( 29 pages)
Consti2_Section19_Prohibited Punishment
(1)(People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953)
(4) People v. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034 (Resolution), August 20, 1996)
(9)(Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998)
Section20_Non-imprisonment of Debt
(18)(Serafin v. Lindayag, A.M. No. 297-MJ, September 30, 1975)
(22) (Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, L-66839-42, 71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13, 725765-67,
75789, December 18, 1986)
(People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-5793. August 27, 1953.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ALBERTO ESTOISTA, defendant-appellant.
Ramon Diokno and Jose W. Diokno for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan Jr.
and Acting Solicitor Antonio Consing for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS. It being established that the
defendant was alone when he walked to the
plantation where he was to hunt with the rifle of his
father, in whose name the firearm was licensed,
and that the son, away from his father's sight and
control, carried the gun for the only purpose of
using it, as in fact he did with fatal consequences,
the evidence support the son's conviction for the
offense of illegal possession of firearm which was in
accordance with law.
2. ID.; ID.; U. S. vs. SAMSON (16 Phil., 323),
EXPLAINED. The implied holding in U. S. vs.
Samson (16 Phil., 323) that the intention to possess is
an essential element of a violation of the Firearms
Law was not intended to imply title or right to the
weapon to the exclusion of everyone else. The
court did not mean only intention to own but also
intention to use. From the very nature of the subject
matter of the prohibition, control or dominion of the
use of the weapon by the holder regardless of
ownership is, of necessity, the essential factor.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEANING OF THE TERMS "CONTROL"
AND "DOMINION." The terms "control" and
"dominion" are relative terms not susceptible of
exact definition, and opinions on the degree and
character of control or dominion sufficient to
constitute a violation vary. The rule laid down by
United States courts - rule which we here adopt - is
that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless
possession or control of a firearm is not violation of a
statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this
kind of weapon. A typical example of such
possession is where "a person picks up a weapon or
hands it to another to examine or hold for a
moment, or to shoot at some object." (Sanderson
vs. State, 5 S.W., 138; 68 C. J., 22.)
1|Consti2_Section19_Prohibited Punishment_Section 20_Non -
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4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT; PENALTY PROVIDED FOR IN Republic
Act No. 4 DEEMED CONSTITUTIONAL. Without
deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution
against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
applies both to the form of the penalty and the
duration of imprisonment, confinement from 5 to 10
years for possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel or
unusual, having due regard to the prevalent
conditions which the law proposes to curb.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTIES; ILLEGAL POSSESSION
OF FIREARM. As Republic Act No. 4 provides a
penalty of from 5 to 10 years imprisonment for illegal
possession of a firearm, the court can not but
impose upon the offender the minimum at least of
the penalty provided. In this case, however,
considering the degree of malice of the defendant,
application of the law to its full extent would be too
harsh, and a recommendation is made to the
President to reduce to fix months the penalty
imposed upon this defendant.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT; FIVE YEARS' IMPRISONMENT,
NOT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL. To come under the
constitutional ban against cruel and unusual
punishment, the penalty imposed must be
"flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community." (24 C. J.
S., 1187-1188.) Five years' confinement for
possessing firearms can not be said to be cruel and
unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of
being shocking to public conscience.
7. ID.; ID.; CONFISCATION OF FIREARMS BELONGING
TO A PERSON OTHER THAN THE DEFENDANT.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4 does not say that
firearms unlawfully possessed or carried are to be
confiscated only if they belong to the defendant,
nor is such intention deducible from the language
of the Act. Except perhaps where the lawful owner
was innocent of, or without fault in, the use of his
property by another, confiscation accords with the
legislative intent. Ownership or possession of
firearms is not a natural right protected by the
constitutional prohibition against depriving one of
his property without due process of law. Above the
right to own property is the inherent attribute of
sovereignty the police power of the state to
protect its citizens and to provide for the safety and
good order of society. (16 C. J. S., 539, 540.)
Pursuant to the exercise of police power, the right
to private property may be limited, restricted, and
impaired so as to promote the general welfare,
public order and safety. (Id., 611). The power of the
legislature to prohibit the possession of deadly
weapon carries with it the power to provide for the
confiscation or forfeiture of weapons unlawfully
used or allowed by the licensed owner to be used.
DECISION
TUASON, J p:
Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao
for homicide through reckless imprudence and
illegal possession of firearm under one information,
the appellant was acquitted of the first offense and
found guilty of the second, for which he was
sentenced to one year imprisonment. This appeal is
from that sentence raising factual, legal and
constitutional questions. The constitutional question,
set up after the submission of the briefs, has to do
with the objection that the penalty from 5 to 10
years of imprisonment and fines provided by
Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and unusual.
As to the facts. The firearm with which the appellant
was charged with having in his possession was a
rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who
held a legal permit for it. Father and son lived in the
same house, a little distance from a 27-hectare
estate belonging to the family which was partly
covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and second
growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to
120 meters from the house, the defendant took a
shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima, a
laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild
chickens and whose presence was not perceived
by the accused.
The evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether
the owner of the rifle was with the accused at the
time of the accidental killing.
Bruno Estoista testified that on the morning of the
accident, February 10, 1949, his son told him that
there were wild chickens on the plantation
"scratching palay and corn" plants and asked if he
might shoot them; that Bruno told his son to wait,
got the rifle from the house or locker, handed it
over to Alberto who is a "sharp- shooter" and "shoots
better," and walked about 20 meters behind the
young man; that Bruno was that far from Alberto
when the latter fired and accidentally wounded
their servant.
The defendant's key testimony is: "When I heard wild
rooster crowing I told my father about the said wild
rooster crowing near our house and he told me to
shoot the said wild rooster, so I went to shoot it."
Bruno's testimony at the trial is in direct
contradiction to his and his son's statements at the
Constabulary headquarters on the same morning
of the shooting, and sworn to by them before the
justice of the peace soon after.
Bruno related on that occasion that Alberto "went
to hunt for wild roosters;" that "later on my son
Alberto came to inform me that he had
accidentally hit our laborer;" that thereupon he
"went with my son to see what happened." Queried
"who was with Alberto when he went out hunting,"
Bruno replied, "He was alone."
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On his part, the defendant declared on the same
occasion that Diragon Dima, after being shot,
requested to be taken to his (Dima's) house; that as
the accused was able to carry the wounded man
on]y about 50 meters, Dima asked the defendant
to call Bruno "who was in the house" which
Alberto did. To the question who his companion
was when he shot at a rooster, Alberto said, "I was
alone."
There is not the slightest ground to believe that
these affidavits contained anything but the truth,
especially that part regarding Bruno's whereabouts
when the defendant used the rifle. Both affiants are
very intelligent, the affidavits were executed
immediately upon their arrival at the Constabulary
headquarters, there is no hint of any undue pressure
brought to bear upon either of them, and, above
all, they stood to gain nothing from the statement
that the accused was unaccompanied. In contrast,
Bruno's testimony in court was interested, given with
his son's acquittal in view. And especially is the
father's veracity in court to be distrusted because
by Alberto's unsolicited admission, he had been in
the habit of going out hunting in other places and
for target practices, and because by Bruno's
unwitting admission, his son, who had no gun of his
own, is a sharpshooter and shoots better.
It being established that the defendant was alone
when he walked to the plantation with his father's
gun, the next question that presents itself is: Does
this evidence support conviction as a matter of
law?
In United States vs. Samson (16 Phil., 323), cited by
defense counsel, it was held that carrying a gun by
order of the owner does not constitute illegal
possession of firearm. The facts in that case were
that a shotgun and nine cartridges which belonged
to one Pablo Padilla, who had a proper permit to
possess them, were seized by the police from
Samson while walking in the town of Santa Rosa,
Nueva Ecija. Padilla was to use the shotgun in
hunting that day and, as he was coming along on
horseback, sent Samson on ahead.
Republic Act No. 4, amending section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, in its pertinent
provision is directed against any person who
possesses any firearm, ammunition therefor, etc. A
point to consider in this connection is the meaning
of the word "possesses. "It goes without saying that
this word was employed in its broad sense so as to
include "carries" and "holds." This has to be so if the
manifest intent of the Act is to be effective. The
same evils, the same perils to public security, which
the Act penalizes exist whether the unlicensed
holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a
borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the
proprietary concept of the possession can have no
bearing whatever. "Ownership of the weapon is
necessary only insofar as the ownership may tend
to establish the guilt or intention of the accused." It
is remarkable that in the United States, where the
right to bear arms for defense is ensured by the
federal and many state constitutions, legislation has
been very generally enacted severely restricting
the carrying of deadly weapons, and the power of
state legislatures to do so has been upheld.
In the light of these considerations, it is a mistake to
point to United States vs. Samson, supra, as
authority for the appellant's plea for acquittal. The
implied holding in that case that the intention to
possess is an essential element of a violation of the
Firearms Law was not intended to imply title or right
to the weapon to the exclusion of everyone else.
The court did not mean only intention to own but
also intention to use. From the very nature of the
subject matter of the prohibition control or
dominion of the use of the weapon by the holder
regardless of ownership is, of necessity, the essential
factor.
The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are
relative terms not susceptible of exact definition,
and opinions on the degree and character of
control or dominion sufficient to constitute a
violation vary. The rule laid down by United States
courts rule which we here adopt is that
temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession
or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute
prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of
weapon. A typical example of such possession is
where "a person picks up a weapon or hands it to
another to examine or hold for a moment, or to
shoot at some object." (Sanderson vs. State, 5 S.W.,
138; 68 C.J., 22)
Appellant's case does not meet the above test. His
holding or carrying of his father's gun was not
incidental, casual, temporary or harmless. Away
from his father's sight and control, he carried the
gun for the only purpose of using it, as in fact he
did, with fatal consequences.
Incidentally, herein lies a fundamental difference
between the case at bar and the Samson case.
Although Samson had physical control of his
employer's shotgun and cartridges, his possession
thereof was undoubtedly harmless and innocent, as
evidenced by the fact that, apparently, he bore
them in full view of the people he met and of the
authorities. Unlike the appellant herein, Samson
carried the gun solely in obedience to its owners
order or request without any inferable intention to
use it as a weapon. It is of interest to note that even
in the United States where, as stated, the right to
bear arms as a means of defense is guaranteed,
possession such as that by Samson is by the weight
of authority considered a violation of similar
statutes.
Without deciding whether the prohibition of the
Constitution against infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment applies both to the form of the penalty
and the duration of imprisonment, it is our opinion
that confinement from 6 to 10 years for possessing
or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having
due regard to the prevalent conditions which the
law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant
lawlessness against property, person, and even the
very security of the Government, directly traceable
in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use
of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in
normal circumstances might appear excessive. If
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imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion
to the present case in view of certain
circumstances, the law is not to be declared
unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality
of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the
light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for
which the heavy net was not spread are, like small
fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a
situation as this that courts are advised to make a
recommendation to the Chief Executive for
clemency or reduction of the penalty. (Art. 5,
Revised Penal Code; People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil.
906.)
The sentence imposed by the lower court is much
below the penalty authorized by Republic Act No.
4. The judgment is therefore modified so as to
sentence the accused to imprisonment for five
years. However, considering the degree of malice
of the defendant, application of the law to its full
extent would be too harsh and, accordingly, it is
ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to
the President, thru the Secretary of Justice, with the
recommendation that the imprisonment herein
imposed be reduced to six months. The appellant
will pay the costs of both instances.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,
Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.
RESOLUTION
December 3, 1953
TUASON, J.:
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4, with
reference to the penalty therein provided, was
carefully considered. In branding imprisonment for
five years too harsh and out of proportion in this
case, we had in mind that six months was
commensurate and just for the appellant's offense,
taking into consideration his intention and the
degree of his malice, rather than that it infringes the
constitutional prohibition against the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive,
out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does
not make it cruel and unusual." (24 C. J. S., 1187-
1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held
that to come under the ban, the punishment must
be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community."(Idem.)
Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure
and the public interest at stake, we do not believe
that five years' confinement for possessing firearms,
even as applied to appellant's and similar cases,
can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or
excessive to the extent of being shocking to public
conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity
on constitutional grounds of the Act in question was
contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate
printed brief for the appellant; it was raised for the
first time in the course of the oral argument in the
Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as possible
gauge of popular and judicial reaction to the
duration of the imprisonment stipulated in the
statute, that some members of the court at first
expressed opposition to any recommendation for
executive clemency for the appellant, believing
that he deserved imprisonment within the
prescribed range.
The sufficiency of the evidence for appellant's
conviction under Republic Act No. 4 likewise had
received close attention and study. There is no
need on our part to add anything to what has
been said, except to point out for clarification that
the references to defendant's previous uses of his
father's gun and the fatal consequences of his last
use of it, were made simply to emphasize that his
possession of the prohibited weapon was not
casual, incidental, or harmless. His previous conduct
was relevant in determining his motive and
intention, and to disprove the claim that his father
followed his son so as not to lose control of the
firearm. It was far from the thought of the court to
condemn the appellant for acts with which he had
not been charged or of which he had been
pronounced innocent.
The confiscation of the gun is, in our opinion, in
accordance with section 1 of Republic Act No. 4,
which reads:
"SECTION 1. Section twenty-six hundred and ninety-
two of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act Numbered fifty-
six, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2692. Unlawful manufacture, dealing in,
acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms, or
ammunition therefor, or instrument used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. Any person who manufactures,
deals in, acquires, disposes, or possesses, any
firearm, parts of firearms, or ammunition therefor, or
instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition
in violation of any provision of sections eight
hundred and seventy-seven to nine hundred and
six, inclusive, of this Code, as amended, shall, upon
conviction, be punished by imprisonment for a
period of not less than one year and one day nor
more than five years, or both such imprisonment
and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor
more than five thousand pesos, in the discretion of
the court. If the article illegally possessed is a rifle,
carbine, grease gun, bazooka, machine gun,
submachine gun, hand grenade, bomb, artillery of
any kind or ammunition exclusively intended for
such weapons, such period of imprisonment shall
be not less than five years nor more than ten years.
A conviction under this section shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the prohibited article or articles to the
Philippine Government.
"The possession of any instrument or implement
which is directly useful in the manufacture of
firearms or ammunition on the part of any person
whose business or employment does not deal with
such instrument or implement shall be prima facie
proof that such article is intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition."
This provision does not say that firearms unlawfully
possessed or carried are to be confiscated only if
they belong to the defendant, nor is such intention
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deducible from the language of the act. We are
inclined to, and do, believe that, except perhaps
where the lawful owner was innocent of, or without
fault in, the use of his property by another,
confiscation accords with the legislative intent.
We can foresee the objection that such legislation
deprives one of his property without due process of
law. The answer to this is that ownership or
possession of firearms is not a natural right
protected by the Constitution. Above the right to
own property is the inherent attribute of sovereignty
- the police power of the state to protect its citizens
and to provide for the safety and good order of
society. (16 C. J. S., 539, 540.) Pursuant to the
exercise of police power, the right to private
property may be limited, restricted, and impaired so
as to promote the general welfare, public order
and safety. (Id., 611.) The power of the legislature to
prohibit the possession of deadly weapon carries
with it the power to provide for the confiscation or
forfeiture of weapons unlawfully used or allowed by
the licensed owner to be used.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,
Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.
(People v. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034 (Resolution),
August 20, 1996)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120034. August 20, 1996.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JOSEFINA A. ESPARAS and RODRIGO O. LIBED,
accused-appellant.
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Florencio V. Aghijvas for accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO
REVIEW DECISION IMPOSING DEATH PENALTY, NOT
SUBJECT TO WAIVER. As the accused remains at
large up to the present time, the Issue that
confronts the Court is whether or not it will proceed
to automatically review her death sentence. The
issue need not befuddle us. In the 1910 ground-
breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna, et al., we already
held thru Mr. Justice Moreland, that the power of
this Court to review a decision imposing the death
penalty cannot be waived either by the accused
or by the courts. Our case law under the 1935
Constitution reiterated Laguna ruling. Thus, in the
1953 case of People vs. Villanueva, we held that
the withdrawal of an appeal by a death convict
does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to
review his conviction. The 1971 case of People vs.
Cornelio, et al., involves the escape of a death
convict. In no uncertain terms, we held that the
escape of a death convict does not relieve this
Court of its duty of reviewing his conviction. Then
came the 1973 Constitution which likewise did not
prohibit the death penalty. Section 9, Rule 122
continued to provide the procedure for review of
death penalty cases by this Court. Finally, we have
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes Congress so provides. On
December 13, 1993, Congress reimposed the death
penalty in cases involving the commission of
heinous crimes. This revived the procedure by which
this Court reviews death penalty cases pursuant to
the Rules of Court. It remains automatic and does
not depend on the whims of the death convict. It
continues to be mandatory, and leaves this Court
without any option.
2. ID.; ACTIONS; APPEALS; RULE AUTHORIZING
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL WHEN APPELLANT JUMPS BAIL,
NOT APPLIED WHERE DEATH PENALTY WAS IMPOSED.
With due respect to the dissenting opinions of our
esteemed colleagues, Section 8 of Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court which, inter alia, authorizes the
dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps
bail, has no application to cases where the death
penalty has been imposed. In death penalty cases,
automatic review is mandatory. This is the text and
tone of section 12, Rule 122, which is the more
applicable rule. No litigant can repudiate this
power which is bestowed by the Constitution. The
power is more of a sacred duty which we have to
discharge to assure the People that the innocence
of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes that
slight but even more, in crimes that shock the
conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.
FRANCISCO, J., separate opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL; PRESUPPOSES
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
ACCUSED. An appeal is a statutory remedy for
the correction of errors which might have been
committed. With the accused lies the power and
option to avail of the remedy, and with the
appellate court belongs the power to affirm or
reverse the accused's conviction. Appeal,
however, presupposes jurisdiction over the person
of the accused.
2. ID.; ID., ESCAPE BY ACCUSED CONSIDERED
WAIVER OF APPEAL. Since appeal is a mere
statutory privilege and is not a natural right nor part
of the due process, it may only be exercised in the
manner and in acordance with the provisions of the
law. Thus, an accused who escapes from prison or
confinement loses his standing in court and unless
he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the
court he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court (People v. Agbulos, 222
SCRA 196; People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79). A
contrary view would encourage the accused to
trifle with the administration of justice, and provide
means for guilty parties to escape punishment
(People v. Ang Gioc, 73 Phil 366). In this case, the
accused escaped from confinement and
heretofore refuses to surrender to the proper
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authorities, thus she must be deemed to have
abandoned the appeal (see People v. Quiritan, 197
SCRA 32; People v. Acol, 232 SCRA 406; People v.
Codilla, 224 SCRA 104).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE APPLIES TO THREE (3) METHODS
OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT IN CRIMINAL
CASES. In criminal cases, appeal may be taken to
the Supreme Court via the following steps: by filing
a notice of appeal in those cases where the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed, by
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
where the penalty imposed is not reclusion
perpetua and the appeal would involve only
question of law (People v. Pagsanjan, 221 SCRA
735), and by automatic review where the penalty
imposed is death (R.A. NO. 7659, Sec. 22; Rule 122,
Sec. 10, Revised Rules of Court). An appeal has "for
its object simply and solely the protection of the
accused." Appeal by way of automatic review is
plainly another mode of appeal and has an
objective similar to any other modes of appeal, i.e.,
the protection of the accused. If the accused has
escaped, then he refuses to avail of the protection
of the Court why then should the Court insist in
protecting him. In the same vein, "the law providing
for automatic review of death sentence seeks to
favor the [accused]." If the accused has
absconded or escaped from confinement then
who is to be favored by the automatic review a
fugitive from justice? Hence, if the escape of the
accused may be deemed waiver of the right to
appeal in any other mode of appeal, then the
same must apply to an appeal by way of
automatic review. I fail to see, in this connection,
any cogent reason why an automatic review
should be given status different from the other
modes of appeal. I thus find, and with due respect
to my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Puno,
unacceptable the proposition that an appeal by
way of automatic review is not subject to waiver. If
the constitutional rights of the accused enshrined
under Artice III of the 1987 Constitution, such as right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, right
against self-incrimination, right to remain silent,
among others, can be waived, then with more
reason with the right to appeal which is merely of
statutory origin.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion
REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL; ESCAPE OF
ACCUSED CONSTITUTES ABANDONMENT OF APPEAL;
HIGH COURT WITH INESCAPABLE DUTY TO REVIEW
DECISIONS UPON RE-ARREST OF THE ACCUSED.
Without repeating the legal arguments pro and
con, as these were already eloquently presented
by Mr. Justice Puno, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr.
Justice Francisco, I hold that the judicial taking of
life cannot be left to mere legal logic. Life is too
precious to be settled against legalism, however
exalted. I believe that this Court cannot abandon
its sacred duty to God and country to see to it that
a lower court judgment that takes away life is
ERROR FREE and can stand THE MOST SEARCHING
SCRUTINY. At the same time, this Court must not
enable an escaped convict to make a mockery of
the foundations of human justice. Consequently, i
believe we must combine the sacred with the
human. After prayer, study, reflection and
discernment, I am thoroughly convinced that this
Court has the inescapable duty to review this and
similar life-taking decisions, but only after the
accused's is re-arrested and taken back into the
custody of law. In view of the foregoing, I vote to
grant the accused's motion for extension to file brief
and in view of the delay in the disposition of such
motion due to the lengthy court deliberation
thereon, to give her a new period of thirty (30) days
from notice within which to file her Brief.
PADILLA, J., dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ONE WHO SEEKS
POSITIVE RELIEF FROM A COURT OF LAW SHOULD
SUBMIT TO ITS JURISDICTION. It is basic in
procedural law that one who seeks positive relief
from a court of law should submit to its jurisdiction.
In criminal law and procedure, it is likewise settled
that the trial court has to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the accused before it can proceed
to try the case and render judgment against him.
Thus, in the present case, trial proceeded only as to
the accused Josefina A. Esparas, who earlier
entered a plea of not guilty, while her co-accused
Rodrigo O. Libed has remained at large and has
been arraigned or tried.
2. ID.; ID.; APPEAL; JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
OF THE ACCUSED REQUIRED DURING PENDENCY
THEREOF; APPEAL MAY BE DISMISSED WHERE
ACCUSED ESCAPES. Jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is also required by the Rules of Court
during the pendency of an appeal from a
judgment of conviction in the trial court so that, in
the event of an accused's escape from detention
during his appeal, the appeal may be dismissed
outright by the appellate court. Section 8, Rule 124
of the Rules of Court gives the appellate court the
authority to dismiss an appeal when the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during the pendency of
the appeal.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES WHERE ACCUSED IS A
DEATH CONVICT. It is my considered view
however that a distinction should be made
between a death convict, i.e., one sentenced to
death by a trial court, who remains in the custody
of law, but who voluntarily withdraws his appeal
and a death convict, i.e., one sentenced to death
by the trial court but who escapes from the custody
of the law during the pendency of the appeal. It
should be clear in the first case, that even if the
death convict withdraws his appeal from the trial
court's judgment sentencing him to death, the
appellate court may still and nonetheless review
the judgment of conviction for the convict-
appellant has at least remained in the custody of
law to await final verdict of the case. In the second
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case, however, the accused no longer recognizes
and respects the authority of law and the duly-
constituted authorities in general and this Court in
particular. Such superlicious conduct of an
escapee cannot and should not be taken lightly by
the court. Respect for and recognition of the
authority of the court are essential and implicit
elements in an effective and credible judicial
system. No one, it should be stressed, should be
allowed to make a mockery of the justice system
by, in one breadth, seeking its protection and even
vindication via an automatic review of death
sentence and, in another breath, continuing to be
a fugitive from justice and repudiating the very
authority of the system whose protection he seeks
and invokes. "Mandatory jurisdiction" of the
Supreme Court to review death penalty cases and
"automatic review" of death penalty cases have to
assume implicitly that the accused in his person is
subject to the processes and jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court if it is to review his conviction to
death by the trial court.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J p:
Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged, with
violation of R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No.
759 for importing into the country twenty (20)
kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 94-5897
before the RTC of Pasay City, Br. 114.
After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail
and was tried in absentia. On March 13, 1995, the
trial court found her guilty as charged and imposed
on her the death penalty.
As the accused remains at large up to the present
time, the issue that confronts the Court is whether or
not it will proceed to automatically review her
death sentence. The issue need not befuddle us. In
the 1910 ground-breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna,
et al., 1 we already held thru Mr. Justice Moreland,
that the power of this Court to review a decision
imposing the death penalty cannot be waived
either by the accused or by the courts, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
"It is apparent from these provisions that the
judgment of conviction and sentence thereunder
by the trial court does not, in reality, conclude the
trial of the accused. Such trial is not terminated until
the Supreme Court has reviewed the facts and the
law as applied thereto by the court below. The
judgment of conviction entered on the trial is not
final, can not be executed, and is wholly without
force or effect until the case has been passed upon
by the Supreme Court. In a sense the trial court acts
as a commissioner who takes the testimony and
reports thereon to the Supreme Court with his
recommendation. While in practice he enters a
judgment of conviction and sentences the prisoner
thereunder, in reality, until passed upon by the
Supreme Court, it has none of the attributes of a
final judgment and sentence. It is a mere
recommendation to the Supreme Court, based
upon the facts on the record which are presented
with it. This is meant in no sense to detract from the
dignity and power of Courts of First Instance. It
means simply that the portion of Spanish procedure
which related to cases where capital punishment
was imposed still survives.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The requirement that the Supreme Court pass on a
case in which capital punishment has been
imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one
having for its object simply and solely the protection
of the accused. Having received the highest
penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under
the law to have the sentence and all the facts and
circumstances upon which it is founded placed
before the highest tribunal of the land to the end
that its justice and legality may be clearly and
conclusively determined. Such procedure is
merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither
the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a
provision of the law that brooks no interference and
tolerates no evasions." (Emphasis supplied)
The Laguna case interpreted section 50 of General
Orders No. 58 as amended, which provides:
"xxx xxx xxx
"It shall not be necessary to forward to the Supreme
Court the record, or any part thereof, of any case in
which there shall have been an acquittal, or in
which the sentence imposed is not death, unless
such case shall have been duly appealed; but such
sentence shall be executed upon the order of the
court in which the trial was had. The records of all
cases in which the death penalty shall have been
imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the
defendant shall have appealed or not, and of all
cases in which appeals shall have been taken shall
be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
investigation and judgment as law and justice shall
dictate. The records of such cases shall be
forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme Court within
twenty days, but not earlier than fifteen days after
the rendition of sentence."
The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition
of the death penalty. Its section 2(4) of Article VIII
provided for review by this Court of death penalty
cases. Both our Rules of Court of 1940 2 and 1964 3
require the transmission to this Court of the records
of all cases in which the death penalty shall have
been imposed by the trial court, whether the
defendant shall have appealed or not, for review
and judgment as the law and justice shall dictate. It
will be noted that these rules were taken from the
second part of General Orders No. 58, as amended
by Section 4, Act No. 194. 4
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Necessarily, our case law under the 1935
Constitution reiterated the Laguna ruling. Thus, in
the 1953 case of People vs. Villanueva, 5 we held
that the withdrawal of an appeal by a death
convict does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction
to review his conviction, viz.:
"An accused appealing from a decision sentencing
him to death may be allowed to withdraw his
appeal like any other appellant, in an ordinary
criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his
withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the
case from the jurisdiction of this court which under
the law is authorized and called upon to review the
decision though unappealed. Consequently, the
withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not
serve to render the decision of the People's Court
final. In fact, as was said by this court through
Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs. Laguna, 17
Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of review by this
court of a decision imposing the death penalty, the
judgment of conviction entered in the trial court is
not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly
without force or effect until the case has been
passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta;
that although a judgment of conviction is entered
by the trial court, said decision has none of the
attributes of a final judgment and sentence; that
until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court
which finally passes upon it, the same is not final
and conclusive; and that this automatic review by
the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death
penalty is something which neither the court nor the
accused could waive or evade."
The 1971 case of People vs. Cornelio, et al., 6
involves the escape of a death convict. In no
uncertain terms, we held that the escape of a
death convict does not relieve this Court of its duty
of reviewing his conviction. In the 1972 case of
People vs. Daban, et al., 7 the ponencia of former
Chief Justice Fernando further stressed, to wit:
"xxx xxx xxx"
"Now, as to the law. It would appear that
respondent Demaisip is unaware of Section 9 of
Rule 122. Thus: 'The records of all cases in which the
death penalty shall been imposed by any Court of
First Instance, whether the defendant shall have
appealed or not, shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court fore review and judgment as law
and justice shall dictate. The records of such cases
shall be forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme
Court within twenty (20) days but not earlier than
fifteen (15) days, after rendition or promulgation of
the sentence in the form prescribed by section 11
of Rule 41. The transcript shall also be forwarded as
provided in section 12 of Rule 41 within five (5) days
after the filing thereof by the stenographer.' The
penalty imposed on appellant Daban y Ganzon in
the judgment of November 21, 1969 being one of
death, the case was properly elevated to this
Court. Moreover, until after this Court has spoken,
no finality could be attached to the lower court
decision. As explained in former Chief Justice
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court: 'In this
connection, it must be emphasized that the
judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty
entered in the trial court, is not final, and cannot be
executed and is wholly without force or effect until
the case has been passed upon by the Supreme
Court en consulta; that although a judgment of
conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision
has none of the attributes of a final judgment and
sentence; and that until is has been reviewed by
the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the
same is not final and conclusive; and this automatic
review by the Supreme Court is something which
neither the court nor the accused could waive or
evade.' The mere fact of escape of appellant,
therefore, could not be relied upon by respondent
Demaisip as sufficient cause for his failure to file
appellants brief."
Then came the 1973 Constitution which likewise did
not prohibit the death penalty. 8 Section 9, Rule 122
continued to provide the procedure for review of
death penalty cases by this Court. Section 10, Rule
122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even
reenacted this procedure of review. Significantly, it
expressly used the term "automatic review and
judgment" by this Court. Our case law continued its
fealty to the Laguna rule. Thus, in the 1976 case of
People vs. Saliling, et al., 9 we held, thru former
Chief Justice Aquino, that this Court is not
precluded from reviewing the death sentence of
an accused who is at large. In the 1984 case of
People vs. Buynay, et al., 10 we reiterated the rule
that the escape of a death convict will not
automatically result in the dismissal of his appeal.
Finally, we have the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes
Congress so provides. 11 On December 13, 1993,
Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases
involving the commission of heinous crimes. This
revived the procedure by which this Court reviews
death penalty cases pursuant to the Rules of Court.
It remains automatic and does not depend on the
whims of the death convict. It continues to be
mandatory, and leaves this Court without any
option. 12
With due respect to the dissenting opinions of our
esteemed colleagues, section 8 of Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court which, inter alia, authorizes the
dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps
bail, has no application to cases where the death
penalty has been imposed. In death penalty cases,
automatic review is mandatory. This is the text and
tone of section 10, Rule 122, which is the more
applicable rule, viz.:
"Section 10. Transmission of Records in Case of
Death Penalty. In all cases where the death
8|Consti2_Section19_Prohibited Punishment_Section 20_Non -
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penalty is imposed by he trial court, the records
shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20)
days but not earlier than (15) days after
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of
any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The
transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10)
days after the filing thereof by the stenographic
reporter."
Similarly, the reliance in People vs. Codilla, 13 by our
dissenting colleagues is misplaced. Codilla is not a
death penalty case. Only the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was imposed on appellant.
Consequently, we ruled that the escape of the
appellant or his refusal to surrender to the proper
authorities justifies dismissal of his appeal.
Our dissenting brethren also make a distinct cut
between ". . . a death convict, i. e. one convicted
to death by a trial court who remains in the custody
of the law, and who voluntarily withdraws his
appeal and a death convict, i.e., one convicted to
death by the trial court but who escapes from the
custody of the law during the pendency of the
appeal." They rationalize the distinction by holding:
"It should be clear in the first case, that even if the
death convict withdraws his appeal from the trial
court's judgment convicting him to death, the
appellate court may still and nonetheless review
the judgment of conviction for the convict-
appellant has at least remained in the custody of
the law to await final verdict in his case. In the
second case, however, the accused no longer
recognizes and respects the authority of law and
the duly-constituted authorities in general and this
Court in particular. Such supercilious conduct of an
escapee cannot and should not be taken lightly by
the Court. Respect for and recognition of the
authority of the Court is an essential and implicit
element in an effective and credible judicial
system.
"No, one, it should be stressed, should be allowed to
make a mockery of the justice system by, in one
breath, seeking its protection and even vindication
via an automatic review of a death sentence and,
in another breath, continuing to be a fugitive from
justice and repudiating the very authority of the
system whose protection he seeks and invokes."
We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our
existing jurisprudence mandating our review of all
death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the
convict and regardless of the will of the court.
Nothing less than life is at stake and any court
decision authorizing the State to take life must be as
error-free as possible. We must strive to realize this
objective, however, elusive it may be, and our
efforts must not depend on whether appellant has
withdrawn his appeal or has escaped. Indeed, an
appellant may withdraw his appeal not because
he is guilty but because of his wrong perception of
the law. Or because he may want to avail of the
more speedy remedy of pardon. Or because of his
frustration and misapprehension that he will not get
justice from the authorities. Nor should the Court be
influenced by the seeming repudiation of its
jurisdiction when a convict escapes. Ours is not only
the power but the duty to review all death penalty
cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is
bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of
a sacred duty which we have to discharge to
assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is
our concern not only in crimes that slight but even
more, in crimes that shock the conscience. This
concern cannot be diluted.
The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended,
approach" to heinous crimes for as discussed
above, we have always reviewed the imposition of
the death penalty regardless of the will of the
convict. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the
policy that the State should not be given the
license to kill without the final determination of this
Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last;
effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of
a one-judge trial court. This enlightened policy
ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking
of life ends all rights, a matter of societal concern
that transcends the personal interest of a convict.
The importance of this societal value should not be
blurred by the escape of a convict which is a
problem of law enforcement. Neither should this
Court be moved alone by the outrage of the public
in the multiplication of heinous crimes for our
decisions should not be directed by the changing
winds of the social weather. Let us not for a
moment forget that an accused does not cease to
have rights just because of his conviction. This
principle is implicit in our Constitution which
recognizes that an accused, even if he belongs to
a minority of one has the right to be right, while the
majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be
wrong.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the counsel for the accused is
given a new period of thirty (30) days from notice
hereof within which to file the Brief of the accused
Josefina A. Esparas.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and
Hermosisima, JJ ., concur.
Vitug, J ., concurs in the result.
(Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601,
October 12, 1998)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998.]
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
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AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 104, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS;
PROSCRIPTION AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING OR
INHUMAN PUNISHMENT; DEATH PER SE, NOT CRUEL,
DEGRADING OR INHUMAN. The death penalty
per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden vs.
Director of Prisons, this Court held that
"[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is
not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution .It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life."
2. ID; ID; ID; DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION,
CONSTITUTIONAL; INFLICTION OF PAIN, MERELY
INCIDENTAL. Any infliction of pain in lethal
injection is merely in carrying out the execution of
the death penalty and does not fall within the
constitutional prescription against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or
distress, and since punishment imports pain of
suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishment are cruel. But of course the Constitution
does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished." The cruelty against which the
Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty
inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any method
employed to extinguish life humanely.
3. ID.; ID.; REIMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY DOES
NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS.
Petitioner assiduously argues that the
reimposition of the death penalty law violates our
international obligations, in particular, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which was adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on December 16, 1966, signed
and ratified by the Philippines on December 19,
1966 and October 23, 1986, respectively.
Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the
individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of
the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital
punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to
life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for
the "most serious crimes." On the other hand, the
Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the
Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The
Philippines neither signed nor ratified said
document. Evidently, petitioner's assertion of our
obligation under Second Optional Protocol is
misplaced.
4. POLITICAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS;
CONSTRUED. The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government.
It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in the framing of our Constitution.
each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. ACETSa
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; NON-DELEGATION OF
POWERS; EXCEPTIONS. Corollary to the doctrine
of separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has
been delegated, cannot be delegated or as
expressed in Latin maxim: potestas delegata non
delegari potest." The recognized exceptions to the
rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to
the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers
to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of
the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at
large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and (5)
Delegation of administrative bodies.
6. ID.; DELEGATION OF POWERS; REQUISITES.
Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. aEHASI
7. ID.; ID.; R.A. 8177, VALID DELEGATION OF
AUTHORITY TO SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction
with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and
regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a
form of delegation of legislative authority to
administrative bodies. Considering the scope and
the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed
the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the
Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what
job must be done, who is to do it and what is the
scope of his authority. R.A No. 8177 likewise provides
the standards which define the legislative policy,
marks its limits, map out its boundaries and specify
the public agencies which will apply it. Thus, the
Court finds that the existence of an area for
exercise of discretion by the Secretary of Justice
and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under
delegated legislative power is proper where
standards are formulated for the guidance and the
exercise of limited discretion, which though general,
are capable of reasonable application. A careful
reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no
undue delegation of legislative power from the
Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections for the simple reason that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of
Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the
Department of Justice. Further, the Department of
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Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of
the "administration of correctional system." Hence,
the import of the phraseology of the law is that the
Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the
Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the
Department of Health. CaAIES
8. ID.; ID.; RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT
R.A. No. 8177, AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWER.
The Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic
Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be
overlooked. the Court finds in the first paragraph of
Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically
abdicated the power to promulgate the manual
on the execution procedure to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode
of review and approval thereof. Being a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the
Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as
the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such
apparent abdication of departmental responsibility
renders the said paragraph invalid. As to the
second paragraph of Section 19, the Court finds
the requirement of confidentiality of the contents of
the manual even with respect to the convict unduly
suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the
convict, should he so desire, to obtain, a copy of
the manual. The contents of the manual are
matters of public concern, "which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."
9. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREE ACCESS TO
INFORMATION OF PUBLIC CONCERN; A
RECOGNITION OF ESSENTIALITY OF THE FREE FLOW
OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION. The incorporation
in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to
information of public concern is a recognition of
the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and
information in a democracy. In the same way that
free discussion enables members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their time, access to
information of general interest aids the people in
democratic decision-making by giving them a
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the
nation. caIDSH
10. ID.; DELEGATION OF POWER; RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. No. 8177; SECTION
17 THEREOF ADDING A GROUND FOR SUSPENSION
OF DEATH SENTENCE, DISCRIMINATORY. While
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends
the implementation of the death penalty while a
woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after
delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits
the one (1) year period following delivery as an
instance when the death sentence is suspended,
and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no
longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve
after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in
petitioner's review, tantamount to a gender-based
discrimination sans statutory basis, while the
omission is an impermissible contravention of the
applicable law.
11. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
AND REGULATIONS; CANNOT SUPPLANT OR MODIFY
LAW; CASE AT BAR. Being merely an
implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not
override, but instead remain consistent and in
harmony with the law it seeks to apply and
implement. Administrative rules and regulations are
intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to
modify, the law. An administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress. In case of discrepancy
between a provision of statute and a rule or
regulation issued to implement said statute, the
statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause in
Section 17 which suspends the execution of a
woman within the three years (3) next following the
date of sentence finds no support in Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended, perforce
Section 17 must be declared invalid. ETAICc
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed 1 the
conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the
crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him
of the death penalty for the said crime. LexLib
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration
raising mainly factual issues, and on its heels, a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for
the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 2 (the death penalty law)
and the imposition of the death penalty for the
crime of rape.
On February 7, 1998, this Court denied 3 petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration with a finding that
Congress duly complied with the requirements for
the reimposition of the death penalty and therefore
the death penalty law is not unconstitutional.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to
change the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, 4 and
passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE
METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24
OF Republic Act No. 7659. 5 Pursuant to the
provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice
promulgated the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing
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rules") 6 and directed the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
7
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition 8 for
Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice
and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying
out the execution by lethal injection of petitioner
under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as
these are unconstitutional and void for being: (a)
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per se
as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary,
unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a
violation of the Philippines' obligations under
international covenants, (d) an undue delegation
of legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful
exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to
legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of
delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed
a Motion for Leave of Court 9 to Amend and
Supplement Petition with the Amended and
Supplemental Petition 10 attached thereto,
invoking the additional ground of violation of equal
protection, and impleading the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
104, in order to enjoin said public respondents from
acting under the questioned rules by setting a date
for petitioner's execution.
On March 3, 1998, the Court resolved, without
giving due course to the petition, to require the
respondents to COMMENT thereon within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, and
directed the parties "to MAINTAIN the status quo
prevailing at the time of the filing of this petition."
On March 10, 1998, the Court granted the Motion
for Leave of Court to Amend and Supplement
Petition, and required respondents to COMMENT
thereon within ten (10) days from notice.
On March 16, 1998, petitioner filed a Very Urgent
Motion (1) To Clarify Status Quo Order, and (2) For
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
expressly enjoining public respondents from taking
any action to carry out petitioner's execution until
the petition is resolved.
On March 16, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General 11 filed a Comment (On the Petition and
the Amended Supplemental Petition) 12 stating
that (1) this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has
repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not
cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; (2)
execution by lethal injection, as authorized under
R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most
modern, more humane, more economical, safer
and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas
chamber); (3) the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; (4) R.A.
No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to
respondent Director; and that (5) R.A. No. 8177
confers the power to promulgate the implementing
rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health
and the Bureau of Corrections.
On March 17, 1998, the Court required the
petitioner to file a REPLY thereto within a non-
extendible period of ten days from notice.
On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human
Rights 13 filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae 14 with
the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear
as Amicus Curiae 15 alleging that the death
penalty imposed under R.A. NO. 7659 which is to be
implemented by R.A. No. 8177 is cruel, degrading
and outside the limits of civil society standards, and
further invoking (a) Article II, Section 11 of the
Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights."; (b) Article III of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states
that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person," and Article V thereof, which
states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."; (c) The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, in particular, Article 6
thereof, and the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Aiming At The Abolition of The Death Penalty; (d)
Amnesty International statistics showing that as of
October 1996, 58 countries have abolished the
death penalty for all crimes, 15 countries have
abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes,
and 26 countries are abolitionists de facto, which
means that they have retained the death penalty
for ordinary crimes but are considered abolitionists
in practice in that they have not executed anyone
during the past ten (10) years or more, or in that
they have made an international commitment not
to carry out executions, for a total of 99 countries
which are total abolitionists in law or practice, and
95 countries as retentionists; 16 and (e) Pope John
Paul II's encyclical, "Evangelium Vitae." In a
Resolution dated April 3, 1998, the Court duly noted
the motion.
On March 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Reply 17
stating that (1) this Court is not barred from
exercising judicial review over the death penalty
per se, the death penalty for rape and lethal
injection as a mode of carrying out the death
penalty; (2) capital punishment is a cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment; (3) lethal
injection is cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment, and that being the "most modern"
does not make it less cruel or more humane, and
that the Solicitor General's "aesthetic" criteria is
short-sighted, and that lethal injection is not risk free
nor is it easier to implement; and (4) the death
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penalty violates the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights considering that the Philippines
participated in the deliberations of and voted for
the Second Optional Protocol.
After deliberating on the pleadings, the Court gave
due course to the petition, which it now resolves on
the merits.
In the Amended and Supplemental Petition,
petitioner assails the constitutionality of the mode of
carrying out his death sentence by lethal injection
on the following grounds: 18
I.
DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FOR BEING A CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN
PUNISHMENT.
II.
THE DEATH PENALTY VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,
WHICH IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.
III.
LETHAL INJECTION, AS AUTHORIZED UNDER Republic
Act No. 8177 AND THE QUESTIONED RULES, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS AN UNNECESSARY
AND WANTON INFLICTION OF PAIN ON A PERSON
AND IS, THUS, A CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND INHUMAN
PUNISHMENT.
IV.
Republic Act No. 8177 UNDULY DELEGATES
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
V.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED
THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER
Republic Act No. 8177 T O RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
VI.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY
DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER Republic Act No. 8177
AND UNLAWFULLY USURPED THE POWER TO
LEGISLATE IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED
RULES.
VII.
SECTION 17 OF THE QUESTIONED RULES IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AS
WELL AS FOR BEING AN INVALID EXERCISE BY
RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF THE POWER TO
LEGISLATE.
VIII.
INJUNCTION MUST ISSUE TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE
DAMAGE AND INJURY TO PETITIONER'S RIGHTS BY
REASON OF THE EXISTENCE, OPERATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTE AND EQUALLY INVALID IMPLEMENTING
RULES.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177
and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our
international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue
delegation of legislative power, and (d) being
discriminatory.
The Court shall now proceed to discuss these issues
in seriatim.
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR
INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE
III OF THE 1987 Constitution
The main challenge to R.A. No. 8177 and its
implementing rules is anchored on Article III, Section
19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the
imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman"
punishment. "The prohibition in the Philippine Bill
against cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-
Saxon safeguard against governmental oppression
of the subject, which made its first appearance in
the reign of William and Mary of England in 'An Act
declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and
settling the succession of the crown,' passed in the
year 1689. It has been incorporated into the
Constitution of the United States (of America) and
into most constitutions of the various States in
substantially the same language as that used in the
original statute. The exact language of the
Constitution of the United States is used in the
Philippine Bill." 19 "The counterpart of Section 19 (1)
in the 1935 Constitution reads: 'Excessive fines shall
not be imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment
inflicted.' . . . In the 1973 Constitution the phrase
became 'cruel or unusual punishment.' The Bill of
Rights Committee of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission read the 1973 modification as
prohibiting 'unusual' punishment even if not 'cruel.' It
was thus seen as an obstacle to experimentation in
penology. Consequently, the Committee reported
out the present text which prohibits 'cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment' as more
consonant with the meaning desired and with
jurisprudence on the subject." 20
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection
constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails
to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out
lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering
said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and
its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date
of execution, time of notification, the court which
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will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties
cause the greatest pain and suffering for the
convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched
executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs
renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Before the Court proceeds any further, a brief
explanation of the process of administering lethal
injection is in order.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is
strapped on a hospital gurney and wheeled into
the execution room. A trained technician inserts a
needle into a vein in the inmate's arm and begins
an intravenous flow of saline solution. At the
warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is
injected into the intravenous line. The deadly
concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a
nonlethal dose of sodium thiopenthotal, a sleep
inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of
pancuronium bromide, a drug that paralyzes the
muscles; and (3) potassium chloride, which stops
the heart within seconds. The first two drugs are
commonly used during surgery to put the patient to
sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in heart
bypass surgery. 21
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death
penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. 22 In the oft-cited case of Harden v.
Director of Prisons, 23 this Court held that
"[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is
not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in
particularity then as to the details involved in the
execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel,
degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For
reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing
details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are
properly left to the competence and expertise of
administrative officials. 24
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 25 of R.A. No. 8177
is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and
date of execution, and the date of execution and
time of notification of the death convict. As
petitioner already knows, the "court" which
designates the date of execution is the trial court
which convicted the accused, that is, after this
Court has reviewed the entire records of the case
26 and has affirmed the judgment of the lower
court. Thereupon, the procedure is that the
"judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its
promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records
are remanded to the court below including a
certified copy of the judgment for execution." 27
Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of
execution nor the time of notification. As to the
date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing
rules must be read in conjunction with the last
sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which
provides that the death sentence shall be carried
out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later than
eighteen (18) months after the judgment has
become final and executory, without prejudice to
the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death
convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executory 28 wherein he
can seek executive clemency 29 and attend to all
his temporal and spiritual affairs. 30
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of
"wanton pain" in case of possible complications in
the intravenous injection, considering and as
petitioner claims, that respondent Director is an
untrained and untested person insofar as the
choice and administration of lethal injection is
concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. Such
supposition is highly speculative and
unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented
evidence that lethal injection requires the expertise
only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel
and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or
ineffective. 31 Petitioner simply cites situations in the
United States wherein execution by lethal injection
allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing
death for the convict, 32 without any other
evidence whatsoever. cdrep
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third
paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings
should be trained prior to the performance of such
task. We must presume that the public officials
entrusted with the implementation of the death
penalty (by lethal injection) will carefully avoid
inflicting cruel punishment. 33
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is
merely incidental in carrying out the execution of
the death penalty and does not fall within the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or
distress, and since punishment imports pain or
suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishments are cruel. But of course the
Constitution does not mean that crime, for this
reason, is to go unpunished." 34 The cruelty against
which the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not
the necessary suffering involved in any method
employed to extinguish life humanely. 35 Numerous
federal and state courts of the United States have
been asked to review whether lethal injections
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. No court
has found lethal injections to implicate prisoners'
Eighth Amendment rights. In fact, most courts that
have addressed the issue state in one or two
sentences that lethal injection clearly is a
constitutional form of execution. 36 A few
jurisdictions, however, have addressed the merits of
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the Eighth Amendment claims. Without exception,
these courts have found that lethal injection does
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. After
reviewing medical evidence that indicates that
improper doses or improper administration of the
drugs causes severe pain and that prison officials
tend to have little training in the administration of
the drugs, the courts have found that the few
minutes of pain does not rise to a constitutional
violation. 37
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice"
and "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 38 Indeed, "[o]ther (U.S.) courts
have focused on 'standards of decency' finding
that the widespread use of lethal injections
indicates that it comports with contemporary
norms." 39 The primary indicator of society's
standard of decency with regard to capital
punishment is the response of the country's
legislatures to the sanction. 40 Hence, for as long as
the death penalty remains in our statute books and
meets the most stringent requirements provided by
the Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the
legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality we
duly sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. We
find that the legislature's substitution of the mode of
carrying out the death penalty from electrocution
to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of
petitioner herein.
II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES
NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner assiduously argues that the reimposition of
the death penalty law violates our international
obligations, in particular, the International
Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, which was
adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on December 16, 1966, signed and ratified
by the Philippines on December 19, 1966 and
October 23, 1986, 41 respectively.
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provides:
"1. Every human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only
for the most serious crimes in accordance with the
law in force at the time of the commission of the
crime and not contrary to the provisions of the
present Covenant and to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court." (emphasis supplied)
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of
genocide, it is understood that nothing in this article
shall authorize any State Party to the present
Covenant to derogate in any way from any
obligation assumed under the provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right
to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence
of death may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years
of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or
to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by
any State Party to the present Covenant."
Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the
individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of
the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital
punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to
life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for
the "most serious crimes". Pursuant to Article 28 of
the Covenant, a Human Rights Committee was
established and under Article 40 of the Covenant,
States Parties to the Covenant are required to
submit an initial report to the Committee on the
measures they have adopted which give effect to
the rights recognized within the Covenant and on
the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights
within one year of its entry into force for the State
Party concerned and thereafter, after five years.
On July 27, 1982, the Human Rights Committee
issued General Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6
of the Covenant stating that "(while) it follows from
Article 6 (2) to (6) that State parties are not obliged
to abolish the death penalty totally, they are
obliged to limit its use and, in particular, to abolish it
for other than the 'most serious crimes.' Accordingly,
they ought to consider reviewing their criminal laws
in this light and, in any event, are obliged to restrict
the application of the death penalty to the most
serious crimes.' The article strongly suggests (pars. 2
(2) and (6)) that abolition is desirable. . . . The
Committee is of the opinion that the expression
'most serious crimes' must be read restrictively to
mean that the death penalty should be a quite
exceptional measure." Further, The Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing the Death
Penalty 42 adopted by the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations declare that the
ambit of the term 'most serious crimes' should not
go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or other
extremely grave consequences.
The Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
December 16, 1966, and signed and ratified by the
Philippines on December 19, 1966 and August 22
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1989, 43 respectively. The Optional Protocol
provides that the Human Rights Committee shall
receive and consider communications from
individuals claiming to be victims of violations of
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty
was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed
nor ratified said document. 44 Evidently, petitioner's
assertion of our obligation under the Second
Optional Protocol is misplaced.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER IN R.A. No. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. No. 8177 IS
INVALID.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle
in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in the
framing of our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters
placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere. 45 Corollary to the doctrine of
separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has
been delegated, cannot be delegated or as
expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non
delegari potest." 46 The recognized exceptions to
the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President
under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the
President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 47
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction
with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and
regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a
form of delegation of legislative authority to
administrative bodies.
The reason for delegation of authority to
administrative agencies is the increasing complexity
of the task of government requiring expertise as well
as the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected
to attend to by itself. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. On many
problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the needed competence
to provide the required direct and efficacious, not
to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them. 48
Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate 49 and (b) fix a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. 50
Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A.
No. 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out
the death penalty, the Court finds that the law
sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is
to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. 51
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which
define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out
its boundaries, and specify the public agencies
which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative purpose may be carried
out. 52 R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "[t]he
death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the
sentence during the lethal injection as well as
during the proceedings prior to the execution." 53
Further, "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections
shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to
be administered is sufficient to cause the
instantaneous death of the convict." 54 The
legislature also mandated that "all personnel
involved in the administration of lethal injection shall
be trained prior to the performance of such task."
55 The Court cannot see that any useful purpose
would be served by requiring greater detail. 56 The
question raised is not the definition of what
constitutes a criminal offense, 57 but the mode of
carrying out the penalty already imposed by the
Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently
definite and the exercise of discretion by the
administrative officials concerned is, to use the
words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area
for exercise of discretion by the Secretary of Justice
and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under
delegated legislative power is proper where
standards are formulated for the guidance and the
exercise of limited discretion, which though general,
are capable of reasonable application. 58
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It is also noteworthy that Article 81 of the Revised
Penal Code which originally provided for the death
penalty by electrocution was not subjected to
attack on the ground that it failed to provide for
details such as the kind of chair to be used, the
amount of voltage, volume of amperage or place
of attachment of electrodes on the death convict.
Hence, petitioner's analogous argument with
respect to lethal injection must fail.
A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that
there is no undue delegation of legislative power
from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that
under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau
of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the
Department of Justice. 59 Further, the Department
of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge
of the "administration of the correctional system." 60
Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is
that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections in
promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in
consultation with the Department of Health. 61
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement
Republic Act No. No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that
could not be overlooked. To begin with, something
basic appears missing in Section 19 of the
implementing rules which provides:
"SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. Details of the
procedure prior to, during and after administering
the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to
be prepared by the Director. The manual shall
contain details of, among others, the sequence of
events before and after execution; procedures in
setting up the intravenous line; the administration of
the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and
the removal of the intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution
shall be limited to authorized prison personnel."
Thus, the Court finds in the first paragraph of Section
19 of the implementing rules a veritable vacuum.
The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated
the power to promulgate the manual on the
execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of
review and approval thereof. Being a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the
Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as
the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such
apparent abdication of departmental responsibility
renders the said paragraph invalid.
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the
Court finds the requirement of confidentiality of the
contents of the manual even with respect to the
convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal
impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to
obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the
manual are matters of public concern "which the
public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen." 62 Section 7 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as a basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitation as
may be provided by law."
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee
of access to information of public concern is a
recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of
ideas and information in a democracy. 63 In the
same way that free discussion enables members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their time, 64
access to information of general interest aids the
people in democratic decision-making 65 by giving
them a better perspective of the vital issues
confronting the nation. 66
D. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
IMPLEMENT R.A. No. 8177 IS INVALID FOR BEING
DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
Even more seriously flawed than Section 19 is
Section 17 of the implementing rules which
provides:
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE
DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection
shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the
three years next following the date of the sentence
or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over
seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the
death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is
unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as
for being an invalid exercise of the power to
legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists
that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express
amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. NO. 7659.
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by section 25 of R.A. NO. 7659 now reads as follows:
"ART. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death
sentence. The death sentence shall not be
inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or
within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any
person over seventy years of age. In this last case,
the death sentence shall be commuted to the
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imprisonment of Debt
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalty provided in Article 40. . .".
On this point, the Court finds petitioner's contention
impressed with merit. While Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the
death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within
one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the
implementing rules omits the one (1) year period
following delivery as an instance when the death
sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for
suspension of sentence no longer found under
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended,
which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is
sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans
statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible
contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17
aforecited must not override, but instead remain
consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to
apply and implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to
supplant nor to modify, the law." 67 An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress. 68 In case of discrepancy between a
provision of statute and a rule or regulation issued
to implement said statute, the statutory provision
prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which
suspends the execution of a woman within the
three (3) years next following the date of sentence
finds no support in Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended, perforce Section 17 must be
declared invalid.
One member of the Court voted to declare
Republic Act No. 8177 as unconstitutional insofar as
it delegates the power to make rules over the same
subject matter to two persons (the Secretary of
Justice and the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections) and constitutes a violation of the
international norm towards the abolition of the
death penalty. One member of the Court,
consistent with his view in People v. Echegaray, 267
SCRA 682, 734-758 (1997) that the death penalty
law (Republic Act No. 7659) is itself unconstitutional,
believes that Republic Act No. 8177 which provides
for the means of carrying out the death sentence, is
likewise unconstitutional. Two other members of the
court concurred in the aforesaid Separate Opinions
in that the death penalty law (Republic Act No.
7659) together with the assailed statute (Republic
Act No. 8177) are unconstitutional. In sum, four
members of the Court voted to declare Republic
Act No. 8177 as unconstitutional. These Separate
Opinions are hereto annexed, infra.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as
petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute
(Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but
GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared
INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of Republic Act. No. 7659; and (b)
Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval
of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of
Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual
confidential, hence unavailable to interested
parties including the accused/convict and counsel.
Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing
and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the
aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177
are appropriately amended, revised and/or
corrected in accordance with this Decision.
NO COSTS. Cdpr
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ ., concur.
Pardo, J ., took no part.
Narvasa, C .J ., on official leave.
(Serafin v. Lindayag, A.M. No. 297-MJ, September
30, 1975)
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 297-MJ. September 30, 1975.]
AVELINA SERAFIN, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL
JUDGE SANTIAGO LINDAYAG, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Despite the fact that the criminal complaint for
estafa against complainant did not charge on its
face any crime but merely recited complainant's
failure to pay a simple indebtedness of P1,500, that
the supporting statements showed that the
complaint was about a simple debt of P1,500
borrowed by complainant which she failed to pay
despite her promise to do so, and that the notes
taken during the preliminary examination showed
that there was no vestige of the essential elements
of estafa as provided in Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, respondent judge admitted the
"criminal complaint" and issued the corresponding
warrant of arrest. By reason thereof, complainant
filed an administrative complaint against
respondent which was endorsed by the executive
judge to the Department of Justice. The latter
forwarded the complaint to the Supreme Court,
which has administrative supervision over all courts
and the power to discipline and dismiss judges
under the 1973 Constitution. Referred for further
investigation, the administrative complaint with its
documentary evidence was found to be amply
substantiated.
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imprisonment of Debt
The Supreme Court, finding respondent guilty as
charged aggravated by the latter's submission of
spurious evidence i e., the alleged complaint and
the purported notes on preliminary examination to
cover up his liability, dismissed respondent from
office and directed the endorsement of the original
and amended complaints to the National Bureau
of Investigation to determine the genuineness of
the signatures and to file the proper criminal
proceedings when warranted.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIARY ACT (R.A. NO. 296); WARRANT OF
ARREST; ISSUANCE. The Judiciary Act, Republic
Act no. 296, precisely requires in section 87 thereof
that "(N)o warrant of arrest shall be issued by any
municipal judge in any criminal case filed with him
unless he first examines the witness or witnesses
personally, and the examination shall be under
oath and reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers."
2. ID.; ID.; ISSUANCE THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR A
BETRAYAL OF OATH OF OFFICE. Where
respondent utterly failed to comply with the
requirement of searching questions and answers in
examining the complaining witness and worse the
one question propounded by him shows that he did
comprehend that the "criminal" complaint involved
a mere failure to pay a simple indebtedness and
yet found probable cause of the complainant's
guilt of estafa and forthwith issued the warrant of
arrest against complainant indicating that either he
believed that non-payment of an indebtedness
constitutes the crime of estafa which would make
him guilty of gross ignorance of the law or although
knowing the law, of nevertheless, disregarding it
and giving due course to the town police chief's
"prosecution" on behalf of the municipal secretary,
his actuations constitute an utter betrayal of his
oath of office to render justice to every man.
3. JUDGES; DISMISSAL; SUBMISSION OF SPURIOUS
EVIDENCE SHOWS RESPONDENT'S UNWORTHINESS
FOR OFFICE. Respondent's crass attempt at
exculpation and cover-up by the submission of
spurious evidence, i.e., an amended complaint
allegedly signed by the Chief of Police and the
purported notes on the preliminary examination, as
supposed records of the criminal case, is more
reprehensible than the estafa charged under the
complaint and shows respondent's unworthiness for
the office, calling for his dismissal.
4. ID.; ID.; IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. A judge who
disregards deliberately or is ignorant of the basic
fundamentals of the law and justice is unfit to
continue in office.
DECISION
TEEHANKEE, J p:
The Court finds from the documentary evidence
and established facts of the case that respondent
municipal judge grossly failed to perform his duties
properly and is unfit for the office and therefore
orders his separation from the service. It is self-
evident from the very face of the "criminal
complaint" for estafa, and the supporting sworn
statements filed with and sworn to before him as
well as the very notes of preliminary examination
taken by him that the "criminal" charge against
complainant showed no vestige of the essential
elements of estafa but simply recited complainant's
failure to pay the creditors as alleged offended
parties a simple indebtedness. Respondent judge's
subsequent crass attempt at exculpation by the
submission of spurious evidence to cover up his
liability is more reprehensible than his guilt under the
charge and shows his unworthiness for the office.
Complainant originally filed on October 19, 1971
with the Secretary of Justice the instant
administrative complaint for capricious and
malicious admission in his court of a criminal
complaint for estafa against complainant and
causing her wrongful arrest and detention, against
respondent Santiago Lindayag, municipal judge of
Guiguinto, Bulacan. On December 28, 1971, then
Executive Judge Andres Sta. Maria to whom the
administrative complaint had been referred sent his
indorsement to the Department of Justice
recommending the exoneration of respondent on
the ground that complainant, assisted by her
counsel, had filed a motion to withdraw her
complaint.
No further action was taken until January 29, 1973
when the Department of Justice forwarded the
record of the case to this Court. After the transfer to
this Court of the power of administrative supervision
over all inferior courts with the power to discipline
and dismiss judges under the 1973 Constitution, 1
the Court, in view of the gravity of the charges as
borne out by the documentary evidence, referred
anew on October 29, 1973 the complaint to the
District Judge of Baliwag, Bulacan for investigation
and report, notwithstanding the previously reported
withdrawal of the complaint. The Court per its
Resolution of December 19, 1973 denied
respondent's petition to "consider the matter closed
and terminated" by virtue of the previous
recommendation in 1971 of Judge Sta. Maria and
directed the District Judge to proceed with the
investigation.
On February 11, 1974, the Court received the overly
long and detailed 34-page (single-space) report 2
of the investigation conducted by Judge Juan F.
Echiverri of the Baliwag court of first instance. The
complaint with its documentary evidence, the
Investigator's Report and record of the proceedings
and the evidence of record amply substantiate the
complaint, notwithstanding complainant's
desistance because the afterwards took pity on
respondent and no longer wanted to be involved in
the case, as manifested by her when she appeared
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imprisonment of Debt
at the hearing and submitted the documentary
evidence supporting her complaint, pursuant to the
process issued by the Investigating Judge for her
attendance.
The criminal complaint for estafa against
complainant (docketed as Criminal Case No. 1602)
was filed on July 21, 1971 with respondent judge by
then Guiguinto chief of police Juan P. Estrella at the
instance of Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal
secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza. Said
complaint sworn to by said police chief before
respondent judge on its face does not charge any
crime but merely recites complainant's failure to
pay a simple indebtedness, thus:
"That on or about the 20th day of July 1971, in the
Municipality of Guiguinto, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines and within the preliminary jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent of gain did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously owe the sum of ONE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, that said amount has long
been due since January 28, 1971 and Mrs. Avelina
N. Serafin failed to pay her account in spite of due
notice sent by registered mail and up to the present
she failed to settle her obligation." 3
The supporting statements 4 executed and sworn to
by the Mendoza spouses as offended parties
before respondent judge likewise show on their very
face that their complaint was about a simple debt
of P1,500.00 borrowed by complainant from Mrs.
Mendoza and which she had failed to repay
despite her promise to do so by January and
February, 1971. (Both sworn statements recite that
complainant borrowed the amount "ay umutang
. . . si ginang Avelina N. Serafin" and did not pay the
same.).
The notes taken during the preliminary examination
conducted by respondent 5 , consisting of seven
simple questions propounded by police chief
Estrella as "private prosecutor" and of seven simple
answers thereto given by Carmelito Mendoza show
beyond doubt that there is no vestige of the
essential elements of estafa as provided in Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code but that they had
simply lent complainant the sum of P1,500.00
without any collateral or security because
complainant was an old friend ("sapagkat matagal
na naming siyang kaibigan"), that they believe her
to be a good person ("at ang paniwala namin ay
mabuti siyong tao") and that when they wrote her a
letter of demand, she promised to pay them and
said that if she failed to keep her promise, they
could get her valuable things at her home.
In the same notes of preliminary examination, there
is recorded as one "searching question and (sic)
provided for by Republic Act sec. (sic) 6" 6 what
appears to be respondent's question as to whether
complainant had paid the money taken by her
and Mendoza's answer in the negative, stating that
such non-payment was the reason why they filed
the complaint so that she would be punished! 7
In admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was
plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the
complaint and the "evidence" presented, and
issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon
his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent
grossly failed to perform his duties properly - which
in this instance was to dismiss the complaint outright
since it is elementary that non-payment of an
indebtedness is not a criminal act, much less estafa;
and that no one may be criminally charged and
punished for non-payment of a loan of a sum of
money.
In recklessly issuing the warrant of arrest on July 22,
1971, respondent further enabled police chief
Estrella as "private prosecutor" of complainant's
creditors, the Mendozas, to avail of the despicable
practice of some police officers to use the warrant
as a means of harassment and serve it on Saturdays
when the person arrested cannot raise bail, as in
fact complainant was arrested on a Saturday, July
25, 1971 at a time when the bonding companies
were closed for business and she consequently had
to undergo the humiliation of being detained for
three days in the municipal jail up to July 28, 1971
when she finally succeeded in putting up the
P1,000.-bail bond fixed for her release. 8
A modicum of circumspection on the part of
respondent could have easily prevented such an
injustice and trampling upon of the complainant's
basic rights. Indeed, two months afterwards, upon
the merit of complainant's counsel's motion to
quash the criminal complaint (which motion,
however, somehow and notably got lost from the
record of the case, infra) respondent in an Order
dated September 30, 1971 ultimately found the
quashal motion as "well taken" and ordered the
dismissal of the case.
The Judiciary Act, Republic Act No. 296, precisely
requires in section 87 thereof that "(N)o warrant of
arrest shall be issued by any municipal judge in any
criminal case filed with him unless he first examines
the witness or witnesses personally, and the
examination shall be under oath and reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and
answers." Respondent utterly failed to comply with
this requirement of searching questions and
answers in his examination of the complaining
witness.
Worse, the one question propounded by him shows
that he did comprehend that the "criminal"
complaint involved a mere failure to pay a simple
indebtedness and yet he found probable cause of
the herein complainant's guilt of estafa and
forthwith issued the warrant of arrest against her
which would indicate that either he believed that
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imprisonment of Debt
non-payment of an indebtedness constitutes the
crime of estafa which would make him guilty of
gross ignorance of the law or although knowing the
law, of nevertheless disregarding it and giving due
course to the town police chief's "prosecution" on
behalf of the municipal secretary which would
constitute an utter betrayal of his oath of office to
render justice to every man.
It should also be noted that the Court directed the
Investigating Judge to include in his report of
investigation certified true copies of the complete
records of the criminal case thus filed against
complainant This could not be wholly complied
with, due to the loss of some of the records of the
said Criminal Case No. 1602, attributed by
respondent to damage wrought by the 1972 floods.
Strangely enough, however, the motion to quash
filed by complainant through counsel which was
eventually granted by respondent after two months
was allegedly never found. Said motion to quash
would have been most likely on the self-evident
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense since no evidence whatever was presented
by herein complainant in support thereof and
respondent's order of September 30, 1971 granting
the same and dismissing the case made no
mention of any counter-evidence from
complainant but simply granted the same as
"meritorious and well-taken". 9 If so, the motion to
quash would have further reinforced the complaint
that respondent either out of ignorance or partiality
and malice issued the baseless warrant of arrest.
Respondent, notwithstanding the hearing given him
on September 12, 1974, by the Court and a further
opportunity to submit a memorandum which was
filed by him on November 11, 1974, did never clarify
or explain to the Court's satisfaction this matter as
well as his other anomalous actions, as set forth in
this decision.
The alleged loss of some records of the case
furthermore furnished respondent the occasion to
include in the records of the case (as submitted by
him to the Investigator) a purported Amended
Complaint 10 allegedly executed and sworn to
before him by police chief Estrella on the same
date as the original criminal complaint (which
would introduce the element of estafa by alleging
that complainant borrowed the sum of P1,500.00
from the Mendozas on the promise to buy on their
behalf some ornamental lamps but that she
defrauded them, neither buying the lamps nor
returning the money) and another set of purported
notes of preliminary examination 11 based on the
Amended Complaint which respondent allegedly
conducted within 30 minutes of the examination
conducted by him as per the original notes of
preliminary examination, 12 supra, (which would
apparently justify his finding of probable cause and
issuance of the warrant of arrest) but both
documents were found by the Investigator to be
spurious. From an examination of the record and
the evidence, the Court finds in order the
Investigator's findings and conclusion, as follows:
"Indeed, the alleged amendment (Exh. 2) and the
Notes of the Preliminary Examination (Exhs. 1, 1-a, 1-
B, 1-c and 1-d) if admitted as genuine and
authentic part of the records of Crim. Case 1602
would find the charges of the complainant herein
entirely baseless. But, as indicated in pages 17-18
herein, even only a superficial examination of the
appearance and condition of these documents,
the manner it was probably treated and dirtied, the
alleged signature of Chief of Police Juan P. Estrella,
as well as the absence of 'staple-holes on the top
and sides of these documents' which are present in
the admitted genuine and authentic records of
said Crim. Case 1602, would lead us to the
inescapable conclusion that these Exhibits (1, 1-a,
1-b, 1-c, 1-d and 2) are definitely not genuine and
authentic parts of the records of Crim. Case No.
1602.
"It is conceivable that preliminary examinations of a
criminal case could take place within the space of
30 minutes after the first one was taken.
"Painful as it may be, we feel duty bound to
conclude and so find that respondent acted
whimsically, and capriciously in giving due course
to the estafa complaint (Exh. 1-D), and issuing the
warrant for the arrest of Avelina N. Serafin,
complainant herein, especially considering that
later on Sept. 30, 1971, said respondent found that
the Motion to Quash filed by counsel for the
accused was 'Meritorious and well taken the same
is granted' and consequently the case was
dismissed." 13
In the Court's view, such a crass attempt at
exculpation and cover-up by the submission of
spurious evidence as supposed records of the
criminal case is more reprehensible than his guilt
under the charge and shows his unworthiness for
the office.
A word as to then police chief Juan P. Estrella. The
Court has examined the two complaints allegedly
executed by him as of the same date, July 21, 1971
and fully concurs with the Investigator's observation
that a comparison of Estrella's alleged signature on
the purported Amended Complaint with his
admittedly genuine signature on the original
complaint (Exh. A and D) 14 would show that the
former alleged signature is "NOT GENUINE". 15
Respondent never presented Estrella at the
investigation to testify as to the authenticity of his
alleged signature or the alleged second preliminary
examination based on the purported Amended
Complaint. In respondent's memorandum
submitted to this Court on November 11, 1974, there
is, however, submitted as Annex "A" a photocopy of
an affidavit purportedly executed on September
30, 1974 by Estrella attesting to his having executed
an Amended Complaint and as to the genuineness
of his signature thereon, notwithstanding the
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imprisonment of Debt
evident dissimilarity and disparity thereof, to the
naked eye, with his admittedly genuine signature
on the original complaint. This matter shall be
referred to the National Bureau of Investigation for
the determination of the genuineness of said
signature on the purported Amended Complaint,
as now belatedly claimed by Estrella in his affidavit
and contrary to the Investigator's finding, which
claim if determined to be untrue, would warrant his
criminal prosecution.
This referral, however, can in no way affect the
disposition of the case at bar. Such belated
affidavit of Estrella can not be admitted at this
stage. Nevertheless, assuming that there were such
a purported amended complaint and a second
preliminary examination conducted by respondent
on the basis thereof, still a judge of discernment
and circumspection would have been wary of such
a second sworn complaint on the very same day
totally contradictory of the first complaint which
referred to a plain indebtedness and was manifestly
oblivious of the sacredness of an oath and
intended to make out a case of instant estafa
regardless of the true facts, as recited by the
alleged offended parties in their original sworn
statements and demand letter for payment.
Even prescinding from the aggravation of the
cover-up, the Court finds that the penalty of
dismissal is called for, in line with the precedents
and standards set by it.
In the analogous case of Carreon vs. Flores, 16 the
Court ordered therein respondent municipal judge's
separation from the service for having rendered a
verdict of conviction against therein complainant
for alleged theft of about a cavan of palay which
could in no way be factually or legally justified, in
that the essential elements of unlawful taking and
that the property stolen belonged to another were
lacking.
As stressed therein by the Court citing other
precedents, "(A) judge who disregards deliberately
or is ignorant of the basic fundamentals of law and
justice is unfit to continue in office. Respondent's
separation from the service is thus called for, in line
with the Court's action in Tadiar vs. Caces 17
(dismissing therein respondent judge for dereliction
of duty in resolving a motion to dismiss a criminal
case only after 18 months and failing to file the
same and serve a copy thereof on the prosecution)
and in Municipal Council of Casiguran Quezon vs.
Morales 18 (dismissing therein respondent judge for
unjustified absences from his station and being
'unmindful of the exigencies of the public service
and neglectful of his duties to the prejudice of the
residents of Casiguran')."
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby dismissed
from the office of municipal judge of Guiguinto,
Bulacan.

The Clerk of Court is directed to endorse to the
Chief, National Bureau of Investigation, the original
complaint and purported amended complaint
both allegedly executed by former Guiguinto chief
of police Juan P. Estrella as per his affidavit
submitted with respondent's memorandum of
November 11, 1974 as well as other pertinent
documents and exhibits for comparison and
determination of the genuineness of said signatures
and for the filing of the proper criminal prosecution
should the findings of the National Bureau of
Investigation so warrant.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, Acting C.J., Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio,
Muoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Makalintal, C.J. and Esguerra, J., are on official
leave.
(Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, L-66839-42,
71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13, 725765-67,
75789, December 18, 1986)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-63419. December 18, 1986.]
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the
HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as
City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. L-66839-42. December 18, 1986.]
LUZVIMINDA F. LOBATON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
GLICERIO L. CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding
Executive Judge, Branch V, Region IV, Regional Trial
Court, sitting at Lemery, Batangas, THE PROVINCIAL
FISCAL OF BATANGAS, and MARIA LUISA
TORDECILLA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 71654. December 18, 1986.]
ANTONIO DATUIN and SUSAN DATUIN, petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PANO, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch LXXXVIII,
HONORABLE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY,
respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 74524-25. December 18, 1986.]
OSCAR VIOLAGO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
JUDGE ERNANI C. PAO, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch LXXXVIII, HONORABLE CITY
FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
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imprisonment of Debt
[G.R. Nos. 75122-49. December 18, 1986.]
ELINOR ABAD, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 139, Makati and
FEDERICO L. MELOCOTTON, JR., in his capacity as
Trial Fiscal Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati,
respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 75812-13. December 18, 1986.]
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ VII and SYLVIA V. AGUILUZ,
spouses, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 154, now vacant but
temporarily presided by HONORABLE ASAALI S.
ISNANI, Branch 153, Court of First Instance of Pasig,
Metro Manila, respondent.
[G.R. Nos. 725765-67. December 18, 1986.]
LUIS M. HOJAS, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE SENEN
PENARANDA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XX, HONORABLE
JUDGE ALFREDO LAGAMON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch XXII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL NOLI T. CATHI,
City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City, respondents.
[G.R. No. 75789. December 18, 1986.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 52,
Manila and THELMA SARMIENTO, respondents.
R.R. Nogales Law Office for petitioner in G.R. No.
63419, G.R. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75812-13, G.R.
Nos. 75765-67 and counsel for respondent in G.R.
No. 75789.
Pio S. Canta for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 66839-42.
Hermogenes Datuin, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No.
71654.
Abinoja, Tabalingcos, Villalon & Associates for
petitioner in G.R. Nos. 75122-49.
The Solicitor General for respondent in G.R. No.
63419, G.R. Nos. 66839-42, G.R. No. 71654, G.R. Nos.
74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75122-49, G.R. Nos. 75812-13,
G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and counsel for petitioner in G.R.
No. 75789.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; B.P. 22 (BOUNCING CHECK
LAW); COVERS ALL KINDS OF CHECKS. The
language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all
kinds of checks, whether present dated or
postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-
existing obligations or given in mutual or
simultaneous exchange for something of value.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P.
22); ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE; PRIMA
FACIE PRESUMED BY REFUSAL OF DRAWEE TO PAY
UPON PRESENTMENT. An essential element of the
offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds
in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon
its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind
difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a
prima facie presumption of such knowledge where
payment of the check "is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such
bank when presented within ninety (90) days from
the date of the check.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SHALL NOT ARISE WHEN PAYMENT
IS MADE WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF
DISHONOR. To mitigate the harshness of the law
in its application, the statute provides that such
presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the
maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment
of the check by the bank or pays the holder the
amount of the check.
4. ID.; ID.; DISHONOR OF CHECK BY DRAWEE BANK;
PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF MAKING OR ISSUANCE OF
CHECK AND DUE PRESENTMENT THEREOF. Another
provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule
of evidence, provides that the introduction in
evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with
the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or
written thereon or attached thereto, giving the
reason therefore, shall constitute prima facie proof
of "the making or issuance of said check, and the
due presentment to the drawee for payment and
the dishonor thereof . . . for the reason written,
stamped or attached by the drawer on such
dishonored check." The presumptions being merely
prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to
present proof to the contrary to overcome the said
presumptions.
5. ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM ARTICLE 315,
Revised Penal Code. Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code defining the crime of estafa reads as
follows: "Article 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person
who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below shall be punished by . . . 2.
By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using
fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits; . . . (d) By postdating
a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation the offender knowing that at the time he
had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by
him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check without informing the payee of such
circumstances." The scope of paragraph 2 (d),
however, was deemed to exclude checks issued in
payment of pre-existing obligations. The rationale of
this interpretation is that in estafa, the deceit
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imprisonment of Debt
causing the defraudation must be prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. In
issuing a check as payment for a pre-existing debt,
the drawer does not derive any material benefit in
return or as consideration for its issuance. On the
part of the payee, he had already parted with his
money or property before the check is issued to
him, hence, he is not defrauded by means of any
"prior" or "simultaneous" deceit perpetrated on him,
by the drawer of the check.
6. ID.; ARTICLE 315, Revised Penal Code AS
AMENDED BY R.A. 4885; PAYMENT OF PRE-EXISTING
OBLIGATIONS NOT COVERED. Article 315, as
amended by Republic Act 4885, does not cover
checks issued in payment of pre-existing
obligations, again relying on the concept
underlying the crime of estafa through false
pretense or deceit - which is, that the deceit or false
pretense must be prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud.
7. ID.; BATASANG PAMBANSA 22 (BOUNCING
CHECK LAW;) THRUST OF LAW; PUNISHES ACT OF
MAKING OR ISSUING WORTHLESS CHECK AS AN
OFFENSE AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER. The gravamen
of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them is circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BATASANG PAMBANSA;
MAY PRESCRIBE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT FOR ACTS
INIMICAL TO PUBLIC WELFARE; MALUM PROHIBITUM.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the
legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of
a debt excontractu. But certainly it is within the
prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only
facts which the law can punish. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong, hence
not malum in se, but because of the harm that it
inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state
can do this in the exercise of its police power.
9. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; BATASANG PAMBANSA
22; VALID EXERCISE THEREOF; NOT REPUGNANT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL INHIBITION AGAINST
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT. The police power of
the state has been described as "the most essential,
insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it
to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society. It is power not emanating
from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent
in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that
man in organizing the state and imposing upon the
government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable individual
citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreason
able the enactment of such salutary measures to
ensure communal peace, safety, good order and
welfare." The enactment of B.P. 22 is a declaration
by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy,
the making and issuance of a worthless check is
deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions. The effect of the
issuance of a worthless checks transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in
the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. In sum, we find the enactment
of B.P. 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is
not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt.
10. ID.; B.P. 22; FREEDOM OF CONTRACT NOT
IMPAIRED CHECKS NOT CATEGORIZED AS
CONTRACTS. We find not valid ground to sustain
the contention that B.P. 22 impairs freedom of
contract. The freedom of contract which is
constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into
"lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene
public policy are not lawful. We must bear in mind
that checks can not be categorized as mere
contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in
this modern day and age, has become a
convenient substitute for money; it form part of the
banking system and therefore not entirely free from
the regulatory power of the state.
11. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW
DOES NOT PRECLUDE CLASSIFICATION OF
INDIVIDUALS; CASE AT BAR. Neither do we find
substance in the claim that the statute in question
denies equal protection of the laws or is
discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the
check, but not the payee. It is contended that the
payee is just as responsible for the crime as the
drawer of the check, since without the
indispensable participation of the payee by his
acceptance of the check there would be no
crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that,
to give equal protection, the law should punish
both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners'
posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the
clause "equal protection of the laws". The clause
does not preclude classification of individuals, who
may be accorded different treatment under the
law as long as the classification is not unreasonable
or arbitrary.
DECISION
YAP, J p:
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imprisonment of Debt
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing
Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is
the sole issue presented by these petitions for
decision. The question is definitely one of first
impression in our jurisdiction.
These petitions arose from cases involving
prosecution of offenses under the statute. The
defendants in those cases moved seasonably to
quash the informations on the ground that the acts
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute
being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by
the respondent trial courts, except in one case,
which is the subject of G.R. No. 75789, wherein the
trial court declared the law unconstitutional and
dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected
have come to us for relief.
As a threshold issue the former Solicitor General, in
his comment on the petitions, maintained the
posture that it was premature for the accused to
elevate to this Court the orders denying their
motions to quash, these orders being interlocutory.
While this is correct as a general rule, we have in
justifiable cases intervened to review the lower
court's denial of a motion to quash. 1 In view of the
importance of the issue involved here, there is no
doubt in our mind that the instant petitions should
be entertained and the constitutional challenge to
BP 22 resolved promptly, one way or the other, in
order to put to rest the doubts and uncertainty that
exist in legal and judicial circles and the general
public which have unnecessarily caused a delay in
the disposition of cases involving the enforcement
of the statute.
For the purpose of resolving the constitutional issue
presented here, we do not find it necessary to
delve into the specifics of the informations involved
in the cases which are the subject of the petitions
before us. 2 The language of BP 22 is broad enough
to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated
or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-
existing obligations or given in mutual or
simultaneous exchange for something of value.
I
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and
issues any check on account or for value, knowing
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of said check in full upon presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty
prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less
than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or
not less than the amount of the check nor more
than double said amount, but in no case to exceed
P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court. 3
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on
"any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank when he makes or draws
and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds
or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of
the check if presented within a period of ninety (90)
days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. 4
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge"
on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the
bank to cover the check upon its presentment.
Since this involves a state of mind difficult to
establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie
presumption of such knowledge where payment of
the check "is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check. 5 To mitigate the harshness of the law in
its application, the statute provides that such
presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the
maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment
of the check by the bank or pays the holder the
amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature
of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction
in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check
with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or
written thereon or attached thereto, giving the
reason therefor," shall constitute prima facie proof
of "the making or issuance of said check, and the
due presentment to the drawee for payment and
the dishonor thereof . . . for the reason written,
stamped or attached by the drawee on such
dishonored check." 6
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is
open to the accused of course to present proof to
the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
II
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the
practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e.
checks that end up being rejected or dishonored
for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is
proscribed by the state because of the injury it
causes to the public interests.
Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions already
existed in our statute books which penalize the
issuance of bouncing or rubber checks. Criminal
law has dealth with the problem within the context
of crimes against property punished as "estafa" or
crimes involving fraud and deceit. The focus of
these penal provisions is on the damage caused to
the property rights of the victim.
The Penal Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines from 1887 until it was replaced by the
Revised Penal Code in 1932, contained provisions
penalizing, among others, the act of defrauding
another through false pretenses. Art. 335 punished a
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imprisonment of Debt
person who defrauded another "by falsely
pretending to possess any power, influence,
qualification, property, credit, agency or business,
or by means of similar deceit." Although no explicit
mention was made therein regarding checks, this
provision was deemed to cover within its ambit the
issuance of worthless or bogus checks in exchange
for money. 7
In 1926, an amendment was introduced by the
Philippine Legislature, which added a new clause
(paragraph 10) to Article 335 of the old Penal
Code, this time referring in explicit terms to the
issuance of worthless checks. The amendment
penalized any person who: 1) issues a check in
payment of a debt or for other valuable
consideration, knowing at the time of its issuance
that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank
to cover its amount, or 2) maliciously signs the
check differently from his authentic signature as
registered at the bank in order that the latter would
refuse to honor it; or 3) issues a postdated check
and, at the date set for its payment, does not have
sufficient deposit to cover the same. 8
In 1932, as already adverted to, the old Penal Code
was superseded by the Revised Penal Code. 9 The
above provisions, in amended form, were
incorporated in Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code defining the crime of estafa. The revised text
of the provision read as follows:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses
or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of other similar deceits;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation the offender knowing
that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the
funds deposited by him were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check without informing the
payee of such circumstances."
The scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was
deemed to exclude checks issued in payment of
pre-existing obligations. 10 The rationale of this
interpretation is that in estafa, the deceit causing
the defraudation must be prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of the fraud. In issuing a check
as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer
does not derive any material benefit in return or as
consideration for its issuance. On the part of the
payee, he had already parted with his money or
property before the check is issued to him, hence,
he is not defrauded by means of any "prior" or
"simultaneous" deceit perpetrated on him by the
drawer of the check.
With the intention of remedying the situation and
solving the problem of how to bring checks issued in
payment of pre-existing debts within the ambit of
Art. 315, an amendment was introduced by the
Congress of the Philippines in 1967, 11 which was
enacted into law as Republic Act No. 4885, revising
the aforesaid proviso to read as follows:
"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the
bank and/or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act."
However, the adoption of the amendment did not
alter the situation materially. A divided Court held in
People vs. Sabio, Jr. 12 that Article 315, as
amended by Republic Act 4885, does not cover
checks issued in payment of pre-existing
obligations, again relying on the concept
underlying the crime of estafa through false
pretenses or deceit which is, that the deceit or
false pretense must be prior to or simultaneous with
the commission of the fraud.
Since statistically it had been shown that the
greater bulk of dishonored checks consisted of
those issued in payment of pre-existing debts, 13
the amended provision evidently failed to cope
with the real problem and to deal effectively with
the evil that it was intended to eliminate or
minimize.
With the foregoing factual and legal antecedents
as a backdrop, the then Interim Batasan
confronted the problem squarely. It opted to take a
bold step and decided to enact a law dealing with
the problem of bouncing or worthless checks,
without attaching the law's umbilical cord to the
existing penal provisions on estafa. BP 22 addresses
the problem directly and frontally and makes the
act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
14
The question now arises: Is BP 22 a valid law?
Previous efforts to deal with the problem of
bouncing checks within the ambit of the law on
estafa did not evoke any constitutional challenge.
In contrast, BP 22 was challenged promptly.
Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22
insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision
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imprisonment of Debt
forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs
freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal
protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative
and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is
flawed in that during its passage the Interim
Batasan violated the constitutional provision
prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.
The constitutional challenge to BP 22 posed by
petitioners deserves a searching and thorough
scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by
the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what
has been described as "the highest and most
delicate function which belongs to the judicial
department of the government." 15
As we enter upon the task of passing on the validity
of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of
the government, we need not be reminded of the
time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our
jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be
valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor
of its constitutionality. This is not to say that we
approach our task with diffidence or timidity. Where
it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the
limits of its authority under the constitution, we
should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall
heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute.
III
Among the constitutional objections raised against
BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict
between the statute and the constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is
contended that the statute runs counter to the
inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person
shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
poll tax." 16 Petitioners insist that, since the offense
under BP 22 is consummated only upon the
dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is
presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really
a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law."
What it punishes is the non-payment of the check,
not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is
nothing more than a veiled device to coerce
payment of a debt under the threat of penal
sanction.
First of all, it is essential to grasp the essence and
scope of the constitutional inhibition invoked by
petitioners. Viewed in its historical context, the
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
debt is a safeguard that evolved gradually during
the early part of the nineteenth century in the
various states of the American Union as a result of
the people's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane
practice, sanctioned by common law, which
permitted creditors to cause the incarceration of
debtors who could not pay their debts. At common
law, money judgments arising from actions for the
recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of
a contract could be enforced against the person or
body of the debtor by writ of capias ad
satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor
could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of
the creditor until he makes the satisfaction
awarded. As a consequence of the popular
ground swell against such a barbarous practice,
provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt came
to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of
various states of the Union. 17
This humanitarian provision was transported to our
shores by the Americans at the turn of the century
and embodied in our organic laws. 18 Later, our
fundamental law outlawed not only imprisonment
for debt, but also the infamous practice, native to
our shore, of throwing people in jail for non-
payment of the cedula or poll tax. 19
The reach and scope of this constitutional
safeguard have been the subject of judicial
definition, both by our Supreme Court 20 and by
American state courts. 21 Mr. Justice Malcolm,
speaking for the Supreme Court in Ganaway vs.
Quillen, 22 stated: "The 'debt' intended to be
covered by the constitutional guaranty has a well-
defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from
imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent
commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising
from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never
meant to include damages arising in actions ex
delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable
therein do not arise from any contract entered into
between the parties but are imposed upon the
defendant for the wrong he has done and are
considered as punishment, nor to fines and
penalties imposed by the courts in criminal
proceedings as punishments for crime."
The law involved in Ganaway was not a criminal
statute but the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
(1909) which authorized the arrest of the defendant
in a civil case on grounds akin to those which justify
the issuance of a writ of attachment under our
present Rules of Court, such as imminent departure
of the defendant from the Philippines with intent to
defraud his creditors, or concealment, removal or
disposition of properties in fraud of creditors, etc.
The Court, in that case, declared the detention of
the defendant unlawful, being violative of the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt, and ordered his release. The Court, however,
refrained from declaring the statutory provision in
question unconstitutional.
Closer to the case at bar is People v. Vera Reyes, 23
wherein a statutory provision which made illegal
and punishable the refusal of an employer to pay,
when he can do so, the salaries of his employees or
laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month
or on Saturday every week, was challenged for
being violative of the constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for debt. The constitutionality
of the law in question was upheld by the Court, it
being within the authority of the legislature to enact
such a law in the exercise of the police power. It
was held that "one of the purposes of the law is to
suppress possible abuses on the part of the
employers who hire laborers or employees without
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imprisonment of Debt
paying them the salaries agreed upon for their
services, thus causing them financial difficulties." The
law was viewed not as a measure to coerce
payment of an obligation, although obviously such
could be its effect, but to banish a practice
considered harmful to public welfare.
IV
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt? To answer the
question, it is necessary to examine what the
statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the
failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or
is it the making and issuance of a worthless check in
payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the
offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue
before us.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order.
Admittedly, the distinction may seem at first blush to
appear elusive and difficult to conceptualize. But
precisely in the failure to perceive the vital
distinction lies the error of those who challenge the
validity of BP 22.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the
legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of
a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the
prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts
which the law can punish. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong, hence,
not malum in se, but because of the harm that it
inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state
can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The police power of the state has been described
as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of
powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. 24 It is
a power not emanating from or conferred by the
constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary,
suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that man in organizing
the state and imposing upon the government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable individual citizens or
group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order and welfare."
25
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the
legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is
deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions.
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of
the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus
exists between means and end. Considering the
factual and legal antecedents that led to the
adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to
understand the public concern which prompted its
enactment. It had been reported that the
approximate value of bouncing checks per day
was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when
overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it
averaged between 50 million to 80 million pesos a
day. 26
By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn
on a bank and payable on demand. 27 It is a
written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn
against a deposit of funds for the payment of all
events, of a sum of money to a certain person
therein named or to his order or to cash, and
payable on demand. 28 Unlike a promissory note, a
check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount
of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and
partakes of a representation that the drawer has
funds on deposit against which the check is drawn,
sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation
to the bank. There is therefore an element of
certainty or assurance that the instrument will be
paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks
have become widely accepted as a medium of
payment in trade and commerce. Although not
legal tender, checks have come to be perceived
as convenient substitutes for currency in
commercial and financial transactions. The basis or
foundation of such perception is confidence. If
such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks
as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished
or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending
to destroy that confidence should be deterred, for
the proliferation of worthless checks can only
create havoc in trade circles and the banking
community.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one-
third of the entire money supply of the country,
roughly totalling P32.3 billion, consists of peso
demand deposits; the remaining two-thirds consists
of currency in circulation. 29 These demand
deposits in the banks constitute the funds against
which, among others, commercial papers like
checks, are drawn. The magnitude of the amount
involved amply justifies the legitimate concern of
the state in preserving the integrity of the banking
system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is
like pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the
nation's economy.
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imprisonment of Debt
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder,
but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice
of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure
the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare
of society and the public interest. As aptly stated
30
"The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than
contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of business;
and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment
to place him in the same category with the honest
man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom
the constitutional inhibition against `imprisonment
for debt, except in cases of fraud' was intended as
a shield and not a sword."
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid
exercise of the police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt.
This Court is not unaware of the conflicting
jurisprudence obtaining in the various states of the
United States on the constitutionality of the
"worthless check" acts. 31 It is needless to warn that
foreign jurisprudence must be taken with abundant
caution. A caveat to be observed is that substantial
differences exist between our statute and the
worthless check acts of those states where the
jurisprudence have evolved. One thing to
remember is that BP 22 was not lifted bodily from
any existing statute. Furthermore, we have to
consider that judicial decisions must be read in the
context of the facts and the law involved and, in a
broader sense, of the social, economic and
political environment in short, the milieu under
which they were made. We recognize the wisdom
of the old saying that what is sauce for the goose
may not be sauce for the gander.
As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic
force that enables the state to meet the exigencies
of changing times. There are occasions when the
police power of the state may even override a
constitutional guaranty. For example, there have
been cases wherein we held that the constitutional
provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield
to the police power of the state. 32 Whether the
police power may override the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue
we do not have to address. This bridge has not
been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it.
We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.
V
We need not detain ourselves lengthily in the
examination of the other constitutional objections
raised by petitioners, some of which are rather
flimsy.
We find no valid ground to sustain the contention
that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The
freedom of contract which is constitutionally
protected is freedom to enter into "lawful"
contracts. Contracts which contravene public
policy are not lawful. 33 Besides, we must bear in
mind that checks can not be categorized as mere
contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in
this modern day and age, has become a
convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the
banking system and therefore not entirely free from
the regulatory power of the state.
Neither do we find substance in the claim that the
statute in question denies equal protection of the
laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the
drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is
contended that the payee is just as responsible for
the crime as the drawer of the check, since without
the indispensable participation of the payee by his
acceptance of the check there would be no
crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that,
to give equal protection, the law should punish
both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners'
posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the
clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause
does not preclude classification of individuals, who
may be accorded different treatment under the
law as long as the classification is not unreasonable
or arbitrary. 34
It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or
improper delegation of legislative powers, on the
theory that the offense is not completed by the sole
act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend
on the will of the payee. If the payee does not
present the check to the bank for payment but
instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic
of the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning
of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot
be delegated is the power to legislate, or the
power to make laws, 35 which means, as applied to
the present case, the power to define the offense
sought to be punished and to prescribe the
penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it
be said that the power to define the crime and
prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any
manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there
any provision in the statute that can be construed,
no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of
executive power. The suggestion that the statute
unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the
offended party is farfetched.
Lastly, the objection has been raised that Section 9
(2) of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution was
violated by the legislative body when it enacted BP
22 into law. This constitutional provision prohibits the
introduction of amendments to a bill during the
Third Reading. It is claimed that during its Third
29 | C o n s t i 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 9 _ P r o h i b i t e d P u n i s h m e n t _ S e c t i o n 2 0 _ N o n -
imprisonment of Debt
Reading, the bill which eventually became BP 22
was amended in that the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of the bill as adopted on
Second Reading was altered or changed in the
printed text of the bill submitted for approval on
Third Reading.
A careful review of the record of the proceedings
of the Interim Batasan on this matter shows that,
indeed, there was some confusion among Batasan
Members on what was the exact text of the
paragraph in question which the body approved
on Second Reading. 36 Part of the confusion was
due apparently to the fact that during the
deliberations on Second Reading (the amendment
period), amendments were proposed orally and
approved by the body or accepted by the sponsor,
hence, some members might not have gotten the
complete text of the provisions of the bill as
amended and approved on Second Reading.
However, it is clear from the records that the text of
the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the
text which was actually approved by the body on
Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected
in the approved Minutes for that day. In any event,
before the bill was submitted for final approval on
Third Reading, the Interim Batasan created a
Special Committee to investigate the matter, and
the Committee in its report, which was approved by
the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated that "the
clause in question was . . . an authorized
amendment of the bill and the printed copy
thereof reflects accurately the provision in question
as approved on Second Reading. 37 We therefore,
find no merit in the petitioners' claim that in the
enactment of BP 22 the provisions of Section 9 (2) of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution were violated.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered granting the
petition in G.R. No. 75789 and setting aside the
order of the respondent Judge dated August 19,
1986. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 63419, 66839-42,
71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13 and 75765-67
are hereby dismissed and the temporary restraining
order issued in G.R. Nos. 74524-25 is lifted. With costs
against private petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C . J ., Feria, Fernan, Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras and Feliciano, JJ ., concur.