UST Civil Law

MUST READ CASES (CRIMINAL LAW)

BOOK I

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I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

1. Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992

Under the utilitarian theory, the protective theory in criminal law, affirms that the primary
function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers.
It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong
sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the
actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should
also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to
such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that criminal law is founded upon
that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society.
This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon
a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an
external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the
amount of punishment, (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note
also Justice Pablos view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).

Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused,
the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the actual and
potential wrongdoers. In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioners four (4) checks were
used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit
for value as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of
the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioners stead the potential
wrongdoer, whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting
the petitioner.

Mala In se and Mala Prohibita

2. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the
acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished
by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements
of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala
prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the
law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been

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violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy.

Proximate Cause

3. People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found
to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab
wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and
not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.

Impossible Crimes

4. Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103119

Intod fired at Palangpangans room, although in reality, the latter was not present in his room;
thus, Intod failed to kill him. The factual situation in the case at bar presents an inherent
impossibility of accomplishing the crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where
the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime.

5. Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009

In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latters wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.

Herein petitioners case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given
in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime ofqualified theft,
which is a crime against property. Petitioners evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value
thereof, which was not rightfully hers.

Stages of Execution

6. People of the Philippines v. Malisce, G.R. No. 190912. January 12, 2015

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There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The essential elements of an
attempted felony are as follows: a) The offender commences the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts; b) He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony; c) The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance.

7. Rait v. People, G.R. No. 180425, July 31, 2008

Unlike in Baleros, the acts of petitioner clearly establish his intention to commence the act of
rape. Petitioner had already successfully removed the victims clothing and had inserted his finger
into her vagina. It is not empty speculation to conclude that these acts were preparatory to the act
of raping her. Had it not been for the victims strong physical resistance, petitioners next step
would, logically, be having carnal knowledge of the victim. The acts are clearly the first or some
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made.

8. Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the
intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows.
Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained
assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit
Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting
in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.

That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if
Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for
attempted murder.

9. Aristotle Valenzuela v. People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007

Theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

10. Ramie Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 149988, August 14, 2009

Considering further that the victim sustained wounds that were not fatal and absent a showing
that such wounds would have certainly caused his death were it not for timely medical
assistance, we declare the petitioners guilt to be limited to the crime of attempted homicide.

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11. People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the
offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all
the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In People v. Publico, we ruled that when the touching of the vagina by the penis is
coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime
committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.

Conspiracy and proposal

12. People v. Carandang, G.R. No. 175926, July 6, 2011

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established
by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing the door when the police
officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the
shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milans following such
instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that
Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what
made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial
evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are
considered principals by direct participation.

As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act of closing the door facilitated the
commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the
police officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to
prevent any chance for the police officers to defend themselves. Treachery is thus present in the
case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.

13. People v. Bokingco, G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011

Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed
Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco
was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.

14. People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 2014

Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds
on Joey during the commotion, Erwins liability is not diminished since he and the others with
him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the
assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation.

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15. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158754, August 10, 2007

Petitioners second and third arguments focus on the possible degrees of participation of Jinggoy
in the crime of Plunder. Noticeably, both arguments, if pursued to their respective logical
conclusions, tend to cancel each other out, one leading as it were to a direction quite the opposite
of the other. For while the second argument attempts to establish animplied conspiracy between
Jinggoy and his father hence, the guilt of one is the guilt of the other the third argument
eschews the idea of conspiracy, but respondent Jinggoy is nonetheless equally guilty as President
Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation and/or direct participation in the crime of
Plunder.

16. Fernan v. People G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007

It is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher cannot be
prepared and completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply
cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Without the check payment, the defraudation cannot
be committed and successfully consummated. Thus, petitioners acts in signing the false tally
sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents.

17. Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989

Under the Sandiganbayans decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief,
commission chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every
crime arising from disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief
auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials
and employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be
premised on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who is
charged with others as part of a conspiracy.

Continuing Crime

18. People v Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974

Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not
robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The
conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is punishable
as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of two roosters in the same place and
on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes of theft.

19. Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993

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The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called single larceny doctrine, that is, the taking of
several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place
constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the separate larceny doctrine, under
which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the
doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as
many distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).

The American courts following the single larceny rule, look at the commission of the different
criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same transaction or as done on the same
occasion (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45
NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).

20. Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110617 December 29, 1994

The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one hand, and those
committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are definitely separate felonies. They were
dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of commission provided
by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated ondifferent occasions, and
caused injury to different parties.

Compound Crime/Complex Crime

21. Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-10364 and L-10376, March 31, 1958

There is no question that appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex offense
of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it could not have
been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from
liability. Even assuming that he had no intention to defraud the offended party if his co-
defendants succeeded in attaining the purpose sought by the culprits, appellants
participation together with the participation of his co-defendant the commission of the
offense completed all the necessary for the perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial document

22. People v. Castromero, G.R. No. 118992, October 9, 1997

In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, we
stress the settled principle that a person who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of
danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other person may
consequently suffer. In this case, Josephine jumped from a window of her house to escape from
Appellant Castromero; as a result, she suffered serious physical injuries, specifically a
broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. This
being the case, the court a quo correctly convicted Appellant Castromero of the complex crime
of rape with serious physical injuries.

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23. People v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012

Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single
act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the
navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time,
constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo.The
crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive
penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is
punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty.

24. People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453. May 29, 2002

Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the
penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide.This is in
accordance with the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, x x x.

25. People v. Villaflores, R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012

There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound
crime under Article 48, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses
is fixed by law; in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not
specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary
means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of
crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the
most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a
composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or
compound crime may be the subject of a separate information.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Justifying Circumstances

- Self-Defense

26. Nacnac v. People, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012

Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference between the act of drawing
ones gun and the act of pointing ones gun at a target. The former cannot be said to be unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. In People v. Borreros, We ruled that for unlawful
aggression to be attendant, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. Unlawful
aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. Here, the act of the [deceased] of allegedly
drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as unlawful aggression. Such act did not put

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in real peril the life or personal safety of appellant. The facts surrounding the instant case must,
however, be differentiated from current jurisprudence on unlawful aggression. The victim here
was a trained police officer. He was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle
a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning shot fired by a fellow police officer, his
superior, was left unheeded as he reached for his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner.
Petitioner was, therefore, justified in defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient
colleague.

27. People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011

An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. In this case, other than the self-
serving allegation of Danny, there is no evidence sufficiently clear and convincing that the
victim indeed attacked him. The prosecutions rebuttal witnesses Jaime Maquiling and Francisco
Austerowho admittedly were among those whom Danny and Bingky had an encounter with on
the night of August 19, 2001, never said in their testimonies that Romeo attacked Danny and a
bladed weapon was used. These witnesses were categorical that Romeo was not with them
during the incident. This testimonial evidence was not refuted by the defense. Even Bingky who
claimed to be a friend of Romeowas not able to identify the latter as one of those present at the
time. Candid enough, Bingky declared that it was only a certain Ago and Jaime who confronted
Danny. Resultantly, Danny failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression, the
most indispensable element of self-defense. Where no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-
defense may be successfully pleaded.

28. People v. Mapait, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending
or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be
merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another
with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand
to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming
to throw a pot.

29. People v. Patotoy, G.R. No. 102058, August 26, 1996

Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or an imminent

danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. There must exist a real
danger to the life or personal safety of the person claiming self-defense.[18] This element, in the
case before us, is sorely wanting. No veritable physical force on the part of Manuel has been
shown that could have really endangered appellants life. Manuels alleged act of drawing
something from his waist certainly is not the unlawful aggression meant in the law that
would justify a fatal strike at the victim with such lightning-speed as appellant has delivered. In

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fact, no weapon, supposedly in the person of Manuel, is shown to have been found. Without
unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot exist nor be an extenuating circumstance.

30. People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, June 13, 2012

The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense. In other
words, no self-defense can exist without unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the
accused will have to prevent or repel. In People v. Dolorido, we held that unlawful aggression
presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and
intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to
ones life. The unlawful aggression may constitute an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to
inflict real imminent injury upon the accused. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and strong,
positively showing the x x x intent to cause injury.

31. People v. Credo, G.R. No. 197360, July 3, 2013

As found by the trial court, there can be no unlawful aggression on the part of Joseph because at
the time of the incident, he was only holding a lemon and an egg. According to the trial court, the
fact that Joseph was unarmed effectively belied the allegation of Ronald that he was prompted to
retaliate in self-defense when Joseph first hacked and hit him on his neck. The trial court further
pointed out that if Joseph indeed hacked Ronald on the neck, it is surprising that the latter did
not suffer any injury when according to them (Ronald, Rolando and Flora Credo), Joseph was
running fast and made a hard thrust on Ronald, hitting the latters neck.

- State of Necessity

32. Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004

Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not
have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the
actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to
pay her mothers hospital bills.

-Fulfillment of Duty

33. Cabanlig v. Sandiganabayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28, 2005

Certainly, an M16 Armalite is a far more powerful and deadly weapon than the bamboo lance
that the fugitive had run away with in People v. Delima. The policeman in People v. Delima was
held to have been justified in shooting to death the escaping fugitive because the policeman was
merely performing his duty.

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In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen when Valino
grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen
would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely necessary to
prevent his escape.[22] But Valino was not only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the
M16 Armalite of a policeman. The policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also
to recover the loose firearm. By grabbing Mercados M16 Armalite, which is a formidable
firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger.

- Obedience to a lawful order of a superior

34. Tabuena v. People, G.R. No. 103501-03. February 17, 1997

This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly
executed order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than
contumacious disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It
carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is
patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the
urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis
essentia.

Battered Woman Syndrome

35. People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004

Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom and
based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her
and inflicted graver harm then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have
ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of
actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery
usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly
attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by
installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering
episodes) prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances
and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense complete or incomplete on the
part of the victim. Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified under the
circumstances.

36. Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

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The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. Petitioners
contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an anti-male, husband-
bashing, and hate-men law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that (t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from
a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part
of the police, the prosecution and the judges.

Exempting Circumstances

- Insanity

37. People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act; i.e.,
when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost
consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the
mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and
clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.

- Minority

38. Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006

Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age
and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic
reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action
of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence
is the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an
illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with
discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding
circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.
Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and
shrewdness.

In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind
the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to

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discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the
petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her
mother, he hid in his grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained
thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.

39. Madali v. People, G.R. No. 180380, August 4, 2009

As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,
Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt
from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant
to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344. Although the crime was committed on 13 April
1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given
retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual criminal. This is
based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the sentence to be imposed against
Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which states: SEC.
38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Provided, however,
That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

40. People v. Sarcia G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009

The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by
the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D.
and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to
a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No.
9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does
not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a
minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension
of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.

To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been
promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and
40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be
entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows: Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement
in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the
DSWD.

12
41. People v. Mantalaba, R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of
the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such
is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA,
when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records
show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344
became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the
CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already
entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of
sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192
of P.D. 603.

- Accident

42. Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004

It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said
defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the
realm of criminal law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a
deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of
another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the
consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and
irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it,
proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends.
Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with
law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both
criminal and civil liabilities. On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action,
or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused
does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there
is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute
free will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or
happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under
the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.

43. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007

Accident is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential
requisites for this exempting circumstance, are: 1. A person is performing a lawful act; 2. With
due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4. Without fault or intention of

13
causing it. By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be
considered as performing a lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellants defense of accident
must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident.

Mitigating Circumstances

-Praeter Intentionem

44. People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended
to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. Here,
there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries,
committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he
expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.

-Immediate vindication of a grave offense

45. People v. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011

As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the same
cannot likewise be appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code requires that the act be committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. The established rule
is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient
time to recover his equanimity. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged
attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he
sought immediate vindication. He testified that he learned of the same from his stepson,
Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the accused-
appellant carried out the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a period
of four days was sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could have
regained his composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be
credited in favor of the accused-appellant.

- Sufficient Provocation

46. Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, January 20, 2009

Petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying to avoid a
fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending when petitioners lucky
punch found its mark. In People v. Macaso, a case where the accused police officer shot and
killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the Court appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party

14
immediately preceding the shooting. The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of
Appeals, a case also involving a policeman who killed a man after the latter challenged him to a
fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the same mitigating circumstance should not be
considered in favor of petitioner.

- Passion/Obfuscation

47. People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 140514 , September 30, 2003

The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion and
obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the same facts or motive. In
other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a grave offense, he
could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded him.
Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and
(2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral
equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery of his wifes
extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and
cool off.

48. People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159. March 18, 2015

To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the
accused must be able to prove the following elements: 1. that there be an act, both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and 2. that said act which produced the obfuscation
was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.

49. Romera v. People, G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004

But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating
circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same
facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts established
in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned.
Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.

-Voluntary Surrender

50. People v. Viernes, G.R. No. 136733, December 13, 2001

The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an acknowledgment of guilt, or an

intention to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that search and capture would

15
require. Going to the police station to clear his name does not show any intent of appellant to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities

51. People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004

In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year had lapsed
since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither
shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the
trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his
surrender, there was a pending warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited
with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Aggravating Circumstances

52. People v. Cortes, G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001

As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered for the simple
reason that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the crime. Night-time becomes
an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender
takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offenders
immunity from identification or capture. In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused
purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity.

The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be appreciated
separately as another aggravating circumstance. Here, treachery qualified the offense to murder.

As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could not be considered as it
was not shown that accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or
showed manifest disrespect for her womanhood. In fact, the accused mistook the victim for a
man.

- Recidivism

53. People v Molina, G.R. Nos. 134777-78. July 24, 2000

On the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the trial court properly appreciated the same
though not alleged in the information. Article 14(9) of the Revised Penal Code defines a
recidivist as one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted
by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code. To prove
recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the information and to attach thereto certified
copies of the sentences rendered against the accused. Nonetheless, the trial court may still give

16
such aggravating circumstance credence if the accused does not object to the presentation of
evidence on the fact of recidivism.

-Reiteracion

54. People v. Cajara, G.R. No. 122498. September 27, 2000

The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10, of The
Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted of frustrated murder in 1975 and of
homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and murder
sometime in 1989 where his sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a
fine of P200,000.00. He was granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8
November 1991. Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when
the accused has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or
greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to
which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of
simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua.Where the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case.

- Treachery

55. People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the victim
was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body
while he was under the impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had [a]
shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the
motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his
torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus
to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both from the people seated in the
side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the trial courts finding of treachery should be
affirmed. There is treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself.

56. People v. Yam-Id, G.R. No. 126116. June 21, 1999

Treachery attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when an adult person illegally
attacks a child of tender years and causes his death, treachery exists.

17
57. People v. Latag, G.R. No. 153213. January 22, 2004

In the present case, we find nothing in the records that shows the exact manner of the killing.
Though Atienza turned around immediately after hearing a gunshot, he could not, and in fact did
not, testify as to how the attack had been initiated. The fact that appellant was standing behind
some shrubs when he shot the victim does not by itself sufficiently establish that the method of
execution gave the latter no opportunity for self-defense. Nor was the attack deliberately and
consciously adopted by the former without danger to himself.

58. People v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312. January 28, 1997

The Revised Penal Code provides that (t)here is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. In the case at bench, the presence of treachery
or alevosia which qualified the killing to murder was correctly appreciated by the trial court
because the manner by which the perpetrators commenced and consummated the stabbing of the
victim Efren Lasona showed conclusively that the latter was totally surprised by the attack and
not afforded an opportunity to raise any defense against his attackers. Efren Lasona could not
have expected, while riding in that tricycle, that he would be savagely and fatally assaulted by
knife-wielding attackers. The victim was defenseless during the attack as his hands were
restrained by the accused-appellant to facilitate the stabbing of the victim by the other
perpetrators. It is well-settled that (a)n unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances
which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness
and severity of the attack, constitutes alevosia. Parenthetically, the fact that the attack on
deceased Efren Lasona was frontal does not preclude the presence of treachery in this case as the
same made the attack no less unexpected and sudden.

- Ignominy

59. People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-62116 March 22, 1990

The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy because of the
greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The testimony of the examining physician that he
did not find mud on the victims private organ, does not necessarily belie the latters asseveration
that the accused plastered (in the words of the lower court) mud on her private part. It is
worthwhile mentioning that the victim was examined and treated by Dr. Claudio at 3:55 p.m. or
about almost two (2) hours after the rape was committed. 17 Given this circumstance, the absence
of mud in the victims private part when she was examined by the physician, may be attributed to
the possibility that the mud washed or fell off even before the victim left the house for her
physical examination. Moreover, Rebeccas testimony was corroborated by that of Amelita
Malong who swore that she saw mud smeared on Rebeccas private part when she (Amelita) saw
Rebecca right after the incident. It is also difficult to conceive why the offended party, young as

18
she was, and with a chaste reputation, would go to the extent of fabricating this portion of her
testimony notwithstanding the consequent humiliation on her person and disgrace on her
womanhood. We cannot but agree with the trial courts finding that the offense was aggravated
by ignominy. We are of the opinion, however that the word cruelty used in the dispositive
portion of the judgment, to describe an alternative aggravating circumstance, is unnecessary. The
act of plastering mud on the victims vagina right after she was raped, is adequately and
properly described as ignominy rather than cruelty or ignominy.

Alternative Circumstances

60. People v. Fontillas, G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010

Accused appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication was not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit the rape. The person pleading intoxication must likewise prove
that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would
blur his reason. Accused-appellant utterly failed to present clear and convincing proof of the
extent of his intoxication on the night of December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he had
taken was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. Not one of accused-appellants
drinking buddies testified that they, in fact, consumed eight bottles of gin prior to the rape
incident.

III. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE

Principal

61. People v. Janjalani et. al. R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011

Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on
principal by inducement. The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas
in Metro Manila and Rohmats confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from
Asali as part of their mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the
determining cause of the commission of the crime. Such command or advice [was] of such
nature that, without it, the crime would not have materialized.

Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the
act would not have been performed. In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved
that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus,
because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one
conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. The
same finding must be applied to the case at bar.

62. People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012

19
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation,
by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation,
one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and
cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would
not have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show
that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape.
The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until
appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the
crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latters services in
exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her
own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this
disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. While this Court does
not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable
cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection
of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act

Accomplice

63. People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009

All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of
ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and
Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus intention to
have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was
already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express
consent to Tampus plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.

It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be
indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by
indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not
indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus
who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have
sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Idas consent.

Accessories

64. Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994

Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as
the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an
accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised
Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Nothing, however, the
reports from law enforcement agencies that there is rampant robbery and thievery of
government and private properties and that such robbery and thievery have become profitable
on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known

20
as fence, of stolen properties, P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the
crimes of robbery and theft. Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be
prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter
case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes aprincipal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise
stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate
and distinct offenses.

Anti Fencing Law

65. Dimat v. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012

The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took
no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that
crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. evidently,
Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that
Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly
could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to
show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents
undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat
sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her
purchase.

IV. PENALTIES

66. People v. Rocha, G.R. No. 173797, August 31, 2007

It should be kept in mind that accused-appellants could not avail themselves of parole if their
appeal is dismissed, unless they also apply for executive clemency and ask for the commutation
of their reclusion perpetua sentences. Republic Act No. 4108, as amended, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with
death penalty or life imprisonment. In several cases, we have considered the penalty of reclusion
perpetua as synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and ruled that said law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said
penalty.

67. People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006

Henceforth, death, as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form
part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower
than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his

21
penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but
instead,prision mayor.

There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing
penalty of death, as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. The
facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an
extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe that both reclusion perpetua and
death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, [w]hen the
penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next
lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale. Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death isprision mayor.

68. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,R. Nos. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987

Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty
but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677
[1957]). Article 70 speaks of service of sentence, duration of penalty and penalty to be
inflicted. Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the imposition of penalty. It
merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe
of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.

69. People v. Temporada, R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008

As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the majority being generic
mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, does not result to a maximum term fixed
beyond the prescribed penalty. At most, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty
in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty and the
minimum term is taken from the next lower penalty, then, in this limited sense, the difference
would naturally be only one degree. Concretely, in the case of homicide with one ordinary
aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is taken from reclusin temporal in its maximum
period which is within the prescribed penalty of reclusin temporal, while the minimum term is
taken from prisin mayor which is the penalty next lower to reclusin temporal; hence, the one-
degree difference observed by the dissent.

In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term can exceed the prescribed
penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum term can be as high as 20 years of reclusin
temporal while the prescribed penalty remains at prisin correccional maximum to prisin
mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty from which the
minimum term is taken remains at anywhere within prisin correccional minimum and medium,
or from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In this sense, the incremental penalty rule
deviates from the afore-stated general rule.

22
70. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case,
Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three
equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three
portions.

Subsidiary Imprisonment

71. Narte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004

This Court clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 dated February 14, 2001 that there is
no legal obstacle to the application of the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should
only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine. This should finally dispel the
petitioners importunate claim that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in this case is
improper.

- Indeterminate Sentence Law

72. Spouses Bacar v. Judge De Guzman Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349. April 18, 1997

The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to
prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic
usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending
upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an
indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special
laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal
range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.

In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty is determined in accordance with the rules and provisions of the Code exactly as if the
Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been enacted.

73. Romero v. People, R. No. 171644, November 23, 2011

In Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to both the Revised Penal Code and the special
laws, and in the same ruling, this Court summarized the application and non-application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:

x x x It is basic law that x x x the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is

mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except only in the following cases:

Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.

23
Those convicted of treason (Art. 114) conspiracy or proposal to commit treason (Art. 115).

Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139)
or espionage (Art. 117).

Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).

Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).

Recidivists are entitled to an Indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547,

February 22, 1974) Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the
crime is committed while he is on parole. (People v. Calreon, CA 78 O. G. 6701, November
19, 1982).

Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.

Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same. (People v.
Corral, 74 Phil. 359).

Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year.

Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1) year, the accused cannot avail
himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which is based upon the penalty
actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that which may be imposed in the
discretion of the court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, January 22, 1962).

Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.

The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence
is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the
economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire
sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The
requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether
punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and
maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified
by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.

74. People v. Mantalaba, R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in

fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules
stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which
is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum
penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no
other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the

24
present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion
perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion
temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.

75. People v. Gunda, G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no other aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the CA correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the
lower of the two indivisible penalties. It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

- Probation Law

76. Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking
or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined
from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis. It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the index of
intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of
a statute there should be no departure.

77. Almero v. People, G.R. No. 188191, March 12, 2014

Petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for probation,
which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal
before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition
supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No.
968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies.

78. Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011

One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the

25
provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an opportunity for
the reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment
convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here,
however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in
excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the
Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum
penalty of 2 years and 4 months.

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it
would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead
undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.

79. Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or
immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes
the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted.[15]
Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for
probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted of
any offense against the security of the State; those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day
and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on probation; and those who
are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became
applicable.

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it
offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not
covered by the disqualification.

80. Bala v Judge Jimenez, G.R. No. L-67301, January 29, 1990

The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be arrested so that he
can serve the sentence originally imposed. The expiration of the probation period of one year is
of no moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed earlier. Neither can
there be a deduction of the one year probation period from the penalty of one year and one day to
three years, six months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment because an order placing the
defendant on probation is not a sentence, but is in effect a suspension of the imposition of
the sentence. 12 It is not a final judgment but an interlocutory judgment in the nature of a
conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his
reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation
are complied with, or by a final judgment if the conditions are violated.

26
 Modification and Extinction of Criminal Liability

81. Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, R. No. L-28841, June 24, 1983

The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of
the Old Rules of Court deal with the computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as,
the filing of tax returns on or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint, taking an
appeal, etc. They do not apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute those
who committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is
automatic and by operation of law. Where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on
a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working day.
Prescription has automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the
information on the last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.

82. Romualdez v Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the
absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period.
Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in
enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a
hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

83. People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four
(4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however,
should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

In the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all fours with the instant case,
this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those
who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds
delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

84. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Lidua, G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013

27
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor
who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription
period. The recent People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not
controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld
this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws
but not to ordinances.

It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on
the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that, is applicable to ordinances and
their prescription period.

85. People v. Lim, February 13, 1992 G.R. No. 95753

To warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victims retraction or pardon should be made
prior to the institution of the criminal action (People v. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250 [1991]). The
present case was filed on February 24, 1988 while the Affidavit was executed only on March 1,
1988.

86. People v. Bacang, July 30, 1996 G.R. NO. 116512

While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the
appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of
Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-
appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No.
347, 3 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent
Resolution No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994.

87. People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010

In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

xxxx

By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.

Article 344 of the same Code also provides

ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and
acts of lasciviousness. x x x.

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offender
with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed
upon him. x x x.

28
On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages contracted between the offender
and the offended party in the crime of rape as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity to totally
extinguish the criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may have been imposed
upon those found guilty of the felony.

BOOK II

Crimes Against National Security (Arts. 114-123)

- Treason

88. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the
enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation, cannot be prosecuted
for the crime of treason for the reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in
the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ruled
that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government.

89. People v. Perez, 83 Phil 314

7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for recruiting, apprehending and commandeering
numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them to satisfy the immoral
purposes of Japanese officers. The Supreme Court held that his commandeering of women to
satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor
was not treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant
for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves
would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the
entertainment.

- Piracy

90. People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997

Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286
of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be

29
true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of
destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat.

Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State

- Arbitrary Detention

91. People v. Flores, G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001

Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person. Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, the question that
remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court proved that
Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accused-appellants.

Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him, he and
Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29, 1992. At
around six in the evening, while on their way home, they passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos
to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go
home because he had to show his residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused-
appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila,
located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father
that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified that he heard
gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.

The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of arbitrary
detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito, for they
dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accused-appellant apprehend
or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores really inspected the
residence certificate and barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony
comprised of hearsay evidence, which has no probative value. In summary, Jerry Manlangits
testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.

92. People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1

When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the arrest without a warrant
under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and legal since the offense must also be committed
in his presence or within his view. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a crime for an essential precondition under the rule is
that the crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.

93. Albor v. Aguis, A.M. No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003

30
Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused and his relatives.
But as an officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing such detention order, he
trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused. Because of the unauthorized order
issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived of liberty without due process
of law for a total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the
issuance of the appropriate order of commitment by the municipal judge on March 25, 1999.

- Expulsion

94. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778

The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties and deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. There is no law expressly
authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a new domicile against their will and in fact Article
127 punishes public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compel any
person to change his residence.

- Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained

95. Burgos v Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/ or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or intending to publish since mere generalization will not suffice. Also,
ownership is of no consequence and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is
directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized.

Crimes Against Public Order

-Rebellion

96. People v. Loverdioro, G.R. 112235, November 29, 1995

If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common
crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership
in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.

97. People v. Geronimo, October 23, 1956 G.R. L-8936

Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it was
committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were

31
done for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion and the individual misdeed
could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and
intent would be unrelated to each other. The individual crime would not be a means necessary
for committing the rebellion, as it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter.

- Sedition

98. People v. Hadji October 24, 1963 G.R. L-12686

The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the common offenses of murder etc. as
distinct and independent acts separable from sedition. Where the acts of violence were deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion, the same does not apply in the crime of sedition.

-Inciting to Sedition

99. Mendoza v. People, G.R. L-2990, December 17 1951

A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty)
infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce
dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government,
is a scurrilous libel against the Government. Any citizen may criticize his government and
government officials and submit his criticism to the free trade of ideas but such criticism
should be specific and constructive, specifying particular objectionable actuations of the
government. It must be reasoned or tempered and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire
government set-up.

Illegal Possession of Firearms

100. Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007

When the other offense is one of those enumerated under RA 8294, any information for illegal
possession of firearms should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to
be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in
murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted
coup d etat and conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated
under RA 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be
prosecuted. The constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are
quite different from one another, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the
second under a special law.

R.A 10591, SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. The use of a
loose firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised
Penal Code or other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance:
Provided, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the

32
law with a maximum penalty which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section
for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be
imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime charged: Provided, further, That if the crime
committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is equal to that imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of
firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in addition
to the penalty for the crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws
of which he/she is found guilty.

If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d etat, such violation shall be
absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d etat.

If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of
this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.

- Direct Assault

101. Justo v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 453

The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public
official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant is not actually performing
the duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault
upon a person in authority, so long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of
official duty. Also, where there is a mutual agreement to fight, an aggression ahead of the
stipulated time and place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would be to sanction
unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play.

102. People v. Dollantes, June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639

When a barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who was making trouble in the
dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. As the barangay captain,
it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay and if in the enforcement
thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime
committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority.

103. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010

The prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of
the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in setting
aside the trial courts verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of
direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault
because she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The
fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to
her official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that

33
they could talk properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal
invectives. WhenLydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in
kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping
Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider while she was going to the
principals office. No fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma.

- Evasion of Service of Sentence

104. Pangan v. Gatbalite, G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005

Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only
by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, escape in legal parlance and for purposes of
Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom.

Crimes Against Public Interest

-Falsification

105. Galeos v. People, G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011

In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does
not call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to
967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what
constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The question of
whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners assertion, statements concerning relationship may
be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a
government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such
information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements
on relationship have no relevance to the employees eligibility for the position but pertains rather
to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.

Since petitioner Galeos answered No to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the
government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement
therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth
degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his
1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query.
In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong, it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of
his information and personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have affected

34
the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding
information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was
guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal
Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to
Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)

106. Luagge v. CA, 112 SCRA 97

If the accused acted in good faith when she signed her spouses name to the checks and encashed
them to pay for the expenses of the spouses last illness and burial upon the belief that the
accused is entitled to them and considering that the government sustained no damage due to such
encashment, criminal intent may not be ascribed, and the accused should be acquitted to such
crime.

107. People v. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120

If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and
malversation are separate offenses. Thus, where the provincial treasurer, as the custodian of the
money forming part of the road and bridge fund, effected payments to his co-accused for
construction materials supposedly delivered to the province for various projects when in fact no
such materials were delivered, and to camouflage or conceal the defraudation, the accused used
six vouchers which had genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but
which were intrinsically fake, the crimes committed are not complex but separate crimes of
falsification and malversation and the falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one
continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.

108. Tenenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013

All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private
individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioners (1) counterfeiting or
imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true
and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act
or proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed
in promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents. Commercial documents
are, in general, documents or instruments which are used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Promissory notes facilitate credit
transactions while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money for
convenience in business transactions. A cashiers check necessarily facilitates bank
transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appear thereon to encash
the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.

-Usurpation

35
109. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17, 2013

We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecutions theory
that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport
salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that
properly belong to the DENR.

But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the
authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering
that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can
be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to
replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance
of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official
functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made
representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an
excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.

Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs

110. People v. Edgardo Fermin, G.R. No. 179344, August, 3, 2011

While Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165
excuses non-compliance with the afore-quoted procedure, the same holds true only for as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. Here, the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural
requirements cannot be excused since there was a break in the chain of custody of the substance
taken from appellant. It should be pointed out that the identity of the seized substance is
established by showing its chain of custody.

The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer
of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

111. People v. Chua 396 SCRA 657

The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith
does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without
legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.

112. Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012

36
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the
property is under appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are void of any
evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used
the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used
the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession.

113. David v. People, G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011

The deliberate elimination of the classification of dangerous drugs is the main reason that under
R.A. 9165, the possession of any kind of dangerous drugs is now penalized under the same
section. The deliberations, however, do not address a case wherein an individual is caught in
possession of different kinds of dangerous drugs. In the present case, petitioner was charged
under two Informations, one for illegal possession of six (6) plastic heat-sealed sachets
containing dried marijuanaleaves weighing more or less 3.865 grams and the other for illegal
possession of three (3) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing shabu weighing more or less 0.327
gram.

114. People v. Sadablab, G.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012

As this Court held in People v. Berdadero,[27] the foregoing provision, as well as the Internal
Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of the failure on
the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust
operation x x x. [T]his silence cannot be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest
without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest
inadmissible.[28] In the case at bar, even if we assume for the sake of argument that Narciso
Sabadlab and accused-appellant Marcos Sabadlab y Narciso alias Bong Pango could have been
different persons, the established fact remains that it was accused-appellant who was caught in
flagrante delicto by the buy-bust team. Following the aforementioned jurisprudence, even the
lack of participation of PDEA would not make accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence
obtained pursuant thereto inadmissible. Neither is prior surveillance a necessity for the validity
of the buy-bust operation.

115. People v. Amansec, G.R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011

The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an
indication that the buy-bust operation was a sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in
[a] buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court.

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116. People v. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011

Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to carry or convey from
one place to another. The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-
appellants were caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their
traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag to
determine its content because when the latter noticed the police officers presence, she walked
briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open
and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being committed
by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following
warantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest.

117. People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013

It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the items seized from an
accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the place of arrest does not
automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items
inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained that marking of the
seized items immediately after seizure and confiscation may be undertaken at the police station
rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in illegal
drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

118. People v. Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011

PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both positively
identified appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to
be positive for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution
witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration of P200.00 for each sachet had been
made known by appellant to the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police
officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in
partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was
charged with attempted sale of dangerous drugs.

Crimes Against Public Morals

- Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibits

119. Fernando v. CA, December 6, 2006 G.R. No. 159751

To be held liable for obscenity, the prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication,
picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such
materials; that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. A picture
being obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately,

38
the question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by
it. It is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and
on the judges sound discretion.

-AntiTrafficking Persons Act

120. People v. Lali y Purih, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011

The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in
bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to
use her sisters passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is questionable
how she could have been travelling to Malaysia previously without a passport, as Rachel claims.
Moreover, even if it is true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime
of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent or knowledge under Section 3(a)
of RA 9208.

Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to transportation
of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it
has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930,
that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one
another to illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a
syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes
trafficking.

Crimes Committed by Public Officers

- Malversation

121. Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011

Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds
or property, or passively through negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either
be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show
that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence
to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.

More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through
deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even
when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through
negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the
offense.

122. Cua v. People, G.R. No. 166847, November 16, 2011

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This Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public funds or property, the
prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property and that he could
not account for them, or did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse
for their disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if
there is no direct evidence of misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in
his accounts which he has not been able to satisfactorily explain.

In the present case, considering that the shortage was duly proven by the prosecution, petitioners
retaliation against the BIR for not promoting him clearly does not constitute a satisfactory or
reasonable explanation for his failure to account for the missing amount.

123. Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 415

When a collecting officer of a government institution assigns his or her work to another without
the former being the one to misappropriate a government fund or property malversation may still
be at hand. Malversation consists not only in misappropriation or converting public funds or
property to ones personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of them.

-Technical Malversation

124. Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 96025, May 15, 1991

In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal
use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the latters personal use. In technical
malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or
anothers personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by
law or ordinance.

Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of
malversation of public funds charged in the information.

125. Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary
school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical
malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is
therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the
use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34
secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code.

-Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)

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126. Ambil Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011

In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use private party rather than private person
to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The
term party is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance as distinguished from
person which, in general usage, refers to a human being. Thus, a private person simply pertains to
one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean
either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.

In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and
detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his
official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying
the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.

127. Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011

Despite APIs obvious lack of financial qualification and absence of basic terms and conditions in
the submitted proposal, petitioner who chaired the PBAC, recommended the approval of APIs
proposal just forty-five (45) days after the last publication of the invitation for comparative
proposals, and subsequently requested the SB to pass a resolution authorizing him to enter into a
MOA with API as the lone bidder for the project. It was only in the MOA that the details of the
construction, terms and conditions of the parties obligations, were laid down at the time API was
already awarded the project. Even the MOA provisions remain vague as to the parameters of the
project, which the Sandiganbayan found as placing API at an arbitrary position where it can do as
it pleases without being accountable to the municipality in any way whatsoever. True enough,
when API failed to execute the construction works and abandoned the project, the municipality
found itself at extreme disadvantage without recourse to a performance security that API likewise
failed to submit.

128. Plameras v. People, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013

As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of
the Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160) were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKL
Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the school desks and armchairs, despite
non-delivery an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality.

129. Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 187340, August 14, 2013

In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. He is
being held liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in performing the duties primarily vested
in him by law, resulting in undue injury to private complainant. The good faith of heads of offices
in signing a document will only be appreciated if they, with trust and confidence, have relied on
their subordinates in whom the duty is primarily lodged. Moreover, the undue injury to private
complainant was established.

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The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal were all done without her
approval and consent. As a result, she lost income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost
control and use of a part of her land. The damage to private complainant did not end with the
canals construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private property by using the canal constructed
thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and waste disposal site.

130. Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007

As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, the Court had
ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and private
persons: x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the
nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character
or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this
construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019
was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

131. Caunan v. People, G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04, September 2, 2009

In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in
turn, based on the special audit teams report. The audit teams conclusion on the standard price of
a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (1)
samples of walis tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on
the walis tingting accomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores
where the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service;
and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Pias City. These documents were
then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to
Paraaque Citys walis tingting transactions.

Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of the
prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque
City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused
was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by the Paraaque City street sweepers at the
time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the
prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to
the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting
purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a determination have
been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public official
liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

132. Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 146 SCRA 508

An official involved need not dispose of his shares in a corporation as long as he does not do
anything for the firm in its contract with another. The matter contemplated in Section 3(h) of the

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Anti-Graft Law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary
interest in order that liability may attach.

-Anti-Plunder Act

133. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since
in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing
Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.

134. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October12, 2009

Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or
impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the
act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On
the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public
official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of
his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover
the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.

Crimes Against Persons

Parricide

135. People v. Sales, R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person
was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe
beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead.
Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried
him the day after. Noemars Death Certificate was also presented in evidence.

136. People v. De la Cruz, February 11, 2010 G.R. No. 187683

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In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was
married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken
as an admission against penal interest. Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna
were husband and wife.

Death under Exceptional Circumstances

137. People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, Sept.14, 1987

There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case,
in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of
passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married
person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and
(2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements
are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore
erred.

Murder

138. People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013

To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the
accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor
infanticide.

139. Aguilar v DOJ, G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013

Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the elements of murder namely: (a)
that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide are, in all reasonable likelihood, present in Dangupons case. As to the
first and second elements, Dangupon himself admitted that he shot and killed Tetet. Anent the third
element, there lies sufficient basis to suppose that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
attended Tetets killing in view of the undisputed fact that he was restrained by respondents and
thereby, rendered defenseless. Finally, with respect to the fourth element, Tetets killing can
neither be considered as parricide nor infanticide as the evidence is bereft of any indication that
Tetet is related to Dangupon.

140. People v. Galicia, G.R. No. 191063, October 9, 2013

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Since the crime has already been qualified to murder by the attendant circumstance of treachery,
the other proven circumstance of evident premeditation should be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. In this case, it was clearly shown that the two accused who were riding
in tandem hatched the means on how to carry out and facilitate the commission of the crime. The
time that had elapsed while the accused were waiting for their victim to pass by, is indicative of
cool thought and reflection on their part that they clung to their determination to commit the crime;
hence evident premeditation is duly proved.

Homicide

141. Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013

In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accuseds intent to take his victims life.
The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt
regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the
means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.

142. Escamilla v. People, G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013

The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even after he was hit.

Anti-Hazing Law

143. Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012

In Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice)
Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress,
to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal. Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows
recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological
suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to
some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when
there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused.
In dubio pro reo.

For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial
courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus
iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the
unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.

The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes

45
felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Unintentional Abortion

144. People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988

The Solicitor Generals brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because
he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We
find that appellants intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing
on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not
sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended
to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.

Mutilation

145. Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008

A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of mutilation under the
first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is,
mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and
deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction.
According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as
defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic)
Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self. Petitioner Gloria
Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the
crime of mutilation. This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the
intentions of the framers of our penal code.

Less serious physical injuries

146. Pentecostes v. People, G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010

Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latters body. If he intended
to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the
car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent
is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical
injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the doctor who attended Rudy stated
that the wound would only require ten (10) days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact,
discharged the following day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less
serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides that (A)ny person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as
serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days
or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious
physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

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Rape

147. People v. Orita, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008

For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Entry of the labia or lips of the
female organ without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because
although the offender has commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, not all
acts of execution was performed.

148. People v. Achas, G.R. No. 185712, August 4, 2009

The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainants body does not necessarily
negate the commission of rape. This is because hymenal laceration is not an element of the crime
of rape, albeit a healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration.

149. People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186129, August 4, 2009

Most important in a prosecution for statutory rape is to prove the following elements: 1. that the
accused had carnal knowledge with a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age.
These elements were sufficiently established during trial and were not rebutted by the defense with
any solid evidence to the contrary.

150. De Castro v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 155041, February 14, 2007

Petitioner insists that a finger does not constitute an object or instrument in contemplation of RA
8353. The insertion of ones finger into the genital of another constitutes rape through sexual
assault. Hence, the prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with the crime of rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

151. People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013

In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Physical resistance need not be
established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to
her attacker because of fear. Physical resistance is not an essential element of rape. Also, delay in
revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy
of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to
the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to
discredit the complainant. Neither does an inconclusive medical report negate the finding of rape.
A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the

47
victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime and the
medical certificate will then be rendered as merely corroborative.

152. People v. Funesto, G.R. No. 182237, August 3, 2011

In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any certificate of live birth or any similar
authentic document to prove the age of AAA when she was sexually violated.Neither did the
appellant expressly admit AAAs age.

This conclusion notwithstanding, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that force and
intimidation attended the commission of the crime, as alleged in the Information. Jurisprudence
firmly holds that the force or violence required in rape cases is relative; it does not need to be
overpowering or irresistible; it is present when it allows the offender to consummate his
purpose. In this case, the appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate rape.
In fact, the medical findings confirmed AAAs non-virgin state.

Thus, the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, and
was properly sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua

153. People v. Dahilig G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011

As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the elements of both crimes
are present in this case. The case of People v. Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on
this issue. It was stated in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-
A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused
of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A
person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.

154. People v. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be understood in its
generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion
of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant
is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance
of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only.

155. People v. Cadellada, G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013

A father who rapes his own minor daughter do not need to use any physical force or intimidation
because in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victims father, it is not necessary that actual

48
force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.

Anti Child Abuse Law

156. Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011

In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and inserted his
finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by
pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao
persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he
was doing and he answered that he was just examining her.

The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the
victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.16 In lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent
to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will.17 In this case,
Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was
examining her.

157. Roallos v. People, 198389, December 11, 2013

Roallos assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. [T]he law covers
not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III
(Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a
child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is deemed
subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult.

Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security

Kidnapping

158. People v. Muit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008

The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the
accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) the
commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The
totality of the prosecutions evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide.

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159. People v. Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013

If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.

160. People v. Baluya y Notarte, G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011

Appellants arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to because he was not
confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and that there is no evidence to show that Glodil
sustained any injury, cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to exist,
it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where
the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender
forcibly restrained the victim. As discussed above, leaving a child in a place from which he did
not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would
still amount to deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom remains at the
mercy and control of the abductor. It remains undisputed that it was his first time to
reach Novaliches and that he did not know his way home from the place where he was left. It just
so happened that the victim had the presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to escape,
he ran away from the place where appellant left him. Moreover, he is intelligent enough to read
the signboards of the passenger jeepneys he saw and follow the route of the ones going to his place
of residence.

161. People v. Jacalne, G.R. No. 168552, October 3, 2011

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled
with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but
also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a
situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted
or impeded in his liberty to move.

In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the latter refused to go with
him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be allowed to go
home, he refused. Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was inside the gate of a
fenced property which is high enough such that people outside could not see what happens inside.
Moreover, when appellant tied the hands of Jomarie, the formers intention to deprive Jomarie of
her liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is
restrained from going home. Because of her tender age, and because she did not know her way
back home, she was then and there deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the length of time
that she stayed in such a situation. It has been repeatedly held that if the victim is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. This notwithstanding the fact also that appellant, after more
or less one hour, released Jomarie and instructed her on how she could go home.

162. People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011

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Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime
of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because
these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes
these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape
because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one
crime committed the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.

However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken
the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape. In People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman
was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the
other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.

Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor

163. People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011

It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine.
Whether this is due to Meranos version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to
Marquezs version that Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions,
Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter,
for the first element to be present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez
was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is
satisfied.

As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of Justine
was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of
days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody of
Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do
so by the latters mother, shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this
case.

Grave Threats

164. Caluag v. People, 171511, March 4, 2009

In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied
by a condition. Considering the mauling incident which transpired earlier between petitioner and
Julias husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias forehead clearly enounces a threat to
kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person which constituted grave threat.

Grave Coercion

165. Alejandro v. Bernas, G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011

51
 We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the
petitioners.

There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear
of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his
spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. Material violence is not indispensable for
there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders
the exercise of the will is sufficient.

In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the
presence of security guards. As aptly held by the CA, it was not alleged that the security guards
committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not
customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the
degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. Here,
the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who presumably know
their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant
because they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the
mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for which it was
intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.

166. People v. Astorga, G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997

This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which is
the primary element of kidnapping. 31 Appellants apparent intention was to take Yvonne against
her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellants plan did not materialize, however, because
Fabilas group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain
Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellants forcible dragging of Yvonne to a
place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of
Yvonne. There was no lockup. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code.
Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will,
be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material
force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will
of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no
right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the
exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away
her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne
from going home, and we cannot find any.

167. Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009

The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act. The
motives of the accused are the prime criterion:

52
The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the other to
coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take
the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was the
purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor, to compel
another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under
Article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion. And there was
no common robber in the present case, but a man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral
estate, taking the law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was due him.
Animus furandi was lacking.

Unjust Vexation

168. Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006

Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from
the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed.
For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was
committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed,
irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their
collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from selling therein,
hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from
January 21, 1997.

Anti-Wire Tapping Act

169. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

170. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28, 1995

Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
to share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, or signifies the process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures) 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive

53
communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latters office.

Crimes Against Property

Robbery with Homicide

171. People v. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004

The rule is, whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all
those who take part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.

While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide, we cannot impose the penalty of death on them. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, the crime of robbery carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In imposing
the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of band, evident
premeditation, craft and disguise against appellants. However, these circumstances were not
specifically alleged in the information as required under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch as no aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be
deemed to have attended the commission of the offense, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua
should be imposed on them.

172. People v. Hijada, G.R. No. 123696, Mar. 11, 2004

There is no crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The crime
is Robbery with Homicide notwithstanding the number of homicides committed on the occasion
of the robbery and even if murder, physical injuries and rape were also committed on the same
occasion.

173. People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be
consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is
other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the

54
robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on
the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. The word homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide,
thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. When homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable
as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not
actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is
guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery
with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the
robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators
and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.

174. People v. Barra, G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013

In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to
give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for
this reason that the victim was shot. Accused can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide. The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was
not duly established, accused should be held liable only for the crime of attempted robbery with
homicide.

Robbery with Rape

175. People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011

For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape
was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This
special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where
the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to
another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. In the case
at bar, the original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the victims and AAA was
raped on the occasion of the robbery.

176. People v. Dinola, G.R. No. L-54567, March 22, 1990

If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also committed even before the
robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is committed however, if the original design was to commit
rape but the accused after committing rape also committed robbery because the opportunity
presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses. In the case at bar, after
the complainant was raped by the accused, the latter threatened to kill her if she did not give watch
on her wrist to him and forcibly took it from her. Hence, the accused was convicted for two crimes
of rape and robbery.

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177. People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 140033, January 25, 2002

Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is guilty of robbery only under Article 294,
No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code but as to appellant Reynaldo Maniquez, who had raped Mary
Ann Galedo, he should be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape, under Article
294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

Theft

178. Pidelli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008

There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final payment due the
partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH.
Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said
funds and give each of the partners their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private
complainant Placido what was due him under the construction contract.

Qualified theft

179. Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013

The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property
belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owners
consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of
the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.18

All these elements are present in this case. The prosecutions evidence proved, through the
prosecutions eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioners instruction, several pieces of wide flange
steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along Marcos
Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed
on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project site,
without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials.

180. Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013

Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the felony of qualified theft, must be the result of the
relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the
offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant
abused. The element of grave abuse of confidence is present in this case. Verily, the petitioner, as
sales clerk/agent of PCS, is duty-bound to remit to Ingan the payments which she collected from
the customers of PCS. She would not have been able to take the money paid by LACS if it were

56
not for her position in PCS. In failing to remit to Ingan the money paid by LACS, the petitioner
indubitably gravely abused the confidence reposed on her by PCS.

Anti-Carnapping Law

181. People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term
gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other
sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing
which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.

182. People v. Lagat, G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011

The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the registration
papers, was found in Lagat and Palalays possession. Aside from this, the prosecution was also able
to establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at
the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had
Biags tricycle. Their unexplained possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for
the unlawful taking of the tricycle.

183. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003

The acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the
driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of
property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested
of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken
does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed
suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latters
will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property
belonging to another is imputable to the offender.

184. People v. Nocom, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013

To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of
the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit
and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.

Estafa

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185. Espino v. People, G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013

When the information alleges the crime of estafa specified under paragraph 1(b) and yet what was
proven was estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same Art. 315 of the RPC, what determines the real
nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information and not the caption of the information. The information in this case may be interpreted
as charging the accused with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It
is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that one act can give rise to two offenses, all
the more when a single offense has multiple modes of commission.

186. Brokmann v. People, G.R. No. 199150, February 6, 2012

the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of confidence or (b) means of
deceit. The acts constituting estafa committed with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item
(1) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of Article 315
enumerates estafa committed by means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by
abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or deceit, which is a usual
element in the other estafas. In this case, the charge against the petitioner and her subsequent
conviction was for estafa committed by abuse of confidence. Thus, it was not necessary for the
prosecution to prove deceit as this was not an element of the estafa that the petitioner was charged
with.

187. Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 199294, July 31, 2013

Unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa under paragraph 2(a) of that
provision does not require as an element of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or
converted the swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage
sustained by the complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent representation. The
prosecution in this case discharged its evidentiary burden by presenting the receipts of the
installment payments made by Sy on the purchase price for the Club share. Petitioner and Ragonjan
knew that the Club was a bogus project.

188. Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187919, February 20, 2013

Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere filing of a formal charge, to
our mind, does not automatically make the dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the
charge should be evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents termination.
The affidavit executed by Montegrico simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents
committed pilferage, which allegations remain uncorroborated. Unsubstantiated suspicions,
accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing
employees. The other bits of evidence were also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage.

189. People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013

58
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Hence, he cannot be convicted of estafa.

190. Milla v. People, G.R. No. 188726, Jan. 25, 2012

In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks tendered by Milla could not
have novated the original transaction, as the checks were only intended to secure the return of
the P2 million the former had already given him. Even then, these checks bounced and were thus
unable to satisfy his liability. Moreover, the estafa involved here was not for simple
misappropriation or conversion, but was committed through Millas falsification of public
documents, the liability for which cannot be extinguished by mere novation.

BP 22

191. People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004

It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant received the demand
letter prepared and sent by her lawyer. She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice
of dishonor of the checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the
appellant. In fact, right after complainant made that presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal
cases against appellant at the Fiscals office without any confirmation that the demand letter
supposedly sent through registered mail was actually received by appellant.

With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held guilty of
violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice violated appellants right to procedural due process. It
is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was
served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving receipt of notice rests upon the party
asserting it and the quantum of proof required for conviction in this criminal case is proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

192. Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004

Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can
be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the
check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored.

193. Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005

A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a
conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee

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bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice.
The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.

The requirement of notice, its sending to, and its actual receipt by, the drawer or maker of the
check gives the latter the option to prevent criminal prosecution if he pays the holder of the check
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the check has not been paid.

194. Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012

What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law
did not look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account against which it was
made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check was
not intended to be deposited was really of no consequence to her incurring criminal liability under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

195. Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 2, 2001

The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of
the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for
payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within
ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of
lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from
his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section
186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check must be presented for payment within a
reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent
of the loss caused by the delay. By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more
than six (6) months,23 or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after
the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct
or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private respondent did not deposit the
checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure
to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored,
petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within
five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance
of the checks. And despite petitioners insistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the
respondent courts affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing
Checks Law.

196. Tan v. People, G.R. No. 141466, January 19, 200

The check in question was not issued without sufficient funds and was not dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. What was stamped on the check in question was Payment Stopped-Funded

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at the same time DAUD meaning drawn against uncollected deposits. Even with uncollected
deposits, the bank may honor the check at its discretion in favor of favored clients, in which case
there would be no violation of B.P. 22.

197. Nissan Gallery Ortigas v. Felipe, 199067, November 11, 2013

A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the
quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than
that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free
from civil liability, a persons acquittal must be based on the fact he did not commit the offense.
If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable
since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. Though the accused has been
acquitted from the criminal charge, the acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not
change the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently dishonored upon its
presentment.

- Other Deceits

198. Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005

For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is required that the prosecution must prove
the following essential elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in
the preceding articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party
suffered damage or prejudice.[40] It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent
representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to part
with her property.

The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles 315
to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its
broad scope and intendment.

-Arson

199. People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006

In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the
main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice,
but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who

61
may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the
crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person,
and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the
killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson.

200. Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013

Petitioners were property convicted of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which
has the following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. Having affixed their signatures on the disputed
documents despite the glaring defects found therein, petitioners were properly found to have acted
with evident bad faith in approving the ghost purchases. Their participation in facilitating the
payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to a loss on the part of the government.

201. Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008

The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing
elements here. However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was
an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.

- Malicious Mischief

202. Taguinod v. People, G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011

Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution had proven beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements. First, the hitting of the back portion of
the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The
version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the
CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the petitioners version that it
was private complainants CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering
the steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for
the private complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it would be hard for him
to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second, the act
of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other crimes involving
destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his
anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private complainant.

In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the prosecution had proven the guilt
of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malicious mischief.

Crimes Against Chastity

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-Qualified Seduction

203. People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968

While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, it does not have to be proved
or established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. Under Art.
337 of the Revised Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of
age, committed by any person in public authority, priest, house servant, domestic guardian,
teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman seduced is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction even though no deceit
intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge was voluntary on the part of the virgin.

204. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80838, November 29, 1988

There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1)
that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen
(18) years of age. However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common elements,
requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation
or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd
designs while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority,
confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.

- Acts of Lasciviousness

205. Sombilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009

In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation be irresistible. It being

sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of
the will of the offended party. Here, the victim was locked inside a windowless room together with
her aggressor who poked a gun at her forehead. Even a grown man would be paralyzed with fear
if threatened at gunpoint, what more the hapless victim who was only 15 years old when she was
subjected to such atrocity.

206. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143838, May 9, 2002

Petitioners acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her
breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly
obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner
actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants sexual organ. Rather, these acts
constitute acts of lasciviousness. The elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender commits any
act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and intimidation or (b) when
the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party
is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.

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207. People v Bonaagua , G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011

Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. It must
be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the
male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already
consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer
lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape
through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present
case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified
that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina.
This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be
identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the
principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot
be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.

-Forcible Abduction

208. People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No. 131914, April 30, 2001

The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal
Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or
reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
On the other hand, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by force or
intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or when she is under
twelve years of age.

All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was taken against her
will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut.
At her tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist considering that the lewd
designs of accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance
need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The employment of
deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting
young girl. Considering that it was raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as
probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the
taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the
evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected in furtherance of
lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual
rape of the victim.

209. People v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012

The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street
and in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became evident
from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in completely
undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her

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body from the neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that
order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we cannot hold him guilty of the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit
the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.

210. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002

There can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible
abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be
considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached
from and considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should
be convicted of one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape.

- Anti Sexual Harassment Act

211. Bacsin v. Wahiman, G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008

The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act
of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument
of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it
was held, It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude,
from the acts of the offender. The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand
from petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual
harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or
training environment is committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear
at the time petitioner touched her. It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked basis for its ruling,
when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the evidence presented by the complainant
sufficient to support a finding of grave misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of
administrative agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court.

212. Alegria v Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019, 04 April 2007

Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason
of sexual desire it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That
power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances. Under
Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment
Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment
is committed by an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the latter. It is committed when the sexual favor is made as a condition
in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual,

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or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges;
or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee
which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee.

In the case at bar, while it is true that the element of moral ascendancy is present, respondent being
the person who recommended complainant to her present position, complainant has failed to prove
the alleged sexual advances by evidence other than her bare allegations in the affidavit-complaint.
Even her own actions or omissions operate to cast doubt on her claim.

Crimes Against Civil Status

-Bigamy

213. Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011

The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming
the conviction of petitioner.

Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001
in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma
was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first
marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage
to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential
requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.

It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that he
cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft
of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.

214. Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is
no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null;
it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner

66
was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence
and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing
a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration
of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

215. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between
the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects.
Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of
the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among
these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render
the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.

Crimes Against Honor

- Libel

216. Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 156183, February 28, 2007

The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, has the following elements:
(1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status
or circumstance; (2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a
natural or juridical person, or even a dead person and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit,
or contempt of the person defamed.

217. Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the

possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken
the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used
are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning
as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were
used and understood in another sense. Moreover, [a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated

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to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were
uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation
or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.

Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts finding that
the phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER tends to induce suspicion on
private respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no
derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its
entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect
on private respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial word NEVER used by petitioner
was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private
respondents integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense.
Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service,
it is our considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private
respondents performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his
reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.

218. Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25, 2007

The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the
libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable,
although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the
allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and
circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter
is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did
understand that he was the person referred to.5 Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons6 laid
the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify
the party vilified in the article.

The libelous article, while referring to Miss S, does not give a sufficient description or other
indications which identify Miss S. In short, the article fails to show that Miss S and Florinda
Bagay are one and the same person.

219. Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008

Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without the
corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or
publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, however, includes not only the author but also the person who prints or published it. Thus,
proof of knowledge or participation in the publication of the offending article is not required.

220. Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008

Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their
paper by simply saying they had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say
that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when
they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as
the president in the publishing company.

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As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his responsibility as a
journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say that they are not liable because they did not
fulfill their responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who
has active charge and control of its management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be
equally liable with the owner for the publication therein of a libelous article. On the theory that it
is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, it is held that
said person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees, so that it is
immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of the publication.

221. Bonifacio v. RTC Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended
party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity
where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for
instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or
serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to
harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its
printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn
the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It
hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the
offending website.

- Slander

222. Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006

Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase Fuck You, which is similar to the
expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in local parlance. Such expression was not held to be libelous
in Reyes v. People, where the Court said that: This is a common enough expression in the dialect
that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom,
if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a
mother. Following Reyes, and in light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming
from complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant
constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the case that the act
complained of was employed by petitioner to express anger or displeasure at complainant for
procrastinating the approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit
or contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall bearresto
menor meaning, imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not exceeding P200.00. We opt
to impose a fine following Mari.

223. Victorio v. CA, G.R. Nos. L-32836-37, May 3, 1989

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Appellant-petitioner admitted having called Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, kayabang, tunaw na utak,
swapang, and estapador, which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and
insulting imputation. Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on
his profession are libellous per se.

- Intriguing Against Honor

224. Betguen v Masangcay 238 Scra 475

Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code defines intriguing against honor as any intrigue which
has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor and reputation of a person. This felony
undoubtedly falls under the coverage of crimes involving moral turpitude, the latter term having
been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty and good
morals.

Criminal Negligence

225. Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 172716, November 17, 2010

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early
as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that reckless imprudence is not a crime
in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x on three points of analysis: (1) the object of
punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat
quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance
of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes

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