Claire Larzen Z.

Tello
Fourth Year
Bachelor of Science in Economics
Visayas State University

A Concept Paper submitted to Prof. Ernesto F. Bulayog as partial requirement for

Econ153- Public Finance and Accountability

Submitted on: October 14, 2014

TITLE:

The Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of the Philippines:

An Economic Perspective on its Impact to Society

I. INTRODUCTION

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), an indicator promulgated by

Transparency International that measures the corruption tendencies in a

country from 1995 to present. From 1995 to 2011 the CPI values range

from 0-10; 0 being an indicator of massive corruption incidences and 10

being clean of corruption incidences and as of 2012 to present the new

indicator values range from 0-100, at 100 being corruption clean and 0

being super corrupt. In line with this, the Philippines Corruption

Perceptions Index ranges from 2.30-3.60 from 1995-2011 and 34-36 from

2012-2013, that means the nation is deemed to have high corruption

tendencies. The Philippines has long been acknowledged as a nation with

high corruption tendencies due to high incidences of bribery, malversation

of public funds, officials accepting cash and other gifts to grant favors, and
 many other corrupt practices especially during the Martial Law Regime.

However, the Philippines has faced a new fiasco that has marked the

nation in the corruption rankings once again.

Since July 2013, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)

Scam first erupted and it has become the most sensationalized corruption

scandal in the Philippines. There have been many articles that surround

the PDAF and as to how these funds are abused by the persons who

govern their allocation.

This paper would then be among those that provide information about

the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) with the specific

objectives:

1. To provide economic analysis on the impact of the PDAF to the Philippine

Society

2. To provide a comprehensive history of the PDAF and pork barrel system

II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Definition of PDAF

PDAF stands for the Priority Development Assistance Fund which

is a form of pork barrel fund in the Philippines. PDAF Watch defined pork

barrel as those funds allocated to politicians such as congressmen and

senators, to be used, based on their decision, to fund programs, projects

in their districts. Although there are many types of pork barrel fund in the
 Philippines, PDAF of the legislators is currently the most controversial.

(Gamela, 2013)

According to G. Luis Igaya of the Institute for Popular Democracy,

the pork barrel is a practice of the Congress to divert national funds into
their districts whether it be in the form of public works (such as highways
or bridges), social services (such as education funds or public school
buildings) or special projects (such as livelihood programs or community
development projects). Simply said, the pork barrel is a public fund
intended only for public purposes. Unfortunately, the pork barrel fund has
become the center of controversy because of its potential as a source of
massive and wholesale corruption in government agencies. (Gamela,
2013)

The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) reported

that according to Sen. Panfilo Lacson the pork barrel fund is a big, big
mafia or syndicate involving the executive and legislative branches of the
government. This grand conspiracy of executive and legislative
agencies, according to Lacson, has involved various agencies in circles
of kickbacks, corruption, patronage politics, and wasteful spending.
(Gamela, 2013)

History of Pork barrel

The pork barrel system is a Western practice brought into the

Philippine public governance practice by the United States. Chua and
Cruz report that in 1823, the US Congress enacted the first appropriation
for rivers and harbors for different states of the nation. (VERA Files, 2013)
However, the practice drew criticisms from opponents who claimed that it
was purely political in purpose. Hence, it was branded as pork barrel
legislation. Pork barrel is also present in the UK, Australia, and New
Zealand. In Denmark, it is called election pork because it
represents promises made before an election (Nograles and Lagman).
(Gamela, 2013)

The pork barrel system is a pre-Civil War practice in the US. Chua
and Cruz (2013) mentioned in their report three possible origins of the
pork barrel in the US: (1) the practice of landowners of setting aside a
definite portion of pork salted in wooden barrels for their black slaves; (2)
the practice of American farmers of preserving pork in barrels in
anticipation of the hardships of winter, when the pork was shared with
their needy neighbors; and (3) that it comes from the old adage, Bring
home the bacon. (Gamela, 2013)

In the Philippines, the pork barrel system was first introduced in

1922 with the passing of the Public Works Act separately from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). The first pork barrel was legitimized under
Public Works Act 3044 which divided public works into two types: (1)
national and other buildings, roads and bridges in provinces, buoys and
beacons, necessary mechanical equipment of lighthouses and (2) police
barracks, normal school and other public buildings, certain types of roads
and bridges, artesian wells, wharves, piers, and other shore protection
works, cable telegraph and telephone lines. The latter is the forerunner of
the infamous pork barrel. It was under the control and supervision of the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications. However, before these
could be distributed, prior approval from the joint committee elected by the
Senate and the House of Representatives was needed (Chua and Cruz,
2013). (Gamela, 2013)

In 1925, Senate Minority Leader Juan Sumulong spoke before

Congress citing the misuse of public funds in the form of pork barrel
appropriations. In 1950 the pork barrel system was stopped, particularly
the practice of releasing lump sums for which no projects were specified.
For the first time, the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from
the Secretary of Commerce to the legislators. Subsequently, the law
carried the identified projects of the members of Congress being the
representatives of the people, either on their own account or by
consultation with local officials or civil leaders. (Gamela, 2013)

The pork barrel system practice was further refined under the public
works act. It was intended to fund community projects which were
divided into two: miscellaneous community projects for congressmen
and nationwide selected projects for senators. (Gamela, 2013)

Although the pork barrel system is inevitably associated with

politics as shown by the quid pro quo or the carrot-and-stick relationship,
it could still be said that during this time the system was functional in terms
of the check and balance mechanism between the legislative and the
executive. Interest groups have their space, too, in the administration
of government-funded projects under the system. This went on for some
50 years, although briefly interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1942.
(Gamela, 2013)

The 1960s
However, in the mid 60s there was a stalemate between the
House and the Senate. No pork barrel funds were released. In 1982,
during the Marcos reign, a new item was introduced in the annual General
Appropriations Act by the Batasang Pambansa. It was called National Aid
to Local Government Units (NALGUs). Under NALGUs there was the
Support for Local Development Projects or SLDP. This was the closest to
the pork barrel system according to journalist Belinda Olivarez Cunanan.
Each assemblyman would get P500, 000.00. SLDP could be used both for
public works projects (now referred to as hard projects) and soft projects
providing medicines, fertilizers, fumigants, insecticides, paints, sports
equipment, etc. Under the SLDP scheme the assemblyman conveyed his
preferences for projects to the Ministry of Budget and Management (MBM)
which had the power to approve projects. MBM then released the
allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) which issued
checks to the treasurer of the city or district where the assemblymans
constituency was located. (Gamela, 2013)

During the Marcos reign, the pork barrel took a twist with the
abolition of Congress. The sole power and discretion to dispense pork
barrel was lodged only in one person, the President himself. This gave
rise to the phenomenon called cronyism. One had to be within the sphere
of power and influence of the then dictator president to enjoy special
favors and privileges. According to Miranda (in Nograles and Lagman),
When former President Ferdinand Marcos governed through martial rule,
the problem earned a new namecronyismand reached its height. The
other difference is that at that time, the dispenser of pork was
concentrated in one personMarcos himselfwith absolutely no check
on any abuse committed. The national tragedy that followed was
unprecedented in the countrys history. (Gamela, 2013)

The Cory Aquino Presidency (1986)

When Pres. Corazon Aquino rose to the presidency she restored
the pork barrel system. In 1989, it started as a lump sum appropriation of
P480 million and P240 million called the Mindanao Development Fund
and the Visayas Development Fund, respectively. Representatives from
these regions were authorized to identify development projects worth P10
million per district. Luzon representatives soon demanded their share. In
1990, the pork barrel assumed a new name: the Countrywide
Development Fund, or CDF. Starting in 1992, each congressional district
across the country was allocated P12.5 million and P18 million for each
senator. Unlike in the past, there was no restriction on the kind of
project the district representatives and senators may want to implement
for their respective constituents. (Gamela, 2013)

The Ramos presidency (1992)

Elected in 1992, Pres. Ramos was a minority president. His
problem was how to muster support from the legislators especially for the
presidents deemed priority bills, or to strengthen the power base of the
presidency. The pork barrel was a convenient means to achieve that
purpose. In 1994, however, the constitutionality of the CDF was
challenged. (Gamela, 2013)

The Supreme Court ruled that the CDF was valid and constitutional.
In the case of Philconsa vs. Enriquez et al., Nograles and Lagman cited
the ruling of the Supreme Court thus:
Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as
the power of the purse belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto
power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but still
the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in Congress. The
power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or
activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be. (Gamela, 2013)

Ramos opened other avenues to strengthen his power base. In

1996, he restored the Public Works Fund, the School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocation or CIA, the El Nino Fund, and the
Poverty Alleviation Fund. (Gamela, 2013)

CIAs as pork barrel version

CIAs were not clearly provided in the GAA. Legislators were
allowed to insert certain amounts in the budget of government agencies
(executive) with the approval of the House Speaker and the House
Appropriations Committee. Legislators had a hand in directing the
utilization of the CIAs which were mostly incorporated in the budgets of
the departments of public works and highways, education, health, and
interior and local government. Monitoring the projects funded by the
legislators pork barrel was not given due attention. Only the officials of the
departments of finance, budget, the implementing agency and the
lawmakers themselves would know the status of the funds. At one time,
CIA was reported to run up to P28 billion. (Gamela, 2013)

The birth of PDAF

During his installation as the countrys 13th president then Pres.
Erap Estrada was quite emphatic on his stand on the pork barrel issue. In
his inauguration speech (June 30, 1998) he said:
Government can provide basic services without the extra cost of pork
barrel or kickback; roads for work; infrastructure for productivity; schools
for skills; clinics for health; police for safety, and a lean and mean military
machine for national defense. This I promise and I will deliver.
Government cannot afford to give all the youth the complete education
promised by the Constitution, but it would be a crime if any money for
education was misspent on inferior textbooks and substandard
classrooms built by pork barrel. I appeal to the coming Congress to
search its conscience for a way to stand behind me, rather than against
me, on the pork barrel issue and find a way to convert pork into tuition
subsidies in the public and private schools. (Gamela, 2013)

But during his short-lived two-year stay in power as president,

Estrada did not entirely scrap the legislators discretionary funds. He
retained the School Building Fund and still allowed the CIAs. But he also
instituted his own version of the executive pork barrel fund called the
Lingap para sa Mahirap. He introduced the Rural Development
Infrastructure Fund (RUDIF), the same as the Public Works Fund, but with
a P30M allocation for each congressman. However, the sole power to
dispense pork to the legislators rested on the Executive. A legislator had
to beg for a share of RUDIFa case of executive supremacy over the
legislative. In 1999, the congressmen lobbied for a share of the huge
executive pork barrel, Lingap para sa Mahirap Program Fund. They were
able to get a share equivalent to 2/3 of the Fund. Estrada reintroduced the
CDF, but renamed it the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
Under PDAF, at least on paper, the congressmen would identify projects
from a narrow set of project categories determined by the Executive.
(Gamela, 2013)

PDAF during the Arroyo administration

In 2001, with the assumption to the presidency of Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo after the impeachment of Pres. Estrada, the PDAF was retained.
Again, the constitutionality of CDF was challenged. The Supreme Court in
Sarmiento et al. vs. The Treasurer of the Philippines, et al. (G.R. No.
125680 and 126313, September 4, 2001) reaffirmed its previous ruling in
1994 (Philconsa vs. Enriquez) saying:
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the
unequal. It is also recognition that individual members of Congress, far
more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to
be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the
priority to be given each project. (Gamela, 2013)

In 2008, there was an initiative to safeguard and rationalize the use

of the pork barrel allocation. Nograles and Lagman cited in their report
Special Provision No. 1 under XLVI on Priority Development Assistance
Fund (p. 950 of the GAA for 2008):
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount appropriated herein shall be
used to fund priority programs and projects under the Ten-Point Legacy
Agenda of the national government, and shall be released directly to the
implementing agencies as indicated (Gamela, 2013)

The list includes projects on education, health, livelihood/CIDSS,

rural electrification, water supply, financial assistance, public works,
irrigation, peace and order, housing, forest management, and
historical/arts/culture. The Act also providesThat in the procurement of
common-use supplies, the implementing agencies shall adhere to the
price list and the rules and regulations to be issued by the Government
Procurement Policy Board (Gamela, 2013)

During the Arroyo administration, there were several cases of

corruption that had their roots in the misuse and abuse of the pork barrel
fund especially to perpetuate her in power which rocked her administration
on several occasions. Sen. Antonio Trillanes, for example, expressed his
disappointment with the abuse of the pork barrel by the Arroyo
administration. (Gamela, 2013)

PDAF under the PNoy administration

PNoy kept the PDAF legacy, and even nurtured it. Before Pres.
Arroyo stepped down, the last PDAF allocated in 2010 was P10.86B. This
figure was doubled (P24.62B) during the first budget allocation of the
PNoy presidency in 2011. Despite the prominent emphasis on the theme
of his electoral campaignKung walang kurap, walang mahirapuntil
his inauguration as the 15th President whose inaugural speech centered
on the theme, Tungo sa daang matuwid, the PNoy administration was
not spared from the massive corruption scandal brought about by the
glaring abuse of the pork barrel fund. In fact, although the issue started
with the legislators pork barrel, the huge lump sum discretionary fund of
the President and that of the Vice-President have also become a major
 issue that would make the legislators pork barrel fund scam pale in
comparison. (Gamela, 2013)

The recent pork barrel scandal of P10B (the amount involved could
be much more) has rocked the nation and exposed the extent of the
systemic nature of corruption and its various modalities in the various
levels of government bureaucracy. The demand for transparency and
accountability was so potent as to draw millions of people to the streets
demanding the rechanneling of the pork barrel allocation or the outright
abolition of the pork barrel system. Added to this is the latest scandal
involving the unconstitutional Disbursement Acceleration Fund (DAF).
With the ongoing government investigation and the progress of the
plunder cases already filed against the initial list of accused legislators,
every Filipino hopes for the restoration of transparency, accountability,
decency, and rationalized use of peoples money as pillars in public
governance and to breathe more life and meaning to the Constitutional
provision that a Public office is a public trust. (Gamela, 2013)

The Impact of PDAF to Filipino Taxpayers

In the same PCIJ report, Malou Mangahas also mentioned that

Sen. Lacson said that less than 50 percent actually went to the programs
of work. And more than 50 percent went to the many deep pockets of
corruption. Based on his personal experience, Lacson said that the
standard commission of a legislator is 20 percent. Depending on the
insatiability of the legislator concerned, it could go as high as 50 percent,
that is, for the greediest really. The only portions of pork barrel funds that
are perfectly legally applied, according to Lacson, are the taxes and profit
due the project contractor which do not go beyond 14 percent. He further
emphasized that in a worst-case scenario, all the taxpayers get are ghost
projects because everything else is just paper work. (Gamela, 2013)
 The legislators pork is used for both soft and hard projects.
Hard projects refer to infrastructure, while soft projects include, among
others, the purchase of school and health supplies, livelihood assistance,
scholarships and the like. Under the present pork barrel system, according
to the Lacson experience with hard projects, at least half goes to the
lawmaker as commission while soft projects are the worst. the
commission (is) from here to eternity, without limits. Lacson estimates
that only 50 percent of the legislators pork barrel is translated into
projects, the good portion of the pork. The recent revelations on the Janet
Lim-Napoles transactions with some government agencies confirm this
figure is confirmed. In fact, the sharing formula is 50-40-10, in which 50
percent goes to the legislator against whose PDAF a certain project shall
be charged, 40 percent to the JLN-owned bogus NGOs, and 10 percent to
the implementing agency. (Gamela, 2013)

III. Economic Analysis of PDAF

The Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), a form of pork

barrel, is available for all senators and congressmen to avail of as sources
of funds for projects all over the country. Before they can avail their PDAF
allocation however, they have to seek approval for their claim. Every year
each senator is entitled a 200 million peso PDAF and 70 million for each
congressman.
The total amount of PDAF releases in 2012 amount to 24.2 billion
pesos with the 4 billion utilized by members of the upper house and 20.1
billion for the lower house. In the same year, here are the average for the
PDAF releases: District Congressman (70.5 million pesos), Party-list
Congressman (65.2 million pesos), and for senators (179.5 million pesos).
It is to be noted that each legislator could use the previous years
unused PDAF allocations as continuing allocation for later years hence,
the pork releases in a given year can exceed the allotments for any given
year.
As of 2012, here are the six highest amounts of PDAF releases:
1. Pia Cayetano (258 million pesos)
2. Alan Peter Cayetano (257 million pesos)
3. Antonio Trillanes IV (254 million pesos)
4. Teofisto Guingona III (229 million pesos)
5. Francis Kiko M. Pangilinan (227 million pesos)
6. Loren Legarda (207 million pesos)

On the contrary here are the lowest PDAF releases from the
upper house as of 2012:
1. Panfilo Lacson ( 0 )
2. Joker P. Arroyo ( 0 )
3. Aquilino Pimentel III (59 million pesos)

On the other hand, here are the highest amounts of PDAF

claimed by congressmen as of 2012:
1. Ruben Ecleo Jr., Dinagat Island (137 million pesos)
2. Thelma Almario, Davao Or. 2nd district (128 million pesos)
3. Dakila Carlo Cua, Quirino (120 million pesos)
4. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo, Pampanga (109 million pesos)
5. Al Francis Bichara, Albay 2nd district (105 million pesos)
6. Ma. Georgina De Venecia, Pangasinan 4th district (105 million
pesos)
7. Czarina Umali, Nueva Ecija, 3rd district (105 million pesos)

The congressmen who received the lowest PDAF allocations in

2012 were:
1. Ignacio Arroyo, Negros Occidental 5th district ( 0 )
 2. Diosdado Ignacio Arroyo, Camarines Sur 2nd district ( 0 )
3. Augusto Syjuco Jr., Iloilo 2nd district ( 0 )
4. Rodolfo Farinas, Ilocos Norte 1st district ( 20 million pesos)
Meanwhile, the following party-list congressmen got the highest
PDAF releases in 2012:
1. Cresente Paez, Coop Natco (105 million pesos)
2. Isidro Q. Lico, Ating Coop (90 million pesos)
3. Mariano U. Plamonte, A Teacher (85 million pesos)
4. Sharon Garin, Aambis OWA (84 million pesos)
5. Mark Sambar, PBA (78 million pesos)

Here are the lowest PDAF releases claimed by party-list

congressmen in 2012:
1. Solaiman Pangandaman, AA Kasosyo ( 0 )
2. Juan Miguel Macapagal Arroyo, Ang Galing ( 0 )
3. Weslie T. Gatchalian, Alay Buhay (14 million pesos)

Basically, the simplest analysis anyone can derive from the lists
presented above is the logic that the legislators who have claimed the
highest amounts of PDAF in 2012 are ideally expected to contribute to
society in the form of hard and soft projects outsourced from the
allocations----the principle that to whom much is given much is expected.
Then ultimately, those who receive less PDAF amounts especially for
those who did not claim any are less accountable. This would be the case
in the real world. But in a nation filled with malversation of public funds,
this is not the case.

At present there are a total of 316 members of the Philippine

congress with its bicameral system comprising 23 senators, 239 district
congressmen, and 54 party-list congressmen. Assuming all of these
legislators would claim their PDAF allocation worth 200 million pesos per
senator and 70 million pesos per district or party-list congressman then
this paper would then show you the expected PDAF allocations with
respect to time.

If there are 23 senators who stake their claim on 200 million pesos
worth of PDAF in one year, then a total of 4, 600, 000, 000 pesos shall be
allocated. The 4.6 billion pesos is supposed to be considered as
government expenditure for development projects and programs.
Assuming that Lacsons expos is indeed true that the PDAF allocation is
spent this way: 50% goes to the legislators pockets, 40% goes to the
owner of bogus NGOs or project beneficiaries, and only 10% actually goes
for the project, then there is a big deadweight loss to society.

With the 50-40-10 shares, an estimated amount of 2.3 billion pesos

shall go to the pockets of the senators, 1.84 billion pesos goes to the
owner of the bogus NGOs, and only 460 million pesos goes to society in
the form of actual programs and projects. Now with these computations,
there is a 90% of deadweight loss to society estimated to be at 4.14 billion
pesos every year. This would also ultimately mean that there is a 4.14
billion pesos worth of loss to the government expenditure (G) computation
to our gross domestic product (GDP) in a year. Even if certain fallacious
documents can be presented to supposedly account for the 4.6 billion
pesos worth of PDAF of the senators, the society deadweight loss is
already a very big factor that we should not take light. The GDP
calculations may still be estimated correctly in terms of government
expenditure given that the fallacious documents exist but in actuality, this
could be a major factor as to why even if the government is very proud of
the increase in GDP growth, economic progress is still not felt by ordinary
Filipinos. In an individualistic scale, if each senator gets 200 million pesos
a year, with the 50-40-10 calculations, 100 million goes to each senators
pockets, 80 million pesos goes to the owner of the fake NGOs, and only
20 million pesos of the pork goes to society.

Now, let us go to the deadweight loss computations if ever all the

members of the lower house shall adapt the corrupt system of this political
mafia. There are 293 congressmen in total and assuming they all stake
claims on their 70 million pesos worth of PDAF per year, these are the
estimates. 20,510,000,000 pesos (20.51 billion) of PDAF fund is the
estimated total given that all the 293 claim their pork. With the 50-40-10
ratios presented earlier, here is the estimated deadweight loss
computations. A total 10,255,000,000 pesos shall go directly to the
pockets of the congressmen, 8,204,000,000 pesos goes to the owner of
the bogus NGOs, and only 2.051 billion pesos goes to society. With a total
of 90% worth of deadweight loss valued at 18.459 billion pesos, it is no
wonder why the ordinary Filipinos feel that the inclusive growth is just a
myth and only those in power and the rich can benefit from the high
growth rates of our GDP.

In total, the estimated amount of PDAF for senators and

congressmen reach about 25.11 billion pesos every year. Still with the 50-
40-10 computations, here is the total deadweight loss of society from the
PDAF of the legislators per year: from the 25.11 billion pesos, 12.555
billion pesos goes to the legislators pockets, 10.044 goes to the hands of
the person owning fake NGOs, while only a total of 2.511 billion pesos
goes to society.

Assuming that all legislators are part of the 50-40-10 corruption

scheme ceteris paribus, the total deadweight loss to society is estimated
at 90% of the PDAF worth 22.599 billion pesos every year. In 10 years,
assuming that we use the theory that the PDAF scam headed by Janet
Lim-Napoles bogus NGOs has been operating, the society is at a
 deadweight loss of 225.99 billion pesos due to malversation of public
funds.

IV. CONCLUSION

Of course, at status quo, there are only a number of identified

legislators who are part of the PDAF scam. Surely however that there are
still legislators who are part of the PDAF scam that are still not caught
since Janet-Lim Napoles still hasnt disclosed all the names of her clients
in public. We cannot only blame the people involved in the PDAF scam for
their practices. We should also blame the system. Lets face the fact that a
legislators job is to create and promulgate laws and having big amounts
of pork at their discretion can really cause them to be tempted. PDAF is
unconstitutional since this pork given to legislators is not part of the
purpose of congress, is not in aid of legislation, and is at their discretion.
To avoid the cost of having more deadweight loss to society, the Filipinos
should make a move to have the government officials scrap the PDAF
system and have these funds be reallocated and given to the different
departments that cater to the different developmental projects intended for
the Philippines to grow. Legislators should just stick to their job description
as stated in Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and leave the
Executive branch to do their job of appropriating funds for various projects.

Yes there are benefits from PDAF in the form of scholarships for
our students and others but the Filipinos should see the bigger picture that
the PDAF is a temptation our legislators could not easily resist. We should
push for the removal of the PDAF system and push for its reallocation to
the different departments under the Executive branch of the Philippine
government. After all, without the PDAF of the legislators, our senators
and congressmen can now work more efficiently since they will only be
focusing on their major task---to create legislations. The removal of PDAF
 shall also secure transparency, full disclosure, and shall promote
accountability of our government officials even more given that when
PDAF is realigned, it shall no longer be a discretionary fund.

With an estimated deadweight loss of 22.599 billion pesos every

year from the PDAF fund given that all our legislators follow the 50-40-10
system exposed by Lacson, this alone is empirical evidence that PDAF is
harmful to attaining human development and economic progress in the
Philippines.

V. RECOMMENDATION

This paper could have been better if graphs of the deadweight loss
can be projected and that tables are generated to facilitate better
readings. It would also be better of historical data of the Corruption
Perceptions Index of the Philippines is projected. Due to time constraints
and limitations to the access of data, the researcher was only able to do
this much. However, if anyone shall wish to improve this case, then the
researcher highly encourages others to do so and suggest that an
econometric model using the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
government expenditures, GDP, and bribery incidence be tested through
regression analysis with CPI as the dependent variable and government
expenditures and GDP be the independent variables as well as other
indicators that other researchers see fit to include in the model.
VI. REFERENCES

Gamela, Ruben M. 2013 article on the History of PDAF

Philippine Star News Online

Tamayo, Adrian M. (2011, July 1). Pork barrel, Philippine politics and the
economy. Philippine Democracy Online. Retrieved from
http://philippinedemocracy.blogspot.com/2011/07/pork-barrel-and-philippine-
politics-and.html

Mangahas, Malou. (2013, July 21). Pork, lump sums, and President PNoy:
Scam, no! PDAF a mafiaof executive and legislature.
Philippine development assistance fund scam. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved
from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Priority_Development_Assistance_Fund_scam
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C. (n.d.) Understanding the pork
barrel. House of Representatives.

Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma. (2013, August 23). Pork by any name
(from The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress,
2004). VERA Files. Retrieved from http://ph.news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-
inbox/pork-name-140158329.html)