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1NC

A Interpretation:
Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through instrumental defense of action
by the United States government.

B Definitions
Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan
American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)
should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

Federal government is the central government in Washington DC


Encarta Online 2005,
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_1741500781_6/United_States_(Government).html#h
owtocite
United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is
responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the
United States is centered in Washington, D.C.

Resolved implies a policy


Louisiana House 3-8-2005, http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm
Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and
making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a
resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art.
III, 17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

C Vote neg

First is Predictable Limits - The resolution proposes the question the negative is
prepared to answer and creates a bounded list of potential affs for us to think about.
Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills
because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of
debate
Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003,
When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES:
2003 VOL 51, 627649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf
What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the
Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time.
Exaggerated claims
and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around
them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to
brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both
sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes
toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of democratic deliberation within, is that
that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation before the formal discussions (deliberations, in the
discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what
experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen
in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or
non-attitudes. There again, peoples engaging with the issue focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it would be something that is
likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or
in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which
they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on central versus peripheral routes to the formation of attitudes. Before
deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be
arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at top of the head conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold
similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as expertness or attractiveness (Petty and Cacioppo,
1986) not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the
formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, central routes to the development of attitudes involve the
application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is
nothing intrinsic to the central route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of sufficient impetus for
engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of on-line versus memory-based
here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing
processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion

routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across
something new, we update our routines our running beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and
evaluations accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into
deep-stored memory. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of
events what we believe or what attitude we take toward something, we easily retrieve what we think
but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment the
sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation requires us to call up
reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line summary
judgments. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily
interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing ones attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources:
group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from online to memory-based processing is likely to occur earlier
rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different
elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the
sorts of settings, it seems likely that

shaping and reshaping of peoples attitudes in a citizens jury-style process. The initial processes of
focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard
about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the
information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence
(perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-
reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their
attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may
not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will
always matter as little as it did in our citizens jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process the
sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective
deliberation that that prompts will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have
us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive
phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From
Citizens Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation
deliberation within will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more
formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about
citizens juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens juries, deliberation will
work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens
juries the need to participate (or the
anticipation of participating) in formally organized group
discussions might be the prompt that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible
prompts that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here
are a few ways citizens juries (and
all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which
lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics : A
citizens jury concentrates peoples minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many
issues at once. A citizens jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all
stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent
common ground on which debates are conducted. A citizens jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of
discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. A citizens jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be
questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of competing experts on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of
expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater selective perception. Participating in something called a citizens jury evokes certain very
particular norms: norms concerning the impartiality appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the common good orientation appropriate to people in their
capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest
a citizens jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion
(or utter disinterest and voter apathy). In

phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they
will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is
perfectly true that citizens juries are special in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a
better more reflective, more deliberative political process, then those are design features
that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that
might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with
the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid
too much competition for peoples time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a deliberation day before every election might
be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And
(although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing
into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens jurors to practice democratic deliberation within, even before the jury discussion gets
underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal and
with the possibility theorem that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those
key features.

Second is dogmatism problems are complex and have multiple causes the
reductionist approach of the affirmative is bad
Keller, et. al, 1 Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago
2001

(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social
Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and
knowledge through active learning, Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)
John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in
the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to
an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social
discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse
perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955,
p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in
combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984;
Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and
the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new
experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students
develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework.
Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing
them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated"
(p. 28). The authors believe that involving
students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and
grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and
critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In
addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing
perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield
a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

The aff alone is meaningless focus on creating spaces is communicative capitalism, thriving
on individualized communication focused debate provides the opportunity to challenge
power
Chandler 10, Professor of IR at the University of Westminster and Poli Sci Prof at Hobart and William Smith Colleges (David,
No Communicating Left, www.davidchandler.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Radical-Philosophy-Dean-review.pdf)
Dean pulls few punches in her devastating critique of the American left for its complacency, its limited capacity,
and even its lack of awareness of the need to offer a stand of political resistance to power. This is how she concludes
her book: The eight years of the Bush administration were a diversion. Intoxicated with a sense of purpose, we could oppose
war, torture, indefinite detention, warrantless wiretapping, a seemingly endless series of real crimes such opposition keeps us
feeling like we matter We have an ethical sense. But we lack a coherent politics. (p.175) Dean highlights clearly the
disintegration of the collective left and its simulacra in the individuated life-style politics of todays depoliticized
radicalism, where it appears that particular individual demands and identities are to be respected but there is no
possibility of universalising them into a collective challenge to the system: no possibility of a left which stands for
something beyond itself. She argues that, rather than confront this problem, the left take refuge in the fantasy that
technology will overcome their inability to engage and that the circulation of ideas and information on the internet will
construct the collectivities and communities of interest, which are lacking in reality. For Dean, this technology
fetishism marks the lefts failure: its abandonment of workers and the poor; its retreat from the state and repudiation
of collective action; and its acceptance of the neoliberal economy as the only game in town (p.33). In fact, she uncovers
the gaping hole at the heart of the left, highlighting that radicalism appears to be based less on changing the world
than on the articulation of an alternative oppositionalist identity: a non-strategic, non-instrumental, articulation of
a protest against power. In a nutshell, the left are too busy providing alternative voices, spaces and forums to think
about engaging with mass society in an organised, collective, attempt to achieve societal transformation. For Dean,
this is fake or hollow political activity, pursued more for its own sake than for future political ends. This is a politics of ethical
distancing, of selfflattery and narcissism, which excuses or even celebrates the self-marginalization of the left: as either the
result of the overwhelming capacity of neoliberal power to act, to control, and to regulate; or as the result of the apathy,
stupidity, or laziness of the masses - or the sheeple (p.171) - for their failure to join the radical cause. Dean suggests that the
left needs to rethink its values and approaches and her book is intended to be a wake-up call to abandon narcissistic
complacency. In doing this, she highlights a range of problems connected around the thematic of the lefts defence of
democracy in an age of communicative capitalism. She argues that the lefts focus on extending or defending democracy by
asserting their role in giving voice and creating spaces merely reproduces the domination of communicative
capitalism, where there is no shared space of debate and disagreement but the proliferation of mediums and
messages without the responsibility to develop and defend positions or to engage and no external measure of
accountability . Communicative capitalism is held to thrive on this fragmented, atomizing, and individuated,
framework of communication, which gives the impression of a shared discourse, community, or movement but
leaves reality just as it is, with neoliberal frameworks of domination, inequality, and destruction continuing
unopposed (pp.162-75). This is not merely a critique of the US left; it is also a powerful deconstruction of its claims for a
collective existence. She suggests this most strongly in her chapters on technology fetishism and on the 9/11 truth
movement, in which she analyzes how individuals come together not on the basis of a collective political project,
challenging power, but on the basis of an invitation for individuals to affirm their alienation from power and to
produce, or to find out for themselves, their own personal truths. These are not projects to change or to
transform the external world but mechanisms whereby individuals can find meaning through their ethical
individual actions and beliefs. She powerfully describes how 9/11 truth movements are about individual affirmation rather
than collective engagement. In this they can easily be equated with the mass anti-war demonstrations where
individuals marched under the banner of Not in My Name, seeking personal affirmation in distancing themselves
from politics rather than taking responsibility to engage in political struggle by the building of any collective movement
(p.47). The same atomization of left politics is analyzed in Deans critique of the radical individualism at the heart of the
displacement of politics with ethics. Here Judith Butler stands in as the exemplar for a left, which is alleged to have given up
on conviction and political struggle and instead retreated into emphasising generosity to difference and
awareness of mutual vulnerability and to focus upon micropolitical and ethical practices that work on the self in
its immediate reactions and relations (p.123). Dean argues that the ethical turn appears to be a reflection of political
despair and celebrates a denial of political struggle and strong subjectivity . Dean also, correctly, links this presentation
of defeatism to a misconstruction of Foucaults work that understands power as operating free from politics. Using Butler as an
example, she argues that Butler reads governmentality as replacing sovereignty, rather than as a discursive framing for the
operation of political power (p.125). The intimation is that in seeing power as having shifted to the global level, free from
states, political opposition is merely expressed in the ethical terms of engagement in discourses that shape and
deform what we mean by the human (p.135). This strongly resonates with the technological fetishism of the
global politics of networked communication which encourages the transformation of politics into the ethics of
virtual participation.

Policy simulation is specifically good education about the intricacies of the political and
legal system is key to decision-making skills and actualizing social change.
Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, Science Education as a
Call to Action, Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206
**note: SSI = socioscientific issues
The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values
developing
and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in
the skills , attitudes, and values that will enable them to take control of their lives, cooperate with others to bring
about change , and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more
equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and
possession of the right attitudes. As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost
always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we
live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A
politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration
of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM
STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the
knowledge that is likely to promote sociopolitical action and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four
dimensions: (a) scientific and technological knowledge that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying
social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems;
(c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely
outcome or direction of possible actions and the desirability of those outcomes. Although formulated as a model for
environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to
be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students
need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them . It is essential
that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and political system(s) that prevail in the communities in
which they live and develop a clear understanding of how decisions are made within local, regional, and national
government and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of
decision making is located and awareness of the mechanisms by which decisions are reached, intervention is not
possible. Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including
knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes
but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies
for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3
knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and
arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent,
robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category
includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which
we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for
themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levelsa clear overlap with
futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which
sociopolitical action depends is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of
technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the
controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely
eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the establishment of
policy.
2NC OV
Our interpretation is that the aff must advocate topical action by the USFG any other
model of debate is bad for clash and ruins fairness and education for both sides. There
are several framing issues for how you should evaluate this debate:
1. Only weigh impacts the aff solves against framework arguments about
massive systemic violence they say come before policymaking are irrelevant
unless they can provide concrete mechanisms for resolving them if this were a
counterplan debate you wouldnt let them outweigh the net benefit with
advantages the plan didnt solve. Have a very high threshold for aff solvency
especially when we have very specific internal links from policymaking to
change and they cannot articulate theirs.
2. Framework is an additive requirement dont buy their attempts to frame this
as a tradeoff - defending instrumental action doesnt require them to remove
any style or content from the 1AC
Newman 10 (Saul, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2)
There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state say
for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing is one of the basic
strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands does not necessarily mean
working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy . On the contrary, demands are made from a position
outside the political order, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that
specific measure. They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting
fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities,
and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.
3. Weigh framework before the substance of the aff 2 reasons

a. Its not the aff versus framework, its their model versus framework
even if discussions about the aff are important, thats outweighed by
opening the floodgates to infinite possible tangential engagements with
the topic. An open topic creates a competitive incentive to run to the
margins and defend nothing at all the primary beneficiaries of this
model arent people with genuine interests in issues about their own
identity but postmodernist white dudes trying to avoid clash.
4. The aff is not a prerequisite assertions the aff comes before policymaking are
infinitely regressive and foreclose actual solutions for social change thats
hodson
a. Either they solve which means they eventually spill up to institutional
action and that they dont get to weigh the aff against framework its
just a question of why the aff chose not to make the plan the central
question of action OR
b. They foreclose all state action which means that they never solve
because institutions overpower their movement thats hodson and
chandler
Predictable limits
Predictable Limits are an important part of the continuance of the activityWithout
limits put in place, activities like debate peter out, because people lose interest in an
activity in which there are no forces to check back against abuse. The Neg isolates two
main reasons why predictability is key
1. Predictable clash is key to specificityIf the neg has to debate something
unpredictable then we have to resort to generics and cannot have specific
arguments. There are two implications to this
a. Lack of specificity means we will never be able to access the affirmative on a
substantive level and therefore the discussion of the aff will allows be shallow
implicating their solvency. This acts as a solvency takeout to any of their in-
round solvency claims.
b. Lack of specificity means we will have to resort to generic arguments which
means we lose topic-specific education because we only get a shallow
discussion of the resolution itself.
2. Limitations helps preserve the activityOnly through restrictions imposed in
debate will we be able to produce debates that all individuals feel the ability to
participate in. Without these limitations individuals from smaller schools cant
prepare for affs outside the resolution and lack strong accessibility making debate
homogenized by larger institutions which the aff probably indicts.
Dogmatism
Policymaking good
Policy simulation is the best model of debate dont weigh any impacts the aff
doesnt solve vs. framework its a question of their model of debate versus ours.
1. policy simulation teaches us about the government. State action about [x thing the
aff is] solves better learning about pragmatic implementation is more likely to
influence things like the state. If you cant combine their philosophy with
pragmatic policy action its just hot air their [we are a jamming or whatever]
will just go back to collecting dust on some random library shelf thats chandler
and hodson
2. Talking about state action creates mutually accessible information there is a huge
literature base about whether or not the US should engage china which allows teams
to form cohesive, well supported arguments by permitting pre-round deliberation.
This has two implications
a. this controls the internal link to fairness, the aff interpretation of debate
justifies teams running to the fringes and talking about things completely
unrelated to the topic which explodes the research burden of the neg and
makes debate impossible
b. we control the internal link to education. Having well-prepared teams on
both sides is better it forces the aff to learn their arguments in greater depth,
and teaches them about holes in the argument that they can shore up. It also
allows the neg to engage the aff- critically interrogating issues with the aff
allows the neg to gain a deeper understanding of the aff better (solves their
education arguments).
3. policy debate facilitates connection to action - good ideas are just synapses firing off
until you actually do something plan focused debate is good because it forces us to
make choices about what we should do about [the aff], not just develop stances on
how we feel about [X thing]
4 Simulations allow us to apply theory anyways solves all their offense and
means the TVA is the best method
Silvia 12 (Chris Silvia is an assistant professor in the School of Public Affairs and Administration at the University of Kansas. His
main research interests include collaborative governance, public service delivery, and leadership. The Impact of Simulations on
Higher Level Learning. Journal of Public Affair Education. JPAE 18(2), 397422) CTD
Experiential learning activities have been a commonly employed pedagogical tool for centuries. The
physical sciences have had laboratory sessions, language classes have included role-playing exercises, and the health sciences
have held mock-ups, all of which were designed to allow the student to use and apply what was read or presented in class.
With the lectures and/or readings as a foundation, many of these experiences were intended to crystallize the students
understanding of the material. For example, since the relationship between force, mass, and acceleration is often not intuitive,
many physics courses include a lab session where students manipulate these three parameters and prove to themselves that
force is equal to mass times acceleration. Whereas classes in the physical sciences reinforce and build upon the concepts and
theories taught in lecture with opportunities to experiment in a laboratory setting, courses in the social sciences often do
not include similar, hands-on learning opportunities. This lack of an active learning experience may be particularly
problematic in the political science, public policy, and public administration classrooms, for students in these
disciplines must often grapple with the conflicting facts and values that are common in public policy
debates and throughout the policy process in the real world. Since pure laboratory experiments in many
disciplines are not possible or ethical, instructors in these fields have turned to simulations as ways to allow students a
laboratory-like experience. Simulations vary widely in their lengthsome last only 5 to 10 minutes (Davis, 2009), and others are
held over multiple class sessions (Woodworth, Gump, & Forrester, 2005). Additionally, the format of simulations ranges from
computerized games to elaborate, role-playing scenarios (Moore, 2009). While not all simulations involve role playing, for the
purposes of this paper, the terms role playing, role-playing simulation, and simulations are used synonymously
to refer to active learning techniques in which students try to become another individual and, by
assuming the role, to gain a better understanding of the person, as well as the actions and motivations
that prompt certain behaviors [and] explore their [own] feelings (Moore, 2009, p. 209) Simulations give
students the chance to apply theory, develop critical skills , and provide a welcome relief from the everyday tasks of reading
and preparing for classes (Kanner, 2007). An additional benefit of many of these simulations is the introduction
of an aspect of realism into the students experience. Such simulations are historically seen in the medical fields,
where mock-up patients take on the signs and symptoms of a certain disease or injury and the student is asked to assess,
diagnose, and/or treat the patient. Here the students must apply what they have learned to a reasonably
realistic scenario. Further, there is evidence that the experiential learning that occurs in role-playing
simulations promotes long-term retention of course material (Bernstein & Meizlish, 2003; Brookfield, 1990).
Increasingly, public administration, public policy, and political science courses are turning toward
simulations and role playing to help their students both better understand and apply the material.
Simulations have been used in courses such as international relations (e.g., Shellman & Turan, 2006), negotiations (e.g., Kanner,
2007), constitutional law (e.g., Fliter, 2009), comparative politics (e.g., Shellman, 2001), professional development (e.g.,
Wechsler & Baker, 2004), economics (e.g., Campbell & McCabe, 2002), human resource management (e.g., Dede, 2002; Yaghi,
2008), leadership (e.g., Crosby & Bryson, 2007), and American government (e.g., Caruson, 2005).

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