A.C. No.
439 April 12, 1961
LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, petitioner, vs. QUINCIANO
VAILOCES, respondent.
This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the
Philippine bar.
It appears that as member of the bar and in his Capacity as a notary
public, Vailoces, on December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution
of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of one
Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Oriental, the will was impugned by her
surviving spouse and daughter. Consequently the probate court,
finding that the will was a forgery, rendered decision denying probate
to the will. This decision e final. On the basis of this decision a
criminal action for falsification of public document was filed against
Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses to the will before the Court
of First Instance of Negros Oriental where after trial, they were found
guilty and convicted On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision with regard to Vailocess but modified it with record to his
co-accused. As finally adjudged, Vailoces was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document
defined and penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and as
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate Penalty ranging from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum, to 8 years and
1 day of prison mayoras maximum, with the accessories of the law,
finest and costs. This sentence having become final, Vailoces began
serving it in the insular penitentiary. As a consequence, the offended
party instituted the present disbarment proceedings.
In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of
conviction rendered against him in the criminal case but contends
that the same is based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence, the
charge being merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice and
spite on the part of herein complainant, and that to give course to this
proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy.
He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.
Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it
appears that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this section, includes any act
deemed contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. 1 Among the
examples given of crimes of this nature by former Chief Justice Moran
are the crime of seduction and the crime of concubinage. 2 The crime
of which respondent was convicted is falsification of public
document, which is indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly
contrary to justice, honesty and good morals. Hence, such crime
involves moral turpitude. Indeed, it is well-settled that
"embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which
denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which
fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude" (58
C.J.S., 1206).
It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude it is clear that he rendered himself
amenable to disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127, of our Rules of
Court. It is futile on his part, much as we sympathize with him, to
dispute now the sufficiency of his conviction, for this is a matter
which we cannot now look into. That is now a closed chapter insofar
as this proceeding is concerned. The only issue with which we are
concerned is that he was found guilty and convicted by a final
judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As this Court well
said:
The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon
us. The judgment not only has become final but has been
executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction,
the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice. (In the Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings against Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No.
229, April 30, 1957).
The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his conviction of
a crime which resulted in the deprivation of his liberty and of his
office as Justice of the Peace of Bais, Negros Oriental would be
tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy is untenable, for such
defense can only be availed of when he is placed in the predicament
of being prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily
included therein, within the meaning of Section 9, Rule 113. Such is
not the case here. The disbarment of an attorney does not partake of
a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the court and
the public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In
re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 588), and its purpose is "to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence" (In
repose confidence"(In reMcDougall, 3 Phil. 77).
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby removed from his office as
attorney and, to this effect, our Clerk of Court is enjoined to erase his
name from the roll of attorneys.
A.C. No. 4017 September 29, 1999
GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant, vs.
ATTY. PRIMO R. NALDOZA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed
before this Court a Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R.
Naldoza. The precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent,
as counsel for complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal,
complainant asserts that respondent should be disbarred for the
following acts:
1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already
final and executory
2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and
fifty-five US dollars (US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly
for "cash bond" in the appealed case
3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act 1
In his Answer, 2 respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to
file an appeal. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainant
who insisted on appealing the case in order to delay the execution of
the POEA Decision. 3 He also controverts complainant's allegation
that he asked for a cash bond and that he issued the fake receipt. 4
In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The pertinent portions of the Complaint were summarized by the IBP
in this wise:
Under its petition, complainant alleges that the respondent
was given the task to defend the interest of the complainant
 corporation in POEA Case No. 8888-06-468, entitled
Olano, et al. versus Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool,
Inc., et al.; that when the said case was resolved in favor of
the complainant therein on October 5, 1992, the
respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said
decision had already become final and unappealable[,]
through malpractice in [an] apparent desire to collect or to
"bleed" his client of several thousand pesos of attorney's
fees, convinced the complainant to appeal the case before
the Supreme Court. Thus, on December 14, 1992, the
respondent filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for
Review which was docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and that
two (2) days thereafter misrepresented to the complainant
corporation that the complainant ha[d] to pay, which it did,
[a] "Cash Bond" in UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S.
$2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in order that the said
appealed case could be heard or acted upon by the
Supreme Court. The said amount was given to the
respondent.1wphi1.nt
. . . [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to
know that the fees to be paid to the Supreme Court
consist[ed] only of nominal filing and docket fees for such
kind of appeal but in order to cover up respondent's
misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza presented complainant a
fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt
representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.
Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by
the complainant corporation revealed that the said receipt
issued by the treasurer's office of the Supreme Court . . .
[was] spurious, meaning a fake receipt. The said
verification revealed that what was only paid by the
respondent to the Supreme Court was the amount of
P622.00 as shown by the enumerated legal fees of the
Supreme Court Docket-Receiving Section showing the
handwritten name of the respondent for purpose of
showing that the said computation was requested by and
addressed to the respondent. 5 (citations omitted)
Meanwhile, a criminal case 6 for estafa based on the same facts was
filed against herein respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt,
he was declared civilly liable in the amount of US$ 2,555.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with
Motion to Dismiss on July 22, 1996, on the ground that he had already
been acquitted in the criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed
the Motion. 7
On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of
Governors' Resolution, which approved the investigating
commissioner's report 8 and recommendation that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. In his Report,
Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified his
recommendation in this manner:
. . . [R]espondent fails to rebut the position of the
complainant that the signature [on the receipt for the
amount of $2,555.00] was his. Hence, respondent anchors
his position on a mere denial that it is not his signature.
Likewise, the respondent denies the check voucher dated
December 15, 1992, and the encircled signature of the
respondent, which . . . according to him is falsified and
irregular. No evidence, however, was presented by the
respondent that his signature therein was falsified and
irregular. [As to the altered Supreme Court Official Receipt,
the respondent denied] that he ha[d] anything to do with it
because it was the complainant who signed the Petition for
Review and tried to explain that his name appear[ed] to be
the payee because he [was] the counsel of record of the
petitioner. But while it is true that the affiant in the said
Petition for Review [was] Mr. Rogelio G. Gatchalian,
president of the complainant company, the respondent
does not deny that he signed the said petition as counsel of
the petitioner corporation and that he was actually the one
who prepared the same and the notary public before whom
the affiant subscribed and [swore] as the one who "caused
the preparation" of the said petition.
The legal form (Exh. "G") of the legal fees for the Petition
for Review re G.R. 107984 was denied by the respondent
because according to him he was never given a chance to
cross-examine the person who issued the [certification] . . . .
However, respondent does not deny that he is the person
referred to by the handwritten name P.R. Naldoza who paid
the legal fees of P622.00.
In addition to the said respondent's Formal Offer of
Evidence, he submitted to this Commission as his most
important piece of evidence the Decision of acquittal in
Criminal Case No. 93-8748 entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Primo R. Naldoza", the copy of which
Decision is appended to his Manifestation with Motion to
Dismiss dated July 22, 1996 praying for the dismissal of the
present administrative case in view of his being exonerated
in the said criminal case based on the same facts and
evidence. 9 (citations omitted)
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent's contention that his
acquittal in the companion criminal case should result in the
dismissal of this administrative complaint. The commissioner
emphasized that the criminal case for estafa 10 was completely
different from the proceedings before him; acquittal in the former did
not exonerate respondent in the latter. 11 He further noted that the
RTC Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability of
respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein complainant for
$2,555. 12
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be
sanctioned. However, the recommended penalty is not commensurate
to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent's Motion
to Dismiss should be denied. In that Motion, he maintains that he
should be cleared of administrative liability, because he has been
acquitted of estafa which involved the same facts. He argues that the
issue involved there was "the very same issue litigated in this
case," 13and that his exoneration "was a result of a full blown trial on
the merits of this case." 14
In a similar case, we have said:
. . . The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal
charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings.
The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties
of . . . criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment
proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from
that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. 15
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. 16 They are distinct from and they may proceed independently
of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; 17 in an administrative
case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence"
is all that is required. 18 Thus, a criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. 19
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case
will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative
case. 20 Conversely, respondent's acquittal does not necessarily
exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court's
finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably
lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court.
Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
administrative liability of the lawyer. 21 The basic premise is that
criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably
govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to
remember the Court's ruling in In re Almacen, 22 which we quote:
. . . Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve
a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated
by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration
of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. . . . (emphasis ours)
We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges against
respondent.
First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA
Decision, despite knowing that it had already become final and
executory. The IBP investigating commissioner had no explicit finding
on this point. Rogelio G. Gatchalian testified that during the pendency
of the appeal, his company had received from the POEA a Writ of
Execution which led him to the conclusion that "they [had] lost the
case before the Supreme Court." 23 This, however, does not
substantiate the charge.
Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the
appeal. Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was
dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final
and executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent
knew that the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this
Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed for
petitioner's failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible
duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand
on.
Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that respondent
obtained from complainant the amount of $2,555, on the false
representation that it was needed for the appeal before this Court.
According to Gatchalian, 24respondent explained that the amount
would "cover all the expenses to be incurred in the Petition for
Review with the Supreme Court and which amount also will answer
for the payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the
money will be given or paid to the complainant in that case so that
our deposit with the bank would not be garnished." 25Corroborating
Gatchalian's testimony, Edna Deles declared that respondent received
the amount on the representation that it "would be paid to the
Supreme Court in connection with the Olano case." 26
The defense of denial proffered by respondent is not convincing.
Quite the contrary, when he paid P10,000 and issued a check to
complainant as his "moral obligation," he indirectly admitted the
charge. Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely
accused of appropriating the money of another. This is an admission
of misconduct. 27 In his Answer submitted to this Court, he declared:
(8). That I have no knowledge, information or belief as to
truthfulness of the allegation of the Petitioner, on his
allegation no. 8 and no. 9, the truth being that in all the
cases and assignments made by the Petitioner to me, I was
made to report to him personally and to his Board of
Directors the progress of the cases both orally and in
writing. I even [went] to the extent of paying him
P10,000.00 as my moral obligation only to find after
accounting that he still owes me P180,000.00 as attorney's
fee [to] which I am entitled under rule 130 of the rules of
court sec. 24, and under sec. 37 of the above-cited rules, I
have the right to apply the funds received from Gatchalian
in satisfaction of my claim for Professional Services,
otherwise known as Attorney's Lien, as shown in my
Service Billings and Statement of Accounts." 28 (emphasis
ours)
Contrary to respondent's claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part
of his attorney's lien. He demanded the money from his client on the
pretext that it was needed for the Petition before the Supreme Court,
but he actually converted it to his personal gain. This act clearly
constitutes malpractice. 29 The claim that respondent merely applied
his lien over the funds of his client is just an afterthought, the
accounting being made after the fact. It is settled that the conversion
by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of
professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. 30
Third. In an effort to conceal his misappropriation of the money
entrusted to him, respondent gave complainant a photocopy of a
receipt purportedly showing that the Supreme Court had received the
sum of $2,555 from him. Again, the testimonies of Gatchalian 31 and
Deles 32 were equally clear on this point. After respondent had
presented the false receipt, Gatchalian learned that no such payment
was made. Ms Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court Cash Collection
and Disbursement Division issued a certification that respondent had
paid the amount of P622 only, not $2,555. In fact, the records of the
said case 33 contain no indication at all that the Court has required the
payment of the latter sum, or that it has been paid at all.
Juxtaposed to the complainant's evidence, the bare denials of
respondent cannot overturn the IBP's findings that he has indeed
presented a false receipt to conceal his misappropriation of his
client's money. We agree with the IBP that "it is unbelievable that the
complainant in the person of Rogelio Gatchalian, being a layman as he
is without any knowledge in the procedure of filing a case before the
Supreme Court, could spuriously weave such documents which are
denied by the respondent." 34
In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards
of his noble profession. As we have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson: 35
[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and
the public at large, with honesty and integrity in
a manner beyond reproach.
Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded
money from his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the same,
and then issued a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag
v. Lumaya, 36 the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer
for not remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to
an execution, viz.:
[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to
Dumadag, his former client, the records abundantly point
to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of
P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear
breach of the canons of professional responsibility.
In Obia v. Catimbang, 37 we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer
who had misappropriated the money entrusted to him:
The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute
malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney.
These acts are noted with disapproval by the Court; they
are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to engage
in no conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal
profession.
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he
misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to
cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to
falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds.
Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of
the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURENCE
D. CORDOVA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to
then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion
Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-
complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required
complainant to submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from
notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on
27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and
detailed complaint against her husband charging him with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent
was declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint
within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required
complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte,
on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant
for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission
scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing
scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-
first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The
hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear.
Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default,
even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed
the Commission that she and her husband had already "reconciled".
In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties
(respondent and complainant) to appear before it for confirmation
and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file
a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days
from notice. Neither party responded and nothing was heard from
either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the
Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its
report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that
any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more
severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a
responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as
follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976
and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the
couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent
Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to
Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G.
Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children
to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado
lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent
Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado
using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado
funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at
Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had
an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would
separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come
home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect
the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant
found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by
hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was
no longer living with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal
home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one
Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie
along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from
the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take
back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig,
gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to
live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to
give support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from
complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been
reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the
IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between
complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not
excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting
upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself.
An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to
show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement
is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership
of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States,
held that "the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the
law ... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though
the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is
important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer
to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed
and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently
cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's
conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the
marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting
with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself
arranged, respondent was disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue
as a member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and
accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual
relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son;
and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous
relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2)
years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife,
in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of
his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or
refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took
up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and
bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly,
respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of
marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and
the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court.
The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent
Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court
that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate
family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he
has clung to.
A.M. No. 1517 November 29, 1977
MARIA LUZ ATIENZA, complainant, vs. VICENTE
EVANGELISTA, respondent.
Membership in the bar is an exacting responsibility. It is, to quote
from Justice Cardozo, "a privilege burdened with conditions." 1 It
imposes, at the very least, the obligation of attending with due zeal
and diligence to a client's cause. In a complaint filed with this Court
by Maria Luz Atienza, respondent Vicente Evangelista, a member of
the Philippine Bar, was charged with unprofessional conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar. It was alleged that he was remiss in
attending to her case with the Manila City Fiscal's Office
notwithstanding his having been retained and paid for his services.
He was required to answer. That he did. There was an admission on
his part of his having been retained, but he denied any imputation of
lack of due diligence in performing the legal services required of him.
He asserted that he had always conducted himself in a manner
expected of a lawyer. This notwithstanding, there was a
recommendation by the investigating fiscal that the case be dropped
for insufficiency of evidence. Then and there, complainant dispensed
with his services and shortly thereafter took from him all the papers
connected with such a case. It was his assumption therefore that he
"was no longer under obligation to participate in any proceeding in
connection with said case. That duty had been shifted to the new
lawyer of Mrs. Atienza in the case involving her husband." 2
Thereafter, this Court, on December 5, 1975, resolved to refer the
administrative complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report, and recommendation. There was such an investigation, with
the report being submitted to this Court on March 17, 1977. The
recommendation was for the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent.
In such report and recommendation submitted by Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, 3 it was stated that respondent was retained to
assist complainant in the prosecution of the persons allegedly
responsible for her husband's death. It was agreed that she should
pay him the sum of P8,000.00 as attorney's fees with P3,000.00 as
down payment and P100.00 to be paid her appearance. A complaint
was duly filed by respondent with the City Fiscal's Office in Manila. It
was assigned to Assistant Fiscal Fernando Agdamag for preliminary
investigation. Respondent presented the complainant and her
witnesses. Two of them refused to submit themselves to cross-
examination. That prompted the fiscal to recommend that the case be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Such recommendation was
concurred in by another fiscal, Roberto D. Cabrera, and the then City
Fiscal, Jose Gamboa.
The report then proceeded in this wise: "The primary issue in this
case is whether the respondent was wilfully negligent in the
performance of his duties as counsel to the complainant to the
damage and prejudice of the latter. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the
legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges until the
contrary is proved, and, as an officer of the court, he has performed
his duty in accordance with his oath. (In re Tiongko, 43 Phil. 191).
Thus, in every case of disbarment the burden of proof lies with the
complainant to show that the respondent is guilty of the acts charged.
In the present case, there is no sufficient evidence showing that the
respondent lawyer violated his oath or was negligent in handling the
complainant's case. The respondent personally prepared the
complaint of Mrs. Atienza and filed this with the Fiscal's Office. When
the case was set for preliminary investigation, he was present in no
less than 15 scheduled hearings. He presented as witnesses the
complainant and four other persons. These facts are home by the
case record and admitted by the complainant. (pp. 73-400, t.s.n.,
March 10, 1976). The complainant's case was dismissed apparently
because of the failure of the complainant's witnesses to submit to
cross-examination. This is clear from a reading of Fiscal Agdamag's
memorandum ... The said memorandum reads: that the hearing of the
case has been continuously postponed several times because of the
failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear; that on October 10,
1972, the counsel for the complainant, together with his client,
manifested into the record that should they be unable to produce the
witnesses at the next hearing they would submit their case on the
basis of the evidence already on record that on October 25, 1972,
'only the counsel for the complainant appeared, His client and their
wit did not arrive ... ' Atty. Evangelista was, thus, constrained to
submit the case on the basis of the evidence already on record. These
facts do not indicate negligence on the Part of the respondent. The
complainant who was present during the hearing of October 10, 1972
was fully aware that she still had to present two of her witnesses for
cross-examination on the next scheduled hearing." 4
As to the allegation by complainant that respondent did not inform
her that the case had been dismissed and that he did nothing to
remedy the same, there is this relevant excerpt from such report:
The record does not support this claim. The respondent
met the complainant in the house of Sgt. Bo sometime in
 December 1972, immediately after he teamed that the case
was dismissed. He informed the complainant then that her
case had been dismissed. He also informed her that he
could appeal or ask for a reconsideration of the same but
the complainant took the case record from him and said
that she has hired another lawyer to handle her case. The
complainant admits the said incident. She also confirms
that she terminated the respondent's services on the same
day. (pp. 31-33, t.s.n., March 10, 1976). 5
The concluding paragraph of the report follows: "The complaint
against the respondent Atty. Vicente Evangelists has not been
established by competent evidence. The dismissal of Mrs. Atienza's
case is not imputable to respondent. A member of the bar can not be
subjected to the peril of disbarment simply because of decision
adverse to his client. The serious consequence of disbarment or
suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance
of evidence showing the basis thereof." 6 Accordingly, the
recommendation was for the dismissal of the complaint.
This Court is in agreement. 7 It would be to place an intolerable
burden on a member of the bar if just because a client jailed to obtain
what is sought by her after due exertion of the required effort on his
part, he would be held accountable. Success in a litigation is certainly
not the test of whether or not a lawyer had lived up to his duties to a
client. It is enough that with the thorough preparation of the case
handled by him, he had taken all the steps to prosecute his suit. If
thereafter the result would be the frustration of his client's hopes,
that is a cause for disappointment, no doubt for him no less than for
his client, but not for disciplinary action. He is more to be
sympathized with than condemned - on the assumption of course
that he did what was expected of him.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Attorney Vicente Evangelists is
dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.
August 6, 1920
In re suspension of MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, attorney.
This is a proceeding relating to the suspension of the lawyer Mariano
J. Cuenco from the practice of his profession. It is remitted to this
court from the Court of First Instance of the Province of Leyte for our
final resolution. On June 23 of this year, while the Honorable Nicolas
Capistrano was acting as vacation judge at Tacloban, Leyte, he issued
an order in which, after specifying certain charges against Mr. Cuenco
for acts executed by the latter in relation to certain cases and for his
conduct towards the court, he was ordered to appear in the Court of
First Instance at Borongan, Samar, at 8 o'clock a. m. on the 28th of
said month to show cause, if any, why he should not be punished for
contempt. On the same day in execution of this order the following
proceedings were taken by the clerk of that court; a summons was
sent to Mr. Cuenco in order that he might within forty days appear in
court at Borongan, Samar, to answer the charge; another summons
was sent to Mr. Cuenco in order that he might appear at Borongan,
Samar, on the 28th of that month of June; a telegram was sent to the
sheriff of the Province of Cebu on order to compel Mr. Cuenco to
appear on the same date before the vacation judge, the Honorable
Nicolas Capistrano at Borongan, Samar, in order that he might show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt. It was also stated
in the telegram that the papers dealing with the matter have been
sent by mail. About the 25th or 26th of that month of June Mr. Cuenco
was notified by the sheriff of Cebu of the telegram which he had
received from the clerk of the court of Leyte and in the afternoon of
the 28th Mr. Cuenco received the summons mentioned.
In the morning of the same date, the 28th, the Honorable Nicolas
Capistrano, at that time holding session at Borongan, Samar, called
for trial the case for contempt against Mr. Cuenco and the latter not
having appeared, the court entered an order suspending him from
the practice of his profession, from the date of the notification of the
order until the final disposition of the case by Supreme Court. It was
also ordered that the original records of the proceedings should be
sent to this court.
Upon receipt of the papers in the office of the clerk of this court they
were endorsed to the office of the Attorney-General for investigation
and report, and the Attorney-General after taking the declaration of
Mr. Cuenco, submitted on the 29th of the month of July his report,
recommending that the order against Mr. Cuenco suspending him
from the practice of his profession be vacated, that the record be
returned to the Court of First Instance of Leyte with the instructions
that Mr. Cuenco should be given the opportunity to defend himself
against the charges presented against him for contempt and that he
also be given the same opportunity to defend himself in all the
proceedings that may be taken against him for his suspension from
the practice of the legal profession.
Although in the 26th of June when Mr. Cuenco received the
telegraphic order directed to the sheriff of Cebu he was notified that
the papers were to be sent to him by mail, and notwithstanding the
fact that he had not received them, nevertheless he tried to obey the
order and looked for a boat in order to go to Borongan, but because of
the lack of regular trips from Cebu to that port, he did no find any
vessel which could take him there on time to appear on the day his
appearance was required. But laying side the fact Mr. Cuenco had no
opportunity to appear at Borongan on account of the lack of
transportation facilities since the 26th of June, and even ignoring the
fact that when he received the papers relating to the order for his
appearance it was already late as the period fixed therefor had
already expired, it appears that he was never notified that his
suspension from the practice of his profession was to be taken up by
the Honorable Judge Nicolas Capistrano. The notification that was
made to him to appear at Borongan and show cause why he should
not be sentenced for contempt cannot be considered as a notification
to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of
his profession. These things are different; they have distinct objects
and for each of them a different procedure is established. A lawyer
cannot be suspended from the practice of his profession without
giving him an opportunity to defend himself and be heard after
reasonable notice to him. (Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure.)
We do not think it proper to make any pronouncement with respect
to the case for contempt. It appears that the papers were remitted to
this court for the suspension of Mr. Cuenco from the practice of his
profession. There is a procedure established for transmitting to this
court the resolutions of the Courts of First Instance relating to
contempt and this procedure has not been followed in this case.
In conformity with the recommendation of the Attorney-General, we
vacate the order of suspension from the practice of this profession
entered against the lawyer Mr. Mariano J. Cuenco. Let the records
together with the accompanying documents be returned to the Court
of First Instance of Leyte in order that, if there are reasons for
ordering the suspension of Mr. Mariano J. Cuenco from the practice of
his profession, the procedure prescribed by law may be followed, that
Mr. Mariano J. Cuenco be notified of the charges against him, and that
he be given the opportunity to defend himself in said proceedings. So
ordered.