ARANETA v.

DINGLASAN
84 PHIL 368

FACTS:
The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental question. Antonio Araneta
is being charged for violating EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.
Another case is of Leon Ma. Guerrero seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation of his
manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the treasury from disbursing
funds pursuant to EO 225, while another is of Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 which appropriated
funds to hold the national elections. They all content that CA 671 or the emergency Powers Act is already
inoperative and that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect

HELD:
CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act has to be sought for in its
nature, object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved and its relation to the Constitution. Article
VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be for a limited period. It is
presumed that CA 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law
repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the Constitutional scope of its power. CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in
regular session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of
law. In a regular session, the power if Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations
imposed by the organic law.

Rodriguez v. Gella Digest

Rodriguez v Gella
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
Paras, C.J.:

Facts:
1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545
appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the
sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.

2. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the
 national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and
Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during
the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to
carry out the national policy declared in section 1."

3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB 727
may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress to formally declare the
termination of the emergency powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative

NO.

1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has since
liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the
Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to such
legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the
corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President.

2. CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National
Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been
duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the
President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.

3. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can
remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he
cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of
the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful
whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations.

4. The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other
powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and
to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for
about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every
conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would
necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.

5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing
delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other
national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty
of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must
decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the
hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and
in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.

PEOPLE v. VERA
July 5, 2013 Leave a comment

PEOPLE v. VERA

FACTS: Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated

to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he

appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of

the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.

However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The

City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it

is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards

the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law

is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And

even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides

equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the islands. The

said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of

power because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

HELD: The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply

only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a

probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer

shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a

system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no

probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits such denial. A

law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal

discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.