against him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land ". The expression ' d u e process of law ', however, defies
all attempts of precise definition. In the words of the U.S. Supreme
Court " few phrases of the law are so elusive of exact apprehension as
this." 4 As observed by the Court elsewhere in a case 5 :
" . . . ' due process *, unlike some legal rules, is not a techni-
cal conception with a fixed content unrelated to time place and
circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect
enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has
been- evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional
history and civilization, ' due process' cannot be imprisoned
within the treacherous limits of any formula. . . . *' 6
The * due process of law ', whatever its exact meaning may be,
was in the beginning interpreted as a restriction upon procedure,
particularly the judicial procedure, by which the government exercised
its powers. Principally, it related to the procedure by which persons
were tried for crimes and guaranteed to accused persons the right to
have a fair trial in compliance with well-established.principles of criminal
procedure. The same principles applied to the proceedings by which
property rights were adjudicated. Gradually, however, the Supreme
Court began to apply due process clause for the protection of sub-
stantive rights of life, liberty and property. 7 Thus, the due process,
as the term implies, was originally a procedural concept, but it develop-
ed in the hands of the Supreme Court a substantive guise under
which it served as a constitutional limitation not merely on legislative
or executive procedure, but on legislative or executive power to act
at all. 8 The present trend in the Supreme Court again is to give
emphasis mainly to the procedural aspects of the due process.9
To sum up, the due process means both procedural as well as
substantive limitation, though the former is more important and has
been often relied on by the U.S. Supreme Court as a limitation
on the exercise of governmental power, federal as well as state. Further
4. Twinning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
5. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
6. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, at pp. 162-63.
7. After some initial hesitation, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the substantiv
due process doctrine for the first time in the year 1897 *and declared a State staUu
invalid in Aliegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,17 S. Gt. 427 (1897).
8. C. Herman Pritchett, The American Constitution, (1959) pp. 554 f.
9. See Carl B. Swisher, The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States, at
p . 107 ; See also 1 Indian Law Review pp. 16-33, (1950).
10. See Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 15 L. Ed. 273
(1856), where the Supreme Court of the United States said that Congress cannot
make any process 'due process of law' by its mere will.
11. See 7 Indian Constituent Assembly Debates p. 854.
12. Dr. Berolzheimer, while writing on the origins of oriental civilizations, says
that "closely connected with the religious and philosophic views of the Vedic Aryans
are certain fundamental positions in regard to the philosophy of law which in turn
became the antecedents of later legal and ethical developments among the Greeks and
Romans." {Modern Legal Philosophy Series Vol. II page 37 ; See also, Radha Binod
Pal, The Hindu Philosophy of Law at page 1.) (According to Dr. Berolzheimer the con-
cept of Pax (meaning not peace, but that which brings peace, the blissful sacred
order), the immortal contribution of Augustine to medieval philosophy, was derived
from the Vedic ' Rita ' Dr. Berolzheimer further says, "To the Vedic Aryans, the
central philosophic conception of organised nature was 'Rita', which included the
natural and human order. A closely related conception was 'Dham' (which is
the realized cosmos corresponding to 'Rita' as a conception). The Greeks by emphasis-
ing the creative energy made of 'Rita*, and of *Dham\ The Romans through the
Greeks derived from 'Rita' their central conception 'ratum', 'ratio', 'naiuralis ratio*
and Augustine christianized 'Rita* into 'Pax'." (Ibid., at pp. 96-97.)
It is a curious historical fact that the same civilization of the East which once
contributed to the development of legal philosophy of some of the ancient civilizations
of the West, the same people who, as Miraglia says, "had always a true conception of
law and political life" (see generally, Miraglia, Comparative Legal Philosophy, pp.
119-24) felt a gap in their own legal philosophy and had to look to the West to pro-
vide legal concepts which could fulfill the aspirations of their people in this modern age.
It is customary to say that there were no democracies known in ancient
societies. True it is that the form of polity in ancient civilizations was mostly the
kingship, but before all ancient polities be branded as despotic monarchies, the true
nature of kingship in those societies should be clearly understood. In ancient India,
for example, there are instances of the kings being elected by the people. Megastha-
nese and Panini give account of several Hindu Republics of 500 B.C. (For the con-
stitutional position of king in ancient India see Indian Law Quarterly Review Vol. I l l
Pt. 10 pp. 531-39(1958).
Regarding the administration of justice in ancient societies it is usual to regard
its association with kingship. Sir Henry ^taine finds in it the whole historical foun-
dation of law. This view, supported as may be by the authorities of Bible and
Homer, labours under a serious defect in not allowing for difference in the types of
civilization and social organisation. (See Dr. N.G. Sen Gupta, Sources of Law and
Society in Ancient India, 1914, at p. 22) "Kingship is primarily an institution represen-
tative of the military principle" (Ihering, Geist der RomishenRechts, 6th ed., I.,
p . 178), but this obtains in different degrees of ascendency in different primitive socie-
ties. "Among Aryan people", for instance, says Miraglia, "there has never arisen
that all-controlling despotism which blots out man, as in Egypt, Babylon, China,
among the Mussulmans and the Tartar tribesor if it has appeared, it has not
been of long duration. (Miraglia, Comparative Legal Philosophy, at p . 120.) It was
not until Manu's writings (300 B.C., approx.) that King in India seemed to be asso-
ciated with the administration of Justice. Gautam and Apastamba (both prior to
Manu) hardly mention anything about King's justice. Manu, and later Yajnavalkya
(2nd cent. A D . ) , Narada and Brihaspati (both between 3rd and 4th cent. A.D.) suc-
cessively give more and more vivid account of justice administered through the
King's court and the procedure adopted therein. But still the bulk of disputes con-
tinued to be settled at the village level through mostly the system of Panchayat (a
village council of five wise men in the community) and whenever justice was
administered by the King he was always regarded as being subject to Dharma (or
Superior Law) and punishable by the same law by which he punished others. The
doctrine "King can do no wrong" never found any place in the ancient Indian legal
philosophy. (See generally Professor Harrop A. Freeman; An Introduction to
Hindu Jurisprudence, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 8, pp. 29-43
(1959).)
13. 7 Indian Constituent Assembly Debates, p. 854 f f.
14. Note here the remarks of Mr. Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme
Court in his address at the occasion of 200th anniversary of John Marshall held at
the Harvard Law School. He observed ;
not shown that the word c law ' means ' jus' in the Japanese
Constitution. The word ' due ' in the expression c due process of
law' in the American Constitution is interpreted to mean ' j u s t '
according to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. The
word imparts jurisdiction to the courts to pronounce what is ' due '
from otherwise, according to law. The deliberate omission of the
word * due ' from Article 21 lends strength to the contention that
the justiciable aspect of 'law ' that is to consider whether it is
reasonable or not by the Court does not form part of the Indian
Constitution. The omission of the word ' due ', the limitation
imposed by the word ' procedure ' and the insertion of the word
c
established ' thus brings out more clearly the idea of legislative
prescription in the expression used in Article 21. By adopting the
phrase ' procedure established by law ' the Constitution gave the
legislature the final word to determine the law." 23
Article 21, thus, as adopted by the Indian Constituent Assembly
and as later interpreted by the Supreme Court, authorises the legisla-
ture to pass a law prescribing the procedure by which a person may be
deprived of his life or personal liberty, and, in so far as the Article
shields such a law passed by an Indian legislature from being chal-
lenged in a court of law on the ground of being an c unjust' law, it
may seem that, it does not lay down a constitutional system comparable
to one adopted by the American Constitution, with the due process
concept lying at the base of it. Nevertheless, the Indian Constitution,
on the whole, it would be seen, lays down a system of fair procedure
for deprivation of life and personal liberty, and at some points the pro-
cedural guarantees provided by it even exceed those provided by the
American i due process clause * as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court. The following points are to be noted in this regard :
(1) Article 21, if read alone, atleast gives full protection against
executive arbitrariness.
(2) Article 21, when read along with other Articles of the Consti-
tution, like Articles 20 and 22, places sufficient restrictions on the legis-
lative authority. 24
These points are discussed in the following pages.
justice but as the lawi n force at the time. The Irish Court gave the expression 'due
course of law' the meaning given to it according to English and not the American
law. (See The King v. Military Governor of the Hare Park Camp 2 Irish Reports K.B
104).
23. [1950] S.C.J. 174 at p. 186-87.
24. Please note that the words 'personal liberty' in Article 21 have a restricted
meaning. Article 21 is not the only Article in the Indian Constitution dealing with
50. See Vimal Kishore v. U.P., supra; State of Bombay v. Atma Ram, [1951] S.C J.
208.
51. Supra.
52. See Ram Narayan v. State of Delhi [1953] S.G.J. 326.
53. [1951] S.GJ. 320.
54. Section 340 (1) of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code is similarly worded.
its place Communist Raj (State) " were tried for indiscriminate mans-
laughter and shooting in a few villages of Hyderabad. They were
convicted and sentenced to death. While their petition for appeal
before the Judicial Committee of the State of Hyderabad was pending
the Constitution of India came into force and the case came before the
Indian Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for consid-
eration of grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari.
The counsel for the petitioners argued that in two of the cases 55 there
was no fair trial inasmuch as the persons accused therein were not
afforded any opportunity to instruct counsel and they had remained
undefended throughtout the trial. 56 In his argument, the counsel relied
mainly on some American cases especially Powell v. Alabama ,57 The
Supreme Court, however, observed :
" It seems to us that in dealing with the point we cannot
rest our judgment wholly on American precedents, which are
based on the doctrine of due process of law, which is peculiar to
the American Constitution, and also on certain specific provisions
bearing on the right of representation in a criminal proceeding.
The provision which is material to the contention raised before us
is section 271 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code which
corresponds to section 3^0 of the Indian Criminal Procedure
Code. 58 ... This provision must undoubtedly be construed liberally
55. Criminal Cases Nos. 17 and 18. There were three cases tried. The third
was Criminal Case No. 14 of 1949.
56. The Supreme Court, however, noted that there was sufficient evidence to
show that the accused were wealthy persons and were given facilities to engage lawyers
for their defence. The point relating to right of counsel was also raised before the
High Court, where Shripat Rao, J., who delivered the leading judgment observed :
" It was not contended before us in appeal that they were not afforded such an
opportunity by the special tribunal (the trial court). In fact the High Court also
wanted them to be represented by lawyers for which time was allowed, but on the
next hearing they stated that they do not wish to engage any lawyer on their behalf
and that the High Court need not engage any lawyer for them. This shows that the
accused for reasons best known to themselves did not avail of the opportunity of
engaging lawyers In view of this, the plea that opportunity was not given to
the accused to engage lawyers and, therefore, the trial was vitiated, in our opinion,
fails."
57. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
58. Section 340 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code runs as below :
" Any person accused of an offence before a criminal court, or against whom
proceedings are instituted under this code in any such court, may of right be defended
by a pleader.'*
in favour of the accused and must be read along with the rules
made by the High Courts and the Circular Orders issued by them
enjoining that where in capital cases the accused has no means to
defend himself, a counsel should be povided to defend him." 5 9
At another place, the Supreme Court, having noted from the evidence
that there was hardly reason to believe that the accused were not given
opportunity to engage a lawyer, said :
" But we must state that throughout the argument on this
point, we cannot help feeling that the special tribunal should have
taken some positive steps to assign a lawyer to aid the accused
in their defence/ 60
Quoting a passage from Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court ruled :
" T h a t the assignment of a counsel in the circumstances
mentioned in the passage is highly desirable, cannot be disputed.
But the question raised before us is whether in law non-assignment
of a counsel would vitiate the trial The proper view seems
to us to be : (1) that it cannot be laid down as a rule of law that
in every capital case where the accused is unrepresented, the trial
should be held to be vitiated; and (2) that a court of appeal or
revision is not powerless to interfere, if it is found that the
accused was so handicapped for want of legal aid that the
proceedings against him may be said to amount to negation of a
fair trial." 62
This holding makes the right to counsel guarantee to a person only
the right to engage a lawyer of his choice if he so wishes. It also shows
that the courts are bound to provide the accused all opportunity to do
so; further, that it does not give any right to the accused to get his
conviction quashed simply on the ground that he was not represented
by a counsel in a capital case, all opportunity having been provided to
accused to engage his own counsel. Though the Supreme Court here
expressly rejected the analogy of the American due process doctrine,
curiously enough the law laid down by it is in no way different than
what the U. S. Supreme Court, deciding a similar case under the due
process doctrine, would have laid down.
In the U.S.A. the scope of the right to counsel depends upon
whether the prosecution is federal or state. For federal prosecutions
82. The accused, had a counsel at the time of trial. H e was afforded this
opportunity after he had made the confession.
83. In their dissent Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black and Brennan said, however,
" No matter how well educated and how well trained in the law an accused may
be he is sorely in need of legal advice once he is arrested for an offence that may
exact his life H e has the right to receive the benefit of the advice of his own
counsel at the trial That same right should extend to the pre-trial stage
The demands of our civilization expressed in the due process clause require that die
accused who wants a counsel should have one at any time after the moment of arrest."
84. 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
88. In House v. Mayo, 1945, 324 U.S. 42, an uneducated man in his twenties, a
stranger to the area was brought before a court to be sentenced on two convictions
previously returned against him. He was there presented for the first time with a
burglary information filed by the State, asked for and was denied opportunity to
engage counsel, and finally pleaded guilty to the information, thereby obviating any
necessity for trial of the charge on the merits. The Supreme Court held this to be
denial of due process right to counsel.
89. See sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, infra, note 103.
in its terms," 93 and ordered his immediate release.93 In the same way
in Swami Hariharanand Saraswati v. The Jailor,H where on 17th Febru-
ary, 1954, the petitioners were arrested by a Magistrate acting under
sec. 64, Cr.P.C. for having obstructed the entry of the Harijans into
the temple of Shri Vishwanathji of Banaras through the main gate and
thereby having committed an offence punishable under section 6, U.P*
Removal of Social Disabilities Act, 1947, and the Magistrate the same
day remanded the petitioner into jail custody, it was held by the
Allahabad High Court, relying on the Supreme Court decision in State of
Punjab v. Ajaib Singh,95 that in the circumstances of the case there was
no proper production of the petitioners before a competent magistrate
within 24 hours of their arrest without warrant and consequently their
further detention in jail was illegal and unconstitutional. According
to the High Court the production of the accused could have been done
before another magistrate that is a Magistrate other than the one who
had arrested the accused and since this was not done further detention
of the accused was held to be illegal.
Federal Prosecution cases in the U.S.A.
Under the United States Constitution even though no rigid time
limit has been provided either by the due process clause or by the
statutory law, in federal prosecutions, the arrested person is required
by rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure noted above
to be-produced before a magistrate or a judicial officer ''without
unnecessary delay" and this requirement has been given strict
enforcement by the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, in Upshaw v. U.S.,96
104. However, as an exception to these rules see section 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act. See generally on Sections 25, 26 and 27 Sarkar, Law of Evidence, 1953 p. 236 ff.
105. Other Clauses of Article 20 of the Indian Constitution are:
" (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a
law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an
offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might
have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of commission
of the offence.
(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence
more than once."
106. I n India it is generally assumed that a self-incriminating statement made by
an accused before a police officer must have been made under compulsion. This
presumption is deeply imbedded in the Indian jurisprudence and is indicative of the
deep distrust which people in India have of the executive authorities.
107. Though the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of U.S.A. provides a rule
against self-incrimination, the rule has not been interpreted to exclude a confession
made before a police officer. Again, this limited rule is applicable only against
federal authorities and not the state authorities as the U,S. Supreme Court has
refused to incorporate it in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment (See
Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See also, Twinning v. Mew Jersey 211 U.S. 78
(1908); Palko v. Connecticut 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Hurtado v. California 110 U.S. 516
(1884) and Maxwell v. Dow 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
108. 322 U.S. 65.
109. 318 U.S. 332 (1942).
until a confession was secured, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
circumstances under which federal officers obtained incriminating
statements from the defendants in this case, together with the flagrant
disregard of the Acts of Congress requiring that accused persons arrest-
ed be taken before a U.S. Commissioner or a judicial officer, render-
ed the evidence thus obtained inadmissible and set aside the con-
viction.
The test, therefore, in the United States to set aside any federal
conviction based on a confession would be : whether the confession
was made during periods of unlawful detention. The whole matter
would then turn upon the validity of the detention. In other words,
if a person arrested on probable cause was without any unnecessary
delay arraigned before the Commissioner any confession made by him
to the police during the arrest and before the arraignment would be
admissible. We have seen in the Mallory case, which along with
McMabb and Upshaw came to be severely criticised,110 that where total
arrest of a person had been even less than 24 hours the Supreme Court
in the peculiar circumstances of the case held that the arraignment was
too late, thus setting aside the conviction based on evidence obtained
during arrest which was deemed to be unlawful. The Mallory case is
an instance of the U.S. Supreme Court's determination to see that no
fruits of illegal detention were to be utilised in federal prosecutions
against any accused, and is the high water mark of the law on this
point. It may, however, be suggested that the absolute exclusion of
any voluntary or involuntary confession obtained by the police or any
person in authority except a judicial officer bars any temptation by the
police to resort to ' third degree' methods. Such a rule is perfectly in
keeping with the real due process standards, a standard which has
been a great bulwark in safeguarding the liberty of the American
people.
110. After the Mallory case there were efforts made in the Congress to revise
the McNabb rule by providing that a confession or other evidence which may be
admissible otherwise should not be excluded solely because of delay in arraign-
ment. However, the efforts failed and the Congress in the 1958 session disapproved
of overruling Mallory and other cases.
Barnhart and Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution (University of California
Press, 1954) pp. 211-321. In particular see Hirabayashi v. U.S. 320 U.S. 81 (1943);
Aorematsu v. U.S. 323 U.S. 215 (1944;; and Export* Endo v. U.S. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). See
also, Charles . Fairman, * The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency ',
55 Har. L. Rev. 1253 (1942); Harrop A. Freeman, * Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus,
Geneology, Evacuation and Law', 28 Cornell Law Quart. 414 (1943); Eugene
v. Rostow, 'The Japanese American Cases'A Disaster, 54 Tale Law Journal 489
(1945).
126. See India Code Vol. I l l Part IV p. 673 ; Act IV of 1950.
ill. Tnis means that action has to be taken by the highest officers of the
governments concerned in the name of the President of India or the Governor of a
state, as the case may be, and not by local or district officers of the government
concerned.
128. See section 3 of the Preventive Detenion Act, 1950.
129. See Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1951] S.CJ. 835.
430. Ujagar Singh v. Slate of Punjab, [1952J S.CJ. 521
131. Lawrence F. Ebb, *' Constitutional Framework for Administrative Law and
Relationship of Bill of Rights to Administrative Proceedings"Journal ofthe Indian
Law Institute, Vol. 1, p . 25y ^1959).
132. Similarly, Proiessor Nathaniel L. Nathanson of the Northwestern Law
School and Shri S.M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab in the course of a seminar
on ' Public Law Problems in India ' held at the Stanford Law School in 1957
observed:
" . . . it is particularly noteworthy that the Supreme Court of India has
exercised considerable control over the administration of the Preventive Detention Act
by insisting on meticulous observation of the requirement of notice embodied in
Article 2 2 ( 5 ; / ' (See Public Law Problems in India, Staniord Pub.).
133. State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Vaidya, [1951] S.C.J. 208.
the person was necessary or not, 13i or whether the grounds supplied
were correct or false.135 But they would certainly inquire if the grounds
that have been furnished would enable the detenue to make a representa-
tion. What is required ,is that the ground of detention must be
furnished and adequate opportunity to make representations be given.
Where the grounds furnished are in any way vague or ambiguous or in
any way take away or jeopardize the detenue's right to exercise his oppor-
tunity of making a representation, the Supreme Court has struck down
the detention as invalid. Courts in India invalidate the preventive
detentions mostly through the exercise of this power.
In Dr. Ram Krishna Bharadwaj v. State of Delhila6 it was argued that
in a case where one or more of the grounds supplied are vague the
petitioner is handicapped in making an adequate representation as re-
gards that grounds and his representation, even if effective in respect of
the other grounds, may fail to carry conviction as regards the ground
which is vague and that this might result in the detention being con-
firmed. The Supreme Court held :
" The question however is not whether the petitioner will in
fact be prejudicially affected in the matter of securing his release
by his representation, but whether his constitutional safeguard has
been infringed. Preventive detention is a serious invasion of perso-
nal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has
provided against the improper exercise of power must be jealously
watched and enforced by the Court We are of the opinion that
this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to
each of the grounds communicated to the person detained. 3 ' 137
The holding of this case was that the detenue is entitled to have parti-
culars ' as full and adequate as the circumstances permit' so as to
enable him to make a representation against his detention and that
the sufficiency of the grounds furnished is a justiciable matter, the test
being whether the detenue can make an adequate representation.
In a recent case of Dwarkadas v. State of Jammu & Kashmir,1**
similarly, where the order of detention was based on the ground that
the petitioner was engaged in unlawful smuggling activities relating
134. Ibid.
135. Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1952] S.CJ. 521; A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 350;
Shibban Lai v. U.P., AI.R. 1954 S.C. 179 : [1954] S.CJ. 74.
136. [1953J S.G.J. 444.
137. Ibid., at p. 447.
138. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 164.
to three commodities cloth, zari, and mercury, of which first two were
found to be not essential commodities and there was no material before
the Court to showr that the smuggling attributed to the petitioner was
substantially only of mercury and that the smuggling as regards the
other two commodities was of an inconsequential nature, the Supreme
Court held that the order of detention was bad and must be quashed.
The Court observed:
" Where power is vest in a statutory authority to deprive the
liberty of a subject on its subjective satisfaction with respect of
specified matters, if that satisfaction is stated to be based on a
number of grounds or for a variety of reasons, all taken together,
and if some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant,
the very exercise of that power is bad." i a j
The constitutional procedural safeguard provided in Art. 22(5), then,
provides significant protection to the individual against the oppressive
power of the government and the courts in India have enforced it as
strictly as possible. The fact, however, remains that the preventive
detention law is a scar on the Indian constitutional system. But as
this power of the government has bcon sparingly used 14u against only
either the suspected traitors of the country or other anti-social elements
like hoarders or black-marketeers, and as the courts have shown
their readiness to strike down of such detention orders on the slightest
opportunity the measure has at no time been any menace to the in-
dividual liberty. May be, considering the overall political and econo-
mic conditions in India at present, any such measure may even be a
necessity for the self-preservation of the country, but tor whatever
duration any such power may exist in the government, it is necessary
that there should be procedural safeguards to protect the individual
liberty from governmental usurpation. Article 2^(5) serves this
purpose.
k
PERSONAL LIBERTY 'ITS RESTRICTED M E A N I N G
I N A R T I C L E 21 : C O N C L U S I O N
Thus far we have been discussing the procedural safeguards
provided under the Indian constitutional system against deprivation
of personal liberty in a restricted sense, as this term is understood in the
context of Articles 21 and 22. These Articles concern only with the
139. Ibid., at p . 168.
140. For a statistics of the number of persons arrested under the Preventive
Dentention Act from year 1950 to I960, see Vivian Bose, Preventive Detention
in India, 3 Journal of the International Commission of Jurists 87, 95-96 (1961).