G.R. No.

105630 February 23, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ENRIQUE P. DE GUZMAN, Spouses RIO RIVERA and CAROLINA R. DE GUZMAN, THE CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
GENERAL SANTOS CITY and HOECHST PHILS., INC., respondents,
RIO RIVERA and CAROLINA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals,1 reversing and setting aside that of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 22, General Santos City,2 and dismissing the complaint for reversion of lot 5249, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas. General
Santos City and cancellation of titles, for lack of merit.

The facts are as follows:

After public bidding held on March 18, 1950, the Board of Liquidators,3 awarded Lot 5249 Ts-217, a 450 square meter land situated in
Dadiangas, General Santos City, to Eusebio Diones of Takurong, Bubon, Cotabato. On March 11, 1955, Eusebio Diono transferred
his rights over the lot to Enrique P. de Guzman (de Guzman, for brevity) for P700.00, evidenced by an Agreement of Transfer of
Right.4 On November 12, 1956, the Board of Liquidators cancelled the award previously given to Eusebio Diones. 5

From the time he purchased the lot, de Guzman did not occupy it. In 1963, Lucena Ong Ante, another claimant of Lot 5249 Ts-217,
authorized Carmen Ty to occupy the land. Ong Ante paid the corresponding real estate taxes from 1963 until 1980. Carmen Ty
remained the occupant of the land until this time.

On August 12, 1967, de Guzman filed with the Board of Liquidators, Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 00222-E,6and submitted
supporting documents.

On August 29, 1967, the Director of Lands ordered the awards and issuance of a patent in favor of de Guzman. 7 On September 5,
1967, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved and issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 814 to de
Guzman.8 On September 26, 1967, the Register of Deeds, General Santos, issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-29712 in the
name of de Guzman.9

Sometime in 1973, de Guzman sold the lot to his married daughter and her husband, Carolina R. de Guzman and Rio Rivera for
P5,000.00. The covering deed of sale could not be located10 and Rio Rivera admitted that his father-in-law Enrique P. de Guzman was
not in occupation of the lot in question.11 On September 4, 1973, the Register of Deeds of General Santos City issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-7203 to spouses Rio Rivera and Carolina R. de Guzman.12 On March 21, 1974, Lucena Ong-Ante's adverse
claim was annotated on the title of the lot.13

Meanwhile, on February 13, 1974, spouses Rivera and Hoeschst, Phils., Inc., as mortgagor and mortgagee, respectively, executed a
deed of real estate mortgage involving the lot. For failure to settle their obligation, on October 29, 1977, mortgagee Hoechst Phils.,
Inc., foreclosed on the mortgage and acquired the lot at the foreclosure sale. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Hoechst Phils.,
Inc. However, for unknown reasons, the real estate mortgage and certificate of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds.
Thus, the transfer certificate of title remained in the name of spouses Rivera.

On January 14, 1981, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed with the Court of First Instance, 16th Judicial District, General Santos
City re-amended complaint14 for reversion of Lot 5249 Ts-217 and cancellation of titles against Enrique P. de Guzman, spouses Rio
Rivera and Carolina R. de Guzman, the City Registrar of Deeds, General Santos City and Hoechst Phils., Inc.

In its re-amended complaint,15 petitioner Republic of the Philippines averred that Enrique P. de Guzman obtained Original Certificate
of Title No. P-29712 through fraudulent means. Petitioner contended since Lot 5249 Ts-217 was awarded to Eusebio Diones, hence,
Eusebio Diono had no right to execute a deed of transfer in favor of Enrique de Guzman. Petitioner maintained that the documents
presented by de Guzman to support his miscellaneous sales application were either issued by fictitious persons who were not
employees of the Board of Liquidators, or contained inconsistencies that cast doubt on their authenticity.

De Guzman was neither in actual possession of the land, nor made improvements thereto, as he alleged in his sales application.
Actual possession of the land by the applicant and making improvements thereto were among the legal requirements to be complied
with by an applicant. Thus, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 814 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-29712 issued to de Guzman
pursuant thereto were null and void. Also, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2703 in the name of spouses Rivera was null and void for
they were not innocent purchasers for value. Admittedly, they knew that their vendor de Guzman was not in possession of the lot.
Petitioner asserted that Lot 5249 Ts-217 must be reverted back to the mass of public domain.

On July 9, 1987, the trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioner.16 It held that the supporting documents submitted by de
Guzman were falsified, hence, OCT No. P-29712 issued in his name was obtained through fraudulent means. Furthermore, the fact
that de Guzman was not in possession of the property disqualified him from being awarded the sales patent. The trial court ruled that
Rio Rivera and Carolina R. de Guzman were not innocent purchasers for value since their close relationship with Enrique P. de
Guzman put them on notice of knowledge of a defect in the acquisition of title to the land. The trial Court ordered the reversion of the
land to the mass of public domain.

The dispositive portion decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, plaintiff having preponderantly proven the allegations of the complaint,
judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 814 and OCT No. P-29712 in the name of Enrique de Guzman
covering Lot 5249, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City, and TCT No. T-7203 in the name of Rio
Rivera and Carolina de Guzman and the Certificate of Sale executed by the City Sheriff, General Santos City,
dated October 29, 1977, in favor (sic) Hoechst Philippines, Inc., null and void;

2. Ordering Rio Rivera and Carolina de Guzman and/or Hoechst Philippines, Inc., to Surrender to the Register of
Deeds, General Santos City, the Owner's Duplicate of said TCT No. T-7203 or any subsequent transfer certificate
of title issued in the name of Hoechst Philippines, Inc. if any, and once surrendered, ordering the Register of
Deeds, General Santos City, to cancel the owner's duplicate original of said Title No. P-29712 in the name of
Enrique de Guzman and owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-2703 in the name of Rio Rivera and Carolina de Guzman
on file with this (Register of Deeds) Office;

3. Ordering the Register of Deeds, General Santos City, to cancel OCT No. P-29712 and TCT No. T-7203 in the
name of Enrique de Guzman and Rio Rivera, respectively, and all other subsequent transfer certificate of titles
derived therefrom should said defendants Enrique P. de Guzman, Rio Rivera and Carolina de Guzman or Hoechst
Philippines, Inc. fail to surrender their respective certificate of titles over Lot No. 5249, Ts-217;

4. Ordering the reversion of Lot No. 5249, Ts-217 situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City, to the mass of
public domain, subject to the administration and disposition of the Director of Lands or the Board of Liquidators as
the case maybe, giving preference to qualified and actual occupant; and

5. Dismissing the counterclaim with costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.

General Santos City, July 9, 1987.

(s/t) ABEDNEGO O. ADRE

Judge17

On November 10, 1988, spouses Rivera appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.18

On May 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered decision reversing the decision of the trial court. 19 The Court of Appeals ruled that
when Enrique P. de Guzman obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-29712, the land ceased to be part of the public domain. The
land became registered under the Torrens system, converted into a private registered land, and governed by the Property Registration
Decree (P.D. 1529). Being a private land, the Director of Lands had neither control nor jurisdiction over the land. Furthermore, the title
became indefeasible after the expiration of one (1) year from issuance thereof.

The Court of Appeals found that no fraud attended the issuance of the patent and Original Certificate of Title to de Guzman. It stated
that the discrepancy in the name Diono and Diones appearing in the records was a mere typographical error.
The appellate court gave little credit to the investigation report relied upon by the trial court. It held that no other evidence, whether
testimonial or documentary, was presented to prove that the documents presented by de Guzman were issued by fictitious persons or
entirely fabricated.

However, the Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the trial court that Enrique P. de Guzman and spouses Rivera were not in
possession of the property. The Court of Appeals concluded that de Guzman misrepresented facts in his application since he was not
the possessor at the time he applied for the sales patent. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that title founded on fraud or
misrepresentation could not be assailed since more than one year had lapsed from the issuance of the public land patent.

At any rate, the Court of Appeals held that the land has passed to innocent purchasers for value, namely, spouses Rivera. The Court
of Appeals argued that mere relationship to de Guzman, without any other proof of bad faith on the part of spouses Rivera, did not
dispute the presumption that they were innocent purchasers for value.

On August 19, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines filed with this Court, a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals'
decision.20

On February 17, 1993, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.21 The parties
have complied.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines contends that Enrique de Guzman obtained the Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 814 and OCT
No. P-29712 through fraudulent means. Petitioner avers that the supporting documents submitted by de Guzman together with his
sales application, were either fabricated or issued by fictitious persons. Thus, both the sales application and original certificate of title
issued in favor of Enrique P. de Guzman were null and void. Petitioner avers that respondent spouses Rivera being related by
consanguinity and affinity to de Guzman were not innocent purchasers for value.

We grant the petition.

Initially, we resolve the question of whether or not the Director of Lands loses authority over the land the moment an original certificate
of title is issued covering the same. The Court of Appeals ruled that the issuance of the original certificate of title converted the lot into
a private land, thereby placing it beyond the authority of the Director of Lands.

We disagree. The authority of the Director of Lands to investigate conflicts over public lands is derived from Section 91 of the Public
Land Act. In fact, it is not merely his right but his specific duty to conduct investigations of alleged fraud in securing patents and the
corresponding titles thereto. While title issued on the basis of a patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured, such indefeasibility
is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title had been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is
to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title, in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be
filed by the Government.22

The next issue to determine is whether or not Enrique P. de Guzman validly obtained the sales patent and the original certificate of
title.

We rule in the negative. There is no question that de Guzman was not in possession of the property. Hence, de Guzman
misrepresented facts in his application for sales patent. Even the Court of Appeals sustained the factual finding of the trial court on this
point. However, the Court of Appeals held that an action for cancellation of patent or title could not be maintained after the lapse of
one year from the date of issuance thereof. As heretofore stated, the ruling is erroneous.

The next issue is whether or not the validity of the patent and the original certificate of title can still be assailed after the lapse of one
year from the issuance of the disputed title.

We rule that the State can assail a patent fraudulently issued by the Director of Lands. "Where public land is acquired by an applicant
through fraud and misrepresentation, the State may institute reversion proceedings even after the lapse of one year."23 "The
indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation." 24

The last issue to resolve is whether the spouses Rivera are innocent purchasers for value.

We agree with the trial court that spouses Rivera are not innocent purchasers for value. Spouses Rivera are related by consanguinity
and affinity to Enrique P. de Guzman knew that de Guzman was not in possession of the land. In fact, Rio Rivera testified that his
father-in-law was not in possession of the lot in question. Carmen Ty was in possession of the land since 1963 and paid the real
estate taxes thereon. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the presumption of a buyer in good faith must prevail. "The
burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that status. In discharging the
burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith."25 "The rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in
the possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise,
without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith."26

"A purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he
acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor. His mere refusal to believe that
such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendors or mortgagor's title, will
not make him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears
that he had such notice of the defects as would have led to its discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which may be
required of a prudent man in a like situation."27

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appeals. We declare Miscellaneous Sales Patent
No. 814 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-29712 in the name of Enrique P. de Guzman, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
7203 in the name of spouses Rio Rivera and Carolina R. de Guzman, and all subsequent transfer certificates of title derived
therefrom, as null and void. We order the reversion to the mass of public domain of Lot 5249, Ts-217, located in Dadiangas, General
Santos City.1wphi1.nt

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on
April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration
of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their
right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who
had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. 1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification
dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco
located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952
is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who
is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of
Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had
been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked
for purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.

Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this
Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine
especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its
declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect
that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12,
1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared
void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso
jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-
interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property
had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property
sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence
possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be
deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito
v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened
it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good
faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and
ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20,
1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared
alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit
and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when
the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing
applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11Land is considered of
public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership
if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the
Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15This means that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of
the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under
the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or
timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of
the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as
lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public
lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as
forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify
public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as
neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or
for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of
patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use
of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the
public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act,
the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property
subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the
application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to
apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies,
and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise
have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification
produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole
prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date
qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of
June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land
subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect
or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the
property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In
fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public
Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time
of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the
State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of
the applicants possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and
public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order
that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of
qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be
defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out,
when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the
adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations. 34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by
declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable
provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction
with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may
not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
 (a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicants possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be
part of the public domain and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of
the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession
and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso
jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to
run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for
the development of the national wealth.1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration
for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land
measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as
amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance
with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December
23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-
l');
 3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back
before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land
from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to
the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on
October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting
absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with
the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos
worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be
registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
(Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela
(Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at
hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the
1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a
prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels),
it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and
through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period
and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially
confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register
ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be
confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind
the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981.
If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already
private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts
prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-
owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and,
before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1,
1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming
that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for
registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be
dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable
agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public
domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition
applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641,
644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in
1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.
That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the
principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal
lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time
and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of
it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called
upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:
 .... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of
Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with,
for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said
land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin
Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the
land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property,
at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the
sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi
doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor
is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate
of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would,
in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character
and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings
would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into
effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their
ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no
serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be
construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that
type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease
public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right
already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held,
in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
 We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four
hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the
State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to
purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the
said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another
accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the
right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title
in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful
successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no
longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public
land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed
statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to
apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its
answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only
citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just
give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application
being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end
result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great
cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after
all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform
to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private
lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for
confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to
anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but
only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and
inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice
Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was
disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to
the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in
that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby
affirmed, without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134308 December 14, 2000

SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN
MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Even assuming that such land has been classified as alienable, title thereto can be registered only upon presentation of
incontrovertible proof of adverse, notorious and open possession in the concept of owner for a period of thirty years.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 30, 1997 Decision1and the June 23,
1998 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 39638. The decretal portion of said Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the appellees application for
registration is hereby DISMISSED."3

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 157),4 which was reversed by the appellate court, granted
petitioners application for registration in this wise:5

"WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case is affirmed, and judgment is
hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants to the land described in their application under plan Swo-13-000227
and its technical descriptions, situated in the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and containing an aggregate area
of 2,112 square meters; and individual and separate certificates of titles to the lots comprising the said land are hereby ordered
registered in the names of the applicants, as follows:

1. For lots 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, and 6045-D in the name of Susana Menguito, of legal age, widow, Filipino citizen, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pater[o]s, Metro Manila;

2. For Lot 6045-E -- in the name of Renato Menguito, of legal age, married to Irene Toledo, Filipino citizen, with residence
and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
 3. For Lot 6045-F -- in the name of Bersamin Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal
address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

4. For Lot 6045-G -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal
address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

5. For Lot 6045-H -- in the name of Helen Marta Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal
address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

6. For Lot 6046-I -- in the name of Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Zenaida Carag, with residence
and postal address at T.Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

7. For Lot 6045-J -- in the name of Emelita Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Luciano Manalili, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila; and

8. For Lot 6045-K -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Luciano Manalili; and Froilan
Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Zenaida Carag, all with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St.,
Pateros, Metro Manila.

Upon the finality of this Decision, let an Order be issued to the Commissioner of Land Registration Authority for the issuance of the
decree of registration and the corresponding certificates of title in favor of the applicants pursuant to Section 39 of PD No. 1529.

SO ORDERED."

The Facts

The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:

"On November 10, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila an Application for Registration of Title was filed by the
following successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo Menguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito, namely: SUSANA
MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO,
FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO. Docketed in the said court as LRC Case No. N-10938, the application reads:

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE

The above-named applicants hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Land
Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529 and to have their title thereto registered and confirmed,

AND DECLARE:

1. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple of eleven (11) parcels of land situated in the Barrio of Ususan,
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and are bounded and described as shown on plan Swo-13-000227 (lot Nos. 6045-A,
6045-B, 6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-F, 6045-G, 6045-H, 6045-I, 6045-J and 6045-K) and corresponding technical
descriptions, x x x;

2. That said parcels of land are assessed for taxation for the current year at P5,910.00 as per Tax Declaration No. B-11-
01351 of the land record of Taguig, Metro Manila;

3. That to the best of applicants knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever
affecting the said land nor any other persons having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession,
remainder, reversion or expectancy;

4. That the applicants acquired the said parcels of land by inheritance;

5. That said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,
peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners, of said parcels of land for more than thirty years;
6. That the names in full and addresses as far known to the undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties are as
follows:

a) Pilar Menguito
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila

b) Andres Filemon
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila

c) Beatriz Dumagat
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila

d) Maura Cabanatan
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila

e) Pateros-Taguig Road
c/o The District Engineer
Pasig, Metro Manila

7. That the applicants full name, age, citizenship, residence, and postal address, are as follows:

SUSAN MENGUITO, widow; EMELITA M. MANALILI, married to Luciano Manalili; HELEN MARTA M. LUNA, married to
Benjamin Luna, Jr.; RENATO MENGUITO, married to Irene Toledo; BERSAMIN MENGUITO, married to Elvira Salvacion;
FROILAN MENGUITO, married to Zenaida Carag; and GENEROSO MENGUITO, single; all of legal age, Filipinos, and with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.

8. That should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case, the applicants hereby apply for the
benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended;

9. That the following documents are attached hereto and made part hereof:

(a) Tracing cloth plan of Swo-13-000227

(b) Two (2) print copies of said plan Swo-13-000227

(c) Three (3) copies each of the Technical Description of:

Lot 6045-A

Lot 6045-B

Lot 6045-C

Lot 6045-D

Lot 6045-E

Lot 6045-F
 Lot 6045-G

Lot 6045-H

Lot 6045-I

Lot 6045-J

Lot 6045-K

(d) Three (3) copies of Engineers Certificate

(e) Four (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. B-011-01351

xxx xxx xxx

(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 1-5).

"Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a Notice of Initial Hearing addressed to: the Solicitor General, the Director
of the Land Management Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of the adjacent properties as mentioned in the
application, informing them that the application is scheduled for initial hearing on April 25, 1989. The addressees were then ordered to
present such claims as you may have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims and
unless you appear at said court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be
adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter, you will forever be barred from
contesting said application or any decree entered thereon (Exhibit A).

"Said notice of initial hearing was published in the April 5, 1989 issue of Abante, a daily tabloid (Exhs. C, C-1, C-1-A).

"Earlier, or on March 30, 1989, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed its Opposition to the application for
registration contending:

1. That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended
by P.D. 1073).

2. That the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto.
Said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended possession of applicant to be of recent
vintage.

3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February
16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on
July 31, 1990.

4. That the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 5-6).

"The Solicitor General therefore prayed for the denial of the application for registration and for the declaration of the properties subject
thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

"At the scheduled initial hearing of the case on April 25, 1989, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared and registered a verbal opposition
to the application. On motion of counsel for the applicants, the court issued an Order of General Default against the whole world,
except as against the oppositors Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his written opposition but
never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
"On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their Formal Offer of Evidence, submitting therewith the following documentary exhibits: (1)
Plan Swo-13-000227 (Exh. F); (2) technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 6045-A to 6045-J, inclusive (Exhs. F to F-10, inclusive); (3)
Engineers Certificate (Exh. G); (4) Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition executed by the applicants dated December 12, 1985 (Exh.
H); (5) description of the land and the apportionment thereof among the applicants (Exhs.H-1 and H-2, respectively); (6) Tax
Declarations (Exhs. I, J, K, L, M, N and O) (7) Tax Receipts (Exhs. O, O-1, P. P-1, Q and R); (8) Kasulatan ng
Pagkakaloobdated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito in favor of Pedro Menguito (Exh. S); and (9) Deed of Partition dated
November 7, 1990 executed by the applicants (Exh. T).

"On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition to applicants formal offer of evidence. The said
manifestation reads:

It interposes no objection to the admission of Exhibits A, B, C, D, relative to jurisdictional requirements. It has no objection to
Exhibits E, F, F-1, to F-10 relating to the plan and the technical description of the lots being applied for and Exhibit G which is the
Engineers certificate.

It objects to Exhibits H, H-1 to H-2 the extrajudicial settlement and partition dated December 12, 1985 for being self serving. It
objects to Exhibits I, J, K, L, M and N for being incompetent and insufficient proof of possession of the lot in question by
applicants or their predecessors-in interest. In fact the said tax declarations do not date back to at least June 12, 1945. It objects to
Exhibits O, P, Q, and R, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It objects to
Exhibits O, P, Q, and R, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It objects to
Exhibit S as being self-serving being a mere photocopy of the alleged Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1989 executed by
Cirilo Menguito the same cannot be accepted in evidence, applicants not having first laid the basis for the presentation of secondary
evidence. It objects to the first page of Exhibit T, being self-serving and a mere photocopy. Furthermore, page 2 of said exhibit, where
the supposed acknowledgment of the instrument appears, refers to different parcels of land other than those being applied for.

WHEREFORE, considering that the applicants have failed to prove their title to the lands applied for, it is respectfully prayed that the
application for registration be denied and that the land applied for be declared as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines.

Considering the above, oppositor respectfully manifests that there is no need for it to submit evidence in support of its opposition.
(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 11-13).

"On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case is affirmed, and judgment is
hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants x x x

"On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a reconsideration of the afore-quoted decision, to
which a written opposition was interposed by the applicants.

"On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit."6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the lower court had failed to consider the legal requirements for registration of
imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land is alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have
occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. It was not convinced that the
land in question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of it since June 12, 1945.

Hence, this Petition.7

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit a single issue for our consideration:

"Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court."8
In fine, the Court will resolve whether the CA erred in rejecting petitioners application for the registration of their respective titles.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Sole Issue: Registration of Petitioners Titles

Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,9 as amended, provides for the registration of imperfect titles to lands of the public
domain in this wise:

"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands
or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter."

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 107310 clarified paragraph "b" of the said provision by specifically declaring that it applied only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.11

Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: (1) the land applied for was
alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945.

The records show that petitioners failed to establish these two requisites.

Classification of the Land

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the
printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No.
2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. x x x." (Emphasis supplied.)

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.12 Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title."13 To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown
by the applicant.14 Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside
alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the
land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.

Period of Possession
Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able to prove that the land is alienable, their Petition for confirmation of their
imperfect titles and registration thereof under the law will still be denied. The reason is that they have failed to establish possession of
the lots in question -- openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely -- in the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12,
1945.

Petitioners do not claim that they are the original possessors of the lots in question, which had allegedly belonged to Cirilo Menguito
before he donated it to his son Pedro. When Pedro died in 1978, these lots allegedly passed down to petitioners.

Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of their
predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even before the Second World War. There is not enough convincing
proof, however, to support such claim.

Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974.15 Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed,
have also been paying taxes on the land for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in
1943.16 However, they did not present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim. General statements,
which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice. 17

Cirilos six children were not presented as witnesses by petitioners during the hearing of their application for registration of the lots in
question. In fact, of the six children, only Pilar Menguito was personally informed of petitioners application. Still, she was not
presented as a witness.1wphi1

There can be no question that Cirilos children were the best witnesses, because they could have substantiated petitioners claim that
indeed the lots in question had been donated to Pedro Menguito. Moreover, they may even have in their possession documents that
can adequately support their supposed claim. Instead, petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of Cirilo
Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners built their houses thereon. Neither Cirilos children nor the documents that they
might have had in their possession were presented.1wphi1

Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners claim that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and adverse possession and occupation of the land. Because they are of recent vintage, the tax declarations (Exhs. "I" to "N"), tax
receipts (Exhs. "O". "O1", "P", and "P-1") and the Municipal Treasurers certifications of tax payments (Exhs. "Q" and "R") presented
in evidence are incompetent and insufficient to prove petitioners and their predecessors-in-interests possession of the lots in
question.

Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate courts were contrary to each other, we waded into the records,18 but found
no reason to modify the assailed CA Decision. Much as we want to conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the
distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the
laws stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. In this case, we agree with the CA that petitioners have not presented
sufficient proof of their compliance with the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186961 February 20, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This Court is urged to review and set aside the July 31, 2008 Decision1 and February 20, 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143. In its July 31, 2008 Decision, the CA affirmed the August 27, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 40 of Cagayan De Oro City. The dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated August 27,
2004 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.3

In its February 20, 2009 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioners August 29, 2008 Motion for Reconsideration. 4

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent filed with the RTC an application for land registration, covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9039 of Cagayan
Cadastre, situated in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental and with an area of 9,794 square meters. The respondent purchased the portion of
the subject property consisting of 4,708 square meters (Area A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 27, 1990 and the remaining portion consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area B) from Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and
Mariano U. Tan pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It was claimed that the
respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property since
June 12, 1945.

After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC issued on August 27, 2004 a Decision, granting the respondents petition for
registration of the land in question, thus:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the application meritorious, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter, particularly the
provisions of P.D. 1529, judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant application. The Land Registration Authority is hereby
ordered to issue a decree in the name of the applicant East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation covering the parcel of land,
Lot 9039, Cad 237, having an area of 9,794 square meters covered by the two (2) tax declarations subject of this petition. Based on
the decree, the Register of Deeds for the Province of Misamis Oriental is hereby directed to issue an original certificate of title in the
name of the applicant covering the land subject matter of this application.5

On appeal by the petitioner, the CA affirmed the RTCs August 27, 2004 Decision. In its July 31, 2008 Decision,6 the CA found no
merit in the petitioners appeal, holding that:

It is a settled rule that an application for land registration must conform to three requisites: (1) the land is alienable public land; (2) the
applicants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
(3) it is a bona fide claim of ownership.

In the case at bench, petitioner-appellee has met all the requirements. Anent the first requirement, both the report and certification
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shows that the subject land was within the alienable and
disposable zone classified under BF Project [N]o. 8 Blk. I, L.C. Map [N]o. 585 and was released and certified as such on December
31, 1925.

Indubitably, both the DENR certification and report constitute a positive government act, an administrative action, validly classifying
the land in question. It is a settled rule that the classification or re-classification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest land is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government. Accordingly, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. As it is, the said certification remains uncontested and even oppositor-appellant
Republic itself did not present any evidence to refute the contents of the said certification. Thus, the alienable and disposable
character of the subject land certified as such as early as December 31, 1925 has been clearly established by the evidence of the
petitioner-appellee.

Anent the second and third requirements, the applicant is required to prove his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

xxxx

In the case at bench, ESRDC tacked its possession and occupation over the subject land to that of its predecessors-in-interest.
Copies of the tax declarations and real property historical ownership pertaining thereto were presented in court. A perusal of the
records shows that in 1948, a portion of the subject land was declared under the name of Agapito Claudel. Subsequently, in 1957 until
1991 the same was declared under the name of Francisca Oco. Thereafter, the same was declared under the name of ESRDC. A
certification was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor of Misamis Oriental that previous tax declarations pertaining to the said
portion under the name of Agapita Claudel could no longer be located as the files were deemed lost or destroyed before World War II.

On the other hand, the remaining portion of the said land was previously declared in 1948 under the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho.
Subsequently, in 1969 until 1990, the same was declared under the name of Jacinto Tan. Thereafter, the same was declared under
the name of ESRDC. A certification was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor that the files of previous tax declarations under the
name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho were deemed lost or destroyed again before World War II.

In 1991 or upon ESRDCs acquisition of the subject property, the latter took possession thereto. Albeit it has presently leased the said
land to Asia Brewery, Inc., where the latter built its brewery plant, nonetheless, ESRDC has its branch office located at the plant
compound of Asia Brewery, Inc.

Corollarily, oppositor-appellants contentions that the court a quo erred in considering the tax declarations as evidence of ESRDCs
possession of the subject land as the latters predecessors-in-interest declared the same sporadically, is untenable.

It is a settled rule that albeit tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.

Finally, it bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner-appellee are incontrovertible. Not one, not even
oppositor-appellant Republic, presented any countervailing evidence to contradict the claims of the petitioners that they are in
possession of the subject property and their possession of the same is open, continuous and exclusive in the concept of an owner for
over 30 years.

Verily, from 1948 when the subject land was declared for taxation purposes until ESRDC filed an application for land registration in
1995, ESRDC have been in possession over the subject land in the concept of an owner tacking its possession to that its
predecessors-in-interest for forty seven (47) years already. Thus, ESRDC was able to prove sufficiently that it has been in possession
of the subject property for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious in the
concept of an owner.7 (citations omitted)

The petitioner assails the foregoing, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that its predecessors-in-interest possessed the
subject property in the manner and for the length of time required under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA), and Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the "Property Registration
Decree" (P.D. No. 1529). According to the petitioner, the respondent did not present a credible and competent witness to testify on the
specific acts of ownership performed by its predecessors-in-interest on the subject property. The respondents sole witness, Vicente
Oco, can hardly be considered a credible and competent witness as he is the respondents liaison officer and he is not related in any
way to the respondents predecessors-in-interest. That coconut trees were planted on the subject property only shows casual or
occasional cultivation and does not qualify as possession under a claim of ownership.

Issue

This Court is confronted with the sole issue of whether the respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits of the PLA and P.D.
No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to GRANT the petition.

Preliminarily, with respect to the infirmity suffered by this petition from the standpoint of Rule 45, this Court agrees with the respondent
that the issue of whether the respondent had presented sufficient proof of the required possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership raises a question of fact, considering that it invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record. 8 However, that a petition for
review should be confined to questions of law and that this Court is not a trier of facts and bound by the factual findings of the CA are
not without exceptions. Among these exceptions, which obtain in this case, are: (a) when the judgment of the CA is based on a
misapprehension of facts or (b) when its findings are not sustained by the evidence on record.
This Courts review of the records of this case reveals that the evidence submitted by the respondent fell short of proving that it has
acquired an imperfect title over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The respondent cannot register the subject
property in its name on the basis of either Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not established by the required
quantum of evidence that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject property for the prescribed statutory period.

The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Under Section 11 thereof, one of the modes of
disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by "confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles". 9 On the other hand,
Section 48 provides the grant to the qualified possessor of an alienable and disposable public land. Thus:

SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands
or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied for the purchase,
composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have
instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any
other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands
continuously since the filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
sub-section (b) hereof.

Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was issued on January 25, 1977, deleted subsection (a) and amended
subsection (b) as follows:

SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense
that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant thru himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

Notably, the first PLA, or Act No. 926, required a possession and occupation for a period of ten (10) years prior to the effectivity of Act
No. 2096 on July 26, 1904 or on July 26, 1894. This was adopted in the PLA until it was amended by Republic Act No. 1942 on June
22, 1957, which provided for a period of thirty (30) years. It was only with the enactment of P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977 that it
was required that possession and occupation should commence on June 12, 1945.

P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws relative to the registration of property. Section 14 thereof
partially provides:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
 (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under
the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different. Section 14 (1) covers "alienable and disposable land" while Section 14 (2)
covers "private property". As this Court categorically stated in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, 10 the distinction
between the two provisions lies with the inapplicability of prescription to alienable and disposable lands. Specifically:

At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold
true with respect to Section 14 (1).11

Property is either part of the public domain or privately owned.12 Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the following properties are of
public dominion:

(a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;

(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

All other properties of the State, which is not of the character mentioned in Article 420 is patrimonial property,13hence, susceptible to
acquisitive prescription.14

In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods
provided under the Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into private property or release it from the public domain.
There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or development of national wealth.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and thus,
may not be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property
may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth". (emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without
such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. 15

In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial
that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of
the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject property on or prior to June 12, 1945 or had completed the
prescriptive period of thirty (30) years, the respondent submitted the following tax declarations:

a) Tax Declaration in the name of Agapita Claudel for the year 1948;

b) Tax Declarations in the name of Francisca Oco for the years 1957, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1989 and 1991;
 c) Tax Declarations in the respondents name for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994;

d) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho for the years 1948 and 1952;

e) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan for the years 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990; and

f) Tax Declarations in the respondents name for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994.

Pursuant to Agapita Claudels 1948 Tax Declaration, there were nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10) banana trees planted on Area A.
The coconut trees were supposedly four years old, hence, the reasonable presumption that she had been in possession even before
June 12, 1945.16

The respondent also offered the following testimony of Vicente Oco:

"Q Mr. Witness, If you know about what period your predecessor has started to possess this land subject matter of this application?

A Per my personal knowledge, it was before the second world war but the Municipality of El Salvador was created on June 15, 1948
by virtue of RA 268 and its started to officially function only on August 2, 1948[.]

Q From whom did you acquire this information?

A From the seller and the adjoining lot owners."17

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject property, the respondent claimed that per
Francisca Ocos Tax Declarations, the following improvements were introduced in Area A: nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10) banana
trees in Area A in 1957 and 1963; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1969 and 1973; thirty-three (33) coconut trees, one (1) mango tree
and three (3) seguidillas vines in 1974; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1980; eighty-seven (87) coconut trees in 1987; and fifteen
(15) coconut trees in 1989. Per Jacinto Tans Tax Declarations, there were fifty-seven (57) coconut trees in Area B in 1973, 1974,
1980, 1989 and 1990.18

A reading of the CAs July 31, 2008 Decision shows that it affirmed the grant of the respondents application given its supposed
compliance with Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It ruled that based on the evidence submitted, the respondent is not qualified to
register the subject property in its name under Section 14 (1) as the possession and occupation of its predecessors-in-interest
commenced after June 12, 1945. Nonetheless, as the CA ruled, the respondent acquired title to the subject property by prescription as
its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject property for more than thirty (30) years. Citing Buenaventura v. Republic of the
Philippines,19 the CA held that even if possession commenced after June 12, 1945, registration is still possible under Section 14 (2)
and possession in the concept of an owner effectively converts an alienable and disposable public land into private property.

This Court, however, disagrees on the conclusion arrived at by the CA. On the premise that the application for registration, which was
filed in 1995, is based on Section 14 (2), it was not proven that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the subject property in the manner prescribed by law and for the period necessary before acquisitive prescription may
apply.

While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable on December 31, 1925 per the April 18, 1997 Certification
and July 1, 1997 Report of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),20 the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) converted the same from agricultural to industrial only on October 16, 1990. 21 Also, it was only in 2000 that the Municipality of
El Salvador passed a Zoning Ordinance, including the subject property in the industrial zone. 22 Therefore, it was only in 1990 that the
subject property had been declared patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive period began to run. The respondent cannot
benefit from the alleged possession of its predecessors-in-interest because prior to the withdrawal of the subject property from the
public domain, it may not be acquired by prescription.

On the premise that the application of the respondent is predicated on Section 14 (1), the same would likewise not prosper. As shown
by the tax declarations of the respondents predecessors-in-interest, the earliest that the respondent can trace back the possession of
its predecessors-in-interest is in 1948. That there were four-year old coconut trees in Area A as stated in Agapita Claudels 1948 Tax
Declaration cannot be considered a "well-nigh controvertible evidence" that she was in possession prior to June 12, 1945 without any
evidence that she planted and cultivated them. In the case of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho, the earliest tax declaration in his name is dated
1948 and there is no evidence that he occupied and possessed Area B on or prior to June 12, 1945. Furthermore, the testimony of the
respondents lone witness that the respondents predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of the subject property as of
June 12, 1945 lacks probative value for being hearsay.

It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an alienable and
disposable public land must be "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious" in character. In Republic of the Philippines v.
Alconaba,23 this Court explained that the intent behind the use of "possession" in conjunction with "occupation" is to emphasize the
need for actual and not just constructive or fictional possession.

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law
is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. 24 (citations omitted)

On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to the
relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof, possession for purposes of prescription must be
"in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted". In Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon,25 this Court
expounded on the nature of possession required for purposes of prescription:

It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious
and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is
so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts
ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription. 26 (citations omitted)

This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the respondent to prove compliance with the possession required either
under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2).

First, the twelve (12) Tax Declarations covering Area A and the eleven (11) Tax Declarations covering Area B for a claimed
possession of more than forty-six (46) years (1948-1994) do not qualify as competent evidence of actual possession and occupation.
As this Court ruled in Wee v. Republic of the Philippines:27

It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed
possession and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership
does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other
competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or declarants right to registration of
title.28 (emphasis supplied and citation omitted)

The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner," by which the respondent describes its possession and that
of its predecessors-in-interest is a conclusion of law. The burden of proof is on the respondent to prove by clear, positive and
convincing evidence that the alleged possession of its predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration required by law.29 It is
therefore inconsequential if the petitioner failed to present evidence that would controvert the allegations of the respondent. A person
who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove
his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the
evidence of the oppositors.30

The respondents claim of ownership will not prosper on the basis of the tax declarations alone. In Cequea v. Bolante,31 this Court
ruled that it is only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property that they may become the
basis of a claim of ownership.32 In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes
does not prove ownership.33

Second, that the nineteen (19) coconut trees supposedly found on Area A were four years old at the time Agapita Claudel filed a Tax
Declaration in 1948 will not suffice as evidence that her possession commenced prior to June 12, 1945, in the absence of evidence
that she planted and cultivated them. Alternatively, assuming that Agapita Claudel planted and maintained these trees, such can only
be considered "casual cultivation" considering the size of Area A. On the other hand, that Jacinto Tan Lay Cho possessed Area B in
the concept of an owner on or prior to June 12, 1945 cannot be assumed from his 1948 Tax Declaration.
Third, that plants were on the subject property without any evidence that it was the respondents predecessors-in-interest who planted
them and that actual cultivation or harvesting was made does not constitute "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" of actual possession
and occupation. As this Court ruled in Wee:

We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence of an unspecified number of coffee plants, sans any evidence as
to who planted them, when they were planted, whether cultivation or harvesting was made or what other acts of occupation and
ownership were undertaken, is not sufficient to demonstrate petitioners right to the registration of title in her favor. 34

Fourth, Vicente Ocos testimony deserves scant consideration and will not supplement the inherent inadequacy of the tax
declarations.1wphi1 Apart from being self-serving, it is undoubtedly hearsay. Vicente Oco lacks personal knowledge as to when the
predecessors-in-interest of the respondent started to occupy the subject property and admitted that his testimony was based on what
he allegedly gathered from the respondents predecessors-in-interest and the owners of adjoining lot. Moreover, Vicente Oco did not
testify as to what specific acts of dominion or ownership were performed by the respondents predecessors-in-interest and if indeed
they did. He merely made a general claim that they came into possession before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and
not factual proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot suffice.35 Evidence of this nature should have been received with
suspicion, if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.

Finally, that the respondents application was filed after only four years from the time the subject property may be considered
patrimonial by reason of the DARs October 26, 1990 Order shows lack of possession whether for ordinary or extraordinary
prescriptive period. The principle enunciated in Heirs of Malabanan cited above was reiterated and applied in Republic of the
Philippines v. Rizalvo:36

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of ownership and possession over
the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription
for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment
the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The July 31, 2008 Decision and February 20, 2009 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the respondents application for registration of
title over Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES, MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and
MARIO C. TANCINCO, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Martin B. Laurea for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:+.wph!1

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court)
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan
Psu-131892 are accretion to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered their registration in the names of
the private respondents.

Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are
registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property and
particularly described as follows: t.hqw

Lot 1-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of
Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on the SE.,
along lines 2-3-4, by Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along fines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on the NE., along
line 9-10, by property of Joaquina Santiago; on the E., NE., and NW., along lines 10-11-12-1, by property of
Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877). ... containing an area of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY SEVEN (33,937) SQUARE METERS. ...

Lot 2-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of
Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by property of Rafael Singson; on the S.,
along line 2-3, by Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; and on the N.,
along line 4-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877). ... containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453) SQUARE METERS. ...

Lot 3-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of
Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1,
Psu-111877); and along line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on the S., along line 3-4, by Meycauayan River, on
the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot 1 of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2,
Psu-111877), and on the NW., along line 6-1, by property of Joaquina Santiago. ... containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985) SQUARE METERS. ...

On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to
the application for registration.

On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-
131892 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court.

On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by
Plan Psu-131892.

On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions
to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads: t.hqw

WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are accretions to the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the owner of said
property. The Court, therefore, orders the registration of lots 1 & 2 situated in the barrio of Ubihan, municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, and more particularly described in plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and their
accompanying technical descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of Benjamin Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez
and residing at 3662 Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.; Azucena Tancinco Reyes, married to Alex Reyes,
Jr., residing at 4th St., New Manila, Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial, married to Juan Imperial, residing at
Pasay Road, Dasmarias Village, Makati, Rizal; and Mario C. Tancinco, married to Leticia Regidor, residing at
1616 Cypress St., Dasmarias Village, Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.

On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads: t.hqw

DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan nang walang bayad.

The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court admits of certain exceptions.
Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the power to review and
rectify the findings of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion,
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.

There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened
is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is
any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters
of the river.

On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acua to the effect that: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already dry almost at the level of the Pilapil of
the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2) arms length the land was
still dry up to the edge of the river; that sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was established on the boundaries of Lots
1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was transferred to the new Pilapil and this was done sometime in 1951; that the
new lots were then converted into fishpond, and water in this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of the
Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .

The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of accretion without human intervention because the
transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.

We agree with the petitioner.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: t.hqw

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.

The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to
have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of
the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of
the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case,
there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of the current
of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that
almost four (4) hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the
private respondents who happens to be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their father noticed the four hectare
accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken
place. If so, their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939.
However, the witness testified that in that year, she observed an increase in the area of the original fishpond which is now the land in
question. If she was telling the truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were
artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits
came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river
and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current
on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private respondents' own evidence shows that the water in the
fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the
river

The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the
danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils
produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the
right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused
by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes
towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the
waters of the river.

We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of the private respondents' lone witness to the effect that as
early as 1939 there already existed such alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in question were
not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality
of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or
33 years after it had supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been
there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951.
What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of
the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and
Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property to the
river to which it belongs.

SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action
against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by
the latter without petitioners' consent.

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032
hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their
deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears
registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan
PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River
(the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took
place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about
105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to
the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet
title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they
and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when
respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the
fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in
themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year
1933 to the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in
question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to
the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:

It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about
by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the
northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931,
because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and
not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as
declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the
declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question
was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not
overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for
which, it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2")
when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2")
cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948.
But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner
of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be
acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land
of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming
arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law
does not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes
manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of
the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the
same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).

This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in possession of the
alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September,
1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land
for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil
Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as
registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession by another person.

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the
beginning of this opinion, partly stating:

That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a
fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened,
it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of
the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that
they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has
resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original
estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of
Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the
month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
 As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to registered land,
while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does
not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act.
Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be
productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of their
character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a
negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land
through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so
registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion
is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and
these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This Court has held
as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.

We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time that the
defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in
1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946,
he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2),
after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is
corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal
president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or
1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same
effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was
then less than one hectare.

We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro
Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in
1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were
the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the
certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes
or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he
tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a
portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their
possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1wph1.t

The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933 to 1958 is not only
preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed
property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were
deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing
so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the
fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees
had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their
hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they
had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were
really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their
rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor
of the defendants.

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners
of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes
automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of
the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining
a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the
Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title
already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be
placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however,
that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of
First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to
the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires
determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the
evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and
adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by
the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed
by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the
possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the
new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.