5. FENEQUITO vs VERGARA, JR.

G.R. No. 172829, July 8, 2012

FACTS:
On February 11, 2004, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila (representing Bernardo Vergara Jr.) against Rosa Fenequito,
Corazon E. Hernandez, and Lauro H. Rodriquez. On April 23, 2004, Fenequito, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case
Based on Absence of Probable Cause. The MeTC issued an order granting the said motion. Upon appeal by the public
prosecutor, however, the RTC set aside the MeTCs order and directed the latter to trial. Fenequito, et al, filed an appeal
before the CA, which subsequent ruled that the RTCs assailed decision was interlocutory in nature and was therefore
not appealable. Hence, the instant petition for review.

ISSUE:
Was the decision of the RTC interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed?

RULING: YES. RTCs decision was interlocutory in nature. As such, it cannot be appealed.

One of the grounds for the CAs outright dismissal of Fenequito et al.s petition for review was because of the latters
failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition filed, as required under
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. An appeal being a
purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. The
rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilities the orderly disposition
of appealed cases.

But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from
the assailed ruling of the CA. This is because Fenequito et al. erroneously assumed that the RTC Decision is final and
appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. An order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be done upon its merits. In contrast, a final order is one that which dispose of the whole
subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution
what has been determined.

Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed to
trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did
not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to be done on its merits.
 14. GALMAN vs SANDIGANBAYAN
144 SCRA 43 (1986)

FACTS:
President Ferdinand Marcos created the Agrava Fact- Finding Board to investigate the assassination of Ninoy
Aquino and the alleged gunman Rolando Galman. The President then referred the Agrava Board reports to the
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) for its resolution. The report contradicted the version of the military. The reported
concluded that Galman was only a fall guy and that Ninoys assassination was the product of a military conspiracy and not
a communist plot. Nevertheless, the President disdained and rejected his own Boards findings and insisted on the
version that Galman was Aquinos assassin.

Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman and twenty-nine other petitioners filed the action for temporary restraining
order to nullify the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and to restrain the court from rendering a decision on the
merit. The petitioners alleged that Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting
mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. The petitioners pray for a re-trial before an impartial tribunal
by an unbiased prosecutor. However, the Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability.

After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of
the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," revealed that President Marcos had ordered the Sandiganbayan, the
Tanodbayan, and the prosecution panel to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and
produce a verdict of acquittal. With that, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and such was
granted by the Sandiganbayan. A three- member commission was created to investigate the charges of collusion. Their
Report concluded that the proceedings in the case have been vitiated by lack of due process because the prosecution
and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of the president, which not only prevented
the prosecution from fully ventilating its position and offering all the evidences which it could have otherwise
presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case. The Sandiganbayan approved and adopted such
report. However, the respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy and argued that the previous judgment of
acquittal of the Sandiganbayan rendered the case moot and academic.

ISSUE: Did the Sandiganbayan violate the rule against double jeopardy?

RULING: NO.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or
acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. Where
the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction and the court rendering such decision is ousted of its jurisdiction.

As a rule legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused. However, the court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the further hearing of the case does not constitute double
jeopardy.

In the case at bar, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and
biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian
President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal is a void
judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless
thing which can be treated as an outlaw". Therefore, the Sandiganbayans resolution of acquittal was a void judgment
for having been issued without jurisdiction and hence no double jeopardy attaches. A void judgment is, in legal effect,
no judgment at all by it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void.
 23. PEOPLE vs LAGUIO, JR.
G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007

FACTS:
Respondent Lawrence Wang was acquitted on 3 different cases filed against him (dangerous drugs act, illegal possession
of firearms and COMELEC gun ban) after his Demurrer to Evidence (inadmissibility of the evidence) was granted by Hon.
Perfecto Laguio, Jr. due to the illegal/unlawful arrest, search and seizure that was conducted by the police officers. The
latter contended that Wang was arrested in flagrante delicto but the defense further presented that respondent did
not do any overt act to make him be subject to a warrantless arrest.

ISSUE:
May the prosecution appeal the trial courts resolution granting Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all
the charges without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy?

RULING: NO.
Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may appeal, the right of the
People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against putting the accused
in double jeopardy. It is basic that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for review
by the appellate court, which is why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double
jeopardy.

An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an
acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has previously made some exceptions: (1)
when the prosecution is denied due process of law; (2) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing a criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence.

The appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This may
be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in
jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil
action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.

Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines filed with the Court in the present case is an appeal by way of
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
 32. PEOPLE vs UY
G.R. No. 158157, September 30, 2005

FACTS:
The victim, Rabel Campos, was found dead with several stab wounds. A suspect in the commission of the crime, Teofilo
Panangin, executed a Sworn Statement with the assistance of Atty. Celso Sarsaba of the (PAO) which revealed that after
he stabbed Rabel, she was able to run away. Uy, however, took the knife from him and chased Rabel. On catching up
with her, Uy dragged her to the ground and stabbed her several times until she expired. An information was filed
charging Uy and Panangin with murder. When arraigned, both accused entered a plea of not guilty.

Following the filing and the subsequent admission of its Formal Offer of Evidence, including Panangins Sworn Statement,
the prosecution rested its case. Thereafter, Panangin, with leave of court, filed on March 3, 2003 a demurrer to
evidence.

The Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 44, granted the separate demurrer to evidence of accused Louel
Uy and Teofilo Panangin resulting in their acquittal for murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In granting the separate
demurrer of the accused, the trial court held that the testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution is hearsay, if
not speculatory; that there was no evidence adduced to the effect that Uy was the last person seen with the victim;
that Panangins extra-judicial confession-sworn statement of January 23, 2002 was not voluntary as it was subsequently
retracted (on July 1, 2002) and even if it were not, it is inadmissible since it is a fruit of poisonous tree as it was obtained
from Panangin as a result of his illegal arrest.

Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the People and the victims mother.

ISSUE: Did the acting judge commit grave abuse of discretion when he granted the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground
that the extrajudicial confession executed by Panangin is inadmissible in evidence after admitting the same to be part
of the evidence in chief of the prosecution?

RULING: YES.
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The same rule applies in
criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not
absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.

This Court finds that the trial court committed not only gross reversible error of judgment but also was actuated with
grave abuse of discretion, exceeding the parameters of its jurisdiction, in holding that Panangins retracting of his
confession shows that the execution thereof was involuntary and that in any event it was inadmissible as it was a fruit
of a poisonous tree. The trial court blindly accepted the claim of the defense that the confession was not made
voluntarily on the basis of an affidavit executed by Panangin on July 1, 2002 or more than 5 months after his sworn
statement-confession was given and after the prosecution rested its case, which affidavit Panangin was not even called
to identify and affirm at the witness stand, hence, hearsay. The decision of the trial court undoubtedly deprived the
prosecution of due process as it was not given the opportunity to check the veracity of Panangins alleged retraction.

In fine, the trial court committed not only gross errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion in the grant of the
defenses demurrer to evidence, no valid judgment was rendered, preventing jeopardy to attach. A remand of the case
for further appropriate proceedings is thus warranted and it does not violate the accuseds right against double
jeopardy.