Buado v.

CA AUTHOR: Castro
[G.R. No. 145222. April 24, 2009] NOTES:
TOPIC: Charges upon ACP (Subsidiary liabilities)
PONENTE: Tinga, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Article 122 of the Family Code16 explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded
to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property
of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership
of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
FACTS:
1984: Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado filed a complaint for damages, civil liability arising from slander, against Erlinda Nicol.
The RTC, CA, and SC ordered Erlinda to pay Sps. Buado, the decision became final and executory in March 1992.
A writ of execution was issued by RTC Branch 19 but Erlindas personal property is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, so the
real property of Erlinda was sold at an auction sale with Sps. Buado being the highest bidder.
1994: Romulo Nicol (husband of Erlinda) filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with PI against
Sps. Buado, w/ RTC Branch 21, alleging that they levied on his real property without exhausting Erlindas personal property.
Upon MTD of Sps. Buado, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it is RTC Branch 19 that has jurisdiction.
CA: Branch 21 has jurisdiction; the case was remanded for further proceedings. Hence, this petition.
Buado: Independent action need not be filed as he is not the third party contemplated in the ROC. Moreover, the obligation
of the wife redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership, so the husband is liable for the tort committed by his wife.
ISSUE: Whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership
HELD: No.
RATIO:
In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the property must be taken into account. In
Mariano v. Court of Appeals, which was later adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the husband of
the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation
that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v.
Discaya, the Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is
therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal
property.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-
spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains
has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held
liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the
conjugal partnership.
In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third party complainant to be conjugal property
was being levied upon to enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper
since the obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his separate property.
Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to
show that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case to Branch 21 for further
proceedings.