CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD
an unconscious condition, and it appeared
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Jose Cangco
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Manila Railroad Co
DOCKET NO.: GR No. L-12191
DATE: October 14, 1918
PONENTE: Fisher, J.
FACTS:
JOSE CANGCO
o employee of MANILA RAILROAD
CO., as a clerk. PhP25, monthly wage.
o Living in San Mateo, Rizal
o Comes to work by TRAIN, using a
pass supplied by the company which
entitled him to ride the companys train
free of charge.
January 20, 1915
o Jose arose from his seat in the 2nd-
class car where he was riding.
o On the side of the train where
passengers alight at the San Mateo
station there is a cement platform
which begins to rise with a moderate
gradient some distance away from the
companys office and extends along in
front of said office for a distance
sufficient to cover the length of several
coaches.
o When Jose was about to step off, one
or both of his feet came in contact with
a sack of watermelons with the result
that his feet slipped from under him
and he fell violently on the platform.
o His body at once rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the
moving car, where his right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated.
o It appears that after the plaintiff
alighted from the train the car moved
forward possibly six meters before it
came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8
oclock on a dark night, and as the railroad
station was lighted dimly by a single light
located some distance away, objects on the
platform where the accident occurred were
difficult to discern especially to a person
emerging from a lighted car.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in
that the injuries which he had received were
very serious. He was therefore brought at
once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila
where an examination was made and his arm
was amputated. The result of this operation
was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then
carried to another hospital where a second
operation was performed and the member
was again amputated higher up near the
shoulder.
It appears in evidence that the plaintiff
expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other
expenses in connection with the process of
his curation.
Jose instituted this proceeding in the CFI
to recover damages from the defendant
company, founding his action upon the
negligence of the servants and employees of
the defendant in placing the sacks of melons
upon the platform and leaving them so placed
as to be a menace to the security of
passenger alighting from the companys
trains.
CFI decision RULED IN FAVOR OF
MANILA RAILROAD CO.
o although negligence was attributable
to the defendant by reason of the fact
that the sacks of melons were so
placed as to obstruct passengers
passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had
failed to use due caution in alighting
from the coach and was therefore
precluded form recovering.
ISSUE: WON Manila Railroad Co. is liable for
damages
HELD: Yes.
o Alighting from a moving train while it
is slowing down is a common practice
and a lot of people are doing so every
day without suffering injury. Cangco
has the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so
risky for him to get off while the train
 was yet moving as the same act would
have been in an aged or feeble
person. He was also ignorant of the
fact that sacks of watermelons were
there as there were no appropriate
warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction
between the liability of employers under
Article 2180 and their liability for breach of
contract [of carriage]:
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an
action for the breach of a contract to show that
the breach was due to the negligent conduct
of defendant or of his servants, even though
such be in fact the actual cause of the breach,
it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant
that the negligence or omission of his
servants or agents caused the breach of the
contract would not constitute a defense to the
action. If the negligence of servants or agents
could be invoked as a means of discharging
the liability arising from contract, the
anomalous result would be that person acting
through the medium of agents or servants in
the performance of their contracts, would be
in a better position than those acting in
person. If one delivers a valuable watch to
watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the
bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its
destruction, he is unquestionably liable.
Would it be logical to free him from his liability
for the breach of his contract, which involves
the duty to exercise due care in the
preservation of the watch, if he shows that it
was his servant whose negligence caused the
injury? If such a theory could be accepted,
juridical persons would enjoy practically
complete immunity from damages arising
from the breach of their contracts if caused by
negligent acts as such juridical persons can of
necessity only act through agents or servants,
and it would no doubt be true in most
instances that reasonable care had been
taken in selection and direction of such
servants. If one delivers securities to a
banking corporation as collateral, and they
are lost by reason of the negligence of some
clerk employed by the bank, would it be just
and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve
itself of liability for the breach of its contract to
return the collateral upon the payment of the
debt by proving that due care had been
exercised in the selection and direction of the
clerk?
The railroad company's defense involves the
assumption that even granting that the
negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of
its contractual obligation to maintain safe
means of approaching and leaving its trains,
the direct and proximate cause of the injury
suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory
negligence in failing to wait until the train had
come to a complete stop before alighting.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence
announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the
accident was caused by plaintiff's own
negligence, no liability is imposed upon
defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
negligence merely contributed to his injury,
the damages should be apportioned. It is,
therefore, important to ascertain if defendant
was in fact guilty of negligence.
As pertinent to the question of contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this
case the following circumstances are to be
noted: The company's platform was
constructed upon a level higher than that of
the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The
distance from the steps of the car to the spot
where the alighting passenger would place his
feet on the platform was thus reduced,
thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off. The nature of the platform,
constructed as it was of cement material, also
assured to the passenger a stable and even
surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the
 plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility
of young manhood, and it was by no means
so risky for him to get off while the train was
yet moving as the same act would have been
in an aged or feeble person. In determining
the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act that is to say, whether
the passenger acted prudently or recklessly
the age, sex, and physical condition of the
passenger are circumstances necessarily
affecting the safety of the passenger, and
should be considered. Women, it has been
observed, as a general rule are less capable
than men of alighting with safety under such
conditions, as the nature of their wearing
apparel obstructs the free movement of the
limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place
was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was
his daily custom to get on and of the train at
this station. There could, therefore, be no
uncertainty in his mind with regard either to
the length of the step which he was required
to take or the character of the platform where
he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight
while the train was yet slightly under way was
not characterized by imprudence and that
therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the
time of the accident, was earning P25 a month
as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has
suffered have permanently disabled him from
continuing that employment. Defendant has
not shown that any other gainful occupation is
open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life,
according to the standard mortality tables, is
approximately thirty-three years. We are of
the opinion that a fair compensation for the
damage suffered by him for his permanent
disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is
also entitled to recover of defendant the
additional sum of P790.25 for medical
attention, hospital services, and other
incidental expenditures connected with the
treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed,
and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff
for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs
of both instances. So ordered.
DISSENTING OPINION (Malcolm, J.)
o With one sentence in the majority
decision, we are of full accord,
namely, "It may be admitted that had
plaintiff waited until the train had come
to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could
not have occurred." With the general
rule relative to a passenger's
contributory negligence, we are
likewise in full accord, namely, "An
attempt to alight from a moving train is
negligence per se." Adding these two
points together, should be absolved
from the complaint, and judgment
affirmed.
SALEN V BALCE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:Severino Salen
Elena Salbanera
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Jose Balce
DOCKET NO.: GR No. L-14414
DATE: April 27, 1960
PONENTE: Bautista, Angelo J.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of
Carlos Salen who died single from wounds
caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate
son of defendant.
o Gumersindo Balce was also Single, a
minor below 18 years of age, and was
living with defendant.
o As a result of Carlos Salen's death,
Gumersindo Balce accused and
convicted of homicide and was
sentenced to imprisonment and to pay
the heirs of the deceased an indemnity
in the amount of P2,000.00.
Upon petition of plaintiff, the only heirs of the
deceased, a writ of execution was issued for
the payment of the indemnity but it was
returned unsatisfied because Gumersindo
Balce was insolvent and had no property in
his name.
o Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon
defendant, father of Gumersindo, the
 payment of the indemnity the latter
has failed to pay, but defendant
refused, thus causing plaintiffs to
institute the present action.
Plaintiffs brought this action against
defendant before CFI to recover the sum of
P2,000.00, with legal interest.
o Defendant, in his answer, set up the
defense that the law upon which
plaintiffs predicate their right to
recover does not here apply for the
reason that law refers to quasi-delicts
and not to criminal cases.
o CFI sustained the theory of
defendant.
ISSUE: WON appellee can be held subsidiary
liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with
Art. 2180 of the CC.
HELD:
o While we agree with the theory that, as
a rule, the civil liability arising from a
crime shall be governed by the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
we disagree with the contention that
the subsidiary liability of persons for
acts of those who are under their
custody should likewise be governed
by the same Code even in the
absence of any provision governing
the case, for that would leave the
transgression of certain right without
any punishment or sanction in the law.
Such would be the case if we would
uphold the theory of appellee as
sustained by the trial court.
o The particular law that governs this
case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: "The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for
damages caused by the minor
children who lived in their company."
To hold that this provision does not
apply to the instant case because it
only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations
which arise from criminal offenses,
would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may
stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent. Verily, the
void that apparently exists in the
Revised Penal Code is subserved by
this particular provision of our Civil
Code, as may be gleaned from some
recent decisions of this Court which
cover equal or identical cases.
o Wherefore, the decision appealed
from is reversed. Judgement is
hereby rendered ordering appellee
to pay appellants the sum of
P2,000.00, with legal interest
thereon from the filing of the
complaint, and the costs.
CASTILEX V VASQUEZ
PETITIONER: Castilex Industrial Corp
RESPONDENTS: Vicente Vasquez, Jr
Luisa So Vasquez
Cebu Doctors Hospital Inc
DOCKET NO.: GR No. 132266
DATE: December 21, 1999
PONENTE: Davide, Jr, CJ
FACTS:
August 28, 1988, 1:30-2 in the morning
Romeo Vasquez, son of the respondents,
was driving a Honda motorcycle around
Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling
counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic
in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet
or goggles. He was also only carrying a
Students Permit to Drive at the time.
Benjamin Abad, manager of Castilex,
registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up
with plate no. GBW-794. ABAD drove the said
company car out of a parking lot but instead
of going around the Osmea rotunda he made
a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in
proceeding to his route to General Maxilom
St.
During such, the motorcycle of Vasquez and
the pick-up of ABAD collided with each other
causing severe injuries to the former. ABAD
 brought Vasquez to CEBU DOCTORS'
HOSPITAL where he died.
A Criminal Case was filed against ABAD
but which was subsequently dismissed for
failure to prosecute. An action for
damages was then commenced by
respondents against ABAD and petitioner
CASTILEX.
TRIAL COURT: ruled in favor of private
respondents and ordered ABAD and to pay
jointly and solidarily respondents
COURT OF APPEALS: affirmed the ruling of
the trial court holding ABAD and petitioner
CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of
the latter is only vicarious and not solidary
with the former.
ISSUE: WON an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the death resulting from
the negligent operation by a managerial
employee of a company-issued vehicle
HELD:
Petitioner contends that the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should only apply to instances where the
employer is not engaged in business or
industry. The fourth paragraph should
apply.
o SC ruled: Petitioner's interpretation of
the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase "even though the former are
not engaged in any business or
industry" found in the fifth paragraph
should be interpreted to mean that it is
not necessary for the employer to be
engaged in any business or industry to
be liable for the negligence of his
employee who is acting within the
scope of his assigned task.
o Under the fifth paragraph of Article
2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is
liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his
assigned tasks. ( But it is
necessary to establish the employer-
employee relationship; once this is
done, the plaintiff must show, to hold
the employer liable, that the employee
was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort
complained of was committed.)
On the issue of whether the private
respondents have sufficiently established
that ABAD was acting within the scope of
his assigned tasks.
o The trial court and the CA ruled that
the driving by a manager of a
company-issued vehicle is within the
scope of his assigned tasks
regardless of the time and
circumstances.
o However, SC did not agree with TC
and CA. The mere fact that ABAD was
using a service vehicle at the time of
the injurious incident is not of itself
sufficient to charge petitioner with
liability for the negligent operation of
said vehicle unless it appears that he
was operating the vehicle within the
course or scope of his employment.
In the case, it is undisputed that ABAD did
some overtime work at the petitioner's office.
After, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in
Fuente Osmea, 7km away from petitioner's
place of business. A witness for the private
respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that
Fuente Osmea is a "lively place" even at
dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back
Street were still open and people were
drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes,
pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.
At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some
snacks and had a chat with friends. It was
when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that
the incident in question occurred.
ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or
was carrying out a personal purpose not in
line with his duties at the time he figured
in a vehicular accident. It was then about
2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond
the normal working hours. ABAD's
working day had ended; his overtime work
had already been completed. His being at
 a place which, as petitioner put it, was
known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps,
and drug pushers and addicts," had no
connection to petitioner's business;
neither had it any relation to his duties as
a manager. Rather, using his service
vehicle even for personal purposes was a
form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks
attached to his position.
Since no evidence that ABAD was acting
within the scope of the functions entrusted to
him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to
show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in providing ABAD with a
service vehicle. Thus, petitioner is relieved
of vicarious liability for the consequences
of the negligence of ABAD in driving its
vehicle.
VICTORY LINER V MALECDAN
PETITIONER: Victory Liner, Inc
RESPONDENTS: Heirs of Andres Malecdan
DOCKET NO.: GR No. 154278
DATE: December 27, 2002
PONENTE: Mendoza, J
FACTS
Andres Malecdan was a 75 year-old farmer
residing in Barangay Nungnungan 2,
Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela.
At around 7:00 p.m., while Andres was
crossing the National Highway on his way
home from the farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the
southbound lane stopped to allow him and his
carabao to pass. However, as Andres was
crossing the highway, a bus of Victory Liner,
driven by Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., bypassed
the Dalin bus. In so doing, the Victory
Liner bus hit the old man and the carabao
on which he was riding. As a result, Andres
Malecdan was thrown off the carabao, while
the beast toppled over.
The Victory Liner bus sped past the old man,
while the Dalin bus proceeded to its
destination without helping him.
The incident was witnessed by a neighbor,
Virgilio Lorena, who was resting in a nearby
waiting shed after working on his farm.
Andres sustained a wound on his left
shoulder, from which bone fragments
protruded. He was taken by Lorena and
another person to the Cagayan District
Hospital where he died a few hours after
arrival. The carabao also died soon
afterwards.
Subsequently, a criminal complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property was filed against
the Victory Liner bus driver Ricardo
Joson, Jr.
The wife and children of the late Andres
brought another suit for damages in the
Regional Trial Court, which, in a decision
rendered the driver guilty of gross negligence
in the operation of his vehicle and Victory
Liner, Inc. also guilty of gross negligence in
the selection and supervision of Joson, Jr.
ISSUE: WON Victory Liner, Inc. can be held
liable for the failure to exercise the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its employee
HELD:
EXPLANATION: Employers may be relieved
of responsibility for the negligent acts of their
employees acting within the scope of their
assigned task only if they can show that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage. For this purpose,
they have the burden of proving that they
have indeed exercised such diligence, both in
the selection of the employee and in the
supervision of the performance of his duties.
In the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience and service
records. With respect to the supervision of
employees, employers must formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches thereof. These facts
must be shown by concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
 In the instant case, Victory Liner alleged that
the regular periodic conducting of safety and
defensive driving [training sessions] for its
drivers are concrete and physical proofs of the
formulated operating standards, the
implementation and monitoring of the same,
designed for the exercise of due diligence of
a good father of a family in the supervision of
its employees.
o It presented the results of Joson, Jr.s
written examination, actual driving
tests, NBI clearance, shop training,
and reports from the General
Maintenance Manager and the
Personnel Manager showing that he
had passed all the tests and training
sessions and was ready to work as a
professional driver.
o Petitioner also presented testimonial
evidence that drivers of the company
were given seminars on driving safety
at least twice a year. Again, however,
as the trial court noted there is no
record of Joson, Jr. ever attending
such a seminar.
o Petitioner likewise failed to establish
the speed of its buses during its daily
trips or to submit in evidence the trip
tickets, speed meters and reports of
field inspectors.
o The finding of the trial court that
petitioners bus was running at a very
fast speed when it overtook the Dalin
bus and hit the deceased was not
disputed by petitioner.
o For these reasons, the trial court
did not err in finding petitioner to be
negligent in the supervision of its
driver Joson, Jr.
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL V CA
PETITIONER: St. Francis High School
Represented by: Sps. Fernando Nantes
Rosario Lacandula
Benjamin Ilumin
Tirso de Chavez
Luisito Vinas
Connie Arquio
Patria Cadiz
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, 11th Div
Dr. Romulo Castillo
Lilia Cadiz
DOCKET NO.: GR No. 82465
DATE: February 25, 1991
PONENTE: Paras, J
FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo, a 13-year-old freshman
student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High
School (SFHS) wanted to join a school picnic
at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. However,
his parents, Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia
Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow
him.
o He was only allowed to bring food
(adobo) to the teachers for the picnic.
However, the teachers persuaded him
to go with them to the beach.
o During the picnic, a teacher was
apparently drowning. Some students,
including Ferdinand, came to her
rescue, but in the process, it was
Ferdinand himself who drowned. He
was brought to Mt. Cannel General
Hospital but was pronounced dead on
arrival.
Ferdinands parents filed a case for
damages against SFHS and the teachers.
COURT OF APPEALS: declared that the
teachers failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family to guard against the
foreseen harm.
o Also, SFHS and principal Benjamin
Illumin was declared jointly and
solidarily liable with the teachers for
the death of Ferdinand, under Art
2180.
ISSUE: WON the school SFHS, principal and
teachers were liable for the death of
Ferdinand
HELD: No.
o It is the rule in Art 2180 that the
negligence of the employees in
causing the injury or damage gives
 rise to a presumption of negligence on
the part of SFHS and its principal; and
while this presumption is not
conclusive, it may be overthrown only
by clear and convincing proof that the
owner and/or manager (SFHS and
principal) exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and/or supervision of the
employee or employees causing the
injury or damage (in this case, the
defendants-teachers).
o SC found that the teachers are neither
guilty of their own negligence nor
guilty of the negligence of those under
them. Consequently they cannot be
held liable for damages of any kind.
o At the outset, it should be noted that
respondent spouses, parents of the
victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to
join the excursion. The fact that he
gave money to his son to buy food for
the picnic even without knowing where
it will be held, is a sign of consent for
his son to join the same.
In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the
actual performance of their assigned tasks.
The incident happened outside the school
premises, not on a school day and most
importantly while the teachers and students
were holding a purely private affair, a picnic.
This picnic had no permit from the school
head or its principal, because this picnic is not
a school-sanctioned activity or an extra-
curricular activity. Mere knowledge by the
principal of the planning of the picnic by the
students and teachers does not in any way
show acquiescence or consent to the holding
of the same.
It was shown that Connie Arquio, the class
adviser of I-C, did her best and exercised
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent any untoward incident or damages to
all the students who joined the picnic.
o a. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso
de Chavez (who conducted first aid on
Ferdinand) and Luisito Vinas who are
both P.E. instructors and scout
masters who have knowledge in First
Aid application and swimming.
o Even respondents' witness, Segundo
Vinas, testified that the teachers
brought life savers in case of
emergency.
o The records also show that both
petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all
what is humanly possible to save the
child.
Moreover, as already pointed out
hereinabove, the teachers are not guilty of
any fault or negligence, hence, no moral
damages can be assessed against them.
While it is true that Ferdinands parents did
give their consent to their son to join the
picnic, this does not mean that the school and
teachers were already relieved of their duty to
observe the required diligence of a good
father of a family in ensuring the safety of the
children. But in the case at bar, petitioners
were able to prove that they had exercised the
required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral
or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned
decision dated November 19, 1987, finding
petitioners herein guilty of negligence and
liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo
and awarding the respondents damages,
is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the
petitioners herein are concerned, but the
portion of the said decision dismissing
their counterclaim, there being no merit, is
hereby AFFIRMED.