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What is Law?

The Path of the Law Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law (Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Review, 457, 460 [1897]).

The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life.

If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only
for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one,
who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions
of conscience.

The law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and negligence, and so forth, and
nothing is easier, or, I may say, more common in legal reasoning, than to take these words in
their moral sense, at some state of the argument, and so to drop into fallacy. For instance, when
we speak of the rights of man in a moral sense, we mean to mark the limits of interference with
individual freedom which we think are prescribed by conscience, or by our ideal, however
reached.

Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence Tolentino

General Sense:

Law is the science of moral rules, founded on the rational nature of man, which govern his free
activity, for the realization of the individual and social ends, of a nature both demandable and
reciprocal.

Specific Sense:

Law is a juridical proposition or an aggregate of juridical propositions, promulgated and

published by the competent organs of the State in accordance with the Constitution.

Law is a rule of conduct, just, obligatory, promulgated by legitimate authority, and of

common observance and benefit. Sanchez Roman

Foundation of Law:

Law is a product of social life, and is a creation of human nature. Law, rests upon the concept of
order, coexistence, and liberty.

Characteristics of Law:

1. It is a rule of human conduct

2. Promulgated by competent authority

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3. Obligatory
4. Of general observance
5.

An Introduction to Philippine Law (Chapter IV) Gamboa

Law as the Delineator of Rights and Duties Whatever may be the ultimate purpose of the
law, its immediate result is mainly the delineation of the rights and duties of the individuals
living in the state. Law regulates the external conduct of man by defining his rights and duties
and providing for the means of their enforcement.

Law in its specific and concrete sense is a rule of conduct, just, obligatory, formulated by
legitimate power for common observance and benefit (Lapitan vs. Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, 60 O.G. 6841).

Legal Education in the Philippines: Confronting the Issues of Relevance and

Responsiveness -Theodore Te

Law is a reality. Law pervades every aspect of human relations, and affects every person, albeit
in varying degrees and with multifarious effects. It has been urged that the idea of law should
always be associated with justice and that law without justice is a mockery, if not a contradiction,
but there exists merely a tenuous relationship between law and justice.

Law is but a reflection of the structure of social and economic relationship existing within a
society.

The law is not a panacea to all the social ills that befall us. In fact, it is often the law, which is the
result of an unjust legal and social system, that breeds such social ills. It is only through
concerted action by students of the law, lawyers and other professionals with and upon the
initiative of the members of the basic sectors made aware of their rights as well as their capacity
to affect change that any meaningful changes, may be effected.

Effect and Application of Laws

Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

Article 3 of the same Code provides that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.

The publication of mandatory and prohibitory laws is essential for the citizens to know their
rights, duties, and obligations under the law. Without its publication, the citizens can rightfully
plead ignorance of the law.

The maxim Ignorantia legis neminem excusat (ignorance of the law excuses no one) cannot be
invoked by the citizen affected by the law after such law has been duly published and has taken

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effect. With its publication and effectivity, the citizens are presumed to know the law.

Nobody can escape its effects by alleging that he does not know its provisions. John Selden
wrote: Ignorance of the law excuses no man: not that all men know the law, but because its an
excuse every man will plead, and no man can tell how to confute him. (Oxford Concise
Dictionary of PRO-VERBS, Second Edition, p. 135.)

When Laws Take Effect?

Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (Art. 4, New Civil Code)

Art. 22 (RPC). Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as
this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.

Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

Doctrine:

The clear object of the above-quoted provision (Art. 2 of the Civil Code) is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is

mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class
of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concerned.

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances of a public nature or of

general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

Presidential Decrees and issuances of general application which have not been published
shall have no force and effect.

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Case Digest: TAADA VS. TUVERA

Ponente: J. Escolin

Facts:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

Held:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)

Doctrine:

The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws
and not to the requirement of publication.

The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with.

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We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.

Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not covered by the rule on prior
publication. Also, not covered are municipal ordinances which are governed by the Local
Government Code.

Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all.

Case Digest: TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

Held:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a

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condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

Askay v. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179 (1924)

Doctrine:

Section 11 of the Administrative Code provides: "A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after
the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being
excluded.

Held: That as there is a special provision in Act No. 3107, it applies to the exclusion of the
general provision contained in the Administrative Code. Held, further: That as Act No. 3107
went into effect on March 17, 1923, and that as it was subsequent thereto, on April 16, 1923, that
Judge of First Instance Harvey was authorized to hold court at Baguio beginning with May 2,
1923, Judge Harvey had jurisdiction to try the case of Askay vs. Cosalan.

Case Digest: Askay v. Cosalan

Ponente: J. Malcolm

Facts:
- The plaintiff in this case is Askay, an illiterate Igorrote between 70 and 80 years of age,
residing in the municipal district of Tublay, Province of Benguet, who at various time has
been the owner of mining property. The defendant is Fernando A. Cosalan, the nephew
by marriage of Askay, and municipal president of Tublay, who likewise has been
interested along with his uncle in mining enterprises.
- About 1907, Askay obtained title to the Pet Kel Mineral Claim located in Tublay,
Benguet. On November 23, 1914, if we are to accept defendant's Exhibit 1, Askay sold
this claim to Cosalan. Nine years later, in 1923, Askay instituted action in the Court of
First Instance of Benguet to have the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim adhered null.
- On April 16, 1923, as appears from the Official Gazette, the Secretary of Justice
authorized and instructed Judge Harvey, Judge of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial
District, to hold a special term of court in the City of Baguio, Mountain Province,
beginning May 2, 1923.

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- Judge Harvey dismissed the complaint.

- Plaintiff attacked the dismissal on two grounds: The first, jurisdiction, and the second,
formal. Both motions were denied and an appeal was perfected.

Issue/s:
- WON Act No. 3107 (an act authorizing a Judge of First Instance to be detailed by the
Secretary of Justice to temporary duty, for a period which shall in no case exceed six
months, in a district or province other than his own, for the purpose of trying all kinds of
cases, excepting criminal and election cases) was in force even without publication in the
OG.
- WON Judge George R. Harvey had jurisdiction to try the case.
- WON the sale of Pet Kel Mineral claim was accomplished through fraud and deceit.

Held/Ratio
- Yes. The final section of Act No. 3107, provides that "This Act shall take effect on its
approval." The Act was approved on March 17, 1923. Obviously, therefore, there being a
special provision in Act No. 3107, it applies to the exclusion of the general provision
contained in the Administrative Code (Plaintiff relies on section 11 of the Administrative
Code, which in part reads: "A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature shall, in the
absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being
excluded.").
- Yes. Judge Harvey had jurisdiction to try this case, that his findings of fact are in
accordance with the evidence, that no prejudicial error was committed in the trial, and
that the complaint was properly dismissed.
Recalling, therefore, that Act No. 3107 went into effect on March, 17, 1923, and that
it was subsequent thereto, on April 16, 1923, that Judge Harvey was authorized to
hold court at Baguio, beginning with May 2, 1923, appellant's argument along this
line is found to be without persuasive merit. We pass to the material issue which is
one of fact.
- No. Facts and circumstances in this case are strong evidences that the sale is legitimate:
The consideration for the sale consisted of P107 in cash, a bill fold, one sheet, one
cow, and two carabaos. The fact that the bargain was a hard one, coupled with mere
inadequacy of price when both parties are in a position to form an independent
judgment concerning the transaction, is not a sufficient ground for the cancellation of
a contract.
The document itself executed in the presence of witnesses and before a notary public
and filed with the mining recorder.
The deed of sale was interpreted to the plaintiff and that thereupon he placed his
thumb mark on the document.
Askay waited for 9 years from the date when the deed was executed before
questioning the said sale in the court.

Balbuna v. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960)

Doctrine:

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DEPARTMENT ORDER No. 8 NOT OF GENERAL APPLICATION; PUBLICATION

THEREOF IN OFFICIAL GAZETTE NOT NECESSARY TO HAVE BINDING FORCE AND
EFFECT

The contention that Department Order No. 8 has no binding force and effect, not having been
published in the Official Gazette, is without merit. The assailed Department Order, being
addressed only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools, and educational institutions under
their supervision, cannot be said to be of general application, requiring previous publication in
the Official Gazette before it could have binding force and effect. Com. Act 638 and Act 2930 do
not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective; said
two Arts merely enumerate and made a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette
presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the government issuing the same, and
of the Bureau of Printing.

Case Digest: Balbuna v. Secretary of Education

Ponente: J. Reyes

Facts:
- Members of the Jehovahs Witnesses appeal the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Capiz, dated June 23, 1958, dismissing their petition for prohibition and mandamus
against the Secretary of Education and the other respondents.
- The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order (DO) No. 8, s.
1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the
conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No.
1265.
- Petitioners appellants assail the validity of the above Department Order, for it allegedly
denies them freedom of worship and of speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; that it
denies them due process of law and the equal protection of the laws; and that it unduly
restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children.
- Petitioners-appellants raise the new issue that that Department Order No. 8 has no
binding force and effect, not having been published in the Official Gazette as allegedly
required by Commonwealth Act 638, Article 2 of the New Civil Code, and Section 11 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
- Appellants contend that Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an
undue delegations of legislative power.

Issue/s:
- WON DO No. 8 denies the freedom of worship and of speech as guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights.

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- WON DO No. 8 has no binding force and effect, not having been published in the
Official Gazette.
- WON DO No. 8 is unconstitutional and void for being an undue delegations of legislative
power.

Held/Ratio:
- The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather, it is a symbol
of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and
national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of
love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for.
Department Order No. 8 does not violate the Constitutional provisions about freedom of
religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and
reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag
ceremony, is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and
refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and
dismissed from the public school they were attending.
- We see no merit in this contention. The assailed Department Order, being addressed
only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools, and educational institutions
under their supervision, can not be said to be of general application.
Statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided (Art. 2, Civil
Code). In the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty
against those pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or
otherwise violating the provisions of said order. Their expulsion was merely the
consequence of their failure to observe school discipline which the school
authorities are bound to maintain.
- That the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the
validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and
policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency. To require the statute to
establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the
administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.

Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 627 (1962)

Doctrine:

Circular No. 22 of the Social Security Commission merely an advisory opinion and need not be
approved by the President.

Circular No. 22 of the Social Security Commission purports merely to advise employers-
members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in
determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security
contributions should be based. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as
amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law
should be construed. Such circular, therefore, did not require presidential approval and
publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.

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Case Digest: Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission

Ponente: J. Barrera

Facts:
- On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22.
- Circular No. 22: Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums
due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration
all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration.
All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2%
and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.
- Petitioner protested that the circular is contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated
October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the
employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions.
- Petitioner questions the authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to
promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the
Official Gazette.
- SEC ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the
President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the
law should be construed.
- Petitioner appealed the ruling.

Issue/s:
- WON Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic
Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal
subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.

Held/Ratio:
- No. Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the
monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions
should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and
publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.

Additional Notes:

Distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative

interpretation of a law:
When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the
force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative
Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or
authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and
compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so

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because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of
carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.

Judicial Decisions:

Article 8 (Civil Code). Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

Lazatin v. Desierto, 588 SCRA 285 (2009)

Doctrine:

Stare Decisis Doctrine of Stare Decisis The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere
is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides, thus: ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.
The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise,
the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably
affected and the publics confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.
Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great
benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be
justified in setting aside the same.

Case Digest: Lazatin v. Desierto

Ponente: J. Peralta

Facts:
- On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein
petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds.
- The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman
Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year
1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF;

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he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing

Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08.
Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A.
Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.
- May 29, 2000 Resolution was approved to charge petitioners with fourteen (14) counts
each of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Said Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman.
- Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the
cases against petitioners.
- September 18, 2000 Offfice of Special Prosecutor (OSP) recommended to the
Ombudsman the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of
evidence.
- The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the
OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum1 dated October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended
that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial
of the cases against petitioners.
- On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby
disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive
prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for
continuation of criminal proceedings.

Issue/s:
- WON the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess
of his jurisdiction.

Held:
- No. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of
the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no
constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated
the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the
Ombudsman.
- The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.2 More
recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera,3 the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on
its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is merely a component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon

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authority of the Ombudsman and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to
preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.

Ratio:
- The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides, thus: ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
- The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts
in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court
thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases
by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.

Co v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 444 (1993)

Doctrine:

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines, according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. Laws shall have no
retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is
echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, ** (this being) the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.

Case Digest: Co v. Court of Appeals

Ponente: C.J. Narvasa

Facts:
- In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel and in
payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated
petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn
against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of
P361,528.00.

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- The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
- A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the
salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The
case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer
a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the
sum of P361,528.00.
- Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it
was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of
conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People,
154 SCRA 160 (1987)

Issue:
- WON Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)
stating that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should be given retrospective effect.

Held:
- No. The decision in Que v. People should not be given retrospective effect to the
prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion
of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Ratio:
- Principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory.
- According to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is
echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal.
- A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set
forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US
371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account
of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating
acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.

Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila, 23 SCRA 948 (1968)

Doctrines:

Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts
were instituted was to put an end to controversies.

Pikachu Notes
 15

If a judge of a lower court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that
the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or
against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the
case in accordance with his personal views he must first think
that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that
any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel,
unnecessary inconvenience, delays and expenses to the litigants.

Case Digest: Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila

Ponente: J. Reyes

Facts:
- The present petition for certiorari is the fifth. Originally docketed in 1949, within a span
of 19 years, the legal dispute has come to this Court four times.
- Plaintiff Albert sued University Publishing Company, Inc. for breach of contract. Albert
died before the case proceeded to trial, and Justo R. Albert, his estate's administrator, was
substituted. Finally, defendant's liability was determined by this Court in L-15275.
Plaintiff was to recover P15,000.00 with legal interest from judicial demand.
- July 22, 1961 - First Decision: Court of First Instance of Manila issued on July 22, 1961
an order of execution against University Publishing Company, Inc. In serving the order,
they discovered that no such entity exist.
- August 10, 1961 Said discovery triggered a verified petition in the court for the
issuance of a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff of Manila to cause the satisfaction of
the judgment against the assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant in
the case.
- All along, Jose M. Aruego and his law firm were counsel for the University Publishing
Company, Inc.
- On August 11, 1961, University Publishing Company, Inc., by counsel Aruego, Mamaril
and Associates (the law firm of Jose M. Aruego aforesaid) merely countered plaintiffs
petition for execution as against Aruego with an unsworn manifestation in court that "said
Jose M. Aruego is not a party to this case," and, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be
denied
- September 9, 1961 Judge Cloribel denied plaintiffs motion on the ground that Aruego
is not a party on the case.
- Plaintiff appealed to SC.
- January 30,1965 Justice Bengzon categorically opined that University Publishing Co.,
Inc has no independent juridical personality separate from Jose M. Aruego; it cannot be
sued independently.
- Respondent in its motion for reconsideration thereof, asked that it be afforded
opportunity to prove its corporate existence.
- June 16, 1965 Motion for reconsideration was denied.
- July 28, 1965 - Petitioner returned to the lower court with a motion for execution and
approval of the bill of costs and asking specifically for the issuance of the corresponding
writ against Aruego to satisfy the judgment.
- July 30, 1965 - Aruego moved to intervene with an opposition in intervention to the
motion for execution.

Pikachu Notes
 16

- February 21, 1966 - Judge Gaudencio Cloribel, upon consideration of this motion for
execution and for approval of the bill of costs, the opposition thereto by Aruego, and the
reply to the opposition, granted the motion for execution and directed that a writ of
execution "be issued accordingly.
- Aruego came back with a motion for reconsideration, adamant in his resolve that he
would not pay as he was not a party to the suit. This was opposed by plaintiff.
- March 5, 1966 - Judge Gaudencio Cloribel reconsidered his order of February 21, 1966,
and denied the motion for a writ of execution against Jose M. Aruego upon the ground
that "said Jose M. Aruego has never been a party to the case and that the judgment sought
to be executed is not against him."
- On April 4, 1966, it was petitioner's turn to file a motion for reconsideration for the
reason that the question of whether or not an order of execution could issue against
Aruego had already been resolved by this Court in its final judgment in L-19118.
- April 20, 1966, Jose M. Aruego opposed the motion for reconsideration and prayed for
supplementary proceedings to allow him as intervenor to present evidence in support
thereof.
- April 28, 1966 - Petitioner filed his reply to Aruego's opposition upon the ground that
these are matters concluded in the decision and resolution of this Court, and that
respondent court cannot admit said documents without going against this Court's clear
mandate.
- May 20, 1966 Judge Cloribel allowed Aruego to present evidence in support of his
opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
- May 28, 1966 - Aruego presented additional documents to prove the corporations
existence (e.g., document signed by majority of the Directors declaring that the
corporation still exists and AOI have not been amended or modified).
- July 13, 1966 - Notwithstanding plaintiff's opposition to the admission of the documents
just mentioned, and his claim that the matter involved in the execution had long been
finished and decided by this Court, Judge Gaudencio Cloribel denied plaintiff's motion
for execution.

Issue/s:
- WON Judge Gaudencio Cloribel acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Held/Ratio:
- Yes. The orders of Judge Gaudencio Cloribel of March 5, May 20, and July 13, 1966 are
hereby set aside and declared null and void.
The liability of Aruego has been established so plainly in the decision and
resolution in L-19118 that there could not be any quibbling as to the import of the
words there used. Case L-19118 was brought into being because precisely Judge
Cloribel ruled that execution could not be issued against Jose M. Aruego upon the
ground, so he said in his appealed order, that Aruego was not a party to the action.
This Court there reversed Judge Gaudencio Cloribel.
The Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has
the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other
courts should take their bearings.

Pikachu Notes
 17

Judge Gaudencio Cloribel should have known that "[a] becoming modesty of
inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in
the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation."
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of
deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority
is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion
on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his
personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted
by the Highest Court of the Land Martiniano P. Vivo vs. Hon. Gaudencio
Cloribel, et al., L-23239, November 23, 1966.

De Roy v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 757 (1988)

Doctrine:

There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding. It is the bounded duty of lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of Supreme Court decisions.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to
the case at bar owing to the nonpublication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as
of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners
view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty
of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

Case Digest: De Roy v. Court of Appeals

Ponente: J. Cortes

Facts:
- The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
- First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages
to private respondents.
- On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in
a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners
on August 25, 1987.
- On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners
filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.

Pikachu Notes
 18

- Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was
denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

Issue/s:
- WON the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
- WON the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case
at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as
of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.

Held/Ratio:
- No. The Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed
entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration.
It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
[G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
Motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of
last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested.
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on
September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on
June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
- No. The rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should apply to the case at bar since there
is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

Ignorance of Law:

Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith (Civil Code).

Zulueta v. Zulueta, 1 Phil., 254 (1902)

Doctrine:

Act No. 75, granting relief from judgments obtained by mistake, applies to mistakes of fact and
not to mistakes of law committed by the trial court.

The mistake in this instance was her own, but it was a mistake of law, and while we should be
unwilling to say that special cases might not occur in which relief would be afforded in such a
proceeding as this against a mistake of law made by a party, we are of opinion that the present is
not such a case. Nothing is shown here except the bare fact that the party acted under ignorance

Pikachu Notes
 19

or misconception of the provisions of the law in regard to the time within which the appeal could
be taken, and there is no reason why the general principle, a principle "founded not only on
expediency and policy but on necessity," that "ignorance of the law does not excuse from
compliance therewith" (Civil Code, art. 2), should be relaxed.

Case Digest: Zulueta v. Zulueta

Ponente: J. Ladd

Facts:
- Don Jose Zulueta and his sister, Doa Francisca Zulueta, are sole heirs under the will of
their father, Don Clemente Zulueta, who died in Iloilo in 1900.
- In the course of testamentary proceedings, three auditors were appointed, one by Don
Jose, one by Dona Zulueta, and an auditor umpire by common accord of the parties.
- The appointed auditor by the parties have different reports. The auditor umpire agreed to
the report of Don Joses appointed auditor. Dona Zuleata opposed.
- On petition of Don Jose the court by a providencia of May 7 fixed the term of fifteen
days as that within which Doa Francisca should formulate her demand, which term was
subsequently enlarged seven days on petition of Doa Francisca.
- An auto rendered June 15, declaring, furthermore, that the term fixed for the filing of the
demand having expired, Doa Francisca has lost her right to institute the action.
- Doa Francisca petitioned that she was prevented from entering an appeal from that auto
by her mistake as to the term prescribed by the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil for entering
appeals in such cases.

Issue
WON Doa Francisca is entitled to relief against the consequences of her failure to interpose her
appeal against the auto of June 22 within the period fixed by the law.

Held:
No. The mistake in this instance was her own, but it was a mistake of law, and while we should
be unwilling to say that special cases might not occur in which relief would be afforded in such a
proceeding as this against a mistake of law made by a party, we are of opinion that the present is
not such a case. Nothing is shown here except the bare fact that the party acted under ignorance
or misconception of the provisions of the law in regard to the time within which the appeal could
be taken, and there is no reason why the general principle, a principle "founded not only on
expediency and policy but on necessity," that "ignorance of the law does not excuse from
compliance therewith" (Civil Code, art. 2), should be relaxed.

Ratio:
- This was a mistake of law and for such mistakes relief can not, as a general rule, be
granted.
- Art. 2 of Civil Code

De Luna, et al. v. Linatoc, 74 Phil., 15 (1942)

Doctrine:

Pikachu Notes
 20

Mistake of law does not make a contract voidable, because ignorance of the law does not excuse
anyone from its compliance (art. 2, Civil Code 8 Manresa, 646, 2d ed.). That the petitioners did
not know the prohibition against partition of the conjugal partner ship property during marriage
(art. 1432, Civil Code) is no valid reason why they should ask for the annulment of the sales
made.

Moreover, there is the time honored legal maxim that no man can take advantage of his own
wrong. To repudiate the sales in question, petitioners are setting up their own wrongful act of
partitioning their conjugal property, which violated article 1432 of the Civil Code. The
prohibition in said article affects public policy, as it is designed to protect creditors of the
conjugal partnership and other third persons. Petitioners shall not, there fore, be allowed thus to
rest their cause of action to recover the lands sold, upon the illegality of the partition which they
attempted to make. Otherwise, they would profit by their own unlawful act.

Case Digest: De Luna, et al. v. Linatoc

Ponente: J. Bocobo

Relevant Laws/Topic: Article 3

Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Short summary:
The wife, who acted as an agent of the husband (De Luna), sold a portion of their conjugal
property during the subsistence of their marriage (The land was under the name of the husband
only because they already partitioned the parcel of land). Under the law, a conjugal property
cannot be partitioned during the subsistence of a marriage unless there was a judicial separation
of property. The spouses, claiming ignorance of the said prohibition, wanted to assail the sale of
the land to Jose Linatoc. The court DID NOT ALLOW such petition because of Article 3
(Article 2 of the CC during the time the decision was rendered)

Facts:
P-wife sold a portion of their conjugal property to R. The parcel of land was the husbands
portion of the conjugal property. The wife, with the knowledge and consent of the husband, sold
the lot to R as evidenced by the deed of sale and the deed of recognition wherein the husband
recognized and reiterated his acquiescence to the sale.
(Art 1416 A conjugal property can be sold by one spouse if the other spouse consents). Such
sale was prohibited by Art 1432 because partitioning the conjugal property during marriage can
only be done if there was a judicial separation of property, or else it would be illegal and void.
The sale can only be valid if the land was sold under the name of the conjugal partnership and
not of the husband only. The Ps assail the validity of the sale to R, claiming that they do not
know of such prohibition.

Issue:
WON the sale may be validly annulled by the spouses?

Pikachu Notes
 21

Held/Ratio:
No. Mistake of law does not make a contract voidable, because ignorance of the law does not
excuse anyone from its compliance (art. 2, Civil Code; 8 Manresa, 646, 2d ed.). That the
petitioners did not know the prohibition against partition of the conjugal partnership property
during marriage (art. 1432, Civil Code) is no valid reason why they should ask for the annulment
of the sales made Exhibits C and D and recognized in Exhibit I. Moreover, there is the time-
honored legal maxim that no man can take advantage of his own wrong. To repudiate the sales in
question, petitioners are setting up their own wrongful act of partitioning their conjugal property,
which violated article 1432 of the Civil Code. The prohibition in said article affects public
policy, as it is designed to protect creditors of the conjugal partnership and other third persons.
Petitioners shall not, therefore, be allowed thus to rest their cause of action to recover the lands
sold, upon the illegality of the partition which they attempted to make. Otherwise, they would
profit by their own unlawful act.

Silence of the Law

Article 9 (Civil Code). No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.

Article 10 (Civil Code). In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is

presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Article 11 (Civil Code). Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall
not be countenanced.

Article 12 (Civil Code). A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.

Cerrano v. Tan Chuco, 38 Phil. 392 (1918)

Doctrine:

There being no rule of law, expressly applicable to the hiring of personal property in
general or of vessels in particular, by which the duration of such a contract is to be
determined, and no local custom having been satisfactorily proved, we are required to
apply the general principles of law.

Case Digest: Cerrano v. Tan Chuco

Ponente: J. Fisher

Facts:
- This is an action by plaintiff for damages alleged to have been caused by the breach of a
contract for the hiring of a casco. The trial court gave judgment for plaintiff. Defendant
excepted to the judgment, moved for a new trial, excepted to the order denying the
motion, and brought the case to this court by bill of exceptions.
- On January 1916, the defendant, who was then the owner of casco No. 1033, rented it to
the plaintiff at a monthly rental of P70.

Pikachu Notes
 22

- There was no express agreement as regards the duration of the contract.

- The rent was payable at the end of each month.
- On May 1916, the defendant notified plaintiff that in the following month it would be
necessary to send the casco to Malabon for repairs.
- Plaintiff then informed the defendant that he would like to rent the casco again after the
repairs had been completed.
- Defendant indicated that he was willing to rent it, but would expect P80 a month for it.
- Plaintiff contends that it was agreed that he was to take the casco at he increased rental
while defendant insists that his offer to lease it at the higher rate was never accepted.
- It is contended on behalf of plaintiff, and denied by defendant, that according to the
custom prevailing in the port of Manila, a contract for the rental of a casco, when made
by the owner, is deemed in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, to run
from the date of the contract until the casco has to be docked for its annual overhauling
and repair. (In this case, 10 mos.)
- Defendant, on the contrary, contends that in the absence of an express stipulation
regarding the duration of the hire, it is deemed to be from month to month when a
monthly rental is agreed upon.
- The casco was taken to Malabon by plaintiff in June, 1916, and delivered at the shipyard
selected by defendant. The casco remained there, undergoing repairs, until the 24th of
July, 1916.
- About one week before the end of the repair period defendant sold the casco to Siy Cong
Bieng & Co.

Issue/s:
- WON it was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant that the casco was to be leased to
the former again after it had been repaired.
- WON the custom or the general principles of the law applies in determining the duration
of the contract.

Held/Ratio:
- Yes. The evidence sustains the conclusion of the lower court that it was understood
between the parties, when the casco was taken to Malabon in June, that plaintiff was to
have it again at the increased rental as soon as the contemplated repairs had been
completed. That such was the understanding is shown by the fact that plaintiff paid for
the towage of the casco to the dry dock at Malabon; that he left his equipment in it; and
that his patron stayed with the casco in Malabon during the time it was on the dock.
There can be no doubt, in our opinion that the casco had been rented to plaintiff, and that
its sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was a breach of the contract.
- There being no rule of law, expressly applicable to the hiring of personal property in
general or of vessels in particular, by which the duration of such a contract is to be
determined, and no local custom having been satisfactorily proved, we are required to
apply the general principles of law. (Civil Code, art. 6.)
- Article 1581 of the Civil Code provides that when no definite agreement has been made
regarding its duration, the lease of a house is deemed to have been made from day to day,
from month to month, or from year to year, according to whether a daily, monthly, or
yearly rent is to be paid.

Pikachu Notes
 23

- A similar presumption arises under similar conditions with respect to the hire of personal
property, in the absence of special circumstances showing a contrary intention.

Philippine Bank of Commerce v. De Vera, 6 SCRA 1026 (1962)

Doctrine:

A reading of the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended (re extra-judicial foreclosure) discloses
nothing, it is true, as to the mortgagee's right to recover such deft efficiency. But neither do we
find any provision thereunder which expressly or impliedly prohibits such recovery.

Article 2131 of the new Civil Code, on the contrary, expressly provides that "The form, extent
and consequence of a mortgage, both as to its constitution, modification and extinguishment, and
as to other matters not include in this Chapter, shall be governed by the provisions of the
Mortgage Law and of the Land Registration Law.

Under the Mortgage Law, which is still in force, the mortgagee has the right to claim for the
deficiency resulting from the price obtained in the sale of the real property at public auction and
the outstanding obligation at the time of the foreclosure proceedings.

The aforementioned discussion applies the general law due to the absence of a specific law
applicable to the case at bar and no local custom having been satisfactorily proven.

Case Digest: Philippine Bank of Commerce v. De Vera

Ponente: J. Barrera

Facts:
- By virtue of a contract, entitled 'Consolidation of First Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of
Assignment, executed on April 26, 1951, defendant Tomas de Vera is indebted to the
plaintiff in the total amount of P127,312.24, guaranteed by a real estate mortgage of the
defendant's land.
- Upon maturity of the defendant's obligation on March 15, 1956, and despite several
demands, the defendant failed to pay the outstanding balance of his obligation, for which
reason, the plaintiff filed a petition with the Sheriff of Pasay City on March 14, 1956 to
sell the properties subject to the Real Estate Mortgage executed and duly recorded in the
Registry of Deeds on May 17, 1949, for the sum of P150,000.00.
- The Sheriff acting accordingly, sold at public auction the two parcels of land to the
highest bidder, which was the plaintiff creditor in this case Philippine Bank of
Commerce, for the amount of P86,700.00 and the corresponding certificate of sale was
issued by the Sheriff of Pasay City dated April 16, 1956. The plaintiff now, thru the
present action, seeks to recover from the defendant the balance of his obligation after
deducting the price of the land sold at public auction, of which, together with the interest
up to January 31, 1958, there remained an outstanding balance of P99,033.20.
- The Court of First Instance of Manila (in Civil Case No. 35169) ordering him to pay to
plaintiff Philippine Bank of Commerce, his outstanding obligation of P99,033.20, with

Pikachu Notes
 24

6% interest from April 16, 1956 until fully paid, and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus
costs.
- The defendant made an appeal.

Issue:
- WON the trial court acted correctly in holding appellee Bank entitled to recover from
appellant the sum of P99,033.20 a deficiency arising after the extrajudicial foreclosure,
under Act No. 3135, as amended, of the mortgaged properties in question.

Held/Ratio:
- Yes. The trial court acted correctly since the step taken by the mortgagee-bank in
resorting to extra-judicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135, was "merely to find a
proceeding for the sale, and its action can not be taken to mean a waiver of its right to
demand the payment of the whole debt. Medina v. Philippine National Bank (56 Phil.
651)
- A reading of the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended (re extra-judicial foreclosure)
discloses nothing, it is true, as to the mortgagee's right to recover such deft efficiency.
But neither do we find any provision thereunder which expressly or impliedly prohibits
such recovery.
- Article 2131 of the new Civil Code, on the contrary, expressly provides that "The form,
extent and consequence of a mortgage, both as to its constitution, modification and
extinguishment, and as to other matters not include in this Chapter, shall be governed by
the provisions of the Mortgage Law and of the Land Registration Law.
- Under the Mortgage Law, which is still in force, the mortgagee has the right to claim for
the deficiency resulting from the price obtained in the sale of the real property at public
auction and the outstanding obligation at the time of the foreclosure proceedings.

Chu Jan v Bernas 34 Phil 631 (1916)

Doctrine:

Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case submitted to him
for decision are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by
dismissing them without deciding on the issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing
that a case may arise to which no law would be applicable, the Civil Code in 2nd paragraph of
Art 6, provides that Customs of the place shall be observed and in absence thereof, the
general principles of law.

Case Digest: Chu Jan v Bernas

Facts:
Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match, defendant
Lucio Bernas was declared the winner. Each had put up a wager of P160 before the cockfight.
Justice of peace court decided that bout was a draw. Defendant appealed toCourt of First
Instance praying judgment and ordering defendant to abide and comply with rules and
regulations governing cockfights to pay P160 and return the other amount which s in safekeeping

Pikachu Notes
 25

of Cockpit owner Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss cost
against plaintiff. Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal without special findings. On
plaintiff's motion, an order ordering provincial treasurer and if possible, Municipal Treasurer
of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu Jan. Proceedings was
forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the proper bill of exceptions

Issue:
Did Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings since grounds for
dismissal pronounced by lower court appealed from ere that court has always dismissed cases of
this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and duties of referees; that
he does not know where to find the law and that he knows of no law that governs the right
to plaintiff and defendants concerning cockfights.

Held:
Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case submitted to him
for decision are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by
dismissing them without deciding on the issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing
that a case may arise to which no law would be applicable, the Civil Code in 2nd paragraph of
Art 6, provides that Customs of the place shall be observed and in absence thereof, the general
principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and order appealed from are reversed and to record of
the proceedings shall remanded to court from when they came for due trial and judgment as
provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to cost.

Go v Anti-Chinese League, 84 Phil. 468 (1946)

Doctrine:

It is the sworn duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or favor, to follow its mandate
not to tamper with it. The court cannot adopt a policy different from that of the law. What the
law grants, the court cannot deny.

Law v. Morality, Justice, Social Justice, Equity

An Introduction to Philippine Law by Gamboa Chapter 1: The General Nature of Law

Law in its widest sense means any rule of action, norm of conduct, or expression of uniformity.
In its most comprehensive signification, law is applicable indiscriminately to all objects of
creation, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational, as well as to intangible processes.
Thus, besides the law of the state, we speak of divine law, natural law, moral law, physical law,
economic law, and others.

Divine law the system of rules or precepts which regulates the operations of the universe
according to the will and command of God.

Natural law or jus natural there exist certain fundamental precepts of life which are
discoverable through divine inspiration and the use of reason.

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Moral law in the sense of positive morality, is the aggregate of all the rules of human conduct
growing out of the collective sense of right and wrong of the community.

Physical law (the laws of physical science) comprises the methods of uniformity and regularity
in the operations of nature.

Differences between law and morality:

Law deals with outward acts while morality is concerned with inner motives and intentions.

Law is enforced by the physical force of the state while morality is enforced not by force but by
public opinion and ones own conscience.

The spheres of positive law and positive morality are different although they often overlap. For
example, it is not punishable under the law to tell falsehood except when it constitutes perjury,
but it is against morality to tell a lie. The law commands that we drive on the right side of the
road but it is immaterial from the point of view of morality on which side of the road we drive.
Often law and morality overlaps as in the case of murder, for example. It is both unlawful and
immoral.

Leus v. St. Scholasticas College Westgrove, 748 SCRA 378 (2015)

Doctrine:

The fact of the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to
characterize the petitioners conduct as disgraceful or immoral.

The determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two (2)-step

process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and
second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis--vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e.,
what the society generally considers moral and respectable.

That the distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality is important
because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious x x x.
Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but
public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms. Otherwise,
if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the
resulting
policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. In other words, government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose.
That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is detrimental (or dangerous)

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to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society and
not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.

Premarital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry
each other, and consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public
and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct.

Case Digest: Leus v. St. Scholasticas College Westgrove

Ponente: J. Reyes

Pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry
each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public
and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.

Facts:
St. Scholastica College Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic school, hired Cheryll Santos Leus as one
of its non-teaching personnel. Leus got pregnant out of wedlock and eventually married the
father of her child. Nevertheless, Leus was dismissed of her employment by the reason that her
conduct of having pre-marital sexual relations was unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic
school.

Issue:
Is pregnancy out of wedlock a valid ground for termination of employment?

Held:
No. Admittedly, Leus is employed in an educational institution where the teachings and
doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld
and taught to the students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock,
is anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against the prevailing
norms of conduct, the petitioners conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or immoral such
conduct is not denounced by public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but
it certainly is not disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law.

Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in upholding the validity of the Leus dismissal. The labor
tribunals arbitrarily relied solely on the circumstances surrounding the petitioners pregnancy
and its supposed effect on SSCW and its students without evaluating whether Leus conduct is
indeed considered disgraceful or immoral in view of the prevailing norms of conduct. In this
regard, the labor tribunals respective haphazard evaluation of the evidence amounts to grave
abuse of discretion, which the Court will rectify.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 618 SCRA 32 (2010)

Doctrine:

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Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to
imagine the reasons behind this censurereligious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of
marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their
perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize
homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not
been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.

A mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

Case Digest: ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs), as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme
Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Held:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.

Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation
of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The
proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the
conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is detrimental or dangerous to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious
conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to
Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on
the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not
tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil., 726 (1940)

Doctrine:

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Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to ensure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time honored principle of salus populi est supremo, lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Case Digest: Calalang vs. Williams

Facts:
Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works
promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue
to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public officers.
Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon
constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all people.

Issue:
Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

Held:
Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice,
therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to
all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental

Pikachu Notes
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and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons,
and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Additional Notes:
Communism - a political theory derived from Karl Marx, advocating class war and leading to a
society in which all property is publicly owned and each person works and is paid according to
their abilities and needs.
Despotism - a country or political system where the ruler holds absolute power.
Atomism - designate a theory to the effect that social processes and groups are by-products of the
doings of social atoms. Individual people or their individual acts may be identified as these
atoms.
Anarchy is society without government / laws.

Agabon v. NLRC, 442 SCRA 573 (2004)

Doctrine:

To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also
enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent doctrines in the law on employment
termination, we believe that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of
the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to
abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just
cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that
imposed in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result by
dispensing justice not just to employees, but to employers as well.

An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be protected by
the Social Justice Clause of the Constitutionsocial justice must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life Social justice is not based on rigid formulas
set in stoneit has to allow for changing times and circumstances.

Case Digest: Agabon v. NLRC

Facts:
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum board and cornice installers from
January 1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was decided in their favor by the Labor
Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the NLRC contending just cause for the dismissal because of
petitioners abandonment of work. NLRC ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not
entitled to backwages and separation pay. The CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal
because they have abandoned their work but ordered the payment of money claims.

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Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Held:
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also
enjoins the employer to give the employee the right to be heard and to defend himself.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.
For a valid finding or abandonment, two factors are considered: failure to report for work
without a valid reason; and, a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship with the
second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be
deduced that the employees has no more intention to work.

Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due
process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an
indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil Doctrine of the Belated Due
process Rule.

Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not for any of the justifiable or authorized by
law. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify
the dismissal but the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory
rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay
later which we sought to deter in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees rights warrants
the payment of nominal damages.

Reno Foods Inc. vs. NLM-Katipuan et. al., 615 SCRA 240 (2010)

Doctrines:

The Court awards financial assistance to employees who were terminated for just causes, on grounds of
equity and social justice. We recognized the harsh realities faced by employees that forced them, despite
their good intentions, to violate company policies, for which the employer can rightfully terminate their
employment. BUT the award of financial assistance shall not be given to validly terminated employees,
whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in their moral character. When the
employee commits an act of dishonesty, depravity, or iniquity, the grant of financial assistance is
misplaced compassion. It is tantamount not only to condoning a patently illegal or dishonest act, but an
endorsement thereof. It will be an insult to all the laborers who, despite their economic difficulties, strive
to maintain good values and moral conduct.

Case Digest: Reno Foods Inc. vs. NLM-Katipuan et. al.

Facts:

Petitioner Corporation terminated Nenita Capor after she was caught sneaking out cans of RENO
products during a standard operating procedure of searching the belongings of employees upon
leaving company premises conducted by the guards. Capor alleged that the goods in her bag

Pikachu Notes
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were not pilfered and that it may have just been planted by the company to avoid paying
separation pay as she was already about to retire. RENO filed a case of qualified theft against
Capor. While NLM-Katipunan filed in behalf of Capor, a case of illegal dismissal and money
claims against RENO before the Head Arbitration Office of the NLRC, praying that Capor be awarded
backwages and moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter found Capor guilty of grave
misconduct which was just cause for termination. Further, that Capor is not entitled to reinstatement,
backwages, moral and exemplary damages. On appeal, the NLRC modified the ruling by awarding
separation pay to Capor as financial assistance. Petitioner appealed before the CA, which affirmed the
ruling of NLRC. Meanwhile, Capor was acquitted of qualified theft charges.

Issue:

Is an employee terminated for just cause entitled to financial assistance?

Ruling:

No. Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employees
fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal
dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed
for just cause, such as serious misconduct.

The Court awards financial assistance to employees who were terminated for just causes, on grounds of
equity and social justice. We recognized the harsh realities faced by employees that forced them, despite
their good intentions, to violate company policies, for which the employer can rightfully terminate their
employment. BUT the award of financial assistance shall not be given to validly terminated employees,
whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in their moral character. When the
employee commits an act of dishonesty, depravity, or iniquity, the grant of financial assistance is
misplaced compassion. It is tantamount not only to condoning a patently illegal or dishonest act, but an
endorsement thereof. It will be an insult to all the laborers who, despite their economic difficulties, strive
to maintain good values and moral conduct.

Further, an employees acquittal in a criminal case, especially one that is grounded on the existence of
reasonable doubt, will not preclude a determination in a labor case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the
employers interests. Criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt while labor disputes require
only substantial evidence. Since the Labor tribunals found substantial evidence to conclude that Capor
had been validly dismissed for dishonesty or serious misconduct there is no compelling reason to doubt
the common findings of these reviewing bodies.

On Capors allegation that her length of service and previously clean employment record should
be considered in awarding her separation pay, the Court ruled that it cannot simply erase the
gravity of the betrayal exhibited by a malfeasant employee. Length of service is not a bargaining chip
that can simply be stacked against the employer. After all, an employer-employee relationship is
symbiotic where both parties benefit from mutual loyalty and dedicated service. If an employer had
treated his employee well, has accorded him fairness and adequate compensation as determined by law, it
is only fair to expect a long-time employee to return such fairness with at least some respect and
honesty. Betrayal by a long-time employee is more insulting and odious for a fair employer.

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Hodges v Yulo, read Dissenting opinion

Facts:
- As attorney-in-fact of Paz Salas and Carlota Salas the herein defendant-appellant (Felix S.
Yulo) obtained a loan from the herein plaintiff-appellee (C. N. Hodges) in the amount of
P28,000 for which a mortgage on certain real estate owned by appellants principals was
executed In favor of the appellee on March 27, 1926.
- On April 16, 1938, the appellee brought an action against the appellant for the recovery
of the aforesaid P10,188.29.
- the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros sustained appellees claim with respect
to the sum of P8,188.29, applied by the appellant to his two promissory notes in favor of
appellee (P2,000.00 was disallowed for being usurious).
- Appellant contends that appellees action had prescribed, because it was not brought
within ten years from 1920.
- Held: the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant appellant absolved from the
complaint on account of statute of limitation (prescription).

Dissenting Opinion

In the light of these facts, is it fair or good law to allow Yulo to assert the statute of limitations,
charging Hodges with neglect, when he himself had induced, fraudulently or through negligence,
the delay?

Doctrine

- The Philippine courts are both courts of equity and law.

- Where a defendant has, by deception or by any violation of duty towards plaintiff,
caused him to subject his claim to the bar of limitations, equity will not permit him to
hold the advantage thus obtained.
- A court of equity may enjoin a defendant in an action at law from using the statute of
limitations fraudulently, and this even where the cause of action did not arise out of a
fraudulent act, if defendant has misled plaintiff in regard to it.
- Equity aids only the vigilant. We fully recognize this principle as being sound and just,
but it must be remembered that it is qualified by another principle of equity, to the effect
that the party seeking to take advantage of the maxim must be free from fault, and he
must have done nothing to lull his adversary into repose, thereby obstructing and
preventing vigilance on the part of the latter.

Muller v. Muller, 500 SCRA 65 (2006)

Pikachu Notes
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Doctrine:

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that
to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks
equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter
is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done
inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity
on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought
the property despite the constitutional prohibition.

Case Digest: Muller v. Muller

Doctrine:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.

Facts:
Elena and Helmut,a German national were married in Germany and resided there in a house
owned by RHelmuts parents but later permanently resided in the Philippines. Helmut had
inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo and in the construction of a house. The Antipolo
property was registered in the name of Elena. After they separated, Helmut filed a motion for
separation of properties for reimbursement of the property in Antipolo.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Ruling:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

Ratio Decidendi:
- There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
- In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put the
property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.
- With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.

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DPWH v. Quiwa, 665 SCRA 479 (2012)

Doctrine:

Parties who do not come to court with clean hands cannot be allowed to profit from their own
wrongdoing. The action (or inaction) of the party seeking equity must be free from fault, and he
must have done nothing to lull his adversary into repose, thereby obstructing and preventing
vigilance on the part of the latter. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court found any design
to defraud on the part of the respondent contractors. While petitioner is correct in saying that one
who seeks equity must do equity, and one who comes into equity must come with clean hands, it
is equally true that an allegation of fraud and dishonesty to come within the doctrines purview
must be substantiated: Bad faith and fraud are allegations of fact that demand clear and
convincing proof. They are serious accusations that can be so conveniently and casually invoked,
and that is why they are never presumed. They amount to mere slogans or mudslinging unless
convincingly substantiated by whoever is alleging them.

Case Digest: DPWH v. Quiwa

Facts:
After the Mt. Pinatubo tragedy in 1991, DPWH engaged a number of contractors, including the
respondents, for the urgent rehabilitation of the affected river systems. Save for Chiara
Construction and Ardy Construction, respectively owned by Efren N. Rigor and Romeo R.
Dimatulac, the contractors signed written agreements with Engineer Philip Meez, Project
Manager II of the DPWH. It is undisputed that the contractors have completed their assigned
rehabilitation works. But DPWH refused to pay the contractors for the reason that the contracts
were invalid due to non-compliance with legal requirements. As such, respondents filed an
action for a sum of money against DPWH. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of
Appeals (CA) upheld the validity of the contracts and thus directed payment of compensation to
the contractors.

Issue/s:
Whether respondents did not come to court with clean hands to assert their money claims against
petitioner in view of their failure to comply with the legal requirements concerning government
contracts and in ascertaining the extent of authority of the public official with whom they
contracted.

Whether the omissions made the contracts void ab initio and, as a consequence, petitioner should
not be made liable.

Held:
Petitioner unsuccessfully established the applicability of the clean hands doctrine. Respondents
purported omissions, standing alone, cannot be construed as fraudulent or deceitful. While
petitioner is correct in saying that one who seeks equity must do equity, and one who comes into
equity must come with clean hands, it is equally true that an allegation of fraud and dishonesty to
come within the doctrines purview must be substantiated.

Pikachu Notes
 36

Petitioner did not present evidence of actual fraud and merely inferred that because of the
omissions, the respondent contractors were in bad faith. Bad faith and fraud are allegations of
fact that demand clear and convincing proof. They are serious accusations that can be so
conveniently and casually invoked, and that is why they are never presumed. They amount to
mere slogans or mudslinging unless convincingly substantiated by whoever is alleging them.

Even with the respondents supposed failure to ascertain the validity of the contract and the
authority of the public official involved in the construction agreements, there is no such
confusion as to the matter of the contracts validity and the equivalent compensation. As found
by the court a quo, petitioner had assured the contractors that they would be paid for the work
that they would do, as even DPWH Undersecretary Teodoro T. Encarnacion had told them to
fast-track the project.

Agra v. PNB, 309 SCRA 509 (1999)

Doctrine:

Laches is principally a question of equity. Necessarily, there is no absolute rule as to

what constitutes laches or staleness of demand each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. Petitioners, however, failed to show that the collection
suit against herein sureties was inequitable. Remedies in equity address only situations tainted
with inequity, not those expressly governed by statutes.

Although the collection suit was filed more than seven years after the obligation of the sureties
became due, the lapse was within the prescriptive period for filing an action. In this light, we find
immaterial petitioners insistence that the cause of action accrued on December 31, 1968, when
the obligation became due, and not on August 30, 1976, when the judicial demand was made. In
either case, both submissions fell within the ten year
prescriptive period. In any event, the fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute
laches.

Petitioners insist that the delay of seven years was unreasonable and unexplained, because
demand was not necessary. Again, we point that, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are
adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a
delay that would bar relief.

Philippine National Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 680 (1990)

Doctrine:

The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and
justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or
commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon.
Said doctrine springs from equitable principles and the equities of the case. It is designed to aid

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the law in the administration of justice where without its aid injustice might result. (Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals, L30831, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 368)

The act and assurance given by the PNB to Alcedo that we shall exclude the aforementioned lot
[Lot No. 1402] as a collateral of Leticia de la Vina Sepe in our recommendation for her 197172
sugar crop loan (p. 37, Rollo) is binding on the bank. Having given that assurance, the bank
may not turn around and do the exact opposite of what it said it would not do. One may not take
inconsistent positions (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 505). A party may not go
back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied
upon them (Lazo vs. Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., 31 SCRA 329.)

Rubio v. Alabata, 717 SCRA 554 (2014)

Doctrine:

Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is
warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice and
that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound
strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or
injustice would result.

Case Digest: Rubio v. Alabata

Facts:
Rufa, Bartolome, Leon, Rodrigo and Adriano filed an action for annulment of declaration of
heirship and sale against Lourdes. The case was decided in their favour on October 31, 1995.
Lourdes elevated her appeal to the Court of Appeals but eventually withdrew her appeal, hence,
it became final and executory on June 20, 1997 and Entry of Judgment entered on August 20,
1997. The judgement however in the case was not enforced. Petitioners, whose case was initially
handled by the Public Attorneys Office of Dumaguete, were never informed of the finality of
judgment. Unknown to them, their case were turned over to the Special Appealed Cases of the
PAO-Manila. All along, they thought their case was still pending before the Court of
Appeals. Although the handling lawyer, Atty. Naz, received a copy of the entry of judgment,
she failed to inform the petitioners even when she resigned from the PAO sometime in
November 1997. They came to know of the entry of judgment when their nephew was able to
secure a copy of the same in November, 2007. Thus, petitioners filed an action for revival of
judgment on December 5, 2007. Lourdes filed her Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
prescription, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals also denied their
appeal.

Issue:
When does the strict application of procedural rules can be relaxed?

Held/Ratio:
Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:

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Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations
declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.

To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners
considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her
appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners.

Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were represented
by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO in particular,
failed them. SAC-PAO never informed them of the abandonment by respondent of her appeal or
of the entry of judgment. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and they were told that the case was
still pending on appeal. Due to their penury and unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the
rules, they could not be expected to bypass PAO-Dumaguete and directly verify the status of the
case with the SAC-PAO. They had to trust their lawyer and wait.

No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal. Withdrawing her appeal
means that she respected the RTC-43 Decision, which voided the Declaration of Heirship and
Sale.

Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes
the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. The
Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way possible and exercise its
soundest discretion to prevent a wrong. Although strict compliance with the rules of
procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict
enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that
courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would
result. Thus:

x x x procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in
order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule,
which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where
observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property,
or where the interest of justice so requires.

Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 278 SCRA 27 (1997)

Doctrine:

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the
economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still
exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate
the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

Pikachu Notes
 39

Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused
Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.

Case Digest: Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines

Facts:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious
illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a
dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a
civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys
fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking
Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion
therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426,
as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?

Held:
NO. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar
as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this
case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the
writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli
in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the
economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still
exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate
the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign

Pikachu Notes
 40

transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused
Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.

Substantive v. Adjective Law

Substantive law defines rights and duties, such as crimes and punishments in the criminal law
and civil rights and responsibilities in civil law. It is codified in legislated statutes, can be
enacted through the initiative process, and in common law systems it may be created or modified
through precedent.

Adjective law refers to that portion of the law that deals with the rules of procedure governing
evidence, pleading, and practice. It pertains to and prescribes the practice, method, procedure, or
legal machinery by which substantive law is enforced or made effective. In short, it prescribes
the procedure for obtaining a decision according to substantive law. Modern jurists now prefer to
use the term procedural law instead of adjective law.

Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 982 (1916)

Doctrine:

The Act is remedial. By remedial is not meant that it pertains to a remedy in the sense of
procedure such as the character and form of the action, the admissibility of evidence, etc. The
Act defines certain rights which it will aid, and specifies the way in which it will aid them. So far
as it defines, thereby creating, it is "substantive law." So far as it provides a method of aiding and
protecting, it is "adjective law," or procedure. The right to damages is the essence of the cause of
action. It is a substantive right granted by the Act Take this away and the injured employee has
nothing of value left.

Case Digest: Tamayo v. Gsell

Facts:
An action for damages against Gsell (employer) for personal injuries suffered by Braulio
Tamayo, minor son of plaintiff asking for P 400, without costs except P 25 for the attorney of the
Bureau of Labor. Braulio is a minor about 11 or 12 years old who is employed as a workman in
the match factory located in Sta. Ana, Manila. He met an accident which consisted of an injury
caused by the knife of one of the machines of the factory which cut the little ring fingers on the
right hand, the latter of which was severed. The accident arose by reason of him being assigned
by Eugenio Murcia, a foreman employed in the same factory to perform work which he was not
accustomed. He was not given any instruction and was put in the new task only on the day of the
accident. He was assigned to clean the part of the machine where pieces of wood from the strips
were stuck, he was caught by the knife of the machine and his right finger was severed. He was
thereupon brought to the General Hospital.

Issue:

Pikachu Notes
 41

Whether or not the trial court erred in rejecting the defenses of assumption of risk and
contributory interpose by the defendant and whether or not damages should be awarded to
Tamayo?

Held:
Applying the foregoing principles (cited in the decision are many American cases in relation to
the case and Act No. 1874, Employers Liability Act), which are founded upon reason and
justice, it is concluded that the trial court did not err in rejecting the defense claim. Tamayo is
also awarded damages for the injury cost on him on the negligence of the part of the foreman to
warn Tamayo or to give instructions and consideration to his age, skills and capabilities & for
pecuniary loss occasioned by the injury as well as his diminished capacity resulting from the
injury.

Act No. 1874 should be liberally construed in favor of employees. The main purpose of the Act,
as its title in dictates, was to extend the liability of employers and to render them liable in
damages for certain classes of personal injuries for which they are not liable under the Civil
Code.

The Act is remedial. By remedial is not meant that it pertains to a remedy in the sense of
procedure such as the character and form of the action, the admissibility of evidence, etc. The
Act defines certain rights which it will aid, and specifies the way in which it will aid them. So far
as it defines, thereby creating, it is "substantive law." So far as it provides a method of aiding and
protecting, it is "adjective law," or procedure. The right to damages is the essence of the cause
of action. It is a substantive right granted by the Act. Take this away and the injured
employee has nothing of value left. No one in this country has a vested interest in any rule of
the Civil Code and the great office of the Act is to remedy defects in the Civil Code rules as they
are developed.

Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640 (1948)

Doctrine:

Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the
legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that
part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for
their invasion.

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which
provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.

Case Digest: Bustos v. Lucero

Pikachu Notes
 42

Facts:
The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of
the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him
and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded, not guilty. Then the counsel for the
petitioner moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her witnesses could be
examined and crossexamined in the manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected to petitioners motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and the
case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First Instance praying that
the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the
petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony. The motion was denied, and for that reason the present special civil action of
mandamus was instituted.

Issue:
Whether or not section 11 of Rule 108 diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in
criminal case, and the Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and therefore is null and
void.

Held:
Evidence is the mode and manner of proving competent facts and circumstances on which a
party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings. It is fundamentally a
procedural law. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound
discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. Said section defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law
restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably
calculated to bring out the truth.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the
majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding
the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the
petitioner.

Ratio:
Section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law
or substantive right.

Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive right is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the
legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that

Pikachu Notes
 43

part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains redress for their invasion.

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which
provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence which is the mode
and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish
the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings"-is identified with and forms part of the method by
which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law
transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs.
Capaci, 164 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the
Rules of Court. We cannot tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without
throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules.

The distinction between remedy and substantive right is incapable of exact definition. The
difference is somewhat a question of degree. It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case
beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the
substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition.

Dissenting Opinion:

It does not require an elaborate argument to show that the right granted by law upon a defendant
to be confronted with and crossexamine the witnesses for the prosecution in preliminary
investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a substantive right. It is based on human
experience, according to which a person is not prone to tell a lie against another in his presence,
knowing fully well that the latter may easily contradict him, and that the credibility of a person
or veracity of his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is a
substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may show, even if he has no
evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are not sufficient
to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and he is guilty thereof,
and therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not committed to prison, and thus avoid
an open and public accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and
the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal prosecution always entails.

Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several cases, (in
which the question of constitutionality or validity of said section had not been squarely raised)
do away with the defendants right under discussion, it follows that said section 11 diminishes
the substantive right of the defendant in criminal case, and this Court has no power or authority
to promulgate it and therefore is null and void.

Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 452 (1953)

Pikachu Notes
 44

Doctrine:

A substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the
powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs, whereas rules of
procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be enforced in
courts of justice. (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 4, Bustos vs. Lucero,
46 Off. Gaz., Jan. supp., pp. 445, 448.)

The right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it must be created and defined by
express enactment as opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress
therefor.

Case Digest: Primicias v. Ocampo

Facts:
This is a petition which seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of two
criminal cases which were then pending against petitioner without the assistance of assessors in
accordance with the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No 409 in relation to section 154 of
Act No 190, and as an auxiliary remedy, to have a writ of preliminary injunction issued so that
the trial may be held pending until further orders of this court.

Issues:
The issues now posed by petitioner are:
"I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right,
and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being a substantive right, cannot be impaired by
this court in the exercise of its rulemaking power.

III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section2477 of the Old Charter of Manila,
creating the right to trial with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and were not repealed by
Rules of Court.

Held/Ratio:

The right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it must be created and defined by
express enactment as opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress
therefor. The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such
are
not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. This is so because in said section
154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a party litigant. Section 1477 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a manner that a similar right is implied when
invoked by a party litigant. It says that the aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute and substantial by the

Pikachu Notes
 45

Supreme Court, in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked (Berbari vs.
Concepcion et al., 40 Phil., 320; Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, 56 Phil., 344),

A substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the
powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs, whereas rules of
procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be enforced in
courts of justice. (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 4, Bustos vs. Lucero,
46 Off. Gaz., Jan. supp., pp. 445, 448.)

The promulgation of the Rules of Court did not have the effect of repealing the provisions on
assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions have not been incorporated
by the Supreme Court in the present Rules of Court because they are substantive in nature. This
remedy may be invoked not only in Manila but in all other places where it existed prior to the
promulgation of the Rules of Court. The provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil
Procedure are still in force and the same may still be invoked in the light of the provisions of
section 49 of Republic Act No 409.

Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 524 (2002)

Doctrine:

We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner
followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied
retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to
reconcile the
retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be
penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the
period of redemption when he made the redemption.

The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to
do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.

Case Digest: Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Involved in this case is a parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 645-C, with an area of 34,829
square meters, more or less, situated in Bunawan, Davao City. The lot was once covered by TCT
No. T-72067 of (Tan, for short) married to Praxedes V. Tan.

From the petition, the motion to dismiss petition, their respective annexes and other pleadings,
we gather the following factual antecedents: On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of
P59,200.00, executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in question in favor of spouses

Pikachu Notes
 46

Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the
same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1) year
within which to redeem or repurchase the property.

Albeit given several opportunities and/or extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed to redeem
the property until his death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tans heirs filed before the Regional Trial Court at Davao City a suit against
the Magdangals for reformation of instrument. Docketed as CIVIL CASE NO. 19049-88, the
complaint alleged that, while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of
absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.

Barely hours after the complaint was stamped received, the Magdangals were able to have
Tans title over the lot in question canceled and to secure in their names TCT No. T-134470.
This development prompted the heirs of Tan, who were to be later substituted by Jaime V. Tan,
Jr. (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental complaint.

On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that
the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the
appellate court or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.
As aforestated, the Court of Appeals set aside the ruling of the trial court.

It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed the subject
property within the 120-day period of redemption reckoned from the appellate courts entry of
judgment. The appellate court, however, did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the new rule retroactively.

Issue:
WON Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive
effect.

Held/Ratio:
We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not
be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a
substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions
of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the
subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject
lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of
fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully
followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption.

The subject lot may only be 34,829 square meters but as petitioner claims, it is the only
property left behind by their father, a private law practitioner who was felled by an assassins
bullet.

Pikachu Notes
 47

Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on
the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the
right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of
redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.

Additional Notes:

There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general rule,
however, has well-delineated exceptions. We quote author Agpalo:
9.17. Procedural laws.
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. They include rules of pleadings,
practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which
one who commits a crime is to be punished.

The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to
procedural laws. It has been held that a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes
away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a
new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past.
Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not
create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The general rule against
giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to
disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the
time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute
which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actionsthose which have
accrued or are pending.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and
to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable.
The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy,
and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of
any other than the existing rules of procedure.

9.18. Exceptions to the rule.

The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits
certain exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by
necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or

Pikachu Notes
 48

where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate
circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural laws in the event
that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be
applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due
process or impair the independence of the courts.

Sources of Law

An Introduction to Philippine Law by Gamboa, Chapter II: The Sources of Law

The main sources of law, or the materials from which it derives its substance, are:

1. Legislation
2. Precedent
3. Custom

To these may be added principles of justice and equity, decisions of foreign tribunals,
professional opinion, and religion. Of these, in our jurisdiction, legislation is the only one that is
absolutely binding. Precedent, custom, principles of justice and equity are only supplementary
that is, they are applied by the courts only in the absence of statute. Decisions of foreign
tribunals, professional opinion, and religion are merely persuasive; that is, they influence the
decisions of the courts only indirectly, and they are resorted to in default of all the other sources.

Who are lawyers?

Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Doctrine:

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court.

A lawyer is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.

The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation
and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily
implied from the restrictions.

Pikachu Notes
 49

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.

Case Digest: Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes
`A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.

Advertisement on Secret Marriage and Divorce

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates
and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it,
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of
the advertisements herein complained of.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of
law. The definition of practice of law is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as
defined.

Pikachu Notes
 50

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer
systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What
is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do
is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving
legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

Forms of Advertisement that are allowed:

Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in
the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable.
He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation
of special branch of law.

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA, G.R. No. L-12426 (1959)

Doctrine:

Pikachu Notes
 51

Under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to
practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, since
much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence
to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-
judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.

Case Digest: PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA

Facts:
Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction against respondent Agrava, the Director of
Philippines Patent Office due to a circular the latter issued scheduling an examination for
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.

Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to
practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction and
is in violation of the law for requiring such examination as condition precedent before members
of the bar may be allowed to represent applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patents. Undaunted, Agrava argued that that the prosecution of patent cases does
not involve entirely or purely the practice of law and that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the
Patent Office from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to
handle cases before the Patent Office.

Issue:
Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law

Held:
Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent,
their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and
scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with
the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for
which a member of the bar has been prepared.

The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized
by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before
the Patent Office, since much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well
as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent
director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are,
taken to the Supreme Court.

Pikachu Notes
 52

Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma

Facts:
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging
as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and
grossly immoral conduct.

Respondent Palma [from ACCRA Law Office] was employed by petitioner as his personal
counsel. Respondent's excellence in managing petitioner's legal affairs, prompted petitioner to
introduced respondent to his family. Since respondent gained the trust of petitioner and his
family, their relationship became intimate. Respondent then was allowed to tutor the 22 year old
daughter of Petitioner.

However, when his concern was supposed to be complainants legal affairs only, he sneaked at
the latters back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked
when nobody was looking. He succeeded in misrepresenting himself to Hong Kong officials as
a bachelor and successfully married petitioner's daughter, eventhough he is legally married.

Respondent argued that, he cannot be punished since there is no allegation that he acted with
wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance of the law in serving complainants
interest. Anent the charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married
complainants daughter with utmost sincerity and good faith and that it is contrary to the
natural course of things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent's acts constitutes gross immoral conduct so as to warrant his
disbarment from the legal profession.

Held/Ratio:
Yes, the Court ruled respondent's action constitutes gross immoral conduct. A gross immoral
conduct, the Court said, is a conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community. Thus, measured against this definition, respondents act is manifestly
immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent
young woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he
could contract marriage in a foreign land.

In particular, adds the Court, "he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality." Moreover, the circumstances here speak of a clear case of
betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondents closeness to the complainants
family as well as the latters complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship
with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainants legal affairs only, he sneaked at
the latters back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked
when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainants resources by securing a

Pikachu Notes
 53

plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter in Hongkong. He
did this without complainants knowledge.

The Court stressed again the principle that law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of
standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time
be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.

Respondent cannot rely on complainant's admission that he is a good lawyer, because

professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral
character is always an indispensable requirement.

In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate
to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme
penalty of disbarment.

The Bar

In Re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22 (1973)

Facts:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated
November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" that the Supreme Court ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of
an appropriate Court Rule."

Issue:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

Held:
1. The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power
to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing
that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar,"
Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a
mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Pikachu Notes
 54

2. Yes.
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with
public
interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession,
to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State,
the
administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is fair and just that the
exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can
be no
collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without
incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the
support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of
doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual
dues to the Integrated Bar.

3. The integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally

unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully
and effectively. ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by
Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of
the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16,
1973.

Ratio: The act legislated by Congress is just a declaration of the inherent power of the Supreme
Court to integrate the bar

In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562

Facts:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a Petition to Surrender the Lawyers Certificate of Title to
the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal peopled by
people who are calloused to our pleas for justice. He also expressed strong words as against
the judiciary like justice is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb. . The petition rooted
from the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His
appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the
disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender
his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence
in the justice system.

Pikachu Notes
 55

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

Held:
YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.

RATIO:
It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty. Almacen
himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are so noble, in
speaking of the truth and alleged injustices, so as not to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has
already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular case is sui
generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited
as benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed.
Indefinite suspension may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to
prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of law.

In Re Cunanan, 94 Phil 534 (1954)

Doctrine:

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law in the practice ofthe profession and their supervision have
been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous
and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more
than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles.

The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
governing the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes, continue to reside in this court. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision remain vested in the
Supreme Court.

By its declared objective, Republic Act No. 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies
1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the
profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public
interest demands of the
legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problems
evolved by the times become more difficult.

Case Digest: In Re Cunanan

Facts:

Pikachu Notes
 56

Under the Rules of Court, a bar candidate is deemed to have passed if they obtain a general
average of 75% in all subjects without falling below 50% in any subject. The Supreme Court
changed the passing average since 1946 in consideration of the varying difficulties and the
varying degree of strictness with which the papers were graded: 72% in 1946, 69% in 1947, 70
% in 1948, 74% in 1949, and 75% in 1950 to 1953. On June 21, 1953, Republic Act No. 972
(Bar Flunkers Act of 1953) was enacted without Executive approval.

Many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking the
new laws provisions, while others who had pending motions for revision of their examination
papers also invoked the law as grounds for admission. There are also others who simply sought
reconsideration of their grades without invoking the new law. Republic Act No. 972 has for its
object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. By its declared objective, the law
is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was evidenced by their failure in the
exams.

Issue:
Whether Republic Act No. 972 (Bar Flunkers Act of 1953) is constitutional?

Held:
No, it is not constitutional.

Ratio:
The Court found Republic Act No. 972 unconstitutional for the following reasons.
1. The law is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may
continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

2. It is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the Supreme Court on the petitions
which only the Court may revise or alter, directly violating the Constitution.

3. Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
on admission to the Bar by the disputed law.

4. It is a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what
the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire
law is void.

The Practice of Law

RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Doctrine:

Pikachu Notes
 57

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree
of legal knowledge or skill. (111 ALR 23)

Case Digest: RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD

Facts:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's
alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari
and prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.

2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in

confirming Monsods appointment.

Held:
1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other
works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional
commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider
lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that
they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also cited an article in
the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own
specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their
specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for
example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore,
Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then
worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also
became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged
in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

Pikachu Notes
 58

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by
the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the
discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess
the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise
its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty Entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in
the Supreme Court, 644 SCRA 543 (2011)

Doctrine:

The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally
primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar,
jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have
exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

The constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed
by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith
in the legal profession and the justice system; To the mind of the Court, the reason that freedom
of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the
academic freedom of law professors.

Lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of lawtheir actions
as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional lawyers.

No matter how firm a lawyers conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply no
excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts and
the legal profession into disrepute.

When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of
legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are
obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them, but when law professors are the ones
who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the
same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have
a grave implication on legal education in our country.

Case Digest: In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty Entitled Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.

Pikachu Notes
 59

Statement of UP Professors. While the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on
the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as
an established fact, but a truth. They expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos
explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a
contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. The statement
bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The first paragraph concludes with a
reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty
and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed that
Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the Court of
perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about the review
of the case. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted
sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed
alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency
and respect.

The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations
of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for
and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely
to determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of
the decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made
it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the
court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit,
or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is
punishable.

The UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would
not reverse the Vinuya decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice.

Analyzing Decisions:

The Four Cs of Effective Decision by Artemio V. Panganiban

1. Completeness
- Facts and legal basis

2. Correctness
- Decision must conform to the law and settled jurisprudence.
- Decisions must be correct not only in substance, but also in form. They must be written in
correct English or Filipino.
- Guidelines: (1) Be Grammatical; (2) Be Clear and precise.

Pikachu Notes
 60

3. Clarity
- A decision should be easy to read and to understand.
a. Be simple.
b. Be Consistent in Tone, Tense, Words, Images, and the Logical and Grammatical
Parallelism of Words or Groups of Words.
1. While it is desirable to avoid monotony of words, do not change a word for the
sake of changing it. (i.e., laches)
2. Strive for logical and grammatical parallelism.
3. Avoid using mixed metaphors and clashing images.
c. Remember to Use in General:
1. Topics and titles for distinct ideas, headings and subheadings.
2. Numbers or letters for enumerations and succession of ideas.
3. Transition words and phrases.
4. Proper punctuation marks.
5. Bold types or italics to stress words and phrases.

4. Conciseness
- The length of a decision depends on the facts and issues involved.
- Judges must know how to synthesize, to summarize and to simplify.

Philippine Legal System

Philippine Legal History

A Guide to Philippine Legal Information by Antonio M. Santos, Chapter II Historical

Evolution of Philippine Law: An Overview

The evolution of the Philippine legal system may be discussed through the various periods of
political development the country had experienced:
- The Pre-Spanish (ante 1521)
Barangay is headed by a Datu, under a higher chief called Rajah.
The Datu, assisted by the elders in the community, preside over the court.
Most of laws were unwritten, handed down by word of mouth from generation to
generation.
Code of Kalantiaw and the Maragtas Code
- The Spanish Regime (1521-1898)
Codification of Laws (Civil Law)
Royal Audencia was established.
- American Period (1891-1946)
Organic Acts defined the structure and organization of Philippine Government
(i.e., Jones Law and the Tydings-McDuffie Law).
- Japanese Occupation (1941-1944)
- Philippine Republic (1946-1972)
- The Martial Law Period (1972-1986); and
- EDSA Revolution until present

Pikachu Notes
 61

Civil Law and Common Law

A Guide to Philippine Legal Information by Antonio M. Santos, Chapter III The

Philippine Legal System

The term legal system refers to an operating set of legal institutions, procedures and rules.

Components of a legal system:

1. Laws
1987 Constitution
Statutes
Administrative regulations
Customs, if authorized by law
2. Judicial Decisions
3. Legal institutions

Our legal system is a blending of common and civil law Philippine Mix or Philippine
Hybrid System.

Common Law:
According to the landmark case In Re: Max Shoop, the concept of a common law is the concept
of a growing and ever changing system of legal principles and theories. It is a constantly
improving science rather than as an art as a system of legal logic, rather than as code of rules.

It is the body of customary law based upon judicial decisions and embodied in reports of
decided cases administered by the common law courts. It has also been defined as the
principles, usages, and rules of action applicable to the government and security of persons and
property, which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the
legislature.

Civil Law:

Jurisprudence sums up in a word the concept of Civil Law as: Codification.

Civil Law Common Law

Originated in Roman Law, 450 B.C. Traces its official beginnings to A.D. 1066
when the Normans won at Hastings and
conquered England
Statutes theoretically take precedence over Court decisions resolving specific cases are
court decisions interpreting them regarded as law
Code law or written law Case law
Adopts deductive method Adopts inductive method
Anchors chiefly on the letter of law Relies heavily on equity
Judge-proof law Judge-made law

Pikachu Notes
 62

The Philippine Mix

The Philippine legal system is a mixture of civil law and common law regimes.

In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its
decision in cases not covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories
and precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances
where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well defined civil law theories and of the
few cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions. -Justice
Malcolm, in the Max Shoop case

In Re: Application of Max Shoop for Admission to Practice Law, 41 Phil. 213 (1920)

Doctrine:

A survey of recent cases in the Philippine Reports, and particularly those of the last few years,
shows an increasing reliance upon English and American authorities in the formation of what
may be termed a Philippine Common Law, as supplemental to the statute law of this jurisdiction.
An analysis of two groups of recent casesthe first, those under the subjects covered by Spanish
statutes, and the second, those covered by American-Philippine legislation and affected by the
change in sovereigntyshows that Anglo-American case law has entered practically every one
of the leading subjects in the field of law and in a large majority of such subjects has formed the
sole basis for the guidance of this court in developing the local jurisprudence.

The past twenty years have developed a Philippine Common Law or case law based almost
exclusively, except where conflicting with local customs and institutions, upon Anglo-American
Common Law. The Philippine Common Law supplements and amplifies our statute law.

There has been developed, and will continue, a common law in the jurisprudence of this
jurisdiction (which for purposes of distinction may properly be termed a Philippine Common
Law), based upon the English Common Law in its present day form of an Anglo-American
Common Law, which common law is effective in all of the subjects of law in this jurisdiction in
so f ar as it does not conflict with the express language of the written law or with the local
customs and institutions.

The Hybrid System of the Philippines

Legal Method Essentials 2.0 by Dante B. Gatmaytan, Chapter 2: Philippine History and
the Legal System

The Philippine legal system is a mixture of civil law and common law regimes. This was the
inevitable outcome of the successive colonization of the country by Spain and the United States.
The civil and common law systems were introduced in Asia through civilization.

The most fundamental difference between the two systems is that while civil law jurisdictions
have comprehensive written codes, which are designed to cover every area of law, common law

Pikachu Notes
 63

systems are based on judge-made law, which is developed on a case-by-case basis. Legislation is
the main source of law in both civilian and common law jurisdictions. However, while in civilian
systems jurisprudence plays a secondary role to codes (codes govern the law primarily in the
area of private law) and statutes (which predominate in public law matters), in common law
jurisdictions case law was historically and theoretically the backbone of the system.

The legal system of the Philippines is a mixture of Islamic law, indigenous systems, Spanish
civil law and American common law.

Cruz v. Pahati, 98 Phil. 788 (1956)

Doctrine:

PARTY TO BEAR LOSS UNDER COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE STATUTORY

PRINCIPLE PREVAILS OVER COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE.

The common law principle that Where one of two innocent parties must suffer by a fraud
perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed cannot be applied in a case which is covered
by an express provision of the new Civil Code. Between a common law principle and a
statutory principle, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.

Under Article 559 of the new Civil Code, a person illegally deprived of any movable may
recover it from the person in possession of the same and the only defense the latter may have is if
he has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, in which case, the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. In the present case, plaintiff
has been illegally deprived of his car through the ingenious scheme
of defendant B to enable the latter to dispose of it as if he were the owner thereof. Plaintiff
therefore can still recover possession of the car even if it is in the possession of a third party who
had acquired it in good faith from defendant B. The maxim that No man can transfer to another
a better title than he has himself obtains in the civil as well as in the common law. (U. S. vs.
Sotelo, 28 Phil., 147.)

The Hierarchy of Courts

The Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, 747 SCRA 1 (2015)

Doctrine:

Hierarchy of Courts The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created
by the Supreme Court (SC) to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient manner.

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The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by the SC to ensure that
every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.
Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the
evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which
may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions
and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of
inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the actual
case that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences,
of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at
their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the
higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination
of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has
original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a
nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional
issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an ironclad rule. This court has full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .
filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the
issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.

Exceptions to the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts (where you can file directly to the SC):

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality
that must be addressed at the most immediate time.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression,
no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional
body.

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Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement
of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.

Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006 (Under Silence of the Law)

FACTS:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him
as well. Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is
still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as
if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,

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provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

KAILANGAN PA BA NG ABUGADO NGAYON?

By former Senator Pepe Diokno, bar topnotcher. In a letter to his son who asked for a list of
books to read to prepare for the study of law. He wrote it a month after Martial Law was declared
- 44 years ago. #NeverAgain
-----
"Dear Popoy,
When you asked me about a month ago, for a list of books that you could read to start studying
law, I was loathe to prepare the list because I felt that you would be wasting your time studying
law in this new society.
I am still not sure that it would be worth your while to do so.
A few days ago, while chatting with a soldier, he asked, in all seriousness and sincerity, Pero
sir, kailangan pa ba ang mga abogado ngayon? And in a way that perhaps he did not intend, he
raised a perfectly valid question.
A lawyer lives in and by the law; and there is no law when society is ruled, not by reason, but by
willworse, by the will of one man.
A lawyer strives for justice; and there is no justice when men and women are imprisoned not
only without guilt, but without trial.
A lawyer must work in freedom; and there is no freedom when conformity is extracted by fear
and criticism silenced by force.
A lawyer builds on facts. He must seek truth; and there is no truth when facts are suppressed,
news is manipulated and charges are fabricated.
Worse, when the Constitution is invoked to justify outrages against freedom, truth and justice,
when democracy is destroyed under the pretext of saving it, law is not only deniedit is
perverted.
And what need do our people have for men and women who would practice perversion?
Yet the truth remains true that never have our people had greater need than today for great
lawyers, and for young men and women determined to be great lawyers.
Great lawyersnot brilliant lawyers. A scoundrel may be, and often is, brilliant; and the greater
the scoundrel, the more brilliant the lawyer. But only a good man can become a great lawyer: for
only a man who understands the weaknesses of men because he has conquered them in himself;
who has the courage to pursue his ideals though he knows them to be unattainable; who tempers
his conviction with respect for those of others because he realizes he may be mistaken; who deals
honorably and fairly with all, because to do otherwise would diminish him as well as themonly
such a man would so command respect that he could persuade and need never resort to force.

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Only such a man could become a great lawyer. Otherwise, what you are speaks so loudly,
cannot hear what you say.
For men and women of this kind, our country will always have needand now more than ever.
True, there is little that men of goodwill can do now to end the madness that holds our nation in
its grip. But we can,even now, scrutinize our past; try to pinpoint where we went wrong;
determine what led to this madness and what nurtured it; and how, when it ends, we can make
sure that it need never happen again.
For this madness must endif not in my lifetime, at least in yours. We Filipinos are proverbially
patient, but we are also infinitely tough and ingeniously resourceful. Our entire history as a
people has been a quest for freedom and dignity; and we will not be denied our dreams.
So this madness will end; the rule of force will yield to the rule of law. Then the country will
need its great lawyers, its great engineers,its great economists and managers, the best of its men
and women to clear the shambles and restore the foundations of that noble and truly Filipino
society for which our forefathers fought, bled and died.
xxx
Your father,
PEPE"

Paper Chase

"The Paper Chase" is about an aggressive, very bright, terribly engaging first-year student at
Harvard Law School. The movie respects its hero, respects the school, and most of all respects
the venerable Professor Kingsfield, tyrant of contract law.
Kingsfield is really the movie's central character, even though John Houseman gets supporting
billing for the role. Everything centers around his absolute dictatorship in the classroom and his
icy reserve at all other times. He's the kind of teacher who inspires total dread in his students,
and at the same time a measure of hero worship; he doesn't just know contract law, he wrote the
book.
Into his classroom every autumn come several dozen would-be Harvard law graduates, who fall
into the categories we all remember from school: (a) the drones, who get everything right but
will go forth to lead lives of impeccable mediocrity; (b) the truly intelligent, who will pass or fail
entirely on the basis of whether they're able to put up with the crap; (c) those with photographic
memories, who can remember everything but connect nothing; (d) the students whose dogged
earnestness will somehow pull them through; and (e) the doomed.
One of each of these types is in the study group of Hart, the movie's hero, and the one who is
truly intelligent. He's a graduate of the University of Minnesota and somewhat out of place
among the Ivy League types, but he does well in class because he really cares about the law. He
also cares about Kingsfield, to the degree that he breaks into the library archives to examine the
master's very own undergraduate notes.
Hart is played by Timothy Bottoms, the star of "The Last Picture Show." Bottoms is an awfully
good actor, and so natural and unaffected that he shows up the mannerisms of actors like Dustin
Hoffman or Jon Voight. Bottoms never seems to try; he's just there, complete and convincing.
He falls in love, fatefully, with Susan (Lindsay Wagner), who turns out to be, even more
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fatefully, Kingsfield's daughter. Their relationship is a little hard to follow in the film; we aren't
sure why she treats him the way she doesafter all, she loves the guyand the movie jerks
abruptly in bringing them back together after a split-up.
But that isn't fatal because the fundamental relationship in the movie is between Hart and
Kingsfield. The crusty old professor obviously appreciates the intelligence and independence of
his prize student, but he hardly ever lets his affection show; there's a great scene in the classroom
where he calls Hart forward, offers him a dime, and says: "Call your mother and tell her you will
never be a lawyer."
Houseman is able to project subtleties of character even while appearing stiff and unrelenting;
it's a performance of Academy Award quality, and resulted in an Oscar for Best Supporting
Actor.
Lindsay Wagner, as the daughter, is also a surprise; she made her movie debut in the unfortunate
"Two People," which had Peter Fonda as a conscience-stricken Army deserter. She wasn't able to
make much of an impression in that one, but "The Paper Chase" establishes her as an actress
with class and the saving grace of humor.
What's best about the movie is that it considers interesting adults--young and old--in an
intelligent manner. After it's over we almost feel relief; there are so many movies about clods
reacting moronically to romantic and/or violent situations. But we hardly ever get movies about
people who seem engaging enough to spend half an hour talking with (what would you say
to Charles Bronson?). Here's one that works.

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On Case Digests

A About case What is the topic about?

topic.
F Facts of the What re the relevant facts of the case?
case
I Issue Should be a question answerable by yes or no
R Ruling Yes / No, supporting text from issue
A Analysis Major Premise: taken from law which should never change
Minor Premise: application to the current case
C Conclusion Application

Sample Digest for ITL

Issue Should Atty. Palma be disbarred?
Ruling Yes, Atty. Palma should be disbarred.
Analysis
Major Premise Lawyers should act morally with fidelity to their clients.
(applies to all)
------------------- ------------------------------------------
Minor Premise Atty. Palma entered into a bigamous relationship and took advantage of the
(Facts/only applied trust of the client
in current case
Conclusion Atty. Palma should be disbarred in the practice of the law due to gross
immoral acts.

Pikachu Notes