "Sam, pa-iskor kami". The accused asked how
much, and they said 500. The accused brought out 3 sachets of shabu. After handing him the 500-peso marked
bill given by PDEA, PO2 Gasid removed his cap as a signal that the sale has been consummated and right then,
the buy bust team apprehended the accused.

According to the defense: In the same evening, while they were sleeping, Umipang and his family were
awakened by loud knocking on the door. The persons outside shouted "Mga pulis kami. Buksan mo ang pinto
kung hindi gigibain namin ito". Umipang opened the door and 5 policemen barged into his house and pointed a
gun at him. Against his will and amid the screams of his wife, Umipang was brought to a waiting vehicle and
brought to the police headquarters. At the Taguig Police station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him P100,000
for his release.

Umipang denied the charges and averred that the alleged evidence were all planted by the police.

The RTC of Pasig convicted Sammy Umipang for violation of Sections 5 (sale, trading, etc) and 11 (possession)
of RA 9165. The CA affirmed this decision.

Umipang contends that:

(1) Since there were two versions presented during trial, the version of the defense must be adopted, because the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties should not take precedence over the presumption
of innocence of the accused.
(2) A surveillance of just 30 minutes was insufficient to establish that Umipang was engaged in the sale of
illegal drugs.
(3) The possession of the confiscated plastic sachets was not clearly established, and the evidence allegedly
confiscated from him was merely planted. PO1 Ragos testified that he did not see Umipang holding the drugs,
and that the sachet was shown only to PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.

The OSG responds:

(1) All the elements needed to convict a person under Secs 5&11 of RA 9165 were proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
(2) Absent independent proof and substantiated evidence to the contrary, Umipang's bare-faced denial should be
deemed merely as a self-serving statement that does not hold merit.
(3) Where there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely
against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given full faith and credence.

Issue: Whether the courts erred in finding that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses were
sufficient to convict Umipang.

Held: Yes, the courts erred. The accused was acquitted.

A. Substantive law requires strict observance of the procedural safeguards outlined in R.A. 9165.

In previous cases, the court acknowledged that buy bust operations have a downside as they are "susceptible to
police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion."
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards that are applicable in cases of buy-bust
operations. (Chain of Custody; see below**)

"Given the nature of buy-bust operations, courts must tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies
of those who conducted the operations. Although mere procedural lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation
are not ipso facto fatal to the prosecutions cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items have been preserved, courts must still thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a
simple procedural lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards
drawn by the law."

Section 21 has a saving clause which states that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items".

This simply means that not all the lapses in the chain of custody for drug cases will automatically result to the
acquittal of the accused if:
(1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and
(2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.

B. On the material irregularities of the buy bust operation

The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with the following defects, which raises doubts on the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items from accused-appellant:

(1) There were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items.
According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the accused's complete name, including the middle
initial, in marking the confiscated sachets, immediately after Umipang was handcuffed. However, a careful
perusal of the testimony of PO2 Gasid would reveal that it was not clearly established that he knew Umipang's
full name. From their testimonies during the trial, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos both admitted that they only knew
their target by the name Sam.

(2) The SAID-SOTF (Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force) failed to show genuine and
sufficient effort to seek the third-party representatives enumerated under Section 21(1). Under the law, the
inventory and photographing of seized items must be conducted in the presence of:
(a) a representative from the media;
(b) from the DOJ; and
(c) from any elected public official.

They did not even attempt to contact the barangay chairperson, any member of the barangay council or any
other elected public official. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an
explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives is to be regarded as a
flimsy excuse. It is the prosecution's positive duty to establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting
the representatives.

"When there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165),
serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in
evidence." This uncertainty cannot be remedied by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties.

"For the arresting officers' failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude from the totality of the
procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting officers deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards
under R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus
delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we must resolve the
doubt in favor of accused-appellant, as every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt."

**Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s:
Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial
laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still
to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the
completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular
inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or
burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society
groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper
disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of
lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes:
Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s
which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court
having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum
quantity as determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the
above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or
accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel
within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary
of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent the former; x x x.

PEOPLE VS. CLIMACO, GR No. 199403, June 13, 2012

Facts: The RTC of San Pedro, Laguna convicted the accused Gomer Climaco for violation of Secs 5&11 of RA
9165illegal possession and sale of shabu/metamphetamine hydrochloride.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: PO1 Alaindeon Ignacio and forensic chemist Donna Huelgas.

PO1 Ignacio testified that he acted as poseur buyer in a buy bust operation against Climaco, who was then #5 on
the drug watchlist in San Pedro.
At the target area, PO1 Ignacio saw the suspect in front of his house and since he already knew the suspect, he
just told Gomer that he would buy shabu. Gomer entered his house and took the shabu. PO1 Ignacio scratched
his head to signal the team that item was shown to him and he would execute the buying of the shabu. After
Gomer asked for the money and PO1 Ignacio gave it to him, SPO3 Samson and the rest of the team
immediately moved in to arrest the suspect. Caught in the act, Gomer did not resist anymore. SPO3 Samson was
able to recover another plastic sachet, which was inserted between Gomers fingers. The plastic sachet, which
was the product of the buy-bust, and the one recovered from Gomer were turned over to SPO4 Teofilo Royena,
who turned them over to the Office of the Special Operation Group located at Brgy. Tubigan, Bian, Laguna.
The plastic sachet product of the buy-bust was marked TR-B, which means Teofilo Royena and the letter B
means Bust. While the plastic sachet recovered from Gomer was marked TR-R, which means Teofilo Royena
and the letter R means Recovered.

The defense presented a different story: When Gomer was feeding the chicken in front of his yard, four
unidentified armed men suddenly arrived and frisked him. When nothing was found in his possession, the men
handcuffed and brought him to the police station.

Issue: Whether the guilt of Climaco for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous
drug, was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: No. The accused was acquitted. PO1 Ignacio, in his testimony, claimed that the drugs seized were
marked by SPO4 Teofilo Royena as TR-B and TR-R. However, the Chemistry Report submitted to the trial
court shows that the dangerous drugs examined and confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
by the forensic chemist were marked as GSC1 and GSC2. Since what was seized (TR-B and TR-R) at the time
of the buy-bust operation was different from the drugs submitted (GSC1 and GSC2) to the forensic chemist for
review and evaluation, the chain of custody over the dangerous drugs was broken and the integrity of the
evidence submitted to the trial court was not preserved, casting doubt on the guilt of Climaco.

The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu are:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual commission by someone of the
particular crime charged. The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of the
dangerous drug itself.

On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be established:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug must be shown to establish the corpus delicti.

The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in
sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drugs unique
characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or
substitution either by accident or otherwise.

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to
obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not
distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a
witness has failed to observe its uniqueness

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject
to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to
the likelihood or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could
have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases by accident or otherwise in which
similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing.

Since the markings are different, the presumption is that the substance in the plastic sachets marked as TR-B
and TR-R is different from the substance in the plastic sachets marked as GSC-1 and GSC-2. There is no moral
certainty that the substance taken from appellant is the same dangerous drug submitted to the laboratory and the
trial court.

PEOPLE VS. UMIPANG, GR No. 190321, April 25, 2012 (see above)
PEOPLE VS. NASARA, GR No. 188328, August 25, 2010
FACTS: In March 16, 2004, an informant tipped Police Station 6, Batasan Hills, Quezon City the selling of
illegal drugs along San Miguel Street, Payatas, Quezon City.
P/Supt. Esquivel ordered a team for a buy bust operation. Four policemen went to the place and conducted the
buy bust operation with SPO2 Dionco being the poseur-buyer. SPO2 Dionco was accompanied by the
informant. They went to the place and handed two 100 peso bill to a certain Kune and together with Nasara they
went inside the house to get the shabu. After examining the pack, SPO2 Dionco scratched his head as a signal
that the transaction was done and other police officer can arrest the accused. Nasara was caught but Kune got
away.

Defense of Accused: He(Nasara) was just framed up by the police who arrested him. That there was also a
violation to the chain of custody that should be followed as stated in Sec. 21 of RA 9165 making the evidence
inadmissible.
Defense of state: The chain of custody rule does not provide inadmissibility when not followed. Why would the
police officer bother with a jobless man when they already have much evidence to convict the two other
accused as to the version of Nasara.

ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody when not followed leads to inadmissibility of evidence.

HELD: The issue, in the event of non-compliance with above-quoted provision of R.A. No. 9165, does not
pertain to admissibility of evidence, but to weight-evidentiary merit or probative value thereof.
People v. Dela Cruz enlightens:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be
The police officers-members of the buy-bust team cannot bank on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties. The presumption has been destroyed upon their unjustified failure to conform to the
procedural requirements mentioned in Sec. 21 of RA 9165.
The prosecution having failed to discharge its onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
appellant, his exoneration is in order.

PEOPLE VS PALOMA, GR No. 178544, February 23, 2011

FACTS: About 1 p.m. in April 23, 2003 the Batasan Police Station received a tip that the accused Manuel
Paloma was selling illegal drugs at Pacomara Street in Commonwealth, Quezon City. The station chief ordered
a buy bust operation. PO2 Amigo and PO1 Arnold Pealosa conducted a buy-bust operation which resulted to the
apprehension of Manuel Paloma.
The buy bust operation went this way:
When the buy-bust team arrived at Pacomara Street at around 3:15 p.m., they saw Paloma with a man
and a woman. PO1 Pealosa and the informant approached them; PO2 Amigo, stood as back-up some 15 meters
away. From where he stood, he saw PO1 Pealosa talking to Paloma. Momentarily, PO1 Pealosa waved his hand,
signifying that he had made the purchase. On seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Amigo approached and
arrested Paloma; PO1 Pealosa for his part arrested Palomas companions, later on identified as Noriel Bamba
(Bamba) and Angie Grotel (Grotel). PO2 Amigo recovered from Palomas pants pocket a plastic sachet with a
white crystalline substance and the marked P100.00 bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not Prosecution was able to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: To prove the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the prosecution is
required to prove (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller as well as the object and consideration of the sale;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment given for the same. Further, the prosecution must present
in court evidence of corpus delicti.
In the case at bar, the proof of the sale of illegal drugs is not enough.
The prosecution must clearly and adequately show the details of the purported sale, namely, the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration, and, finally, the accuseds delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer, whether the latter be the
informant alone or the police officer. This proof is essential to ensure that law-abiding citizens are not
unlawfully induced to commit the offense.
 The cross examination of the police officers failed to show the details of the sale. All they could say is
that the transaction has been consummated. They were not able to discuss what happened when Pelealosa
approached Paloma and cannot describe the transaction between Pelealosa and Paloma.
While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption is disputable by contrary proof and cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent. The totality of the evidence presented in this case does not support Palomas conviction for
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of the offense.

PEOPLE VS. ROBLE, GR No. 192188, April 11, 2011

FACTS:

Andrew Roble was caught in a buy bust operation in Looc, Danao City selling 2 sachets of shabu weighing .06
grams for 300 pesos on March 2003. During the trial, the prosecution presented witnesses Police Officer 2
Castor Laurel (PO2 Laurel) and Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza. On the other hand, the defense
presented accused Roble as its sole witness.
According to the prosecutors version Cuizon the arresting officer gave the sachets to PO3 Casas when they
approached to arrest Jojo. PO3 Casas, in turn, gave them to the investigator, Senior Police Officer 3 Edgar Awe.
Thereafter, a request for laboratory examination was made. After examination, Medical Technologist Mendoza
issued Chemistry Report which stated that the two (2) plastic sachets contained methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
In contrast, Roble interposes the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that from March 11, 2003 to June 14,
2003, he was in Babatngon, Leyte working, to avoid a frame-up by his enemy.
He went to his cousin, Danilo Roble, to ask him to accompany him to Wantai Piggery, owned by Nicomedes
Alde (Alde), where he would apply as a worker on the recommendation of his uncle, Atty. Santiago
Maravilles Roble further testified that the poseur-buyer, Cuizon, is his enemy in Danao City. Robles girlfriend,
Leny Tiango (Tiango), informed him that Cuizon would frame him in a buy-bust operation because Tiango is
also the girlfriend of Cuizon
After trial, the RTC found Roble guilty of the crime charged. therefore, sentences him to suffer the penalty of
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and pay the fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00). The two
(2) packets of shabu which are the evidence in this case shall be forfeited in favor of the government, and turn
over to PDEA for disposition and destruction.
On appeal to the CA, Roble argued that the testimony of PO2 Laurel was replete with inconsistencies.
But the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court based on the time-honored doctrine that the assessment by
the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies deserves great respect. Roble timely filed
a notice of appeal of the decision of the CA. On October 13, 2010, he filed his supplemental brief with this
Court.
ISSUES:
WON the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Yes. The appeal is meritous. Accused-appellant argues that the trial and appellate courts erred in relying on the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses. He points out several inconsistencies in the testimony of PO2 Laurel
raising doubts as to its credibility. Further, he argues that the buy-bust operation was irregularly conducted
resulting in a broken chain in the custody of the drugs.
We agree with accused-appellant. It is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility
of the witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great weight and is generally not disturbed upon appeal.
However, such rule does not apply when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact
of weight or substance. In the instant case, circumstances are present that, when properly appreciated, would
warrant the acquittal of accused-appellant. In the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be able
to successfully prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Similarly, it is essential that the
transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti. Corpus delicti means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.
In the instant case, the prosecution has failed to prove all the elements of the crime with moral certainty. It must
be established that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed.
After a thorough review of the records of the instant case, this Court has serious doubts as to the identity of the
drug in question. While a buy-bust operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards must be undertaken. It is the duty
of the Courts to ascertain if the operation was subject to any police abuse.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that there is confusion as to when the plastic sachet in question was turned
over by the poseur-buyer to PO3 Casas. During PO2 Laurels direct examination, he testified that the plastic
sachet was handed over by the poseur-buyer to PO3 Casas when they arrived at the police station. But, on cross-
examination, his story changed. He testified that the poseur-buyer handed the plastic sachet when his team tried
to approach him after he gave the pre-arranged signal.
After receiving the plastic sachet, PO3 Casas then gave it to the investigator, SPO3 Awe. From here, the trail
becomes vague once again. It is unclear as to who he is and as to how he was able to obtain the plastic sachets.
Similarly, it is uncertain as to how the plastic sachets were transferred to P/Supt. Lloveras from SPO3 Awe.
Again, PO2 Laurels testimony is bereft of any details as to the chain of custody of the drugs at these critical
points.
Furthermore, the Request also mentions that the plastic sachets were marked ARJ 1-2. Yet again, PO2 Laurels
testimony is lacking as to who marked the plastic sachets and when it was done.
Moreover, the testimony of Medical Technologist Mendoza reveals certain anomalies in the handling of the
plastic sachets as well. In his testimony, a certain PO3 Enriquez delivered the plastic sachets. The trail from
P/Supt. Lloveras to PO3 Enriquez was also not explained by the prosecution. Further, the sachets were
delivered to Medical Technologist Mendoza in an unsealed packet,
Obviously, the way the packets were delivered could make them easily susceptible to replacement or
substitution. Medical Technologist Mendoza even attested that he had no knowledge as to who marked the
plastic sachets since they arrived in his office already marked.
Clearly, the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove that the plastic sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from accused-appellant are the very same objects tested by the crime laboratory and offered in
court as evidence. The chain of custody of the drugs is patently broken.

Summing up all these circumstances, it behooves this Court not to blindingly accept the flagrantly wanting
evidence of the prosecution. Undoubtedly, the prosecution failed to meet the required quantum of evidence
sufficient to support a conviction, in which case, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails. As we
have held, When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably
becomes a matter of right.
Petitioner Andrew Roble is then ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered
immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.

PEOPLE VS ROSELLE SANTIAGO, GR No. 191061, February 9, 2011

FACTS:
The public prosecutor of Makati charged the accused Roselle Santiago y Pabalinas alias Tisay with violation of
Section 5 and Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
PO1 Voltaire Esguerra (Esguerra) testified that on April 4, 2005, they received information that Roselle was
selling illegal drugs at her house at Pipit Extension, Barangay Rizal, Makati City. Esguerra conducted a test buy
and received from her one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet that presumably contained shabu. When he
returned to his office, Esguerra marked the sachet with @ Tisay then sent it to the laboratory for testing Before
receiving the results of the test buy, an asset told the police that Roselle was going to leave her house,
prompting Esguerras team to conduct a buy-bust operation.
Esguerra met Roselle again and told her that it was he who bought shabu from her earlier that day. She thus let
him enter the front yard of her house where he told her that he wanted to buy another pack for P300.00. Roselle
took his marked money and entered the house. While waiting and looking in, Esguerra spotted two women
inside using shabu with the asset by their side, apparently waiting for his turn. Subsequently, Roselle returned
with one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet presumably containing shabu. Upon receipt of the sachet,
Esguerra signaled his team. They arrested Roselle and appraised her of her rights. Esguerra immediately marked
the sachet with RPS.
After returning to the station, he turned over Roselle and the seized sachet to the investigator. When the
contents of the first and second sachets (with @ Tisay and RPS markings) were examined, these were
confirmed to be Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). A confirmatory test also found Roselle positive
for the use of shabu. For her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabu to Esguerra. She claims that the case
was a product of a mistaken identity, as she was not known as Tisay in the area but Roselle. She narrated how
she was forcibly taken from her house and into custody. The RTC then found her guilty.
Roselle appealed from both judgments to the Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed the two convictions.
She looks for her acquittal from this Court.
ISSUES:
WON the police conducted a valid arrest in Roselles case and WON the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding
that the prosecution evidence established her guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
One. Roselle claims that the police did not make a valid arrest in her case since they arrested her without proper
warrant and did not apprise her of the rights of a person taken into custody as the Constitution and R.A. 7438
provide. But Roselle raised this issue only during appeal, not before she was arraigned. For this reason, she
should be deemed to have waived any question as to the legality of her arrest.
Two. Although the prosecution established through Esguerra the acts constituting the crime charged in the drug-
pushing case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of the allegedly prohibited substance that the police
seized from Roselle.
Esguerra testified that he seized a heat-sealed sachet of white substance from Roselle and marked the sachet
with RPS right in her presence. He claimed that he then immediately submitted the specimen to the police crime
laboratory for examination. But the request for laboratory exam reveals that it was not Esguerra who delivered
the specimen to the crime laboratory. It appears that Esguerra gave it to a certain SPO3 Puno who in turn
forwarded it to a certain PO2 Santos. No testimony covers the movement of the specimen among these other
persons. Consequently, the prosecution was unable to establish the chain of custody of the seized item and its
preservation from possible tampering.
Since the seized substance was heat-sealed in plastic sachet and properly marked by the officer who seized the
same, it would have also been sufficient, despite intervening changes in its custody and possession
What is more, the prosecution failed to account for the whereabouts of the seized specimen after the crime
laboratory conducted its tests. This omission is fatal since the chain of custody should be established fro m the
time the seized drugs were confiscated and eventually marked until the same is presented during trial.
Taking into account the above reasons, the Court finds it difficult to sustain the conviction of Roselle for
violation of Section 5. The presumption of her innocence of the charge must prevail.
As for the other offense, her violation of Section 15 (Use of Illegal Drugs), it is curious that the CA still
entertained her appeal from it despite the fact that she pleaded guilty to the charge and did not ask the trial court
to allow her to change her plea. At any rate, since she had been under detention at the Correctional Institute for
Women since 2005 and presumably deprived of the use of illegal substance during her entire stay there, she
should be deemed to have served the mandatory rehabilitation period that the RTC imposed on her.
Roselle is then ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
alleged violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165

PEOPLE VS. DELOS REYES, GR No. 174114, August 31, 2011

Facts:
An informant gave a tip to the Regional Mobile Group of the NCR Police Office that a drug trade will happen at
the Parking Area of Shangrila Hotel in Mandaluyong. The police went there and positioned themselves to arrest
the appellants. A box in transparent plastic bag which was alleged to contained illegal drugs was confiscated by
the police.

Held:
The confiscated materials were inadmissible as evidence and that thr arrest was unlawful since the acts of the
appelants when they were in the restaurant of the hotel was not "indicative of a felonious enterprise". The search
and seizure made without a warrant was not valid (basis was that of a lawful arrest). Therefore the seized
materials were inadmissible as evidence.
Decision of CA and of the lower courts were set aside.

PEOPLE VS. FERMIN, GR No. 179344, August 3, 2011

Facts:

Edgardo Fermin and Job Madayag were sentenced to life imprisonment in RTC of QC for violating Art.
5 Sec. 5 and Art. 2 of RA 9165 (drug pushing, sale of drugs). The appellants were caught by a police team
through a buy-bust operation. An informant told the police in La Loma Station in QC, that 2 males were
engaged in the illegal sale of shabu in Barangay San Isidro Quezon City. The police formed a team of 6 headed
by Senior Inspector Villanueva. Other police were PO1 Valencia, PO1 Mabutol, PO2 Pascual, PO2 Ibasco and
PO De Guzman. (Police names are important in thi case)
Ibasco will act as the buyer and will pay 100 peso bill to the suspects in exchange for the drugs. EI
(Ibasco's initials) was written on the bill.
During the operation, the informant told Madayag that Ibasco was a drug dependent and that he would
like to purchase some. Madayag then asked for payment. Ibasco gave the 100 peso bill. Madayag called another
from his house, then came out Fermin with 3 sachet of shabu. Ibasco got one of the sachet. After examining it,
he scratched his head as a signal for the arrest of the 2 suspects.
Ibasco testified that Pascua got hold of Fermin while Valencia got hold of Madayag. Pascua recovered
the other sachet and the money used to buy the drugs while Valencia recovered a bente nueve knife from
Madagag. Ibasco added that the sachet which was the subject of the sale remained with him and that he wrote
EI-JM into it.
The testimony of Ibasco was different with Pascua. Pascua stated that the sachet which was the subject
of illegal sale was not with Ibasco but with him. This violates the chain of custody rule. In addition to this,
Ibasco claimed that they coordinated with PDEA the said buy bust operation. However, as per PDEA
certification, none was made.
The identity of who had custody of the subject of the sale of illegal drugs was not clearly made. The
procedure on drug related criminal prosecution was not followed in this case. (Picture taking of the seized items
were not also made). The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of thr accused.

Decision of CA and of the lower court were set aside.

PEOPLE VS. GARRY DE LA CRUZ, GR No. 185717, June 8, 2011

"Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of custody of
seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is especially true when only a miniscule amount of
dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused."

FACTS:
De la Cruz was arrested in a buy-bust operation after an informant tipped the Zamboanga City Police
Office that a certain "Gary" was selling illegal drugs at the parking area for buses behind Food Mart, Governor
Lim Street, Sangali, Bunguioa, Zamboanga City. The buy-bust operation team included PO1 Wilfredo Bobon as
poseur-buyer, and SPO1 Roberto Roca as back-up arresting officer. PO1 Bobon handed the marked money to
de la Cruz in exchange of one heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected shabu (0.0120 gram). After which, he
removed his bull cap. SPO1 Roca then arrested dela Cruz.

PO1 Bobon allegedly recovered six more heat-sealed sachets of suspected shabu (total of 0.1285 gram).
PO1 Bobon placed the sachet he purchased from de la Cruz in his right pocket and the six other sachets in his
left pocket. They proceeded to ZCPO and from there, PO1 Bobon taped the sachets and marked the sachet from
his right pocket with his initials, "WB." He marked the sachets from his left pocket as "WB-1," "WB-2," "WB-
3," "WB-4," "WB-5," and "WB-6."

On the same day, the seven sachets were turned over to SPO1 Federico Lindo, Jr., the investigating
officer, who prepared the request for laboratory examination. Subsequently, the tests yielded positive results for
shabu.

De la Cruz was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The RTC rendered a
decision convicting De la Cruz which was affirmed in toto by the CA.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether presumption of regularity in the performance of duties can be applied in this case
(2) Whether the accuseds guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt

HELD:
(1) No. Section 21 of RA No. 9165 provides that PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures:
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

(b) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;

(c) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That
when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to
 be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued
immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification

The Regional Trial Court acknowledged that no physical inventory of the seized items was conducted.
There is nothing in the records to show that the seized items were photographed in the manner required by
Section 21. Likewise, none of the persons required by Section 21 to be present (or their possible substitutes)
have been shown to be present.

The prosecution also admits that from the moment of the supposed buy-bust operation until the seized
items turnover for examination, these items had been in the sole possession of a police officer. In fact, not only
had they been in his possession, they had been in such close proximity to him that they had been nowhere else
but in his own pockets.

Given the above procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious
evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be
applied in this case.

A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule
of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance
thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the
standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption
cannot arise.

(2) No. In addition to Section 21, the elements that must be established to sustain convictions for illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs are settled:

In illegal sale: (a) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (b) the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.

In illegal possession: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (b) such possession is not authorized by law, and (c) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. The evidence of corpus delicti must also be established
beyond reasonable doubt.

The SC held that in every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the prosecution must
account for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the
moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough that the evidence
offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with
the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has an actual connection
with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and laying a
foundation for the introduction of evidence are important.
In the case, the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that constituted the
corpus delicti itself. The omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being actually conducted and
warrants the suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence.

For the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, de la Cruz is acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. NAVARETTE, GR No. 184170, February 2, 2011

(Dear all, pasensya na, hindi ko mahanap ang Navarette case related to drugs/ obligations of arresting officers...,
rape case ang mayroon. Mukhang mali rin ang GR. No. nito sa syllabus kaya kailangan ko munang itanong kay
sir bukas. Ida-digest ko ito when I have the copy, pramis. mia)
 PEOPLE VS. ULAT, GR No. 180504, October 5, 2011
PEOPLE v. EDWIN ULAT y AGUINALDO (Pudong)
CRIME: Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Sold, delivered and distributed
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, weighing 0.02 grams, in consideration of P100.00)

FACTS
A confidential informant relayed information regarding the illegal drug pushing activities of one alias
Pudong along Seabird Street, Barangay Rizal, Makati City to Barangay Chairman Dreu, head of the Makati
Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) Cluster 6.
Then, the MADAC Cluster 6, in coordination with the Makati Police Drug Enforcement Unit (Makati
DEU), met and decided to go to the place of alias Pudong to verify if alias Pudong is indeed selling illegal drugs
and to conduct an entrapment operation under the supervision of PO1 Randy Santos. During the briefing, it was
agreed that one of the MADAC volunteers, Armando Pol-ot, together with the confidential informant, would act
as poseurbuyer and buy illegal drugs from alias Pudong. The pre-arranged signal for the back-up team to know
that the transaction was already consummated would be the poseur-buyers act of lighting a cigarette.

Pol-ot and the confidential informant went to Seabird Street, Barangay Rizal, Makati City. Pol-ot
approached alias Pudong and was introduced by the informant as a buyer in need of shabu. Alias Pudong asked
how much and Pol-ot replied Piso lang naman, meaning One Hundred Pesos only. Thereafter, alias Pudong took
the marked money and left. Upon his return, he handed Pol-ot a small plastic sachet containing suspected
substance. Pol-ot then gave the pre-arranged signal.
PO1 Santos and Rogelio Patacsil approached alias Pudong and apprehended him. Pol-ot then identified
himself as member of the MADAC. Alias Pudong was then ordered to empty the contents of his pockets and the
marked money was recovered. PO1 Santos then informed him of the nature of his arrest and apprised him of his
Constitutional rights in Tagalog. Thereafter, alias Pudong was brought to the barangay hall of Barangay Rizal to
have the incident listed in the barangay blotter. The confiscated substance contained in the plastic sachet was
then marked EUA.

CONTENTION
The witnesses for the prosecution allegedly presented conflicting testimonies on material points
regarding the chain of custody of the illegal drug taken from appellant, resulting in the failure of the prosecution
to sufficiently establish the corpus delicti and engendering doubt as to appellants guilt.
ISSUE
W there was an unbroken chain of custody

HELD
No
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 states:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 expounds
on the aforementioned provision of law:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
In the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be able to successfully prove the following
elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.

Also, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual commission by someone of the
particular crime charged.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to demonstrate with moral certainty that the identity and
integrity of the prohibited drug, which constitutes the corpus delicti, had been duly preserved.
First, the records reveal that the prosecution did not establish the exact location where the confiscated
illegal drug was marked and the identity of the person who marked it because of contradicting testimonies from
the prosecution's witnesses.
According to Pol-ot, it was PO1 Santos, the leader of the buy-bust team, who placed the marking on the
confiscated sachet of shabu. But, his testimony contradicts what he declared in the Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng
Pag-aresto or the Joint Affidavit of Arrest that he was the one who marked the sachet. PO1 Santos testified that
it was Pol-ot who marked the sachet.

In addition, Pol-ot declared that he was present when an inventory report of the confiscated illegal drug
was prepared by PO1 Santos at the barangay hall where they brought appellant immediately after arresting
him. PO1 Santos testified that no inventory report was made.
When Pol-ot was asked by the defense counsel if the confiscated sachet of shabu was photographed, he
answered in the affirmative. PO1 Santos declared that no photos of the confiscated items were taken.
Taking into consideration all the conflicting accounts, any reasonable mind would entertain grave
reservations as to the identity and integrity of the confiscated sachet of shabu submitted for laboratory
examination. Apart from the testimony that PO1 Santos turned over the accused to an unnamed duty inspector,
the prosecution evidence does not disclose with clarity how the confiscated sachet passed hands until it was
received by the chemical analyst at the PNP crime laboratory. In other words, the prosecution could not present
an unbroken chain of custody for the seized illegal drug.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground
therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. In the present case, there were not merely trifling lapses in the handling of the
evidence taken from the accused but the prosecution could not even establish what procedure was followed by
the arresting team to ensure a proper chain of custody for the confiscated prohibited drug. ACQUITTED

PEOPLE VS. ALCUIZAR, GR No. 189980, April 6, 2011

PEOPLE v ALBERTO BACUS ALCUIZAR,
CRIME
Violation of Sections 5 (illegal sale), 6 (maintaining a drug den), 11 (illegal possession) and 12 (illegal
possession of dangerous drug paraphernalia) of Republic Act No. 9165

On appeal: Illegal possession of shabu (twenty-six (26) heat-sealed plastic packets containing white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 0.52 grams; one (1) heat-sealed plastic pack containing 10.26 grams of white
crystalline substance; two (2) strips of tin foil containing traces of white crystalline powder; and one (1) heat-
sealed packet containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, which when subjected to laboratory
examination gave positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug)
FACTS
SPO1 Agadier, PO3 Rolando Gantuangco, SPO1 Roland Navales, who were all assigned at the
Municipality of Carcar Police Station in Cebu City, secured a search warrant to search the house of appellant on
the suspicion that the latter is selling and in possession of shabu. They first conducted a buy-bust operation in
Sitio Awayan. SPO1 Agadier was standing in a store across the house of appellant. He witnessed the poseur
buyer hand the marked money to appellant in exchange for one deck of shabu. SPO1 Agadier immediately
Perseus the accused. After effecting the arrest, SPO1 Agadier and his team went back to the house of appellant
to conduct a search. The items recovered inside appellants house were one big heat-sealed transparent plastic
pack with white crystalline substance believed to be shabu, two packs containing thirteen decks each of
suspected shabu, three disposable lighters, a tooter, a tin foil with traces of shabu residue, and an improvised
lamp.
SPO1 Agadier related that appellant, appellants sister-in-law, one barangay captain, one barangay tanod,
and several photographers were present during the implementation of the search warrant. A receipt of the seized
items was prepared and the barangay captain, barangay tanod, and two photographers were asked to sign the
receipt. The seized items were initially in the custody of SPO1 Navales. Upon reaching the police station, SPO1
Navales turned them over to SPO1 Agadier for marking. SPO1 Agadier prepared the request for laboratory
examination before turning them over back to SPO1 Navales, who then delivered the items and the request to
the PNP Crime Laboratory.

TC
The prosecution has clearly proven that appellant was guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
since the plastic packs of shabu were found inside his room. It is presumed that when prohibited drugs are found
in a house or building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, such person is in possession of such
drugs in violation of the law.

ISSUE
Whether the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant.

HELD
No.
The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in
sustaining a conviction, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been
preserved. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence
must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the
accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails.
The chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the seized items should be done in the presence of
the apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the same items that enter
the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence.
It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Indeed, it
is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be
derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. (Lopez v
people)
Alcuizar cites the failure of the police officer to mark the evidence immediately after purportedly taking
it from him. This omission, he contends, renders the chain of custody dubious.
SPO1 Agadier admitted that he only marked the seized items at the police station. While the rule allows
marking of evidence to be done in the nearest police station, this contemplates a case of warrantless searches
and seizures. In this case, the police officers were able to secure a search warrant prior to their operation. SPO1
Agadier did not offer an explanation or a justification on why he did not immediately mark the plastic packs of
shabu seized inside appellants house notwithstanding that an inventory receipt was even prepared while the
police officers were still inside the house of appellant. They were given sufficient time and opportunity to
prepare for its implementation. Thus, failure to comply with the marking of evidence immediately after
confiscation constitutes a first gap in the chain of custody.
Appellant also points out the failure of the police officers to give or leave a copy of the inventory receipt
upon the accused or any of his family members pursuant to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Adherence to
the guidelines under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 relating to custody and disposition of confiscated or
seized dangerous drugs accounts for a crucial link in the chain of custody rule.
SPO1 Agadier narrated that a certain photographer took pictures of the items seized from the house of
appellant. However, the photograph/s do not appear on the records nor were they offered by the prosecution as
evidence. Thus, the requirement of taking a photograph was not clearly proven. Anent the inventory receipt,
while it was prepared and appeared on records, the police officers failed to provide appellant a copy of the
inventory receipt. Appellant construed this omission as fatal. This omission alone is not necessarily fatal to the
cause of the prosecution. However, there is nagging doubt with respect to the barangay tanods testimony
pertaining to the inventory receipt which affects the integrity of the corpus delicti in general.

He testified that he and the barangay captain arrived later than the police officers. And when they
reached appellants house, the alleged confiscated shabu were already on top of a table. He was merely asked to
sign the inventory receipt, which he did without hesitation. As can be gleaned from his testimony, the barangay
tanod did not witness how the police officers conducted their search and how they were able to discover the
packets of shabu inside appellants house. Aside from the barangay tanod, no other signatories in the receipt
were presented by the prosecution to authenticate the document.
The first gap in the chain of custody was compounded by the vague recollection of SPO1 Agadier
regarding the transfer of custody of the shabu. Based on his testimony, it was not indicated who had initial
control and custody of the plastic packs of shabu upon their confiscation. SPO1 Agadier merely claims that he
turned them over to SPO1 Navales without specifying whether the latter received it while they were still inside
the appellants house or at the police station. It is also not clear who was in possession of the plastic packs of
shabu while in transit. Moreover, SPO1 Navales did not testify to confirm the statement of SPO1 Agadier.
Verily, the failure of the police officers to mark the dangerous drugs immediately after their seizure and
the vague recollection of SPO1 Agadier concerning the custody of the drugs from the residence of appellant up
to the time it was submitted to the crime laboratory constitute a huge and significant gap in the chain of custody
which substantially affects the identity of the corpus delicti. ACQUITTED

PEOPLE VS. HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN, GR No. 19225, July 11, 2012

FACTS: On April 20, 2002 at around 11:00 oclock in the evening, Noriel Urieta was in Brgy.
Francisco, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro along with Ignacio Flores. They were drinking in the amusement area.
When they were about to leave the premises, appellant suddenly approached them and without any provocation,
suddenly stabbed Noriel Urieta with a knife on his left chest. After the first blow, the victim was already
kneeling down and appellant proceeded to stab him three (3) more times. Appellant thereafter ran away. Ignacio
Flores called out for help and one Elmer Honato arrived to give them aid and bring the victim to a secure place
and thereafter proceeded to call for help. He waited for Elmer Honato to arrive but he did not return anymore.
With the condition of the victim uncertain and as he was afraid, he decided to leave the victim and go home.
Two days later, Police Officer Gamba, together with the father of Noriel Urieta and Gina Urieta, the wife of
Noriel Urieta, went to the house of Ignacio Flores in order to get the sworn statement as to the facts that
happened in this case. They were able to do so. Subsequently, an arrest on the person of Hermogenes de
Guzman was made. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor then filed the appropriate charges thereafter. De
Guzman was charged with the crime of Murder.
HELD: The crucial issue here is the sufficiency of evidence to convict De Guzman. The incident took
place at 11 PM in a remote barangay with no electric lighting in the surroundings and the only source of light
then was the illumination of a moron coming from a peryahan. Apart from the testimony of Flores, no other
competent and corroborative evidence was adduced to settle this question of visibility and lighting condition. In
his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Flores stated that the moron (de gas) was just on the table where they were
drinking which was contrary to what he had testified in court. The distance of the moron in the peryahan
from the site of the stabbing incident was not disclosed either. It could have helped determine if the place was
well illuminated. In People v. Faustino, it was ruled that the identification of an accused by an eyewitness is a
vital piece of evidence and most decisive of the success or failure of the case for the prosecution. Here, the
inconclusive and unreliable identification by Flores of De Guzman as the culprit failed to break the barrier of
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
It has not been shown that De Guzman had any motive for killing Urieta. The brutal and gruesome
attack on Urieta, who sustained two stab wounds on the chest, a stab wound along the waist area which hit the
liver, and a stab wound on the elbow, clearly manifested the intention of the perpetrator to purposely bring
death upon the victim. There was no evidence, however, that De Guzman carried a grudge or had an axe to
grind against the victim or his family, or even knew the victim at all. Prosecution witnesses Flores and Gina
even attested that they did not know of any reason why De Guzman killed Urieta. Generally, the motive of the
accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven. Proof of the same becomes relevant
and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in question. In People v. Vidad, the Supreme
Court ruled that it is true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the particular motive for
taking the life of a human being shall be established at the trial, and that in general when the commission of a
crime is clearly proven, conviction may and should follow even where the reason for its commission is
unknown; but in many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission
of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motive which tempted the mind to
indulge in the criminal act.

PEOPLE VS. PAJARIN, GR No. 190460, January 12, 2011

FACTS: The City Prosecutor of Manila charged the accused Luis Pajarin and Efren Pallaya before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with violation of Section 5 in relation to Sections 26 and 11 (3) in
relation to Section 13, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
PO2 Nestor Lehetemas and PO2 James Nolan Ibaez testified that on June 1, 2005 at around
10:00 p.m., an informant arrived at their Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) with the report that drugs would be
sold on P. Ocampo and Dominga Streets the next day at around 5:00 pm. As the poseur-buyer, PO2 Ibaez
marked a P500.00 bill with SAID on top of its serial number. On June 2, 2005 the buy-bust team went to the
site of the operation on board a Tamaraw FX which they parked near Dominga Street. The informant pointed to
the two accused, Luis Pajarin and Efren Pallaya. They stood 10 to 20 steps away beside a red scooter. PO2
Ibaez and the informant approached them. After the informant introduced PO2 Ibaez as an interested buyer, the
police officer bought shabu from the two, using the marked P500.00 bill. Pajarin opened the compartment of the
red scooter and took from it one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance.
When Pallaya asked for the money, PO2 Ibaez handed it to him. Then Pajarin gave one plastic sachet containing
the suspected shabu to the officer, who raised his right hand as a pre-arranged signal. PO2 Ibaezs companions
immediately rushed to the group. PO2 Ibaez grabbed Pallaya. Pajarin tried to escape but PO2 Lehetemas got
hold of him.
The arresting officers turned over the seized suspected shabu to PO3 Roel Young who marked
the plastic sachet seized from the scooter with the letters ETP, and the sachet Pajarin handed over with the
letters LDCP. Chemistry Report D-369-05 showed that upon examination of the submitted specimen, the same
yielded positive result for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
HELD: The Supreme Court acquitted the accused on the ground that the police officers involved in the
buy-bust operation failed to comply with Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of R.A. 9165, which requires them to take immediate inventory of and photograph the seized item in the
presence of the accused or his representative or responsible third persons mentioned. Here, the prosecution
failed to show that the substances allegedly seized from the accused were the same substances presented in
court to prove their guilt. Since custody and possession change over time, it has been held indispensable that
the officer who seized the article places it in a plastic container unless it is already in one, seals it if yet
unsealed, and puts his marking on the cover. In this way there is assurance, upon inspection, that the substance
reaches the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused. Here, the police officers did not
mark the sealed plastic sachets to show that they were the same things they took from the accused. Rather, the
marking on the items were done by the station investigator who would have no way of knowing that the
substances were really seized from the accused. The marking of captured items immediately after they are
seized from the accused is the starting point in the custodial link. This step is vital because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. Failure to place such markings paves the way for
swapping, planting, and contamination of the evidence. These lapses seriously cast doubt on the authenticity of
the corpus delicti, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. If the alleged shabu was not marked by the
arresting officers after the buy-bust operation at the place where the arrest was made but marked by the
investigator when it was turned over in the police station, there is violation of Section 21 and accused shall be
acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. LORENZO, GR No. 184760, April 23, 2010

PEOPLE VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN, GR No. 184595, June 29, 2010

PEOPLE VS. RONALDO DE GUZMAN, March 26, 2010

FACTS: Ronaldo de Guzman was charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, punishable under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165. That on June 10, 2003, a confidential informant reported De Guzmans drug pushing
activities to Alcala, Pangasinans Chief of Police, Sotero Soriano, Jr. Soriano immediately formed a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation. Once there, the confidential informant introduced appellant to Senior Police
Officer Daniel Llanillo, who was designated as poseur-buyer. Llanillo tried to buy P200 worth of shabu. He
handed two marked P100 bills to De Guzman, and the latter, in turn, gave him two heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing what was suspected as shabu. Llanillo gave the prearranged signal to the rest of the
team. Appellant was arrested and frisked. The team recovered from De Guzman two packs of empty transparent
sachets, three disposable lighters, and P3,380.00 in cash, which included the marked money paid by SPO1
Llanillo. The team then brought De Guzman to the police station in Alcala, Pangasinan.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision, finding De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA
affirmed the RTCs decision.
De Guzman went to CS on a Petition for Review. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that the
police officers complied with the mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165.[11] In particular, he points to the
fact that the seized items were not marked immediately after his arrest; that the police officers failed to make an
inventory of the seized items in his presence or in the presence of his counsel and of a representative from the
media and from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and that no photographs were taken of the seized items and of
appellant. Appellant also claims that the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was not established.
Further, appellant contends that the failure of the police officers to enter the buy-bust operation in the police
blotter before the said operation, the lack of coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), and the failure to observe the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 have effectively overturned the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers duties.
HELD: De Guzman was acquitted.
The Constitution mandates that an accused in a criminal case shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is laden with the burden to overcome such
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. Consequently, courts are required to
put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing, and the constitutional right to presumption
of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the
innocence of the accused. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of
which is consistent with innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must
prevail, and the court must acquit.
The Court finds that the apprehending officers failed to comply with the guidelines set under R.A. No.
9165 and its IRR. Accordingly, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render void and invalid the seizure
and custody of the drugs only when: (1) such non-compliance is attended by justifiable grounds; and (2) the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. There
must be proof that these two (2) requirements were met before such non-compliance may be said to fall within
the scope of the proviso.
In this case, it was admitted that it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator, who marked the seized
items, and only upon seeing the items for the first time at the police station. Moreover, there was no physical
inventory made or photographs of the seized items taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165
and its IRR. There was also no mention that representatives from the media and from the DOJ, and any elected
official, were present during this inventory. The prosecution never explained the reasons for these lapses.
Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized items has
been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender reasonable doubt on the
guilt of an accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability after such investigation to let the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not
demanded by the law to convict a person charged with a crime, but moral certainty is required as to every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent
doubt on the identity of the drug.

JULIUS CACAO VS. PEOPLE, January 22, 2010

FACTS: Police Officer 3 Celso Pang-ag of the Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police
Station received a telephone call from an informant about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the
Starlight Hotel located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City. PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel
Mangapit, went immediately to the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. They saw petitioner
seated on top of the bed sniffing shabu while Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing shabu.
At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the
drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic sachets.
The trial court found accused guilty beyong reasonable doubt. CA affirmed the decision.
Petitioner moves for reconsideration to SC. In his petition, the lower court gravely erred in ruling that the guilt
of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt considering the myriad material inconsistencies,
discrepancies, and incredible statements in the prosecution evidence. And the lower court erred in not finding
that the crucial first link in the chain of custody of the specimen subjected for examination was not proven.
HELD: Cacao was acquitted. The court found testimonies of the prosecution witnesses not only with glaring
inconsistencies on material points but more importantly a failure to identify indubitably the prohibited drug
allegedly confiscated from Cacao. The testimonies of the prosecution's principal witnesses are inconsistent and
contradictory. The considered view that this contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy
touching on substantial and significant matter which could well affect the credibility of the witnesses.
The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the same item confiscated
from Cacao. The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and the
testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified
in court is the same item that was allegedly seized and confiscated from petitioner.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires the presentation of the seized
prohibited drugs as an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. This would ideally cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from
seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description
of the condition in which it was delivered to the next in the chain.
Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence needed to convict, that is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by the prosecution. While as a rule we
desist from disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial court especially with respect to the credibility of
witnesses, we must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt because the law presumes that the accused is innocent unless and until proven otherwise.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence.

PEOPLE VS. KIMURA and KIZAKI, April 27, 2004

 FACTS: Appellants Tomohisa Kimura and Akira Kizaki seek reversal of the decision dated June
27, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 94-5606, rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 66), Makati City,
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting and delivering hemp, which is in violation
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Maj. Anso organized a team composed of SPO4 Baldovino, Jr., SPO1 Cabato and PO3 Cadoy to
conduct surveillance of the area. A buy-bust operation was launched and PO3 Cadoy was designated to
act as poseur-buyer and they prepared the buy-bust money consisting of one P500.00 bill and five pieces
of P100.00 bill.
Kimura and Kizaki say that their guilt has not been proven without reasonable doubt, as there is
no proof of the corpus delicti in their person.
HELD:
Petition is meritorious. After examining the evidence for the prosecution, and tested in the light of
the Casimiro case, we find that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the marijuana allegedly
seized from appellants Kimura and Kizaki. Extant in the records were the admissions made by the police
operatives of their failure to place any markings on the seized marijuana immediately after they had
allegedly apprehended appellants, thus failing to prove that the marijuana presented in court was the
very same marijuana seized from appellants.
While SPO1 Baduas testimony showed that it was investigator SPO1 Delfin who made the
markings A, B, C on the three sacks containing the marijuana which he brought to the laboratory,
nowhere in his testimony did he say that such markings were made on the night the appellants were
arrested, i.e., on June 27, 1994. Investigator Delfin did not initial said markings nor did he testify
affirming his markings.
It is not positively and convincingly clear that what was submitted for laboratory examination and
presented in court was actually recovered from the appellants.
They are acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. PARTOZA, May 8, 2009

FACTS: Edwin Partoza is convicted of selling shabu.
Appellant questions the integrity of the evidence used against him on the grounds of failure to
mark the items seized from him immediately and failure to observe the chain of custody as required
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
The Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), on the other hand, argues that PO3 Tougan held on to
the sachets from the time he confiscated them from appellant until such time that he was able to place his
initials on them and submitted the duly accomplished request for examination of said sachets to the crime
laboratory. Finally, the OSG avers that Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 which pertains to the chain of
custody and disposition of confiscated or seized drugs was not yet applicable at the time appellant
committed his crimes.
ISSUE: Was the corpus delicti adequately proven in the case at bar?
HELD: NO. In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and
disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with.
PO3 Tougan did not mark the seized drugs immediately after he arrested appellant in the latter's
presence (he placed his initials only at the police station). Neither did he make an inventory and take a
photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of appellant. There was no representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and
who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these
statutory safeguards were observed.
No explanation was offered by PO3 Tougan for his failure to observe the rule.
Furthermore, while PO3 Tougan admitted to have in his possession the shabu from the time
appellant was apprehended at the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of proof on how the
seized items were handled from the time they left the hands of PO3 Tougan. PO3 Tougan mentioned a
certain Inspector Manahan as the one who signed the request for laboratory examination. He did not
however relate to whom the custody of the drugs was turned over. Furthermore, the evidence of the
prosecution did not reveal the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs
after its examination and pending presentation in court. The failure of the prosecution to establish the
chain of custody is fatal to its cause.

PEOPLE VS. MARIAN CORECHE, August 4, 2009

FACTS: On between 4:00- 4:30 in the morning of September 10, 20013, SPO1 Arellano, PO1 Tougan, and
PO1 Pineda of Philippine National Police (PNP) of San Mateo, Rizal received a tip from an unnamed informant
that Marian Coreche was peddling shabu. They then decided to conduct a sting operation involving a sting
money of two P100 bills marked HVA. The operation took place at the appellants house in San Mateo Street,
Dulongbayan, San Mateo, Rizal. Arellano and the informant posed as buyers while Tougan and Pineda
positioned themselves nearby as back-up. They then arrested Emily and Marian Coreche and recovered from the
former two plastics of suspected shabu. After bringing them to the police station and inspecting the specimen,
the two were separately charged with violation of Sec. 11 (Possession; and selling) RA 9165 or Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Appellant and Emily posted bail, and during arraignment pleaded not guilty.
Emily was tried in absentia for failing to appear at trial.On the other hand, appellant denied the charges and
claimed that no transaction took place between them and Arellano. The trial court then rejected her defense for
lack of credence in the face of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Marian appealed
to the CA contending the the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution discharged its burden of proving her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She argued that the testimonies of Arellano and Pineda were far from credible
because they failed to coordinate with the PDEA, did not conduct surveillance before the operation, and failed
to give the details on the marking of the shabu. The CA then sustained the decision of the trial court. They
found no problem in the police officers credibility and they turned the table by stating that appellants denial of
defense and frame-up strain credulity.
(Heres the part na may chain of evidence rule > Presumption of Innocence
*Prosecution Failed to Prove Beyond Reasonable Doubt the Corpus Delicti or body of the crime
In drug-related prosecutions, the State not only bears the burden of proving the elements of the offenses
of sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride under RA 9165,but also carries the obligation to
prove the corpus delicti, the body of the crime,to discharge its overall duty of proving the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.The prosecution fails to comply with the indispensable requirement of proving corpus
delicti not only when it is missing [8]but also when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized
drugs which raise doubts on the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.
*Failure to Mark Arrest Sites show inconsistency in the discharge of official duties.
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately
after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is
vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use
the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus
of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of
at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
The records of this case show that the plastic sachets allegedly seized from appellant were indeed
marked (as HVA, HVA-1 and HVA-2). However, there is nothing on record to show when and where this was
done.

*Equivocal Evidence on Post Chemical

The prosecutions failure to prove that the sachets of shabu presented in court were marked immediately
after they were allegedly seized from appellant is compounded by the equivocal evidence on the specimens
post-examination custody. According to the prosecution, the plastic sachets seized from the accused were
transferred to the custody of Police Senior Inspector Isidro L. Cario (Cario) of the Eastern Police District (EPD)
Laboratory for chemical analysis of their contents
When taken together with the contents of Chemistry Report No. D-1742-03E,what the stipulation proves
is that upon chemical analysis by Cario, the contents of five plastic sachets marked HVA thru E (JLT1)tested
positive for methylamphetamine [sic] hydrochloride. This fact leaves unanswered the question of post-
examination custody. Did the plastic sachets remain in Carios safekeeping? Were they transferred to another
location until they were presented in court? The stipulation in the fifth paragraph that after the examination, the
specimens had been placed in a transparent plastic bag with markings D-1742-03E and initialed by the said
witness [Cario] merely settles the issue of how the specimens were packaged after testing, not who took custody
of them.
ISSUE: Whether or not Presumption of Innocence should prevail over Presumption of Regular Performance of
Official Duty in drug-related cases.
HELD:Yes. The presumption of innocence should prevail. Although the lower courts relied on the evidentiary
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed, this presumption should not be conclusive. Not
only it is rebutted by contrary proof, but is also inferior to the constitutional presumption of innocence. All told,
we find merit in appellants claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt due to substantial gaps in the chain of custody, raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of
the corpus delicti.
The disposition of this appeal once more underscores the need for trial courts to conduct a more exacting
scrutiny of prosecution evidence to meet the stringent standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt with due
regard to relevant jurisprudence. In the long run, this redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice system by
protecting civil liberties and at the same time instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors.
Decision is reversed. Appellant is acquitted.

BONDAD VS. PEOPLE, December 10, 2008

FACTS:At around 7:05 p.m. of January 29, 2004, while PO2 Ferdinand Brubio, PO1 Christopher Anos, and
PO1 Roberto Muega were at the Station Anti Illegal Drug Special Operations Task Force (SAIDSOTF), Office
of the Marikina City Police Station, PO2 Nelson Arribay arrived together with a confidential informant. The
confidential informant reported about the rampant sale of shabu in a billiard hall along Bonifacio Avenue,
Barangka, Marikina City and named a certain alias Jun as the vendor.
The Chief of the SAIDSOTF, P/Sr. Insp. Ramchrisen Haveria, Jr., at once formed a buy-bust team composed of,
among others, PO2 Ramiel Soriano and PO2 Dano who was designated as the poseur-buyer. PO2 Dano was
given a one hundred peso bill bearing Serial No. Q487945 to be used as buy-bust money. It was agreed that
PO2 Danos removal of his cap would signal that the buy-bust was consummated.
The conduct of a buy-bust operation was recorded in the police blotter and was coordinated with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) which gave it control number NOC-012904-28.
The buy-bust team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to 3 Cs billiard hall at the corner of M.
Cruz St. and Bonifacio Avenue in Barangka, Marikina City. On entering the hall, the confidential informant
pointed to appellant who was then holding a cue stick beside the billiard table as the alias Jun. The confidential
informant approached appellant and talked to him. Within minutes, appellant approached PO2 Dano and asked
him if he wanted to buy shabu, to which PO2 Dano answered piso lang. Appellant at once took out a Vicks
container from his right front pocket[5] which, when opened, yielded heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
substances suspected to be shabu. From the container, appellant drew out one sachet in exchange for which PO2
Dano gave the marked one hundred peso bill. At that instant, PO2 Dano removed his cap. As the back-up police
officers were closing-in, PO2 Dano grabbed appellants arm, identified himself, and apprised appellant of his
constitutional rights. Upon PO2 Danos order, appellant returned the buy-bust money, handed the Vicks
container, and gave his name as Elpidio Burac Bondad, Jr.
Still at the place of arrest, PO2 Dano placed the markings EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04 on the substance-filled
sachet sold to him, and EBB-ED, POS 1 and 2, 01/29/04 on the sachets that remained inside the Vicks
container.
Elipidio Jr. was then charged before the RTC of Marikina for violation of Sec. 5, par 2(3), Article II of RA 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for possessin 3 sachets of methampethamine
hydrochloride.
He denied the charges by claiming that he was framed-up. He narrated that PO2 Brubio suddenly forced him,
asked him for money, and brought him to the Office of SAIDSOTF at the police station. His defense was
corroborated by his son Christian and by Roberto who was a spotter at the billiard hall where the appellant was
arrested. The RTC convicted him of the charges. The case was raised to the appellate court which affirmed the
ruling with modification. The court stated that The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable
doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for illegal possession of a prohibited drug,
namely, (a) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug,
(b) such possession is not authorized by law and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed said
drug.Under Section 11, Par. 2 [3] of R.A. 9165, the mere act of possessing any dangerous drug consummates
the crime.
Appellant then raised that there was a failure to follow the requirements of the law since there was no physical
inventory and that no photographs were taken.
ISSUE:Whether or not the failure to comply with the requirements of the law compromised the identity of the
items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against appellant.
HELD:Yes. The failure to comply with the requirements compromised the corpus delicti which is needed in
proving that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Pringas holds, however:Non-compliance
by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor,
and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. (Citation omitted, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The Courts pronouncement in Pringas is based on the provision of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulationsof R.A. No. 9165, viz:
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the present case, by PO2 Danos claim, he immediately marked the seized items which were brought to the
Crime Laboratory for examination. By his admission, however, he did not conduct an inventory of the items
seized. Worse, no photograph of the items was taken. There was thus failure to faithfully follow the
requirements of the law.
Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, the defense in the present case questioned early on, during the cross
examination of PO2 Dano, the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and
photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165[19], despite PO2 Danos awareness of such
requirements.
Decision is reversed. Appellant is acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. OBMIRANIS, December 16, 2008

FACTS: Samuel Obmiranis was caught in a buy-bust operation by the Manila Western Police District while
offering to sell 2.8 kg of methylamphetamine hydrochloride. The team was led by police officer Jerry Velasco.
According to Velasco, he was the one who effected the arrest but it was Cinco who seized the plastic
sachet from appellant. He further stated that immediately after the arrest, he and his team brought the seized
item to the police headquarters and there, in his presence, Cinco marked the same with the initials SOO. At the
trial, he identified the plastic sachet as that seized from appellant as well as the marking made by Cinco on it.
Furthermore, he admitted on cross-examination that there was no evidence custodian designated and that he
could not remember if the seized item had been inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused;
that Cinco put the item in his pocket after the same was recovered and did not mark it on the spot and that the
markings made on the buy-bust money had not been entered in the blotter.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was established beyond reasonable doubt that the drug presented from the accused
was the same that was presented as evidence.
HELD: The prosecution evidence in the case at bar, however, does not suffice to afford such assurance. Of all
the people who came into direct contact with the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from appellant, only
Velasco was able to observe the uniqueness thereof in court. Cinco, who, according to Velasco, took initial
custody of the plastic sachet at the time of arrest and who allegedly marked the same with the initials SOO at
the police station, was not even presented in court to directly observe the uniqueness of the specimen and, more
importantly, to acknowledge the marking as his own. The same is true with respect to the laboratory personnel
who could have but nevertheless failed to testify on the circumstances under which he received the specimen at
the laboratory for analysis and testing, as well as on the conduct of the examination which was administered on
the specimen and what he did with it at the time it was in his possession and custody. Aside from that, it was not
reasonably explained why these same witnesses were not able to testify in court.
The Court certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of substitution, alteration or
contamination whether intentional or unintentional of narcotic substances at any of the links in the chain of
custody thereof especially because practically such possibility is great where the item of real evidence is small
and is similar in form to other substances to which people are familiar in their daily lives.
Even granting that we must blindly rely on the credibility of Velascos testimony, still, the prosecution
evidence would fall short of satisfying the quantum of evidence required to arrive at a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt inasmuch as the evidence chain failed to solidly connect appellant with the seized drug in a
way that would establish that the specimen is one and the same as that seized in the first place and offered in
court as evidence. The Court cannot indulge in the presumption of regularity of official duty if only to obliterate
the obvious infirmity of the evidence advanced to support appellantss conviction. In Mallillin v. People, we
categorically declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer in court the testimony of key witnesses for the
basic purpose of establishing a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu and the
irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was finally offered in court,
materially conflict with every proposition as to the culpability of the accused. For the same plain but
consequential reason, we will not hesitate to reverse the judgment of conviction in the present appeal.
*Presumption of regularity: a principle applied in evidentiary evaluation that transactions made in the normal
course of business are assumed to have been conducted in the usual manner unless there is evidence to prove
otherwise.
- It must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty
or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof.
- The presumption applies only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers
involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. In this case, the CA
blindly relied in the presumption for the conviction of the accused

MALLILLIN VS. PEOPLE, April 30, 2008

PEOPLE VS. MONALYN CERVANTES, March 17, 2009
FACTS: Isidro Arguson, Monalyn Cervantes, Wilson del Monte, and Richard Requiz were all arrested in a
buy-bust operation headed by PO3 Reynaldo Ramos. Arguson instructed the would-be-buyers to wait for
someone who will come out from Estrella Street. Cervantes came and checked if Ramos (poseur buyer) had the
money. After checking, she left and appeared again this time with del Monte, Requiz and Arguson. Del Monte
was the one holding the plastic bag containing 473.76 grams of shabu. Arguson then took from Del Monte the
bag, later found to contain 473.76 grams of shabu packed in six small self-sealing transparent bags, and handed
it to PO2 Balosbalos, who in turn gave him the bundle of boodle money. Finally, PO3 Ramos gave the pre-
arranged signal to indicate the consummation of the drug deal and introduced himself as policeman. Accused-
appellant and her scampering companions were later arrested and brought to and booked at Camp Vicente Lim.
Del Monte alleges that he is a carpark boy and was performing his duties when the police arrested him.
Cervantes claims that she is a laundry woman who was buying ice cream for her son when she was arrested.
Requiz stated that he was just riding a borrowed bicycle when the police arrested him. Arguson is the leader of
the group and was proven to be a drug dealer.
The RTC acquitted Requiz and del Monte, but held Cervantes and Arguson liable. The RTC ruled that
the court does not find the evidence sufficient to pass the test of moral certainty to find accused Del Monte
liable as charged. Even if PO3 Ramos saw him to have held the bag for Arguson, it could have been possible
that he was merely asked by Cervantes or Arguson to carry the bag.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of Cervantes is proper
HELD: Cervantes should be acquitted, based on two grounds:
1. Equipoise rule: If the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with
the innocence of the accused persons and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
The trial court, mentioned that it could have been possible that [Del Monte] was merely asked by
Arguson to carry the bag. The RTC therefore extended to Del Monte the benefit of the doubt, a
benevolence denied to accused-appellant without so much of an acceptable explanation. The
contrasting treatment of one and the same testimony violative of the equipoise rule
2. Failure to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the seized substances.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug, what is crucial is the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object and its consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the payment for it. Implicit in these cases is first
and foremost the identity and existence, coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded prohibited
substance, this object evidence being an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime of possession or selling
of regulated/prohibited drug. There can be no such crime when nagging doubts persist on whether the specimen
submitted for examination and presented in court was what was recovered from, or sold by, the accused.
Essential, therefore, in appropriate cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
certainty. This means that on top of the key elements of possession or sale, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
As the Court distinctly notes in this case, of the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical
custody of the seized regulated items, only PO3 Ramos testified for the specific purpose of identifying the
evidence. In the witness box, however, he did not indicate how he and his companions, right after the buy bust,
handled the seized plastic bag and its contents. He did not name the duty desk officer at Camp Vicente Lim to
whom he specifically turned over the confiscated bag and sachets at least for recording. What is on record is
Exhibit C, which, as earlier described, is a memorandum PO3 Ramos prepared dated April 5, 2000 from the
RSOG-IV Director to the Chief, PNP R-IV Crime Laboratory Service, submitting for qualitative analysis the
white crystalline substance confiscated by the buy-bust group. Needless to stress, the unnamed person who
delivered the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at the laboratory were no-show in court to testify on the
circumstances under which they handled the specimen or whether other persons had access to the specimen
before actual testing. And C/I Geronimo, the analyzing forensic chemist, was not also presented. Then, too, no
one testified on how the specimen was cared after following the chemical analysis.

3-b. Effect of inconsistent testimonies of arresting/searching officers

10. PEOPLE VS. ZAFRA MARAORAO, G.R. NO. 174369, June 20,2012

Facts:
Appellant was charged under an Information dated January 4, 2001 filed before the RTC of Manila for illegal
possession of shabu. On March 19, 2001, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged against him. Thereafter, trial ensued.For the prosecution, PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on
November 29, 2000, they received reliable information at Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District
(WPD) that an undetermined amount of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the early
morning of the following day. On November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he and PO2Mamelito Abella, PO1
Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman Gamit went to the Islamic Center. While walking along Rawatun Street in
Quiapo, they saw two men talking to each other. Upon noticing them, one ran away. PO2 Abella and PO1 Dela
Cruz chased the man but failed to apprehend him. Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon
bag on the pavement. Hewas about to run when PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1 Gamit picked up the maroon
bag. The man was later identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang. The police examined the contents
of the bag and saw a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance, which they suspected to be
shabu. At the police station, the investigator marked the plastic sachet ZM-1 in the presence of the police
officers. The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory chemical analysis.
When examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Miladenia O. Tapan, the 1,280.081grams of white crystalline
substance gave a positive result to the test for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. Her
findings are contained in Chemistry Report No. D-1121-00 .In his defense, appellant testified that on November
30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he was going to the place of his uncle, Abdul Gani, at the Islamic Center to get a
letter from his mother. He went there early because he had to report for work at the Port Area in Manila at
8:00a.m. On his way, an unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a house number which he did not
know. He stopped walking to talk to the man, who placed his bag down. When they turned around, they saw
four men in civilian attire walking briskly. He only found out that they were police officers when they chased
the man he was talking to. As the man ran away, the man dropped his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run
because he was not aware of what was inside the bag .He was convicted by the RTC of illegal possession of
shabu which was affirmed by theCourt of Appeals.
Held:
Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional
mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Now, in order to convict appellant for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, or the shabu in this case,
the prosecution evidence must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following elements:
(1) the appellant was in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug;
(2) such possession was not authorized by law; and
(3) the appellant freely and consciously possessed the drug. In this case, the fact of possession by appellant of
the bag containing the shabu was not established in the first place. The testimony of PO3 Vigilla reveals a
glaring discrepancy which both the trial and the appellate courts overlooked. In their Joint Affidavit, arresting
officers PO3 Vigilla, PO2 Abella,PO1 dela Cruz and SPO1 Gamit stated that they spotted two unidentified
persons standing and seemingly conversing a few meters ahead of them. However, when one of them noticed
our presence, he hastily r[a]n away heading towards the Muslim Center leaving behind the other person and a
maroon colored bag with Adidas marking in the pavement. In other words, the maroon bag was left behind
by the man who ran away. But at the trial, PO3 Vigilla testified during direct examination that they spotted two
persons talking to each other, and upon noticing them, one of them scampered away and was chased by my
companions while the other one dropped a bag, sir . Presumably, under his testimony, the bag was now held by
the one who did not run away referring to the accused-appellant. Later, in another part of his testimony, he
again changed this material fact. When he was asked by Prosecutor Senados as to who between the two persons
they saw talking to each other ran away, PO3 Vigilla categorically answered, [t]he one who is holding a bag,
sir .Such material inconsistency leaves much to be desired about the credibility of the prosecutions principal
witness and casts reasonable doubt as to appellants guilt for itrenders questionable whether he in fact held the
bag with intention to possess it and its contents. In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused. While
a lone witness testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in certain instances, the testimony must beclear,
consistent, and crediblequalities we cannot ascribe to this case. Jurisprudence isconsistent that for testimonial
evidence to be believed, it must both come from a crediblewitness and be credible in itself tested by human
experience, observation, commonknowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the years. Clearly
from theforegoing, the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was
indeed in possession of shabu, and that he freely and consciously possessed the same. The presumption of
innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules
which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence is susceptible to two (2) interpretations, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other his innocence, the prosecutions evidence failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal. Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never
sway judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence
may not have been established.
The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the
presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.

10. LEJANO VS. PEOPLE & PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB, December 14, 2010
FACTS:
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City,
which has commonly referred to as the Vizconde massacre. In 1995, the NBI presented Jessica M. Alfaro, one
of its informers as star-witness, pointing to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Lejano, and 6 others as the
culprits. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with
homicide against Webb, et al. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was in the USA. He
presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. On January 4,
2000, the RTC rendered judgment against the accused party. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision
with modifications.
On April 20, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the
semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping
of the NBI. Unfortunately, said specimen was lost. This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent
motion to acquit on the ground that the governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the
denial of his right to due process.
ISSUE:
1) Did Webb present sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaros testimony and thus acquit him
and his fellow accused?
2) Can the aggrieved party make an appeal towards the acquittal of the accused?
HELD:
1) Yes, sufficient enough to have them acquitted on the grounds of reasonable doubt. Webbs documented
alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano,
Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was
in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold together. Webbs participation is the
anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall. The prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2) On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the
Court to reconsider its decision. But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places
the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that: Section 21. No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Thus, the appeal was denied for lack
of merit.

10. AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE, April 30, 2008

FACTS: The records reveal that on October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house of
spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them
several valuables, including cash amounting to P600,000.00. The spouses reported the matter to the police, who,
in turn, immediately applied for a search warrant with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur.
Search Warrant directing a search of the items stolen from the victims, as well as the firearms used by the
perpetrators. One of the target premises was the residence of petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in
the crime. On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of petitioner's house
located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm
and ammunitions which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon, and, consequently, the filing of a
criminal case; violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms.
The prosecution presented eight witnesses namely: (1) P/Insp. Anselmo Baldovino (P/Insp. Baldovino), a police
investigator and the applicant for the search warrant; (2) Rosemarie Gante (Gante), the victim of the robbery
and private complainant; (3) Ignacio Yabes (Yabes), a Municipal Local Government Operations Officer of the
Department of Interior and Local Government who was the civilian witness to the search; (4) P/Supt. Bonifacio
Abian (P/Supt. Abian), Deputy Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police and part of the search
team; (5) SPO4 Marino Peneyra (SPO4 Peneyra); (6) SPO1 Franklin Cabaya (SPO1 Cabaya); (7) SPO1 James
Jara (SPO1 Jara); and (8) SPO2 Florentino Renon (SPO2 Renon). The prosecution's case centered mainly on
evidence that during the enforcement of the search warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was
found in the latter's house.
The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement of the search warrant against
petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was found in the latter's house. The prosecution's case centered mainly
on evidence that during the enforcement of the search warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm
was found in the latter's house. RTC charged Agustin Guilty.
Instant Petition for Review, on the principal ground that the CA gravely erred in finding that the guilt of
petitioner has been proven beyond reasonable doubt; and more specifically, in giving weight and credence to
the testimonies of the police officers who searched the house of the petitioner which are replete with material
and irreconcilable contradictions and in giving SPO1 Cabaya the presumption of regularity in the performance
of duty despite the claim of Lorna that the .38 caliber revolver was planted.
Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA committed reversible error in giving little credence to his
defense that the firearm found in his residence was planted by the policemen. He also alleges material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the policemen as witnesses for the prosecution, which amounted to failure
by the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. whether a gun was found in the house of
petitioner, must necessarily be resolved.
In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of SPO1 Cabaya, who testified that he
discovered the subject firearm in a closed cabinet inside the former's house. The trial court brushed aside
petitioner's defense of denial and protestations of frame-up. The RTC justified giving full credence to Cabaya's
testimony on the principles that the latter is presumed to have performed his official duties regularly; that he had
no ill motive to frame-up petitioner; and that his affirmative testimony is stronger than petitioner's negative
testimony.
the CA justified its affirmation of the trial court's decision on the basis of long-standing principles that denials,
such as the one made by petitioner, cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters, and reiterated that absent evidence x x x that the prosecution
witness was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that no such ill motive exists, and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.
The CA upheld the trial court's findings of presumption of regular performance of duty on the part of the
searching policemen and the weakness of the petitioner's defense of frame-up. Petitioners claim that the
prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to the material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of its witnesses, the Court finds, after a meticulous examination of the records that the lower courts,
indeed, committed a reversible error in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he was
charged with. The RTC and the CA have overlooked certain facts and circumstances that would have interjected
serious apprehensions absolutely impairing the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who actually entered the house and conducted the
search, who discovered the gun, and who witnessed the discovery are material matters because they relate
directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been found in the house of petitioner; or to a
fact to which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in
issue. A material matter is the main fact which is the subject of inquiry or any circumstance which tends to
prove that fact or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony
relative to the subject of inquiry or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.
First material inconsistency:
On SPO1 Cabaya's companions
and the circumstances of his
discovery of the subject firearm
SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other policemen, among whom were SPO1 Jara,
SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Bernabe Ocado (SPO3 Ocado) and another one whose name he does not remember.
While searching, he discovered the firearm in the kitchen, inside a closed cabinet near the door. He said that
SPO1 Jara was standing right behind him, at a distance of just one meter, when he (Cabaya) saw the firearm;
and that he picked up the gun, held it and showed it to SPO1 Jara. He asserted that SPO2 Renon was not one of
those who went inside the house.
SPO1 Cabaya's testimony is contradicted by the testimonies of four other prosecution witnesses on material
points, making Cabaya's testimony in particular, and the prosecution's evidence in general, not credible, and
therefore, of no probative weight, thus:
1. SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have corroborated SPO1 Cabaya's testimony, related a different story
as to the circumstances of the firearm's discovery. SPO1 Jara testified that he merely conducted perimeter
security during the search and did not enter or participate in searching the house. SPO1 Jara testified that he
remained outside the house throughout the search, and when SPO1 Cabaya shouted and showed a gun, he was
seven to eight meters away from him. He could not see the inside of the house and could see Cabaya only from
his chest up. He did not see the firearm at the place where it was found, but saw it only when Cabaya raised his
arm to show the gun, which was a revolver. He is certain that he was not with Cabaya at the time the latter
discovered the firearm. He further testified that SPO3 Ocado, who, according to SPO1 Cabaya was one of
those near him when he (Cabaya) discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did not enter or search the house.
2. P/Insp. Baldovino testified that only SPO2 Renon conducted the search and entered the house together with
SPO1 Cabaya, directly contradicting SPO1 Cabaya's testimony that he, together with SPO1 Jara, SPO4
Peneyra, SPO3 Ocado, and another one whose name he cannot recall, were inside the house when he discovered
the gun and that SPO2 Renon did not enter the house of petitioner.
3. P/Supt. Abian categorically testified that it was SPO4 Peneyra, not SPO1 Cabaya, who recovered the firearm
from petitioner's house.[41]
4. SPO4 Peneyra contradicted SPO1 Cabaya and P/Supt. Abian. He testified that he did not enter the house, but
stayed outside, during the search. He also said that it was SPO1 Cabaya and SPO2 Renon who discovered the
firearm.
5. SPO2 Renon contradicted SPO4 Peneyra and SPO1 Cabaya when he (Renon) testified on rebuttal that
Cabaya was alone in the kitchen when the latter allegedly discovered the gun.
Second inconsistency:
On the reaction of petitioner
to SPO1 Cabaya's alleged
discovery of the subject firearm
SPO1 Cabaya testified that when he turned over the firearm to his superior, P/Insp. Baldovino, petitioner was
present and did not utter a single word of protest. This was contradicted, however, by P/Insp. Baldovino, who
testified that petitioner protested, claimed that he did not know anything about the gun and refused to sign the
certification that a search was conducted in his house. Likewise, prosecution witnesses P/Supt. Abian, SPO4
Peneyra and SPO1 Jara all confirmed that petitioner vehemently denied possession of the firearm as soon as its
discovery was announced.
Third inconsistency:
On the witnessing of the actual
discovery of the subject firearm
by civilian Yabes
At first, SPO1 Cabaya testified that Municipal Local Government Operations Officer Yabes was outside the
house when the firearm was discovered, but later, he clarified that Yabes was actually inside the house when it
happened. He informed Yabes of the discovery by shouting, [50] but he did not call Yabes to witness the actual
taking of the gun from its hiding place because he had to show it to his officer; and that Yabes saw the gun
when he showed the gun outside.
The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses further muddled the prosecution evidence with more
inconsistencies as to matters material to the determination of whether a gun had in fact been found in the house
of petitioner. SPO4 Peneyra testified that Yabes stayed outside of the house during the search; whereas SPO1
Jara testified that Yabes was inside, at the sala, but the latter saw the gun only when SPO1 Cabaya raised it.
Such inconsistencies on the material details of the firearm's discovery are so glaring that they ought not to have
been ignored or brushed aside by the lower courts. The contradictions of the prosecution witnesses not only
undermine all efforts to reconstruct the event in question, but altogether erode the evidentiary value of the
prosecution evidence.
RULING: Although the Court has held that frame-up is inherently one of the weakest defenses, as it is both
easily concocted and difficult to prove, in the present case, the lower courts seriously erred in ignoring the
weakness of the prosecution's evidence and its failure to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
The rule requiring a claim of frame-up to be supported by clear and convincing evidence] was never
intended to shift to the accused the burden of proof in a criminal case. As the Court held in People of the
Philippines v. Ambih:
While the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frame-up is easily fabricated, this claim
assumes importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is well to remember
that the prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather on its own proof which
must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished. The
constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent even if his defense is weak as long as the
prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales,[66] the Court held that where there was material and unexplained
inconsistency between the testimonies of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not to inconsequential
details but to the alleged transaction itself which is subject of the case, the inherent improbable character of the
testimony given by one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the effect of vitiating the testimony given
by the other principal prosecution witness. [67] The Court ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable
testimony of one officer and adopt the testimony of the other that is more plausible. [68] In such a situation, both
testimonies lose their probative value. The Court further held:
Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory descriptions of the same sale transaction, which
allegedly took place before their very eyes, on the same physical location and on the same occasion? We must
conclude that a reasonable doubt was generated as to whether or not the "buy-bust" operation ever took
place.[69]
In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses generate serious
doubt as to whether a firearm was really found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution utterly failed to
discharge its burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of firearms beyond reasonable
doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been demolished and therefore
petitioner should be acquitted of the crime he was with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.

10. ULEP VS. PEOPLE, GR No. 183849, June 11, 2011

Allegedly going to his aunt in Barangay 13 to claim a package that his mother sent from abroad, Ulep
was waiting on the road to get a ride home. Police officer Tuzon and a certain Monmel Corpuz approached him
in their motorbikes and took him near the Mobile Video Center where Tuzon frisked him because they
suspected him of coming from Cacayorins house. Ulep denied this.
When Tuzon failed to get anything from Ulep, he let him go, telling him not to show his face ever in that
place. As Ulep started to walk away, he heard Corpuz, who was crossing Mckinley Street, shout at Tuzon to get
his attention. Ulep saw Corpuz waving a plastic sachet in his right hand. After talking to Corpuz, Tuzon
approached Ulep, saying that the thing they got belonged to him. Tuzon apprehended Ulep and brought him to
the police station.
On July 14, 2006 the RTC rendered a decision in the case, finding Ulep guilty of the crime illegal
possession of dangerous drugs and sentencing him to imprisonment ranging from 12 years and 1 day as
minimum to 15 years as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00 with costs.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses given
certain inconsistencies in them;

2. Whether or not the CA erred in not excluding the evidence of the seized shabu on the ground of the
prosecutions failure to prove the chain of custody over the same; and
HELD:
 Ulep was acquitted because of the inconsistencies in the testimony of the arrest and chain of custody of
the drugs.

While the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the officers, saying that the inconsistencies were
minor, the Supreme Court disagreed. They said that the disparity in the testimonies of those witnesses is too
serious to be simply brushed aside.

Tuzon said that a police asset directly tipped him that Ulep was about to buy shabu from a source;
Labutong said, however, that it was the Chief Police Inspector who told them that Ulep had just bought shabu
from the source. Labutong said that the police had been watching Ulep as a user for a month before the incident;
Tuzon said they only came to know Ulep after they apprehended and brought him to the police station. Also,
Tuzon said that he and Labutong went to Barangay 13 on board a tricycle that he drove; Labutong was sure, on
the other hand, that they came in a patrol car which he himself drove. These inconsistencies are irreconcilable
and could not possibly be the result of mere memory lapses. They bear the signs of poor fabrication.

There was failure to follow chain of custody. None of the officers involved in the seizure marked the
plastic sachets of alleged drugs. The markings took place at the police station already and it is not clear who
made them. Tuzon testified that Labutong placed the markings; Labutong said that SPO2 Butay did it. Prompt
marking of the seized items is vital because it serves as the starting point in the custodial link and succeeding
handlers of the specimens often use the marking as reference. Since the officers in this case could not even
agree as to who made the required marking, then it would be difficult for the Court to rest easy that the
specimens presented before the trial court were the same specimens seized from Ulep. These lapses cast a
serious doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. Failure to
observe these basic rules results not only in consequent acquittals but also in loss of precious time to futile
exercise.

3-c. The equipoise rule

The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional,
presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.

PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS, 355 SCRA 415

(Please see case 8)

PEOPLE VS. SATURNO, 355 SCRA 578

(Please see case 9)

4. Other cases-

Read:

1. P vs. Opida, June 13, 1986

This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District,
imposing the death penalty upon Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo for the crime of murder.
 On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian Galvan, stoned and hit him with
beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed him to death. The actual knife-wielder was identified as Mario del
Mundo. 3 Nonetheless, Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged with murder as conspirators and, after
trial, sentenced to death. 4
The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, neither of
whom positively said that the accused were at the scene of the crime, their extrajudicial confessions, which
were secured without the assistance of counsel, and corroboration of the alleged conspiracy under the theory of
interlocking confession.
What is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his interrogation of the two accused
and their lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was hardly judicious and certainly far from judicial, at times irrelevant,
at Worst malicious. Reading the transcript, one gathers the impression that the judge had allied himself with the
prosecution to discredit at the outset the credibility of the witnesses for the defense.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confession that was used as a basis for conviction was admissible as
evidence.
2. Whether or not the evident hostility and bias of the judge in the case at bar is proper.
DECISION:
1. We have consistently held that, aside from the required assistance of counsel, the rights guaranteed
during a custodial investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated to the suspect, especially if he is
unlettered, but must be painstakingly explained to him so he can understand their nature and significance.
Moreover, manhandling of any sort will vitiate any extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from him and
renders it inadmissible in evidence against him.
2. Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial,
to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. This guaranty was not observed in this case.
Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the protestations of the
accused in this respect would be, as they in fact were, dismissed. And once the confessions were admitted, it
was easy enough to employ them as corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy among the accused.
The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to convict the accused, who had
manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision
now?" 23, he was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and obviously waiting only to be formalized.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo is reversed and they are hereby
ordered released immediately. No costs.

2. P vs. Tempongko, October 2, 1986

The appellant is before us to challenge his conviction of the crime of rape. He claims it was not he who
erred but the trial court. The usual plea is made: that there was a misappropriation of the evidence, resulting in
the sentence of reclusion perpetua that he now faces. He prays for a reversal.
At the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the complainant, Lolita Dacoycoy, was an 18-year
old senior student at the Manuel L. Quezon High School and undergoing citizen army training (CAT) under the
command of the appellant. 1 The appellant was 43 years old, married, with five children, and commandant of
the said course, besides being the owner of a tailoring shop. 2
These are the facts as the trial court saw them.
On November 9, 1981, the complainant and her friend, Rosalita Quinto, went to the appellant's tailoring
shop in accordance with the appointment made by them the day before. This was about 7 o'clock in the evening.
Their purpose was to solicit a contribution for their high school annual. Upon arrival one hour later, the
appellant offered them beer, which they drank. Lolita became dizzy and the appellant suggested that the two
girls stay for the night. The appellant then left, at about 11:30 o'clock. Lolita slept on the sofa while Rosalita
slept on the floor about two arms length from her. It was at dawn when Lolita felt the weight of a person on her
whom she immediately recognized as the appellant. She pleaded, "Huwag mong gawin sa akin iyan, sir." The
appellant kissed her and bit her lower lip. Lolita boxed him in the back and he boxed her in the stomach,
rendering her unconscious. She did not scream or call for help because it all happened so fast. When she woke
up, the deed was done and she was bleeding. The appellant was seated on the sofa totally naked. She moaned
presumably in anguish and pain, and Rosalita woke up. Rosalita embraced and consoled Lolita. She turned on
the light and upbraided the appellant who at that time was already putting on his trousers. The appellant soon
left without saying a word, looking very nervous. As Lolita's jogging pants were bleed, Rosalita left to get her
some clothes. Lolita stayed until past noon and when Rosalita did not return decided to leave the office. She
proceeded to the house of another friend, a certain Cecile, where she stayed for five days until she was fetched
by her stepfather, Delfin Dalisay. This was Lolita Dacoycoy's testimony. 3
Continuing the story, Delfin Dalisay related that on November 10, Rosalita and her mother informed
him of Lolita's rape. He blamed Rosalita for Lolita's misfortune, and Rosalita and her mother left in a huff. Five
days later, Cecile's sister informed them at their market stall that Lolita was in their house. He fetched Lolita
from there and later, upon advice of the lawyer to whom they had earlier been referred by a friend, he and her
mother took Lolita to the National Bureau of Investigation, where she underwent a medical examination. 4 Part
of this narration was contributed by Clarita Dacoycoy, Lolita's mother, who also testified on the civil damages
suffered by the complainant. 5
According to the medical report as explained by Dr. Orlando Salvador of the NBI in layman's terms, the
complainant was deflowered on or about the date of the alleged rape. This witness also testified that the claimed
blow inflicted on the complainant's stomach would not necessarily leave any external sign or mark. 6
Testifying for himself, the appellant denied the charge, saying he was at home with his family when the
rape was supposedly committed. He did not deny that he offered the two girls beer and allowed them to sleep in
his office in the night of November 9, 1981. He declared, however, that having left his office at about 11:30
p.m. of that date, he returned thereto at about 9 o'clock in the morning of the following day and not earlier. In
fact, he saw the complainant having breakfast at that time. 7
The appellant presented two witnesses to corroborate his testimony, but it seems they did him more
harm than good. We shall go to that later.
The medical report suggests that the complainant was a virgin at the time of the supposed intercourse,
but it would seem that her conduct in the night of November 9, 1981, was hardly maidenly or at least discreet.
First, she went to the office of a man she did not know very well at 7 o'clock on a Sunday evening. Then she
accepted beer instead of a soft drink, which would have been the proper refreshment for her and her companion,
considering their age and sex. Not only that, instead of taking a few sips just to be polite, what she did was
drink about three-fourths of the glass, as a result of which she felt dizzy. Then, instead of going home with her
companion, she decided to stay and sleep in the strange office of this person who, to repeat, was by her own
narration not close to her.
There is no evidence that her friend Rosalita was also dizzy and could not have taken her home that
night. In fact, Lolita herself testified that Rosalita did not complain of being dizzy. 8 The appellant's office on
C.M. Recto was not far from the complainant's house on Vicente G. Cruz, which could have been reached by
one jeep ride. Alternatively, she had a telephone at her house and could have called one of her relatives to fetch
her if she and Rosalita could not leave by themselves. 9 It is incredible that she did not even trouble to tell her
parents of her whereabouts. One might expect such thoughtless conduct of an experienced girl of loose
discipline but not of the virtuous and virginal girl the complainant was supposed to be.
The other parts of her testimony also raise some perplexing questions. By her own account, she was
raped on the sofa while her friend Rosalita was sleeping on the floor only two arms length away and in the same
room. 10 The implication is that the appellant was reckless not only of resistance from Lolita but also of
discovery by Rosalita. The complainant testified that he immediately recognized the appellant although she had
just awakened and that when she recovered consciousness after having been boxed in the stomach, she had
already been ravished. Strangely, the appellant was then still seated on the sofa and apparently taking his time
about dressing. 11 She also said she was desperate for clothing because her jogging pants were bloody. 12 Yet it
did not occur to her to get other attire, which must have been available in abundance in the place where she was
then, which was a tailoring shop. In fact, the shop was a contractor for the supplying of, precisely, CAT
uniforms. 13
Instead of going straight home, which would have been the normal reaction of a young woman subjected
to her traumatic experience, what she did was stay with a friend, the mysterious Cecile. 14 She stayed there for
five days and did not communicate with her mother even once. Neither did her friend Cecile. In fact, it was only
on the fifth day that Cecile's sister saw fit to tell the complainant's family where Lolita was notwithstanding
Lolita's alleged condition at the time. If, according to Delfin Dalisay, the complainant was "tulala" when he saw
her, it would have been the natural thing for Cecile to inform Lolita's family of her state of shock as soon as
possible.
One also wonders why Rosalita Quinto, the complainant's companion on the night of the alleged rape,
and who was supposed to be in the room when the complainant claimed she was ravished, was not presented as
a witness by the prosecution It is not often that the prosecution has the good fortune of an actual eyewitness in
cases like this, and yet neither the fiscal nor the private prosecutor saw fit to ask Rosalita to corroborate the
testimony of Lolita. Instead, they presented only the parents of Lolita who testified on what happened after, and
not before and during, the alleged rape.
For its part, the defense was none-too-convincing either and, in the view of the trial court, fatally flawed.
The appellant relied on alibi, an inherently feeble excuse that cannot prevail as against the positive
Identification of the accused. Moreover, the appellant was living in Sisa, in Sampaloc, only two kilometers or so
from his office, 15 where the rape was allegedly committed. It could have been reached from his house in a
matter of minutes, as the trial court observed, considering the light traffic at 5 o'clock in the morning or
thereabouts.
The appellant's first witness, Remy Oriola, testified that Lolita and Rosalita slept in the appellant's office
in the morning of November 8, 1981, and that the appellant returned thereto the following morning of
November 9, 1981. 16 By contrast, the appellant's testimony was that the two girls slept in his office on
November 9, 1981, and that he returned thereto the following morning of November 10, 1981. 17 And whereas
the appellant testified that the complainant came to his office with a paper bag containing clothes, 18 the
witness said Lolita was carrying only a handbag. 19
The testimony of the other defense witness, Rolando Hermilo, was not only practically useless but in
fact prejudicial to the appellant. In the first place, he testified only up to the time he left the appellant's office at
about 11 o'clock in the night of November 9, 1981, and not on what happened later to the girls who were left
behind. 20 But what makes his testimony suspect was his admission that he learned of the charge against the
appellant, and was asked to testify for him, only on the date itself of the hearing, in the very morning when he
was presented as witness, 21 and this was more than two years after the alleged rape. On top of this, he was by
his own admission reading the transcript of the appellant's testimony before he was actually called to the
witness stand. 22
The defendant argues that Lolita should have shouted for help but did not; that he would not have
attempted the rape in such a cramped place and with another person in the very room where the crime was
supposedly committed; and that there were no signs of the alleged stomach blow on the complainant's stomach.
On the other hand, he could not explain why he offered the two girls beer when soft drinks would have
been more appropriate, and also why he allowed them to sleep in his office when they were just trainees under
his command and had no special ties with him. His claim was that they had left home because Lolita had been
scolded by her mother was belied by his own testimony that he heard Lolita calling her mother on the telephone
to say she was sleeping with a friend. 23
It is unfortunate that the trial court did little to analyze the evidence of the parties and virtually limited
itself to the defense of alibi, which it declared to be untenable. There should have been a more careful analysis
of the other evidence to get to the truth of this unfortunate mess where there is more than meets the eye. This is
not a pat case, so to speak. There are many unanswered questions. The conduct of both the complainant and the
defendant, as narrated by the requires not a little explaining. The trial judge should have probed deeper instead
of simply relying on the question of alibi, which is only part of the intriguing mosaic.
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails
utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The defendant faces the full
panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking,
he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize
the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able
to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 The appellant does not deny that he asked the two girls to see him at his office in the evening of
November 9, 1981; that he there offered them beer, which they drank; and that he permitted them to sleep there
that night.
The proper thing to do was to receive these girls at his office at the MLQ where he was working as
commandant of the CAT, and during school hours. Soft drinks would have been a more appropriate refreshment
for the young ladies, especially since such beverages were easily available. And if it is true, as he says, that the
complainant asked to sleep in his office because she had been scolded by her mother, the appellant, exercising
as he did some moral influence over her as her commandant, should have counseled her to go home. Failing
that, he should have at least caged up the complainant's mother to tell her that Lolita was in his office.
But all these improprieties and omissions come under the heading of indiscretions and not crimes.
Serving beer instead of soft drinks and snowing the use of one's office for sleeping purposes are not indictable
offenses. Moral irresponsibility and thoughtlessness are also not prohibited under our criminal laws. More
importantly, all these indiscretion do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the appellant raped the
complainant in the morning of November 10, 1981, in his office. The connection is too far-fetched.
The only fact conclusively established by the prosecution is that the complainant was deflowered on or
about the time of the alleged rape, but that is all. The rest of its case is based on the improbable testimony of the
complainant, whose conduct, even before the alleged rape, was hardly befitting a proper young lady, to say the
least.
The almost indifferent reaction of her family is implausible too, if we go by the recorded testimony.
After being informed of Lolita's rape, they did not immediately look for her; and when they did, their efforts
were hardly energetic. The mother testified that they later searched for her but did not elaborate beyond saying
that they asked her friends. They did not inquire from her classmates in MLQ They did not talk to the alleged
rapist, whom Rosalita had Identified. In fact, when she and her mother informed Delfin Dalisay that Lolita had
been raped, he did not ask where she was a most natural and logical question to ask at that time. All he did,
by his own account, was blame Rosalita for the incident.
It was only five days later that they teamed of her whereabouts, and this because Cecile's sister came to
see them and informed them. As for Cecile, in whose house the complainant supposedly stayed for five days,
she was not even presented as witness to corroborate Lolita's testimony. It is significant that although she and
Rosalita Quinto played key roles as it were in this case, they were strangely silent and absent at the trial.
The trouble with the appellant, according to the trial court, is that he could not prove his defense of alibi.
But then how could he? He said he was sleeping in his house with his family. At five o'clock in the morning,
where else could he have been? How could he have produced third parties as witnesses to testify that he was
fast asleep in his own house? His presence in his own bedroom at that time was not incredible or even
improbable but perfectly believable.
What does strain the imagination is the complainant's own implausible story: of a virgin who visited a
casual acquaintance of the opposite sex in his own office on a Sunday evening; accepted and drank beer with
him; asked to sleep in his office; was awakened by the weight of a person on top of her whom she immediately
recognized notwithstanding that her eyes were not yet accustomed to the dark; suffered a blow in her stomach
and recovered consciousness to discover she had been raped by the appellant who was still seated on the sofa
totally naked; could not leave because her jogging pants were bloodied notwithstanding that she was in a
tailoring shop where clothes were available in abundance; finally went to a friend's house instead of straight to
her mother from whom she normally would have sought solace. Most significantly, the alleged rape was
committed within two arms length of her companion, Rosalita Quinto, who was sleeping with her in the same
room, and could have awakened any time and in fact did so, according to Lolita, when she moaned after her
ravishment.
The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of
this Court. The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond doubt and so cannot be affirmed in this
appellant The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the Solicitor General and the
private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant raped the complainant. The appellant may
have been lying, and there is evidence of this, but we are not prepared to accept, to the point of moral certainty,
that the complainant was telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our
condemning the appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are whispers of doubt that he is guilty.
 WHEREFORE, the decision' of the lower court is REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED,
without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

3. P vs. Drammayo, 42 SCRA 59

FACTS: The accused Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder
of Estelito Nogaliza. The claim is vigorously pressed that because the information alleged conspiracy on the
part of seven defendants, with only the two appellants being convicted, two having been utilized as state
witnesses and the other three having been acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence as to their
culpability, the judgment of conviction against the appellants cannot stand, there being a reasonable doubt as to
their guilt.
On the morning of January 9, 1964. The two accused, now appellants, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in
the company of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao
del Norte, saw its chief of police. Their purpose was to shed light on a robbery committed in the house of the
deceased five days before by being available as witnesses. The response was decidedly in the negative as they
themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least two individuals who had confessed. At
about 7:00 o'clock of the same day, while they were in the house of their co-accused Priolo Billona, the accused
Dramayo invited all those present including the other accused Francisco Billons, Modesto Ronquilla.
Crescencio and Severo Savandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on that
occasion that Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the
robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The
others were to station themselves nearby. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette. It was
then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation
consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the
former also, who warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His
equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed
the, latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of
police were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to
explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof.
RULING: The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by now appellants
Dramayo and Ecubin, and it must have been their lack of persuasive character that must have led to the able
brief of counsel de oficio, Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing the absence of evidence sufficient to convict,
there still being a reasonable doubt to be implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged, only two of
the seven accused were held culpable.
1. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the
Constitution. 5 That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not
even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeited only if the requisite quantum
of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a
standard this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently whatever defense is offered by the accused.
Only if judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into count. The proof against him must survive
the reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway away judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty. It is understandable
why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of appellants beyond
reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting any further discussion. It cannot be denied
though that the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only
by the trial judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants. The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other
hand, required that the other three accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the
requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no question as to
the other two who testified for the state being likewise no long subject to any criminal liability. The reference
then to opinion of the late Justice Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to the fundamental postulate that a
finding of guilt is allowable only when no reasonable doubt could be entertained, is unavailing.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from
the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The
presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof
that was offered by the prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as
established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would have been acquitted likewise just
because the other five defendants, for the reasons above stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal
contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first
time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the
element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense
guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability.

2. The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the allegation as to their guilt not having been sufficiently
demonstrated with the contention that the lower court overlooked or did not properly consider material and
significant facts of record that ought to have substantially affected or altered the judgment. Even the most
careful reading of such brief, however, with due recognition of the vigor in which this particular point is
pressed, would not destroy the credibility of the facts as testified to concerning the manner in which the
deceased was killed and the motive that prompted appellants to put an end to his life. That such a version could
not have been concocted is shown by the undeniable fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of
robbery, with the deceased as the offended party. It was understandable then why they would want to do away
with the principal witness against them. There was thus a strong inducement for the appellants to have
committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of record pointing to no other conclusion except the
perpetration of the killing by them, the effort of their counsel, while to be expected from an advocate zealous in
defense of his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended with success. It suffices to reiterate the well-
settled principle that this Court has invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a
position to weigh and appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this case,
circumstances weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of September 8, 1965 affirmed with the modification that the indemnification to
the heirs of Estelito Nogaliza should be in the sum P12,000.00. With costs.

4. P vs. Fernando, 145 SCRA 151

Facts: On May 16, 1982, Pat. Ernesto Labucay, a member of the Quezon City Police Force assigned to the
Anti-Narcotics Unit was directed by his Commanding Officer, to conduct operations against users and pushers
of narcotics at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, Dispatched with Pat. Ernesto Labucay was Victoriano
Mangrobang, a confidential informer.
1.) A test buy was conducted where mangrobang posed as the buyer, he went to the house of the accused.
After a while Mangrobang and the accused went out of the house and they talked together. Thereafter the
accused went inside the house and came out. The accused handed something to Mangrobang. As per their pre-
arrangement, he touched the top of his head and forthwith Pat. Labucay approached him. After Identifying
himself as a police officer, Pat. Labucay confiscated from Mangrobang the thing wrapped in paper given by the
accused which turned out to contain forty (40) cigarette sticks of marijuana.
2.) On May 20, 1982, Asstnt Fiscal Dayrit conducted an inquest He examined the statement, Mangrobang. He
asked him on how and from whom did he purchase the marijuana and he pointed to the accused Laureano
Fernando seated beside him as the person from whom he bought the 40 sticks of marijuana. Mangrobang
confirmed to Fiscal Dayrit what appears in his statement, Mangrobang signed his signature again on Exhibit F
before Fiscal Dayrit.
During the trial, however, to the surprise of the prosecution, and despite threats of a possible charge for perjury
since he was testifying under oath, MANGROBANG denied having given any statement to the police and
refused to confirm the contents of Exhibit "F". He maintained that he was merely made to sign a prepared
statement when he was drunk and that when Pat. Labucay had instructed him to buy "dame" or marijuana and
gave him a P100.00 bill for the purpose, he was also drunk. What is more, he categorically stated and reiterated
that he did not buy the marijuana sticks in question from the Accused but from one "Boy Oxo" who was then at
the Accused's place and to whom he paid the marked P100.00 bill handed to him by Pat. Labucay.
To rebut MANGROBANG's damaging testimony, the Inquest Fiscal, who was also the Prosecuting Fiscal, took
the. witness chair and testified that he conducted the inquest in the evening of May 20, 1982 at his residence;
present then were Pat. Labucay, Pat. Chua, their informant MANGROBANG, and the Accused. He examined
MANGROBANG's statement, asked questions of the latter, and when he asked MANGROBANG from whom
he had purchased the marijuana, MANGROBANG pointed to the Accused who was seated beside him
(MANGROBANG) at the time. MANGROBANG allegedly confirmed his statement and affixed his signature
again in the Fiscal's presence.
Issue: effect of inconsistent testimonies
Held: After a careful scrutiny of the evidence, we find that the guilt of the Accused has not been proven to a
moral certainty.
Without MANGROBANG's Identification, the conclusion of the Trial Court that the Accused was seen
delivering something to MANGROBANG wrapped in a paper, which turned out to be marijuana, is not
supported by the evidence. The testimony of Pat. Labucay to that effect was overturned by MANGROBANG,
the very person to whom it was allegedly delivered. Significant is the fact that in the course of Pat, Labucay's
testimony, he was not made to Identify the Accused. It was MANGROBANG who Identified the Accused in
open Court but who insisted that it was not from the latter that he had bought the marijuana sticks.
It could have helped the cause of the prosecution if the marijuana sticks were recovered from the Accused
himself but they were not. A body search on his person by Pat. Labucay neither yielded the marked money used
to purchase the marijuana sticks as testified to by Pat. Labucay. There is thus an hiatus to the evidence fatal to a
finding of guilt.
True, MANGROBANG admitted having signed the statement attributed to him (Exhibit "F") but alleged that it
was a prepared statement. This is likely as it dovetails closely with the declarations of the arresting officer, Pat.
Labucay. It is to be noted also that the name mentioned therein is not that of the Accused but that of
"Marciano." Exhibit "F" is thus unreliable evidence in the face of the Accused's denials.
We hark back to the fundamental precept that the prosecution carries the burden of proof to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable double. It is not incumbent upon and accused to disprove his guilt. In this case,
without the testimony of the poseur-buyer, MANGROBANG, there is no convincing evidence pointing to the
Accused as having feloniously sold and delivered to MANGROBANG the 40 sticks of marijuana cigarettes.
Thus, the accused acquitted.

5. P vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597

Facts: Rachel Parco was raped by her step father Abundio Tolentino, accordingly, he placed his sex organ on
Rachelles genitals and bumped (binubundol-bundol) hers with his. At that moment, Rachelle remained silent,
because she was afraid and did not know what Tolentino was doing to her. Tolentino's carnal act lasted only for
three minutes. Thereafter, Abundio Tolentino put on his short pants and hers and went down the house.
Abundio Tolentino repeatedly did the same thing to Rachelle Parco at least three to four times a week in May,
June, and July 1995 (Ibid, pp. 11-12). Rachelle Parco was overc[o]me by fear that she did not tell anyone about
what Abundio Tolentino was doing to her.
When the family of Rachelle transferred residence to Taguig, it was then that Rachelle Parco mustered enough
courage to tell her mother, upon learning such she accompanied her to NBI to report the event.
The victim, Rachelle was likewise subjected to a physical examination, the result of which revealed that she
was still a virgin and that her hymen was still intact and its orifice was 0.5 cm. in diameter "as to preclude
complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any
genital injury.
On 19 May 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting TOLENTINO of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and indemnify RACHELLE in the sum of P100,000.
TOLENTINO asserts that the prosecution failed to prove with moral certainty that rape had been committed
because the physical examination disclosed no genital or extragenital injuries on RACHELLE; her hymen was
intact, and the orifice was so small as to preclude penetration by an average-size adult Filipino male organ in
full erection without producing any genital injury. If there had been penetration as claimed by RACHELLE,
there would have been injuries to her genitals, considering her age and the number of times the incident
allegedly took place. RACHELLE's testimony in the vernacular that binundul-bundol ang kanyang ari by
TOLENTINO does not conclusively prove that rape was committed, to the exclusion of other offenses, in
light of the aforesaid medical findings; besides, that testimony is subject to different interpretations and
will not lead to the conclusion that TOLENTINO's intent was to have carnal knowledge of her.
There was nothing from RACHELLE's testimony that proved that TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of the
pudendum of RACHELLE's vagina.As translated, she only said: "He placed his sex organ to my sex organ, sir."
This was the translation of the word binubundul-bundol. And when asked to explain what she meant by it, she
answered: He was trying to force his sex organ into mine, sir.
Issue: effect of absence of convincing evidence in a prosecution (of a rape case)
Held: The prosecution did not ask her the appropriate questions to get some more important details that would
demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of the pudendum or the
lips of RACHELLE's vagina. It should have, for instance, asked whether TOLENTINO's penis was firm and
erect or whether RACHELLE's legs were spread apart to bring us to the logical conclusion that, indeed,
TOLENTINO's penis was not flabby and had the capacity to directly hit the labia of the pudendum or the lips of
RACHELLE's vagina. There is paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever took place.
Consequently, TOLENTINO can only be liable for attempted rape.

6. Castillo vs. Filtex, September 30, 1983

Facts:
Artemio Castillo, an employee of FILTEX was charged together with others in the Municipal Court of
Makati with the offense of slight physical injuries, for his alleged involvement in a mauling and shining incident
at the height of a strike. On July 8, 1964, FILTEX and SAMAHAN entered into a "Return Work Agreement
that if found guilty on trial they will be dismissed without backpay wages. After trial, the Municipal Court of
Makati rendered a decision, convicting Castillo of slight physical injuries. However, on appeal, the Court of
First Instance of Rizal dismissed the case. Thereafter, Castillo asked for reinstatement to his former job and
payment of back wages. But the respondent did not grant the request because he then convicted in the MTC.

Issue: Whether or not the accused can be presumed innocent after dismissal of the case in RTC despite its
conviction on MTC.

Held:
Yes. The judgment of conviction rendered by the municipal court was vacated upon perfection of the
appeal, to be tried de novo in the court of first instance as if it were originally instituted therein. The phrase "to
vacate" applied to a judgment means "to annul, to render void." Since the criminal case was ultimately
dismissed, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellant should be applied.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment set aside.

7. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, supra

Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory
and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired
elective provicial or municipal official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to
run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to
class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52,
which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered
by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

Issue:
Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should be
declared null and void

Held:
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and
valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class
can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently
from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the need for new blood in the workplace.
In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. Explicit is the constitutional provision that,
in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the
ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one
is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold
office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints
will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie
evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather
than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two
government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a
legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable
portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid and
that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void,
for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.