RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY Tiac to be the manager of the Binondo branch.
Even petitioner
CUISON vs. CA and Valiant
October 26, 1993
FACTS: Kue Cuison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the
purchase and sale of newsprint, bond paper and scrap.
Valiant Investment Associates delivered various kinds of paper
products to a certain Tan. The deliveries were made by Valiant
pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiac who was then employed
in the Binondo office of petitioner. Upon delivery, Tan paid for the
merchandise by issuing several checks payable to cash at the
specific request of Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine (9) postdated
checks to Valiant as payment for the paper products. Unfortunately,
sad checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank.
Thereafter, Valiant made several demands upon petitioner to pay for
the merchandise in question, claiming that Tiac was duly authorized
by petitioner as the manager of his Binondo office, to enter into the
questioned transactions with Valiant and Tan. Petitioner denied any
involvement in the transaction entered into by Tiac and refused to
pay Valiant.
Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against
petitioner for the collection of sum of money representing the price of
the merchandise. After due hearing, the trial court dismissed the
complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. On appeal, however,
the decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect reversed
by the CA. CA ordered petitioner to pay Valiant with the sum plus
interest, AF and costs.
ISSUE: WON Tiac possessed the required authority from petitioner
sufficient to hold the latter liable for the disputed transaction
HELD:
YES
As to the merits of the case, it is a well-established rule that one who
clothes another with apparent authority as his agent and holds him
out to the public as such cannot be permitted to deny the authority of
such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third
parties dealing with such person in good faith and in the honest belief
that he is what he appears to be
It matters not whether the representations are intentional or merely
negligent so long as innocent, third persons relied upon such
representations in good faith and for value. Article 1911 of the Civil
Code provides:
Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is
solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as
though he had full powers.
The above-quoted article is new. It is intended to protect the rights of
innocent persons. In such a situation, both the principal and the
agent may be considered as joint tortfeasors whose liability is joint
and solidary.
It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission,
petitioner held out Tiac to the public as the manager of his store in
Binondo. More particularly, petitioner explicitly introduced to
Villanueva, Valiants manager, as his (petitioners) branch manager
as testified to by Villanueva. Secondly, Tan, who has been doing
business with petitioner for quite a while, also testified that she knew
admitted his close relationship with Tiu Huy Tiac when he said that
they are like brothers There was thus no reason for anybody
especially those transacting business with petitioner to even doubt
the authority of Tiac as his manager in the Binondo branch.
Tiac, therefore, by petitioners own representations and
manifestations, became an agent of petitioner by estoppel, an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon (Article 1431, Civil Code of the Philippines). A party
cannot be allowed to go back on his own acts and representations to
the prejudice of the other party who, in good faith, relied upon them.
Taken in this light,. petitioner is liable for the transaction entered into
by Tiac on his behalf. Thus, even when the agent has exceeded his
authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former
allowed the latter to fact as though he had full powers (Article 1911
Civil Code), as in the case at bar.
Finally, although it may appear that Tiac defrauded his principal
(petitioner) in not turning over the proceeds of the transaction to the
latter, such fact cannot in any way relieve nor exonerate petitioner of
his liability to private respondent. For it is an equitable maxim that as
between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the
wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss
ALMARIO VS CA
]This appeal by certiorari seeks to set aside the resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated November 21, 1996[1] and of January 7,
1997,[2] in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, which denied the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
instituted by petitioner against the Hon. Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 139, Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC),
and the People of the Philippines.[3] Involved in said petition were the
orders of Judge Jaime D. Discaya and Judge Tuason dated October
25, 1995[4] and April 11, 1996,[5] respectively, issued in Criminal
Cases Nos. 91-6761-62 which petitioner claimed were violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy but which respondent
appellate court upheld.
The factual antecedents in these cases, as culled by the Court
of Appeals, are as follows:
Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for
estafa thru falsification of public document, and Criminal Case No.
91-6762, for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in
both cases.
The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioners
arraignment on March 18, 1992, pre-trial was held, which was
terminated on October 21, 1994. Thereafter, the cases were
scheduled for continuous trial in December 1994, and in January and
February 1995, but the hearings were cancelled because the
Presiding Judge of the court was elevated to this Court and no trial
judge was immediately appointed/detailed thereto.
The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of
notice to all the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17,
1995, upon request of private prosecutor, and without objection on
the part of petitioners counsel, postponed to July 24, 1995. However,
for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioners three co-
accused, the hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled
and the cases were reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995.
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On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite
due notice. Hence, upon motion of petitioners counsel, respondent
court issued the following order:
When this case was called for hearing, private complainant is not in
Court despite notice. Atty. Alabastro, counsel for accused Roberto
Almario, moved that the case against the latter be dismissed for
failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a
speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, the case against accused Roberto Almario is hereby
dismissed. With respect to accused Spouses Susencio and
Guillerma Cruz and Dante Duldulao, 1st warrant be issued for their
arrest.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of
petitioner, respondent court in its Order dated October 25, 1995,
reconsidered the Order of September 8, 1995. The pertinent portion
of said order reads as follows:
In Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21, 1993)
the Supreme Court held that the right of the accused to a speedy trial
is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by
vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed
to (e) lapse without the party having his case tried. At least this right
is relative, taking into (the) account the circumstances of each case.
There has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or
unjustified postponements of the trial, or a long time is allowed to (e)
lapse without the party having his case tried which would constitute,
according to the above case, violation of the right of the accused to
speedy trial. After arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was set
and the same was ordered terminated on October 25, 1994. On June
21, 1995, the case was set for initial presentation of evidence of the
proof of service of the notices to the accused and their respective
counsels. On July 17, 1995, counsel for the accused did not
interpose objection to private prosecutors motion to postpone due to
absence of witnesses. On July 24, 1995, the trial could not proceed
as, being a joint trial of three criminal cases, the three other accused
were not present. There were only three settings from the date of
termination of the pre-trial for the prosecution to present evidence
and the same were postponed with valid reasons.
The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in
the acquittal of the accused since the right of the accused to speedy
trial has not been violated, and its dismissal having been made upon
the motion of the accused there is no double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated September 8,
1995 dismissing the charge/case against the accused Roberto
Almario is reconsidered and set aside.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above order. Acting on the
Motion for Reconsideration dated November 9, 1995, respondent
Judge issued his assailed Order of April 11, 1996, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration
dated 9 November 1995 is hereby denied for lack of merit
considering that, based on the foregoing facts, the proceedings in
this case have not been prolonged unreasonably nor were there
oppressive delays and unjustified postponements in violation of the
Accuseds constitutional right to speedy trial.
Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction against the presiding judge of Branch 139
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, RCBC and the People of
the Philippines.In a resolution dated November 21, 1996, respondent
appellate court denied the petition due course and dismissed it for
lack of merit. Petitioners motion to reconsider it was likewise denied
for lack of merit in a resolution dated January 7, 1997.
Before us, petitioner maintains that the appellate court erred in
sustaining the trial court which, in turn, had gravely abused its
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it reconsidered the
order which dismissed the criminal cases against him. Petitioner
asserts that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine of double
jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged
violation of petitioners constitutional right to a speedy trial. [7]
The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioners cases, double
jeopardy had set in so that petitioners constitutional right against
such jeopardy had been violated.
Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
xxx
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2)
before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea
has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.[8]
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation
of the right to speedy trial was made upon motion by counsel for
petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the
accused before the trial court, and with his express
consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in
acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his
own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy.However,
this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence
and denial of the right to speedy trial. [9] Double jeopardy may attach
when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in
violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial. [10]
Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in
the conduct of the trial so that violation of the right to speedy trial of
the accused, herein petitioner, resulted. For it must be recalled that in
the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case. [11] Both the trial court and
the appellate court noted that after pre-trial of petitioners case was
terminated on October 21, 1994, continuous trial was set in the
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months of December 1994, and January and February of 1995. The
scheduled hearings, however, were cancelled when the presiding
judge was promoted to the Court of Appeals, and his successor as
trial judge was not immediately appointed, nor another judge detailed
to his sala.
Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed
for lack of proof of notice to the accused and their counsel. The
hearing on July 17, 1995, was postponed upon motion of the private
prosecutor without objection from petitioners counsel. The hearing
set on July 24, 1995 was reset, despite the presence of petitioner
and his counsel, because of lack of proof of service of notice to co-
accused Dante Duldulao and the spouses Susencio and Guillerma
Cruz.[12]
As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial
was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties and of
the trial court. The first and third postponements were clearly justified
on the ground of lack of notice to accused, co-accused, and/or
counsel. Another was made without objection from petitioners
counsel. However, on September 8, 1995, counsel for petitioner
moved for dismissal of this case, because of the absence of the
private prosecutor due to a severe attack of gout and arthritis,
although he had sent his associate lawyer acceptable to the
court.[13] All in all, there were only three re-setting of hearing
dates. Thus, after a closer analysis of these successive events, the
trial court realized that the dates of the hearings were transferred for
valid grounds. Hence, the trial court set aside its initial order and
reinstated the cases against petitioner,[14] which order the appellate
court later sustained.
That there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is
apparent from the chronology of the hearings with the reasons for
their postponements or transfers. Petitioner could not refute the
appellate courts findings that petitioners right to speedy trial had not
been violated. As both the trial and appellate courts have taken pains
to demonstrate, there was no unreasonable, vexatious and
oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no violation of
petitioners right to speedy trial as there were no unjustified
postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable
lengths of time.[15]
There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no
postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur with the conclusion
reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioners right to speedy trial
had not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial
had not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial
order of dismissal.
It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right
against double jeopardy when that order was reconsidered
seasonably.[16] For as petitioners right to speedy trial was not
transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy
that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused was not met. The trial courts initial order of dismissal was
upon motion of petitioners counsel, hence made with the express
consent of petitioner. That being the case, despite the
reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did not attach. As this
Court had occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal, (244 SCRA 202)
reiterated in People vs. Leviste,[17] where we overturned an order of
dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the
dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent
to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for
the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these
dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to
speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench
considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial
has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus not in
error when they allowed reinstatement of the cases against
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. SP-42312, dated November 21, 1996 and January 7, 1997,
which upheld the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
139, in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-62, are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
MANANTAN VS CA
FACTS:
In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National Highway of
Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, George Manantan was driving a Toyota
car going home. At that time, he was with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel
Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas. Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the
opposite direction hit the driver side of the car, driven by Manantan.
Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured while
Nicolas died. Trial followed.
The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide. The respondents filed their notice
of appeal on the civil aspect of the lower courts judgment. Even if the
accused was acquitted from his criminal liability, the Appellate Court
held him civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved
party for the death of Nicolas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil
liability.
RULING:
The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that a civil liability is
not extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore, the accused cannot be
exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by
preponderance of evidence.
Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the
courts did not give merit to this contention. The following elements
must be present for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) The first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense
as the first.
In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was
terminated by his discharge. When the case was elevated to the
Court of Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Thus, there could be no double jeopardy.
PEOPLE VS FELICIANO
From being the subject of moral condemnation, the Kiss of
Judas appears to attain a different dimension in criminal
procedure. Indeed, by entering into an "unholy" contract with an
accused, so that the latter might betray his partner in crime in
exchange for an acquittal, the State demonstrates how far its efforts
3|Page
could go to vindicate crime. That the State should agree to become a
party to setting up a premium on "treachery," and that it should
reward conduct from which an honorable man would ordinarily recoil
with aversion, paradoxically illustrates the perceived necessity of
such kind of an arrangement in criminal procedure. [1] It is this
doggedness of purpose on the part of the State which herein
accused-appellant, in one of his assignment of errors, decries -
The trial court [has] erred in discharging accused Rodel de la Cruz to
be the state witness against co-accused Carlos Feliciano despite
strong objections from the defense.[2]
The accused-appellant, Carlos Feliciano, was a security guard
detailed by the Atlantic Security Agency at the Kingsmen building,
also popularly known in the small community as the hub of four disco
pubs located on four floors of the edifice, in Kalibo, Aklan. He was
assigned to the "Superstar" disco pub and his duties ranged from
refusing entry to dubious characters to making certain that no
customer would leave without first paying his bill. Rodel de la Cruz, a
security guard from another agency, the Rheaza Security Agency,
was stationed at the parking lot of the same building. In keeping with
the nocturnal business hours of the establishments at Kingsmen, the
two security guards would report for duty at 7:00 in the evening until
the wee hours of the next morning or when the last customer would
have by then left the premises. In the early morning of 05 June 1995,
Feliciano and de la Cruz centrally figured in the investigation over the
grisly death of an unidentified woman whose body was found
sprawled in Barangay New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan.
Finding a dead body at 5:30 in the morning in nearby Barangay
Buswang was big news to the small community of Kalibo. The radio
news about an unidentified lifeless female lying in the Sampaton
Funeral Parlor caught the curiosity of Rosalie Ricarto. The dead
woman, so described as wearing a red jacket emblazoned with the
words "El-Hassan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" and maong pants, fit
the description of Teresita Fuentes. Rosalie, a rice retailer, shared a
stall with Teresita, a vendor of spices, condiments and fruits, at the
Yambing Building. Rosalie last saw Teresita on the afternoon of 04
June 1995. Teresita, who regularly went to Iloilo twice a week to buy
goods to sell, was scheduled to leave the following morning of 05
June 1995. According to Rosalie, Teresita, who normally would take
the 2:00 a.m. trip to Iloilo, should already be back at Kalibo by about
4:00 p.m. of the same day. But Teresita did not return that
afternoon. Rosalie said that Teresita wore pieces of jewelry - a
necklace, a pair of earrings, a bracelet, four rings and a Seiko
wristwatch - all of which, except for the timepiece, were eventually
recovered. Anna Liza Pronton Fuentes, the daughter of Teresita, was
able to identify the bag recovered by Myca Banson from the crime
scene, as well as all its contents, to be those belonging to her
mother. Likewise, recovered at the crime scene were twelve P100.00
bills, seven P5.00 bills and the broken windshield of the tricycle
owned by Ruben Barte. Turned over to the police by the manager of
the Superstar Disco Club was the sum of P1,000.00.
The autopsy report showed that whoever bludgeoned the
hapless Teresita Fuentes to death had used a blunt instrument,
inflicting twelve different wounds on her head and face. The cause of
death was noted to be severe hemorrhage secondary to lacerated
wounds and skull fracture.
On 02 August 1995, an Information was filed against Rodel de
la Cruz and Carlos Feliciano -
"That on or about the 5th day of June 1995, in the early morning, in
Barangay New Buswang, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, while
armed with a handgun, by means of force and violence, and with
intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, rob and
carry away cash money in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00), Philippine currency, more or less, belonging to
TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO, to the damage and prejudice of
the owner in the aforesaid amount; that by reason or in the occasion
of said robbery, and for the purpose of enabling the accused to take,
steal and carry away the aforesaid amount, the above-named
accused with intent to kill and conspiring with one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident
premeditation and under the cover of darkness, treacherously attack,
assault and wound TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO, thereby
inflicting upon her mortal wounds, to wit:
1. Lacerated wound about 1 inches in length left chin.
2. Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left lower lip.
3. Fracture of the left mandible.
4. Fracture of the left upper lateral incisor and the left
upper canine.
5. Lacerated wound about 1 inches in length and about 1
in depth left face.
6. Punctured wound in diameter and about 1 inches in
depth mid-portion base nose bridge left.
7. Lacerated wound about 2 inches in length and about 1
inches in depth left cheek.
8. Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left ear
medially.
9. Lacerated wound about inch in length left face near the
left ear.
10. Lacerated wound about 1 in length below the left
eyebrow.
11.Punctured wound about 1 inch in diameter and about
5 inches in depth left parietal
12.Skull fracture occiput right.
"as per autopsy report of Dr. Agrelita D. Fernandez, of the
Rural Health Unit, Kalibo, Aklan, hereto attached and forming
an integral part hereof which wounds directly caused the death
of said TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO.
"That as a result of the criminal acts of the accused, the heirs of the
victim suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS."[3]
The prosecution sought the discharge of accused Rodel de la
Cruz so that the latter could testify against his co-accused Carlos
Feliciano. Pending resolution by the trial court on the motion, Carlos
Feliciano and Rodel de la Cruz were arraigned on 08 February
1996. The two accused entered a plea of not guilty. On 18 June
1996, the court a quo granted the motion of the prosecution and the
name of Rodel de la Cruz, an accused turned state witness, was
forthwith stricken off from the Information. [4]
A detailed account of the incident presented at the trial by the
prosecution was narrated by the Office of the Solicitor General.
"In the early morning of June 5, 1995, before 2 o'clock, appellant
went to the guard post of Dela Cruz to tell the latter to assist him in
going after a customer who did not pay the bill. It was not the first
time that they had to run after a non-paying customer. Dela Cruz thus
accompanied appellant who rented for the purpose a tricycle from its
4|Page
driver, Ruben Barte, who stayed behind. Appellant initially drove but
about twenty meters past Kingsmen Building, he asked Dela Cruz to
take over while he stayed inside the passenger sidecar of the
tricycle. Somewhere between the Ceres and Libacao terminals,
appellant alighted from the tricycle after instructing Dela Cruz to stop
and wait for him. Appellant subsequently informed Dela Cruz that
they shall wait there for the customer they were after. About a half
hour later, however, appellant decided to leave the place, apparently
because the person he was looking for was nowhere in sight. As they
passed Banga, New Washington crossing, they saw a woman
walking alone.Appellant waved at her, giving Dela Cruz the
impression that they knew each other. Dela Cruz stopped the
vehicle, as he was told by appellant, who then jumped out. Drawing
his service gun, appellant suddenly held the woman by the neck and
at the same time poked his gun at her face. He dragged her towards
the tricycle and ordered her to board it. The woman would later be
identified as Teresita Fuentes. Dela Cruz was shocked with what
appellant did and was at a loss on what to do. Still stricken with
panic, Dela Cruz asked appellant what was going on and said he
was leaving as he did not want to be part of whatever plans appellant
had. Appellant retorted that Dela Cruz was already involved. Dela
Cruz was about to alight from the tricycle when appellant poked his
gun at him and ordered him to drive. Thinking that appellant was in a
position to easily shoot him, Dela Cruz did as he was ordered.
"Appellant then instructed Dela Cruz to drive back to the public
market. When they reached the junction of Toting Reyes and Roxas
Avenues, appellant told Dela Cruz to turn right at Rizal Memorial
College of Arts and Trade (RMCAT). They noticed at this point that
another tricycle, which came from the direction of Kingsmen Building,
was following them. This prompted appellant to order Dela Cruz to
turn left at Magdalena Village instead and to drive faster. During the
ride, appellant held Fuentes, who was crouching, by her hair,
pressing her head down. He also kicked her and struck her head with
the butt of his gun whenever she struggled. Dela Cruz asked
appellant to stop hurting Fuentes and to have pity but his entreaties
fell on deaf ears. Appellant even threatened to shoot Dela Cruz if he
does not stop complaining.
"When they reached New Buswang, they noticed that the other
tricycle they saw earlier was still trailing them by about 15 meters. As
they approached Magdalena Village after passing Camp Martelino,
Fuentes struggled so appellant hit her again. Dela Cruz told appellant
to desist from striking her. Appellant did not take kindly to the
unsolicited advice and fired his gun in the air. Seeing an opportunity
for escape, Dela Cruz suddenly swerved the tricycle towards
Magdalena Village until the vehicle toppled over. When the tricycle
was lifted from its fallen state, Dela Cruz immediately jumped out of it
and ran towards a feeder road leading to the Cooperative Rural
Bank. He was resting at the back of the bank for a few minutes when
appellant also arrived. Enraged, Dela Cruz this time drew his service
firearm and aimed it at appellant, demanding from the latter an
explanation why he had to involve him (Dela Cruz). With an
assurance that he would own up the responsibility for everything that
had happened, appellant was able to calm Dela Cruz down. After
returning his service gun to the holster, Dela Cruz headed back to
the road. Behind him following was appellant. Then, they saw Barte,
from whom appellant rented the tricycle earlier, trying to start the
engine thereof. It turned out that it was Barte who was in the other
tricycle, driven by Ramon Yael. Appellant assured Barte that he will
pay for all the damages of the rented tricycle.
"Meanwhile, Dela Cruz went back to Kingsmen Building aboard
Yael's tricycle to look for his dancer girlfriend, Myka (or Mika) Banzon
(or Vanson), but she was not there. Dela Cruz, with Yael in his
tricycle, were about to go to Banzon's boarding house when
appellant approached them, insisting that Yael take him first to
Magdalena Village. Afraid of appellant, Yael agreed. When they got
there, particularly where Barte's tricycle turned over earlier, appellant
walked towards a mango tree. Curious, Dela Cruz followed him. Dela
Cruz saw appellant hitting Fuentes on the head with his gun.She was
lying down face up, groaning. Dela Cruz admonished and pushed
appellant away, telling him to have pity on Fuentes. Since he did not
want to get involved further nor did he want to see any more of what
appellant was up to, Dela Cruz walked back to the tricycle. He took a
last look back and saw appellant getting something from the pocket
of Fuentes and putting it inside the pocket of his chaleco. Soon
enough, appellant caught up with Dela Cruz and Yael as they were
about to leave and they all went back to Kingsmen Building.
"Dela Cruz finally found Banzon at the third floor of the building and
informed her that he was going to bring her home already. She
passed by the ladies' room while he stood watch outside. Appellant
arrived and told Dela Cruz and Banzon that they had to talk inside
the ladies' room. He was giving Dela Cruz and Banzon P600.00
each, but they declined to accept the money. Appellant threatened
Dela Cruz not to squeal whatever he knows or appellant will kill him
and his family. When appellant insisted in giving the money, Dela
Cruz took it only to place it on the sink, then, he and Banzon left.
"Dela Cruz and Banzon were leaving for her boarding house aboard
Yael's tricycle when appellant caught up with them again and
ordered Yael to first take him to Ceres terminal. As they passed the
Tumbokan Memorial Hospital, they came across Barte driving his
tricycle. After signaling for Barte to stop, appellant gave him
money. Dela Cruz and Banzon quickly transferred to Barte's tricycle
since Yael still had to take appellant to the terminal. In the course of
the transfer to the other tricycle, appellant placed something inside
the pocket of Dela Cruz who thought nothing of it as he was in a
hurry to go home. In Banzon's boarding house, Dela Cruz found out
that what appellant had put in his pocket was a blood-stained
necklace wrapped in a piece of paper. Banzon also showed him a
bag she found at the place where Barte's tricycle turned turtle. Dela
Cruz planned to return the necklace and the bag the next day.
"In the evening of June 5, 1995, Dela Cruz reported for
work. Appellant asked him for the necklace so that he could pawn
it. Dela Cruz, however, was unable to give the necklace back
because in the morning of June 6, 1995, the police raided the
boarding house of Banzon. Among those confiscated by the police
was his wallet where he placed the necklace. The police invited Dela
Cruz to the police station to shed light on what he knew about a
murder committed in Magdalena Village. The police had earlier
confirmed an anonymous call that a dead woman was found at New
Buswang. Twelve 100-peso bills were found at the scene, as well as
a broken windshield that was traced to the tricycle rented by Barte to
appellant.The dead person was identified as Fuentes by her
daughter, Analiza Fuentes Pronton. Thus, Dela Cruz revealed
everything that appellant had done.The police asked Dela Cruz to go
with them to Lalab, Bataan where appellant was arrested. Appellant
was then brought to the Kalibo Police Station for investigation." [5]
Carlos Feliciano, in his testimony, denied the asseverations of
state witness de la Cruz. He claimed that the accusations were
motivated out of pure spite and revenge borne of the hostility
between them due to work-related differences. An altercation arose
between him and de la Cruz two months before the incident, on 06
April 1995, when a customer had complained to the Kingsmen
Building manager that the toolbox of his tricycle, parked near the
building, was missing. The manager then ordered Feliciano to go to
the parking lot and summon de la Cruz. Feliciano reported back to
say that he did not find de la Cruz in his designated post, a fact that
de la Cruz later resented. The next incident happened the following
month. On the evening of 01 May 1995, Myca Banson, the live-in
girlfriend of de la Cruz, was to be "taken out" by a
customer. Feliciano, upon orders of the management, refused de la
Cruz entry within the premises of the pub house, in order to avoid
any possible trouble, which culminated in a physical tussle between
5|Page
the two men and ended with de la Cruz aiming his gun at
Feliciano. The third incident occurred when a motorcycle parked at
the Kingsmen parking lot could not be located and de la Cruz again
was not at his post. Feliciano reported the matter to the manager
and, two days later, de la Cruz was fired from work. Feliciano
admitted having seen de la Cruz at about 9:30 on the evening of 04
June 1995 escorting Myca Banson to the pubhouse. De la Cruz
stayed at the billiard house fronting Kingsmen, while waiting for Myca
to finish work, often at 4:00 in the early morning of the next
day. Feliciano said that he knew Ramon Barte, the driver, being a
habitue of the Kingsmen premises. It was Barte who would often
fetch Rodel de la Cruz and Myca Banson from work during early
mornings.
The defense placed at the stand two additional
witnesses. Eduardo Magsangya, a cigarette vendor at the Ceres
terminal, testified that on the late evening of 04 June 1995, de la
Cruz went to see him at the Ceres Terminal to inquire whether
Teresita Fuentes had already arrived. Magsangya responded in the
negative. De la Cruz returned to the terminal looking for Teresita four
times that night. Magsangya knew Teresita as being a biweekly
passenger of the 2:00 a.m. bus for Iloilo and de la Cruz as a security
guard at Kingsmen where he would at times sell his wares. Jefferson
Arafol, a pahinante of Ideal Trucking, testified that at approximately
2:30 on the early morning of 05 June 1995, he and truck driver Oca,
were transporting coconut lumber to Iloilo, when, at the vicinity of
Magdalena Village, they spotted a tricycle running at high speed,
eventually overtaking them. Its fast pace caused the vehicle to turn
turtle. When Arafol approached, the tricycle driver, Rodel de la Cruz,
pointed a gun at him and told him not to come any closer. Arafol was
acquainted with Rodel de la Cruz and Carlos Feliciano because he
frequented Kingsmen on Sundays after getting his
salary. The pahinante saw two more persons with de la Cruz, one
male and the other female. Arafol was certain that the male
companion of de la Cruz was not Carlos Feliciano. While de la Cruz
was pointing his gun at him, his male companion was dragging an
unidentified woman towards the nearby mango tree.
When the trial concluded, the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo,
Aklan, found for the prosecution and pronounced accused Carlos
Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the extreme penalty of
death -
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused CARLOS FELICIANO Y
MARCELINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct
participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and
penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 x x x, with three
aggravating circumstances, the court hereby imposes upon the said
accused the supreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of
Teresita Fuentes the sum of P50,000.00.
"The caliber .38 revolver Squires Bingham with SN # 14223 (Exhibit
J) used by Feliciano is hereby forfeited and confiscated in favor of
the government to be disposed in accordance with law.
"Costs against the accused."[6]
In an automatic review before this tribunal, appellant Carlos
Feliciano raised the following assignment of errors -
"I.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING THE
ACCUSED RODEL DE LA CRUZ TO BE THE STATE
WITNESS AGAINST CO-ACCUSED CARLOS FELICIANO
DESPITE STRONG OBJECTIONS FROM THE DEFENSE.
"II.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE
WELL-REHEARSED TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
"III.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT CARLOS FELICIANO FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM."[7]
The Court is inclined to agree with appellant that state witness
Rodel de la Cruz appears to be far from being the inculpable young
man who has simply been an unwitting and reluctant accomplice to a
gruesome crime. Several incidents militate against his
innocence. The events, related by him, make tenuous the purported
threat and intimidation exerted by appellant over him.
The behavior of Rodel de la Cruz during and immediately after
the crime could not be that of a threatened, frightened man. If he
indeed wanted to escape, he had in his possession his own service
gun, and he was in control of the tricycle. He had enough advantage
and chances to escape, if he really wanted to, from Feliciano who
was at that time engrossed at restraining a struggling victim. In fact, it
was de la Cruz who was caught in the possession of the dead
womans necklace. Another damning evidence against de la Cruz
was the letter introduced by police inspector Winnie Jereza, Chief of
Intelligence of the Philippine National Police of Kalibo, Aklan, who,
after taking the witness stand for the prosecution, testified for the
defense. The letter, dated 02 June 1995, came from one Roger R.
Zaradulla, proprietor of the Rheaza Security Agency, addressed to
SPO3 Gregorio F. Ingenerio of the Kalibo Police Station, to the effect
that the detail order of Rodel de la Cruz to the Kingsmen Disco pub
had expired as of 31 May 1995. According to Zaradulla, de la Cruz
was nowhere to be found and his whereabouts were
unknown. Apprehensive that de la Cruz had gone on AWOL without
first surrendering to the agency the firearm issued to him, Zaradulla
sought the arrest of de la Cruz by the police.
The evident attempt, nevertheless, of the accused turned state
witness to mitigate his own culpability did not adversely affect his
discharge nor did it render completely weightless the evidentiary
value of his testimony.
The rules of procedure allowing the discharge of an accused to
instead be a witness for the state[8] is not a home grown innovation
but is one with a long and interesting history. It has its origins in the
common law of ancient England where faithful performance of such
an agreement with the Crown could entitle a criminal offender to an
equitable right to a recommendation for executive clemency. The
practice, soon recognized through widespread statutory enactments
in other jurisdictions, finally has found its way to our own criminal
procedure in a short and compact military General Order No. 58
issued in 1900. Its adoption highlights the emphasis placed by the
new system on the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused,
on the requirement that the State must first establish its case beyond
a reasonable doubt before an accused can be called upon to defend
himself, and on the proscription against compelling an accused to be
a witness against himself as well as against drawing inferences of
guilt from his silence.[9] Underlying the rule is the deep-lying intent of
the State not to let a crime that has been committed go unpunished
by allowing an accused who appears not to be the most guilty to
testify, in exchange for an outright acquittal, against a more guilty co-
accused. It is aimed at achieving the greater purpose of securing the
conviction of the most guilty and the greatest number among the
accused for an offense committed.[10]
6|Page
 In this jurisdiction, it is the trial court judge who has the
exclusive responsibility of ensuring that the conditions prescribed by
the rules exist.[11]This grant is not one of arbitrary discretion but
rather a sound judicial prerogative to be exercised with due regard to
the proper and correct dispensation of criminal justice. [12] But that
there would be the possibility of error on the part of the judge is
understandable. A trial judge cannot be expected or required to
inform himself with absolute certainty at the outset of the trial as to
everything which may develop in the course of the trial in regard to
the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime
charged in the complaint.[13] If that were possible, the judge would
conveniently rely on large part upon the suggestion and the
information furnished by the prosecuting officer in coming to the
conclusion as to the "necessity for the testimony" of the accused
whose discharge is requested, as to the "availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence," and as to who among the accused is the
"most guilty," and so the like.[14] Then, there would be little need for
the formality of a trial.[15] Thus, here, even while one might be
convinced that state witness Rodel de la Cruz would, on the basis of
evidence ultimately submitted, appear to be equally as, and not less
than, guilty in conspiracy with appellant Carlos Feliciano, the hands
of the State are now stayed and the Court must assure the
exemption of the witness from punishment.
It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to
become a state witness has the same effect as an acquittal. The
impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the
competency and quality of the testimony, nor would it have the
consequence of withdrawing his immunity from prosecution. [16] A
discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already
attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution
would be tantamount to the state reneging on its part of the
agreement and unconstitutionally placing the state witness in double
jeopardy.The rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In an instance
where the discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain
and refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit of his
discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the
same offense.
In US vs. de Guzman,[17] one of the earlier cases discussing
this issue, Justice Carson had occasion to briefly touch on the
immunity clauses in the Acts of the United States Congress and
some States. In Wisconsin, the immunity clause contained
a proviso providing that persons committing perjury when called upon
to testify could be punished therefor. [18] Oklahoma law suffered from
the absence of any reservation; thus observed Justice Carson
"x x x. We have no such reservation in our constitutional provision;
and, as before said, if we should follow the precedents, when the
witness does not speak the truth, the State would be left without
redress, although the witness had violated the purpose and spirit of
the constitution. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of the
intelligent and justice-loving people of Oklahoma, when they voted
for the adoption of the constitution, to grant immunity to any man,
based upon a lie, or, in other words, that they intended that the
commission of perjury should atone for an offense already
committed. It is a familiar rule of common law, common sense, and
common justice that a legal right cannot be based upon fraud. We
therefore hold that the witness who claims immunity on account of
self-incriminatory testimony which he had been compelled to give
must act in good faith with the State, and must make truthful replies
to the questions which are propounded to him, and which he had
been compelled to answer, and that any material concealment or
suppression of the truth on his part will deprive him of the immunity
provided by the constitution; and the witness must testify to
something which, if true, would tend to criminate him. This immunity
is only granted to those who earn it by testifying in good faith. In our
judgment any other construction would be an insult to and a libel
upon the intelligence of the people of Oklahoma, an outrage on law,
and a prostitution of justice."[19]
Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own participation
in the crime, state witness de la Cruz, nevertheless, did not renege
from his agreement to give a good account of the crime, enough to
indeed substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now appellant
Carlos Feliciano, by the trial court. On significant points, the
damaging testimony of de la Cruz against appellant was
corroborated by Ruben Barte and Ramon Yael. On the night of the
incident, Feliciano hired his vehicle and drove it himself while De la
Cruz was seated on its passenger seat. When the two did not return
at the appointed time, Barte asked Ramon Yael, another tricycle
driver who happened to be at the Kingsmen parking area, to
accompany him to look for them. Myca Banson decided to come with
them. After a while, the trio spotted Bartes tricycle being driven by de
la Cruz, and followed it. Barte testified how the first tricycle turned
turtle at the junction towards Magdalena Village. When the tricycle
tilted, he saw a person in red falling from the vehicle, while another
person who was in white, lifted the first person. When the first tricycle
precariously lurched, its occupants hurriedly abandoned the
vehicle. The obfuscating foliage, however, blocked his view so Barte
was not able to identify who was with appellant and de la Cruz nor
ascertain where the two men were later headed. When the three of
them approached the overturned tricycle they found no one. Near the
vehicle, they saw an abandoned bag which Myca Banson hastily
retrieved. While Barte struggled to turn his vehicle upright, Myca left
with Ramon Yael. Later, while riding his vehicle on his way back,
Ruben Barte was forced to stop because its engine stalled. While
inspecting the tricycle engine, appellant and de la Cruz approached
him, and the former told him not to worry as he would pay for the
damages. After a while, at the parking lot of the Kingsmen Building,
appellant told him to take his vehicle to a dark place where he wiped
off the blood from the tricycles seats. When they met again several
hours later, appellant gave him P450.00 for the damages sustained
by the vehicle. Much later, Yael handed him another P250.00 given
by appellant as additional payment. Ruben Barte kept quiet about the
incident because appellant warned him against reporting the matter
to anyone. Ramon Yael corroborated the testimony of Barte, adding
that while they were chasing appellant and de la Cruz, one of the two
fired a gun in the air, constraining them to decrease their
speed. Militating against the unbiased nature of the testimony of
these two witnesses was their admission of having willingly accepted
the blood money which appellant gave them that could well qualify
them as being themselves accessories to the crime.[20]
Appellant Carlos Feliciano was not able to sufficiently dispute
his participation therein. Neither his blanket denial nor his alibi, both
inherently weak defenses, was amply proved.
Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, provides -
"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death [shall be imposed],
when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson." (Italics
supplied.)
Given the evidence in this case, heretofore narrated, the Court
is not convinced that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing
beyond reasonable doubt any of the aggravating circumstances
alleged in the information that can warrant the imposition of the
maximum of the penalty prescribed by law. Evidence is wanting that
appellant has especially sought nighttime to perpetrate the crime or
that the criminal act has been preceded, required in evident
premeditation, by cool thought and reflection. Not only is treachery
an aggravating circumstance merely applicable to crimes against
persons but neither also has the mode of attack on the victim of the
robbery been shown to have been consciously adopted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED
except insofar as it imposed on appellant Carlos Feliciano the
7|Page
penalty of death which is hereby reduced to reclusion
perpetua. Costs de oficio.
MERCIALES VS CA
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 37341, denying her petition to annul
the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8, [2] in
Criminal Case Nos. 6307-6312, which dismissed the charge of rape
with homicide based on a demurrer to evidence filed by private
respondents, accused therein.
The antecedent facts as succinctly synthesized by the
respondent court are as follows:
On August 12, 1993, Criminal Case Nos. 6307, 6308, 6309, 6310,
6311, and 6312, for rape with homicide, in connection with the death
of one Maritess Ricafort Merciales, were filed against the private
respondents, Joselito Nuada, Pat. Edwin Moral, Adonis Nieves,
Ernesto Lobete, Domil Grageda and Ramon "Pol" Flores, before the
Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Legaspi City. The said
cases were consolidated in Branch 8, presided over by the
respondent judge.
During the trial, after presenting seven witnesses, the public
prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of accused Joselito
Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a state witness. However,
the prosecution contended that it was not required to present
evidence to warrant the discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter
had already been admitted into the Witness Protection Program of
the Department of Justice. Consequently, the respondent judge
denied the motion for discharge, for failure of the prosecution to
present evidence as provided for by Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
On December 22, 1993, the prosecution filed a petition[3] for certiorari
[G.R. No. 113273-78] before the Supreme Court, questioning the
respondent judge's denial of the motion to discharge the accused
Nuada. Despite the fact that the petition did not contain a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, the trial judge did not set the case for
further hearing so as to give the prosecution time to secure such
temporary restraining order from the Supreme Court.
On July 13, 1994, herein private respondents filed a motion to set the
case for hearing, invoking their constitutional right to speedy
trial. The respondent judge granted the motion, and set the case for
hearing on July 29, 1994.
On the said date, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,
instead of presenting further evidence. The respondent Judge
postponed the hearing and reset the same for August 9, 1994.
On August 9, 1994, again the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration, invoking its pending petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court. The private respondents, thru counsel, objected to
any further resetting as this would constitute a violation of their right
to a speedy trial. The respondent judge called for a recess so as to
let the prosecution decide whether or not to present an NBI agent,
who was then present, to prove the due execution of the accused
Nuada's extrajudicial confession.
However, after the recess, the public prosecutor declined to present
the NBI agent, and instead manifested that he was not presenting
any further evidence. The defense then moved that the cases be
deemed submitted for decision, and asked leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence.
On August 29, 1994, the Solicitor General filed [in G.R. No. 113273-
78] a motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court, to enjoin the
respondent judge from proceeding with the resolution of the
case. However, on September 19, 1994, the motion was denied by
the Supreme Court.
In due time, the accused filed their demurrer to evidence x x x. [4]
On October 21, 1994, the trial court issued the assailed Order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
For lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, all the accused in all these cases are
hereby ACQUITTED and the cases filed against them are hereby
DISMISSED. The accused in all these cases, being detention
prisoners, are hereby ordered RELEASED from detention, unless
they are being detained for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the victim in
the said criminal cases, filed before the respondent Court of Appeals
a petition to annul the foregoing Order of the trial court. However, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on October 4, 1995.
A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 6,
1996. Hence, the instant petition based on the ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED TO
NULLIFY THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 21, 1994 OF
THE TRIAL COURT FOR BEING NULL AND VOID ON
THE GROUND THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE TOLERATED
AND/OR COMMITTED INJUSTICE BY FAILING TO
REQUIRE THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT ALL
THEIR EVIDENCE INSTEAD OF SUPPRESSING THEM
APPARENTLY TO FAVOR THE ACCUSED IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
THE PEOPLE TO DUE PROCESS, OUSTING THE
TRIAL COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION.[6]
The case was set for oral argument on December 11,
2001. Counsel for petitioner and the Solicitor General
appeared. During the oral argument, the Solicitor General manifested
that he was joining the cause of petitioner in order to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. The Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda in amplification of the points raised during the
oral argument.
Petitioner maintains that the reopening of the criminal case will
not violate the accuseds right to double jeopardy. More particularly,
she ascribes prosecutorial and judicial misconduct in the undue
haste which attended the prosecutions premature resting and the trial
courts grant of the demurrer to evidence when the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution has not been completed.
Private respondent Ramon Flores filed his Memorandum,
arguing that petitioner, being the private complainant in the criminal
case below, has no legal standing to appeal the acquittal of private
respondents; that there was no extrinsic fraud, abuse of discretion or
jurisdictional defect to warrant either a petition for annulment of
judgment or certiorari; and that the reopening of the criminal case will
violate the accuseds right against double jeopardy.
It is true that a private complainant cannot bring an action
questioning a judgment of acquittal, except insofar as the civil aspect
of the criminal case is concerned.[7] In the case at bar, we agree with
8|Page
petitioner that this issue was rendered moot when the Solicitor
General, in representation of the People, changed his position and
joined the cause of petitioner, thus fulfilling the requirement that all
criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor.[8]
In any event, petitioner has an interest in the maintenance of
the criminal prosecution, being the mother of the deceased rape
victim. The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial
court which deprives them of due process has always been
recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any
adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double
jeopardy.[9]
The criminal case below was for rape with homicide. Although
the public prosecutor presented seven witnesses, none of these
actually saw the commission of the crime. It was only Joselito Nuada,
one of the accused, who came forward and expressed willingness to
turn state witness. His testimony was vital for the prosecution, as it
would provide the only eyewitness account of the accuseds
complicity in the crime. The trial court required the public prosecutor
to present evidence to justify Nuadas discharge as a state witness,
but the latter insisted that there was no need for such proof since
Nuada had already been admitted into the Witness Protection
Program of the Department of Justice. The public prosecutors
obstinate refusal to present the required evidence prompted the trial
court to deny the motion to discharge Nuada.
The prosecution elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on a
petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, the accused moved to set the case
for hearing, invoking their constitutional right to speedy trial. The trial
court granted the motion. The public prosecutor moved for a
continuance, and the trial court acceded. At the next scheduled
hearing, however, the trial court denied a similar motion by the
prosecution in view of the objection of the accused. The trial court
directed the public prosecutor to present Atty. Carlos S. Caabay, the
NBI Agent who took Nuada's extrajudicial confession. At the
resumption of the hearing, the public prosecutor declared that he was
resting the prosecutions case, knowing fully well that the evidence he
has presented was not sufficient to convict the
accused. Consequently, the ensuing demurrer to evidence filed by
the accused was granted by the trial court.
It is clear from the foregoing that the public prosecutor was
guilty of serious nonfeasance. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to
bring the criminal proceedings for the punishment of the
guilty.[10] Concomitant with this is the duty to pursue the prosecution
of a criminal action and to represent the public interest. A crime is an
offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of
the People of the Philippines. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule 110
provides that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the fiscal x x x. As the representative of the State, the public
prosecutor has the right and the duty to take all steps to protect the
rights of the People in the trial of an accused. [11] If the public
prosecutor commits a nonfeasance in refusing to perform a specific
duty imposed on him by law, he can be compelled by an action
for mandamus.[12]
In the case at bar, the public prosecutor knew that he had not
presented sufficient evidence to convict the accused. Yet, despite
repeated moves by the accused for the trial court to continue hearing
the case, he deliberately failed to present an available witness and
thereby allowed the court to declare that the prosecution has rested
its case. In this sense, he was remiss in his duty to protect the
interest of the offended parties. More specifically, the public
prosecutor in this case was guilty of blatant error and abuse of
discretion, thereby causing prejudice to the offended party. Indeed,
the family of the deceased victim, Maritess Merciales, could do
nothing during the proceedings, having entrusted the conduct of the
case in the hands of the said prosecutor. All they could do was
helplessly watch as the public prosecutor, who was under legal
obligation to pursue the action on their behalf, renege on that
obligation and refuse to perform his sworn duty.
Indeed, Rule 119, Section 9 (now Section 17) of the Rules of
Court expressly requires the presentation of evidence in support of
the prosecutions prayer for the discharge of an accused to be a state
witness, viz:
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission
of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the
state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge, xxx xxx xxx.
By refusing to comply with the trial courts order to present
evidence, the public prosecutor grossly violated the above-quoted
rule. Moreover, the public prosecutor violated his bounden duty to
protect the interest of the offended party, at least insofar as the
criminal aspect is concerned. After the trial court denied his motion to
discharge Nuada as a state witness, he should have proceeded to
complete the evidence of the prosecution by other means. Instead,
he willfully and deliberately refused to present an available
witness, i.e., the NBI Agent who was present in court on that date
and time. The public prosecutor was duty-bound to exhaust all
available proofs to establish the guilt of the accused and bring them
to justice for their offense against the injured party.
Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial
court. Notwithstanding its knowledge that the evidence for the
prosecution was insufficient to convict, especially after the public
prosecutor tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state witness,
the trial court passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the
case. The trial court was well aware of the nature of the testimonies
of the seven prosecution witnesses that have so far been
presented. Given this circumstance, the trial court, motu
proprio, should have called additional witnesses for the purpose of
questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind with reference to
particular facts or issues involved in the case.[13]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was
deprived of her day in court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more
so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal
cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a
quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null
and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot
constitute a claim for double jeopardy. [14]
By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of the accused
against double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy
attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused
are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3)
the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are
convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent.
Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused
would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very
beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely,
any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation,
necessarily null and void and does not exist. [15]
Otherwise put, the dismissal of the case below was invalid for
lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is, due process.[16] In
rendering the judgment of dismissal, the trial judge in this case acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, for a judgment which is void for
9|Page
lack of due process is equivalent to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.[17] Indeed, jurisdiction is the right to hear and determine,
not to determine without hearing.[18]
Lack of jurisdiction is one of the grounds for the annulment by
the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions of
Regional Trial Courts.[19] Hence, the remedy taken by petitioner
before the Court of Appeals was correct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
37341 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order dismissing
Criminal Case Nos. 6307-6312 is ANNULLED, and this case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8,
for further proceedings. The public prosecutor is ORDERED to
complete the presentation of all available witnesses for the
prosecution.
POTOT VS. PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioner Potot was charged with homicide. Upon
arraignment, he pleaded guilty to thecharge. Thereupon, the trial
court convicted Potot of homicide. The petitioner filed amanifestation
with motion that he is not appealing from the Decision. However, the
wife of thevictim, filed a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying that
the Decision be set aside and thatthe case be heard again because
there were irregularities committed before and during the trialwhich
caused miscarriage of justice. The trial court granted private
complainant's motion andset aside its Decision and ordered that the
records of the case be remanded to the Office of theProvincial
Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the
corresponding charge.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction toissue the order as
the Decision had become final, and that the said order would place
theaccused in double jeopardy. This was denied for the reason that
the State is not bound by theerror or negligence of its prosecuting
officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment has become final that the
accused right against double jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of
the same case.
Ruling:
Affirmative. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the
accused, be modifiedor set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penaltyis imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused haswaived in writing his right to appeal,
or has applied for probation.Only the accused may ask for a
modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. Andthis he
must do before the said judgment becomes final or before he
perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of
the following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed bythe
accused, except in case of automatic review of the decision imposing
the capital penalty; (b)when he has partially or totally served his
sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right toappeal the
judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he
applies
for probation. When one of these circumstances is present, the trial
court which rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to
alter, modify or revoke it.In this case, petitioner filed a manifestation
expressly waiving his right to appeal therefrom.Such waiver has the
effect of causing the judgment to become final and unalterable.
Thus, it
was beyond the authority of the trial court to issue the order setting a
side its Decision which hadattained finality.A judgment which has
acquired the status of finality becomes immutable. Any error,
assumingone was committed in the judgment, will not justify its
amendment except only to correct clericalerrors or
mistakes.The assailed orders would violate the constitutional right of
the petitioner against double jeopardy.
Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a
crime of which hehas previously been acquitted or convicted. The
objective is to set the effects of the
first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall no
t thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge
against him for the same offense.To invoke the defense of double
jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a
validcomplaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the
case; (3) the accused
has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitte
d, or the case against himdismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
PEOPLE VS ASTUDILLO
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 1698, convicting
appellants Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo and Hilario Astudillo
of the crime of Murder; sentencing them to suffer the
penalty reclusion perpetua and ordering them, jointly and severally,
to pay damages to the heirs of the deceased, Silvestre Aquino, Jr.
The Information filed against the appellants reads:
That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30 oclock in the
evening at Zone 7, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and while armed with a sharp-pointed instrument
(unrecovered) did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab one SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR., thereby inflicting multiple stab
wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused his death
and thereafter, the accused rode on an unregistered
motorizedtricycle (recovered) with Municipal Plate No. 7077, which
they used in escaping from the crime scene.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on November 21, 1995, appellants pleaded
not guilty.[3] Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecutions account of the antecedent facts are as
follows: At around 7:00 p.m., of November 12, 1995, brothers
Clarence, Crisanto and Hilario Astudillo, went to house of Alberto
Damian who was celebrating the eve of his birthday. Clarence
greeted Alberto and thereafter asked the victim, Silvestre Aquino,
who was one of the visitors, to go with him. [4] Silvestre acceded and
the two walked towards Floras Store, where they were later joined by
Crisanto and Hilario. While at the store, Crisanto and Silvestre had
an argument.[5]
At around that time, prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel Bareng
and Eduardo Bata, 12 and 11 years of age, respectively, were
selling balut in front of Floras Store. They saw Clarence stab
Silvestre with a bolo while Crisanto and Hilario held him by the
wrists. Clarence delivered several stab blows at the back and on the
chest of the victim until the latter fell to the ground. Thereafter, the
three appellants fled on board a tricycle.[6]
Silvestre was rushed to the Municipal Health Office of
Bangued, Abra, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The
Autopsy Report prepared by Dr. Milagros Cardenas-Burgos revealed
that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds and 1 abrasion, as follows:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
Stab wound 2 cm., Antero-lateral aspect, neck, [r]ight
10 | P a g e
 Stab wound #2, penetrating 3 cm., each. Antero-lateral
aspect, neck, left [2 cm.], penetrating ,
3rd Intercostal space, paresternal area,
left
2 cm., 7th mid axillary line, left
1.5 cm., anterior superior iliac spine, left
1.5 cm., upper outer quadrant, left
1.5 cm., Antero-lateral aspect, middle third
thigh, left
2.0 cm., infrascapular area, left
3.0 cm., dorsolateral aspect, forearm, middle
third, left
2 cm., dorsomidial aspect, forearm, middle
third, left
2.0 cm., suprascapular area, right
1.5 cm., infrascapular area, paravertebral
area, right
1.5 cm., paravertebral area, right
2.5 cm., Level of T8, midscapular area, right
#2, 1.5-2.0 cm., lumbar area, paravertebral
area, right
Abrasion #2 1.0 2.0 cm., Level T7, paravertebral area, left and right
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
Pericardium, 1.5 liter
LW, Right atrium traversing the right
ventricle Hemothorax, left 1 liter
LW, 1.0 cm., posterior lobe, lung left
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardiac Tamponade, secondary to Stab Wound. [7]
On the other hand, the version of the defense is as follows: On
November 12, 1995 at around 7:00 p.m., Clarence passed by the
house of Alberto Damian where Silvestre and several others were
playing cards. Silvestre offered Clarence a glass of gin, which he
declined. Silvestre got embarrassed and cursed him so he decided to
leave the house. However, Silvestre followed him in front of Floras
Store and pushed him twice, causing him to fall on the ground. Then,
Silvestre struck him on the head and arm with an empty one-liter
softdrink bottle.[8]
Hilario arrived and tried to pacify Silvestre but the latter
attacked him. As he retreated, he saw a knife which he then swung
at the victim. Silvestre was hit but continued to attack him. Left with
no choice, Hilario stabbed Silvestre 2 or 3 times. When the latter
collapsed to the ground, Hilario rushed to the succor of his elder
brother, Clarence.[9] Meanwhile, Clarence suffered from shock and
remained seated on the ground while their other brother, Crisanto,
stood on the roadside and called for help. [10] The appellants left the
scene on board a tricycle and proceeded to the house of Clarences
in-laws. On the same night, they surrendered to the Philippine
National Police, stationed at Bangued, Abra.[11]
On March 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting appellants of the crime of Murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength.[12] Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and, assuming that it did, the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not having been alleged
in the information, cannot be appreciated against them. [13] Appellants
motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated July 13,
1998.[14] However, an Amended Decision[15] was rendered where the
phrase abuse of superior strength was replaced with TREACHERY in
the body of the Decision and in the decretal portion thereof, which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep Act No. 7659,
qualified by TREACHERY AND for having conspired together and
helping one another to kill Silvestre Aquino, Jr., with the aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle, [which is] however, offset by
the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and
sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the amount of
P65,288.50 [as] actual damages, P50,000.00 for his death and
suffering plus P500,000.00 [as] moral and exemplary damages and
to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence, appellants interposed the instant appeal, raising the
following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT DID NOT ACQUIT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE
GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF
MURDER.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RENDERED THE SECOND DECISION DATED JULY 10,
1998.
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ALL
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED WHEN IT RULED THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF CONSPIRACY AND
SENTENCED THEM TO A UNIFORM PENALTY.[17]
The resolution of the instant case hinges on the credibility of
the witnesses. The settled rule is that the matter of assigning value to
a declaration on the witness stand is more competently performed by
a trial judge who had the front-line opportunity to personally evaluate
the witnesses demeanor, conduct, and behavior while testifying. In
the absence of a clear showing that some fact or circumstance of
weight or substance had been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied, the trial judges assessment of the witnesses testimonies
shall not be disturbed on appeal.
A careful review of the records of the case at bar shows that
the trial court did not miss any such material circumstance, nor did it
commit any palpable error in upholding the facts as established by
the prosecution. We see no reason to doubt the positive and
straightforward testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Manuel
Bareng and Eduardo Bata, that the appellants ganged up on the
defenseless victim. These witnesses were not shown to have been
impelled by ill-motive to falsely testify against the appellants, hence,
their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. [18]
Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses and their affidavit are too inconsequential
to merit consideration. Specifically, appellants point to the failure of
Eduardo Bata to state in his sworn statement that appellants Crisanto
and Hilario restrained the victim while Clarence stabbed him, as well
as the alleged unfamiliarity of prosecution witness Manny Bareng
with the Ilocano words bagsol and binagsol (which mean stab and
stabbed, respectively), in his sworn statement. Suffice it to state that
inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony
given in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness since an
affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is
generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open
11 | P a g e
court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given
during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in
sworn statements, usually being incomplete and inaccurate for a
variety of reasons, at times because of partial and innocent
suggestions or for want of specific inquiries. Additionally, an
extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the
affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiants statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by
the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses direct
and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to
their extrajudicial statements. This is especially so because their
testimony to the effect that Crisanto and Hilario held the victims
wrists while Clarence stabbed him remained consistent even under
cross-examination.[19]
The trial court correctly rejected the appellants self-defense
theory. When an accused invokes self-defense, he thereby admits
authorship of the crime. The burden of proof is thus shifted on him to
prove all the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused.[20]
In the instant case, even if it was true that the initial act of
aggression came from the deceased, still the appellants plea of self-
defense will not prosper. As stated above, the evidence
overwhelmingly shows that appellants Crisanto and Hilario were able
to restrain the victim by the wrists. At that point, any unlawful
aggression or danger on the lives of the appellants ceased, hence, it
was no longer necessary for appellant Clarence to repeatedly stab
the victim. Verily, their act could no longer be interpreted as an act of
self-preservation but a perverse desire to kill.[21] Furthermore, the
number of wounds sustained by the victim negates self-defense. It
certainly defies reason why the victim sustained a total of 15 wounds
on the different parts of his body if appellants were only defending
themselves. Parenthetically, the number of wounds was eloquently
established by the physical evidence, which is a mute manifestation
of truth and ranks high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. [22]
From the attendant circumstances, it is evident that appellants
collective and individual act of holding the victims wrists and
delivering several stab blows demonstrated the existence of their
common design to kill the victim. Direct proof of an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it
is not necessary. Conspiracy, as in the instant case, can be inferred
from the acts of the three appellants which clearly manifest a
concurrence of wills and a common intent or design to commit a
crime.[23]
Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no merit
in appellants contention that the trial cannot validly appreciate the
same in its amended decision because the attendance of treachery
was not one of the issues raised in their motion for
reconsideration.Otherwise stated, appellants posit that the
reconsideration of the judgment of conviction should be limited only
to the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration, i.e., their guilt
or innocence and/or the propriety of appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was not alleged in
the information.
Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure,[24] a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of
conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the court, with
the consent of the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7, [25] a
judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon
motion of the accused.[26] These provisions changed the previous
rulings[27] of the Court to the effect that such modification may be
made upon motion of the fiscal, provided the same is made before a
judgment has become final or an appeal has been perfected. [28] The
requisite consent of the accused to such motion for reconsideration
or modification is intended to protect the latter from having to defend
himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties which the
prosecution or the court may have overlooked.[29] Accordingly, once
the judgment has been validly promulgated, any reconsideration or
amendment to correct a manifest substantial error, even if unwittingly
committed by the trial court through oversight or an initially erroneous
comprehension, can be made only with the consent or upon the
instance of the accused. Errors in the decision cannot be corrected
unless the accused consents thereto, or himself moves for
reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision. [30]
It must be stressed, however, that the protection against double
jeopardy in the foregoing rules may be waived by the accused.Thus,
when the accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion
for reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be
invoked because the accused waived his right not to be placed
therein by filing such motion.[31] His motion gives the court an
opportunity to rectify its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of
facts and conclusions of law and make them conformable with the
statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to
render.[32] The raison detre is to afford the court a chance to correct
its own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals from being
taken.[33] In effect, a motion for reconsideration or modification filed
by or with consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open
for the review of the trial court without, however, conducting further
proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof.
Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the trial court
which aspects of the judgment of conviction should be
reviewed.Having filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the
court to acquit, or in the alternative, convict them of the lesser
offense of homicide, appellants waived the defense of double
jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at the trial open
for the review of the trial court. At any rate, the issue of the attendant
qualifying circumstance in the case at bar was squarely raised by the
appellants in their alternative prayer for conviction for the lesser
offense of homicide in view of the erroneous appreciation of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was not
alleged in the information. Hence, the court a quo is not only
empowered but also under obligation to rectify its mistake in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength instead of treachery.Verily, it is precluded from considering
the attendance of a qualifying circumstance if the complaint or
information did not allege such facts.[34] Even before the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure[35] took effect on December 1, 2000,
qualifying circumstances were required to be so specified in the
complaint or information, otherwise they cannot be appreciated
against the accused.
In order that treachery may be considered, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the employment of means, method or
manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor
from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no
opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted by the offender. [36] Here, it is clear that
treachery qualified the killing of the deceased to murder, considering
that the appellants deliberately restrained the victim so as to enable
one of them to successfully deliver the stab blows without giving the
latter a chance to defend himself or to retaliate.
As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of use of
motor vehicle, the trial court erred in appreciating the same inasmuch
as the prosecution failed to show that the tricycle was deliberately
used by the appellants to facilitate the commission of the crime or
that the crime could not have been committed without it. The use of
motor vehicle is not aggravating where the use thereof was merely
incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission
of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his
apprehension difficult.[37]
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was
correctly appreciated in favor of appellants. To benefit an accused,
the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has
12 | P a g e
not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a substantiated with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured
to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the party. In the instant case, the records show that the amount of
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either P65,288.50 awarded by the trial court as actual damages is not fully
because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the substantiated by receipts.[48] However, as the heirs of the deceased
trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and actually incurred funeral expenses, they are entitled to temperate
capture.[38] damages.[49] In the recent case of People v. Abrazaldo,[50] we ruled
that where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined
In the case at bar, appellants voluntarily surrendered to the because of absence or lack of receipts to prove the amount claimed,
authorities on the same night of the incident when they learned that temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be
the authorities were looking for them. [39] Though they did not give a awarded.
statement regarding the stabbing incident, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should nonetheless be Finally, the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is
considered in their favor. What matters is that they spontaneously, affirmed. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity which has been fixed
voluntarily and unconditionally placed themselves at the disposal of by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than the fact
the authorities. This act of respect for the law indicates a moral of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accuseds
disposition favorable to their reform.[40] responsibility therefor.[51]
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the
Republic Act No. 7659, Murder is punishable by reclusion Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case
perpetua to death. With no generic aggravating circumstance and No. 1698, finding appellants, Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo @
one generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Anteng or Enteng, and Hilario Astudillo @ Boda, guilty beyond
penalty imposable on the appellants, in accordance with Article 63 reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to
(3) of the Revised Penal Code, should be the minimum period, which suffer the penalty of reclusion
is reclusion perpetua.[41] perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the civil
liability. As modified, appellants are ordered, jointly and severally, to
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, the award of pay the heirs of the deceased, Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the amounts of
moral and exemplary damages cannot be lumped together as was P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
done by the trial court. These kinds of damages are different in P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
nature, and require separate determination. Moral damages are damages
awarded where the claimant experienced physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as a result
of the felonious act.[42] The award of exemplary damages, on the
other hand, is warranted when the commission of the offense is
attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying. In People v. Catubig,[43] we explained:
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law
not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged
effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other
upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of
which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages
to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State
concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make
little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to
be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should
only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case,
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within
the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. [44]
As testified to by the widow of the deceased, the death of her
husband brought grief and emotional suffering to their
family.[45]Hence, they are entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, pursuant to current jurisprudence. [46] Likewise, the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of
the deceased justifies the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.[47]
The award of actual damages should also be modified. In order
that actual damages may be recovered, the amount actually
expended in connection with the death of the victim must be

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