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Whither Lexit?

Owen Worth
University of Limerick, Ireland

The left campaign to leave the EU was one that was rooted in the belief that European
Integration was ultimately a process geared towards the advancement of capital and as
a result reduced the power of labour at the national level. Yet, even before the advance-
ments of Social Europe, the complexities of the different positions over the question
of European integration on the left had already been discussed in depth (Nairn 1973).
The Lexit position (as it became known)1 during the Brexit referendum was one that
dismissed claims that a viable social Europe was achievable within the remit of the EU.
The observation that the EU as a structure could not be reformed or socialised was one
of the few common agreements for those who attached themselves to Lexit. Instead,
Lexit appeared to be rather abstract in its form with some advocating forms of inter-
nationalism and others pointing to traditional forms of left nationalism of the sort
that was traditionally levelled against the EU/EC. While left-wing veterans such as
Arthur Scargill and Dennis Skinner reiterated the importance of a return to the
national struggle,2 others in the parliamentary Labour Party could certainly not be
understood to be on the left of the party.3 Indeed, in the case of Frank Field and Kate
Hoey (who have both previously been associated with right-leaning think-tanks or
pressure groups such as Reform and the Countryside Alliance), they were not just to
the right of the party, but had a Euro-scepticism far more in common with the right-
wing of the Conservative Party and in the case of the latter, with the UK Independence
Party (UKIP).
The internationalist position, on the other hand, was one that rejected the EU from
the position that it appeared both an imperialist entity in world politics and one that
enforced claims of fortress Europe (Ali 2016; Callinicos 2015). Central to this was the
conviction that as the EU, along with its monetary system, served to consolidate and
deliver the practices of neoliberal capitalism, then it restricted the potential for interna-
tional emancipation. As a result, free from the neoliberal structures that facilitate the EU,
labour movement can generate greater cooperation to confront the wider institutions of
global capitalism. The EU is thus one less restraint.
Despite these attempts to theorise a Lexit position, there seemed very little coherence
regarding where and how a post-Brexit strategy for the left could be forged. Brexit itself
came at a time during which we appeared to be experiencing a renaissance for a new left.
From the ashes of the Occupy movement to the growth of civil demonstrations against
the troika, a new left, based on the aspirations of radical forms of civil society and on a
352 Capital & Class 41(2)

new form of party politics, seemed to be emerging. The success however short term
of Syriza, Podemos, the left in Portugal and of the campaigns of Corbyn and Sanders,
each suggested that this new left might be finally emerging to tackle the fall-out from the
financial crisis. As the foundations of this new left emerged from radical global civil
society, it can be said that they were rooted in not just internationalism, but also in glo-
balism. Yet, when we witness the fall-out from the Corbyn opposition since the referen-
dum seen with his decline in popularity, continued division over his leadership within
the Labour Party and the inability to forge a coherent post-Brexit strategy4 this leads us
to conclude that far from escaping the structural confines of European capitalism, Brexit
has left us further behind when it comes to the potential for socialist renewal. Not only
might Brexit cut-off perhaps the only possibility for such a mobilisation, but it also serves
to provide a platform for a more de-regulated form of hyper-liberalism of the sort that
the neoliberal right within the British Conservative Party have long been eager to develop
(Worth 2017). In light of this, the Lexit campaign/arguments have proved to be a hin-
drance. Without the platform of social Europe, it seems that any post-Brexit strategy
must look to provide more than just empty suggestions of internationalism or left
nationalism if it seeks to forge new forms of opposition to global capitalism.

The incoherence of Lexit

In the 2007 special issue of Capital and Class on the left in Europe, the lefts transfor-
mation from being broadly sceptical of the European project in the 1960s and 1970s
to being broadly supportive was scrutinised in depth (Strange & Worth 2007). While
critical of both the neoliberal turn and the democratic deficit within the institutions
of the EU, the general theme across the articles was one that favoured a political
response at the European level. As Hugo Radice sums up quite aptly in his contribu-
tion to the issue:

What is needed now is a far more arduous long march into and across the European Union,
constructing a popular movement against neoliberalism based on common concerns about
equality, citizenship, human rights and the environment, and engaging unions and social
movements as well as the groundswell of broader opposition since 2003 to European complicity
in the renewed imperial adventures of the US regime. (Radice 2002: 42)

This position was one that was reiterated in other pieces within the issue (see e.g. the
articles by Bieler, Worth, Strange, Hermann and Hofbauer, Holmes and Lightfoot and
Wilde), which all identify the left in Europe as one which has moved from a collection
of national variates to one which identifies itself far more with national convergence.
Some did provide an exception. The most obvious here being the contribution from
Mark Baimbridge, Philip Whyman and Brian Burkitt. They argue for a distinct national-
first alternative to EU membership which provides us with far more clarity to the realities
of a post-Brexit world than any internationalist contribution to Lexit. They also per-
haps give us far more insight into the core thoughts of Labour leave, which was the largest
pressure group associated with the left. The arguments presented by them are quite
simple. The EU is incompatible with British sovereignty and restricts its decisions to
Worth 353

determine its trade. Therefore, a special United Kingdom/EU trade deal which allows for
greater freedom for parliamentary sovereignty should be forged which would provide a
basis again to build a socialist alternative via Westminster centrality (Baimbridge,
Whyman & Burkitt 2007: 8284). In sum, this offers no such radical alternative but
merely an endorsement to the most basic form of left-nationalism. In reality, the only
difference between this position and the one argued throughout the campaign by the
hard right from an economic point of view is the inserted words socialism and left.
The fact that the authors have collaborated with the neoliberal right and populist politi-
cians in subsequent publications is telling (Baimbridge et al. 2010).5 There is also partly
a sense that in doing so, they are in danger of appearing as useful idiots within a wider
hyper-liberal project.
This follows the official Labour Leave, which sees that a post-Brexit Britain should
be forged around issues of self-determination, the restriction of immigration and the
commitment towards becoming a global trade actor (Labour Leave 2016). While this
might assume a different outcome to the dominant conservative/hyper-liberal positions
that Vote Leave campaigned for,6 it ultimately fed into the same discourse. While the
Labour Leave campaign included an opposition to the TTIP trade deal, the loss of this
amidst the post-Brexit prioritisation of a new bilateral US/UK deal with the Trump
administration gives us the first symptom of the useful idiot role of the Labour Leave
position.
Another feature of the wider leave campaign but also one which drifted into Lexit and
indeed which featured in some of those more internationalist arguments was the belief
in British exceptionalism. Largely associated with the right, the view that the United
Kingdom is somehow separate from Europe due to its imperial past and its prominence
as a global (rather than a European) power is one that resonates strongly within British
culture, yet some have also noted political differences. Richard Tuck, for example,
reminded us that Marx saw the House of Commons as an omnicompetent institution
that fundamentally differed from the bourgeois constitutionalism inherent within
emerging 19 states. As a result, the radical elements of the Labour Party from the early
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) through to stalwarts such as Bevan and Benn, have
understood that parliamentary sovereignty has more potential to achieve social change in
the absence of a liberal constitution (Tuck 2016). In terms of internationalism, excep-
tionalism has also been seen as an opportunity. In this narrative, as the left in Britain
becomes free of its European fortress, it can engage with the international working-class
movement and challenge the shackles of regionalism. As Britain became the site for the
first forms of liberal internationalism, it can similarly take the lead in orchestrating a new
form of international socialism (Ali 2016). This can be played out iteratively through
campaigns that promote freedom of movement and which look to counter the anti-
immigration rhetoric that Brexit has become synonymous with (Callinicos 2015).
Yet it seems rather nave to assume that these campaigns can somehow find a platform
that would form the basis for a renewed internationalism, especially without a considera-
tion for the need to also construct some kind of political construction, in the form of a
type of Comintern to serve alongside it. It is indeed here where Lexit falls down in its
totality. While the ideas of control, parliamentary sovereignty and left nationalism might
have served to aid the right-wing environment that has emerged post-Brexit, the
354 Capital & Class 41(2)

internationalists offered a tentative vision that was simply incoherent. The fact that the
former called for controls on immigration, claiming that this was compatible with left/
working-class thinking, the internationalist position has not succeeded in stemming this
dominant trend and as a result any campaign that has favoured wider freedom of move-
ment must logically be hindered by the outcome of the Brexit vote. Some international-
ist positions have not even got so far as to suggest a counter immigration campaign,
preferring instead to remain as abstract as possible. The arguments made by Lee Jones
provide a telling example of this. As with many Lexiters, Jones argues that leaving repre-
sents the only way to break from the neoliberal structural shackles that constitute the
EU.7 As a result, Jones suggests that leaving the EU would precipitate a return to national
democracies that can mobilise a wider class struggle towards internationalism (Jones
2016). Like many in the Living Marxism/Spiked Online tradition (see, for example,
Bickerton 2016), this seems to suggest that the impact of the Brexit vote on the European
liberal elites will be profound enough to lead a wider set of class struggles capable of
wider transformation. While Jones does acknowledge that the far right might play a part
in this process, he ultimately concludes that the struggle is surely worth it (Jones 2016).
This perhaps sums up the real problems with Lexit. In addition to the problems that
have occurred in terms of the renaissance of the far-right, and the advancing forces of
conservatism and hyper-liberalism, all of which have served to negate any potential
advance from the left, the sheer lack of strategic rigour represented by the Lexit position
has ensured that it has subsequently been replaced by mere speculative determinism. As
a result, while many in the Lexit camp have maintained their position in the aftermath
of the referendum, Lexit itself has been side-lined beyond repair.

Exit Lexit, enter Class War Conservativism

The post-referendum period has, thus, not only revealed the implausibility of the Lexit
position, but also seen the left as a political force slip further and further behind. The
new left revival that saw Corbyn voted in with a landslide from Party members in sum-
mer 2015 and briefly saw him top some opinion polls in March/April 2016 (You Gov
2016) has been compromised not just by the significant divisions and the subsequent
leadership challenge in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, but also by the failure to provide
clarity or coherent opposition in the run up to Article 50. Instead, the tentative position
adopted by Corbyn which upheld the result of the referendum by voting with the gov-
ernment to instigate article 50, while pledging to hold them accountable over upholding
workers and citizens rights in the course of negotiations, merely led to further voter
alienation. The objective was to bridge the divide between traditional working-class vot-
ers who favoured Brexit and the younger metropolitan radicals that supported social
Europe and who were largely seen to be responsible for his two electoral successes. Yet
the result has been the reverse, as the Party has continued to lose ground in its traditional
heartland and the drive that it was building through Momentum has been somewhat
derailed due to disillusion regarding the lack of meaningful opposition by Corbyns
Labour to the process of EU withdrawal. This is a trend that has been reflected both in
terms of a decline in party membership (albeit from a peak in the aftermath of Corbyns
initial election) and a significant drop in the opinion polls.
Worth 355

In response, Theresa May has embarked upon a series of measures that have looked to
seize upon the problems in the Labour opposition in order to secure backing for her
Brexit manoeuvre. Since taking office she has looked to the forces of patriotism and
national solidarity in order to garner support for her hard Brexit position. Like the
majority of Conservative members of parliament (MPs), May has been seen to have done
a U-turn on Britains relationship with Europe. Her rather hands-off pro-remain posi-
tion, that was seen during her own rather lukewarm campaign on the side of Remain, has
been replaced by a post-referendum leadership that not only looked to uphold the result,
but also to pursue an agenda which took even the most ardent anti-EU conservative by
surprise. The rejection of any form of European Free Trade Association (EFTA)/single
market compromise has seen a form of divide-and-rule majoritarian mentality not seen
since the Thatcher era. Like Thatcher, she has embarked upon a form of conservative
national-populism which seeks to push through a specific agenda, rather than rely on any
attempt at consensus building (see Halls 1988 classic critique of Thatcherism). At a
wider level, we can also see a process which Ralph Miliband understood as Class War
Conservatism. Here, capital looks to mobilise itself and discipline forms of labour when
periods of crisis threaten it (Miliband 2015). This was already seen with the austerity
measures brought in during the Cameron/Osborne periods in government, which saw
the re-configuration of the neoliberal polity after the crisis had put it under strain. The
myth of the necessity of austerity has been well detailed (Blyth 2013), presented by pro-
government forces as the inevitable result of previous overspending and as a means to
balance the books to reduce debt in the same way individuals and families require to do
at times of difficulty (Stanley 2014). Yet, Brexit has provided an opportunity for national-
populism that goes far beyond this.
In the same way that Thatcher gained a modicum of working-class support by utilising
a popular British nationalism through the Falklands factor (Miliband, 287288), May
is attempting to do the same with her vision of Brexit. Not since the Falklands War has
the tabloid press contributed to the construction of a nationalist narrative that seeks to
demonise its retractors or opponents.8 Brexit can thus be utilised as a vehicle for legitimat-
ing any future move towards a hyper-liberalising model of political economy which the
Euro-sceptic wing have longed wish to see instantiated (Worth 2017). The spirit of such
a nationalism has been seen with the euphoria of getting the country back alongside the
need to come together to make it work for everyone (Mays own favourite). The intended
results of this can be seen as being two-fold. It first gives greater legitimacy to the austerity
measures that have preceded it, by placing them within a wider national context. More
prominently, it provides a subsequent framework for the de-regulated political economic
model which conservative libertarians have longed craved for.
So what consequences might arise from these developments? As we saw in the 1980s,
any form of Class War Conservativism carried out within a national-populist context is
highly problematic and prone to instabilities and divisions. Yet, in this case, this instabil-
ity is even more profound. Not only does the Conservative Party itself have to contain its
own forces by balancing its different strands of libertarianism and populism with its
own moderates but a wider narrative across society also needs to be formed in order
to provide a similar balance. This would somehow require the fusing of post-Brexit
nationalism alongside a new re-regulated economic model that is able to appeal in
356 Capital & Class 41(2)

predominantly working-class pro-Brexit areas. Marrying the forces of national-populism

with economic libertarianism is something that UKIP have attempted. Yet, the industrial
working-class heartlands which UKIP have been making significant inroads into are
themselves unlikely to support such a model, which might lead to a renaissance of
protectionist-based far-right parties in areas where the British National Party (BNP) had
marked success during Nick Griffins leadership. The context that emerges during the
Brexit negotiations and subsequent deal (if any) will also play into this. At the same time,
the potential break-up of the United Kingdom has left any attempt to forge a British
nationalism increasingly problematic. The snap general election provides an opportunity
for May to seize the moment and gain greater legitimacy before these problems become
more significant.
This leaves the left with a number of problems with regard to where to go from here.
Does it attempt to force a collection of left-leaning, internationalist actors which might
include the Green Party, Parties with a claim to Socialism, the Celtic Nationalist Parties,
Trade Unions and progressive non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to organise an
alliance against a right-wing Brexit? Or does it look to create an alternative sort of rela-
tionship with social Europe of the sort that Tony Benn argued with his Commonwealth
of Europe model, which he saw as a more democratic solution to internationalism (Benn
2005: 189190). Or should the left dispense with forms of statism altogether and seek
to relocate itself firmly in the autonomous Marxist tradition and look to forge struggles
across society in ways that seek to advance labour objectives and address social inequali-
ties? Some of this might become clearer after the 2017 election, where a more coherent
position might develop that has not really been able to flourish due to the chaos that has
followed the referendum. Whatever might emerge, the process of Brexit has left us fur-
ther away from a potential challenge to neoliberal capitalism from the left. No matter
how principled the various Lexit arguments were, ultimately they have significantly
harmed a momentum that was previously building.

Notes
1. The term was coined by the left leave campaign.
2. Skinner commented in the Morning Star: My opposition from the very beginning has been
on the lines that fighting capitalism state-by-state is hard enough. Its even harder when youre
fighting it on the basis of eight states, 10 states and now 28.
3. These include Frank Fields, Kate Hoey, Gisela Stuart, Graham Stringer, Roger Godsiff and
John Mann.
4. This was written before the snap June 2017 election, so the performance and consequences
of the Labour Party cannot be assessed fully here.
5. Included in their 2010 book Britain and the Global World are chapters by hyper-liberal
figures such as Patrick Minford, Ruth Lea and John Redwood as well as populist politicians
such as Philip Davies and Roger Helmer (the latter a UKIP MEP).
6. That is the official campaign. While Brexit has become notorious for its populist right-wing
language and nationalist sentiment, the campaigns associated with the cross-party group were
largely based on the assumptions around less EU regulation, greater labour flexibility and the
reclamation of sovereignty. Economically, it was also heavily influenced by the free market
Economists for Brexit group.
Worth 357

7. Incidentally, this is not a position that Stephen Gill, who was synonymous with new
Constitutionalism (1998) particularly favoured. In a recent roundtable talk on Brexit, he was
concerned with the losing of citizens rights as a result of Brexit.
8. The usual suspects here being The Sun, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express, but there has
been a marked emergence of jingoist populism in the Daily Telegraph, which traditionally has
attempted to garner the professional conservative right and has scorned such moves.

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Author biography
Owen Worth is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Limerick, and
managing editor of Capital and Class.