REGISTRABLE AND NON-REGISTRABLE LANDS

20. IN RE: APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE. SPOUSES FRANCISCO LAHORA

and TORIBIA MORALIZON v. EMILIO DAYANGHIRANG, JR., and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
37 SCRA 346 (1971)

Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Who:

1. Sps. Francisco Lahora & Toribia Moralizon applicant for ORIGINAL registration nine
(9) parcels of land located in barrio Zaragoza, municipality of Manay, province of Davao
2. Emilio Daynghirang, Jr. oppositor; alleges that Lot no. 2228 belong to him and his wife;
Facts:
(November 26, 1965)
Sps. Francisco Lahora & Toribia Moralizon filed an application for ORIGINAL registration of nine
(9) parcels of land located at barrio Zaragoza, municipality of Manay, province of Davao, of
which Toribia Moralizon acquired by inheritance, and the other half by continuous, open, public
and adverse possession, including Lot 2228.
Emilio Dayanghirang, Jr. alleges that Lot 2228 belong to him and his wife and said to be already
covered by an OCT in the name of his wife (name not mentioned) and prayed that the application
be dismissed in so far as it includes Lot no. 2228. Director of Lands opposed the application
contending that the applicants never had sufficient title over the parcels of land nor have they
been in an open, continuous, and notorious possession for at least 30 years.
CFI: dismissed the application; having been previously registered and titled, said parcel of land
can no longer be the subject of adjudication in another proceeding.
Issues: whether lot 2228 can be registered in the name of the applicants
Held: Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the CFI in dismissing the application for having been
previously registered to a different owner/person.

Discussion: It is not denied by the applicant that Lot 2228 was the subject of a public grant in
favor of the oppositors wife, by virtue of which an OCT was issued in her name on June 21, 1956.
Applicants now contends that
1. the patent issued to oppositors wife was procured by fraud, because appellants, the alleged
actual occupants of the land, were not notified of the application for patent therefor and of
its adjudication.
2. That since they were the actual occupants of the property, the government could not have
awarded it to oppositors wife, and the patent issued to the latter, as well as the OCT
subsequently obtained by her, were null and void.
 The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate
of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is
issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the
Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards
provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its
issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued
in a registration proceeding.
In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of oppositors' wife as
of 21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier. Clearly, appellants' petition for registration of the same
parcel of land on 26 November 1965, on the ground that the first certificate of title (OCT No. P-
6053) covering the said property is a nullity, can no longer prosper. Orderly administration of
justice precludes that Lot 2228, of the Manay Cadastre, should be the subject of two registration
proceedings. Having become registered land under Act 496, for all legal purposes, by the issuance
of the public land patent and the recording thereof, further registration of the same would lead to
the obviously undesirable result of two certificates of title being issued for the same piece of land,
even if both certificates should be in the name of the same person. And if they were to be issued
to different persons, the indefeasibility of the first title, which is the most valued characteristic of
Torrens titles, would be torn away.
21. SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., v. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

Panganiban, J
Facts:

Sps. Mariano and Erlinda Laburada were the applicants for registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-
1372, located in Mandaluyong City. The trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered
a favorable decision; that the applicants have a registrable title over the parcel of land.

LRA refused to issue a decree of registration. It was found that it might be a portion of the
parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per
plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932.

The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued
Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905,
respectively. On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig,
Metro Manila, requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued
in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;

On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355
was received by this Authority, per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila.
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the
parcel of land described therein is not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another
letter dated April 15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila requesting for a certified
typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of
title with complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. no reply has yet
been received by the LRA.

After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it
was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No.
159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name
of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan
Psd-1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are incomplete.

A Special Civil Action for Mandamus was filed by the petitioners to ask the Court to direct the
LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration.

Solicitor General prays that the petition be dismissed for being premature.

In a Supreme Court Resolution acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case filed
by petitioner (wife), require the Solicitor General to report what concrete and specific steps, if any,
have been taken by respondent (LRA) to actually verify whether the lot might be a portion of the
parcels of land decreed in CLR cases.
Solicitor Generals letter: that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159,
Swo-7237 is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura
Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395,
per verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for
the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is
incomplete. and that to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners
would result in the duplication of title over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy
and purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same.

Issue: Can the respondent, LRA be compelled to issue the corresponding decree. (IS MANDAMUS
THE RIGHT REMEDY?)

Held: In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of
registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more
appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is
included in the property described in TCT No. 6595. Petition dismissed but remanded to the
court of origin (Pasig City). LRA is ordered to submit a report determining with finality whether
Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595.

Discussion:

Petitioner cite 4 reasons why the writ should be issued:

1. That they have a clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative
duty to perform because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding, the jurisdictional
requirement of notices and publication should be complied with;
2. That it is not the duty of the LRA to take the cudgels for the private persons in possession
of OCT 355, TCT 29337, TCT 6595. Rather, it is the sole concern of said private person-
holders of said titles to institute in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may
have against the property subject of petitioners application for registration;
3. That they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of the failure of the
RD of Pasig to furnish LRA the certified copies of TCT 29337 and TCT 6595
notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles;
4. That the State consented to its being sued in this case; thus, the legislature must recognize
and judgment that may be rendered in this case as final and make provision for its
satisfaction.

LRA: contends that the CFI has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already
decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and
void.

SC agrees with the SolGen that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three reasons:

1. Judgment is not yet executory

Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition
is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they
do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a
 judgment of registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one year
after the entry of the final decree of registration.

2. A Void Judgement Is Possible

That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than
a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is
reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same
parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.

It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of
land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second
decree for the same land would be null and void, since the principle behind original
registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land
which petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905,
the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle.

It has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again
the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second
decree for the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res
judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power
in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to
adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the
property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice
to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter
applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title
so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would
defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and
guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in
the efficacy of the registration law.

3. Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act

The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not
a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus.

Although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, the administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered
a ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts
not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a final
decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one (Delos Reyes v. De Villa)

It is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because
it is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion. (Go v. CA)
ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

22. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. HEIRS

OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, 71 SCRA 57 (May 7, 1976)

Esguerra, J

Facts: ****Subdivision plan ---- intestate proceedings ---- tcts were issued --- TC finds SP no legal
effect for lack of notice to interested persons*****

This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted by the Republic of
the Philippines (May 9, 1969), represented by the Director of Lands, against the Estate of Luisa
Abrille, represented by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land Registration Commissioner and
the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao.

The Director of Lands alleges that:

1. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the parcel
of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under a
subdivision plan which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner, ANTONIO
NOBLEJAS on March 17, 1967;
2. March 27, 1967, Luisa Abrille was able to secure an order form the CFI of Davao directing
the RD for the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of CTC No. T-1439
and thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;
3. That the registration of Lot 379-B-2-B-2 (TCT T-18887), which includes an excess area of
82,127 square meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the required notice and
publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Law; and that the excess or enlarged area was formerly a portion of the Davao
River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the river, hence belong to the
public domain and TCT 18887 is null and void ab initio.

The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to include the increase in
area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322 recommended by the
Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report, and for issuance of new title under Section 44,
Act 496, as amended, filed with the trial court.

TC: Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy was sought,
notice before the hearing is required. The parties admit that there was no notice to the persons
interested, including the Director of Lands, before the petition was heard.

The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent estate, might have acquired a registrable
title to the land in question but to bring it under the operation of the Land Registration Act, a
petition for registration under Act 496 should have been filed.

The trial court ordered the cancellation of TCTs issued in the name of the heirs.

Issue: whether the lower court was correct in holding the approval of Subdivision Plan on the
ground of lack of notice to interested persons.
HELD:

The judgement appealed from is affirmed in toto. Trial court acted correctly in ordering the
cancellation of TCTs which admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters under
Subdivision Plan for the City of Davao;

That the 13 foregoing requisites were not complied by the defendant-appellants

Discussion:

The steps taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval of their
Subdivision Plan and to include the questioned increased area is unwarranted and irregular.

In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed
of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496,
proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed Instead of an ordinary approval of
subdivision plan.

It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the predecessor-in-
interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers
previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of
82,127 square meters, has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse
still, the approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all
parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands.

For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally
registered under Act 496, the following requisites should all be satisfied:

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;

2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;

3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;

4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all
the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the
Land Registration Commission;

5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the
hearing in the Official Gazette;

6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have
interests in the property by the sheriff;

7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice
or not;

8. Hearing of the case by the Court;

9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;

10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing
the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and
registration;

11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;

12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of

Deeds, and

13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the
issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the
Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
23. IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and
ESTEBAN CALALUNG, 5 SCRA 524 (June 30, 1962)

Barrera, J

Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land by inheritance from their deceased mother. For
purposes of registration, the land was surveyed sometime in 1930. A gradual accretion took place
by action of the current of the Cagayan River. The bank thereof had receded from its original site
and an alluvial deposit had been added to the registered area. Petitioners instituted an action
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion alleging that they and their
predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof.
CFI ruled in favor of Ignacio and ordered respondents to vacate the premises and deliver
possession;
On appeal, CA said that the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of
alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for
both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong
to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of
the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters."
Issue:
1. Whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.
2. Whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which
receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible.
SC: (Affirmed the decision and findings of CA)
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366
of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered
owners of the land which it adjoins.

Issue #1: CA, after analyzing the evidence, found that the respondents-appellees were in
possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a
claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958.

Court agrees with the CA that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the
registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land.
Issue #2:

The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in
possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a
claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. (cannot be reviewed by the SC)
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the
Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms
and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by
occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of
the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old
Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.