Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals & City Assessor of Pasay

GR No. L-50466
May 31, 1982

FACTS

The City Assessor characterized the items in gas stations of petitioner as

taxable realty. These items included underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks,
water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps,
etc. These items are not owned by the lessor of the land wherein the
equipment are installed. Upon expiration of the lease agreement, the equipment should be
returned in good condition.
.

ISSUE

WON the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery permanently affixed by Caltex to
its gas station and pavement should be subject to realty tax.

HELD

The equipment and machinery as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by
Caltex and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas
station would be useless, and which have been attached and fixed permanently to the gas station
site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the
Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.

Lunod et al vs. Meneses

G.R. No. 4223 | August 19, 1908

FACTS

Plaintiifs (Appellees) Nicolas Lunod and 7 others are owners of farmlands on the upper estates
near a lake (Calalaran).
Defendant-Appellant Higno Meneses is the owner of a fishpond and a strip of land in Paraanan
adjoining said lake on one side and a river on the other. Paraan is the only outlet of water to the river from
the lands of Lunod et al during rainy season.
In 1901 Meneses converted the land in Paraan to a fishpond and by means of a dam and a
bamboo net prevented the free passage of water through Paraan causing flood and damage of
plantations in the upper estates.
Lunod et al filed a complaint alleging that there exists in favor of their rice fields a statutory
easement for more than 20 years before 1901 and praying that Meneses be ordered to remove the
obstructions that impede the passage of water through Paraanan.
TC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE

WON Meneses can be permitted to obstruct the flow of waters through his lands.

HELD

NO. But Lunod et al cannot prevent the defendant from building works to prevent his lands against influx
of waters.

Where a statutory easement exists between adjoining estates, the owner of the lower lands must not
construct any work that may impair or obstruct an easement which consists in receiving the waters which
naturally, and without the intervention of man, descend from more elevated lands; neither shall the owner
of the latter construct any work that may increase the easement.

The Civil Code allows that every owner may enclose his property by means of walls, dikes, fences, or any
other device, but his right is limited by the easement with which his estate is charged.

Since the plaintiffs can not prevent the defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of salt water;
but the defendant could never be permitted to obstruct the flow of the waters through his lands to the river
during the heavy rains, when the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are flooded, thereby
impairing the right of the owners of the dominant estates; the court advised that it is perhaps useful and
advantageous to all parties that Meneses be made to build a another dike in addition to the old dike
between the lake of said place and the low lands in Paraanan, for the purpose of preventing the salt
waters of the river flooding (at high tide) not only the lowlands in Paraanan but also the higher ones of
Calalaran and its lake.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.

452 SCRA 174 (2005)

FACTS:
Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective
of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and
jeepney terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal
facility in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary
terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc.
The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of
police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena
then elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the petition
to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition
and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and
Resolution of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain its
professed objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive upon individuals

HELD:
With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the
subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including
those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city
proper, the franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes to and
from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of
Lucena.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that
rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to
rights.

A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to
societal problems.

From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and
unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the
terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright
proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be
considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, the Court has not been
enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and
unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for
the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are
unable to meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of
terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the
franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.

The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the
establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private sector,
copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of
popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individuals rights.
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