Volume 1
E-JET
AL 16
May 2014
This manual is and remains the property of Flybe Plc. All rights reserved. No part of
this manual may be reproduced or copied in any form or by any means without the prior
written permission of Flybe Plc.
The Company aims to achieve the safest possible operations for its customers and
employees and anyone else associated with our activities. An important element in
developing an even safer operation is that we learn all possible lessons from any
incidents or accidents whether on the ground or in the air and use these to avoid
recurrences.
All employees are urged to help provide the highest levels of safety in the industry, and
so are encouraged to report any information, which may affect flight or ground safety.
To promote a free flow of information the Company will not normally take disciplinary
action against any employee reporting an incident affecting safety.
The only possible exception may be where someone has acted recklessly, maliciously,
or omitted to take action, in a way that is not in keeping with their training,
responsibilities or experience. In such cases, the fact that a person has made a report
will be taken into account in their favour.
The Company will take very seriously, however, occasions where an incident is
discovered that has not been reported. Not reporting anything, which could affect flight
or ground safety is considered serious misconduct.
It is accepted that Company Procedures do not override the need to comply with the
Air Navigation Order, British Civil Airworthiness Requirements or EU Operational
Requirements in so far as: they are endorsed by the United Kingdom Civil Aviation
Authority, Airworthiness Notices and other formal requirements published by the Civil
Aviation Authority from time to time.
J Palmer
Director of Operations (Accountable Manager)
Flybe is the trading name of Flybe Plc. Any reference in this manual to Flybe or The
Company, relates to Flybe Plc (Company No. 2769768).
Registered Office: Jack Walker House Exeter International Airport Exeter Devon,
EX5 2HL.
Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
Record of Amendments
Amendment Number Amendment Date Date Entered Incorporated by (Signature)
AL 2 June 2007 MM
AL 3 1 October 2007 MM
AL 4 1 April 2008 MM
AL 5 1 October 2008 MM
AL 6 1 April 2009 MM
AL 7 1 October 2009 PC
AL 8 1 April 2010 MM
AL 9 1 October 2010 MM
AL 10 1 April 2011 MM
AL 10 Erratum MM
AL 11 1 October 2011 PC
AL 12 1 April 12 RIH
AL 15 1 October 2013
AL 16 1 May 2014
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
Contents
0 General Information........................................................................ 01
1 Limitations....................................................................................... 11
2 Normal Procedures......................................................................... 21
3 Abnormal and Emergency Procedures......................................... 31
4 Performance .................................................................................... 41
5 Flight Planning ................................................................................ 51
6 Weight and Balance........................................................................ 61
7 Loading Instructions ...................................................................... 71
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
Section 0 Contents
0 General Information........................................................................ 01
0.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 01
0.2 Units of Measurement ........................................................................ 01
0.3 Aircraft Dimensions ............................................................................ 01
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
0 General Information
0.1 Introduction
This section of the Operations Manual is type specific to the Embraer E-Jet aircraft.
The manual provides operating crew members with information on the technical,
procedural and performance characteristics of the Embraer E-Jets. This volume should
be treated as a referencing manual apart from certain sections, which will be obvious.
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
Section 1 Contents
1 Limitations....................................................................................... 11
1.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 11
1.1.1 General............................................................................... 11
1.1.2 Category of Operation ........................................................ 11
1.1.3 Kinds of Operation.............................................................. 11
1.1.4 Minimum Crew.................................................................... 11
1.1.5 Number of Occupants......................................................... 12
1.1.6 Seats .................................................................................. 12
1.1.7 Smoking.............................................................................. 12
1.1.8 Electronic Flight Bags......................................................... 12
1.1.8.1 EFB Software ..................................................................... 13
1.2 Weight and Balance ........................................................................... 14
1.2.1 Maximum Weights .............................................................. 14
1.2.2 Loading............................................................................... 15
1.2.3 Centre of Gravity ................................................................ 16
1.3 Operational Limitations....................................................................... 18
1.3.1 Operational Envelope ......................................................... 18
1.3.2 Maximum Operating Speed................................................ 19
1.3.3 Flap Operation.................................................................. 110
1.3.4 Landing Gear Operation ................................................... 110
1.3.5 Direct Vision Window........................................................ 110
1.3.6 Manoeuvring..................................................................... 111
1.3.7 Wind Components ............................................................ 113
1.3.8 Minimum Control Speeds ................................................. 113
1.3.9 Maximum Tyre Speed ...................................................... 113
1.3.10 Runway Surface and Slope .............................................. 113
1.3.11 Runway Contaminant Depth............................................. 113
1.3.12 Door and Air Stair Wind Limitations.................................. 114
1.3.13 Noise Levels ..................................................................... 114
1.3.14 Flybe Operational Limitations ........................................... 115
1.3.15 Turbulent Air Penetration.................................................. 115
1.4 Flight Guidance and Management ................................................... 117
1.4.1 Autopilot Minimum Engagement and Use
Heights ............................................................................. 117
1.4.2 VOR Flight Director Mode ................................................ 117
1.4.3 Engine Failure at or Above V1.......................................... 117
1 Limitations
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 General
The aircraft must be operated in accordance with the limitations in this section. The
limitations in this section are of two kinds:
The limitations in this section are never less restrictive than the AFM limits.
Visual (VFR).
Instrument (IFR).
Icing conditions.
Category I, Category II and Category IIIA ILS approach and landings.
RVSM.
RNP (RNP10 only on ferry flights when HF radio is fitted).
Precision RNAV (P-RNAV) including GNSS only and APV BARO NAV approaches.
Other than Standard Category II and lower than Standard Category I ILS approach
and landings. E-195 Only.
A pilot, and
A co-pilot.
Children who are under the age of two years and who are carried in the arms of
passengers may be left out of the count for these purposes.
A pictorial representation of the passenger seating layout for both variants is presented
in Section 6.1.30.
1.1.6 Seats
All crew seats must be locked in the fore and aft direction during take-off and landing.
1.1.7 Smoking
Smoking is not permitted in the toilets or any other part of the aircraft while in the air or
on the ground. This limitation applies when the aircraft is in operational service and
when the aircraft is parked-up.
Full details on the use of each of the various EFB applications can be found in the EFB
User Guide which is available on the Company Intranet and each iPad unit.
The Maximum weights listed in Table 2.1 are the maximum design weights as
described in the approved, Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM).
To comply with the performance and operating limitations of the regulations, the
maximum allowable take-off and landing operational weights may be equal to but not
greater than the design limits.
The highest allowed take-off weight at the start of the take-off run is the lowest of the
following:
The maximum operational take-off weight.
The maximum take-off weight calculated using the approved software taking into
account the field length limit, the climb limit and the brake energy limit.
The maximum take-off weight limited by en route and landing operating
requirements.
The highest allowed landing weight is the lowest of the following:
The maximum design landing weight.
The maximum landing weight limited by the runway and calculated using the
approved software.
The maximum approach and landing weight, calculated using the approved
software, as limited by altitude, temperature and climb gradient.
1.2.2 Loading
The aircraft must be loaded in accordance with the information contained in the Part B6
V1 Section 6 Weight and Balance and Section 7 Loading Instructions.
58000
56000
54000
7.5 10 % 31% 32.5%
52000
50790 kg
50000 MTOW
48000 50415 kg
46000 MLW
45000 kg
WEIGHT - kg
44000
MZFW
MZFW 43400 kg
42000 42500 kg
40000
38000 38000 kg
36000
34000 1
32000
31800 kg
30000 7% 30600 kg
10%
27%
22%
195CTA02 - 16FEB2006
28000 28.5%
31195 kg
29500 kg 18.4%
26000
24000
-5 5 15 25 35 45
CG POSITION - %MAC
Note: On empty ferry flights it is possible for the aircraft weight to fall below 29,500 kg.
In such cases fuel may be used for ballast. On fuel critical sectors ballast will be
required because any fuel used for ballast purposes cannot be used in flight and
cannot be considered in the planning stages.
Note: On empty ferry flights it is possible for the aircraft weight to fall below 22,500 kg.
In such cases fuel may be used for ballast. On fuel critical sectors ballast will be
required because any fuel used for ballast purposes cannot be used in flight and
cannot be considered in the planning stages.
The maximum operating altitude is 41,000 ft. The minimum operating altitude is minus
1,000 ft. The maximum altitude for take-off, landing and ground start is 10,000 ft for the
E195 and 8,000 ft for the E175.
The maximum temperature for all operations is ISA +35C. The minimum temperature
for in-flight operations is -54C up to 25,000 ft, decreasing linearly to -65C at 36,000 ft
and remaining at -65C above 36,000 ft.
The minimum temperature for take-off, landing and ground start is -40C. In the event
of a landing at a temperature below -40C, the aircraft may not take-off without a further
maintenance inspection.
40 000 41 000 ft
-65C -21.5C
35 000
30 000
25 000
Altitude (feet)
ISA + 35C
20 000
In-flight
only
15000
-54C
10 000 10 000 ft E195
8 000ft E175
5 000 In-flight, take-off,
-40C landing & ground start
0
52C
-5000
-80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Static Air Temperature (C)
VMO/MMO may not be deliberately exceeded in any regime of flight (climb, cruise or
descent).
40 000
35 000
MMO = 0.82 Mach
30 000
25 000
20 000
Altitude (feet)
15000
10 000
0
200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340 350
Airspeed (KIAS)
VFE is the maximum speed for extending the flaps and for flight with the flaps extended.
VFE depends on the flap position. VFE for each flap setting is given in Table 3.1.
Flap 2 215
Flap 3 200
Flap 4 180
Flap 5 180
VLO RETRACTION is the maximum speed at which the landing gear can be safely
retracted.
VLO EXTENSION is the maximum speed at which the landing gear can be safely
extended.
VLE is the maximum speed at which the aircraft can be safely flown with the landing
gear extended and locked.
1.3.6 Manoeuvring
VA is the design manoeuvring speed. It is given in Figure 3.3.
For the E195, at sea level VA is 253 KIAS; increases linearly to 288 KIAS at 25,600 ft,
and then increases linearly to 295 KIAS at 32,700 ft. Above 32,700 ft, VA is equal to
MMO: 0.82 Mach.
For the E175, at sea level VA is 243 KIAS; increases linearly to 265 KIAS at 18,000 ft,
and then increases linearly to 283 KIAS at 29,000 ft and then increases linearly to 287
KIAS at 33 800 ft. Above 33 800 ft, VA is equal to MMO: 0.82 Mach.
The range of normal accelerations (that is load factors) that the structure has been
designed to withstand without permanent deformation are given in Table 3.3.
Manoeuvres that involve angle of attack near the stall or full application of rudder,
elevator and aileron controls should be confined speeds below VA. In addition, the
manoeuvring flight load factor limits must not be exceeded.
WARNING
Rapid and large alternating control inputs, especially in combination with large changes in pitch,
roll or yaw (for example: large side slip angles) may result in structural failures at any speed,
even below VA.
The rudder surface angle selected by full pedal deflection reduces as speed increases.
The aircraft is designed to meet the airborne loads resulting from the application of full
rudder pedal deflection in one direction. In the certification flight test, the aircraft is
allowed to stabilise before the rudder is returned to neutral.
The aircraft is not designed to meet the loads produced by full pedal deflection in one
direction followed by full pedal deflection in the opposite direction. Coarse rudder
reversals can result in dangerous loads on the fin even below VA.
The rudder should always be used with care. However, it must be used positively and
without delay in the cases of engine failure, crosswind landings and crosswind
take-offs.
Revision 14 | Apr 2013 111
Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
Limitations
40 000
30 000
25 000
20 000
Altitude (feet)
VAA E195
V
15000
10 000 VA E175
5 000
0
200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300
Airspeed (KIAS)
Wet 31
Due to the possibility of compressor stall, static take-off with cross winds in excess of
25 kts is not recommended.
Table 3.7 Embraer 175 STD (with Silent Kit) Noise Levels (EPN
db)
Condition
Noise Level
Flyover Lateral Approach
Actual 82.1 90.6 95.2
Flyover and lateral noise levels were established for the EMBRAER E-Jets:
Equipped with a Sundstrand APS 2300 APU.
Equipped with two GE CF34-10E7 engines (E195) or, two GE CF34-8E5 engines
(E175), both fitted with the chevron nozzle.
At maximum take-off weight.
With all engines at the maximum take-off power setting.
With the flaps at the flap 1 position.
No determination has been made by the Airworthiness Authority that the noise levels
in this manual are or should be acceptable or unacceptable for operation at, into, or out
of any airport.
All crews are to use instrument approaches to airfields until completion of their first
recurrent simulator check ride. Visual approaches may be conducted prior to first OPC
if operationally essential or for training purposes under the supervision of a training
Captain.
Embraer do not publish a maximum wind speed for taxi operations, therefore, the
Company limitation is 65 kts including gusts.
Pilots may not carry out HGS procedures until completion of their first OPC and
appropriate training as specified in the Operations Manual Part D.
The terrain awareness part of the EGPWS must be serviceable when conducting
non-precision approaches.
Use attitude indicator as the primary instrument. Allow altitude and airspeed to vary and
maintain attitude. Avoid abrupt and large control inputs.
The maximum recommended turbulence air penetration speed can be obtained from
the chart at Figure 3.4.
When planning a GNSS approach at the destination, crews are to ensure that the
alternate airport is served by an approach based on a navigational aid other than GPS.
When planning a GNSS only approach, the crew is required to verify that the predicted
RAIM at destination ETA is within the approach criteria.
If HUD A3 mode is not available, manual approaches (autopilot not coupled) with HGS
using the Flight Director guidance are prohibited.
The performance of HUD A3 approaches requires that the following equipment and
instruments be in operating conditions:
1 Head-Up Guidance System (HGS);
2 Inertial Reference Systems (IRS);
Modular Avionics Units (MAU) 1 and 2;
1 Multifunction Control Display Unit (MCDU);
2 VHF/NAV Systems;
2 Radio Altimeters;
Windshield Wipers;
Windshields Heating;
2 Primary Flight Displays (PFD);
1 Yaw Damper channel;
1 Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS).
1.5.2.4 HGS System Capability Limitations
1.5.2.4.1 Airport Altitude Limit
The HGS was demonstrated to meet the necessary requirements under the following
conditions:
Demonstrated Maximum Airport Altitude .................................... 6121 ft
1.5.2.4.2 Demonstrated Minimum Visibility Take-off Limit
Runway Visual Range (RVR)........................................... 125 m (400 ft)
1.5.2.4.3 Demonstrated Minimum HUD A3 Mode Limits
Decision Height (DH) ...................................................................... 50 ft
Runway Slope .................................................. FROM -0.8% TO +0.8%
Runway Visual Range (RVR)........................................... 200 m (700 ft)
1.5.2.4.4 Demonstrated Wind Components for LVTO Operations
Headwind ....................................................................................... 25 kt
Tailwind ............................................................................................ 9 kt
Crosswind ...................................................................................... 13 kt
These maximum demonstrated values are not considered to be limiting.
The maximum cabin differential overpressure is 8.77 psi (E195) and 8.6 psi (E175).
The maximum differential pressure for take-off and landing is 0.2 psi.
Clouds.
Fog with visibility of 1.6 kilometres or less.
Rain.
Snow.
Sleet.
Ice crystals.
Note: That the 1.6 kilometre visibility only applies to fog. So, for example, icing
conditions exist if the IOAT is 10C or below and rain is present regardless of
the visibility.
Icing conditions may also exist when the OAT is 10C or below when operating on
contaminated ramps, taxiways and runways even though there is no visible moisture
present. Icing conditions exist, on the ground and for take-off, when the OAT is 10C
or below and either:
CAUTION
On the ground, do not rely on visual icing evidence or ice detector actuation to turn on the anti-
icing system. Use the temperature and visible criteria as specified above. Delaying the use of
the anti-icing system until ice build-up is visible from the cockpit may result in ice ingestion and
possible engine damage or flame-out.
The aircraft may be operated within the magnetic polar cut-out regions, but IRS
magnetic heading and track angle magnetic data will not be available.
Whenever operating within the North or South magnetic polar cut-out regions, the
aircraft heading must be referenced to true heading. If true is not selected, the heading
failure flag will be displayed.
Operation above 72.50 North and below 59.50 South is prohibited due to unreliable
magnetic heading, unless at least one Inertial Reference System (IRS) is verified
operational as a sensor to the FMS. In this case the system will automatically switch to
TRUE.
IRS stationary alignment will complete only after a valid position is received from the
FMS.
%.
%'
324(
$&
4$&
1.10.8 TCAS
In relation to TCAS, pilots may only deviate from their ATC assigned altitude to the
extent necessary to comply with a TCAS resolution advisory (RA).
1.10.9 EGPWS
Navigation is not to be predicated on the use of the Terrain Awareness System.
The use of predictive EGPWS functions should be manually inhibited when landing at
an airport that is not in the airport database to avoid nuisance alerts.
Pilots are authorised to deviate from their current ATC clearance to the extent
necessary to comply with an EGPWS warning.
The Terrain Display is intended to be used as a situational tool only and may not
provide the accuracy and/or fidelity on which to solely base terrain avoidance
manoeuvring.
The use of predictive EGPWS functions should be manually inhibited during QFE
operations if GPS data is unavailable or inoperative.
The system does not provide warnings for man made objects.
1.10.10 RVSM
During RVSM operation, the following instruments and equipment must be in proper
operating condition:
ADS 1, ADS 2 and ADS 3 are compliant with RVSM. ADS 3 is not RVSM compliant if
sideslip compensation is lost. The IESS must not be used as the source of altitude for
RVSM height keeping.
The following EICAS messages reflect the loss of the respective ADS system:
Should any of the above equipment fail prior to the aircraft entering RVSM airspace,
the pilot must request a new clearance to avoid entering this airspace.
1.11 Fuel
1.11.1 Fuel Quantity
The usable and unusable fuel quantities are given in Tables 11.1 (E195) and 11.2
(E175).
Table 11.1 Fuel Usable and Unusable Quantities (E195)
Maximum Usable Unusable Total Capacity
Tank
Litres kg Litres kg Litres kg
Left 8,076.3 6,550 56.7 46 8,133 6,596
Right 8,076.3 6,550 56.7 46 8,133 6,596
Total 16,152.6 13,100 113.4 92 16,266 13,192
The fuel weights above have been calculated using a density of 0.811 kg/litre. Different
fuel densities may be used provided the volumetric limits are not exceeded.
1.12 APU
1.12.1 Type of APU
A Sundstrand APS 2300 APU is fitted.
1.12.2 Starting
The minimum ambient temperature for starting is -54C.
The maximum ambient temperature for starting is ISA +35C.
The maximum altitude for starting is 30,000 ft.
The maximum EGT during start is 1032C.
The starter duty cycle is shown in Figure 12.1.
A start attempt must not last more than one minute. Three attempts may be made at
one-minute intervals. Then a cooling period of five minutes is required before the cycle
may be repeated.
Cool
Minimum
5 minute
1.13 Engines
1.13.1 Type of Engine
Two General Electric CF34 10E7 engines are installed in the E195 and two General
Electric CF34 8E5 engines are installed in the E175.
Table 13.1
Engine Operational Limits CF34-10E7 (E195)
Parameter Minimum Maximum
N1 100%
N2 100%
Ground start 740C
In-flight start 875C
ITT Normal take-off and go-around 943C (1) (3)
Maximum take-off and go-around 983C (1) (2) (3)
Maximum Continuous 960C
Oil Pressure 25 psi (4)
Oil Temperature 155C
Note 3: (ITT transients above the normal ITT limits are allowed to Normal and
Maximum take-off, up to 5.5C for 2 seconds, 4.4C for 5 seconds, 3.6C for
15 seconds and 2.4C for 30 seconds.
Note 4: During starts with oil temperature below -22C, the minimum oil pressure is
5 psi; time limited to 2 minutes.
Table 13.2
Engine Operational Limits CF34-8E5 (E175)
Parameter Minimum Maximum
N1 99.5%
N2 58.5% 99.4%
Ground start 815C
In-flight start 815C
Normal take-off and go-around 965C (1)
ITT 949C (2)
Maximum take-off and go-around 1006C (1)
990C (2)
Maximum Continuous 960C
Oil Pressure 25 psi 95 psi
Oil Temperature
Continuous 155C
Transient 163C (3)
Note 1: Time limited to the first 2 min of the total 5 min limit.
Note 2: Time limited to the remaining 3 min of the total 5 min limit.
Cool
Minimum
15 minute
For each ground start, the starter must not be run for more than 90 seconds. The timing
starts from the point the engine starts to turn until starter cut-out. So the time includes
the starter operation that occurs before light up and the starter operation from light-up
to starter cut-out.
For each in-flight start, the starter must not be run for more than 120 seconds. The
timing starts from the point the engine starts to turn until starter cut-out. So the time
includes the starter operation that occurs before light up and the starter operation from
light-up to starter cut-out.
In-flight Starts
Start 1 Cool Start 2 Cool Start 3 Cool Start 4 Cool Start 5
Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
120 sec 10 sec 120 sec 510min
sec 120 sec 5 min 120 sec 5 min 120 sec
1.13.5 ATTCS
Take-off with the Automatic Take-off Thrust Control System (ATTCS) selected OFF in
the MCDU is not permitted in E-Jet aircraft unless appropriate performance data is
supplied.
1.13.10 Power-back
Power-back operations using the thrust reversers are prohibited.
Aircraft Category
Embraer-175 C C
Embraer-195 C C
From the table above it can be seen that the JOEB has determined that the differences
training, recurrent checking and currency requirements between the variants of the
E-Jet family are defined as A/A/A. Definitions of Level A requirements are detailed
below:
1.14.2.1 Level A Training
Level A difference training is applicable to aircraft with differences that can adequately
be addressed through self-instruction. Level A training represents a knowledge
requirement such that, once appropriate information is provided, understanding and
compliance can be assumed to take place. Compliance with Level A training is typically
achieved by methods such as issuance of operating manual page revisions,
dissemination of flight crew operating bulletins or differences handouts to describe
minor differences between aircraft.
Based on the above recommendations by the JOEB, Flybe will initially train all E-Jet
pilots using the E195 course as a baseline. Differences training will be provided in the
form of a self study package. Differences will be tested at each recurrent training
session. Pilots may fly different variants on the same day provided they are rostered at
least 1 hour for self study in between duties.
EMBRAER 175
CF34-8E5
T/O-1: 13,000 lbf (OEI ATTCS ON:
14,200 lbf).
T/O-2: 11,700 lbf (OEI ATTCS ON:
13,000 lbf).
EMBRAER 195
CF34-10E7 (ISA +20C:
T/O-1: 18,500 lbf (OEI ATTCS ON:
20,000 lbf).
T/O-2: 17,100 lbf (OEI ATTCS ON:
18500 lbf).
T/O-3: 15,450 lbf (OEI ATTCS ON:
16,650 lbf).
NOISE Effective Perceived Noise Levels A/A/A Self Study Included in
LEVELS (EPNLs) are different. E-Jet Manual Part B6.
Refer to specific model AFM for noise
levels measured in EPNdb.
LIMITATIONS A/A/A Self Study.
175 STD 195 LR
Weight MRW 37660 50950
MTOW 37500 50790 Weight limitations detailed
MLW 34000 45000 in Part B6.
MZFW 31700 42500
EMBRAER 195
EMBRAER 195 LR = 10% to 31% at
MTOW.
10% to 30% at MZFW.
EMBRAER 195
-1,000 ft to +10,000 ft.
LIMITATIONS Category II wind limitations are as A/A/A Self Study.
Winds shown in table below:
Limitations included in
LIMIT E175 E195 Part B6.
Headwind 25 37
Tailwind 10 15
Crosswind 12 16 Mandatory check on OPC/
LPC.
All figures are in kts.
EMBRAER 195
Max Cabin Diff > FL370 = 8.4 psi.
Max over pressure = 8.77 psi.
EICAS DOOR EMER LH (RH) OPEN A/A/A Self Study.
MESSAGES presented only for the EMBRAER 190/
195.
Message associated with proper
locking of the overwing emergency
door.
EMBRAER 170/175
Max usable quantity per tank =
4714 kg.
Unusable quantity per tank = 34 kg.
Fuel LO LEVEL message trigger =
300 kg.
EMBRAER 190/195
Max usable quantity per tank =
6550 kg.
Unusable quantity per tank = 46 kg.
Fuel LO LEVEL message trigger =
400 kg.
EMBRAER 170/175
TL (Thrust Lever) are advanced
beyond 45 TLA for two engines.
TL are advanced beyond 59 TLA for
one engine inoperative.
EMBRAER 190/195
TL are advanced beyond 38 TLA for
two engines.
TL are advanced beyond 57 TLA for
one engine inoperative.
33 LIGHTS Three external emergency lights are A/A/A Self Study.
installed close to the over-wing
emergency exits on 195.
EMBRAER 195
CF34-10E7
N1 = 100% (MAX).
N2 = 59.3% (MIN); 100% (MAX).
ITT:
GROUND START = 740C (MAX).
FLIGHT START = 875C (MAX).
TAKE-OFF Flap 3 may not be used on the 175 but A/A/A Self study.
FLAP it is available on the 195.
Flap 3 is not available in
175 and take-off
configuration warning will
prevent departure.
Flight Controls. The E175 flight controls are much lighter than the E195. This is
especially noticeable in the longitudinal axis. The forces required to rotate the
aircraft on take-off are considerably lighter and there can be a slight tendency to
over rotate at VR. In addition, the aircraft is more responsive in roll and only small,
gentle inputs are required to achieve the desired bank angle in a turn manoeuvre.
Landing. The E175 has a forgiving undercarriage and it is perhaps easier to land
than the E195. Due to the shorter fuselage, there is little chance of a tail strike on
take-off or landing. However, the landing flare should be commenced at a lower level
than on the E195 otherwise there is a tendency to float down the runway.
Configuration Trim. Pilots should be aware that the E175 does not have
auto-configuration trim fitted. This feature is only provided on the E195. This means
that, whenever the slat/flap or gear position is changed, the pilot will need to trim the
aircraft manually unless the autopilot is engaged. Therefore, on take-off, there is a
need to trim nose down as the gear is retracted. Pilots should be aware of this as
failure to trim properly can result in higher nose up attitudes on departure.
The small handling differences highlighted above are in light of recent flight testing
carried out on the E175 aircraft by Flybe pilots and are provided in order to ease the
transition between the E-Jet variants.
In addition, crews should be aware that the E175 aircraft will be delivered with EPIC
Load 25.1.0.1 embodied. The E195 has Load 21.4 incorporated (Load 23 was never
fitted because of the large number of misbehaviours it introduced). Load 25 has fixes
for most of the misbehaviours in Load 23 and also introduces some added features that
will be of assistance to crews. A full explanation of the Epic Load software and the
differences each load introduces is provided in an Embraer document called the
Aircraft Changes, Flight Operations Guide (ACFOG). A copy of the latest ACFOG is
provided in the 195 Useful Reading folder on the Company Intranet. Pilots should
familiarise themselves with the Load differences for both Load 23 and Load 25.
The E195 will be upgraded to Epic Load 25 once Embraer release a suitable version.
Currently, the only version available is for aircraft fitted with Pentium M processors.
Unfortunately, the E195s are fitted with Pentium 2 processors and the development of
Load 25 for Pentium 2 aircraft is still underway and is likely to take at least another
9 months.
Note: The E175 aircraft are all fitted with the Pentium M chips.
Section 2 Contents
2 Normal Procedures......................................................................... 21
2.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 21
2.1.1 Derivation and Structure..................................................... 21
2.1.2 Operational Flight Plan ....................................................... 21
2.1.3 On-side and Cross-side...................................................... 22
2.1.4 Language............................................................................ 22
2.1.5 Dark and Quiet Cockpit Concept ........................................ 22
2.1.6 Safety Priority ..................................................................... 22
2.1.7 Transfer Between Variants ................................................. 23
2.2 Cockpit Management ......................................................................... 24
2.2.1 The Team ........................................................................... 24
2.2.2 Standard Operating Procedures......................................... 24
2.2.3 Changes ............................................................................. 24
2.2.4 Main Tasks ......................................................................... 25
2.2.5 Hand Flying Versus AP ...................................................... 25
2.2.6 High Workload Procedures................................................. 25
2.2.7 Communications................................................................. 26
2.2.8 Monitoring........................................................................... 26
2.2.9 Use of Automation .............................................................. 27
2.2.10 Use of MCDU ..................................................................... 28
2.2.11 Electronic Checklist (ECL).................................................. 28
2.2.12 Weather Radar ................................................................... 28
2.2.13 PFD/EICAS......................................................................... 28
2.2.14 Use of Embraer Re-set Guide (AOM Volume 1,
13-60) ................................................................................. 29
2.2.15 Use of Flight Guidance Control Panel ................................ 29
2.2.16 Technical Log Verification Sheet ........................................ 29
2.2.17 Sterile Cockpit .................................................................. 210
2.2.18 Shoulder Harness............................................................. 210
2.2.19 Headphones ..................................................................... 210
2.2.20 On-ground Areas of Responsibility................................... 211
2.2.21 In-flight Areas of Responsibility ........................................ 212
2.3 Normal Checklist .............................................................................. 213
2.3.1 Layout............................................................................... 213
2.3.2 The Check Card ............................................................... 213
2.3.3 Checklist Use.................................................................... 214
2 Normal Procedures
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Derivation and Structure
The basic building block of the Company procedures are the Embraer E-Jet Aircraft
Operations Manuals (AOM). Practical operating experience and the Company culture
have been melded with the AOM procedures to produce the Company procedures.
The procedures:
Allow safe and efficient operation of the Embraer 195 and 175 aircraft.
Reduce crew workload while maintaining the highest possible level of safety.
In the air, tasks are generally distributed between the Pilot Flying (PF) and the Pilot
Monitoring (PM). On the ground, they are distributed between the Captain and the First
Officer, regardless of who is the PF.
This document avoids the clumsy statements his/her, he/she and him/her by following
the traditional use of he, him and his to include both sexes.
The early parts of this section describe the sequence of operations from reporting for a
flight through to leaving the aircraft. Notes on handling, performance and system
operation pertinent to a phase of flight are presented with the appropriate procedures.
Where these aspects do not apply to just one phase of flight or are rather lengthy, the
subject is given a dedicated sub-section. Also, some topics are important enough to
warrant a separate sub-section: for example, altimeter setting procedures and low
visibility procedures.
Procedures are frequently tabulated. The sequence of actions runs in the natural
sense: left to right along a row and then down to the next row. An italicised phrase in
bold and quotes indicates that this is a call given by the appropriate pilot. For example,
After Take-off Checklist in the PF column means the PF makes the call After
Take-off Checklist.
The procedures are written for a normal crew complement: Captain in the left seat and
First Officer in the right seat. When the Captain is training from the right seat, the
trainee in the left seat will normally execute the procedures as if he were Captain and
the Training Captain as if he were the First Officer. The Training Captain will brief any
exceptions to this rule.
2.1.4 Language
English must be used at all times when operating Company aircraft with two
exceptions:
When the ground engineer and both pilots speak a common language, this may be
used for start and pushback.
When the route is not a UK domestic route, PA announcements are made in English
and, if possible, the appropriate foreign language.
The overhead, main, glareshield and control pedestal panels have no lights on.
No aural warnings are being given.
The selector knobs are positioned at 12 oclock.
A white striped bar illuminates on a button to show that it is not in its normal position.
The cockpit and cabin crew must get along as a team. A sense of collaboration and
mutual help must prevail for the ultimate objective of safely and efficiently completing
the flight.
When the First Officer is PF, the Captain will encourage the First Officer to make
decisions and to develop his Captaincy. However, the First Officer must not lose sight
of who is Captain. Equally well, the Captain must remember that he has the ultimate
responsibility for the safe and efficient operation of the aircraft.
The Captain must use crew resources in the most effective way and must encourage
the other crew members to engage in teamwork by allowing them to participate and
give suggestions whenever useful for the execution of the flight. All crew members
must treat each other with respect and consideration at all times.
Occasionally, there is a need to depart from some aspect of the SOPs. In this case, the
aspect should be clearly briefed and announced as Non-standard. Non-standard
calls should be the exception rather than the norm. If a difficulty is found in following
these SOPs, it must be reported.
2.2.3 Changes
It is important that each pilot informs the other of new information especially changes
to the FGS, aircraft systems and the MCDU. Dont let your colleague be surprised by
an unexpected navigation aid indication.
It must always be clear who is PF. When control of the aircraft is handed from one pilot
to the other, the traditional calls You have control and I have control must be
used. Whenever changes are made to the FGS, pilots should report this to one another.
A good method is to report not only the change but also the colour of the FMA
indication: for example, FLCH Magenta.
Below FL150, PF should not make changes via the MCDU; PM makes any changes
on PFs request. There are certain, non-normal procedures that may require PF to
make changes to the MCDU below FL150.
When PF is hand flying, he should not make any changes via the MCDU or
glareshield controls apart from small heading changes. PM makes any changes on
PFs request.
Below FL 150, PMs OFP activities should be confined to recording data; calculating
estimates should be deferred until above FL 150.
Below FL 150, PA announcements and communications with ground agencies,
other than the controlling ATC agency, should be minimised.
Below FL150, the sterile cockpit lights should be ON.
There are times when, due to his high workload, it is impractical for PM to make
changes to the glareshield or area navigation system: for example on a busy departure
with frequent VHF COMM frequency changes. In such exceptional cases, PF may
make changes to the glareshield or MCDU, regardless of the height of the aircraft and
whether or not he is hand flying. However, PF should:
The descent is a busy time, so the quiet period in the cruise should be used to
advantage. Gather information and complete the descent brief and PA announcement
as early as is practicable. The descent checks should be completed about 2 to 3
minutes before the top of descent.
2.2.7 Communications
Non-essential conversation should be avoided during high workload flight phases and
at any time below FL 150.
2.2.8 Monitoring
The monitoring function is as important as the flying function.
All pilots are fallible; they make mistakes. The monitoring function is intended to pick
up those errors that will inevitably be made. In most cases, all that is required is a few
words to draw the pilots attention to the error. He then corrects it. In extreme cases,
PM may need to take control. Fine judgement is required, but this action should be
taken well before aircraft safety is compromised.
The monitoring pilot must take a common-sense approach to monitoring, he must not
nitpick. He has expectations of the aircraft flight path and speed, both from the brief and
SOPs. Also, experience tells him what standard of flying accuracy to expect; of course
this depends on the meteorological conditions.
Deviations from the expected may be due to tiredness, illness (perhaps leading to
incapacitation) or instrument failure. So the monitoring pilot should be aware of his
colleagues condition and check both sets of instruments if errors are apparent.
Of course, it is not just the deviation from the expected that is important. The trend is
also important. A deviation that is clearly being corrected needs no mention; the
converse, one that is diverging quickly with no sign of correction, must be announced.
So for most of the flight regime, the monitoring pilot uses his experience and judgement
to decide whether or not to announce a deviation. If he decides to announce a
deviation, he must do so clearly. The announcement must include the parameter and
either its value or its deviation from the expected target.
There are three areas where specific limits are laid down: the descent, the approach
and the take-off climb.
Below 5,000 ft in the descent, a call of Vertical speed is made if the rate of descent
exceeds 2,000 ft/minute.
For the approach and the take-off climb, a call of Speed together with the deviation
is made if the speed falls outside an acceptable band. The acceptable band is target
speed +10 knots to target speed -5 knots. A deviation above target is prefixed by
plus and below by minus. So a speed deviation of 15 knots above target is called
as Speed plus 15.
If a glideslope or localiser deviation of more than a dot occurs, the applicable call of
Glideslope or Localiser is given. The sense of the deviation is called as Low,
High, Left or Right as appropriate.
If the desired flight path is not being maintained, disconnect the automatic system and
establish manual flight. If the deviation is due to an incorrect setup, correct it and
re-engage the automatics.
The autopilot, autothrottle, flight director and other FMS components are tools to be
used at the crews discretion. Traffic and workload permitting, hand flying the aircraft is
encouraged to maintain flying skills. Do not get into the habit of relying on the
automation at the expense of piloting skills.
After take-off the autopilot must not be engaged below 400 ft. It may remain engaged
until:
Below FL150, changes to the MCDU should be made only by the PM; the change
should not be activated until it has been confirmed by PF. If necessary, revert to basic
autopilot/FD modes to avoid heads down time during high workload flight phases.
The most commonly made mistakes while handling a paper checklist, such as skipping
an item due to an interruption or stating that an item had been completed when it has
not, are minimised with the use of this tool.
During slaved weather radar operations, one pilot controls both pilots weather radar
displays. The pilot operating the radar should inform the other pilot before any change
is made. If the radar is to be operated in any mode other than STBY while the aircraft
is on the ground, some restrictions listed in the AOM apply.
2.2.13 PFD/EICAS
Precision approaches should be flown with ILS indications on both sides.
VOR and NDB approaches must use some form of raw data to cross check FMS
information.
EICAS messages should always be announced when displayed. When more than one
message is displayed careful consideration should be applied in order to prioritise
actions.
The procedures are to be used on ground only with the aircraft stationary and the
emergency/park brake applied.
If a procedure is used, it must be recorded in the aircraft Technical Log in the
Non-Airworthiness comments box; refer to the AOM Volume 1, 13-60.
All mode button selections must be confirmed on the FMA panel on the PFD.
Care must always be taken when completing the Technical Log. To help ensure
accuracy, the First Officer performs a cross check of the Technical Log Entry using an
Hours and Landings Cross Check Form. The form is used for the whole days flying.
The First Officer independently records the landings and sector times on the form. After
each flight, the First Officer enters the Technical Log time on the form and a
comparison is made. If there is a crew change, the form is handed on to the new First
Officer. At the end of the day, the form may be disposed of.
2.2.19 Headphones
Use of headphones is mandatory from engine start to the top of climb (above FL 150)
and from the top of descent until engine shut down. If the cruise section of the flight is
at FL 150 or below, the crew must remain on headsets at all times.
The head set and associated boom microphone are to be used as the primary means
of communication with ATC at all times.
The numbers and arrows indicate the recommended flow sequence for the First Officer.
The letters indicate the recommended flow sequence for the Captain.
Captain A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H.
First Officer 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.
When the AP is engaged PF may operate the guidance panel (GP) controls or ask PM
to make GP selections. When PF is manually flying, he should ask PM to make the GP
selections.
PM
PNF Checklist reading and communications
The majority of the checklists are performed using the challenge and response method.
The First Officer or PM gives a challenge; the Captain or PF checks the item and then
makes a verbal response. The response should be the same as the words on the
checklist, except in the case of an as required response. Here, the response should
be the actual state of the item and not as required.
The exceptions to challenge and response are the Cockpit Safety, Power Up and
Leaving Aircraft Checklists; they are completed by the First Officer on a read and do
basis. However, when experience is gained, these checklists may be done from
memory and then confirmed by reading.
Each checklist has three columns (except the cockpit safety and power up checklists).
The first contains the check, the second the response and the third indicates who is
responsible for any set-ups and also who responds when the check is called.
System set-ups follow the Power Up Checklist. These set-ups are known collectively
as the Cockpit Preparation. In addition, set-ups are used for the Before Start, After
Start, After Landing and Shutdown Checklists (Yellow). These are confirmed on a
challenge and response basis. Blue checklists are used whenever the aircraft is
moving and are completed on a read and do basis.
On the ground, PF calls for the checks and PM reads the checks up to the point that
the engines are started. Thereafter, whilst on the ground, the Captain calls for the
checks and the First Officer reads them. In the air, PF calls for the checks; PM reads
the checks. The reader must receive a correct response before he advances to the next
item. When the checklist is complete, the reader calls checklist complete. If a
checklist is interrupted, the reader is responsible for ensuring that the reading
recommences at the correct line. It is acceptable to repeat a check; it is not acceptable
to miss a check.
When the required response is from the reader, the check and response must be read
aloud so that the other pilot is aware that the checks are being performed.
Where a response is required from both pilots, the reader gives his response last.
If a checklist cannot be completed, the physical checklist is left protruding from the card
holder on top of the glareshield.
The expanded checklist associated with each phase of operation is included in that
phases section.
Power Up Checklist
Battery 1 .............................................................................................ON
Battery 2 ........................................................................................ AUTO
Battery Voltage .......................................................................... CHECK
GPU Button .............................................................................AS REQD
EICAS ......................................................................................... CHECK
Fire Extinguisher Panel ................................................................ TEST
APU Master Selector Knob....................................................AS REQD
GPU Button .......................................................................AVAIL LT ON
GPU Button ...........................................................................PUSH OUT
GPU ................................................................................. DISCONNECT
Navigation Lights ..............................................................................ON
Hydraulic Panel ................................................................ PBIT CHECK
Electronic CBs........................................................... ACKNOWLEDGE
DVDR Panel ............................................................................... CHECK
Cockpit Door Panel ................................................................... CHECK
Cabin Photoluminescence Strip .............................................. CHECK
Taxi Checklist
CABIN ......................................................................... SECURE F/O
STERILE COCKPIT LIGHT ..................................................ON F/O
TAKE-OFF CONFIGURATION ........................................CHKD F/O
TAKE-OFF BRIEFING ............................................ REVIEWED PF
Lineup Checklist
TRANSPONDER............................................................. TA/RA F/O
BRAKE TEMPERATURES ..............................................CHKD BOTH
LIGHTS/STROBES ...............................................................ON F/O
AUTO THROTTLE ........................................................ ARMED F/O
EICAS/FMA......................................................................CHKD BOTH
Climb Checklist
ALTIMETERS....................................... STD SET AND XCHKD BOTH
(WHEN CLEARED TO A FLT LEVEL)
Descent Checklist
BRIEFING ............................................................COMPLETED PF
LANDING DATA ................................................................. SET PF
Approach Checklist
ALTIMETERS .................................. QNH ... SET AND XCHKD BOTH
APPROACH AIDS........................................ SET AND XCHKD BOTH
AUTOBRAKE ......................................................................SET CAPT
FASTEN BELTS................................................................... ON CAPT
CABIN.......................................................................... SECURE PM
Landing Checklist
LANDING GEAR ............................................................ DOWN BOTH
SPEED SELECTOR KNOB........................ MANUAL (BY FAF) BOTH
FUEL X-FEED .....................................................................OFF PM
SLATS/FLAPS ....................................................................SET BOTH
LANDING LIGHTS ............................................................... ON PM
Shutdown Checklist
THRUST LEVERS ..............................................................IDLE CAPT
PARKING BRAKE........................... SET AND BRAKE TEMPS CAPT
ELECTRICAL ................................................ON GPU OR APU CAPT
START/STOP SELECTORS ......................... STOP/CHECK N1 CAPT
RED BEACON AND TAXI LIGHTS.....................................OFF F/O
ELECTRIC HYD PUMP SYS 3A .........................................OFF F/O
ELECTRIC HYD PUMP SYS 1/2......................................AUTO F/O
FASTEN BELTS/STERILE LTS..........................................OFF CAPT
COCKPIT DOOR ................................................... UNLOCKED CAPT
The N1 adjustments to obtain the flexible thrust N1 for take-off. There are three
tables: one for T/O 1, one for T/O 2 and one for T/O 3 (E195 only).
The final segment speed for the take-off weight: VFS.
On the E195, four tables of stabiliser trim setting for take-off: one for flap 1, one for
flap 2, one for flap 3 and one for flap 4. The E175 has only a simplified set of
stabiliser trim setting tables for all weights and for flap settings of 1, 2 and 4.
Flap 5 VREF and full flap VREF for the landing weight.
VFS for the landing weight.
Un-factored landing distances for the landing weight with manual braking.
The VREF for a Category 2 approach is higher than that for a non-category 2 approach
it also includes the 5 kts minimum increment for VAPP and icing speeds are the same
as non-icing speeds.
For a flap 5 approach, the approach climb speed (VAC) is the same as the flap 5 VREF
for the approach condition: non-category 2 or Category 2. VAC for a flap 5 approach is
applicable to a missed approach with flap 3 set.
For a full flap approach, VAC is the same as VREF for a full flap landing. VAC for a full
flap approach is applicable to a missed approach with flap 4 set.
Note: For fuel efficiency purposes, the preferred landing flap is flap 5. In addition, on
the E175, flap 5 is more comfortable from a passenger perspective in that it
does not suffer from the Rumble associated with full flap settings. However,
crews should remain cognisant of the advantages offered by a full flap landing
which include: lower landing speeds resulting is less brake and tyre ware; lower
nose down approach attitude resulting in better visibility and reduced risk of
tailstrike.
On the reverse of the card is the Landing Mass and Climb limitations table.
2.3.9 Loadsheet
This card can be used to cross-check weight and balance information on computerised
loadsheets.
2.4 Pre-flight
2.4.1 Timing
The crew must check in one hour before departure time for a routine scheduled flight;
different times apply to training flights and are given in the roster. The crew should
arrive at the aircraft 30 minutes before departure time. The automatic boarding
sequence will run unless the Captain stops it. This ideal sequence requires fuelling to
be started at the latest 25 minutes before departure and passengers to start boarding
20 minutes before departure.
2.4.2 Responsibilities
The First Officer obtains:
The OFP.
Pertinent weather.
Aircraft status.
NOTAMS.
Technical log verification sheet.
Journey Log; he is responsible for completing the Journey Log.
The Captain is responsible for the fuel management of each sector. However, the First
Officer should be encouraged to participate in the decision making process.
Both pilots should check the appropriate sections of the Company intranet to ensure
that they have the latest issue of all NOTACS.
2.4.3 Briefing
The Captain will brief the cabin crew on relevant items from the following list:
Flight routes/cruising altitudes/flight time/alternate airports.
Weather.
Taxi time.
Information on the terrain/water to be over flown.
Status of relevant aircraft systems.
Refuelling.
Cabin crew control of cabin temperature.
Any other relevant information.
Both pilots must participate in the cabin crew SEP pre-flight discussion.
2.5.2 Refuelling
If refuelling with passengers on board or boarding is considered likely, brief C/A 1 and
the dispatcher to invoke the appropriate procedures. They are described in the
Operation Manual Part A.
2.5.4 Maintenance
Confer with the engineers and consider the effects of any maintenance action in
progress on passenger boarding and the operation of aircraft systems. Some
maintenance action is allowed with passengers on board or during boarding. However,
if the maintenance action could unduly worry passengers, delay the boarding until the
maintenance is complete.
The Captain is responsible for the management of the Technical Log and must check
for any deferred defects. These defects must be brought to the attention of the First
Officer and, where applicable, the C/A 1. If required, MEL procedures should be
reviewed. The crew must check the software and ballast status of the aircraft. The
Captain may delegate responsibility for management of the Technical Log to the First
Officer, but the Technical Log must still be signed by the Captain, not the First Officer.
Note: When an aircraft is handed over directly crew to crew, without powering down,
a confirmation from the off-going crew that the Cockpit Safety Inspection has
been completed satisfies the requirement.
CAUTION
Ensure the aircraft is not moved before the IESS is initialised (90 secs).
Battery 1 .............................................................................................ON
Battery 2 ........................................................................................ AUTO
CAUTION
Verify that only displays 2 and 3 are available and that no EICAS messages
are displayed for the first five seconds.
If more than two displays are available, the aircraft must not be dispatched.
Battery Voltage .......................................................................... CHECK
Check the battery 1 and 2 voltage on the MFD status pages; the voltages
should be at least 22.5 V.
CAUTION
To avoid battery discharge, minimise the time without AC power by
performing the battery voltage check as quickly as possible.
If the battery voltage is between 21.0 and 22.5 V, recharge the batteries
before take-off using any AC source for:
30 minutes if the OAT is at least 0C.
35 minutes if the OAT is less than minus 5C.
40 minutes if the OAT is at least minus 10C.
50 minutes if the OAT is less than minus 10C.
If battery voltage is below 21.0 V, maintenance action is required.
GPU Button .............................................................................AS REQD
Verify the AVAIL light is illuminated before pushing in. When a GPU is not
available or not required, maintain GPU button pushed out.
This check must be carried out after the battery voltage check to avoid
incorrect battery voltage readings.
The power up built in test (PBIT) takes three minutes to complete after the
aircraft is powered by an AC source. If any hydraulic pump is set to ON
before three minutes has elapsed from the time AC power is on, the flight
controls PBIT will not be completed. A FLT CTRL TEST IN PROG message
is displayed to inform the pilot that the Electrical PBIT is in progress.
Electrical.
Hydraulic.
The electrical PBIT starts automatically once the aircraft is powered by any AC source.
The electrical PBIT takes three minutes; it will be interrupted and not completed if any
of the following occurs:
The hydraulic PBIT is performed when all three hydraulic systems are pressurised; the
test takes about one minute. The hydraulic PBIT must not be started until the electrical
PBIT is complete. If any flight control surface is moved during the hydraulic PBIT, the
test is interrupted and will not be completed.
The PBIT checks the flight control system; a successful check is valid for 50 hours. If
the aircraft is powered up for more than 50 hours, a message is given on the EICAS:
FLT CTRL BIT EXPIRED.. The message remains on the EICAS until a new PBIT is
carried out successfully. So the aircraft has to be powered down and then repowered.
A pause of one minute between powering down and powering up is required.
When the electrical PBIT is completed, a check of the EICAS is required to confirm that
the check has passed. The normal EICAS messages are shown in Figure 5.1.
If the PBIT has not been passed, one or more of the non-normal messages shown in
Figure 5.2 may be displayed. There is a corrective action for each message.
WARNING
During the P-BIT or when ever two AC sources are powering the aircraft, the L/R windscreens
will be powered on the ground and there is a risk of electrical shock if the outside of either screen
is touched.
In some cases the situation may be recoverable by cycling the three FLIGHT
CONTROLS MODE push buttons or powering down the aircraft and powering up after
one minute.
If a FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH message is given, cycle the three FLIGHT CONTROLS
MODE push buttons. If the message remains or reappears, power down the aircraft,
wait one minute and then power up the aircraft again. If the message remains or
reappears, maintenance action is required.
The new Epic Load 21.4 has introduced an inhibit on the hydraulic part of the PBIT
that will not allow this test to run until the fluid temperatures are above +10C.
It has been established that the flight controls must not be moved during the
Hydraulic PBIT. If this is the case, the PBIT will not complete.
The full and free checks must not be completed until the FLT CTRLS TEST IN
PROGRESS message has extinguished.
Providing that the Hydraulic PBIT has not expired (i.e. 50 hours have not elapsed
since the last successful test), crews will not experience any problems.
Once 50 hours have elapsed since the last successful PBIT, the
FLT CTRL BIT EXPIRED. message will be illuminated. Dispatch is not allowed with
this message displayed. To clear this message, a successful PBIT (electrical or
hydraulic, depending on which has reached zero hours) must be completed.
During the winter months, it is possible for a crew to take over an aircraft that has
not run for over 50 hours.
On first flight of the day, crews should check the Flight Controls Synoptic page to
verify the time remaining since the last successful PBIT.
If the PBIT is about to expire, crews should then check the hydraulic reservoir fluid
temperatures on the Hydraulic Synoptic page.
If the fluid temperature is below +10C, the hydraulic part of the PBIT will not run and
the crew must perform the warm up procedure.
Once the warm up is complete, the system pressures must be allowed to fall below
100 psi by turning off all the electrical pumps. Once this is completed, the hydraulic
PBIT will initiate the next time that all three systems are fully pressurised.
On first flight of the day, crews are to check the time remaining on the FLT CTRL PBIT.
If the PBIT is about to expire, crews should check the fluid temperatures in the hydraulic
reservoirs. If required, the hydraulic warm up procedure should be used.
CAUTION
To allow the flight controls built in test to complete, wait three minutes after power up before
turning any hydraulic pump on.
The External Inspection is given in Table 5.3. The recommended walkround sequence
is shown in Figure 5.3. Start at the forward entry door and proceed in the direction
indicated; terminate at the bottom of the passenger stair door.
Particular attention should be made to ensure that all pitot and static ports are not
damaged or obstructed. Any damage to the aircraft structure must be reported to
engineering prior to dispatch.
If a navigation light filament has failed, the alternative filament can be selected in the
cockpit by accessing the panel adjacent to the jump seat passengers oxygen mask
stowage.
EICAS............................................................................................ Check
Check EICAS messages to ensure agreement with aircraft status.
WARNING
Take-off with ATTCS OFF is not allowed in the E-Jets unless appropriate
performance data is available (EFB Units do provide this information if
required).
The assumed temperature is entered into the MCDU as the FLEX TEMP. The N1 target
is not checked until after start because the ambient temperature sensor is in the engine
in-take and may not sense the correct ambient temperature until the engine is drawing
air over the sensor. The FADEC derived N1 can be used to cross-check the EFB
calculated N1.
Note: If, for performance reasons, the crew elect to take-off with the ECS selected to
OFF on the TAKEOFF Data Set page of the MCDU, there is a possibility that
the Bleed Pressure sensors will detect an overpressure and illuminate the
Bleed Overpressure (1/2) caution (s) as the Packs are automatically selected
ON at 500 ft AAL. This is caused by the sudden rush of HP compressor air as
the Nacelle SOV opens. The cautions can be cleared by cycling the Bleed
Switches. However, to prevent this occurrence, crews should consider leaving
the APU running during the take-off and subsequent climb. The APU can be
secured during the normal After Take-off checks.
The take-off briefing is performed by PF. The Captain must state the rejected take-off
procedure and the specific actions in the event of an engine fire on take-off.
The departure procedure ((Include P-RNAV, FMS Speeds and VNAV use).
The taxi-out route and single-engine taxi procedures if required.
Power reductions.
Weather.
Terrain and MSA.
Noise abatement procedures.
Low visibility procedures.
Inoperative aircraft components.
Runway in use and its condition.
Take-off alternate airport.
Emergency brief.
Engine fire procedures.
Actions in the event of a rejected take-off due to engine fire.
NOTAMS.
Any deviation from SOPs.
The emergency briefing is given in full by PF on each crews first flight of the day.
Thereafter, at the Captains discretion, it may be reduced to just the crosswind, the
emergency acceleration altitude, the emergency routing and the take-off alternate. If
just one crew member changes, then PF must give a full emergency brief for the first
flight of this new crew.
PF gives the selections, departure and special conditions sections of the take-off
briefing before every flight.
The acceleration altitude quoted in the emergency brief is that found in the airport
performance manual or shown on the EFB performance program; generally
1000 ft AAL.
2.6.10 Weapons
Any potential weapon that a passenger has not been allowed to carry in the cabin must
not be carried in cockpit. The weapon must be carried in the cargo compartment.
At the Captains discretion, the First Officer may carry out the data entry into the MCDU.
The Captain always signs the load sheet, prints his name and also records the date and
time of signature.
The First Officer will set the take-off trim by reference to the Take-Off Data Card and
the MACTOW figure from the load sheet.
LMC rules are contained in Section 7.
The electrical air compressor is an optional modification that was installed in the E195
aircraft, however, it was not fitted to the E175 fleet. This means that, during the
turnaround on the E175s, if the engines are shut down and the APU bleed air is
switched off, there will be no pressurisation air supplied to the potable water system.
If the potable water system has no pressure, it will be unable to supply all services and,
in the case of the water boilers, the system will detect an overheat condition due to the
reducing content and then isolate power to the boilers in order to prevent a potential
fire risk. This protection system is very sensitive and it only takes the pouring of a few
cups of coffee from the water boiler to trigger the isolation switch. The cabin crew must
be informed and reminded that they may trigger the isolation switches on the water
boilers if they use the potable water system. If the cabin crew require use of the water
system, the APU bleed valve must be opened beforehand.
2.7 Starting
2.7.1 Before Start
Before start, the STATUS page is to be on the First Officers MFD. The Before Start
Checklist may be conducted up to the line when appropriate.
When the report from the C/A 1 has been received, the First Officer announces Cabin
crew, doors to automatic and cross-checked.
Once start clearance has been received and the push-back marshaller is visible, the
checks below the line are completed.
The PF calls for the set-up. When the set-up is complete, the PM reads the checklist
which is completed on a challenge and response basis.
Table 7.1 Before Start Checklist
SHIPS PAPERS .................................................................................COMPLETE BOTH
EFB UNITS ........................................................................... AEROPLANE MODE BOTH
DOORS and WINDOWS ..........................................................................CLOSED BOTH
Each pilot verifies that his window is closed.
The First Officer verifies on the MFD status page that all doors are closed.
MCDU ................................................................................................... SET/CHKD BOTH
SPEED SELECTOR KNOB............................................................AS REQUIRED BOTH
Both pilots confirm correct speed is indicated (V2 FMS or V2+10 or VFS MAN).
ALTITUDE SELECTOR KNOB .................................................CLEARED LEVEL BOTH
Both pilots confirm cleared level set. (If assigned).
TO/GA BUTTON.....................................................................................PRESSED BOTH
Both pilots confirm cross bars on PFD and ROLL + TO on FMA.
PITCH TRIM ............................................................................................... SET.. F/O
First Officer sets and announces the pitch trim setting.
2.7.2 Starting
The Captain communicates with the ground staff; the First Officer communicates over
the radio.
The red Anti-collision beacon should not be selected ON until the push-back marshaller
is in sight (completed his walk-round).
It is important that the Captain confirms with the pushback marshaller that the towing
light is GREEN and all doors are closed and flush with the fuselage. There is a failure
mode on the cargo doors that might result in the MFD indications showing all doors
closed (green) whereas, in reality, a door might still be partially open. As long as the
doors are flush with the fuselage and the handles are in the closed position and also
flush with the door, it is safe to assume that the doors are properly closed.
If the APU EGT is greater than 550C, there is a chance that the priority valve will
reduce the air output during engine start to protect the EGT whilst still providing
electrical power. This could cause hot or hung starts, therefore, in this circumstance,
the Packs are to be selected OFF prior to main engine start.
Engine 2 is normally started first but will generally be the first engine if Single-engine
Taxi Out procedures are to be used.
Crews should note that the CF34 10 E7 engine (0n E195) is prone to starting
difficulties (no light off) particularly during first start of the day. In such circumstances,
the FADEC will terminate the start automatically after 15 seconds and then conduct a
30 second ground run prior to attempting a second start using both igniters. If the
EICAS message ENG 1 (2) SHORT DISPATCH or ENG 1 (2) NO DISPATCH is
displayed after the complete engine start cycle, perform two additional complete engine
start cycles to ensure that both igniters A and B are functioning properly. Crews should
also be aware that the FADEC controlled, second start attempt will not terminate
automatically, the pilots will need to abort this start attempt.
On the CF34 8E5 engines (E175), FADEC will activate both igniters if no light off is
detected after 15 seconds from fuel injection. Once 30 seconds have elapsed from fuel
injection, if no light off is detected, crews should abort the start manually.
Make sure the engine starter duty cycle limitations are not exceeded.
Starting may be performed during a pushback provided that the pushback marshaller
has a serviceable headset. If the Before Start checklist is done during a pushback, then
the red beacon is switched on before pushback.
If the pushback marshallers headset fails, prior to pushback, ATC are to be informed
and the engines are to be started on stand. After engine start, the pushback may be
completed.
When the ground engineer is connected to the intercom for pushback, checks and
pilot-to-pilot conversation should be done microphone off.
PF PM
When cleared:
Turns the start selector to START for at least
2 secs and releases it to RUN.
Starts clock.
Keeps his hand on the start selector to abort
the start if necessary.
Checks fuel flow; fuel flow should start at Starts clock with fuel flow indication.
approximately 20% N2. Verifies ITT rise within 5 seconds.
Monitors N1, N2 and oil pressure rising Verifies that the EICAS IGN annunciator goes
normally. out at approximately 55% N2.
Monitors ITT.
27% N1.
460 ITT.
62% N2.
Fuel flow of 220 kg/hr.
Oil pressure greater than 25 psi.
However, it is the PFs responsibility to monitor engine parameters and to abort the
start manually in the following cases:
A hung start; that is, N1, N2 or both failing to accelerate to a stable idle speed.
N1 rotation does not occur.
N1 decreases.
A hot start; that is ITT rapidly increasing towards or exceeding the start limit of 740C
(E195) or 815C (E175). Crews should note that ITT protection only activates as a
limit is exceeded; it will NOT prevent an over temperature.
No ITT indication within 15 seconds of fuel introduced for the second time (E195
only).
No ITT indications within 30 seconds of fuel injection (E175 only).
Oil pressure stabilising below 25 psi.
No positive oil pressure indication by the time N2 rotation reaches idle speed.
An intermittent electrical, pneumatic or starter malfunction occurs before starter
disengagement.
During engine start with a tailwind, if a positive increase in N1 is not indicated before
starter cut out (50% N2). In this case, the aircraft should be re-positioned to minimise
the effects of a tailwind.
If an automatic or manual abort occurs, its cause must be investigated before a further
start attempt is made.
Coordination between the pilots in checking proper release and application of the
brakes is important. Aircraft have been damaged because a push has started with
brake pressure applied; aircraft have been damaged because the tow bar has been
disconnected without adequate brake pressure.
Push must not be mentioned unless the brakes are off with zero pressure.
Whenever possible, the ground engineer should be on intercom for start and pushback.
However, if the ground engineer and both pilots do not speak a common language
(preferably English), hand signals must be used for pushback, but the ground engineer
should still be on the intercom. If hand signals are to be used (no headset available),
the Captain is to hold a thorough briefing with the pushback marshaller with particular
emphasis to be placed on the signals to be used for an emergency stop. In addition,
the Captain must confirm that the external, Steering Disengagement switch is selected
to DISENG during his external walk round inspection. If this is not possible, the Captain
must press and hold the steering disengage switch, on the control column, until the tow
bar is removed.
Prior to commencing the pushback, the Captain is to confirm with the ground crew that
the nose gear towing light is GREEN and all cargo doors are closed and flush.
They are accomplished in an After Start set-up. The Captain calls for the set-up either
to the line or the complete set-up. Once the set-up is complete to the requested
point, the After Start Checklist is performed. The set-up is given in Table 7.4.
The ground equipment to be removed includes the tow bar. After starting on stand, the
chocks and any external power units must be removed: AC GPU and ground starting
pneumatic supply.
Hydraulic AC Pump #1 (2) is selected ON, if Single-engine Taxi Out has been briefed.
This is to ensure that the #1 (2) hydraulic system is pressurised.
The Captain calls for the flap; the First Officer selects the flap and calls when the flaps
have reached the take-off setting. Then the primary flight controls are checked for full
and free movement. The control surfaces are monitored on the left MFD. The Captain
moves the rudder pedals, column and hand wheel over the full range while the First
Officer checks the surface positions on the left MFD. The First Officer then checks full
and free movement on his rudder pedals by monitoring the Captains pedal check.
During the rudder check it is important that the rudder pedal steering is disengaged;
this is done by the Captain by holding the steering handle down. Although the switch
on the control column may be used this is not the Company preferred method.
Control surface full travel on the synoptic page (solid green) is not required when the
associated cockpit control reaches full deflection. However, no flight control messages
should be displayed on the EICAS.
Both pilots check that the V speeds are still present on their speed tapes and that the
correct speed is indicated in the speed window (V2, V2+10 or VFS) on each PFD.
Note: FMS speeds will not be indicated until an altitude is set for departure.
The APU is shut down after the second engine has been started, unless it is required
by the MEL or ambient conditions.
The Hydraulic Pump #1 (2) is checked to be in the AUTO position. If the pump was
selected to the ON position as a result of single-engine taxi, then it should only be
returned to the AUTO position once the second engine (engine #1 or 2) has been
started.
The flight crew confirm that there is N1 rotation on both engines and the First Officer
checks the EICAS N1 target is not less than the N1 target obtained in the performance
calculation.
The First Officer confirms that the Packs are ON. This check is required if the Packs
were selected OFF for engine start to protect the APU EGT (greater than 550C).
Checks the flight controls before taxi. Using the left MFD synoptic page, verifies that
Rudder, aileron and elevator should be the controls move freely to the fully deflected
checked for free travel to their full deflection position.
stops. Calls out any discrepancy.
Using the left MFD synoptic page, verifies that Checks the rudder for free travel to its full
the rudder moves freely to its fully deflected deflection stops.
positions.
Selects HYD synoptic page on the left MFD.
With consideration to engine warm up times: Starts engine with the same procedure as
Start Engine #1 (2) prescribed in table 7.2, but verbalises all
(Not applicable for Dual Engine Taxi.) aspects required of PF and PM to ensure the
Captain is within the loop whilst taxiing.
When the setup is complete, the Captain calls for the After Start checklist (whether it
be to and from the line for single-engine taxi or in its entirety for dual-engine taxi); the
First Officer reads the checklist.
The After Start Checklist to the line is not complete until a thumbs up is received
from the ground engineer. Taxi lights must not be switched on and taxi clearance must
not be requested until this signal has been received.
In order to allow thermal stabilisation within the engines, they must be operated at or
near to idle settings for a minimum of two minutes prior to setting high thrust values.
Time spent taxiing can count towards the two minutes.
Early versions of the FADEC software would allow a latched EICAS caution message
of ENG EXCEEDANCE to be displayed following a transient peak in engine vibration
levels. This message was inhibited (for high vibration levels only) when FADEC
software version 5.10 was incorporated (installed on all Flybe aircraft). After start,
crews should monitor the appropriate vibration indications on the EICAS display.
It is possible that, prior to start up, the engine had not cooled evenly (reached thermal
stabilisation). This effect of uneven cooling between the top and bottom of the engine
can result in a Bowed Rotor which may cause increased vibration levels of a transient
nature immediately after start until the engine reaches thermal stabilisation. Providing
that all other engine parameters are normal and the vibration levels return to normal
limits, the aircraft may dispatch without engineering input.
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If there are any permanent indications of high vibration levels of either the LP or HP
turbines, the crew should seek maintenance advice prior to dispatch. Likewise, any
ENG EXCEEDANCE EICAS massages will require maintenance input prior to
dispatch.
The specified times at idle, prior to shut down or application of full power, have been
stipulated in order to minimise the chances of bowed rotor starts.
2.8 Taxi
2.8.1 Taxi After Start
The standard procedure is for the Captain to taxi the aircraft. Thus the taxiing tasks are
distributed between the Captain and the First Officer rather than PF and PM.
When the After Start Checklist is complete, the First Officer calls ATC for taxi
instructions.
When clearance has been received, the Captain confirms the QNH by calling
QNH ... set. Each pilot checks that his side of the aircraft is clear of obstructions
before taxiing. The Captain calls clear left and the First Officer calls clear right.
The Captain releases the parking brake, switches on the taxi lights and calls for the
Taxi Checklist.
When all Brake Temperature indicators in the MFD Status Page are in the green range,
it is safe for take-off. However, if any of those indicators reaches the amber range, the
associated brake must be allowed to cool down.
The amber range may be reached in normal operation and it does not represent any
potential risk to the brake system.
The wind conditions may help to cool down one brake assembly more than the other,
depending on wind orientation and intensity. In addition, worn brakes may reach higher
temperatures than new brakes which may cause uneven brake temperatures.
Temperature differences between brakes of the same landing gear leg may reach up
to 200C. Within this range, they are considered normal and do not represent any
potential risk to the airplane braking capability.
Temperature differences between brakes of RH and LH landing gear legs can be even
higher than 200C, for the reasons previously mentioned.
If the airplane shows a tendency to turn to the side of the brake with higher
temperature, it may be an indication of dragging brake. In this case, maintenance shall
be informed, regardless of any EICAS message mentioned before.
Do not maintain brakes partially applied during taxi to control the speed of the aircraft.
It is better to let the aircraft accelerate and then reduce speed with a steady brake
application. This technique reduces brake temperature and increases the life of the
brakes.
Apart from short duration halts, the parking brake must always be applied when the
aircraft is stationary. Whenever the parking brake is applied, the brake pressure is
checked.
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Once taxi has commenced, idle thrust is more than adequate in most conditions.
Nosewheel scrubbing indicates excessive steering angles or excessive taxi speed for
the surface conditions.
The normal straight taxi speed should not exceed 30 knots. The recommended taxi
speeds are:
2.8.5 Turning
The nosewheel should not be turned when the aircraft is stationary.
Do not start a turn until sufficient forward speed has been attained to allow the aircraft
to turn at idle thrust.
When approaching a turn, adjust the speed for the surface conditions and the turn
radius.
During a turn, maintain positive pressure on the nosewheel steering tiller to prevent the
nose gear returning abruptly to the centre position.
Straight ahead steering and large radius turns should be accomplished with rudder
pedal steering only.
Avoid stopping the aircraft in a turn, as excessive thrust will be required to start taxiing
again. After completing a turn, and prior to stopping, centre the nosewheel and allow
the aircraft to roll straight ahead for a short distance.
Increased traffic.
Airport expansion.
Large airports with complex runways and taxiways.
The cockpit workload can be reduced if the flight crew properly plan and brief the
expected taxi route. If the ATC clearance differs from that expected, make sure that it
is understood and briefed.
Pilots should:
Heads down time must be minimised while the aircraft is moving: for example FMS
entries.
Both pilots must agree that clearance has been given before crossing runways or lining
up for take-off.
The cabin secure report has been received. The C/A 1 gives a cabin secure call over
the cabin interphone. The First Officer acknowledges the call and informs the
Captain.
Once the cabin is secure, the First Officer selects the sterile lights to ON. This serves
as a useful reminder that the Cabin Secure report has been received. The cabin
secure call also means that the cabin crew are seated and strapped into their seats;
ready for departure.
The take-off configuration is checked by the First Officer after the Emergency/Park
Brake has been released by pressing the T/O CONFIG button on the control
pedestal. If a safe configuration for take-off is set, the synthetic message take-off
OK will be given.
The PF reviews the take-off briefing if a new clearance has been given since the
take-off briefing was completed.
Once all actions are complete, the First Officer reads the checklist.
If a Quick re-set procedure is used, Captains should record the fact in the
"non-airworthiness" comments box of the Technical Log.
The only message that might require extra investigation is the Flight Control No
Dispatch. There is a normal quick re-set that can be applied and if this does not work,
crews are authorised to carry out the Flight Control Return to Service procedure. This
is listed in the AOM, Section 13 and is a complex process. It may only be completed
whilst in telephone contact with an engineer in MAINTROL.
When lining up, the Captain compares his altimeter with the expected threshold
elevation and his compass with the expected runway direction. These are not precision
checks, just reasonableness checks. The First Officer should cross check his altimeter
with the Captains and confirm that the difference is within allowable tolerances for
RVSM operations (50 ft max and within 75 ft of airfield elevation).
Equal power settings should be verified before releasing the brakes, especially on
slippery runways. The A/T system will automatically engage when the thrust levers
have both been advanced beyond 50 TLA (halfway between IDLE and TO/GA).
Under normal conditions the nosewheel steering tiller should not be used above
20 knots. Directional control is maintained using the rudder pedals; initially, rudder
pedal steering is used; the rudder becomes effective between 40 and 60 knots. At aft
CGs and light weights, the nosewheel steering effectiveness may be reduced; hold the
control column slightly forward to improve nosewheel steering.
The take-off procedure and calls are given in Table 9.2. The normal take-off profile is
shown in Figure 9.1.
If the First Officer is the PF, he will remove his hand from the thrust levers after take-off
thrust has been checked. The Captain is always responsible for aborting the take-off;
he will always hold the thrust levers from the moment take-off thrust has been reached
until V1 is announced.
The FD must be used for all take-offs; the aircraft is rotated to follow the pitch
command. If the FD becomes unavailable, the aircraft should be rotated to the pitch
angle displayed on the TAKE-OFF page 3/3 on the MCDU. The aircraft should be
rotated smoothly towards the target pitch attitude; use a rotation rate of approximately
2 to 3 per second. High weights, high temperatures or engine failure will require a
lower rotation rate. To ensure adequate performance, the correct rotation technique
must be used. Liftoff will occur prior to reaching the initial climb target attitude.
Note: The fly-by-wire control system incorporates a tailstrike protection feature (on
E195 only) which reduces elevator authority until clear of the ground. Whilst this
feature will help prevent inadvertent tailstrike on rotation, it cannot cater for
gross mishandling.
When a positive rate of climb is indicated on the altimeter and VSI, PM calls Positive
climb; PF confirms the positive rate of climb and then calls Gear up; PM then
selects the gear up; when three white UP indications are given on the EICAS, PM calls
Gear up.
Starts stopwatch.
Verifies that:
N1 target is achieved.
Engine parameters are
normal.
ATTCS is armed.
Thrust checked
ATTCS armed
80 knots 80 knots
Checked
V1 V1
VR Rotate
V2 V2
There are three possible scenarios that could arise when setting power manually:
Firstly, PF does not advance the Thrust Levers all the way to the TOGA gate or,
secondly, PF advances the Thrust Levers beyond the TOGA gate. Finally, PF
advances the Thrust Levers correctly and establishes them in the TOGA gate. In the
third case (correctly setting the Thrust Levers into TOGA), the remainder of the take-off
roll is normal and identical to when the autothrottle is used except that HOLD mode will
not annunciate at 60 KIAS.
In the case of the first scenario (Thrust Levers not advanced all the way to the TOGA
gate), it is likely that the correct N1 will still be achieved unless the thrust levers are a
long way short of the TOGA gate. However, ATTCS will not arm and, at 60 knots, the
ENG TLA NOT TOGA caution will illuminate. In this instance, PM should advance the
Thrust Levers into the TOGA gate. ATTCS will then arm and the caution will extinguish.
The take-off may be continued once these actions are completed.
The second scenario (Thrust Levers advanced beyond the TOGA gate) will result in the
FADEC selecting TO# RSV. Clearly this is sufficient power to take-off. However,
ATTCS will not arm (because both engines are running at RSV power). In this case,
take-off may be continued and at acceleration altitude the Thrust Levers can be moved
just below TOGA and re-set into the TOGA gate to restore normal power demands.
Although the FADEC will protect the engine limitations, crews should be mindful that
TO#RSV is a five minute rating.
PM has a very important role to play when setting take-off power manually. He will need
to ensure that power is set correctly and make any adjustments necessary to achieve
a safe take-off. The most important indicator that power has been set correctly is when
the ATTCS arms. Should ATTCS not arm, the most likely cause is that the Thrust
Levers are not in the TOGA gate. In this case PM will have to check the set power. If
power has increased to TO# RSV, the Thrust Levers are beyond the TOGA gate,
conversely, if power is normal or slightly below the target N1, the Thrust Levers will not
have been advanced far enough. All such events must be reported by ASR.
The most assured way of setting power manually is to conduct a standing start and only
release the pedals once ATTCS is armed. However, there is an attendant risk of FOD
damage should this option be used.
At 400 ft agl, the FGS lateral mode is set. At the acceleration altitude, the aircraft is
accelerated through the flap/slat retraction speed schedule towards an initial target
speed: (usually 210 knots or FMS speed).
PF calls for the appropriate lateral mode; PM sets the lateral mode.
PF makes a passing MSA; call PM checks that the passing altitude corresponds to
the MSA for the aircraft position and replies position checked. Where the MSA is
divided into sectors, the MSA appropriate to the passing MSA call is the highest
minimum sector altitude on the departure flight path.
When cleared to a FL, but no later than the transition altitude, the left and right
BARO SET must be set to STD. The IESS remains on QNH except during RVSM
operations when it is set to STD PF calls for the Climb Checklist.
2.9.5 AP Engagement
The minimum engagement height for the AP is 400 ft agl. However, the AP must not
be selected to ON until the pitch mode for the climb sequence has been selected
(usually FLCH or VNAV). In high workload situations such as a departure in a busy
TMA, the AP should be engaged as soon as possible after take-off.
The flap retraction schedule for use if the F-bug is not available is given in Tables 9.4
(E195) and 9.5 (E175).
3 V2 +8 V2 +16 VFS 23
2 V2 +8 VFS 23
1 VFS 23
2 V2 +8 VFS 17
1 VFS 17
Alternatively, flaps can be retracted by reference to the Green Dot when the target
flap retraction speed is Green Dot +10 kts for each flap setting.
Flaps zero:
Set / Check initial climb speed
After take-off checklist
400ft aal:
HDG or NAV
The 10,000 feet checks and calls are given in Table 9.7.
2.9.9 Speeds
The recommended speed for maximum angle of climb is VFS.
The rule of thumb speed for maximum rate of climb is VFS + 50 knots/Mach 0.60. A
more accurate speed can be found in the CPH.
After passing Acceleration Altitude, VNAV may be selected. The default climb speeds
in the FMS are:
If different FMS climb speeds are required, they can be set on the performance CLIMB
page or the PERFORMANCE INIT page 1. The Company prefer to use 250 KIAS/
M0.73 in the climb for fuel saving purposes.
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2.10 Cruise
2.10.1 Weather
PM keeps a check on weather at en-route alternates, destination and destination
alternates using VOLMET and ATIS.
Periodically, the Captain updates the IESS with the en route QNH (unless in RVSM
airspace when the IESS is set to STD until destination ATIS is received when QNH is
again set).
2.10.2 Terrain
Routinely, note should be made of any significant terrain features or obstacles that
could be a cause for concern if the aircraft had to descend to a lower altitude due to
loss of thrust or cabin pressure.
Consider the best heading for the descent and engine-out stabilising altitudes.
2.10.3 Fuel
Once established in the cruise, PM checks the fuel contents and balance. Fuel checks
should be made every 30 minutes. A gross landing weight check is made towards the
end of the cruise and recorded on the OFP (PLOG).
2.10.4 Systems
Once established in the cruise, PM reviews the EICAS and the synoptic pages every
20 minutes.
If flying under conditions that might result in fuel temperature dropping close to the limit
for the fuel in use, monitor fuel temperature periodically on the fuel synoptic page.
The EFB units have installed a cost index application. This should be used by crews
during the cruise phase of the flight in order to determine the most cost effective speed
for that sector. Clearly, this speed is likely to be slower than that included in the filed
flight plan. If ATC request a crew to speed up, this should be complied with.
The speed reduction could be achieved using the SPEED SELECTOR KNOB on the
guidance panel or changing the cruise speed value on PERFORMANCE INIT page on
MCDU.
If the speed reduction does not decrease the vibration levels the applicable QRH
procedure must be promptly accomplished.
At any time at pilots discretion and if engine vibration occurs at any another conditions
the applicable QRH procedures must be accomplished.
Upon entering airspace where a logon "CPDLC NOT IN USE. VOICE ONLY
is maintained but CPDLC is not UNTIL NOTIFIED."
available, the flight will receive the
following CPDLC message:
Operational
Circumstance R/T Phraseology Pilot Action
LOG-ON provides the ground system with the information necessary for data link
application association. To establish a successful log-on the flight identification
displayed on the ATC NOTIFY/STATUS MCDU page shall be identical to that on the
filed flight plan. If the flight identification is changed a new log on should be performed.
LOG-ON request to can be sent some 10-15 minutes prior to lateral entry. For
departing aerodromes close to or below UAC, it may be conducted on the ground.
After log-on, the ground system will initiate the CPDLC connection automatically and
appropriate status information will be available to flight crew. Flight crew should only
initiate operational CPDLC downlinks with a specific ATC station after:
Receiving a data link message confirming the identity of the ATC unit concerned, or;
They are in voice communication with that ATC station. After a frequency change,
you have to check in by voice prior to the use of CPDLC.
Downlinks received before the arrival of the CURRENT ATC UNIT message on the
flight deck will be rejected, do not attempt to send CPDLC downlink messages before
you receive this CPDLC message.
When transferring from one ATC center to another, the log-on information will be
forwarded via the ground system. The CPDLC connection to the new ATC center is
automatic, and appropriate information is displayed to the flight crew.
Prior to flight, the crew should verify the availability of the CPDLC service on the
intended route.
Voice communications and voice instructions have precedence over data link
communications at all times.
The flight crew and/or the air traffic controller involved have the discretion to
discontinue the use of data link services.
Messages received via data link should be replied to via data link. In the same way,
messages received via voice should be replied to via voice.
If a conflicting CPDLC clearance/instruction is received, the crew should ask for
clarification via voice.
If the content of a CPDLC ATC message is uncertain, the crew should reject the
instruction sending an UNABLE message. After sending the UNABLE message the
crew should use CPDLC or voice to confirm the content of the message.
Clearances and instructions received via data link should be accomplished by the
crew in a timely fashion. This time to accomplish the ATC instructions accounts for
both sending a CPDLC response and initiating the required action.
The specific phraseology developed to be used in conjunction with data link
operation generally is to be strictly applied. The specific phraseology to be used is
also to be strictly applied when reverting from CPDLC to voice.
If aircrew receive an ERROR response to a downlink that they have sent, they
should not re-send it by CPDLC as it may only generate another ERROR. In case of
any doubt or error crews shall straight revert to voice to clarify the situation.
Crews should refrain from any inquiry on the frequency with regard to reasons for
provider aborts or CPDLC usage. Controllers do not have further information and it
is up the discretion of the individual ATCO if it is safe to use CPDLC.
Particular vigilance shall be exercised by aircrews in order not to misinterpret old
CPDLC message in the LOG with actual CPDLC clearances.
In the event of voice communication failure, the availability of a CPDLC between the
airplane and the ATC station does not relieve the flight crew from following the ICAO,
or any other local authority procedure, for loss of communications.
Once the message is read the crew should brief its content in order to determine if it is
possible to comply with the instruction received. The PM responds by selecting the
applicable answer from the available options on the ATC UPLINK MSG page.
The PF should confirm the content of the response message before sending the
message. After confirmation from PF, the PM will select the applicable response on the
MCDU. The message status will change to CLOSED on the ATC MSG LOG page
indicating that the message was correctly sent.
PF PM
To maintain the same level of situational awareness, the PM should verify and confirm
with the PF the content of the request/report message before sending the message to
ATC. To verify the message content the PM selects VERIFY on the applicable ATC
REQ/REPORT page on the MCDU.
Once both pilots have agreed with the request/report message content the PM selects
SEND on the ATC MSG VERIFY page. The message status will change to SENT on
the ATC MSG LOG page indicating that the message was correctly sent.
PF PM
2.11 Descent
2.11.1 Briefing
The passenger briefing, arrival briefing and descent checklist should all be completed
before the top of descent.
PF and PM prepare themselves for the briefing. PF gives the briefing. The preparation
and briefing are summarised in Table 11.1.
Briefing
The PF for the approach will brief the arrival; the brief should be given in an interactive fashion
and must include the following elements:
Top of descent position.
Weather, runway surface and NOTAMS.
Fuel, including holding capability.
Terrain, descent profile and safety altitudes.
Aerodrome, STAR and approach plates with missed approach procedure and route to
alternate.
Radio aid set-up.
Review of BARO/RA minimums and landing speeds.
Use of continuous ignition, weather radar and TAD.
Autobrake setting.
Taxi routing after landing including stopping technique for expected runway exit; plus
Single-engine Taxi procedures.
Any special conditions e.g., GNSS only approach.
Inoperative aircraft components.
CATEGORY II or Category III brief if required use aide memoire card or CPH.
The expected landing weight is verified on the FMS. The speeds to be set are:
VREF.
VAPP.
VAC.
VFS.
PM checks that the FMS expected landing weight is reasonable when compared with
the OFP. He then sets the landing speeds on the MCDU. PF then cross checks the
data.
Pilots are not to use the flaps to increase drag and assist in slowing down the aircraft.
This poor practice increases stress on the flap/slat mechanism which has suffered from
repeat failures in the past. Additionally, in turbulence, there is an increased risk of
exceeding the flap limiting speeds.
2.11.5 Icing
The STALL PROT ICE SPEED landing speed values should be used if:
Note: Landing speeds with and without icing are the same on the 195.
Additionally at FL 150
Selects:
Sterile Lights to on.
Fasten Belts to on.
Delay the selection of the fasten seat belt signs if the time to touchdown is expected to
be significantly greater than normal; for example, if prolonged holding is expected.
Remember that passengers may need to use the toilets. However, the seat belt signs
should be on by 10 minutes before touchdown.
Turbulence may dictate that the seat belt signs are switched on earlier than usual. If so,
inform the cabin staff so that they do not prematurely prepare the cabin for landing.
2.11.9 MSA
Descent below MSA must be approached with caution. The procedure and calls are
given in Table 11.4.
Approaching the TOD set the Altitude Selector to the cleared altitude and the FMS
commands to descent upon reaching the TOD.
The FMS commands a VPATH descent unless a late descent is required or the lateral
mode is other than LNAV.
In VFLCH descents, the altitude constraint may not be reached by the altitude
constraint waypoint. VFLCH is similar to FLCH descents where the guidance is to
maintain the selected speed with the engine thrust at idle.
If the speed control is set to MANUAL, the pilot is responsible for maintaining the proper
speed limits and constraints. In this case it is recommended that the airspeed is
synchronised with the FMS speeds.
Note: For fuel conservation reasons, the Company, preferred descent profile is Mach
0.74 or 250 knots. Pilots should change these settings on the PERFORMANCE
INIT page 1/3. Wherever possible the continuous descent approach (CDA)
profile should be used.
Descent speed reduced from 290 knots / 250 knots to 250 knots
Figure 11.1
2102
Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
Normal Procedures
Calculate the difference between the actual flight level and the desired flight level
(FLDIFF).
Divide FLDIFF by 10 and then multiply by 2.
Add 15.
FL
In summary: Distance = 2
DIFF 15
10
Without VNAV guidance, the initial distance to descent for approximately a 3 descent
angle can be found as follows:
Calculate the difference between the actual flight level and the desired flight level
(FLDIFF).
Divide FLDIFF by 10 and then multiply by 3.
FL
In summary: Distance = 3 DIFF
10
For a cruise flight level of 350 and a desired flight level of 70, the idle descent
calculation is:
Distance = 2 350 - 70 +15 = 71 nautical miles
10
For a cruise flight level of 350 and a desired flight level of 70, the 3 descent calculation
is:
Distance = 3 350 - 70 = 84 nautical miles
10
CDAs are encouraged at all airports (mandatory at LHR, LGW, STN) to realise the
benefits of reduced fuel burn and lower environmental noise impact.
Crews should use all available data to achieve a CDA. It is recommended that crews
use VNAV, FPA or VS in the decent rather than FLCH or IAS. The 500 fpm ROD does
not apply below the transition altitude and accurate speed control is essential.
The E-Jets are slippery a/c and reducing speed in any decent with a nominal 3 degree
glide can be problematical even with the use of speed brake. The a/c should arrive at
FL 100 at 250 kts and crews should consider either reducing the glidepath angle or
reducing speed to around 230 kts just above the transition altitude so as to arrive at the
turn in for the closing heading of the ILS at 210 kts.
A suggested approach procedure is as follows: Closing LOC Flap 1, Speed 180 kts.
G/S Live, Flap 2, Speed 160 kts. Five Miles DME Flap 3, Gear Down, Speed 150 kts.
Four Miles DME, Land Flap, VAPP, Landing Checklist. Stable Check 500 ft Rad Alt.
Sets/confirms QNH.
QNH ... set, passing ... feet for ... feet
Checks that the called altitude agrees with the If GNSS approaches are to be made check
altimeter. altimeters agree to within 100 ft.
2.12.5 Lights
When cleared to land, PM switches on the nose landing lights.
A stabilised approach is one in which all the criteria for stabilisation are achieved by the
applicable minimum stabilisation height and are then maintained.
The criteria for a stabilised approach are divided into two distinct parts. There is one
set of criteria for the should gate (at 1000 ft arte) and one for the must gate (at 500 ft
RA). If pilots do not achieve the should gate there is every likelihood that they will fail
to meet the must gate criteria and captains must consider taking immediate, early
action in the form of a missed approach. If the appropriate must gate criteria are not
achieved, a go-around must be flown; this is ordered by PM.
1000 ft arte.
Aircraft established on the centreline/localiser and correct glideslope.
Speed 140 KIAS 10 kts.
Flap 5.
Gear down.
A CAT 1 approach must be flown within one dot of the glideslope and localiser.
A CAT 2 approach must be flown within a dot of the glideslope and localiser.
A nonprecision approach must be flown within 5 of the inbound course.
On a circling approach, the aircraft must be wings level on final by 300 ft arte.
On a GNSS only approach the CDI must be within 1 dot (this equals half the RNP
default value for the approach) of the inbound course.
The threshold crossing height is the height at which the aircraft crosses the runway
threshold when on the correct flight path. It is often referred to as the screen height; it
is 50 ft for most approaches.
VREF is defined as 1.23 times the stalling speed in one g flight (VS-1g).
Apart from short term fluctuations, the speed on the final approach must not be below
VREF.
Typical VREF values are 100 to 130 knots; so VREF provides a margin of between 20 to
30 knots above the stalling speed.
Even in relatively calm air, speed errors of around 5 knots can occur. It is always
necessary to target a final approach speed 5 knots above VREF.
A gust factor is first calculated and then the wind correction factor is determined.
The wind correction is equal to half the steady headwind plus the full gust factor. For
example, if the wind is reported as 20 knots gusting 28:
For both flaps 5 and flaps full landing, the minimum wind correction is 5 knots and the
maximum wind correction is 20 knots.
Pilots should be aware that when landing speed increments are applied following an
emergency, they are applied to the full flap landing speeds and that the first 5 knots of
the wind correction are included.
If the threshold is crossed at speeds above VREF, the safety margins on landing
distance may be eroded.
2.12.13 Accuracy
The importance of establishing and maintaining a stabilised approach at the correct
speed cannot be overemphasised.
Small short-term speed fluctuations averaging the correct target speed are acceptable.
Excessive speed over the threshold can very easily lead to an overrun of a limiting
runway. Too low a speed could result in landing short of the runway or a heavy landing.
The threshold speed provides for safe flight during the approach and landing. There is
some margin in the aircraft landing performance for errors in speed and height over the
threshold. However, the scheduled performance does not allow for large errors:
especially the combination of high speed and high threshold crossing height.
If there is any doubt as to the accuracy of the landing, especially considering the
threshold crossing height, the speed and the expected touchdown point, then a go-
around must be flown.
1 180
2 160
3 150
4 140
5 140
FULL 130
Note: For performance calculation, the following maximum bank angles are allowed
at various low speed situations:
2 215
4 180
5 180
FULL 165
The maximum speed with flap down is VFE for the flap configuration. The minimum
speed until established on final approach is the minimum manoeuvring speed for the
flap configuration. Apart from short term fluctuations, the minimum speed on final is
VREF for the flap configuration.
The initial approach can be flown clean at up to 250 knots. The recommended
minimum speed clean is 210 knots. Frequently, the speed flown depends on ATC
requirements. However, assess the energy (that is the speed and height combination)
against track miles to the final descent point, and aim to start the deceleration with
passenger comfort in mind. Ideally, the speed brake should not be used, but profiles
sometimes demand its use especially if the use of ice protection has forced a high idle
thrust. Approaching the final approach track, select Flap 1 and reduce speed to
180 knots; this is also a suitable configuration for the start of the downwind leg of a
visual circuit.
Aim to be at 160 knots with Flap 2 on the final approach track approaching the final
descent point. This is also a suitable configuration for:
Sometimes, for spacing reasons, ATC may request that vectors are flown at speeds
below the minimum manoeuvre speed for Flap 3 (150 KIAS). Rather than having to
select Flap 5 with gear down, crews should consider selecting Flap 4 with gear up in
order to reduce drag and, hence, fuel burn during prolonged vectoring at low level.
This procedure may be used at speeds down to 140 KIAS and not below 1500 ft agl.
Crews are reminded that normal, stabilised approach criteria still apply.
Approaching the instrument descent point, or just before turning base on a visual
circuit, select the landing gear down and flap 3; reduce speed to 150 knots.
By the stabilisation altitude, the aircraft must be fully configured and speed must be
stabilised at VAPP. VAPP is a target speed for the approach not a minimum; take care
not to carry excess speed, especially on approaches to short runways.
When the weather is close to minima or some other condition indicates that the Landing
Checklist should be completed at an early stage, the gear should be selected down well
before the marker or its equivalent.
The final approach speed has safety margins for most operating conditions. In order to
ensure that the flight path is stable, unnecessary speed increments and late flap
selections should be avoided.
WARNING
Pitch rates sufficient to cause aircraft structural damage can occur if a large nose down control
column movement is made prior to nosewheel touchdown.
In the case of a bounced landing, it is recommended that pilots initiate the go-around
procedure because it is very difficult to evaluate the landing distance remaining and
also the aircraft energy.
If the airspeed has dropped below VREF, the go-around may be initiated but flaps
should not be retracted until airspeed is greater than VREF.
If the ground spoilers do not deploy, braking effectiveness may be reduced by as much
as 60% initially, since very little weight is on the wheels; brake application may cause
rapid brake modulation by the antiskid system.
Do not use the nosewheel steering tiller until reaching taxi speed.
2.12.24 Stopping
The braking applied should be commensurate with the distance to run to the
appropriate runway exit point. However the brakes must be applied such that speed is
comfortably under control before the end of the runway.
If doubt ever exists about stopping, or the runway distance is limiting, apply maximum
brake pedal deflection and maximum reverse thrust.
With maximum pedal deflection, the anti-skid system will modulate the brakes for
optimum braking performance. Do not pump the brake pedals.
Carbon brakes wear faster when they are cool; so avoid sudden crisp braking with cool
brakes. The optimum temperature for carbon brakes is 200C.
If reverse thrust is required, maintain up to maximum reverse thrust until the speed
approaches 60 knots. Then start moving the thrust levers towards MIN REV so that
MIN REV is achieved at 60 knots. The thrust levers should be moved to IDLE by the
time 30 knots is achieved.
The thrust reverser is more effective at high speeds; the use of reverse below 60 kt
increases the chances of foreign object ingestion by the engine. If necessary, the thrust
reversers can be used until the aircraft come to a complete stop.
After touchdown, smoothly apply a constant brake pedal pressure consistent with the
desired stopping performance. For a short or slippery runway, use full brake pedal.
The anti-skid system will stop the aircraft in a shorter distance than is possible with
anti-skid off or brake pedal modulation; this applies to all runway conditions.
The anti-skid system adapts to runway conditions by sensing a skid or impending skid
and adjusting the brake pressure at the wheels for maximum braking effort. When
brakes are applied on a slippery runway, several skid cycles will occur before the
anti-skid system establishes the brake pressure for the most effective braking.
2.12.27 Autobrakes
Pilots are encouraged to use autobrakes for landing as this results in reduced brake
wear. However, it should be noted that all tables for unfactored landing distances
assume that manual braking is used. This is because each of the autobrake settings
provides a set deceleration rate as opposed to manual braking where it is assumed that
the pilot sets maximum braking throughout the landing roll. For take-off, the RTO
setting on autobrakes does apply full braking and can be assumed to be comparable
to manual braking. Tables that show the different landing distances for each brake
setting are provided in Section 4. Which ever autobrake setting is used, the autobrakes
should be disengaged at 80 kts during the landing roll.
Review the approach procedures and speeds earlier: Keep your situation
awareness over the stabilised approach and stabilised landing is mandatory for a
well-planned and executed approach;
Use Full Flap;
Cross the Threshold at Screen Height of 50 ft and VREF;
Avoid extended flare;
Conduct a positive landing and fly nose wheel to the runway;
Apply maximum thrust reverse. If necessary the thrust reverser can be used until the
airplane comes to a complete stop;
Immediately after the main landing gear wheels have touched down apply firm and
steady maximum manual brakes andhold pedal pressure until the airplane
decelerates to a safe taxi speed within the runway;
Lower nose wheel immediately to the runway. It will decrease lift and increase main
landing gear loading.
Note: The same technique could be used for Flaps 5 configuration; nevertheless the
landing distance will increase accordingly.
Ensure that the nosewheel is on the ground and that the ground spoilers have
deployed before applying the brakes.
Initiate wheel braking using very light pedal pressure and increase pressure as
airspeed reduces. Apply steady pressure; do not pump the brakes.
Anti-skid off braking requires even more care if the aircraft weight is low.
Category 2 approaches must be monitored approaches with the Captain PF for the
landing. If a Category 2 approach is expected, the First Officer is PF from the start of
the flight through to DH; if a missed approach is required, the First Officer flies the
missed approach.
The Captain may decide to make a monitored approach at any time. A monitored
approach can be used to advantage in adverse weather conditions; for example: poor
visibility, low cloud base or strong crosswinds. In deciding who should land the aircraft,
the Captain should consider the experience and competence of the First Officer.
In order to stay within the operational margins of the required landing distance the crew
must conduct a stabilised approach and landing using the correct landing techniques.
However, aside those factors, if the approach and landing is performed with deviations
from the standard procedures, the operational margin available will be reduced or even
exceeded.
The following operational factors, among others, have effect over the airplane landing
distance:
Unstabilised approach;
Crossing runway threshold with airspeed above VREF;
Crossing runway threshold above the screen height;
Extended flare, touching down the runway beyond the touchdown zone;
No proper application of the available deceleration devices (brakes, spoilers and
thrust reverse);
Deceleration devices not applied until a safe taxi speed is achieved.
If the airplane crosses the threshold with 10 kt above the VREF, the landing distance
increases by approximately 20%. Crossing the threshold at 100 ft instead of the normal
screen height increases the landing distance by approximately 35%.
Extending the flare during landing increases the landing distance because the airplane
will touchdown the runway in a point ahead of the runway touchdown zone, usually
located at 1000 feet from the runway threshold. Extending the flare by 3 seconds
increases the landing distance by approximately 25%.
Figure 12.1
REFERENCE LANDING
Vref + 10 kt
3 s extended Flare
100 ft at Threshold
1 1.67
UNFACTORED LANDING REQUIRED LANDING
DISTANCE (DRY) DISTANCE (DRY)
Prior to carrying out a visual approach, it is of vital importance that a thorough briefing
is conducted. Both pilots must be aware of the flight path and gates that should be
achieved during the manoeuvre. In addition, PF must brief his proposed contingency
actions in case he fails to achieve any of the gates; this includes the missed approach
profile which should also be discussed with ATC. Having completed a comprehensive
briefing, both pilots will know the expected flight path and will be able to monitor
progress accordingly. This is particularly important for PM who cannot conduct his
monitoring tasks to a satisfactory standard unless he is fully cognisant of PFs proposed
actions. In short, a visual approach is not to be flown on an ad-hoc basis just because
PF suddenly becomes visual with the destination airfield. Unless a visual briefing has
been completed, the pilots should continue to follow the already briefed instrument
approach profile.
Whilst it is acknowledged that the use of visual approaches can save both time and
money (in terms of reduced fuel burn), they should not be used at the expense of
safety. All visual approaches should be treated as a procedural manoeuvre with the
objective of achieving a 4 to 5 mile final at approximately 1200 ft to 1500 ft arte to then
meet the Should Gate, stabilised criteria. Figure 12.2 shows a number of gates and
these should be part of the mental picture of the approach to land. If PF fails to meet
any of the gates, he must propose immediate action to ensure that he meets
subsequent gates. If it starts to go wrong, there is no disgrace in calling it off early and
requesting assistance from ATC such as radar vectors or an orbit.
Figure 12.2 shows the approach profile for both a downwind and base leg join. Each
profile culminates at the same point (Key Aiming Point) which, if met, should ensure a
safe and stable final approach to land. Normal stabilised approach criteria still apply
and, should a go-around be required, it is recommended that the Climb Sequence is
completed as far as Flap 1, speed 180 KIAS whilst climbing to 2000 ft arte. Once
re-established downwind, PF can then target the Key Aiming Point for a further attempt
to land. In this case, the aircraft will be slightly lower than the ideal profile and the ROD
in the final turn may have to be reduced. This will have the effect of slowing the
manoeuvre to give a greater chance of achieving the stabilised approach criteria.
By using the defined gates for a visual approach it will become apparent that various
ground features at a particular airport can be used as useful visual markers/aiming
points. Throughout the visual approach, both pilots must monitor the glide path for
reasonableness. This can be achieved either by height checks using approximately
300 ft per mile to run or, by viewing the PAPIs.
The key to achieving a well flown visual approach is to ensure that it is thoroughly
planned, briefed and executed in a manner that does not result in a rushed manoeuvre.
Early recognition of becoming either too fast or too high will enable PF to take
appropriate corrective measures, or to request assistance from ATC. The Key Aiming
Point is designated as a desirable position on an approach such that the pilots can roll
out on a 5 mile final and easily meet the Should Gate criteria. On a downwind join, the
Key Aiming Point is at 8 track miles to run (3 miles in the turn and 5 miles final) and
coincides with the commencement of the turn onto final. For a base leg join, the Key
Aiming Point will be displaced further out on the approach because the turn will only be
for approximately 1.5 track miles.
Full use of the vertical navigation features of the FMS is encouraged and the Map
function of the MFD is also very helpful in planning and achieving the correct turning
points.
Pilots should not perform visual approaches unless the weather conditions are
commensurate with the proposed profile. A cloud base of 2500 ft (or MSA if higher) and
visibility of at least 8 km should be considered as minimum requirements.
Approaching the final approach track, select flap 1 and reduce speed to 180 knots.
After localiser capture, the heading selector is set to the missed approach heading.
At glideslope intercept:
If the AP or FD is used for the approach, APP is selected once the aircraft is cleared to
intercept the localiser. The aircraft will not descend on the glideslope before the
localiser is captured.
The minimum use altitude is 50 ft. So it is not mandatory to disengage the AP at the
Category 1 decision height, but the AP must be disengaged by the minimum use
height. In poor weather conditions, it is often an advantage to leave the AP engaged
below the Category 1 decision height. The AP generally continues to fly the beam well,
leaving PF with more spare capacity for flight path monitoring. If the AP is used below
DH then:
180 knots
160 knots
150 knots
When the localiser becomes alive, PF calls Localiser live; PM checks the localiser
indication on his display and responds Checked.
PF calls Glideslope live; PM checks the glideslope indication on his display and
responds Checked.
PF then calls for the gear and flaps 3. The call is Gear down, flaps 3, speed 150.
PM then selects gear down, selects flap 3 and selects 150 knots.
PF calls for the go-around altitude to be set on the altitude selector. The call is Set
go-around altitude. PM sets the go-around altitude; PF checks the setting.
PF then calls for landing flap and the landing checklist; the call is either Flap 5,
speed VAPP, landing checklist or Full flap, speed VAPP, landing checklist.
The glideslope check point is the on slope altitude at a DME range, locator or marker.
If a DME range to touchdown is available and an on glideslope altitude is published at
4 DME, then this is the preferred means of checking the glideslope.
At the GS check point, PF calls the actual altitude followed by the facility. PM checks
that the altitude is correct and responds with the altitude followed by Checked.
At 800 ft radio altitude, PF calls 800 rad alt, APPR 1 green; PM checks the
annunciation and responds Checked.
At 500 ft radio altitude, PF calls 500 rad alt; PM checks the height and responds
either Stable or Go-around.
At 100 ft above the decision altitude, PM calls 100 above; PF checks the altitude and
responds Checked.
If the call is visual, PF lands the aircraft. If the call is go-around, PF executes a missed
approach.
If visual contact is made by PF before DA, he calls Visual. If visual contact is made
by PM before decision altitude, he calls Visual followed by what he has seen (lights
or runway) and the direction.
Checked
DA Decide
Visual or Go-around
If the call is visual, lands.
If the call is go-around,
executes a missed approach.
The terrain awareness part of the EGPWS must be serviceable prior to conducting any
non-precision approach.
Levelling at the MDA and then continuing to the MAP often leaves the aircraft too high
to make a safe landing. So, if circling is not intended, the EASA Part OPS procedure is
a Continuous Descent Final Approach (CDFA). The three elements of the procedure
are:
The last segment of the approach is flown so that the aircraft is on a nominal 3
glideslope to the threshold when (M)DA is reached. The FPA facility of the flight
guidance system can be used to fly a nominal 3 approach path. Alternatively, the
VGP mode can be used on any published procedure.
Under EASA Part OPS, providing the approach is flown using the CDFA technique,
the MDA may be treated as a DA provided that the airfield has published such
minima. The descent below DA during the go-around is accepted and Flybe have a
Safety Case registered with the CAA to adopt this procedure.
The decision to land or go around is made at DA.
Descend outbound with flap 2 at 160 knots.
When tracking inbound and ready for the final descent, set the go-around altitude on
the altitude selector.
When inbound and approaching the final descent point (FDP):
Select the gear down.
Select flap 3.
Reduce speed to 150 knots.
At the FDP, start a descent at the appropriate descent angle assisted by use of the FPA
or VGP facility.
At the FAF:
Both pilots start their stopwatches.
Descent is continued to DA if circling is not intended. If the required visual
references have not been established by DA or the Missed Approach Point (which
ever is achieved first) the appropriate missed approach procedure must be
executed.
During the final approach, PM calls out any check altitudes at appropriate crossing
fixes. If required, PF adjusts the descent profile accordingly.
The AP may be used for the approach and the missed approach. If the AP is used and
a decision to land is made, it should be disconnected by DA; it is recommended that
the AP is disconnected and the aircraft manually flown to intercept the landing profile
once the runway is in sight.
Set QNH
FDP
FAF:
Inbound & ready for Start timing
final descent:
Set GA altitude
Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
VAPP speed
Landing checklist Target touchdown
C heck altitude 1 000 ft in
2133
Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
Normal Procedures
Approaching the final descent point, PF calls Gear down, Flap 3, speed 150. PM
then:
At the final descent point, PF selects or requests the appropriate FPA settings or
selects APP to arm the VGP mode.
In order for the aircraft to descend in the FPA mode, the ALT SEL must be re-set to a
different level.
Approaching the FAF, PF calls Final fix or Beacon as appropriate. Both pilots
start timing. PM responds with the crossing altitude followed by Checked and
timing.
During the final approach, PM calls check altitudes at appropriate crossing fixes. If
required, PF adjusts descent profile accordingly.
At 500 ft Radio Height PF calls 500 rad alt, PM responds Stable or Go-around.
If visual contact is made by PF before DA, he calls Visual. If visual contact is made
by PM before decision altitude, he calls Visual followed by what he has seen (lights
or runway) and the direction.
Approaching the final Gear down, flap 3, speed Selects gear down.
descent point 150 Selects flap 3.
Sets 150 knots.
Approaching the FAF Flap ..., speed VAPP, landing Selects flap.
checklist Sets speed .
Completes landing checklist.
CAUTION
When flying down an ILS to then conduct a circling approach, great care is needed when
approaching MDA. The AP will not capture the selected altitude unless the glideslope is de-
selected. It is suggested that the flight guidance mode is changed to FPA in the last few hundred
feet. Similarly, it is recommended that the heading bug is pre-set to the desired offset heading
so that HDG mode can be selected once visual at MDA.
2.12.44 Go-around
The go-around procedure and calls are summarised in Table 12.9. Just as in any
aircraft, the fundamental actions are to set go-around thrust and select a go-around
pitch attitude. In the Embraer E-Jets, this can all be done automatically using the
autothrottle and the autopilot: just press either TO/GA button.
A completely manual go-around requires manual rotation to the go-around pitch
attitude and manual setting of the thrust. With no FD guidance the go-around pitch
attitude is 8 with one engine operative.
The initial flap setting for the go-around is:
Flap 3 if the approach was made with flap 5.
Flap 4 if the approach was made with full flap.
The gear is raised when a positive rate of climb is indicated by both the altimeter and
the VSI. At the acceleration altitude, the aircraft is accelerated through the flap
retraction schedule.
PF initiates the go-around by simultaneously:
Calling Go-around followed by either flap 3 or flap 4.
Pressing either TO/GA button.
Verifying that the autothrottle moves the thrust levers to the TO/GA position or
manually moves the thrust levers to the TO/GA position.
Verifying that the autopilot rotates the aircraft to the GA pitch attitude or manually
rotates the pitch attitude.
On the call of go-around, PM:
Checks that GA is annunciated on the PFD.
Checks that GA N1 is achieved.
Selects GA flap.
Calls Positive climb when a positive rate of climb is indicated.
PF then checks that a positive climb rate has been achieved and then calls gear up.
PM then selects the gear up. Both pilots select the appropriate navigation primary
source (V/L or FMS).
At 400 ft agl, PF calls for HDG or NAV. PM engages HDG or NAV mode.
At the acceleration altitude, PM calls Acceleration altitude. PF then calls Climb
sequence, Target speed, autopilot on. PM then:
Selects the target speed; VFS initially.
Selects FLCH.
Retracts the flap using the F Bug and calls Flap zero when the flaps and slats
are fully retracted.
Sets 210 knots or appropriate climb speed.
PF then calls After Take-off Checklist; PM reads the After Take-off Checklist.
Of course, the go-around procedure may be continued all the way to a climb to altitude
using the procedures in the climb section. On the other hand it may be necessary to
exit the procedure before completion: for example, a go-around to a visual circuit where
remaining at flap 1 and making an early thrust reduction may be more appropriate.
Flap 1 may be appropriate to a short radar circuit but flap zero should be used if the
pattern is likely to be prolonged or holding is expected.
At low weights, high rates of climb are achieved in the go-around. In this case, it may
be prudent to reduce thrust during the acceleration phase, thus making the process
easier to manage. Equally, selection of full power may not be appropriate for go-around
manoeuvres flown from higher levels; a more gentle procedure can be initiated by
simply pressing FLCH.
Note: Go-around speed in the second segment is a minimum of VAC. For one engine
inoperative, the minimum speed is VREF Full +20.
Up to and including the 500 above call, the procedures are identical. PF at the start of
the approach makes the calls and actions in the PF column; PM at the start of the
approach makes the calls and actions in the PM column.
At 100 ft above the bugged minimum altitude, PF at the start of the approach calls
100 above; PM responds Looking and scans for visual reference.
At the bugged minimum altitude, PF at the start of the approach calls Decide; PM
responds Visual or Go-around.
If the call is go-around, PF at the start of the approach executes a missed approach.
The taxi lights should be on whenever the aircraft is taxiing and off when the aircraft is
stationary.
In order to reduce engine wear and to allow the engines to stabilise thermally (and
hence reduce the possibility of a Bowed Rotor Start at subsequent re-lights), the
engines should be run at idle for the following times:
If shutting down engine 1 (2) for the taxi in, select the electric hydraulic pump 1 (2) to
ON before shutting down engine 1 (2). The electric hydraulic pump 1 (2) should be kept
on for at least 30 seconds after engine shutdown. When appropriate, select electric
hydraulic pump 1 (2) to AUTO.
Once the aircraft is on stand and the Captain has stopped both engines, the First
Officer announces Cabin Crew, doors to manual and cross checked.
To shut down the engine, the respective START/STOP selector is set to STOP after
waiting at least 10 secs after the APU or GPU is established on line.
2.14 Shutdown
2.14.1 Shutdown Checklist
At the ramp, the Captain sets the parking brake and calls for the Shutdown setup. The
shutdown flow is completed from memory. The First Officer then reads the Checklist
which is completed challenge and response. It is given in Table 14.1.
Table 14.1 Shutdown Checklist
THRUST LEVERS.............................................................. IDLE CAPT
Check 2 minutes (6 if max reverse used) at idle have elapsed.
PARKING BRAKE ............................SET and BRAKE TEMPS CAPT
The PARKING BRAKE lever is pulled up to the set position; the aircraft must be
stationary when the parking brake is applied.
Check the brake temperatures; if they are hot, release the parking brake once the
chocks are in place; this will reduce the brake cooling time.
ELECTRICAL................................................ ON GPU OR APU CAPT
If the APU GEN is not available, an AC GPU should be plugged in.
Check that the AVAIL light is illuminated before pushing in the GPU button.
Wait 10 secs minimum until engine shut down to avoid power interrupts.
START/STOP SELECTORS......................... STOP/CHECK N1 CAPT
N1 gauges must be checked to ensure that the engines have stopped. Engines will
not shut down if Thrust Levers are not at IDLE. If STOP is selected before the Thrust
Levers are at IDLE, the START/STOP selector must be placed momentarily to RUN
before again selecting STOP (having placed the Thrust Levers to IDLE).
Do not press any rudder pedal for 15 seconds after all hydraulic power is shut down.
After engine shutdown, the messages ENG 1 and ENG 2 REV TLA FAIL may be
displayed for 30 seconds.
RED BEACON and TAXI LIGHTS...................................... OFF F/O
ELECTRIC HYD PUMP SYS 3A......................................... OFF F/O
HYDRAULIC AC PUMP 1/2............................................ AUTO F/O
Leave Electric Hydraulic pump ON for at least 30 seconds after engine shut down.
WARNING
If either STD or the QNH is set before a vertical mode is engaged (eg. FLCH) the aircraft will
respond immediately to try and regain the originally selected altitude. This is particularly
dangerous when the QNH is low.
The procedure and calls for altitude alerting and capture are given in Table 16.4.
If practicable, both pilots must monitor the flight path between the live and the locked
calls.
Checked
Makes a reasonableness check the
difference between barometric altitude and
radio altitude should be around the expected
terrain height.
There are four ADSs, which interact with the flight crew. In normal operation, ADS 1
provides information to the Captains PFD, ADS 2 provides information to the First
Officers PFD and ADS 3 is the backup source for both PFDs whereas ADS 4 is the
IESS.
Differences between Captain and First Officer altitude readings may occur due to a
number of reasons. Altitude, airspeed, aircraft configuration and the location of the
ADSPs influence the difference in the altitude readings. As long as the miscompare is
within a certain tolerance, it is acceptable.
To verify if the altimeter difference is within tolerance the aircraft must be flown at
constant altitude in smooth air, preferably using the autopilot in altitude hold mode. The
airspeed must be held within 5 knots of the target speed.
There are three cockpit altimeters: one on each PFD and one on the IESS.
The maximum allowable difference between any two altimeters is given in Table 16.6.
If a difference above the tolerance is noticed, maintenance must be informed.
2.17.1.2 Taxiing
Taxiing in low visibility conditions requires great care especially if ground movement
radar is not available. Salient points are:
Taxi slowly.
Ground equipment and aircraft are not as visible as bright taxiway lights.
Beware of aircraft with taillights on the wing tips.
Use taxi lights and navigation lights for day and night operations.
Maintain awareness of the position of other aircraft by monitoring the R/T.
Use compass heading to assist in the identification of the correct taxiway.
Use the correct CATEGORY II/CATEGORY III holding points.
Taxiway lights are generally 30 m apart but may be 15 m or 7 m apart on bends.
If in doubt stop and consider the use of a follow me vehicle.
Delay checklists if necessary. The top priority is to taxi the aircraft maintaining a high
standard of look out from both seats.
The departure runway ILS may be used to confirm that the aircraft is lined up on the
centreline of the runway. However, remember to retune the VHF NAV to the
frequency required for the departure.
2.17.1.3 Minimum RVR/Visibility for Take-off
Company minima are listed in the Operations Manual, Part A.
A low visibility take-off is defined as one from a runway where the RVR is below
400 metres. The minimum RVR or visibility for a particular runway depends on the
facilities available. The minimum visibility for take-off is detailed on each individual
airfield plate. The actual minimum to be used is the higher of either the airfield plate or
those described in the Operations Manual, Part A.
2150 Revision 16 | May 2014
Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
Normal Procedures
The Captain must perform the take-off. He may use the low visibility take-off guidance
in the HUD if appropriately trained and the associated checks have been completed
(E195 only).
The preferred flap setting is Flap 2 but the Captain may use his discretion. Short
runways may demand a higher flap angle to achieve the required performance.
In very low visibility conditions, consider the use of a higher flap angle. Higher flap
angles will reduce the take-off roll and the distance required for an aborted take-off.
Take-off thrust is set and checked before brake release, unless the runway is too
slippery for a static take-off.
If one of the above conditions is not met, the green APPR 2 annunciator will not appear.
When the green APPR 2 annunciator is enabled, the localiser lateral deviation scale is
expanded with the external limits representing the excessive deviation points.
CAUTION
A difference of only one degree between the pilots and co-pilots course selectors will cause
the monitoring system to disable the APPR 2 system and the APPR 1 Only Amber indication
will be annunciated.
The amber APPR 1 ONLY annunciation will flash active characters in inverse video for
5 seconds then illuminates steadily; this is done in conjunction with the RA minimum
selected digital readout.
2.17.1.9 Autopilot
The autopilot minimum use height is 50 ft. There may be a 50 ft height loss in a coupled
go-around.
On a Category II approach, the autopilot is left engaged until the minimum use height.
There are two reasons for keeping the autopilot engaged to the minimum use height:
It ensures that the requirement to make continued use of the autopilot to 80% of the
DH is met.
The chances of being seduced by limited visual cues are reduced.
All airborne facilities that are required for the approach must be available. However it
is not necessary to test these systems immediately prior to the approach. Adequate
assurance of system availability is given by:
However, there is one exception, if only one radio altimeter is available, it must be
tested before the localiser is intercepted. If the radio altimeter fails the test, the
Category II approach must be discontinued.
2.17.1.11 Minima
The minimum DH is 100 ft above the runway threshold. The actual DH for an approach
is given on the associated approach plate minima page. Also given are the DA and RA.
The RA is the value the radio altimeter will indicate when the aircraft is on the glideslope
and at the DH value of height above the threshold. RA is the height of the aircraft above
terrain. As the terrain is not always level, RA and DH may be slightly different. RA may
even be slightly less than 100 ft. However, RA is the reference for the decision to land
or go-around. So the radio altimeter DH control is set to RA and the decide call is
made when the radio altimeter indicates RA.
The absolute minimum RVR allowed for an approach depends on the DH. The
relationship is given in the table below. These values assume that the autopilot remains
engaged to a height that is not greater than 80% of the DH.
The actual minimum RVR for the approach is given on the approach plate minima
page. The reported touchdown RVR must be at least this value. The midpoint RVR
must be at least the minimum for take-off on that runway. The stopend RVR is not
required.
If the TDZ RVR assessment system is unserviceable, the MID RVR can temporarily
replace it if approved by the State of the aerodrome.
Failure of the midpoint RVR assessment system or the stopend RVR system or both
has no effect on the landing minima.
The visual reference must include a lateral element of the ground pattern. That is:
Essentially, a row of three lights along track is required together with a lateral reference.
The along track lights allow lateral position and cross-track velocity to be established.
The lateral reference allows bank angle to be stabilised.
Of course time is required to assess the actual visual references and the aircraft flight
path before a decision to land or not is made. This time required is generally assumed
to be around 3 seconds. Thus the landing pilot searches for visual cues from 100 ft
above DH. He must make his decision by DH. A decision to go-around must be
followed by an immediate missed approach.
Strobe lights should be switched off for the approach and landing.
Have flown three Category II approaches on his last OPC. Note that one of these
approaches may be replaced by an approach (actual or practice) in the aircraft.
It is recommended that each pilot performs at least one Category II approach each
month. This ensures:
So a Cat I reversion call indicates that a Category I approach ban is not in force; a
Cat II only call indicates that a Category I approach ban is in force but that a
Category II approach ban is not in force.
If the Captain does not respond to the 100 above call, the First Officer takes control
and lands or makes a go-around as appropriate. Please note that failure to respond to
any call should be treated as incapacitation. Incapacitation at any point will invalidate
the Catagory II requirements, therefore, a go-around should be initiated unless
Catagory I reversion is available or the required visual references for a landing are met.
The First Officer must continue to monitor the flight instruments from DH to touchdown
and call any excessive deviation from the desired flight path.
If the Captain decides to make a go-around from below decision height, he makes the
go-around. The First Officer continues to monitor the instruments.
2.17.1.18 Landing
Be aware of illusions:
Limited visibility combined with the glare of the runway lights can give the impression
that the aircraft is higher than it is.
Illusions are best countered by remembering that if the aircraft was on a stable flight
path down to disconnect height, then no drastic changes are required to touchdown in
the TDZ.
The landing flare should not be prolonged; it is better to aim for a positive firm
touchdown than aim for a zero sink rate arrival. Touchdown should be made in the
Touchdown Zone. If this is not possible, a go-around must be made.
The TDZ is marked by white barrettes. It extends 900 metres into the runway, except
when the runway length is less than 1,800 metres. For these shorter runways, the TDZ
extends for 50% of the runway length.
Once the TDZ is left, the lack of barrettes gives an apparent decrease in visibility.
Cues to progress in the landing roll are given by the centreline lights. They are all red
for the last 300 metres; they alternate between red and white for the preceding
610 metres. If the airspeed is 90 knots or more when the lights start to alternate red/
white, maximum braking must be applied. The Company terminology for this point is
90/900: that is, 90 knots with 900 metres to go.
After landing, call runway vacated once out of the CAT2/CAT3 protected area.
The After Landing Checks must not be done until after the runway vacated call.
2.17.1.19 Reporting
Whenever the Category II or IIIA procedure is used, whether it is used for practice or in
actual conditions, the result must be reported. The form to be used is All Weather
Operations Performance Report Embraer E-Jets. Either pilot may complete the form;
it is returned to Operations with the Journey Log. Alternatively, the iForms app can be
used to submit a low visibility approach report. The iForm can be completed at any time
following completion of a low visibility approach (with or without connectivity). If the
form is completed without connectivity (in flight for example), the crew must open the
iForms app once back on the ground in order to synchronise the program which, in turn,
will send any completed forms back to Exeter.
2160 Revision 16 | May 2014
Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
Normal Procedures
For localiser, the following additional condition is required: both LOC signals are tuned
and valid for at least 15 seconds.
For glideslope, the following additional conditions are required for at least 15 seconds:
Both glideslope signals valid.
Both LOC signals tuned and valid.
For radio altitude, the following additional condition is required: both radio altimeters
valid and on scale.
The localiser comparator warning is an amber LOC annunciator on the left side of the
PFD between the EADI and the EHSI. The annunciator flashes for the first 10 seconds
and then becomes steady. The localiser warning is given if the left and right indications
differ by more than half a dot.
The glideslope comparator warning is an amber GS annunciator on the left side of the
PFD between the EADI and the EHSI. The annunciator flashes for the first 10 seconds
and then becomes steady. The glideslope warning is given if the up and down
indications differ by more than two thirds of a dot.
The radio altitude comparator warning is an amber RA annunciator on the ADI. The
annunciator flashes for the first 10 seconds and then becomes steady. The radio
altitude warning is given if the No 1 and No 2 indications differ by more than 10 ft.
The excessive localiser deviation warning is given if the localiser deviation exceeds one
dot.
The excessive glideslope deviation warning is given if the glideslope deviation exceeds
one third of a dot.
If any of the above occurs, an appropriate call must be made by the first pilot to notice
the deviation.
If reversion is made to Category I minima, the approach may only be continued below
the Category I DH if the required Category I visual reference is established and
maintained.
2.17.1.30 Performance
The performance data required for Category II operations are presented in the Landing
Data Card and the GWC.
In order to provide appropriate symbology and guidance cues for the above
procedures, the A3 mode of HGS must be activated via the MENU and then HGS
selections on the MCDU.
All other phases of flight (category I, non-precision and visual approaches) do not utilise
the A3 mode and the Head Up Display acts simply as a repeater of the PFD.
2.17.2.2 Approval
In order to make actual low visibility approaches (Category II or 3A), both pilots must
be qualified in HGS procedures (simulator and line training) and be in possession of
current validation/revalidation cards (Form 10). Initially, Captains will only be qualified
to use the HGS to Category I or better weather limits. In order to upgrade this approval,
a Captain must have completed 4 practice HGS approaches to touchdown under the
supervision of a Training Captain, in Category I conditions or better. Captains may use
the HGS for low visibility take-off guidance as soon as they have completed the
simulator training.
To be qualified for either Category II or 3A approaches and low visibility take-offs using
the HGS, each pilot must have completed at least 50 sectors on type and:
Have flown four Category IIIA approaches on his last OPC.
Note: Two of these approaches may be replaced by approaches (actual or
practice) in the aircraft.
It is recommended that each pilot performs at least one HGS low visibility (practice or
actual) approach each month. This ensures:
A high level of familiarity with the procedures.
That the aircraft are checked frequently.
That adequate statistics are gathered.
All HGS approaches, whether for practice or in actual conditions, are to be recorded in
each pilots Log Book.
Flybe has adopted the new approach minima as advised in Appendix 1 (New) to
OPS 1.430, Therefore, qualified crews may use the HGS to provide supplementary
guidance for approaches to the following minima where published:
Note: HGS LVTO guidance complies with the provisions of CS-AWO Subpart 4 for
reversionary use only. Visual reference should be the primary means of
guidance and the pilot should not commence the take-off run unless the visual
reference and reported RVR are within prescribed limits (125 metres).
CAUTION
A difference of only one degree between the pilots and co-pilots course selectors will cause
the monitoring system to disable the HUD A3 system.
If HUD A3 mode is not available, manual approaches (autopilot not coupled) with HGS
using the Flight Director guidance are prohibited. With this in mind, Category I
approaches may be flown using HGS guidance but the Autopilot must remain coupled
until decision altitude.
The performance of HUD A3 approaches requires that the following equipment and
instruments be in operating conditions:
CAUTION
Runway Remaining is a supplemental situation awareness display decreasing in 100 METRES
OR 500 FEET increments available in low visibility take-off. The data displayed is not intended
to be used for performance monitoring purposes.
2.17.2.10.4 Descent
FMS ARRIVAL Page:
Landing Runway.......................................................................SELECT
Approach Procedure ................................................................ SELECT
MCDU HGS Page:
2.17.2.10.5 Approach
HUD A3 Mode Approach
Display Control Panel 1 ........................ NAV SOURCE SET TO LOC 1
Display Control Panel 2 ........................ NAV SOURCE SET TO LOC 2
Note: FGCS Approach Preview mode may be used.
CAUTION
The flare cue is advisory information only. The crew must perform a visual landing.
2.17.2.10.6 Landing
Autopilot ...................................................DISENGAGE BY 1,000 ft RA
(Required to arm A3 Mode; may remain engaged for visual, Catagory I or Non-
precision approaches).
Slat/Flap ...............................................................................................5
Speed .....................................................................................SET VAPP
Note: The VAPP is determined by adjusting the VREF 5 cat II/III for head wind component
and gust according to the following equation:
VAPP = VREF 5 catagory II/III + wind correction, where:
Wind Correction = head wind component + full gust, limited to 20 kt.
CAUTION
Runway Remaining is a supplemental situation awareness display decreasing in 100 METRES
OR 500 feet increments available after touchdown in HUD A3 mode. The data displayed is not
intended to be used for performance monitoring purposes.
A voice message will be presented in case of a red WSHEAR indication on the PFD.
The WSHR vertical mode is selected and a windshear guidance cue is provided.
Preventive Advisories do not require that action be taken by the crew to alter the flight
path of the airplane, but indicate an unsafe zone.
Preventive and corrective resolution advisory use angled lines to guide the fly-to zone
box or preventive bracket to indicate the unsafe or no-fly zone.
In this case, the angled lines out of the box will flash until the flight path is positioned
within the safe zone.
Preventive RA procedure:
Corrective RA procedure:
Fly the airplane to box and outside of the unsafe zone indicated by the angled lines off
the fly-to zone.
For HUD A3 mode operations, the approach must be discontinued in the event of
engine failure above DH. A new approach may be attempted with one engine
inoperative. In this case, the normal HUD A3 approach procedure described in this
section must be used changing the reference speed to VREF FULL + 20 KIAS.
In flight:
Above 1500 ft:
The flight crew must establish visual cues in order to continue or reject the take-off.
The flight crew must establish visual cues in order to continue or reject the take-off.
All calls on the take-off are as for a normal, conventional take-off. If the HUD is being
used in genuine low visibility conditions, power is set on the brakes unless the runway
is slippery. TO-1 rated power is used.
Initial climb is as per normal SOPs using V/L mode on both sides.
Starts stopwatch
Verifies that:
N1 target is achieved.
Engine parameters are normal.
ATTCS is armed.
Thrust checked, ATTCS armed
Captain takes control of the thrust levers and releases brakes (only required
if taking off in genuine low visibility conditions).
80 knots 80 knots
Checked
V1 V1
VR Rotate
Rotates smoothly to follow the FD
command or to the appropriate pitch
attitude if the FD is not available.
V2 V2
Flaps zero After Take-off Checklist Reads the After Take-off Checklist
and confirms complete.
The only difference is that the HGS checks must be completed as follows:
Descent Checks:
FMS ARRIVAL Page:
CAUTION
The flare cue is advisory information only. The crew must perform a visual landing.
When the normal, descent checks are completed, the following additional checks must
be performed:
The following additional checks are completed when the normal, approach checklist is
carried out:
Once established on final, the following additional landing checks must be completed:
CAUTION
Runway Remaining is a supplemental situation awareness display decreasing in 100 METRES
OR 500 feet increments available after touchdown in HUD A3 mode. The data displayed is not
intended to be used for performance monitoring purposes.
The procedure for HGS, low visibility approaches is the same for both Category II and
Category IIIA minima. It is only the approach minima that changes between the two
approaches. A3 mode and annunciations are the same for both types of approach. The
approach procedure is presented in Table 17.2.2 below:
Perhaps the biggest difference to head down, low visibility approaches is that the A3
approach is NOT a monitored approach. The Captain flies the entire procedure up to
either the landing and roll out or go-around using the HGS.
In order to allow the A3 mode to arm, the autopilot must be switched OFF at 1,000 ft
RA. This will allow time for the A3 mode to arm, prior to the aircraft reaching 800 ft Rad
Alt when the crew confirm that the appropriate approach mode is engaged.
Gear selection Gear down, flap 3, speed 150 Selects gear down
Sets flap 3
Sets 150 knots
IF LANDING:
Touchdown Checks and follows roll out Remains monitoring head down;
guidance cue particularly localiser deviation
IF GO-AROUND:
Special consideration should also be given to the fact that there is an increased
likelihood of a go-around from a Lower than Standard CAT I approach as a result of
the reduction in required RVR but with the same decision altitude. Crews should pay
special attention to the go-around procedures during their approach briefing.
Prior to conducting a Lower than Standard CAT I approach operation or an Other than
Standard CAT II approach operation each crew member shall have completed the
training and checking requirements prescribed in the Part D and the qualification will
be entered into the pilots Flight Operations Certificate (Form 10).
2.18.3 Taxi
Operation in areas of high ambient temperature may cause brake temperature limits to
be exceeded. This could lead to fusible plugs melting and deflation of the tyres.
Runway and taxiway surfaces often exceed the air temperature. Brake cooling must
always be considered. Excessive use of the brakes and riding the brakes must be
avoided. Minimise braking where possible to allow ample time for cooling between
applications. The recommended technique is to allow the aircraft to accelerate, then
brake to a very slow taxi speed and then release the brakes completely.
2.18.4 Take-off
High ambient temperature reduces the aircraft performance; the reduction can be
severe if the runway is short or at high altitude. Consider the potential performance
reductions early in the planning stage.
2.18.5 Landing
During high temperature operations, there may be areas of low friction on the runway
due to heavy deposits of melted rubber, particularly in the touchdown area.
Excessive braking should be avoided; the thrust reversers should be used to their full
advantage.
Note that the 1.6 kilometre visibility only applies to fog. So, for example, icing conditions
exist if the air temperature is 10C or below and rain is present regardless of the
visibility. On the ground, SAT is the relevant temperature; in flight, TAT is the relevant
temperature.
Icing conditions may also exist when the SAT is 10C or below when operating on
contaminated ramps, taxiways and runways even though there is no visible moisture
present. Icing conditions exist, on the ground and for take-off, when the SAT is 10C or
below and either:
The engines may ingest snow, ice, standing water or slush,
OR
Snow, ice, standing water, or slush may freeze on engines, nacelles or engine
sensor probes.
CAUTION
On the ground, do not rely on visual icing evidence or ice detector actuation to turn on the anti-
icing system. Use the temperature and visible criteria as specified above. Delaying the use of
the anti-icing system until ice build-up is visible from the cockpit may result in ice ingestion and
possible engine damage or flameout.
CAUTION
Even small accumulations of ice on the wing leading edge may change:
The stall characteristics,
OR
The stall protection system-warning margin.
It may be necessary to leave the engine covers installed until ready to start
the engines.
APU area ............................................................ Clear of ice and snow
Check that the APU air inlet, oil cooler air inlet and APU outlet are all clear
of ice and snow.
Air conditioning inlets and outlets .................. Clear of ice and snow
Batteries ....................................................................................Installed
At low temperatures, the batteries are removed from the aircraft. Check that
they have been reinstalled.
CAUTION
Do not allow the hot air from the ground cart to exceed 100C. Higher temperatures may
damage components within the APU compartment.
At the completion of the walkaround, if ice, snow or frost is discovered on the aircraft,
except that allowed on the fuselage, de-icing will be required; anti-icing may also be
required. The check for ice accumulation must be done in a well lit area.
During the pre-flight walkaround, ensure that the following are clear of ice and
unobstructed:
Smart probes.
TAT probes.
Pressurisation static port.
All inlets, outlets and vents.
CAUTION
To prevent inadvertent slide deployment, ensure that the evacuation slide is disarmed (handle
up) before opening the door.
CAUTION
With the PACKS operating and all doors and vent flaps closed, inadvertent outflow valve
closure could result in the aircraft pressurising.
Do not leave the aircraft unattended during the cabin warm-up.
CAUTION
Before extending SLATS/FLAPS, ensure that area is clear of personnel and equipment.
Start the engines in the normal manner. If an engine does not start, maintenance
procedures may be required or ground heating may be necessary to warm the nacelle,
Air Turbine Starter (ATS) and Starting Control Valve (SCV).
In order to improve the chances of a successful engine start, the oil temperature should
be raised to at least minus 20C.
CAUTION
Do not allow the hot air from the ground cart to exceed 100C. Higher temperatures may
damage components within the engine nacelle.
The oil pressure may be slow to rise but may suddenly increase and then exceed the
normal range. The high oil pressure should progressively reduce to normal as the
engine achieves normal operating temperatures.
CAUTION
If oil pressure is not indicated by idle rpm, shut down the engine.
CAUTION
During cold weather operations, oil pressure peaks to full scale may occur due to high oil
viscosity. Oil pressure should decrease as the oil temperature increases.
If the oil pressure remains above the normal operating range, the engine should be shut down
and the cause investigated.
The checks in Table 19.5 supplement the normal after start checks.
The generators may be slow to produce steady power due to cold oil in the IDGs. Five
minutes may be required for the IDGs to stabilise.
CAUTION
APU operation is not recommended when de-icing/anti-icing with fluids.
If APU operation is absolutely necessary, make sure that:
Neither deicing fluid nor anti-icing fluid is applied directly to or near the APU air inlet.
The APU bleed air valve is closed and the packs are set to off.
2.19.15 Taxi
Use minimum thrust for breakaway and taxiing to avoid blowing snow or slush on
personnel or aircraft nearby.
When taxiing on low friction surfaces, maintain a low forward speed (less than
10 knots). Anti-skid protection is not provided below this speed, so apply brakes
judiciously.
CAUTION
Taxi at reduced speed on ice-covered runways and taxiways to avoid skidding the aircraft.
Reduce speed for all turns and use caution when taxiing with high crosswinds.
The part of the tyre in contact with the ground is flat. Normally, the elasticity of the tyre
allows the circumference of the tyre to move smoothly from a curved to a flat shape as
the tyre rotates. If the aircraft is parked for some time in cold conditions, the tyre retains
its flat; this condition is called cold set. It is manifested as a vibration during taxiing. The
vibration should disappear as the tyres recover their elasticity during taxi. A take-off
must not be initiated until the vibration disappears.
Turns should be performed at the largest turning radius, preferably at speeds which do
not require braking during the turn.
Maintain a greater than normal distance behind other aircraft while taxiing in snow or
slush-covered runways to avoid contamination by snow blown by jet blasts.
During ground operations of more than 30 minutes (including taxi in and taxi out) in
icing conditions, it is recommended that the engine thrust level be increased at
30 minute intervals to approximately 54% N1 and held at that thrust level for
30 seconds. If airport surface conditions and the concentration of aircraft do not permit
the engine thrust level to be increased to 54% N1, then set a thrust level as high as
practicable for as long as practicable. This procedure is effective in removing ice from
the fan blades.
CAUTION
Before increasing thrust, check the area is clear and get clearance from ATC.
Do not apply reverse thrust unless it is strictly necessary. Reverse thrust should be
used with extreme caution and only when necessary to prevent nosewheel skidding or
departure from the intended taxi path.
When taxiing through slush or standing water, slat/flap should be retracted to avoid
snow and slush contamination from the main gear wheels.
Carbon brakes can absorb water and freeze subsequently when the aircraft climbs to
altitude. Firm braking where conditions allow can help by warming up the brake discs
such that the heat evaporates the trapped water and reduces the chances of disc
freeze.
WARNING
If SLATS/FLAPS were left up during taxi, ensure that they are set for take-off.
The extra items to check before take-off are given in Table 19.7.
2.19.17 Take-off
For take-off in icing conditions, it is recommended that take off power is set initially to
approximately 54% N1 to determine if there is any indication of abnormal engine
vibration. If no indications of abnormal vibration are present, the pilots may then set full
take-off power for departure. However, if there are signs of any increased vibration
levels, the 54% N1 should be maintained for a maximum of 30 seconds. During this
period, if vibration levels reduce to within normal limits, the take-off may continue. If the
vibration levels do not fall to within normal limits within this time, the aircraft should be
returned to stand for engineering inspection.
2.19.20 Holding
The holding configuration in icing conditions is:
Gear up.
Slat/flap up.
Minimum airspeed 210 knots.
2.19.21 Descent
If engine vibration increases, reduce the thrust to idle, advance the thrust levers to
obtain 70% N1 and then return to the desired setting.
When using the autopilot, monitor pitch attitude and speed continuously.
Note 1: That the 195 uses the same speeds for icing or non-icing conditions.
Note 2: If using the green dot for speed reference, then use green dot +10 kts.
Landing on wet or slippery runways is covered in Section 2.20 Contaminated
Runway Operations
The APU should be used to supply warm air via the air conditioning packs.
Make a walk around and check the items in table 19.2.
Engine parameters.
Pitch attitude.
Airspeed.
Be careful of any mistrimmed condition that may be masked by the autopilot. Keep the
aircraft trimmed at all times. Consider disconnecting the autopilot when flying in severe,
or suspected severe, icing conditions.
Monitor the anti-ice systems for proper operation. Apply the associated abnormal
procedure in the case of a system failure. If the failure persists, leave and avoid icing
conditions. Enlist the help of ATC to leave icing conditions and keep ATC informed of
the flight conditions and the state of the aircraft.
Avoid landing at an airport where icing conditions exist or are anticipated if any of the
items below have failed:
Do not hesitate to leave icing conditions when the icing cannot be handled by the ice
protection systems, even with anti-ice system operating properly.
The Green Dot (GD) is a reliable and useful guide for driftdown, minimum speed for
current configuration and flap extension. Unfortunately, the GD logic does not account
for ice accretion, i.e., it is not corrected after an ice encounter. However, following flight
trials, if the flight crew wish to use green dot guidance in icing conditions, Embraer
recommends flying GD +10 kts.
If ice forms on areas not usually affected by icing or ice forms on the previously treated
upper surface of the wings, the aircraft must be considered to be flying in severe icing
conditions. In this case, the anti-ice system cannot reduce or control ice formation. The
aircraft must leave freezing rain/drizzle conditions as soon as possible since
continuous flight under such conditions is hazardous. The aircraft is not to be flown in
freezing rain or drizzle conditions.
When an airspeed indication is present on the PFDs, the following messages from the
AFCS system may be displayed on EICAS:
AFCS FAULT.
AT FAIL.
AP FAIL.
FD FAIL.
YD FAIL.
APPR 2 NOT AVAIL.
Air Data Systems (ADS) messages can be displayed on the EICAS also.
Procedure
To melt the frozen moisture and clear the undesired airspeed indication, turn the ADSP
heaters ON by running either engine (G-FBEA and G-FBEB) or, on all other aircraft,
once AC power is available, press the ADSP heater button (adjacent to the water dump
button).
Wait for 10 minutes with the ADSP heaters ON. After that, make sure there is no
airspeed indication on both PFDs and that the AFCS messages were cleared.
In such scenario, the electrical PBIT may not run during airplane power-up. Therefore,
check the PBIT remaining time on the MFD Flight Controls synoptic page and consider
performing a power-down/power-up procedure if applicable.
Prior to the issue of Epic Load 19.4, it was assumed that this fault would only occur if
the fluid temperature in a reservoir was below 0C. However, it has become apparent
that this problem can occur at any time when the outside air temperature is below +5C.
Re-set Procedure
If a crew experience an unexplained FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH Caution EICAS
message (associated with cold weather operations), the following procedure should be
carried out:
(1) Pressurise the No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 hydraulic systems. The hydraulic P-BIT
will not run if the fluid temperature is below +10C.
(2) After the hydraulic PBIT stops to run, do 10 full cycles of the elevator.
Note: One cycle of the elevator is when you move the pilot or co-pilot control
column fully forward and it moves back to neutral position. Then, you
move it to the fully aft position and it moves back to the neutral position.
WARNING: Keep persons and equipment clear of the rudder. This surface
will move automatically and quickly during this test. injury to
persons or damage to equipment can occur.
(4) On the HYDRAULIC control panel, set the SYS 1, SYS 2, and SYS 3 ELEC
PUMP switches to OFF.
(5) Wait until the hydraulic system 1, 2 and 3 pressure drops and wait until the
hydraulic PBIT stops running.
(6) Pressurise the No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 hydraulic systems and wait until the
hydraulic PBIT stops running.
Note 1: The hydraulic PBIT stops to run after 2 minutes.
Note 3: You must not move the flight controls. If you move the flight controls, the
hydraulic PBIT stops and does not pass correctly.
When the OAT is 5C or less, crews can gain an early insight into this problem by
selecting the electrical hydraulic pumps 1, 2 and 3A to ON once the normal power up
is completed. Providing the fluid temperature is above +10C, this will allow the
hydraulic P-BIT to run and so identify, prior to engine start, if a problem is apparent.
Once the aircraft is on stand the Water Dump pushbutton should be de-selected and
an entry made by the Commander in the Non-Airworthiness section of the Tech-log
this will be an indication to Engineering staff that the procedure has been completed
satisfactorily.
The Embraer SCAP contains the performance data for contaminated runways. Each
airfield page presents the landing and take-off data in the same format as for the
uncontaminated case. Engine failure is assumed in both the uncontaminated and the
contaminated take-off cases.
Slush is water saturated with snow, which spatters when firmly stepped on. Slush forms
at temperatures around 5C and has a density of approximately 0.9 kg/litre, therefore,
12 mm WED equals 13 mm depth of slush.
Wet snow is snow that will, if compacted by hand, stick together and tend to form a
snowball. Wet snow has a density of approximately 0.5 kg/litre, therefore 12 mm WED
equals 24 mm depth of wet snow.
Dry snow is snow which can be blown if loose, or which will, if compacted by hand, fall
apart upon release. Dry snow has a density of 0.2 kg/litre, therefore 12 mm WED
equals 60 mm depth of dry snow.
2.20.6 Take-off
A layer of contaminant will increase wheel drag during the take-off roll, particularly at
higher speeds. Consequently the distance required to accelerate will be increased. The
maximum allowable water equivalent depth of contaminant allowed for take-off in the
AFM is 25.4 mm, however, this is further restricted by a Company limitation of 12 mm
water equivalent depth.
For a take-off on a low friction or contaminated runway:
The take-off flap setting must be the Optimum as shown on the GWC.
Flexible thrust must not be used. TO-1 rated power is required.
A rolling take-off should be used on low friction surfaces. If a power check is required
but the aircraft starts to creep forward, release the brakes and begin the take-off.
Maintain control column slightly forward of neutral on a low friction surface.
Delay gear retraction if performance is not limiting to remove any contaminant.
The ground spoiler function and all wheel brakes must be serviceable.
Anticipate a lag in nosewheel steering and the possibility of nosewheel skidding. Apply
corrections as necessary.
If a skid develops, reduce reverse thrust and, if necessary, return the engines to
forward thrust to return to the centreline. Regain the centreline with the rudder pedals;
use differential braking if necessary.
2.20.8 Landing
Conduct a positive landing to ensure initial wheel spin up and initiate firm ground
contact on touchdown, achieving wheel spin up as quickly as possible. This reduces
the chance of hydroplaning and also reduces the strength of any ice bond that may
have formed on the brake or wheel units in flight.
Wet runways can cause aircraft hydroplaning. The factors that influence the
occurrence of this phenomenon are high speed, standing water and poor runway
macro-texture. When hydroplaning occurs, it causes a substantial loss of tyre friction
and wheel spin-up may not occur.
Stopping the aircraft with the least landing run must be emphasised when landing on
wet or slippery runways.
Immediately after touchdown, check that the ground spoilers deploy as the thrust levers
are reduced to IDLE.
Lower the nosewheel immediately to the runway; lift will decrease and the main gear
loading will increase.
Apply thrust reversers, up to FULL Reverse, judiciously to observe how the aircraft
responds before full reverse is used. The normal procedure is to move the thrust levers
to MIN REV when speed is reduced to 60 knots. In an emergency, reverse thrust may
be used to bring the aircraft to a full stop.
Apply brakes with moderate-to-firm pressure, smoothly and symmetrically, and let the
anti-skid do its job.
If a skid develops, reduce reverse thrust and, if necessary, return the engines to
forward thrust to return to the centreline. Regain the centreline with the rudder pedals;
use differential braking if necessary.
At low speeds, the intensity and duration of reverse thrust should be minimised. Using
reverse thrust at low speeds on snow or ice covered runways may cause:
The use of sand and grit is often used to enhance the braking action on ice covered
runways, which may be such that operations become possible. Also, hoar-frost or
frozen dew which normally has a depth of less than 1 mm can often be reported as Ice
but with a better braking action than a true ice-covered runway.
The reported braking action will be the clue as to how these sorts of ice are to be
considered. If the braking action is being reported as good, then it can be considered
as contaminated with compacted snow, with slippery runway data used if the braking
action is less than good.
If computerised performance calculations are used, pilots have the ability to enter the
reported braking action in cases of compacted snow or dry ice contamination. This is
acceptable and offers greater flexibility when operating in such conditions. If wet
ice-slippery conditions are reported, pilots must use the appropriate performance
selection and there is no further option to enter a reported braking action, the computer
will default to Poor (Friction Coefficient of 0.16).
Compacted Snow and Less than Slippery or For T/O use Wet Ice (Slippery)
Ice. Good. reported performance data unless using
Braking Action if electronic performance when the
using Electronic reported Braking Action can be
Performance used.For Landing use Wet Ice
calculations. (Slippery) data for braking action
medium or poor.
Nil. Less than Slippery or For T/O use Wet Ice (Slippery)
Good. reported performance data unless using
Braking Action if electronic performance when the
using Electronic reported Braking Action can be
Performance. used.
For Landing use Wet Ice
(Slippery) performance data for
braking action medium or poor.
Any reported braking action of less than GOOD (40 on the METAR Report) is to be
considered as SLIPPERY and the WET ICE (SLIPPERY) performance chart should
be used. If computerised performance is available, pilots may use the reported
Friction Coefficient or Braking Action and do not have to defer to the most restrictive
option of Wet Ice-Slippery.
Operations on any runway that has a reported braking action as POOR should be
avoided.
The best way to take-off on a contaminated runway is to wait until it has been
cleared. If this is not feasible, proceed with caution and if there is any doubt, there
should be no doubt, do not operate.
2.21 RVSM
2.21.1 General
RVSM operation provides continuous 1,000 ft vertical separation between FL 290 and
FL 410. For flight in RVSM airspace, the aircraft must be equipped with height keeping
equipment complying with the Minimum Aircraft Systems Performance Specification
(altimetry) (MAPS). Flybe has been awarded RVSM approvals for Embraer E-Jet
aircraft.
The following EICAS messages reflect the loss of the respective ADS system:
ADS 1 FAIL, ADS 2 FAIL, ADS 3 FAIL.
ADS 1 HTR FAIL, ADS 2 HTR FAIL, ADS 3 HTR FAIL.
ADS SLIPCOMP FAIL.
Should any of the required equipment fail before the aircraft enters RVSM airspace, a
new clearance must be requested to avoid entering the RVSM airspace.
In level cruise, the aircraft must be flown at the cleared flight level by reference to one
of the two PFD altimeters. Particular care should be taken to ensure that ATC
clearances are fully understood and followed. The aircraft must not intentionally depart
from the cleared flight level without a positive clearance from ATC unless an
emergency situation demands departure from the cleared level.
During cruise, the AP should be operative and engaged in ALT hold mode except when
exceptional circumstances such as turbulence require disengagement. Following loss
of the automatic height keeping function, any consequential restrictions will need to be
observed.
PFs PFD altimeter should be the altitude source for both the autopilot and the
transponder. When the altitude difference between the PFD 1 and PFD 2 displays
exceeds 100 ft, select ADS 3 on the PFD that does not agree with the IESS.
If notified by ATC of a deviation from the assigned altitude that exceeds 300 ft, action
should be taken to return to the cleared flight level as quickly as possible. If this cannot
be achieved, a revised clearance must be negotiated with ATC. This deviation must be
reported under the MOR reporting scheme.
If the difference between two altimeters seems significant, make the comparison in
steady flight.
If a limit in the table is exceeded, the altimetry system is defective and an entry must
be made in the Technical Log. ATC must be notified if a deviation exceeds 200 ft.
ATC should be notified of weather conditions or equipment failures which affect the
ability to maintain the current clearance. Examples of this would be: severe turbulence,
loss of thrust, loss of pressurisation, need to divert, uncertain of position, etc. A plan of
action appropriate to the airspace concerned should be coordinated with ATC. If ATC
cannot be contacted immediately to negotiate a revised clearance before departing
from the old then pilots should:
2.22 FMS
2.22.1 Approvals
2.22.1.1 Operational Approvals
The Honeywell Primus Epic FMS has been demonstrated to be capable of and has
been shown to meet the requirements for the following:
The FMS has been demonstrated to be compliant with the requirements of AC 121-13
and FAR 121, Appendix G, regarding use of IRS as a primary means of navigation in
remote/oceanic flight, with dual installed FMS, GPS and IRS operational prior to the
start of flight.
The FMS has been demonstrated to be compliant with the requirements of FAA Notice
8110.60, regarding use of GPS as a primary means of navigation in remote/oceanic
flight, with dual installed FMS and GPS operational prior to the start of flight.
Compliance with Notice 8110.60 also requires the Operator to use Honeywell Sure
Flight Off Line RAIM and FDE prediction program prior to flight.
For aircraft Post Load 19.3 or equivalent factory modifications incorporated with VGP
enabled, the FMS has been demonstrated to be compliant with the requirements of
AC90-97 regarding the use of barometric vertical navigation for instrument approach
operations using decision altitude, when used in accordance with the limitations and
operational procedures contained in this Chapter.
Use of the FMS is limited to procedures that are referenced to the WGS-84 datum
or the NAD-63 datum, unless other appropriate procedures are used.
The pilots must verify that the navigation database cycle is valid.
The FMS use is limited to the geographic regions contained within the installed
navigation database.
A minimum of one VOR, DME and IRS must be verified to be installed and
operational.
Any appropriate ground facilities (VOR, DME) that are utilised by the procedures to
be flown must be verified as operational using an approved method.
When using FMS guidance to conduct an instrument approach procedure that does not
include GPS in the title of the published procedure, the flight crew must verify that the
procedure specified navigation aid(s) and associated avionics are operational (VOR,
DME, ADF).
The pilot must rely on the altimeter as the primary vertical reference during the final
approach segment, including step down fixes. VNAV path guidance is supplementary
guidance information.
Use of VNAV guidance below the published approach minimums without the
appropriate visibility indications is prohibited.
When using VGP, use of Temperature Compensation is prohibited on aircraft that are
pre-Load 21.4.
LNAV and VNAV must not be armed below the one engine inoperative acceleration
height.
LNAV must not be armed until there are no more turn considerations. Normally,
HDG and BANK must be used initially.
The use of VNAV guidance is prohibited when the FD vertical mode is standby.
The use of FMS speed guidance is prohibited when the FD vertical mode is standby.
The use of VNAV guidance is prohibited when the FD mode is other than VNAV unless
the pilot adjusts the ALT SEL to each altitude constraint in the flight plan.
Selection of the FMS disable function on the Radio Tune NAV page of the MCDU is
prohibited on aircraft that are pre-Load 19.3.
The pilot must ensure that displayed guidance data from non-usable stations is not
used for navigation purposes by the flight crew. The NOTAM function in the FMS does
not always inhibit tuning of a NOTAM selected station by the FMS when in AUTO tune
mode. Note that the FMS will not use NOTAM selected station data for FMS position
determination.
2.22.3.3 Approach
The FMS approach procedure is in Table 22.3.3.
Note: When VGP is engaged, the FMS descent path will not be restricted by the
altitude pre-selector.
Select FMS.
Select LNAV.
If the hold is defined as a hold to an altitude, as part of a procedure from the navigation
database, the pilot must select the EXIT prompt on the FPL page when the hold altitude
termination point is reached.
If hold patterns are flown at speeds higher than 210 knots, the crew should monitor
position throughout the manoeuvre to ensure that the aircraft remains in the protected
airspace.
During approaches with VNAV armed, the ALT SEL must be set to altitudes lower than
the current aircraft altitude (only on aircraft that are pre Load 19.3).
If a landing is necessary immediately after take-off, the pilot must clear the take-off
v-speeds from the TAKE-OFF VSPEEDS page of the MCDU in order to clear the
take-off v-speeds from the airspeed tape on the PFD.
The system does not support the display of landing v-speeds for touch-and-go
operations.
The PRNAV operations must satisfy a required track keeping accuracy of 1 NM for at
least 95% of the flight time, and the automatic selection, verification and, where
appropriate, de-selection of navigation aids (AUTO TUNE function).
P-RNAV operations determine airplane position on the horizontal plane using inputs
from the following types of positioning sensors:
Distance Measurement Equipment (DME) giving measurements from two or more
ground station (DME/DME).
VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) with a co-located DME (VOR/DME), where it is
identified as meeting the requirements of the procedures.
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) GPS or GALILEO.
Inertial Reference System (IRS), with automatic updating from suitable radio based
navigation equipment.
P-RNAV is used for departures, arrivals and approaches down to (FAWP Final
Approach Waypoint). The final APPR segment down to the RWY threshold and the
associated missed approach are not covered by P-RNAV procedures.
The FMS VNAV and the FMS SPEED are not required for PRNAV.
1 FMS.
FMS 1 (2) FAIL displayed on the EICAS.
1 Flight Director.
FD FAULT displayed on the EICAS.
1 DME Sensor.
1 VOR sensor.
1 GPS System.
1 MCDU.
1 Source (SRC) Selector Button.
The terrain awareness part of the EGPWS must be serviceable when conducting any
VGP or APV approaches.
2.22.3.7.5 Arrival
Verify NOTAM for the availability of the intended P-RNAV procedure. Verify also if any
navaid identified in the AIP as critical for the intended P-RNAV procedure is
unavailable.
1 Flight Director
1 FMS source selector button.
1 VOR/ILS system.
1 DME sensor.
1 GPS system.
1 FMS (FMS 1 (2) FAIL displayed on EICAS).
The terrain awareness part of the EGPWS must be serviceable for GNSS approaches.
CAUTION
Crews must recognise that temperature compensation by the system is applicable to the VNAV
guidance only and is not a substitute for the flight crew compensating for the cold temperature
effects on minimum altitudes or the decision altitude.
Crews should consider using temperature compensation for any VGP referenced
approach regardless of the ambient temperature. By so doing, the aircraft will maintain
an accurate 3 degree glide slope to DA. Therefore, when the crew become visual, they
will be aligned correctly with the PAPIs.
For airfields with an elevation greater than 6000 ft msl, Temperature Compensation
must be used.
Once the arrival is programmed into the FMS, a reasonableness check must be made
by confirming headings and distances between approach waypoints. This can be
achieved by checking the FPL page on the MCDU or by examining the approach in
PLAN mode on the MFD.
When QNH has been set during the approach, the crew are to compare altimeters to
ensure that the maximum difference is less than 100 ft.
When BARO VNAV guidance (VGP) is not available the GNSS approach profile is
essentially the same as the normal, non-precision approach. This profile is presented
at Figure 22.3.1 and also in tabular form at Table 22.3.6.
If the published approach also includes VNAV, pilots may use the VGP mode to
complete the approach. This is engaged by pressing APP once established on the
inbound track.
When tracking inbound and ready for the final descent, set the go-around altitude on
the altitude selector. This serves to de-select ALT SEL so that FPA mode can be
engaged at the Final Approach Fix (FAF) if VGP is not available.
If on radar vectors, note that it is permissible to accept routing direct to any point
between the Initial Fix and the Final Approach Fix (but not beyond the Final Approach
Fix). In all cases, the final intercept angle should be less than 30 degrees.
At the FAF/FAP, start a descent at the appropriate descent angle assisted by use of
the VGP or FPA facility. Both pilots should start their stopwatch.
The AP must be used for the approach and the missed approach, if available. If the AP
is used and a decision to land is made, it must be disconnected by DA.
Final Approach
Fix
PM Monitors raw data
and cross checks
Complete Altitude with Distance
landing checks
Missed Approach
When cleared for procedure: Point
(Aircraft c/s), request RNAV approach, via (Initial Approach Fix Designator),
runway xx.
Where traffic conditions permit, air traffic controllers shall clear the pilot to follow the
procedure using the following phraseology:
(Aircraft c/s), cleared RNAV approach, runway xx, (report at [Initial Approach Fix
Designator]).
For traffic sequencing and to aid situational awareness, air traffic controllers may
request the pilot to report when established on final approach track or to report at any
other relevant point in the procedure. For example:
Air Traffic Controllers shall instruct the pilot to report at the final approach fix, using the
phraseology:
After reaching the final approach fix, the pilot will continue to fly the procedure towards
the next waypoint (normally the runway threshold). At the appropriate time, the pilot will
either continue with the air traffic clearance received or will execute the Missed
Approach Procedure (MAP).
When Air Traffic Control is aware of problems with the GNSS system, the following
phraseology shall be used:
(Aircraft c/s), GNSS reported unreliable (or GNSS may not be available [due to
interference]):
(Aircraft c/s), GNSS unavailable for (specify operation) [from (time) to (time) (or
until further notice]).
Following a RAIM indication, pilots shall inform the controller of the event and
subsequent intentions.
(Aircraft c/s) GNSS unavailable (due to [reason e.g., Loss of RAIM or RAIM alert])
(intentions).
2.22.3.9.1 Limitations
The limitations in the AFM are that the use of FMS speeds is not allowed for one engine
inoperative operations and by the FAF MANUAL speeds must be selected. The use of
FMS speeds is also not allowed for go-arounds.
The DEPARTURE SPEED page: is used to set the maximum speed to be flown until
passing either the selected vertical or lateral limits. The default limit is set to 210 knots
within 4.0 nm and below 2,500 feet. As soon as either the distance, which is radial
distance from the airport, or altitude as set is exceeded then the speed will revert to the
climb speed as set in the PERFORMANCE INIT page 3/3.
The APPROACH SPEED page: is used to set which speeds are required for a given
flap setting. The FMS will command the normal descent speed as selected in the
performance initialisation. On lines 4L, 4R and 5L crews can tell the FMS when to start
flying approach speeds. Line 5L is used to define if the crew wishes to start the speed
reduction from the first waypoint on the instrument arrival procedure. This can quite
often be at a great distance from the destination so it will normally be selected to NO.
In any case when within both the vertical and lateral limit as set on 4L and 4R the
commanded speed will be reduced to the speed limit as set in approach speeds. They
are default set to 3,000 feet AGL and 15 nm. So only when below 3,000 feet and within
15 nm, which again is a radial distance from the airport, will the target speed be
reduced to the selected clean speed.
The third page is the GO-AROUND SPEEDS page. This page is used to set the
speeds to be commanded in the given configuration in case of a go-around. At the
moment this is not allowed by the AFM. At the FAF MANUAL speeds must be selected.
2.22.3.9.3 Take-off
If FMS speeds are selected before TO then the target speed will be set to V2 as set in
the TO speeds. This target speed will stay at V2 until Vr. At this stage the FMS will
check for an engine failure. If an engine has failed then the target speed will remain at
V2, if the speed is already greater than V2 it will stay at the speed as achieved up to a
maximum of V2+10. If no engine has failed then the target speed will be set to V2+10.
This will stay until FLCH is selected. As soon as FLCH is selected, the FMS will
again check for a failed engine. If this is the case then it will set the target speed to VFS,
if both engines are running then it will set the target speed as set in the departure
speeds page. This will normally be 210 knots until passing either the distance or
altitude constraints as set in the departure speed page. After that it will accelerate to
the climb speeds as set in PERFORMANCE INIT. The FMS will also keep within the
speed limit as set in PERFORMANCE INIT page 1 which defaults to 250 knots/
10,000 ft.
Note: FMS speeds will not be presented in the speed window on the PFDs until a
departure altitude is set in the altitude window.
If a departure with a higher flap setting (Flap 3 or 4) is conducted, the target speed will
be set to VFE-5 knots for the configuration until the configuration and limit have
changed. Once passed the distance or altitude as set in the DEPARTURE SPEED
the target speed will be set to the climb speed as set in the PERFORMANCE INIT. If
The aircraft is not cleaned up at that stage, then again the target will be set to VFE-5
knots until the flaps are retracted. If a crew wish to delay the acceleration to 250 knots,
this can be achieved by increasing the distance and altitude constraints as required.
In the case of a noise abatement take-off, crews should access the DEPARTURE
SPEED page and set the speed limit to V2+10 and the altitude limit to 3,000 ft agl. Set
the distance limit to a high value (say 25 nm) to make sure that the first limit to be
passed is the altitude and not the distance. Perform a normal take-off and at
acceleration altitude PF should call for FLCH as normal. The Target Speed will now
remain at V2+10 until passing 3,000 feet and then increase to VFE-5 for the
configuration until the slats/flaps have reached 0. Thereafter, the target speed will be
set to the climb speed.
In the event of an engine failure on take-off, the FMS will set the correct speed.
However, the AFM does not allow the use of FMS speeds for engine out operations,
therefore, crews will have to select MANUAL speeds. With this in mind, the
single-engine climb out procedure includes a call at 400 ft Heading, Bank and
Manual. (see engine failure profile in Section 3.3.)
WARNING
If turbulence or windshear is expected, crews must consider the effects of the resulting
fluctuations in IAS. The FMS targets VFE-5 knots for the acceleration phase and this provides
little protection over flap limiting speeds. In such circumstances, crews should consider using
manual speeds for the departure.
2.22.3.9.4 Approach
For the approach the FMS will anticipate and try to reduce the speed, first to comply
with the speed limit as set in the PERFORMANCE INIT (250/10,000). Then, hen
descending below the altitude constraint and within the distance as set in the approach
speeds page, it will command a speed according to the configuration. There is no
option to set the speed for Flap 1, the FMS will set the Flap 1 speed to selected Flap 2
speed +6 kts. This creates a significant problem in that the standard Flap 2 speed is
160 knots. The resulting Flap 1 speed of 166 knots is well below a comfortable
manoeuvre speed for Flap 1. With this in mind, Company procedures are to set an
artificial speed of 174 knots for Flap 2 so that the FMS will command 180 knots for
Flap 1. Prior to selecting Flap 2, MANUAL speeds must be selected. This procedure
will ensure that crews have selected MANUAL speeds prior to the FAF which is in
keeping with current AFM limitations.
If a DEGRAD annunciator is displayed, the pilot should select the cross-side FMS if it
is available. If the cross-side FMS is not available, the appropriate contingency
procedure in Table 22.4.1 should be followed.
RNP-0.3 and GPS required approach If not visual, make a missed approach.
RNP0.3 and GPS required approach If not visual, make a missed approach.
2.22.4.6 FD FAULT
Non Affected Side .............................................. Select AS NAVIGATION SOURCE
In case of FD FAIL, apply the P-RNAV contingency procedure (Table 22.4.2).
Once the aircraft has landed, any failures are to be reported in the aircraft Technical
Log prior to dispatch.
The FMS has not been demonstrated to comply with the VNAV requirements stated in
Appendix H of DO283. The FMS does not provide the capability to utilise the RNP value
from the procedures in the navigation database. Fixed radius leg transition capability is
not provided. The FMS does not provide constant radius hold patterns or RNP hold
entries as defined in Appendix J of DO 283.
2.22.5.3 CDI
When the FMS is selected as the navigation source on the PFD, the scale of the CDI
will be based on the displayed active RNP value. The two dot full scale deflection will
always be equal to the RNP value (1xRNP) displayed on the PFD.
If the EPU is greater than the active RNP for a set period of time (determined by phase
of flight), the FMS will provide an alert (DEGRAD on the PFD and UNABLE RNP on the
MCDU scratch pad) to notify the crew that the system does not have the necessary
accuracy or integrity to maintain RNP operations for the current RNP type. Table 22.5.2
describes the relationship between phase of flight and the time to alarm.
En route 24
Terminal 6
Approach 6
The abnormal procedures for degraded operation are given in Section 2.22.4.
The FMS also provides annunciations to alert the crew of an ability to meet the RNP
for future flight plan legs. Refer to the Honeywell Primus Epic FMS Pilots Operating
Manual for further details regarding system features and annunciations.
The resulting alarm limits differ from the TSO C129a specified alarm limits as shown in
Table 22.5.3.
En route 2 4 2
Terminal 1 2 1
The navigation data bases as installed into the E-Jets are subject to spot checks by
crews who should complete this as part of their cross check when inputting any SID/
STAR or route.
2.23 Engines
2.23.1 Ground Engine Cross-bleed Start
The engine cross-bleed start procedure is given in Table 23.1.
The Packs should be left in AUTO for this procedure as the HPSOV closes when no
bleed air demand is made with the aircraft on the ground.
For instance, at an airport where the field elevation is 2000 ft and the OAT
is 10C, the recommended bleed duct pressure for engine start using a
ground pneumatic cart is 35 psig.
The bleed duct pressure is displayed on the MFD ECS synoptic page.
Engine start........................................................................ Accomplish
Ground cart ......................................................................... Disconnect
After start:
Packs. .....................................................................................Pushed in
Engine starts using pneumatic carts usually result in higher ITT values. Use pneumatic
carts to start right engine only. Consider performing a cross bleed start on the second
engine.
Battery Voltage
The batteries voltage must be above 22.5 V.
If the battery voltage is between 21.0 V and 22.5 V, recharge the batteries prior to
take-off using any AC source (including engines during taxi) for:
Note: The required battery voltage prior to start is the same as the original limitation
for APU starting.
Bleed Pressure
The minimum bleed duct pressure is 40 psi minus 0.5 psi for every 1,000 ft above sea
level. Check on the STATUS or ECS synoptic pages the bleed pressure before starting
the engines.
Hydraulic Pumps
No hydraulic pump may be turned on for at least 3 minutes after AC power is
established or, for airplanes PostMod SB 190-31-,0007 (Primus Epic Load 4.5) or an
equivalent modification factory incorporated, the FLT CTRL TEST IN PROG Status
message is no longer presented. Otherwise the electrical PBIT will not run.
Eicas Messages
Expect EICAS messages related to the hydraulic system not being pressurised and the
packs being selected to OFF. Wait until the start procedure is completed before
acknowledging any EICAS messages not related to an abnormal engine start.
For the taxi-out, a single engine start is performed on the ramp. The second engine
start is delayed until a suitable time before take-off. (Note the required 2 minutes at
idle). Once the engine is started, the after start checklist is completed.
For the taxiing, an engine may be shut down once it has been at idle for more than two
minutes (this time commences just before touch down in Retard Mode).
One-engine taxi is permitted in icing conditions (provided the 30 sec run at 54% N1 is
completed prior to take-off) but may not be conducted if taxi ways are contaminated or
slippery.
Normally engine 2 is used for one-engine taxiing (although either engine can be used).
Since engine 2 is started first using external air, one-engine taxiing using engine 2 is
approved following an external air start. When deciding which engine to start first, pilots
should consider the possible effects of any crosswinds. This is to help prevent the
ingestion of engine exhaust fumes into the APU inlet.
The Captain should consider the following before deciding on one-engine taxiing:
Crew experience.
Workload.
Expected taxi time.
Gross weight, ambient temperature and ramp gradient.
Ramp congestion.
Taxiway surface condition.
Whether sharp turns are required. Sharp turns towards the operating engine are
difficult.
The Flight Controls check should be performed slowly, one surface at a time. This will
help avoid spurious FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH messages.
Keep the APU running for taxi-out; an APU start is more efficient than a cross-bleed
start.
If possible, begin the one engine taxi with a slight turn towards the non-operating
engine; there will be less resistance, resulting in a lower thrust setting to initiate taxiing.
A constant pressure on the tiller will be required due to asymmetric thrust. Do not use
the rudder trim to counteract this turning tendency.
If shutting down engine 1 for the single-engine taxi, switch the electric hydraulic pump 1
selector to the ON position, before shutting down the engine. The electric hydraulic
pump 1 should be kept on for at least 30 seconds after final engine shutdown on stand.
When appropriate, turn the electric hydraulic pump 1 selector back to AUTO.
When departing from stand, the Captain is to brief verbally with the ground crew team
leader and ensure that he is aware that the aircraft has no APU. There are two possible
scenarios with the APU unserviceable. Firstly, if the APU cannot generate electrical
power, there will be a need to keep the GPU or FEGP attached until number two engine
has started. Secondly, if the APU cannot supply air power for the engine start, the
number two engine will have to be started by use of a ground air cart. Of course, there
is the possibility that the APU is completely unserviceable and there will be a need for
both electrical and air external supplies. The basic procedure will be the same,
whatever the scenario. The team leader will brief the other ground crew members
accordingly. The flight crew are to request a start on stand prior to push back. Once
start clearance has been given by ATC:
The Captain is to complete the before start check list (and the External Air Start
checklist if required) and then ask the team leader for the pre-starting ground
checks.
The ground crew team leader will acknowledge and the flight crew will start engine
number 2 once approved by the ground team leader.
The flight crew are to monitor the Electrical Synoptic page to ensure that the no
break power transfer is completed. Thereafter, the Captain is to indicate to the team
leader that the FEGP or GPU may be disconnected and, if necessary, the
nosewheel chocks may be removed. If an external air start is required, the air cart is
to be disconnected prior to removing the nosewheel chocks.
The ground crew are to indicate that the FEGP/GPU and external air cart are
disconnected and chocks have been removed. The Captain may then request
pushback from ATC.
Once the pushback is completed engine number 1 may be started. Number 1 engine
must not be started during the pushback operation, particularly if a cross bleed start
is required. The need to increase thrust on engine number 2 could cause significant
problems for the tug driver and may result in loss of control of the tug vehicle.
Single engine taxi out operations may not be conducted when the APU is
unserviceable.
It is important that the ground crew team leader is aware that the aircraft has an
inoperative APU. This is achieved during departure by holding a face to face, or
headset briefing with the Captain. For arriving aircraft this issue is more problematic.
Flybe Operations are to make every effort to give advance warning of the inoperative
APU to all relevant handling agents including cleaning and refuel staff. In addition,
the flight crew are to contact the handling agent by radio to pass this information.
Finally, the EFB Message Board app can be used to give a visual indication that the
APU is u/s.
If there is any confusion once on stand, the Captain is to warn the cabin crew and
then shut down completely. Although this may result in starting problems (that
usually require a subsequent shut down and re-start) it is by far the safest option and
it will prevent any ground crew approaching whilst the aircraft is in a potentially
dangerous condition.
At night, the flight deck Dome light is to be switched on so that ground crew can
easily see the pilots hand signals.
Departures should be conducted using headset communication. Only as a last
resort are ICAO hand signals to be used. If this is the case, a face to face briefing
must be completed between the Captain and the ground crew team leader prior to
commencing the start.
The aircraft/cabin altitude conversion table must be consulted to determine the cabin
altitude according to aircraft altitude: refer to the Quick Reference Handbook.
Check the cabin altitude, cabin rate and differential pressure values on the EICAS.
At the traffic pattern altitude, slowly position the knob to full UP.
During descent the thrust levers should be moved as slowly as possible to prevent
bumps.
2.25.2 MMO
VMO for the E-Jets is 300 KIAS up to 8000 ft. It then increases linearly to 320 KIAS by
10,000 ft. This limitation remains up to approximately 29,000 ft when maximum Mach
number (MMO) takes over. Thereafter, the aircraft is limited by MMO at M.82. Mach
number is determined primarily by reference to air temperature. The colder it is, the
higher the Mach number for a given indicated airspeed. Therefore, as you climb above
29,000 ft at a constant Mach number, the air temperature will decrease and the
indicated airspeed will decrease accordingly.
2.25.3 VS1G
VS1G is a computerised stall speed based on un-accelerated flight. It is the point of
maximum lift for a given condition. One of the variables in the lift formula is density.
Again, in flight, the air density decreases as altitude is increased. Therefore, to maintain
lift, the airspeed must be increased to compensate. This means that the stall can be
approached at much higher indicated speeds at altitude. Equally, deployment of the
speed brakes will also disturb the airflow over the wings further increasing the stall
speed and, thus, reduce the available flight envelope.
These effects are depicted below:
Coffin Corner
45 000
Stall Speed
(VS1G) 40 000 As air temperature
decreases with
(Illustrative 35 000 altitude, the indicated
MMO = 0.82 Mach
example only) airspeed must
30 000
reduce to maintain a
Effect of deploying constant Mach
25 000
speed brake number
20 000
Altitude (feet)
15000
10 000
0
200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340 350
Airspeed (KIAS)
A further issue that can cause confusion to pilots is the speed trend vector as presented
on the E-Jet Speed Tape on the PFD. If the trend vector impinges into the over speed
area (red and white diagonal stripes) of the speed tape, the speed presentation will turn
initially amber and then red even though the actual speed remains below a limiting
value. This effect is very prevalent in turbulence as shown below:
Over speed Mode has
engaged and the
active mode (FPA) is
now armed.
In order to avoid the above scenarios, pilots are provided with two important data cards
in the flight deck. These are the Cruise Capability Charts and the Manoeuvre Capability
Chart. Examples and explanations of both are shown below:
This chart shows the performance limited cruise capability of the aircraft based on
engine thrust. The chart shows the cruise capability based on having a climb rate of
300 ft/minute. It does not take account of manoeuvre capability.
This chart must be consulted to determine your safe manoeuvre capability. In clear
conditions a capability of 1.3 g is acceptable but in turbulence pilots should target
1.75 g, usually by descending if necessary.
When lowering the nose, only a small attitude change is required to minimise height
loss.
At high altitude, stall recovery will take a long time because power from the aircraft
engines is already limited. In such circumstances, height loss should be traded for
speed (because terrain avoidance is hardly an issue at such levels.)
Section 3 Contents
3 Abnormal and Emergency Procedures......................................... 31
3.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 31
3.1.1 General............................................................................... 31
3.1.2 QRH Layout........................................................................ 31
3.1.3 Smoke Procedures ............................................................. 32
3.1.4 Non-annunciated Procedures............................................. 32
3.1.5 Annunciated Procedures .................................................... 32
3.1.6 Relationship to the Normal Checklist.................................. 33
3.1.7 Procedure Title Format....................................................... 33
3.1.8 Indications of the Failure Condition .................................... 34
3.1.9 Vital Actions........................................................................ 34
3.1.10 Questions ........................................................................... 34
3.1.11 The End Symbol ................................................................. 34
3.1.12 Application of a Procedure to More Than One
condition ............................................................................. 35
3.1.13 Procedures Covering Two Coincident Failures .................. 35
3.1.14 Assumptions of the QRH Procedures................................. 35
3.1.15 Landing at the Nearest Airport............................................ 35
3.1.16 Circuit Breakers .................................................................. 36
3.1.17 Landing Distance Correction Factors ................................. 36
3.1.18 Fire Handle Operation ........................................................ 37
3.1.19 Study .................................................................................. 37
3.2 Work Method ...................................................................................... 38
3.2.1 Division of Responsibility.................................................... 38
3.2.2 Use of Automation .............................................................. 39
3.2.3 Correct Procedures ............................................................ 39
3.2.4 Decision Making ................................................................. 39
3.2.5 Communication and Resource ......................................... 310
3.2.6 Control Identification......................................................... 310
3.2.7 Vital Actions...................................................................... 310
3.2.8 Multiple Failures ............................................................... 311
3.2.9 Summary .......................................................................... 312
3.3 Engines ............................................................................................ 313
3.3.1 Engine Failure During Take-off After V1........................... 313
3.3.2 Emergency Engine Shutdown Procedure after
V1 ..................................................................................... 316
3.3.3 Engine Failure Contingency Procedures .......................... 318
Revision 16 | May 2014 TOC31
Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
Section 3 Contents
This section:
Describes the QRH and AOM procedure format.
Gives the Company work method for accomplishing an abnormal or emergency
procedure.
Amplifies some of the procedures.
Lists all the procedure items that must be memorised. The Company terms these
items vital actions.
Smoke
Each page of the non-annunciated procedures section is identified at the top by:
Non Annunciated
The index of EICAS messages is divided into three categories: warning, caution and
advisory. Within each category, the messages are listed in alphabetical order. Some of
the messages do not have a drill; the intention of these messages is to make the crew
aware of a condition. Instead of a page number, these messages have an index
annotation of Crew Awareness.
The system sub-sections are listed in alphabetical order. Each systems sub-section is
preceded by a table of contents divided into warning, abnormal and advisory
procedures. Within each of these divisions, the procedures are listed in alphabetical
order. The lists are colour coded; yellow text on a black background is used for warning
procedures; black text on a grey background is used for abnormal procedures; black
text on a yellow background is used for advisory procedures.
AMS Pneumatics/Air-conditioning/Pressurisation.
Auto flight
APU.
Electrical.
Engine.
Fire Protection.
Flight Controls.
FMS/NAV/COM and Flight Instruments.
Fuel.
Hydraulics.
Ice and Rain Protection.
Landing Gear and Brakes.
Oxygen.
Each page of a system is identified by the subsection's title in white text on a grey
background. For example:
Oxygen
3.1.6 Relationship to the Normal Checklist
The emergency and abnormal procedure instructions take priority over the normal
checklist instructions.
Emergency and warning procedure titles are in yellow text on a black background. An
example is given below:
Abnormal procedure titles are in black text on a grey background in a single lined box.
An example is given below.
AC BUS 2 OFF
Advisory procedure titles are in black text on a yellow/clear background in a single lined
box. An example is given below.
Aural warnings.
Lights.
EICAS indications.
Flight instrument flags.
The aircraft condition.
The other actions of the procedure should be performed as soon as the condition
permits.
3.1.10 Questions
Some procedures in the QRH require a different sequence of actions depending on the
conditions observed. These procedures often include questions to which the answer is
either yes or no. The question is given in a box.
If the answer is no, then a line is followed from the right of the box to the appropriate
set of actions. NO is written above the line.
If the answer is yes, then a line is followed from the bottom left of the box to the
appropriate set of actions. YES is written to the right of the line.
Following a route through the appropriate questions and answers until an end symbol
is reached completes these procedures.
END
The same applies to text within a procedure. For example, in the Cargo Compartment
Fire procedure, either the CRG AFT FIREX ARM message is given or the
CRG FWD FIREX ARM message is given. In the procedure,
CRG AFT (FWD) FIREX ARM is written.
3.1.19 Study
It is important to study the procedures from time to time: not just to ensure that the vital
actions are learnt but also to maintain a familiarity with all the procedures. It is better to
find out that one does not understand a procedure on the ground rather than in the air
when the procedure is being used in anger.
When an emergency situation occurs, PFs top priority is to control the aircraft. If unable
to do so he must immediately inform PM: for example, jammed controls. So providing
it is possible, PF initially retains control of the aircraft. In general, he will retain control
throughout and PM will deal with the failure. However, under some circumstances it
may be prudent to change control. Examples are:
Whenever an emergency or abnormal situation occurs, the Captain must decide who
is to fly the aircraft and who is to deal with the emergency. If the Captain wishes to
change roles and act as PF or PM, he must clearly announce his decision and receive
an acknowledgement from the First Officer; otherwise, there will be no change of
control. There must be no doubt about who is in control of the aircraft.
Once the aircraft is in a safe condition and the vital actions are complete:
The other extreme must also be considered. If you have to extend your flight, monitor
the fuel contents closely. Do not spend an inordinate amount of time dealing with a
problem and run short of fuel.
Consider how the effects of the failure and the prevailing atmospheric conditions are
going to affect the approach and landing. If necessary, divert to the nearest suitable
airfield.
Where the course of action is not clear-cut, discuss the possible courses of action
before making a decision.
Make use of all resources available. There might be a passenger who can help you
perhaps another pilot qualified on type.
Any problem and any assistance required should be clearly transmitted to ATC.
Remember that ATC is there to help you in an emergency; so do not be reluctant to ask
for their assistance; a MAYDAY can always be downgraded to a PAN once the incident
is under control. Do not fly a complicated arrival procedure unnecessarily under
abnormal or emergency conditions if ATC can give you radar vectors. Similarly, dont
waste effort flying a precise hold while carrying out an abnormal or emergency
procedure. Instead, ask for radar vectors while completing the abnormal or emergency
procedure.
The C/A 1 should be informed of any abnormal or emergency situation; a useful briefing
format is the NITS format. The format is:
In cases where the cabin crew have associated cabin procedures, it is imperative that
C/A 1 is informed. However, the communication should not be one way. The cabin crew
may have valuable information for the flight deck crew. So, when briefing C/A 1 about
the problem ask for a cabin report and do not deter the cabin crew from offering
information.
When actuating any lever, handle, guarded switch or guarded knob, confirmation of the
correct selection must be made between the pilots.
If more than one CAS message appears at the time, perform the required checklists
following the message priority:
Warning (red).
Caution (amber).
Advisory (cyan).
If more than one CAS message within a Category appears at the same time, analyse
the situation and decide on the order of performing the required checklists. If the
messages include AC BUS, DC BUS, AVNX MAU or SPDA, to identify the root cause,
messages should be addressed in the following order:
AC BUS failures.
DC BUS failures.
AVNX MAU failures.
SPDA failures.
For aircraft that are post Epic Load 21.2 the use of Root Cause CAS Messages will
aid diagnosis. These messages are indicated on the CAS display with a chevron:
A Root Cause CAS message is indicated when one system failure has resulted in
multiple (and possibly confusing) messages. The objective is to give crews assistance
in diagnosing the root cause of a problem.
3.2.9 Summary
The work method is summarised in Table 3.1.
3.3 Engines
3.3.1 Engine Failure During Take-off After V1
In the event of engine failure or engine fire before V1 is achieved, the take-off must be
rejected.
If an engine fails or an engine fire warning is given after V1 has been achieved, the
take-off must be continued. The procedure is summarised in Table 3.2 and a pictorial
representation of the profile is presented in figure 3.1.
If engine failure occurs after V1, oppose the thrust asymmetry with rudder. Use aileron
to keep the wings level during lift-off. Additional rudder displacement will be required
when the nosewheel leaves the runway. The correct amount of rudder will be applied
when the handwheel is approximately zero. There will be a few degrees of bank toward
the live engine.
On reaching VR, commence a smooth continuous rotation at a rate slightly less than
that for a normal take-off. The required rate is about 2 per second. After lift-off,
continue the rotation rate as follows:
When a positive rate of climb has been confirmed, retract the landing gear and maintain
the speed between V2 and V2 + 10 knots.
If the engine fails during a flexible thrust take-off, the ATTCS should set the reserve
thrust according to the rate set on the Take-off Data Set page of the MCDU. If the
ATTCS does not set the reserve thrust, manually advance the thrust levers to the MAX
position.
During the climb to 400 ft AAL, PM should monitor PFs actions and he should identify
the nature of the failure. It is important that PM identifies whether or not the engine has
suffered a catastrophic failure such as a fire, separation or some form of severe
damage. An indication of severe damage is no N2 or N1 rotation. An engine separation
will result in all EICAS indications for the separated engine showing Amber dashes. PM
informs PF which engine has failed and the nature of the failure.
At 400 ft AAL, PF calls for Heading, Bank and Manual. PM selects HDG, BANK and
sets FMS speeds to MANUAL. PM confirms speed is V2 or V2+10. PF calls for PM to
State the problem and both pilots agree on the nature of the emergency. PF calls
for vital actions if required Carry out vital actions for Fire, Severe Damage,
Separation, engine #.
PM carries out the required vital actions in accordance with the drills detailed in Table
3.3. PF continues the climb out at V2 to V2 +10. Once the vital actions are completed,
PM reports Vital Actions Completed.
It is very important that a crew achieves early identification of either, separation, fire or
severe damage. By closing the fire pull handles (as part of the vital actions) you prevent
both fuel and hydraulic fluid leaking out of the airframe which could exacerbate a fire or
result in total loss of a hydraulic system.
Continue the climb at or above V2 to the acceleration height, and then commence a
level acceleration through the standard flap retraction airspeed schedule to the final
segment speed (VFS).
Continue the climb at VFS to 1,500 ft above airfield level or higher if required.
VR Rotate
Selects gear up
At 400 ft AAL Select, heading, bank and Selects HDG and BANK and sets
manual FMS speeds to MANUAL
Both pilots agree on the nature of the problem and the procedure(s) to be used:
Confirmed, idle
Once the engine has been shut down and at a minimum of 1,000 ft agl, PF calls for the climb
sequence and then initiates a work split
At 400ft aal:
Select HDG &,BANK
Set FMS speeds to MANUAL
Vital Actions if required
317
Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
Abnormal and Emergency Procedures
The Engine Failure Climb-out Procedure (ENG FAIL Procedure) is published in the
upper right hand window of the iPad application and also in the note at the upper part
of the GWC below the title except where the ENG FAIL Procedure conforms to the SID
or other departure clearance. The ENG FAIL Procedure is normally designed with a
straight climb to 1,500 ft above the runway end threshold before turning towards a
designated ENG FAIL holding pattern, thus allowing the acceleration phase to be
completed before commencing the turn.
ATC permission will be required for the engine failure turn-back but note that in most
circumstances at major airfields, radar control (which will also guarantee terrain
clearance) may be available. The following emergency call format is suggested:
PAN, PAN, PAN (MAYDAY if appropriate), Jersey 123, engine failure, climbing
straight ahead to altitude XXXX ft, request L/R turn to the ABC beacon or radar vectors
downwind.
If an engine fails when already established in a SID, turn the nearest way to the ENG
FAIL holding pattern. A crew may continue to follow the SID if their climb gradient on
one engine is greater than that required for the SID. For SID departures surrounded by
high terrain where this procedure is not applicable, a special ENG FAIL procedure will
be published (for example, Innsbruck).
In general, the missed approach procedures assume a climb gradient of 2.5%; thus if
you determine (as part of the approach brief) that your expected single-engine
performance can meet this requirement, you do not need to follow the emergency turn
procedure.
Expected Climb Gradients on One Engine
25C Sea Level
E 175 E 195
CF34-8E5 CF34-10E7
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT FLAP 3 FLAP 4 FLAP 3 FLAP 4
25 TONNE 10.84% 10.75%
30 TONNE 6.90% 6.67%
34 TONNE 4.65% 4.40%
35 TONNE 11.0% 10.6%
40 TONNE 8.1% 7.6%
45 TONNE 5.8% 5.4%
Note: For airfields of 1,000 ft elevation, reduce the climb gradient by 0.5%.
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400 ft AAL Select heading and bank Selects HDG and BANK
Acceleration Acceleration
altitude altitude
The initial go-around speed in the second segment climb is to be a minimum of VREF
FULL +20.
Rejected take-offs in the low speed regime can be completed with relative ease. A
rejected take-off should be made if, below 80 knots:
A CAS message is given that indicates a condition that would be unwise take into
the air.
The importance of a CAS message cannot be assessed immediately. If in doubt
reject the take-off.
Above 80 knots and below V1, the situation is a more serious matter, particularly on
slippery runways. Very few situations should lead to a decision to reject the take-off.
The main ones are:
Fire or severe damage.
Sudden loss of engine thrust.
Compressor stalls.
Smoke.
Additional malfunctions or conditions that give unambiguous indications that the
aircraft will not fly safely.
A rejected take-off above V1 may be extremely hazardous. The take-off should be
continued if a failure occurs above V1.
Below 80 Knots, either pilot may reject the take-off by calling Stop, Stop. Above
80 knots but before V1, either pilot may reject the take-off for one of the five reasons
listed above. For all other situations only the Captain may reject the take-off. In such
circumstances, the First Officer is to report any abnormality to the Captain who will
make a decision and then announce either Stop, Stop or Go.
The procedures for the rejected take-off are to form part of the take-off briefing.
For all rejected take-offs, the First Officer will select the flaps to 5.
Normally, the Captain will carry out the rejected take-off manoeuvre. The one exception
to this is when the Captain has become incapacitated and this is recognised prior to
reaching V1 speed. An example of this would be no response to the 80 knots call. In
such circumstances, the First Officer is to take control and reject the take-off by
retarding the thrust levers to max reverse and allowing the autobrakes to arrest the
aircraft. Once the aircraft has reached a standstill, the First Officer should confirm that
the thrust levers are at idle and then apply the emergency/parking brake. After which
he will assess the situation whilst requesting assistance from ATC. It is advisable to be
towed onto stand but, if possible, the aircraft should be taxied clear of the runway by
use of the nosewheel steering on the yaw pedals.
The First Officer monitors the Captains actions and informs ATC that the aircraft is
stopping giving the reason for abandoning the take-off. The call must be prefixed by
Mayday, Mayday, Mayday if immediate assistance is required: for example, a fire.
He then selects the flaps to 5.
If a fire warning is given on the ground, the engine fire vital actions should be carried
out and both fire bottles should be discharged into the burning engine with a delay of
about 15 seconds between discharging the first and the second bottle.
Once the Captain has made the decision to evacuate, he orders the cockpit evacuation
drill by calling Carry out the emergency evacuation procedure.
In the case of a fire warning, the Captain makes a PA This is the Captain, cabin crew
standby as soon as possible.
The evacuation actions are split between the Captain and the First Officer. The Captain
puts the parking brake on; once the parking brake is on, the First Officer confirms
Flap 5. The Captain then:
The Captain then orders: This is the Captain, Evacuate, Evacuate and then
notifies ATC. Both pilots review the emergency evacuation checklist. The First Officer
then turns the batteries off.
The Captain does not refer to specific exits in his evacuation PA. It is up to the cabin
crew to decide on which exits to use.
The Captain and First Officer leave the aircraft by their primary escape route: the flight
deck windows using the escape rope. The pilots then assist the evacuation.
Confirms Flap 5
Sets both thrust levers to IDLE
Sets both START/STOP selectors to STOP
3.5 Miscellaneous
3.5.1 Overweight Landing
Landing at weights above the normal maximum landing weight may be attempted in
abnormal circumstances providing the touchdown is made with a vertical speed of
300 ft/min or less.
Weight can be reduced by flying at low altitude in a high drag configuration. However,
reducing weight must be balanced against the urgency of landing the aircraft.
Plan a touchdown in the runway touchdown zone; a go-around should be flown if the
landing occurs beyond the touchdown zone.
Fly a 3 approach angle. Use a precision glideslope such as an ILS to crosscheck the
approach angle.
Over the threshold, set the thrust levers to IDLE. Flare just enough to reduce the rate
of descent. Do not float.
After landing apply a light forward pressure on the column and use maximum reverse
thrust. Use the brakes as required.
Pilots will have to refer to the Embraer QRH when carrying out either a forced landing
or ditching, unfortunately, neither of the above calls are highlighted in the two drills.
With this in mind, pilots should note the requirement for the emergency calls and try to
ensure that they are made at the appropriate times. It is also recommended that
Captains raise this issue periodically with their cabin crew during the normal pre-flight
briefings.
If structural damage is suspected, use the flight controls with care and limit speed as
appropriate. Consider use of landing gear to expedite descent.
The Captain flies the descent. If he is not PF at the time of the failure, a positive
handover of control must be made.
In UK airspace, the ATC authorities prefer the aircraft to remain within the present
airway during the descent process. However, in all other countries, the ATC preferred
action is to vacate the airway (by turning 90 deg left or right).
Once descent is completed, O2 masks should be removed, the O2 stowage doors must
be closed and the TEST/RESET buttons must be pressed to activate the headset
microphones.
The Electrical Smoke drill (NOTE: no longer a drill on the E-Jets) on the E195 requires
the pilots to deploy the electrical Ram Air Turbine (RAT) and then switch off the main,
AC electrical power supplies. In addition, the Emergency Lights are also switched off
in order to prevent them from illuminating and, thus, using up the battery charge.
Prior to carrying out the emergency drills, the flight deck and cabin crew held a short
NITS briefing. After the NITS briefing was completed, the cabin crew started to prepare
the cabin for a normal landing. Meanwhile, the pilots commenced the Electrical Smoke
Drill.
As the RAT deployed, the cabin crew were extremely startled by the noise, which is
typically a constant, loud drone as the RAT propeller spins around. In addition, the
normal and emergency cabin lights all went out. Having not been prepared for both of
these unexpected occurrences, the cabin crew tried to call the flight deck by use of the
normal interphone system. However, the normal interphone does not work (on the
E195) when power is reduced to the emergency level. Only the Emergency Interphone
remains operative. The cabin crew never tried to use the Emergency Call button
because they may have been mislead by the normal interphone button that still lit up
when pressed although the actual interphone was not functioning. Faced with a lack of
communication and unexpected noises (RAT), the cabin crew now became convinced
that the pilots were incapacitated.
Somewhat concerned, the cabin crew elected to enter the cockpit by use of the
Emergency Flight Deck Access System. However, this too is not powered during an
electrical emergency. Thus, the cabin crew were unable to gain access to the flight
deck, furthermore, they were unable to communicate with the pilots. All this whilst they
were convinced that the crew were incapacitated.
Meanwhile, in the flight deck, the pilots were blissfully unaware of the panic that was
beginning to erupt amongst their cabin crew. They completed what was actually quite
a long checklist. Only then did the Captain make a PA. This obviously alerted the cabin
crew that all was well in the flight deck. At this point, the pilots were able to re-instate
normal, electrical power and this enabled them to use normal FMS procedures for the
approach and uneventful landing.
Whilst it is acknowledged that the crew concerned carried out their respective roles in
a professional manner, there are a number of important lessons that can be learned
from this event. In short, if the basics are correct, the rest will follow.
(a) In any emergency, a thorough NITS briefing can save a great deal of confusion.
It is most important that all crew members are absolutely clear about what is
going to happen and what they are expected to do.
(b) Electrical Smoke procedures in most aircraft require the crew to reduce power to
emergency levels in order to try and isolate the cause of the smoke.
(c) All cabin crew should be aware that in an electrical emergency, some aircraft (for
Flybe aircraft only the E195) use Electrical Ram Air Turbines to provide
emergency power. The noise associated with the deployment and operation of
the RAT can be quite alarming when heard for the first time.
(d) When crews are considering the use of various emergency systems, an early,
rather than late PA is of benefit. This will alleviate concerns of both the cabin crew
and the passengers.
(e) Once the power supplies have been reduced to the emergency level, many of the
systems that are used on a regular basis may well not be available. As a general
rule of thumb, if a normal and an emergency system are available, there is every
likelihood that only the emergency alternative will be operative in emergency
situations. If the normal system does not work, use the emergency alternative.
(f) As aircraft become more automated, it is understandable that pilots can become
over reliant on the automatic systems. In a degraded state such as an electrical
emergency, pilots need to consider what is and what is not available to them. If
in doubt, revert to basics ie green needles and raw data.
(g) What ever the situation, good communications and good briefings are a
pre-requisite to a successful outcome.
During the landing and take-off phases of flight there is little time to react if PF becomes
incapacitated. With this in mind, any failure to respond to a check or SOP call is to be
treated as pilot incapacitation and PM is to take control immediately by announcing "I
have control".
The 80 kts call on the take-off roll serves, primarily, as an incapacitation check.
Prompt actions by PM (before V1) can result in a rejected take-off rather than a
single pilot circuit. This is certainly a much safer option that will also result in a faster
response by the medical teams.
Any failure to respond to any calls in the latter stages of an approach to land must
be treated as pilot incapacitation. The decision to land should only be taken if the
desired visual cues are available.
During a Category II approach, the minimum crew is two pilots, therefore, pilot
incapacitation must result in an immediate go-around unless Category 1 reversion
is available.
3.6.2 Recognition
Aircraft weather radar equipment cannot detect ash clouds or volcanic dust. So
recognition can be difficult, particularly at night or in cloud.
If a volcanic ash cloud is inadvertently entered the following can be expected:
Smoke or dust in the cockpit.
An acrid odour similar to that from electrical arcing or smoke.
Multiple engine malfunctions surge, increasing ITT, torching from the tailpipe,
flameout.
At night, St Elmos fire/static discharges around the windscreens accompanied by a
bright orange glow around the engine intakes.
Do not attempt to climb over the ash cloud. Reduce thrust if conditions permit. Try to
escape the ash cloud by making a 180 turn and, if terrain permits, by descending. If
possible use flight idle power in the descent.
It may be necessary to shut down and then relight engines to prevent ITT limits being
exceeded.
If an engine flames out, attempt a relight. Use the QRH procedure. If a relight attempt
fails, persist with further attempts to avoid solidification of molten ash on the turbine
blades.
Restricted visibility from the cockpit may make visual identification of a runway difficult
even in good meteorological visibility. If so, consider an autopilot coupled ILS approach
down to the minimum engagement height. Runway friction and brake efficiency may be
reduced by ash on the runway, so consider using contaminated runway landing data.
The aircraft should not be flown again until a full inspection of the airframe and engines
has been made.
However the aircraft may be damaged by lightning strikes and flash blindness may
occur for a few seconds. So, conditions conducive to lightning strikes must be avoided.
Pit marks along the fuselage or holes in the trailing edge of the wing tips and the tail
tips.
Melting of rivets.
Puncturing of non-metallic structures.
Puncturing and delamination of composites.
Slight deformation of metal skins and structure.
Welding or roughening of moveable hinges and bearings.
Damage to other parts that may conduct lightning current other than the airframe,
such as bonding or diverting straps and pitot tubes.
Effects caused by the flash-induced electromagnetic field and the increase of the
voltage due to the current at the aircraft structure are defined as indirect effects and
may be:
Incident reports show that most strikes occur when an aircraft is:
Incident reports show that in over 80% of the strikes, the aircraft was within a cloud and
experiencing some precipitation and turbulence. But other strikes may occur:
Cold fronts.
Warm fronts.
Stationary fronts.
Unstable air.
Squall lines.
Incident reports also show that lightning strikes occur most commonly under light or
heavy turbulence conditions.
3.7.3 General
Even though the aircraft is adequately protected against lightning strikes effects,
lightning strikes must be avoided.
Check the radar for precipitation, review all available types of weather information,
examine other pilot reports and follow ATC instructions. Even with a good weather
report, storms may develop rapidly along the route; the development of storms cannot
always be predicted. While en route, constantly update the previous weather briefing
through radio contact and airborne equipment for actual storm avoidance.
Remember that radar detects only liquid droplets, not the cloud itself. Only rain
suspended in the cloud will produce a radar echo, which may lead to occasional
encounters with hail and lightning.
Be aware that lightning can strike an aircraft miles away from the extreme side of a
developed thunderstorm. Reports of aircraft receiving strikes in clear air at 25 miles or
more from the nearest storm are common.
Check for holes, punctures, discolouration and delamination throughout the whole
airframe.
Check for loose, melted or missing rivets.
Check that all static dischargers are in place or in accordance with the CDL.
Check the integrity of the lights installed on tail, wing, fuselage and landing gear.
Check all antennas, ice detectors, smart probes, TAT probes and pressurisation
static ports for condition.
Report the strike to the maintenance personnel by making an entry in the Technical
Log.
3.8 Turbulence
3.8.1 Definitions of Turbulence
Table 3.9 contains the definitions of turbulence.
Severe Abrupt changes in aircraft attitude and/or altitude. The aircraft may be out of
control for short periods accompanied by large variations in airspeed.
Occupants are forced violently against seat belts. Loose objects are tossed
around.
3.9 Windshear
3.9.1 General
In most windshear-related accidents, several potential windshear indicators have been
present. Windshear indicators are meant to be cumulative. The more indicators that are
present, the more the crew should consider delaying the departure or the approach.
The weather evaluation process must continue during:
Take-off.
Climb-out.
Approach and landing.
The following should be examined for any potential windshear conditions affecting the
flight:
Aerodrome forecasts.
Actual weather reports.
SIGMETS.
PIREPS.
Weather radar returns.
Visual cues from the cockpit.
The importance of avoiding known windshear cannot be overemphasised. Microburst
windshears exist which are beyond the capability of transport Category aircraft and the
most highly skilled pilots. Avoidance may only mean a ten to twenty minute delay.
Always exercise caution when determining a course of action.
The best way of coping with windshear or potential windshear is to avoid it.
An advanced technology windshear detection and guidance system is fitted. However,
its presence does not alleviate the need to avoid windshear and take precautions. It is
important to develop an awareness of windshear causes and the attendant warning
signals, so that windshear can be successfully avoided. The windshear system is
installed to provide warning of an inadvertent encounter with windshear and to give
guidance to assist escape from the inadvertently encountered windshear conditions.
Immediate recovery action should be taken as soon as the presence of windshear is
recognised, even if the windshear detection function has not yet given a caution or
warning.
Develop a cockpit atmosphere that encourages awareness and effective crew
coordination, particularly at night and during marginal weather conditions.
Approach and landing into known severe windshear conditions is prohibited.
Precautions are recommended whenever the probability of windshear exists; be
prepared for the possibility of an inadvertent encounter.
Use the lowest flap setting that meets the take-off performance criteria. The extra
airspeed resulting from increased V speeds is always beneficial.
Use a runway that avoids suspected areas of windshear. In choosing the runway,
consider not just the length, but also the obstacles and the wind direction. A long
runway has two advantages:
More stopping distance is available to cater for a late decision to reject the take-off.
Maximum distance is available to accelerate to rotation speed and gain ground
clearance.
Be alert for any airspeed fluctuations during take-off and initial climb.
Minimise reductions from the initial climb pitch attitude until terrain and obstructions
clearance is assured.
Be alert for abnormal values of airspeed, attitude, vertical speed and acceleration. PM
must closely monitor the vertical flight path and call-out any deviations from normal.
Embraer recommend that Flap 5 is used for landing where possible. This requires
increased VAPP and VREF speeds which reduce the proportionate effect of wind speed
fluctuations (because the stall protection is a constant 1.23 VSR the increase in
approach speed gives a greater value, and hence margin, over the stall).
Do not immediately compensate for a speed increase with a thrust reduction and
noseup trim. It is prudent to pause and evaluate speed trends; a decreasing shear may
follow an increasing shear.
Use the autopilot and autothrottle to the maximum extent possible. Their use reduces
workload and allows more time for monitoring.
PM must closely monitor the flight path and call out any deviations from normal.
Develop an awareness of normal air speed, vertical speed, thrust and pitch values.
Crosscheck flight director commands using vertical flight path indications.
However, some windshears may not be recognised by the EGPWS or the EGPWS may
not be serviceable. Thus it is necessary to establish windshear recognition criteria.
The recognition criteria on take-off and on the approach are changes in:
States:
Engage Autopilot
As Required:
3.10 TCAS
3.10.1 General
General procedures for TCAS operation are provided in the Operations Manual,
Part-A. This section contain information pertinent to the Embraer E-Jets only.
It is most important that pilots react promptly to any RA. This requires accurate flying
and it is important that the manoeuvre is flown smoothly. The pilot must follow the
directed commands and not overshoot or hunt about the guidance cue. One of the main
reasons why pilots do not fly this manoeuvre well is because they try to override the
autothrottle. Usually, when in the climb or descent, (the most likely time for a TCAS
event) the autothrottle will be in speed on elevator mode. It therefore follows that, if the
pilot tried to override the pitch command to accomplish the TCAS manoeuvre, the
autothrottle will try to compensate. This results in the pilot and the AFCS fighting one
another and does not result in a prompt, accurate and smooth manoeuvre. Following
receipt of a TA caution, pilots should hold their thumb over the TCS button and also
select a speed on thrust mode such as VS or FPA. On receipt of a RA, the TCS should
be pushed and the manoeuvre completed as demanded. Once clear of conflict, the pilot
can regain his originally cleared level by engaging FLCH. By allowing the autothrottle
to control power, there is little chance of the pilot setting too much thrust during the RA
manoeuvre and this will minimise any altitude deviations.
WARNING
It is possible in some cases to have insufficient aircraft performance to follow the TCAS
command without flying into stall warning or buffet. Conditions where this may occur
include:
Bank angle in excess of 15.
Operations at airports above 5,300 ft amsl or temperatures greater than ISA + 28C.
One engine inoperative.
Failure to configure the aircraft to go-around following a climb RA in the landing
configuration.
Failure to advance thrust to MAXIMUM CONTINUOUS THRUST following a climb RA
at reduced thrust.
Speeds less than normal operation speeds.
Abnormal configurations, which reduce performance (e.g. gear down).
TCAS command reversal to a CLIMB-CLIMB NOW.
Buffet margin less than 0.3 g.
WARNING
If stall warning occurs during an RA manoeuvre, immediately abandon the RA and execute the
stall recovery procedure. The TCAS will continue to provide RAs while the stall warning is active
and during the recovery procedure.
WARNING
If high speed buffet is encountered when initially responding to an RA, relax pitch force as
necessary to reduce buffet but still continue to manoeuvre in response to the RA.
WARNING
If one aircraft does not comply with a crossing RA, vertical separation may be reduced; there
may be a need to achieve vertical separation by visual means.
CAUTION
Under certain conditions, commanded manoeuvres may significantly reduce stall margins with
the need to respect the stall warning if it occurs.
3.11 EGPWS
3.11.1 General
The Company EGPWS policy is contained in the Operations Manual, Part A.
When an EGPWS alert occurs, use the flight controls and thrust as necessary to correct
the aircraft attitude, flight path and configuration, according to the voice message
presented, to provide terrain clearance.
WARNING
If a terrain awareness warning occurs, immediately initiate and continue a climb that will provide
maximum terrain clearance until all alerts cease. Only vertical manoeuvres are recommended
unless operating in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and/or the pilot determines, based
on available information, that turning in addition to the vertical escape manoeuvre is a safer
course of action.
WARNING
The EGPWS terrain display is intended to be used as a situational awareness tool only; it may
not provide the accuracy or fidelity to be the sole basis for terrain avoidance manoeuvring
decisions.
WARNING
When a terrain awareness caution occurs:
Check the aircraft flight path and correct it if required.
If in doubt, perform a climb until the caution alert ceases.
During the pull up manoeuvre, PM should select the seat belts signs ON whilst also
monitoring the MFD TERRAIN display and calling out radio height.
Emergency/Parking Brake................................................................ON
Slat/Flap Lever...................................................................................... 5
Thrust Levers................................................................................... DLE
Start/stop Selectors ..................................................................... STOP
Fire Extinguishing Handles ................. Pull and Rotate (1-L and 2-R)
APU Emergency Stop Button................................................... Push in
APU Fire Extinguishing Button.................................................... Push
Pressurisation Dump Button.................................................... Push in
ATC ................................................................................................ Notify
Emergency Evacuation.........................................................Announce
Batteries ........................................................................................... OFF
Autothrottle........................................................................... Disengage
N1 of the operative engine.......................... At least 5% above N1 idle
For the affected engine:
Thrust Lever ................................................................................... IDLE
Start/Stop Selector ....................................................................... STOP
Fire Extinguishing Handle ...............................................................Pull
On the ground only:
Fire Extinguishing Handle ...........Rotate outboard, wait 15 seconds,
then rotate inboard
3.12.13 Smoke/Fire/Fumes
The vital actions for the Air Conditioning Smoke procedure are:
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
Section 4 Contents
4 Performance .................................................................................... 41
4.0 Performance Data .............................................................................. 41
4.1 General............................................................................................... 41
4.2 Explanations and Definitions .............................................................. 42
4.3 Minimum Control Speeds ................................................................... 44
4.4 General Aircraft Configuration ........................................................... 44
4.5 Airport Data ........................................................................................ 45
4.6 Engine Failure Procedure/Climb-out Procedure (CLP) ...................... 46
4.7 Performance Limited Take-off Mass .................................................. 46
4.8 The Flybe GWC for E-Jets ................................................................. 47
4.9 Calculation of Take-off Data............................................................... 48
4.9.1 Assumed Temperature (Flex Take-off) .............................. 49
4.9.2 N1 for Assumed Temperature ............................................ 49
4.9.3 Take-off Speeds ................................................................. 49
4.9.4 N1% for Flexible Take-off ................................................. 410
4.9.5 N1% Adjustment for Temperature Difference................... 410
4.10 Determination of VFS ....................................................................... 411
4.11 Stab Trim Setting for Take-off .......................................................... 412
4.12 Climb Gradient All Engines Operating........................................... 414
4.12.1 Initial Climb with Take-off Power (E195) .......................... 414
4.12.2 Climb Gradient with Climb Power Set (E195)................... 416
4.12.3 Initial Climb with Take-off Power (E175) .......................... 418
4.12.4 Climb Gradient with Climb Power Set (E175)................... 420
4.13 Driftdown Tables .............................................................................. 422
4.14 Net Level-off Altitude ........................................................................ 423
4.15 Landing Performance Considerations .............................................. 424
4.16 Landing Mass Calculation ................................................................ 424
4.17 Approach, Landing and Go-around Speeds..................................... 426
4.17.1 Reference Landing Speed................................................ 426
4.17.2 Final Approach Speed ...................................................... 426
4.17.3 Threshold Speed .............................................................. 427
4.17.4 Touchdown Speed............................................................ 427
4.17.5 Calculation of Landing Speeds......................................... 427
4 Performance
4.0 Performance Data
Performance data for E-Jet crews is presented in the form of Gross Weight Charts
(GWC) which are provided over the Intranet and also in booklet form in the aircraft
cockpits. GWC are produced by a third party performance provider.
Throughout this section, where charts are readily available to crews in the flight deck
(either as cockpit data cards or in the QRH), only an example is shown. If any chart is
not readily available, the full versions for both variants are presented.
4.1 General
The Gross Weight Chart (GWC, also known as ToDc) contains information regarding
take-off and landing performance limitations for the Embraer 195 with CF34-10E7
engines and the Embraer 175 with CF34-8E5 engines, operated by Flybe and covers
dry, wet and contaminated runway performance. By use of the GWC, Flybe, E-Jet pilots
can determine: Take-off speeds (V1, VR and V2), the maximum take-off weight for
ambient conditions, the best assumed temperature for flex take-off, the required engine
power setting for take-off and also any corrections that may be required for wind, ECS,
anti-icing and QNH. Other aspects of take-off data (e.g. stabiliser trim settings; N1
corrections and VFS) are provided in laminated cockpit cards and in the QRH.
If taking off or landing at airports for which the GWC is not available, the take-off and
landing mass should be determined as follows:
(1) For take-off data, request the GWC from the Operations Department who will fax
it to the handling agent (make sure that the data is up-to-date).
(2) For landing data, use the Scheduled Landing Distance Chart provided in the QRH
or cockpit cards.
(3) Pilots are not permitted to use the AFM directly to calculate take-off or landing
data.
Make sure that all the airport information is correct, especially obstacle information. The
airport information is published in the AIP. The GWC referred to in this manual conform
to OPS 1.
Clearway Obstacle free surface after the end of TORA used for extending the TODA
used in case of continued take-off.
Contaminated RWY A RWY is considered to be contaminated when more than 25% of the
RWY surface area (whether in isolated areas or not) within the required
length and width being used is covered by the following:
Surface water more than 3 mm deep, or by slush, or loose snow,
equivalent to more than 3 mm of water, snow which has been
compressed into a solid mass which resists further compression and will
hold together or break into lumps if picked up (compacted snow) ice,
including wet ice.
Damp RWY A RWY is considered damp when the surface is not dry, but when the
moisture on it does not give it a shiny appearance. For performance
purposes, a damp runway may be considered to be dry.
Dry Ice A RWY is considered as dry ice when the braking action is given, that is
a friction coefficient between 0.4 and 0.16.
Dry RWY A dry RWY is one which is neither wet nor contaminated, and includes
those paved RWYs which have been specially prepared with grooves or
porous pavement and maintained to retain effectively dry braking action
even when moisture is present. To use the 'DRY when WET' provisions
of a grooved/porous runway, the manufacturer must provide supporting
data in the AFM.
ICAO ICAO code of the airport. Presented along with IATA code in page header
of the GWC.
LDA Landing Distance Available. The length of the runway which is declared
available by the appropriate Authority and suitable for the ground run of
an airplane landing. Presented in page header of the GWC.
Slope RWY slope (max 2%), negative = down, positive = up. Presented in
page header of the GWC.
Stopway Extension of the runway with limited runway bearing capacity. Used to
extend the ASDA in case of a rejected take-off.
TODA The length of the take-off run available plus the length of the clearway
available. Presented in page header of all GWCs.
V1 The maximum speed in the take-off at which the pilot must take the first
action (e.g. apply brakes, reduce thrust, deploy spoilers) to stop the
airplane within the accelerate-stop distance (V1max). V1 also means the
minimum speed in the take-off, following a failure of the critical engine at
VEF, at which the pilot can continue the take-off and achieve the required
height above the take-off surface within the take-off distance (V1 min).
VA The speed at which application of full available aileron or rudder will not
overstress the airplane.
VEF Critical Engine Failure Speed. The speed at which, if one engine fails, the
failure is recognised at V1.
VMCA Air Minimum Control Speed. The minimum flight speed at which the
airplane is controllable with a maximum 5 bank, when one engine
suddenly becomes inoperative with the remaining engines at take-off
power.
VMCG Ground Minimum Control Speed. The minimum speed on ground at which
the take-off can be continued, utilising aerodynamic control alone, when
one engine suddenly becomes inoperative and the remaining engines are
operating at take-off power.
VR The speed at which the rotation is initiated during take-off, to attain the
take-off safety speed at or before a height of 35 ft above RWY surface.
Vso Stall Speed. The minimum speed at which the lift provided by the airplane
is capable of supporting its weight.
Wet Ice Slippery A RWY is considered as wet ice or slippery when the braking action is
poor, that is with a friction coefficient of 0.16.
Wet RWY A RWY is considered wet when the RWY surface is covered with water,
or equivalent, less than 3 mm WED or when there is sufficient moisture
on the RWY surface to cause it to appear reflective, but without significant
areas of standing water.
The slope is the difference in elevation between the line up position and the runway end
divided by the distance. This is a mean slope used for calculations.
Aerodrome elevation is the elevation of the Airport Reference Point. This is used for
deciding the general pressure altitude, and is not used for obstacle calculations.
Obstacle data is given as distance from and height above the end of the runway, i.e.
the end of TORA. When calculating obstacle clearance the effect of the slope when the
TOD is shorter than the TODA is considered, i.e. the lift-off point will have a different
height than the runway end.
Runway alignment penalties are included. There are three different line up methods to
consider:
This assumes that the aircraft comes from a taxiway perpendicular to the runway and
makes a 90 degree turn onto the runway. Note that the taxi runway markings will take
the aircraft too far into the runway.
This assumes that a backtrack has been done and a full 180 degree turnaround is
made.
Runways marked NIGHT assumed that taxi lights are followed when making the
alignment.
The Engine Failure Climb-Out Procedure (ENG FAIL Procedure) is published in the
note at the upper part of the GWC below the title except where the ENG FAIL
Procedure conforms to the SID or other departure clearance. A full description of the
turn back procedure is provided in Section 3.3.
RUNWAY AIRCRAFT
DATA CONFIG
ENGINE FAIL
TURN BACK
TAKE OFF
DATA SETS
OAT
(AMBIENT)
AND MAX
FLEX TEMP
IN ( )
N1 SETTING
FOR TAKE
OFF
(ASSUMES
AI OFF AND
ECS ON)
DATA BOX
ECS & ICING INCLUDING
CORRECTIONS ACCELERATION
ALTITUDE, QNH
CORRECTION
OBSTACLES ETC.
USED FOR
ANALYSIS
FIELD
LIMITED
LANDING
DATA
Note: Landing data sets for the E175 will also include a row for Ldg Flap 5 with ice
speeds increment. This is not required on the 195 as the speeds with and
without ice accretion are the same.
WARNING
E 175 GWC are supplied in two distinct versions for either the normal C of G envelope or the
Alternate C of G envelope. If Alternate C of G calculations are used, crews must ensure that the
MAC is not less than 16%.
Procedure
(a) Determine N1REF ASSUM.
(b) Calculate: TASSUM OAT.
(c) Determine the N1 adjustment from the N1 Adjustment Table (see overleaf).
(d) Calculate the N1 for Flex Take-off: N1 = N1REF ASSUM N1 adjustment.
Note: When using Optimum Flap, make sure the take-off speeds refer to the same flap
setting as for the intended take-off configuration.
10 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3
20 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6
70 11.4 10.4
Having determined the take-off speeds (V1, VR and V2) and the maximum assumed
temperature (flex) settings for N1, the pilots have almost all of the initial take-off data
required. Two steps remain to be completed; determining VFS and the stabiliser trim
setting.
WEIGHT VFS
(kg) (KIAS)
31000 164
32000 167
33000 169
34000 172
35000 174
36000 177
37000 179
38000 182
39000 184
40000 187
41000 188
42000 191
43000 194
44000 196
45000 198
46000 200
47000 202
48000 205
49000 207
50000 209
51000 211
52000 213
The VFS table is presented in the cockpit as part of the laminated, take-off data card. It
is also included in the performance section of the QRH.
It is a simple table to use and the pilot enters it with his actual take-off weight and then
reads the appropriate VFS opposite. In the example above, for a take-off weight of
38,000 kg, the corresponding VFS is 182 KIAS.
The E195 has 4 tables (one for each flap setting); The E175 has a much more simple
presentation of only one chart that caters for all three allowed take-off flap settings.
Examples of both types on chart are presented below:
Example Stabiliser Trim Setting Chart for E195 (One of Four Charts)
FLAP 1
CG POSITION (% MAC)
TOW (kg)
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.5
53,000
UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP DN DN
2.7 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.6
51,000 0.0
UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP DN DN
2.6 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.7
49,000
UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP DN DN DN
2.4 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8
47,000
UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP DN DN DN
2.2 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0
45,000
UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP DN DN DN DN
2.1 1.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1
43,000
UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP DN DN DN DN
1.9 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.3
41,000
UP UP UP UP UP UP UP DN DN DN DN DN
1.7 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.4
39,000 0.0
UP UP UP UP UP UP DN DN DN DN DN
1.4 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.6
37,000 0.0
UP UP UP UP UP DN DN DN DN DN DN
1.2 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8
35,000
UP UP UP UP UP DN DN DN DN DN DN DN
0.9 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.7 2.0
33,000
UP UP UP UP DN DN DN DN DN DN DN DN
0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.2
31,000
UP UP UP DN DN DN DN DN DN DN DN DN
Example Stabiliser Trim Setting Chart for E175 (Only One Chart Used for E175)
ALL WEIGHTS
CG POSITION (% MAC)
FLAP
7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27
6.0 6.0 5.5 5.0 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 2.5
1
UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP
6.0 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0
2
UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP
6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0
4
UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP
A-ICE A-ICE
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT
OFF ON
A-ICE A-ICE
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT
OFF ON
A-ICE A-ICE
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT OFF ON
A-ICE A-ICE
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT OFF ON
A-ICE A-ICE
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT
OFF ON
A-ICE A-ICE
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT
OFF ON
A-ICE A-ICE
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT
OFF ON
A-ICE A-ICE
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT
OFF ON
Note: Pilots should note that the charts presented in this section are not provided on-
board the aircraft except in the cockpit copy of the Operations Manual, Part B6.
Immediately after engine failure set maximum continuous N1 and allows the airplane to
decelerate from the cruise speed to the initial driftdown speed shown in the driftdown
table. Although the tables contain initial driftdown speeds, a more accurate
representation of the true driftdown speed is the Green Dot. This will indicate
driftdown for the actual, in flight conditions and aircraft weight. Pilots should note that
the Green Dot is not corrected for icing conditions so, in such circumstances, Green
Dot +10 kts should be used. When this speed is achieved, start the descend profile by
disengaging the autothrottle and engaging FLCH mode on the guidance panel.
The airplane should level off at the gross altitude and weight shown in the driftdown
table.
Note: If a re-light is considered, a windmill start attempt can be made at 265 KIAS and
FL 210 on the E195 and 250 KIAS and FL250 on the E175.
DRIFTDOWN TABLE
EMBRAER 195 ALL ENGINE TYPES EASA CERTIFICATION
BLEEDS ON/ENGINE & WING ANTI-ICE OFF
GROSS LEVEL OFF
WEIGHT (kg) INITIAL ALTITUDE - FT
(NET LEVEL OFF
DRIFTDOWN ALTITUDE - FT)
START LEVEL SPEED ISA+10C
ISA+15C ISA+20C
DRIFTDOWN OFF (KIAS) & BELOW
50000 19727 18798 17829
48000 216
(15138) (13592) (12095)
20398 19794 18882
48000 46100 212
(16585) (15222) (13691)
21321 20506 20003
46000 44300 207
(18189) (16880) (15306)
44000 23064 21603 20604
42500 203
(19163) (18247) (17060)
24317 23292 21800
42000 40700 198
(20192) (19429) (18482)
25621 24722 23425
40000 38700 194
(20893) (20339) (19740)
38000 27008 26200 24986
36700 189
(24254) (23349) (21948)
The chart is self explanatory, in that pilots can determine easily their all up mass when
an engine fails and this is the start point in column one. The next column shows the
AUM when driftdown is completed. Column three can be used as the target speed
should the green dot not be available. The final columns show the settling altitude for
both net () and gross performance in various ISA conditions.
54000/45067
FIELD LENGTH FIELD LENGTH
LIMITED MAX LIMITED MAX
LANDING MASS LANDING MASS
(DRY) (WET)
(b) Get the landing mass limited by Climb (approach 2.5% and landing 3.2%) in
the Landing Mass Climb Limit table presented on the rear of the landing data
cockpit card.
(c) The maximum landing mass is the lowest between the values obtained from
steps a. and b.
0 52182 51937
FLAP 5 ANTI-ICE ON 1000 51060 50828
WEIGHTS VALID WITH OR WITHOUT 2000 50090 49860 N/A
0 50601 50390
FLAP 5 CAT II ANTI-ICE ON 1000 49624 49399
WEIGHTS VALID WITH OR WITHOUT 2000 48682 48458 N/A
0 50454 50251
FLAP FULL ANTIICE ON 1000 49343 49130
WEIGHTS VALID WITH OR WITHOUT 2000 48365 48167 N/A
Whilst the GWC will indicate your landing weight capability as determined by field
length, this chart will allow pilots to calculate the landing weight based on go-around
capability. A worse case of ice accretion is assumed.
For the dispatch landing calculation, pilots must consider the most favourable runway
in still air conditions. Account should also be made for slope, temperature and runway
surface condition. Finally, the resulting unfactored landing distance must be multiplied
by 1.67 for dry conditions and 1.917 for wet. These safety factors are included in the
GWC results; they are incorporated to cater for pilot handling errors and changes in
forecast conditions on arrival.
VREF is defined as 1.23 times the stalling speed in one g flight (VS-1g).
Apart from short term fluctuations, the speed on the final approach must not be below
VREF.
Typical VREF values are 100 to 130 knots; so VREF provides a margin of between 20 to
30 knots above the stalling speed.
Even in relatively calm air, speed errors of around 5 knots can occur. It is always
necessary to target a final approach speed 5 knots above VREF.
A gust factor is first calculated and then the wind correction factor is determined.
The gust factor is equal to half the steady headwind plus the full gust increment. For
example, if the wind is reported as 20 knots gusting 28:
Half the steady headwind is 10 knots.
The full gust increment is 28 minus 20 knots = 8 knots.
So the gust factor is 10 + 8 = 18 knots.
To find the wind correction, limits are applied to the gust factor.
For a flaps full landing, the minimum wind correction is 5 knots and the maximum wind
correction is 20 knots.
For a flaps 5 landing, the minimum wind correction is 5 knots and the maximum wind
correction is 20 knots.
Pilots should be aware that when landing speed increments are applied following an
emergency, they are applied to the full flap landing speeds and that the first 5 knots of
the wind correction are included.
Landing Speeds
VREF Full
VREF Flap 5 and VAC Flap
VFS
Flap 3 and VAC Weight
Weight Flap 4
Ice/No CAT 2 & All All
Ice 3A Conditions Conditions
32 000 119/119 122 111 166 32 000
33 000 121/121 124 111 169 33 000
34 000 122/122 126 111 171 34 000
35 000 124/124 127 112 174 35 000
36 000 126/126 129 114 176 36 000
37 000 128/128 131 115 179 37 000
38 000 130/130 133 117 181 38 000
39 000 131/131 135 118 184 39 000
40 000 133/133 136 120 186 40 000
41 000 135/135 138 122 188 41 000
42 000 136/136 140 123 190 42 000
43 000 138/138 141 124 193 43 000
44 000 140/140 143 126 195 44 000
45 000 141/141 145 127 197 45 000
46 000 143/143 146 129 199 46 000
47 000 144/144 148 130 201 47 000
48 000 146/146 150 132 204 48 000
49 000 147/147 151 133 206 49 000
50 000 149/149 153 134 208 50 000
51 000 150/150 154 136 210 51 000
52 000 152/152 156 137 212 52 000
In the highlighted example above, for a 36,000kgs landing mass, VREF for a
flap 5 landing is 126 KIAS (with and without ice accretion as this is a E195
example). VAC is also 126 KIAS whilst VAPP would be 131 KIAS (nil wind
conditions). VFS is 176 KIAS.
For CAT 2 or 3A operations, VREF is 129 KIAS and VAC is the same whilst VAPP
is also 129 KIAS (you do not need to add the minimum 5 kts increment to VAPP
for CAT 2 or 3A operations). VFS remains as 176 KIAS.
4.18 Landing
4.18.1 Unfactored Landing Distance
Unfactored landing distance is the actual distance to land the airplane on a zero slope,
ISA temperature, dry runway, from a point 50 ft above runway threshold at VREF using
only the brakes and spoilers as deceleration devices (i.e., no engine reverse thrust is
used). For an in-flight assessment of landing performance, the unfactored landing data
is used and any increments for overspeed can be obtained from the tables provided in
the QRH. Unfactored data is only provided for DRY runways. To cater for a wet runway,
it is usual to apply a 1.15 factor (as in normal dispatch calculations).
In accordance with recent landing performance analysis conducted in the USA (TALPA
ARC) it is recommend that a factor of 1.15 is applied to all in-flight landing
assessments. This factor is to be applied to Operational Landing Performance which
at present is not available but can be approximated by adding 20% to the ULD.
Therefore for a dry runway a factor of 1.35 is used whilst in the case of a wet runway a
factor of 1.5 is applied.
When checking landing performance the expected conditions have to be taken into
account. This includes the possibility of gusting conditions and increased wind
corrections. If increased wind corrections are expected the unfactored landing distance
tables in the back of the QRH give the penalty values to be added to the unfactored
landing distance before the factor of 1.35 DRY and 1.5 WET is applied. If the LDR
exceeds the LDA due to this increment crews should calculate what overspeed will be
acceptable and then calculate their VAPP accordingly.
The GWC landing calculations are based on the Embraer published, unfactored
landing distance charts as provided in the AOM Volume 1. Pilots may need to use such
data for various types of approach. (e.g. Abnormal operations usually require pilots to
use the full flap landing distance suitably factored to cater for the emergency). The
unfactored landing distances for manual braking only are provided on the laminated,
cockpit, landing data card and in the performance section of the QRH. An example of
the cockpit data card presentation is below:
For the E175, figures presented for Flap 5 will be with NO ice accretion. If figures for
ice accretion are required, the QRH must be consulted. Unfactored landing distances
for autobrake settings are provided in the Cockpit Handbook.
Emergency/Abnormal Operations
General Considerations
For each emergency/abnormal and flaps/slat fail condition, the required landing
distance is the unfactored landing distance for flaps full multiplied by the associated
landing distance correction factor. Unfortunately, the factors provided on the individual
emergency pages are only for dry conditions. If you are operating into wet or
overspeed conditions (extra speed for wind correction, etc.) you will need to refer to
tables presented at the back of the QRH in the performance section. An example of the
table presentation in the QRH is shown below:
Factor
ALD = (ULD x K) B
Emergency/
Flaps Speed Wet Wet + OVSP
Abnormal Procedure
(m) (m)
K B K B
The previous table refers to wet conditions only. In the case of wet conditions, an
additional factor has to be considered for the landing calculation. For all emergency/
abnormal landings the following process should be followed:
(a) Recognise the system malfunction;
(b) Find the Unfactored Landing Distance (ULD) for flaps full on the laminated,
landing data card, considering the airplane type, altitude, landing weight and ice
accretion condition;
(c) Find the multiplier factor value (K) on the table with Landing Distance Correction
Factors and multiply the obtained values of (ULD) and (K).
(d) In the same line of table with Landing Distance Correction Factors, find the value
(B).
(e) Subtract (B) from the result of step (3). This is the actual landing distance (ALD)
to safely land the airplane on wet runways condition.
Example:
ALD = (ULD x K) B
Pilots should be aware that the need to consider the extra factor (b) is required only for
emergency/abnormal landings in wet conditions. in dry conditions, a separate chart is
provided that considers only the ULD multiplied by the landing distance correction
factor.
ALD = (ULD x K) B
SLAT ?
Distance in
0 1 (2) (3) 4 (5) (FULL)
metres FLAP
VREF (KIAS) VREF FULL +60 VREF FULL +50 VREF FULL +50
0 K B K B K B
Factor
3.63 855 3.29 758 3.29 749
VREF (KIAS) VREF FULL +35 VREF FULL +35 VREF FULL +35
1 K B K B K B
Factor
2.77 612 2.77 604 2.77 599
VREF (KIAS) VREF FULL +30 VREF FULL +25 VREF FULL +20
2 K B K B K B
Factor
2.52 528 2.36 471 2.21 420
3 K B K B
Factor
1.88 320 1.76 286
FULL K B K B
Factor
1.66 246 1.00 0
Pilots should note that up to two stages of flap can usually be selected if the slat fails
in the zero position.
Limit Code
Weight Correction per
51629 O (40) (4) [-347/119] 1kt tailwind or headwind
124-134-139
The acceleration height used is the same altitude as indicated under the normal
operations GWC (underneath right hand column).
To obtain corrections for ECS OFF and Anti-Ice ON, use the WET corrections table.
The data sets for Compacted Snow and Wet Ice (Slippery) runways do not reference
depth of contaminant as both are considered to be solid surfaces but with degraded
braking action. Relative wind columns are provided instead:
If your take-off weight is less than that presented in the table, you should only use the
V1 speed for your take-off. This speed (albeit for a heavier weight than your actual
weight) is a safe V1 min for your conditions. The aerodynamic speeds of VR and V2
should be obtained from the appropriate page of the QRH. An example of the QRH
page is shown below:
<#`
V
!%=
`
"~
==
=%
U
By using the appropriate chart (in this case for Flap 4 take-off using TO-1) the VR and
V2 speeds for 44,000 kg can be obtained (122 and 128 kts respectively). On longer
runways in particular, it might be that the ToDc V1 is actually higher than the QRH VR
and V2. This is indicating that a balanced field calculation can be used and pilots should
simply equate V1 to the VR as obtained from the QRH.
(a) Standing Water Performance masses with respect to temperature and depth.
(b) Slush Performance masses with respect to temperature and depth.
(c) Wet Snow Performance masses with respect to temperature and depth.
(d) Dry Snow Performance masses with respect to temperature and depth.
(e) Compacted Snow Performance masses with respect to temperature and wind.
(f) Wet Ice Performance masses with respect to temperature and wind.
Landing mass
QNH Correction
Pilots should note that a full flap landing is designated as Flap 6 rather than the usual
nomenclature of flap full.
The decode for landings on Compacted Snow and Wet Ice (Slippery) runways is
identical except that the wind correction factor is not included because these data sets
are grouped by relative wind component as highlighted in red below:
The contaminated, unfactored landing distance is the actual distance to land the
airplane after a stabilised approach, crossing a point at 50 ft above the threshold at
VREF, on a zero slope runway, ISA temperature, using maximum manual braking effort.
A full set of tables are provided in the QRH and only an example is shown in this
document. The QRH must be used if pilots need to calculate the unfactored landing
distance on a contaminated runway.
The tables are to be used as a guide to help suppliment the aircraft performance figures
and to increase pilot awareness during contaminated runway operations. As with an
emergency landing, there is no need to apply the normal landing distance safety factors
as supplimental corrections are being made for the ambient conditions at the time.
The factors to multiply the full flaps unfactored landing distance from the emergency/
abnormal procedures were not analysed for contaminated runways.
In order to find the contaminated landing distance, enter the table with the current
contaminant, flaps and autobrakes configuration, ice condition, and current landing
weight and obtain a reference Contaminated Unfactored Landing Distance (CULDREF).
Final altitude correction (%) = Altitude correction from the table x (Current Altitude
in ft/1,000 ft).
Final tailwind correction (%) = Wind correction from the table x (Current tailwind
component in kt/5 kt.
Final overspeed correction (%) = Overspeed correction from the table x (Current
overspeed in kt/5 kt).
Final temperature correction (%) = Temperature correction from the table x (Current
temperature in C above ISA/5).
Final slope correction (%) = Slope correction from the table x (Current downhill slope
in %/1%).
Final reverse correction (%) = Reverse correction from the table.
From the example chart overleaf we can determine that the following corrections need
to be applied:
Calculations:
COMPACTED SNOW
FLAP 5 FLAP FULL
WEIGHT AUTO
(kg) BRAKE NO ICE NO ICE
ICE ACC ICE ACC
ACC ACC
MAN 1296 1296 1087 1087
HI 1440 1440 1228 1228
34000
MED 1464 1464 1258 1258
LO 2042 2042 1738 1738
MAN 1384 1384 1159 1159
HI 1533 1533 1305 1305 CULDREF
37000
MED 1561 1561 1340 1340
LO 2196 2196 1867 1867
MAN 1472 1472 1230 1230
HI 1625 1625 1382 1382
40000
MED 1657 1657 1421 1421
LO 2349 2349 1994 1994
MAN 1560 1560 1301 1301
HI 1718 1718 1457 1457
43000
MED 1754 1754 1500 1500
LO 2504 2504 2120 2120
MAN 1647 1647 1372 1372
HI 1808 1808 1532 1532
46000
MED 1848 1848 1580 1580
LO 2655 2655 2247 2247
MAN 1734 1734 1443 1443
HI 1898 1898 1607 1607
49000
MED 1943 1943 1661 1661
LO 2807 2807 2375 2375
MAN 1821 1821 1513 1513
HI 1988 1988 1681 1681
52000
MED 2038 2038 1739 1739
LO 2960 2960 2500 2500
CORRECTIONS
per 1000 ft
ALTITUDE LANDING DISTANCE + 4% above SEA
LEVEL
WIND LANDING DISTANCE +11% per 5kt tailwind
per 5C above
TEMPERATURE LANDING DISTANCE + 2% Correction
ISA
per 1% slope Factors
SLOPE LANDING DISTANCE + 4%
donwhill
per 5kt above
OVERSPEED LANDING DISTANCE + 9%
VREF
REVERSER LANDING DISTANCE -2% for ALL REV OP
Enter the chart with the reported wind velocity and the relative angle to the runway, to
read the wind component parallel to the runway and the crosswind.
Table 1 for elevations of the altimeter setting source less than 2,000 ft.
Table 2 for elevations of the altimeter setting source between 2,000 ft and 4,000 ft.
CAUTION
The pressure altimeter is calibrated to read true altitude in ISA conditions.
When the temperature is colder than ISA, the true altitude will be lower than the indicated
altitude.
Each table is entered with the temperature of the altimeter setting source and the height
of the published altitude above the altimeter setting source. The rows are headed with
the temperature of the altimeter setting source on a pink background.
The columns are headed with the height above the altimeter setting source on a blue
background. The table value is the correction; the correction is on a yellow background.
The correction is added to the published altitude. This gives the indicated value that will
be the true value of the published altitude.
Post the incorporation of Epic Load 21.4, pilots may use temperature compensation in
the FMS to adjust the height profile of an approach.
CAUTION
When temperature compensation is used in the FMS, pilots will also need to adjust manually
the relevant approach minima.
Overload Operations
Individual airport authorities are free to decide on their own criteria for permitting
overload operations as long as pavements remain safe for use by airplane. However,
a 10% difference in ACN over PCN for flexible pavement and 5% for rigid pavements
is generally accepted, provided that overload operations do not exceed 5% of the
annual departures and are spread throughout the year.
Graphs for the calculation of the ACN for both the E195 and E 175 are presented on
the next few pages.
The E-Jet MEL allows aircraft to dispatch if the MFD brake temperature indications
have failed. Following an approach to land, a subsequent take-off must not be
performed before 25 minutes after chocks on. At the end of this time interval check that
the wheel thermal plugs have not melted.
If the tyres are not flat after 22 minutes, this is a positive indication that the wheel
thermal plugs have not melted. However, crews should be aware that if a single tyre on
a bogey has deflated, it is still possible for it to look normal as the other tyre will take all
of the aircraft loading.
In such circumstances, crews need also to comply with the instructions contained in the
DDG. This includes leaving the gear selected down for 7 minutes after take-off. Due to
this requirement, there are severe weight penalties to be applied as shown in the tables
in the DDG.
-1,000 80.7 81.5 82.3 83.1 83.9 84.7 85.5 86.3 87.1 87.8
0 81.8 82.6 83.4 84.2 85.0 85.8 86.6 87.4 88.1 88.9
1,000 82.3 83.1 83.9 84.7 85.5 86.3 87.1 87.9 88.6 89.4
2,000 82.7 83.6 84.4 85.2 86.0 86.8 87.6 88.4 89.2 89.9
3,000 83.3 84.1 85.0 85.8 86.6 87.3 88.1 88.9 89.7 90.5
4,000 83.8 84.7 85.5 86.3 87.1 87.9 88.7 89.5 90.3 91.0
5,000 84.4 85.2 86.0 86.8 87.7 88.5 89.3 90.1 90.8 91.6
6,000 84.9 85.7 86.5 87.3 88.1 88.9 89.7 90.5 91.3 92.0
7,000 85.4 86.2 87.0 87.8 88.6 89.4 90.2 90.9 91.7 92.5
8,000 85.9 86.7 87.5 88.3 89.1 89.9 90.6 91.4 92.2 93.0
9,000 86.4 87.2 88.0 88.8 89.6 90.3 91.1 91.9 92.7 93.4
10,000 86.9 87.7 88.5 89.3 90.1 90.8 91.6 92.4 93.2 93.9
-1,000 88.5 89.3 90.0 90.8 91.5 91.5 91.0 90.4 89.9
1,000 90.1 90.9 91.6 92.4 92.6 92.1 91.6 91.1 90.3
2,000 90.7 91.4 92.2 92.9 92.7 92.1 91.6 91.1 90.3
3,000 91.2 92.0 92.7 93.2 92.7 92.1 91.6 91.0 90.2
4,000 91.8 92.5 93.3 93.2 92.6 92.1 91.6 90.9 90.3
5,000 92.3 93.1 93.8 93.1 92.6 92.0 91.6 90.8 90.3
6,000 92.8 93.5 93.7 93.1 92.5 92.0 91.4 90.7 90.2
7,000 93.3 94.0 93.6 92.9 92.3 91.8 91.1 90.5 90.1
0 81.8 82.6 83.4 84.2 85.0 85.8 86.6 87.4 88.2 88.9 89.7
1,000 82.3 83.1 83.9 84.7 85.5 86.3 87.1 87.9 88.6 89.4 90.1
2,000 82.7 83.6 84.4 85.2 86.0 86.8 87.6 88.4 89.2 89.9 90.7
3,000 83.3 84.1 85.0 85.8 86.6 87.3 88.1 88.9 89.7 90.5 91.2
4,000 83.8 84.7 85.5 86.3 87.1 87.9 88.7 89.5 90.3 91.0 91.8
5,000 84.4 85.2 86.0 86.8 87.7 88.5 89.3 90.1 90.8 91.6 92.3
6,000 84.9 85.7 86.5 87.3 88.1 88.9 89.7 90.5 91.3 92.0 92.6
7,000 85.4 86.2 87.0 87.8 88.6 89.4 90.2 90.9 91.7 92.5 92.5
8,000 85.9 86.7 87.5 88.3 89.1 89.9 90.6 91.4 92.2 93.0 92.4
9,000 86.4 87.2 88.0 88.8 89.6 90.3 91.1 91.9 92.7 92.9 92.2
10,000 86.9 87.7 88.5 89.3 90.1 90.8 91.6 92.4 93.2 92.8 92.1
0 82.4 83.3 84.1 84.9 85.7 86.5 87.4 88.2 88.9 89.7
1,000 82.9 83.8 84.7 85.5 86.3 87.1 87.9 88.7 89.5 90.3
2,000 83.5 84.3 85.2 86.0 86.8 87.6 88.4 89.2 90.0 90.8
3,000 84.1 84.9 85.8 86.6 87.4 88.2 89.0 89.8 90.6 91.4
4,000 84.7 85.5 86.4 87.2 88.0 88.8 89.6 90.4 91.2 92.0
5,000 85.3 86.1 86.9 87.8 88.6 89.4 90.2 91.0 91.8 92.6
6,000 85.8 86.6 87.5 88.3 89.1 89.9 90.7 91.6 92.3 93.1
7,000 86.3 87.2 88.0 88.8 89.6 90.4 91.2 92.0 92.8 93.6
8,000 86.9 87.7 88.6 89.4 90.2 91.0 91.8 92.6 93.4 94.1
9,000 87.4 88.3 89.1 89.9 90.7 91.5 92.3 93.1 93.9 94.7
10,000 88.0 88.8 89.6 90.4 91.2 92.0 92.8 93.6 94.4 95.2
1,000 91.0 91.8 92.5 93.3 93.6 93.1 92.6 92.1 91.3
2,000 91.6 92.3 93.1 93.9 93.6 93.1 92.6 92.1 91.3
3,000 92.2 92.9 93.7 94.2 93.6 93.1 92.6 92.1 91.3
4,000 92.8 93.5 94.3 94.2 93.6 93.1 92.6 92.0 91.4
5,000 93.4 94.2 94.9 94.2 93.6 93.1 92.6 91.8 91.4
6,000 93.9 94.6 94.9 94.2 93.6 93.1 92.5 91.8 91.3
7,000 94.4 95.2 94.8 94.1 93.5 93.0 92.3 91.7 91.3
1,000 87.6 88.4 89.1 89.9 90.0 89.3 88.6 88.0 87.4
2,000 88.1 88.8 89.6 90.3 90.0 89.3 88.6 88.0 87.3
3,000 88.6 89.3 90.1 90.6 89.9 89.3 88.6 88.0 87.2
4,000 89.0 89.8 90.5 90.5 89.9 89.3 88.7 87.9 87.2
5,000 89.5 90.2 91.0 90.5 89.9 89.3 88.7 87.8 87.2
6,000 89.9 90.7 90.9 90.4 89.8 89.2 88.5 87.7 87.1
7,000 90.3 91.1 90.8 90.2 89.6 89.0 88.2 87.5 87.0
0 79.4 80.2 81.0 81.8 82.6 83.4 84.1 84.9 85.7 86.4 87.2
1,000 79.8 80.6 81.4 82.2 83.0 83.8 84.6 85.4 86.1 86.9 87.7
2,000 80.2 81.1 81.9 82.7 83.5 84.3 85.0 85.8 86.6 87.4 88.1
3,000 80.7 81.6 82.4 83.2 83.9 84.7 85.5 86.3 87.1 87.9 88.6
4,000 81.2 82.0 82.8 83.6 84.4 85.2 86.0 86.8 87.6 88.3 89.1
5,000 81.6 82.5 83.3 84.1 84.9 85.6 86.4 87.2 88.0 88.8 89.5
6,000 82.1 82.9 83.7 84.5 85.3 86.1 86.9 87.7 88.4 89.2 89.8
7,000 82.5 83.3 84.1 84.9 85.7 86.5 87.3 88.1 88.9 89.6 89.7
8,000 82.9 83.7 84.6 85.3 86.1 86.9 87.7 88.5 89.3 90.0 89.5
9,000 83.3 84.1 84.9 85.7 86.5 87.3 88.2 88.9 89.7 89.9 89.3
10,000 83.8 84.6 85.4 86.2 87.0 87.8 88.6 89.4 90.2 89.8 89.2
0 80.0 80.9 81.7 82.5 83.3 84.1 84.9 85.7 86.5 87.2 88.0
1,000 80.5 81.3 82.2 83.0 83.8 84.6 85.3 86.1 86.9 87.7 88.5
2,000 81.0 81.8 82.7 83.5 84.3 85.0 85.8 86.6 87.4 88.2 89.0
3,000 81.5 82.3 83.2 84.0 84.8 85.5 86.3 87.1 87.9 88.7 89.5
4,000 82.0 82.8 83.6 84.4 85.3 86.1 86.9 87.7 88.5 89.2 90.0
5,000 82.5 83.3 84.1 84.9 85.8 86.6 87.4 88.2 89.0 89.7 90.5
6,000 82.9 83.8 84.6 85.4 86.2 87.0 87.9 88.7 89.5 90.2 90.8
7,000 83.4 84.3 85.1 85.9 86.7 87.5 88.3 89.1 89.9 90.7 90.7
8,000 83.9 84.7 85.5 86.4 87.2 88.0 88.8 89.6 90.4 91.2 90.6
9,000 84.3 85.2 86.0 86.8 87.6 88.5 89.3 90.1 90.9 91.1 90.4
10,000 84.9 85.7 86.6 87.4 88.2 89.0 89.8 90.6 91.4 91.0 90.4
Pressure
Altitude Static Air Temperature C
(ft) 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
-1,000 83.0 83.7 84.4 85.1 85.8 85.6 84.9 84.3 83.7
0 84.0 84.7 85.4 86.1 86.8 86.2 85.5 84.8 84.3
1,000 84.4 85.2 85.9 86.6 86.8 86.1 85.5 84.8 84.1
2,000 84.9 85.6 86.3 87.1 86.7 86.0 85.4 84.7 83.9
3,000 85.3 86.1 86.8 87.2 86.6 86.0 85.3 84.6 83.8
4,000 85.8 86.5 87.2 87.2 86.5 85.9 85.3 84.5 83.8
5,000 86.2 86.9 87.7 87.1 86.5 85.8 85.2 84.3 83.7
6,000 86.6 87.4 87.6 87.0 86.4 85.8 85.0 84.2 83.9
7,000 87.1 87.8 87.5 86.9 86.3 85.7 84.8 84.2 84.2
8,000 87.5 88.0 87.4 86.8 86.2 85.6 84.7 84.3
9,000 87.9 87.9 87.3 86.7 86.1 85.4 84.7 84.5
10,000 88.3 87.7 87.2 86.6 86.1 85.2 84.6 84.9
0 76.5 77.3 78.0 78.8 79.6 80.3 81.1 81.8 82.6 83.3 84.0
1,000 76.8 77.7 78.5 79.2 80.0 80.7 81.5 82.2 83.0 83.7 84.5
2,000 77.3 78.1 78.9 79.7 80.4 81.2 81.9 82.7 83.5 84.2 84.9
3,000 77.7 78.5 79.3 80.1 80.8 81.6 82.3 83.1 83.9 84.6 85.4
4,000 78.1 78.9 79.7 80.5 81.2 82.0 82.8 83.5 84.3 85.1 85.8
5,000 78.5 79.3 80.1 80.9 81.7 82.4 83.2 84.0 84.7 85.5 86.2
6,000 78.9 79.7 80.5 81.3 82.1 82.9 83.6 84.4 85.1 85.9 86.6
7,000 79.3 80.1 80.9 81.7 82.5 83.3 84.0 84.8 85.6 86.3 86.5
8,000 79.7 80.5 81.3 82.1 82.9 83.6 84.4 85.2 86.0 86.7 86.4
9,000 80.1 80.9 81.7 82.5 83.2 84.0 84.8 85.6 86.4 86.8 86.3
10,000 80.5 81.3 82.1 82.9 83.6 84.4 85.2 86.0 86.8 86.7 86.1
0 77.1 77.9 78.7 79.5 80.3 81.0 81.8 82.6 83.3 84.1
1,000 77.6 78.4 79.2 79.9 80.7 81.5 82.3 83.1 83.8 84.5
2,000 78.0 78.8 79.6 80.4 81.2 82.0 82.8 83.5 84.3 85.0
3,000 78.4 79.3 80.1 80.9 81.6 82.4 83.2 84.0 84.8 85.5
4,000 78.9 79.7 80.5 81.3 82.1 82.9 83.7 84.4 85.2 86.0
5,000 79.3 80.2 81.0 81.7 82.5 83.3 84.1 84.9 85.7 86.4
6,000 79.8 80.6 81.4 82.2 83.0 83.8 84.6 85.4 86.1 86.9
7,000 80.2 81.0 81.8 82.6 83.4 84.2 85.0 85.8 86.6 87.3
8,000 80.6 81.4 82.3 83.1 83.9 84.7 85.4 86.2 87.0 87.8
9,000 81.0 81.9 82.7 83.5 84.3 85.1 85.9 86.7 87.5 88.3
10,000 81.5 82.4 83.2 84.0 84.8 85.6 86.4 87.2 88.0 88.7
1,000 85.3 86.0 86.7 87.5 87.7 87.0 86.4 85.8 85.1
2,000 85.7 86.5 87.2 88.0 87.6 87.0 86.4 85.7 84.9
3,000 86.2 87.0 87.7 88.2 87.6 87.0 86.3 85.7 84.9
4,000 86.7 87.4 88.2 88.1 87.5 86.9 86.3 85.6 84.9
5,000 87.2 87.9 88.7 88.1 87.5 86.9 86.3 85.4 84.8
6,000 87.6 88.4 88.6 88.1 87.5 86.9 86.2 85.4 84.8
7,000 88.1 88.9 88.6 88.0 87.4 86.9 86.0 85.4 84.8
-1,000 76.1 76.9 77.7 78.5 79.2 80.0 80.8 81.5 82.3 83.0 83.7
0 77.1 77.9 78.7 79.5 80.3 81.0 81.8 82.6 83.3 84.1 84.8
1,000 77.5 78.4 79.2 80.0 80.7 81.5 82.3 83.0 83.8 84.5 85.3
2,000 78.0 78.8 79.6 80.4 81.2 82.0 82.7 83.5 84.3 85.0 85.8
3,000 78.4 79.3 80.1 80.9 81.6 82.4 83.2 84.0 84.7 85.5 86.3
4,000 78.9 79.7 80.5 81.3 82.1 82.9 83.6 84.4 85.2 86.0 86.7
5,000 79.3 80.2 81.0 81.7 82.5 83.3 84.1 84.9 85.7 86.4 87.2
6,000 79.8 80.6 81.4 82.2 83.0 83.8 84.6 85.4 86.1 86.9 87.5
7,000 80.2 81.0 81.8 82.6 83.4 84.2 85.0 85.8 86.6 87.4 87.5
8,000 80.6 81.4 82.3 83.1 83.9 84.7 85.4 86.2 87.0 87.8 87.4
9,000 81.0 81.9 82.7 83.5 84.3 85.1 85.9 86.7 87.5 87.9 87.4
10,000 81.5 82.3 83.2 84.0 84.8 85.6 86.4 87.2 88.0 87.9 87.4
The screen shot above shows the general take-off performance page. In this case the
page for the E175 is shown. Data is entered by the pilots using the iPad touch screen
and is self-explanatory, however, the following points should be noted:
Actual TOM. This button is used to enter your actual take-off mass and is defaulted
to the Company RTOM. A caution to inform pilots of this is provided in the red bar at
the bottom of the page.
Flap Setting. This is defaulted to Optimum but any take-off flap setting can be
selected. Pilots should note that, unlike the Gross Weight Charts, the Optimum
selection will not calculate the maximum lift capability. This option will force the
program to calculate the minimum flap to lift the already set, actual take-off mass.
The result will be the least drag, and hence, the most fuel efficient take-off setting.
Power Setting/ATTCS. Computerised performance allows the use of ATTCS OFF
calculation should this system be inoperative. The default will be to the lowest power
setting (TO-2 for the E175 and TO-3 for the E195).
Take-off Flight Path. This option is defaulted to the Second Segment which is the
preferred setting and is the one used in the existing, GWC. In general, pilots will not
need to change this setting.
Special Dispatch. There are a number of ferry flight options that can be selected.
This includes items such as gear locked down take-off.
MEL Drag Index. There are a number of items within the MEL that require special
performance considerations, for example, Anti-ice valve locked open. Embraer offer
two methods of calculating the restricted performance associated with each
particular MEL item. This is either in the form of a weight reduction or the use of a
MEL Drag index. Until now, the only option was to use the very restrictive weight
reduction method, however, pilots can now simply enter the Drag Index as indicated
in the DDG.
Alternate 1. This selection is only applicable to the E175 and is not provided in the
E195 performance program. This option refers to the Alternate C of G envelope
which is provided for the E175. By restricting the C of G to no further forward than
16%, the programme is able to deliver an improved take-off capability. The button is
defaulted to Alternate 1 and it toggles between this selection and Normal. When
using the Alternate 1 option, pilots must confirm from the loadsheet that their take-off
C of G is no further forward than 16%.
Having input all of the necessary data, pilots may then press the Calculate button to
initiate the performance solution. Depending on the complexity of the calculation, it may
take up to 30 seconds to complete the analysis. A Calculating caption is placed in the
red bar during this process.
Pilots should be aware that until all the required options are entered, the Calculate
button will be greyed out and it will not be possible to select it. When all of the
necessary inputs have been made, the button then becomes available.
If the entered, actual take-off weight is greater than the performance limited take-off
weight, there will be no solution presented to the pilots. Instead, a warning is presented
in the red bar that states this fact and also shows what the performance limited take-off
weight is for the inputs provided.
Once a calculation is completed, the answer will remain in view until any of the inputs
are changed by the pilots. In this case, the performance solution will be removed and
the Calculate button must be pressed to commence a subsequent analysis. Once
completed, the performance solution is presented to the pilots on the bottom right hand
side of the screen as shown below:
In the above case, the airfield chosen is Birmingham. We can see that the aircraft can
get airborne at the maximum RTOM of 34,999 kgs using TO-2. The program has
selected Flap 1 as this is the most efficient (least drag) option. Also provided are all of
the V speeds (for rated and flex), Acceleration Altitude, Rated N1, Flex N1 and Flex
Temperature.
In addition, the maximum performance capability is indicated to the pilots (up to the
maximum structural limit of 37,500 kgs). In this case it is 36,895 kgs and the limit is
caused by Obstacle number 2. If more information regarding the take-off runway is
required, this can be obtained by pressing the More Infobutton.
Note: Crews should note that the restriction on using Flex take-off calculations in icing
conditions does not apply to computerised performance. This restriction only
applies to calculations completed using the existing, GWC and was introduced
because of the complexity of the calculation when using tabulated charts.
Although most of the required inputs are self-explanatory, pilots should note the
following:
Performance Data. The performance data box presents the maximum limiting
capability which is usually the maximum structural limit of 45,000 kgs. In addition, all
required data for the landing are provided. This includes V speeds, factored and
un-factored LD, LDA, Approach Climb (OEI) gradient and Landing Climb (AEO)
gradient.
Crews must complete an analysis prior to departure by using the estimated landing
weight taken from the loadsheet. This can be useful when determining approach
minima that can be based on Approach Climb gradient (e.g. at GLA). On arrival at
destination, the crew must complete an in-flight assessment of landing performance
taking into account the actual conditions for arrival. This can be completed by using the
unfactored landing distance tables in the QRH. Any increments for overspeed, etc.
should be applied before multiplying the LDR by the Company safety factor of
1.35 DRY and 1.5 WET.
4.28 Cross-Checking
It is very important that crews carry out suitable cross-checking of any performance
calculation. In general, the First Officer will complete the take-off and, if required,
landing analysis. He will note the relevant information onto the PLOG. Thereafter he
will hand the iPad unit to the Captain who will enter the computed flap setting into the
take-off page 2 of the MCDU. He will also enter, the required data into the TRS page,
this will include the flex temperature if required. The Captain will then check that the
FADEC derived N1 agrees with the computed N1 (the First Officer also conducts this
check after engine start). Finally, the Captain will conduct a gross error check on the
take-off V speeds by use of the performance pages in the QRH, an example of which
is below:
Using the example screen shot on page 70, the calculated take-off speeds for the
departure from Birmingham are V1 = 148, V2 = 149 and VR = 151. By reference to the
QRH extract below, it can be seen that the balanced field V speeds are: V1 = 144, V2
= 149 and VR = 151.
In the above case, we can see that V1 is slightly different but the aerodynamic speeds
(VR and V2) are identical. The reason why V1 is a few knots less is because the QRH
derived figures assume a balanced field calculation and also, they cater for Dry and
Wet runway surfaces as well as ECS ON or OFF and Anti-Icing ON or OFF. Given
these factors it is safe to assume that the computerised analysis is accurate and the
gross error check is satisfactory.
Performance Data
When operating from contaminated runways, a crew can enter the type of contaminant
by pressing the Runway Conditions button (defaulted to Dry) as shown below.
Selection of the Runway Conditions button will result in the presentation of a pop-up
window in which the pilots can select the various types of contaminant. The box does
not contain all of the types of contaminant but pilots can scroll through the list by use
of the First and Last buttons on the left of the selection list. The rest of the contaminant
selections available are shown below.
When operating off runways that are contaminated with Standing Water, Loose Dry
Snow, Wet Snow or Slush, pilots can enter the depth of contaminant by selecting the
Contaminant Depth button which is immediately below the Runway Condition button.
Pilots should enter the actual, reported depth (not the Water Equivalent Depth) of the
contaminant. There is an option to select the reported braking action but this selection
is redundant in all but the ice or compacted snow cases. For all other contaminant
types, the SCAP applies a pre-set braking action. Indeed, selection of any of the
braking action options does not alter the final solution. However, this selection has to
be made in order to effect a calculation, therefore, in all cases, the crews should select
the braking action to Good.
There are three other types of contaminant that can be considered. These are:
Compacted Snow, Dry Ice and Wet Ice-Slippery. For these three options, the depth
button will not be selectable, however, for Compacted Snow and Dry Ice (but not Wet
Ice-Slippery) the pilots can enter the reported Braking Action or Friction Coefficient if
supplied. This is achieved by pressing the Braking Action button which activates a
pop-up window as shown below:
Pilots may select the reported Braking Action or, if it is supplied, the FC selection can
be made which results in the presentation of a second pop-up window to enter the
numerical, friction coefficient value as shown below:
The value range available is from 16 to 99. These actually represent 0.16 (Poor) to .99
(Good). In fact any coefficient above 0.4 is classified as Good whilst 0.16 represents
Wet Ice-Slippery (this value is set automatically, and cannot be changed, if Wet
Ice-Slippery is selected as the runway contaminant).
Unlike the contaminated performance calculations that are made with the existing,
GWC, pilots do not have to use Wet Ice-Slippery if the reported braking action is
anything but Good. Instead, they can now enter the actual, reported Braking Action or
Friction Coefficient when operating from runways that are contaminated with
Compacted Snow or Ice that is not deemed to be Wet and Slippery (i.e. Dry Ice).
However, if there is any doubt as to the efficacy of the reported braking action, pilots
should always defer to the safest option which is Wet Ice-Slippery.
For Landing Calculations, pilots will have to continue to use the existing GWC when in
flight because the iPad cannot compute the results without a 3G connection.
The contaminated runway cross-wind limitations that are specified in the Limitations
Section continue to apply as depicted in the table below (these include gusts):
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
Section 5 Contents
5 Flight Planning ................................................................................ 51
5.1 Computer Flight Plans........................................................................ 51
5.1.1 Introduction......................................................................... 51
5.1.2 Normal Plans ...................................................................... 51
5.1.3 Back-up Plans .................................................................... 51
5.1.4 Communications................................................................. 51
5.1.5 Use of Planning Data.......................................................... 51
5.2 Simplified Flight Planning ................................................................... 52
5.2.1 Introduction......................................................................... 52
5.2.2 Simplified Flight Planning ................................................... 52
5.2.3 Cruise Flight Level Table............................................... 511
5.2.4 Cruise Altitude Capability Table .................................... 516
5.2.5 Cruise-wind Altitude Trade ............................................... 519
5.2.6 Flight Planning Fuel Tankering...................................... 524
5.2.6.1 Embraer 195 Fuel Tankering Tables ................................ 525
5.2.6.2 Embraer 175 Fuel Tankering Tables ................................ 526
5.2.7 Engine and APU Fuel Consumption................................. 527
5.2.7.1 Engine Fuel Consumption ................................................ 527
5.2.7.2 APU Fuel Consumption .................................................... 528
5.2.8 Climb ................................................................................ 529
5.2.8.1 Climb speeds.................................................................... 529
5.2.8.2 Cruise Buffet Onset Chart ............................................ 530
5.2.9 In-flight Diversion.............................................................. 532
5.2.9.1 Embraer 195 In-flight Diversion Charts ............................ 533
5.2.9.2 Embraer 175 In Flight Diversion Charts ........................... 535
5.3 Single-engine Driftdown ................................................................ 537
5.3.1 Driftdown Table ................................................................ 537
5.3.2 Net Level-off Altitude ........................................................ 537
5.4 Single-engine Cruise Capability .................................................... 542
5.4.1 Cruise Altitude Capability Table (OEI)........................... 542
5.4.1.1 Embraer 195 Cruise Capability Table (OEI) ..................... 542
5.4.1.2 Embraer 175 Cruise Capability Table (OEI) ..................... 543
5.4.2 One Engine Inoperative Maximum Distance
from an Adequate Aerodrome .......................................... 543
5.4.2.1 Embraer 175 .................................................................... 544
5.4.2.2 Embraer 195..................................................................... 545
5 Flight Planning
5.1 Computer Flight Plans
5.1.1 Introduction
A complete description of the Operational Flight Plan is given in the .
There are two types of Embraer E-Jet computer flight plan Normal Plans and Back-up
plans.
5.1.4 Communications
Flight plans will be generated by Easy Brief and are available with 24 hr lead time on
the intranet (OFP). As an alternative the flight plan can be provided by Exeter
Operations and faxed to bases either to the crew room or the relevant handling agent
prior to the flights departure.
TAS
CGD GD
TAS WIND
Where:
CGD: Corrected Ground Distance;
GD: Ground Distance;
Headwind is negative;
Tailwind is positive.
The alternate fuel is determined by entering the LRC Simplified Flight Planning chart
with the alternate distance and wind.
The holding fuel is determined from the holding table in this section. Depending upon
national regulations, the holding fuel is normally calculated so that the aircraft can hold
for 30 min., at 1500 ft above the alternate airport.
9000
FL350
8500
8000
7500
7000
6500
6000
5500
5000
4500 FL370
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
LANDING WEIGHT - KG
500
0
-500
46000
-1000
44000
-1500
42000 REF. LINE
40000
-2000
-2500
38000
-3000
36000
-3500
-4000
60
HEAD
-4500
30
-5000
WIND - KT
-5500
-6000
0 REF. LINE
-6500
TAIL
-7000
30
-7500
60
-8000
-8500
-9000
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800
TRIP DISTANCE - NM
280
270 FL350
260
250
240
230
220
210
200
190
180
170
160
150
140
130
FL370
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
LANDING WEIGHT - KG
-10
46000
-20
-30
44000
-40
-50
42000
-60 REF.
-70 LINE
40000
-80
-90
38000
-100
-110
36000
-120
-130
-140
60
-150
-160
HEAD
-170
30
-180
WIND - KT
-190
-200
-210 0
-220
REF.
TAIL
-230
30
-240 LINE
-250
-260
60
-270
-280
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800
TRIP DISTANCE - NM
9000
8500
8000
7500
FL370
7000
6500
6000
5500
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
LANDING WEIGHT - KG
0
-500
46000
-1000
44000
42000
-1500
40000
-2000 REF.
38000
-2500 LINE
-3000
36000
-3500
-4000
60
HEAD
-4500
30
-5000
WIND - KT
-5500
-6000
0 REF.
-6500 LINE
TAIL
-7000
30
-7500
60
-8000
-8500
-9000
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600
TRIP DISTANCE - NM
250
240
FL370
230
220
210
200
190
180
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
60
0
-10
-20
30
-30
HEAD
-40
WIND - KT
-50
REF.
-600 LINE
-70
TAIL
-80
30
-90
-100
-110
60
-120
-130
-140
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600
TRIP DISTANCE - NM
CRUISE
CLIMB
DESCENT
UP
AT LEAST 5 MINUTES OF
CRUISE
The tabulated data are presented for ISA conditions, all engines operating, Long
Range Cruise and Mach 0.78 schedules.
EMBRAER 195
FLIGHT LEVEL - ALL ENGINES OPERATING
CF34-10E7 ENGINES, LONG RANGE CRUISE AND ISA CONDITIONS
(1) Owing to the reduced fuel consumption in this trip, the blank spaces are caused
by the landing weight going beyond the Maximum Landing Weight.
(2) The blank spaces are caused by the TOW that does not allow a sufficient fuel
quantity to accomplish the specified trip distance.
EMBRAER 195
FLIGHT LEVEL - ALL ENGINES OPERATING
CF34-10E7 ENGINES, MACH 0.78 CRUISE AND ISA CONDITIONS
(1) Owing to the reduced fuel consumption in this trip, the blank spaces are caused
by the landing weight going beyond the Maximum Landing Weight.
(2) The blank spaces are caused by the TOW that does not allow a sufficient fuel
quantity to accomplish the specified trip distance.
EMBRAER 175
FLIGHT LEVEL - ALL ENGINES OPERATING
ALL ENGINE TYPES, LONG RANGE CRUISE AND ISA CONDITIONS
(a) Owing to the reduced fuel consumption in this trip, the blank spaces are caused
by the landing weight going beyond the Maximum Landing Weight.
(b) The blank spaces are caused by the TOW that does not allow a sufficient fuel
quantity to accomplish the specified trip distance.
EMBRAER 175
FLIGHT LEVEL - ALL ENGINES OPERATING
ALL ENGINE TYPES, MACH 0.78 CRUISE AND ISA CONDITIONS
(1) Owing to the reduced fuel consumption in this trip, the blank spaces are caused
by the landing weight going beyond the Maximum Landing Weight.
(2) The blank spaces are caused by the TOW that does not allow a sufficient fuel
quantity to accomplish the specified trip distance.
ISA + C
WEIGHT
(kg) -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
31,000 350 410 410 410 410 410 410 390 360 -
30,000 350 410 410 410 410 410 410 390 370 -
Pilots should note that these charts are provided as part of the laminated cockpit card
suite.
These tables are based on the comparison between ground specific range at the new
and actual altitudes. They do not consider climb/descent time, fuel and distances. The
tables may be used in-flight, where the wind information is available and more
accurate.
Evaluation Method
(1) Check the wind factors for actual and new altitudes.
(2) Calculate the difference between new and actual wind factors. This number may
be negative or positive.
(3) The break-even wind at the new altitude is the wind component at actual altitude
plus the difference calculated on step (2).
Wind on FL350 (20 kt headwind) is more favorable than break-even wind (44 kt
headwind). Therefore, climb to FL350.
Wind on FL310 (15 kt tailwind) is less favorable than break-even wind (66 kt tailwind).
Therefore, maintain FL360.
Wind on FL350 (20 kt headwind) is more favorable than break-even wind (36 kt
headwind). Therefore, climb to FL350.
Wind on FL310 (20 kt tailwind) is less favorable than break-even wind (29 kt tailwind).
Therefore, maintain FL340.
Since the surplus fuel tankered results in additional fuel burn-off (due to the weight
increase) it is important to analyse the costs of the extra fuel transportation operation.
The following tables are designed to determine the break-even fuel price on departure
airport and it may be used whenever there is difference on fuel price compared to
destination. Tables are provided for LRC and M 0.78 cruise schedule.
Enter the trip distance on the table and read the fuel surplus ratio according to cruise
altitude. The break-even fuel price is the price at departure multiplied by the fuel surplus
ratio. If break-even fuel price is lower than destination price, it is economically feasible
to execute fuel tankering.
Example
Analyse the potential for fuel tankering between two airports distant 600 NM from each
other, using LRC speed schedule cruising at FL350. Consider the following fuel price
indices:
Since fuel on destination airport (110%) is greater than break-even fuel index (105%)
it is economically feasible to tank fuel between these two airports.
FUEL TANKERING
EMBRAER 195/CF34-10E7 ENGINES
MACH 0.78
FUEL SURPLUS RATIO
TRIP DISTANCE
(nm) 31,000 ft and 32,000 ft and
below above
200 1.01 1.01
400 1.02 1.02
600 1.03 1.03
800 1.03 1.04
1000 1.04 1.05
1200 1.05 1.06
1400 1.06 1.07
1600 1.07 1.08
1800 1.08 1.10
2000 1.08 1.11
2200 1.09 1.12
2400 1.12 1.13
FUEL TANKERING
EMBRAER 175/ALL ENGINE TYPES
MACH 0.78
FUEL SURPLUS RATIO
TRIP DISTANCE
(nm) 31,000 ft and 32,000 ft and
below above
200 1.01 1.01
400 1.02 1.02
600 1.03 1.03
800 1.04 1.04
1000 1.04 1.06
1200 1.05 1.07
1400 1.06 1.08
1600 1.07 1.10
1800 1.08 1.10
2000 1.09 1.11
FUEL CONSUMPTION
ENGINE PHASE OF FLIGHT
kg/min
TAXI 9
ALL TAKE-OFF 95
ENGINE
TYPES APPROACH AND LANDING 26
GO-AROUND 89
A typical average value to be used during the flight planning calculation should be
considered:
TAKE-OFF = 142 kg (1.5 minutes used).
APPROACH AND LANDING = 79 kg (3 minutes used).
GO-AROUND = 71 kg (0.8 minutes used).
Embraer 175
FUEL CONSUMPTION
ENGINE PHASE OF FLIGHT
kg/min
TAXI 8
ALL TAKE-OFF 73
ENGINE
TYPES APPROACH AND LANDING 17.5
GO-AROUND 73
A typical average value to be used during the flight planning calculation should be
considered:
TAKE-OFF = 146 kg (2 minutes used).
APPROACH AND LANDING = 70 kg (4 minutes used).
GO-AROUND = 146 kg (2 minutes used).
Note: FLYBE uses 160 kg for taxi fuel; 300 kg for take-off fuel and 105 kg for landing
fuel. The Company figures provide a safety margin over the data supplied by the
manufacturer.
These figures are entered into the MCDU on page 2/3 of the PERFORMANCE INIT
menu.
0 1.5
0
40 1.7
0 0
0 2.1
Max.
40 2.4
0 1.3
0
40 1.5
5,000 170
0 1.8
Max.
40 2.0
0 1.3
0
40 1.5
5,000 300
0 1.8
Max.
40 2.0
0 1.0
0
40 1.2
15,000 170
0 1.4
Max.
40 1.7
0 1.0
0
40 1.2
15,000 320
0 1.4
Max.
40 1.7
0 0.7
33,000 170 0
40 1.0
0 0.6
33,000 300 0
40 0.9
5.2.8 Climb
5.2.8.1 Climb speeds
5.2.8.1.1 Maximum Angle of Climb Speed
This speed is recommended for obstacle clearance in order to reach an altitude on
minimum ground distance. The recommended maximum angle speed is related to flaps
up, all engines operating and is approximately VFS for all gross weights and altitudes.
5.2.8.1.2 Maximum Rate of Climb Speed
This speed is recommended when maximum rate of climb is desired in order to reach
an altitude on minimum climb time. The recommended maximum rate of climb speed
is related to flaps up, all engines operating and is function of gross weights and
altitudes as shown in the tables below:
Embraer 195
Maintain the speeds above until intercepting Mach 0.60. Then fly with this Mach
number until level off.
Embraer 175
Maintain the speeds above until intercepting Mach 0.63. Then fly with this Mach
number until level off.
The charts provide the buffet margin (manoeuvre capability) and associated bank
angles for a variety of cruise altitudes and weights as a function of mach number.
MANOEUVRE
ManeuverCAPABILITY
Capability
Embraer 195
30
20 54000 kg 50000 kg
23000 ft
0 46000 kg
25000 ft
00 21000 ft
90 42000 kg
80
70
60 27000 ft 38000 kg
50
40 34000 kg
29000 ft
30
20 31000 ft
0
00
33000 ft
90
80
70
37000 ft
60
50
40 41000 ft
30
20
0
0
0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
1.00 1.00
1.25 1.05
1.50 1.10
1.75 1.15
2.00 1.20
2.25 2.50 Load
1.25 1.30 Factor
1.35
Mach 0 37 48 55 60 64 66 Bank Angle
Pilots must consider en-route weather when planning a flight. Therefore pilots are to
allow at least 1.3 g for manoeuvre (e.g. At 42T and Mach .76, you are limited to
40,500 ft). If turbulence is forecast en-route, then a manoeuvre margin of 1.75 g should
be considered (i.e. in the same conditions as the previous example, you must descend
to approximately 32,000 ft).
MANOEUVRE CAPABILITY
Fuel and time are determined in the same way as the simplified flight planning charts,
with distance to destination instead of trip distance, disregarding the climb phase.
The pilots can also use the charts in the opposite direction, i.e., entering with the fuel
remaining on board and finding the range at a given flight level at LRC.
Normally, pilots will not use these charts as all relevant information is provided on the
Operational Flight Plan (PLOG). It is envisaged that such charts will only be used in the
event of an unplanned diversion as a result of some form of in flight emergency.
Charts are provided firstly for the Embraer 195 and then the Embraer 175.
6000
5500 FL370
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
LANDING WEIGHT - kg
46000
-500
-1000
44000
42000
-1500
40000
-2000
REF.
LINE
38000
-2500
36000
-3000
-3500
-4000
60
-4500
-5000
30
HEAD
-5500
WIND - kt
-6000
0 REF.
LINE
-6500
TAIL
-7000
30
-7500
-8000
60
-8500
-9000
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200
TRIP DISTANCE - NM
210
200
190
180
FL370
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
LANDING WEIGHT - kg
-20
46000
-30
44000
-40
-50
42000
-60
-70
REF.
40000
-80
38000
LINE
-90
38000
-100
-110
36000
-120
-130
-140
-150
60
-160
-170
HEAD
-180
30
-190
WIND - kt
-200
-210
REF.
0
-220 LINE
-230
TAIL
-240
30
-250
-260
-270
-280
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200
TRIP DISTANCE - NM
Immediately after engine failure set maximum continuous N1 and allows the airplane to
decelerate from the cruise speed to the initial driftdown speed shown in the driftdown
table (or use Green Dot speed) When this speed is achieved, start the descend profile.
The airplane should level off at the gross altitude and weight shown in the driftdown
table.
To estimate the net level off pressure altitude, enter with the gross weight, proceed to
the ISA deviation and find the value within bracket. This is the net level off pressure
altitude. The net level off pressure altitude must clear all en-route obstacles by at least
1,000 ft.
In case the obstacles heights are close to the values published in the tables below, a
detailed driftdown analysis must be accomplished.
DRIFTDOWN TABLE
EMBRAER 195 ALL ENGINE TYPES EASA CERTIFICATION
BLEEDS ON/ENGINE AND WING ANTI-ICE OFF
DRIFTDOWN TABLE
EMBRAER 195 ALL ENGINE TYPES EASA CERTIFICATION
BLEEDS ON/ENGINE AND WING ANTI-ICE ON
DRIFTDOWN TABLE
EMBRAER 175 ALL ENGINE TYPES
BLEEDS ON/ENGINE AND WING ANTI-ICE OFF
DRIFTDOWN TABLE
EMBRAER 175 ALL ENGINE TYPES
BLEEDS ON/ENGINE AND WING ANTI-ICE ON
EMBRAER 195
CRUISE ALTITUDE CAPABILITY
ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE
CF34-10E7 ENGINES, LONG RANGE CRUISE
ISA + C
Weight (kg) -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
51,000 130 130 130 130 130 100
50,000 130 130 130 130 130 110
49,000 150 150 150 150 150 120
48,000 150 150 150 150 150 130 110
47,000 150 150 150 150 150 140 120 -
46,000 180 180 180 180 180 150 130 100
45,000 180 180 180 180 180 150 140 110
44,000 180 180 180 180 180 170 140 120 100
43,000 190 190 190 190 190 170 160 130 110
42,000 200 200 200 200 200 180 170 140 120
41,000 200 200 200 200 200 190 170 160 120 100
40,000 200 200 200 200 200 190 180 160 130 110
39,000 200 210 200 200 210 200 190 180 150 120
38,000 220 220 220 220 220 200 200 180 160 130
37,000 230 230 230 230 230 210 200 190 180 140
36,000 240 240 240 240 240 210 200 200 180 160
35,000 250 250 240 250 240 230 210 200 190 170
34,000 250 250 250 250 250 240 220 200 200 180
33,000 260 260 260 260 260 250 230 220 200 190
32,000 270 270 270 270 270 260 250 220 210 200
Note: For planning purposes, the single-engine cruise speed in ISA conditions at
FL150 at max take-off weight is:
E 195
261 kts Indicated Air Speed.
325 kts True Air Speed.
E 175
242 kts Indicated Air Speed.
297 kts True Air Speed.
The distance from any point along the proposed route of flight to an adequate
aerodrome must be covered within the maximum allowed time using one of the speeds
shown in the table provided in this section (assuming still air, ISA conditions and one
engine inoperative).
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Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
Flight Planning
The data is based on OEI drifting down using maximum continuous thrust at the Mach
number until reaching the corresponding IAS and maintaining that airspeed during the
remaining of the driftdown and level cruise.
Enter the table for the appropriate speed with the weight at the point of diversion and
time selected and read the maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome.
Two charts are presented, the first for the E175 and the second for the E195. The
charts are reproduced in the Cockpit Handbook.
60 min 75 min
Correction for anti-ice ON with ice accretion: Fuel flow increases by 1,000 kg/hr.
Note: On initial detection of ice, and for flight in icing conditions the minimum holding
speed is 210 kts.
Correction for anti-ice ON with ice accretion: Fuel flow increases by 500 kg/hr.
Note: On initial detection of ice, and for flight in icing conditions the minimum holding
speed is 210 kts.
The speeds presented in the table are for Anti-Ice ~OFF. On initial detection of icing,
speed must be increased to 210 KIAS.
The speeds presented in the table are for Anti-Ice OFF. On initial detection of icing,
speed must be increased to 210 KIAS
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
Section 6 Contents
6 Weight and Balance........................................................................ 61
6.1 General............................................................................................... 61
6.1.1 Aircraft Variants .................................................................. 61
6.1.2 Registration And Configuration........................................... 61
6.1.3 Standard Terms and Definitions ......................................... 61
6.1.4 (MEW) Manufacturer Empty Weight .................................. 61
6.1.5 (BEW) Basic Empty Weight................................................ 61
6.1.6 (OEW) Operational Empty Weight...................................... 62
6.1.7 (MZFW) Maximum Zero Fuel Weight ................................ 62
6.1.8 (AZFW) Actual Zero Fuel Weight ....................................... 62
6.1.9 Total Traffic Load................................................................ 62
6.1.10 Maximum Allowable Traffic Load........................................ 62
6.1.11 (MRW) Maximum loadsheet Weight................................... 62
6.1.12 (MTOW) Maximum Take-off Weight................................... 62
6.1.13 (MLW) Maximum Landing Weight ...................................... 62
6.1.14 (MOW) Minimum Operating Weight ................................... 62
6.1.15 (CG) Centre of Gravity........................................................ 63
6.1.16 Index System...................................................................... 63
6.1.17 Balance Reference System ................................................ 63
6.1.18 (MAC) Wing Mean Aerodynamic Chord ............................. 63
6.1.19 Moment Changes Due to Movement.................................. 64
6.1.20 Fuel and Fluid Data ............................................................ 65
6.1.21 Passengers......................................................................... 66
6.1.22 Flight Crew Items................................................................ 66
6.1.23 Index System...................................................................... 67
6.1.24 Fuel Index Variation.......................................................... 610
6.1.25 OEW/OEI Determination .................................................. 611
6.1.26 Weight Limitations ............................................................ 612
6.1.26.1 EMB 175 Limits ................................................................ 612
6.1.26.2 EMB 195 Limits ................................................................ 613
6.1.27 Cabin Trim Passengers ................................................. 614
6.1.28 Basic Weight and Centre of Gravity Limits ....................... 614
6.1.28.1 EMB 175 Certified Centre of Gravity Limits...................... 614
6.1.28.2 EMB 175 Weight and Centre of Gravity Chart.................. 616
6.1.28.3 EMB 195 Certified Centre of Gravity Limits...................... 617
6.1.28.4 EMB 195 Weight and Centre of Gravity Chart ................. 618
6.1.29 General Arrangement of Aircraft....................................... 619
G-FBEE G-FBEL
G-FBEF G-FBEM
G-FBEG G-FBEN
Note: Due to variations in catering between scheduled and charter flights, the catering
weight is added to the DOW on Flybe flights to provide an APS weight.
Note: The weight of the fuel used in the taxi phase, may be added to the MTOW
providing it does not exceed the MRW.
On the 175, its located 12.488 m ahead of the wing stub front spar. For external
reference, its located 12.861 m ahead of the wing jacking points.
On the 195, its located 15.256 m ahead of the wing stub front spar. For external
reference, its located 15.670 m ahead of the wing jacking points.
EMB 175, 2.0% MAC at 2300 kg, 1.4% MAC at 32,000 kg, 1.2% MAC at 38,000 kg.
64 Revision 11 | Oct 2011
Operations Manual B6 E-Jet V1
Weight and Balance
EMB 195, 1.6% MAC at 3400 kg, 1.2% MAC at 41,000 kg, 0.9% MAC at 52,000 kg.
Fuel Quantities
Embraer 175 STD Model
Volume
Fuel Category Weight (kg) CG Balance Arm (m)
(litres)
Volume
Fuel Category Weight (kg) CG Balance Arm (m)
(litres)
The values specified in the above tables have been determined for an adopted fuel
density of 0.811 kg/l.
Note: The maximum fuel imbalance between tanks on the EMB 175 and EMB 195 is
360 kg.
MISCELLANEOUS FLUID
EMB 175 EMB 195
Fluid Balance Arm Balance Arm
Weight (kg) Weight (kg)
(m) (m)
Engine Oil(1) 30 12.148 32 14.815
Apu Oil(1) 2 30.104 3.7 34.717
Hydraulic(2) 50 14.927 56 17.522
Waste Tank Fluid 8 25.148 8 32.045
Potable Water(3) 35 24.130 110 5.168
Note 1: Adopted engine oil Density (ref. MIL-L-7808): 0.98 kg/l. Engine oil considers
oil from engine, integrated driven generator (IDG), oil lines and starter.
Note 2: Adopted hydraulic fluid density (ref. SAE AS 1241A TYPE IV): 0.99 kg/l.
Note 3: Potable water is stored in a potable water tank. Tank capacity is 35 litres for
the EMB 175 and 110 litres for the EMB 195.
6.1.21 Passengers
Passenger Location
The passenger location and respective balance arm are shown in the interior
arrangement.
Passenger Weight
See Section 7.
The adopted flight crew items are in accordance with the approved average weight, not
including the respective carry-on baggage.
The crew members weights refer to males. For female crew members, a weight equal
to 75 kg may be adopted.
As the operational usage of long numeric expressions may result in safety problems an
index system is adopted for weight and balance purposes.
The index system is just a method of presenting aircraft or body moments on a different
measuring system. When using the index system, short numeric expressions result.
where:
I = Index.
W = Weight of item.
Arm = Arm or centre of gravity of an item.
Reference arm. The selected arm around which all index values are
A =
calculated.
Constant used as a denominator to convert moment values into index
B =
values.
Constant used as a plus value to avoid negative index figures. It is only
C = used when calculating the aircraft Operating Empty weight Index (OEI),
and is not used when calculating individual items index influence.
Index Influence
The index influence is the variation of the index when an item is loaded or unloaded
from the aircraft. It is usually referred to as index units per kilogram for variable weight
items (cargo, catering, passengers, etc.) or index units for fixed weight items (flight
attendant, cockpit observer, etc.).
The following tables show the index influence for various items.
Actual Index
Item Arm (m) Weight (kg)
Influence
Actual Index
Item Arm (m) Weight (kg)
Influence
9,400 -1.60
9,500 -7.24
10,000 -7.24
10,500 -7.10
11,000 -6.86
11,500 -6.46
12,000 -5.93
12,500 -5.21
13,100 -4.05
The BEW is obtained from the aircraft weight schedule, which is produced from the
weighing record.
The BEW calculation considers the APU oil, engine oil, hydraulic fluid and unusable
fuel.
The potable water is often full at the time of the aircraft weighing. Therefore the
weight schedule should be checked to confirm if this has been included.
The values above are only an example. The actual aeroplane BEW should be used
in determining the OEW.
The catering weights are included in the above example, but as these are variable,
they are not included in the Flybe OEW/OEI and should be added to produce the
actual APS/OEW of a particular flight.
OA 28 26
OB 32 32
OC 28 32
OD 28
The take-off and landing limits are with flaps and landing gear extended.
Take-Off/ Take-Off/
Landing (kg) %SMC Arm (m) Landing (kg) %SMC Arm (m)
In Flight (kg) %SMC Arm (m) In Flight (kg) %SMC Arm (m)
7.0% 10.0%
16%
2
This shaded area denotes the alternative C of G envelope used for
i
improved dtake-offtake-off
t performance. If a crew wishes to use the Alternate C of G
take-off data, they must ensure that the take-off MAC is greater than 16% and within
the shaded area.
The take-off and landing limits are with flaps and landing gear extended.
Zero Fuel (kg) %SMC Arm (m) Zero Fuel (kg) %SMC Arm (m)
In Flight (kg) %SMC Arm (m) In Flight (kg) %SMC Arm (m)
The above figures are demonstrated graphically in the table shown on the next page.
Toilet Galley 1
Wardrobe
Fwd Attendant
88 Seats in
22 Rows
Numbered 1 to 23
(no row 13)
AFT Attendant
Galley 3
Toilet
FWD Stowage
Galley 1
Airstairs
Galley 2
FWD Attendant
Toilet
118 Seats in 30
rows Numbered
1 to 31
(No row 13)
AFT Attendant
AFT Attendant
Galley 3
Toilet
Galley Units 1 3 1 2 3
Galley Units 1 3 1 2 3
10 -0.10 10 0.10
20 -0.21 20 0.20
30 -0.31 30 0.30
40 -0.42 40 0.40
50 -0.52 50 0.50
60 -0.63 60 0.60
70 -0.73 70 0.70
80 -0.83 80 0.80
90 -0.94 90 0.90
110 1.10
120 1.20
130 1.30
140 1.40
150 1.50
160 1.60
B 0.46 G 0.94
C 0.05 H 0.49
D 3.35 I 2.74
E 2.00 J 3.01
Dimensions Dimensions
cm cm
A 44.6 C 29.4
B 27.8
A maximum of 9.0 kg can be stowed under the seat, provided it is properly restrained
to avoid sliding.
Both cargo compartments are pressurised. They are class-C compartments and have
the following systems installed:
No dedicated temperature control is available for cargo compartments. The air flowing
from passenger cabin heats the fwd cargo compartment, providing proper conditions
for live animals carriage.
There are two cargo compartments, both below the passenger floor, one situated
forward of the wing, the other aft.
Dimensions (m)
EMB 175 EMB 195
A 0.90 0.90
B 2.66 1.22
C 2.41 5.64
D 6.26 8.06
Dimensions (m)
EMB 175 and 195
E 0.94
F 0.74
G 2.72
Dimensions (m)
EMB 175 EMB 195
A 0.88 0.88
B 0.78 0.78
C 2.77 5.76
D 1.85 1.85
E 5.26 8.75
Dimensions (m)
G 0.74
H 2.06
I 0.27
J 0.51
K 1.65
Trial loading is recommended for packages with dimension marginally above those
shown in tables.
Enter the package width and height and read the maximum package length that can be
stowed in the cargo compartment.
HEIGHT
MAXIMUM PACKAGE LENGTH cm
cm
HEIGHT
MAXIMUM PACKAGE LENGTH cm
cm
Attachments in the forward and aft cargo compartments allow the installation of vertical
cargo nets. The vertical cargo nets prevent the luggage shifting and optimises the
loading.
The use of vertical cargo nets is only required when a load has been placed into the
hold. Where provided, the door nets must always be fitted, regardless of whether the
hold has any load placed into it. If the door nets are missing, the hold must be placarded
inoperative and must be empty prior to dispatch.
Whether or not vertical cargo nets are used, the maximum cargo section weights must
be observed.
Decals on the net assembly indicate orientation (FWD, AFT, UP, or RIGHT/LEFT).
Note: Centroid figures refer to the CG between the two points, i.e. Bulkhead to 1st Net,
1st Net to 2nd Net, etc.
The maximum allowed resultant weight that can be attached to each tie fitting
cup inside the forward and aft cargo compartments is 60 kg (132 lb).
When using tie down points, the vertical net located at that position must be
removed.
Cargo door safety nets and crew baggage net attachment points shall not be used
as tie down points. The cargo door safety nets are required for operation.
This is not applicable to the cargo tie fitting cups located on the cargo compartment
ceiling.
Loose volumes are not allowed in the same section where tie down fitting cups are
being used to restrain cargo.
The weight statement for Flybe aircraft is published as a Notice To Aircrew. This lists
the variable items and possible operational adjustments, along with the basic weight,
training weight and APS weight (Aircraft Prepared for Service) for each individual
aircraft.
The APS figure includes all the variable items for a standard crew configuration, with
the exception of the catering. The correct catering for the route, along with any
operational adjustments, should be added to the APS figures to obtain the dry
operating weight.
The passenger seating is divided into bays. The arm or centroid of the bay is used to
calculate the index figure for the passengers in that bay. Should all the passengers sit
in the forward or rear rows of the bay, there will be either a (+) or (-) index error for that
bay. Calculations are done to determine the maximum error for each of the bays.
Similarly the arms used for the cargo holds are those listed above. But as can be seen,
the forward or rear areas of the hold have different arms and consequently would
produce a different index figure. Again the maximum error per hold is calculated.
Together with the known effects of passenger/cabin crew movement, the total forward
(-) and aft (+) errors, are calculated and the certified forward and aft operating limits
reduced.
This produces a graph, which will allow the aircraft to be safely trimmed regardless of
such loading errors.
Before an EDP loadsheet can be printed, the following checks are made automatically:
(a) The maximum gross weights valid for the flight are not exceeded.
(b) In all cases, the appropriate weight capacity limitations are not exceeded.
(c) The centre of gravity of the aircraft is within specified limits.
(d) All information which is essential for the safe operation of the flight is inserted
operating data, cargo and mail weights, etc.
Part B
21 TOTAL TRAFFIC LOAD Total traffic load is the total weight of
passengers, baggage, cargo and mail.
22 DRY OPERATING WEIGHT The dry operating weight is the basic weight of
the aircraft plus operational items, e.g. crew,
crew baggage, flight equipment and pantry.
23 ZERO FUEL WEIGHT ACTUAL Sum of items 21 and 22.
24 MAX Maximum design zero fuel weight.
25 TAKE-OFF FUEL Take-off fuel is the amount of fuel on board less
the fuel consumed before take-off.
26 TAKE-OFF WEIGHT ACTUAL Sum of items 23 and 25.
27 MAX Maximum weight for take-off is the maximum.
design take-off weight or operational take-off
weight, whichever is the lower.
28 TRIP FUEL Trip fuel is the amount of fuel planned to be
consumed from take-off to the station of first
intended landing.
29 LANDING WEIGHT ACTUAL Actual landing weight item 26 minus item 28.
30 MAX Maximum weight for landing is the maximum
design landing weight or operational landing
weight, whichever is the lower.
31 L Indicator showing which of the maximum
weights is limiting the allowed traffic load.
32 ADJ Effects LMCS. Entry to be made according to
Company regulations.
33 DOI Dry Operating Weight Index.
34 LIZFW Laden Index at Zero Fuel Weight.
35 LITOW Laden Index at Take-Off Weight.
36 MACZFW %MAC (Mean Aerodynamic Chord) 1. %SMC
(Standard Mean Chord) at Zero Fuel Weight
Not Required.
37 MACTOW %SMC at Take-Off Weight.
38 STABILISER SETTING Stabiliser setting for take-off. Stated as aircraft
nose-up or nose-down.
39 Oa0b0c Actual distribution of passengers within cabin
bays does not include infants.
40 CABIN AREA TRIM Balance effect of passengers calculated by
number in each bay.
Part C
Load Message and Captains Information Before LMC
47 TAXI FUEL Allowance for start-up and taxi.
48 TAXI WEIGHT Actual taxi weight of aircraft.
49 MAX Maximum design taxi weight.
50 Destination.
51 Passenger split MIFICII.
52 Total compartment load.
53 Compartment load distribution.
54 Class of passenger (FIJIY).
55 PAD Passengers Available for Disembarkation.
56 SI Supplementary Information.
57 SERVICE WEIGHT ADJ Any change made to DOWIDOI.
58 PANTRY CODE Self-explanatory.
59 AUTHORISED WEIGHT, etc. Self-explanatory.
60 GCI Destination (3 letter code).
61 FRE Freight/weight.
62 POS Mail/weight.
63 BAG Hold bags, number/weight.
64 TRA Transit load/Weight.
65 CHECKED Loadsheet agents signature.
66 APPROVED/TIME Signature of authorised person/local time.
(25) From the position of the DOW index, draw a vertical line through to Hold 1 scale
until it intersects a sloping line of the scale. From this point, draw a horizontal line
(in the direction indicated by the arrow) corresponding to the amount of weight in
Hold 1.
Note: Division = 200 kg).
Drop the trim line to the next and subsequent scale containing load, completing
all scales, containing load. The scales do not necessarily need to be completed
in the order shown.
(26) Refer to the horizontal weight scale and mark on the trim line the actual zero fuel
weight 15.
(27) Obtain the index vale for take-off fuel and return to the point where the vertical
line passed through the fuel index scale. From this line, plot horizontally, the fuel
index, regarding the negative and positive values.
(28) Having plotted the final index value, drop a second vertical line into the CG
envelope. Refer to the horizontal weight scale and plot the take-off weight.
Note: The zero fuel point MUST always fall within the limits of the CG envelope.
(29) Relate the take-off weight point to the %SMC graticule to determine %SMC
value. Refer this value to the horizontal %SMC/Elevator Setting graph; establish
setting for take-off, record value thus obtained.
(30) Enter total number of passengers on board including infants.
(31) Enter %SMC value obtained in 29.
(32) Actual Standard weights used for passengers/baggage clarify.
(33) To be signed by person responsible for the loading of the aircraft and signed by
the aircrafts Commander.
Section 7 Contents
7 Loading Instructions ...................................................................... 71
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7 Loading Instructions
Please refer to GHM Part 1 Ramp, Section 7.
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