THE GREEK ORTHODOX THEOLOGICAL REVIEW Vol. 44, Nos.

1-4,1999

The Dialectic Relationship between

God and Human Beings in Origen
and Maximus the Confessor

D R . CHRISTOS TEREZIS - EUGENIA TZOURAMANI

The present article represents an analysis of some texts from the

work of Maximus the Confessor De variis difficilibus locis. The rea
son, which led Maximus to write the above work, was his intention
to render theologically reliable some ambiguous texts by two writ
ers. This endeavor took place in a period when a heretical monotheistic
sect had come to the foreground and a systematic attempt was made
by its followers to establish their beliefs in the Christian Orthodox
Church. Indeed it was in the first half of the 7th century that the
Monenergist danger threatened the Christian Church since the sect
which bore its name tried to use the teaching of Gregory the Theolo
gian and to incorporate it into its own doctrine. It was in this
theological climate that the Archbishop of Cyzikos sent a letter to
Maximus requesting his written comments regarding the texts in ques
tion, because Maximus had already expressed his views on this issue
during a previous visit to Cyzikos. Maximus accepted this offer and
so he earned the distinction of becoming a defender of Orthodoxy,
while at the same time he defined precisely his position against the
newly established sects of Monenergism () and
Monotheletism ().
It is in this same work that Maximus also examined Origen's views
regarding the creation of man. It should be noted, however, that Maxi
mus did not embark on a polemic against the Origenist positions, but
rather tried to expose their doctrinal basis as theologically unfounded
1
using solid evidence. The tentative manner in which Maximus tried
to approach the Origenist standpoint has been seen by some scholars

329
330 The Greek Orthodox Theological Review: 44/1-4, 1999
as an inclination on his part towards an adoption of Origenism and
accordingly it has been suggested that Maximus' works exhibit in
fluences from the Alexandrian theologian. With regard to this issue,
however, P. Sherwood maintained that a careful analysis would prove
otherwise. In other words, it would make clear that in fact Maximus'
views and arguments contain a radical and systematic refutation of
Origenism.
Origen argued, by means of recasting the early Plato in familiar
Christian terms, that there was in the divine region an original unity
of rational entities which was interrupted due to their own choices.
These entities, he argued were imprisoned by God in bodies as a
punishment but they would return to their original unity abandoning
their bodies within a context of a universal restitution
(). For Maximus, these positions are very closely
related to the anthropological issue and in a way usurp the original
relationship between God and man which is based on love as the
Christian faith advocates. For this reason such positions should be
rejected.2 We may note here in advance that the argumentation of
Maximus, despite its clear theological orientation, is expressed in
such a manner that satisfies two of the most basic needs of contem
porary man. It satisfies the need for completeness of and a rational
and philosophically reliable approach to the substance of the natural
world in the wider context of a universal cosmology.
In the specific paragraphs which will be analyzed Maximus the
Confessor attempts to illustrate his theological and partly philosophi
cal thought embarking from the Platonic-Origenist theory about the
relation between the divine and the human. It should be noted, how
ever, that Maximus does not use this theory as a theoretical basis for
articulating and presenting his theological and philosophical specu
lation about God and man. On the contrary, after lining up all of the
basic principles of this theory, which are indicative of its basic direc
tions, he pursues a solid and methodical refutation of it. Furthermore,
he does not establish his argumentative line on powerless theological
data and methodological ambiguities but on a rational and flexible
scheme of thought, which at some points resembles the mathemati
cal precision and intuitive consistency of positive sciences.
Maximus starts his analysis with methodological flexibility and
qualifies the adoption of a position derived from Greek, or similar to
 Terezis - Tzouramani: Orgen and Maximus 331
the Greek, theories (dogmas) as an "easy solution." He retains this
position because he holds that these theories do not reflect the truth -
a factor particularly demanding - but constitute an oversimplified
notion of it, a point that he will personally attempt to prove, as he
states, as he proceeds further.
The main points that make up the Platonic-Origenist theory are
connected with a certain version of the creation of man. They include
the relationship between God and man, the process of the creation of
the physical world and the transposition of rational beings from the
region of the spiritual or contemplative situation to the corporal and
carnal way of existence. According to this theory there was origi-
nally a unity, namely a coexistence of the souls within a divine orbit
in a close interrelation with God in an eternal contemplation of him.
In other words these spiritual beings in their totality constituted with
God a unique, undivided and cohesive unity. Moreover, the way this
unity was presented was developing according to the nature of God:
"
, 9
v ."
In the process of time, however, there was a friction and an es
trangement, which had as a result a negative movement of the rational
creatures, namely their estrangement from God and the quest for a
different way of " being."3
According to the way Maximus conceives of Origen's theory this
specific movement of estrangement from the divine region and tran
sition from unity to a totality of interspersed entities had taken place
before the creation of the material world. This is why the world of
corporeal perception derived from God as a form of punishment, ex
actly because the rational beings left the region of the divine and
rational life. It is obvious then that the material world is in a sense the
price which man is obliged to pay due to his own decision to exist
independently and not in relation to God.4
After this concise description of the Platonic-Origenist theory
Maximus attempts to refute it by focusing his analysis on certain
axioms and trying to prove their relativity and inaccuracy. This at
tempt is methodically articulated and takes the form of six oppositions.
It is to the first two of these oppositions that this paper seeks to focus
attention providing an appropriate analysis.
332 The Greek Orthodox Theological Review: 44/1-4, 1999
1st opposition
The substance of God, the way of existence of man and the basic
elements involved in the relation of corporeal - incorporeal beings
The Christian theologian does not challenge the fact that the di-
vine is immobile, that it acts as a unity and that it preexists everything,
without owing its existence to a superior intervening cause. There-
fore it is an unconditional entity which is not subjected to time
constrains, processes and imperfections of corporeality. Accordingly
in order to present the evolution of human existence, he proceeds to
the distinction of "being" from"non being " arguing that the corpo-
real, in contrast to the incorporeal, is determined by superior factors
as far as its birth is concerned. At the same time its movement and its
way of existence are characterized by a process of reunion with God,
an ascending motion which is in constant process. Thus it has a posi-
tive quality not only as a progress but also as to the goal it pursues.
On the contrary according to Maximus' thought the Platonic-
Origenist God, out of his specific act of imprisoning the human souls
in bodies, is qualified as being relative and opposed to being abso-
lute and complete which characterize the manner of existence and
manifestation of the divine Goodness. His act is defined by the im-
pact that the estrangement of souls has on his consciousness.5
In addition, Maximus argues that the relation between the corpo-
real and the incorporeal is presented by Origen through a nexus of
forensic specifications which, once its limits are breached, brings
about punishment as a direct consequence. Therefore the Fall leads
to acts of a juridical retributive type on behalf of God. He also notes
that the fact of the Fall demonstrates a similar state in God himself,
since it concerns spiritual beings which are originally intermingled
with the divine substance.
It is obvious that Maximus wants to demonstrate that in the Pla-
tonic-Origenist theories God is projected not only as relative regarding
his substance, but also with demonstrations which are not consistent
with his infinite Godhood, such as the control of human freedom. All
these happen to such an extent as to refute his ontological self-exist-
ence, since he originally co-exists with other creatures and at the
same time incorporates both good and evil qualities without any radi-
cal distinction between these opposed powers.6
On the other hand Maximus does not describe the life movement
 Terezis - Tzouramani: Origen and Maximus 333
of man as sinful or evil and thus he refutes, at least on this level, any
intervention of divine punishment. He establishes that Good and Evil
co-exist in the human behavior, but considers that Evil is the means
for the restoration of the Good:
"
, 9
."
This is why since Evil is opposed to the nature of man who is
created "in God's image" and is directed towards "God's likeness,"
is abandoned for the sake of the Good. In addition, he does not con
sider the creation of the material world as a means of punishment of
a pre-existent (prior birth) sin due to movement. It was rather a means
leading to re-incorporation into the divine life and to revival of bliss-
fulness as a quality of it. Thus the Good maintains its authenticity
and attracts human movement to a communication with It by ex
pressing Its permanent and stable character without approaching any
finite ontological and ethical limits. Therefore Evil evades its label
as a sin, since it is exclusively included in the wide context of inten
tions and experiences, while at a later stage when its falling character
is realized, it leads to the Good through repentance.7
Although here the presentation of Good and Evil is compromised
through their co-existence, this is approached from a different point
of view and is envisaged in a radically dissimilar way so as to dimin
ish Origen. This means that Evil in itself is neither considered to be
the panacea for the solution of all ontological and ethical issues, nor
is it believed that it diminishes the entire human existence. At the
same time, since reference is made to the way of coexistence of Good
and Evil, the material world is not absolutely rejected in favor of the
spiritual, but the purpose of the existence of the material is stressed.
Indeed both the material and the spiritual are considered to be ele
ments which significantly effect the quality of human nature. The
basic axis of the above elements is presented as man's continuous
struggle to communicate again with the divine and to actualize the
communion of creation as a whole with the Holy Trinity on the basis
of the conditions which are provided by the Trinity's primordial will.
This contact is not conceived by Maximus as a return to the Origenist
unity but as an achievement under the human terms of a communica
tive relationship with a source that constantly moves by a love drive.
334 The Greek Orthodox Theological Review: 44/1-4, 1999
2nd opposition
The properties of human movement: its starting point and its final
destination.
In this context Maximus proceeds to an analysis of the term "move
ment" arguing that it is not possible for it to have existed before the
creation. This is why movement is presented as a product of thought,
choice, and expression of will towards some element, all being quali
ties which presuppose existence and sensation. As this Christian
theologian teaches, it constitutes on the level of the material world a
perceptible situation of the tangible, while there is an analogous quality
for the spiritual:
" ,
.
.
, , ,
, ." 8
In other words the substance from which it is derived and which it
expresses determines movement.
Maximus' thought, however, is not limited to the above distinc
tion but proceeds further to search for the particular meaning of the
notion of movement, in attempt to prove Plato's and Origen's mis
conception in defining movement as an act leading to apathy. At first,
he bases his argument on the traditional Christian position that the
element of movement is indicative of human nature, since it is cre
ated and owes its existence to the Creator God who is not subjected
to such physical necessities. This is because, as it has been already
stressed, God is immutable as compared to the totality of mutable
things and does not owe his being to a preexisting entity which is
superior to him.9
Maximus thought is developed as follows: Therefore God, by be
ing superior to all the material and finite entities, is the reference
point and the final purpose of all rational entities. At the same time
he is in the process of time a stable, permanent and immovable real
ity from which movability and immovability are derived. More
specifically, all the above means that in himself God is first and fore
most an immovable, superior and immutable substance in that he is
not subjected to interventions and mutations from external factors.
On the other hand these statements mean that his existence operates
so as to attract the movement of his creatures.
 Terezis - Tzouramani: Origen and Maximus 335
The above shows that it is not possible to posit a kind of move
ment which would lead to the end of activation of human existence
or to the exhaustion of its nature since it is not self-existent, namely
it is not itself the cause of its existence. This means that all human
beings retain an intense and permanent existential quest as well as an
inherent inclination towards something that surpasses them, since
they are God's creatures and owe their existence to his generating
acts:
" ,
,
, ,
, ." 10
That is to say, movement is not sinful in itself, but its negative
quality is only acquired when the purpose of the movement does not
aim at God, who is its final destination. Since movement is inherent
in the human substance, it is imperative for it to aim towards the
ultimate Good so as to obtain true bliss.
It is established then, through the present reasoning, that Maxi
mus disagrees with the Platonic-Origenist theory of an original unity,
which proceeded through movement to the dispersion of rational be
ings. This theory had served, apart from other purposes, the exclusion
of any prospect of pantheism:
" e'Iv9

."
On the contrary Maximus maintains that human beings have not
yet reached complete unity with God, which proves that they are in
constant movement. Their relation to the one and only cause will be
completed at the end of their life-process as a real and definite exis
tential completeness.11
To validate his position Maximus invokes the visions (theories) of
Moses, David and Paul the Apostle, according to which the move
ment of human beings towards God is granted as a developing and
gradually completed process. Maximus validates the authority of his
arguments by referring to the invocation of Christ himself by human
beings which signals and activates a reverse course of them towards
God, the final cause of all. Within this cause human beings will find
the answer as to the purpose of their existence and they will satisfy
their inner quests.
336 The Greek Orthodox Theological Review: 44/1-4, 1999
On the other hand Maximus refers to a "movement of passion"
which is defined as dilution, but not in the negative sense of the term.
Rather it is understood as an element which defines man positively,
i.e. as a being that endures the movement which is not produced by
its own powers and is defined by a reality which surpasses it.12
According to our data we have encountered so far three values
which Maximus has extensively analyzed: human nature, divine na
ture and human movement with God himself as point of reference
God himself. It is about a notional combination, which leads us to
conclude that the movement is indeed a "passion" [] for man,
since this is the only means of his encounter with God. It has been
imposed on him as a complementary factor due to his created nature,
which is created by God, the absolute being:
"
,
. ,
." 1 3
Therefore we are led to conclude that, since the movement stems
from God - who is immovable and self-existing and has created hu
man beings - it has to return to him. And so man can be transformed
from a simple created being to one that is in bliss as a result of a most
ethical attainment. Thus, movement is not evil because it is derived
from God, moves towards man and is completed as it returns to its
one and only destination which is also its starting point. Here begin
ning and end coincide, since God is at the same time self-existent,
possesses absolute bliss, is free from any necessities that could arise
and acts voluntarily:
"
14
."
In order, however, to attain a more objective view of the matter it
is deemed vital to stress the following points: When Origen was ar
ticulating his texts the philosophical agenda was clear of heretical
sects such as Arianism and Pelagianism which, as is known, were
directly against the incipient Christian dogma. The theologians of
rd th
the 3 and the 4 century had to pay particular attention to the formu
lation and especially to the articulation of their thoughts so as not to
encourage the aggressive resurgence of any heretical positions but
rather to safeguard the Christian dogma with sound arguments against
these positions. Origen, on the contrary, did not encounter any such
 Terezis - Tzouramani: Origen and Maximus 337
"dangers." For this reason he expressed himself freely in his attempt
to explain the creation of the world and man.15
It should be noted that according to his own statements, Origen's
thought was not meant to be a fixed dogmatic statement, but mainly
a suggestion. Thus, Origen himself states that he articulated his thought
rationally but not dogmatically. At another point he argues that in
fear of being condemned as a heretic and an opponent of the Faith of
the Church he is going to speak in the form of an open discussion and
avoid making absolute statements. Origen deemed his theory to be
more functional as it was logically inter-twined with the cosmologi-
cal system he had constructed. It should be stressed, however, that
his tendency of not justifying all of the particular points of his theory
constantly and sufficiently finally resulted in heretical deviations.
He was trying to explain the creation of the world and to correct the
inconsistencies of previous theories, without always having the nec-
essary dogmatic foundation.16
Origen justifies the creation of souls before bodies by arguing that
since God is the Creator he should have created something from the
beginning. Otherwise either this property is refuted or one should
accept that there was a period in which God was not a Creator. In this
case God would be subject to change and improvement, which is
incompatible with his immutable nature. At this point, however,
Origen falls into a notional confusion involving creation as an initial
ability and its content, a confusion that had clear ontological reper-
cussions.
It should be noted nevertheless, that Origen was against those
Gnostics for whom there was a distinction in creation resulting in the
birth of angels, demons or humans in relation to their inherent prop-
erties. Origen himself maintained that they were all born equal, that
there was an individual retreat of virtue during the fall and that God's
justice was always the rule. Besides, he did not accept any version of
an evil and arbitrary God. Freedom of will, which is supported by
Origen, helps him to justify the creation of beings. Thus change was
necessary in order to transform entities into creatures.17
In conclusion we would like to note that theological research after
the Council of Nicaea had not introduced a relevant dogma regard-
ing the pre-existence of souls. Indeed until the 5th century nothing
had been officially declared on this issue. In fairness to Origen we
must acknowledge that the silence of the Church at his time provided
338 The Greek Orthodox Theological Review: 44/1-4, 1999
the stimulus for speculative approaches to this topic of inquiry. So
the subject was given a legal character until the matter was dealt with
officially and given a solid dogmatic verification. Moreover it is par-
ticularly important that a highly speculative climate regarding the
way the soul exists is also observed in the period close to the Fifth
Ecumenical Council. All these are reinforced by the fact that the Bible
on the whole did not project any specific theory, but provided a basis
for a variety of interpretations and in a sense it encouraged this type
of theological discussion.18 Therefore it should be said that Origen
belongs to the historical and dogmatic context of preparation.

NOTES

1
The text which will be analyzed here is included in PG 91 1069A-1081C. For the
topics discussed, see P. Sherwood's essay The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the
Confessor and his refutation of Origenism, Romae 1955 and Rev. Dimitru Staniloae,
"Introduction" Maximus the Confessor, Athens: 1978, pp. 13-51 and his extended
comments on the text.
2
For Maximus' Anthropology, see Nikos Matsoukas, World, Man ,Society according
to Maximus the Confessor, "Grigoris" Athens 1980, particularly pp. 99-135 and 253-
289. It should be mentioned from the outset that Plato's standpoints which resemble
Origen's positions are obviously included in Memno and Phaedo, where it is argued
that human souls existed before their embodiment in the celestial world of Ideas. The
anthropological views of Origen, which are reviewed by Maximus, are included in his
famous systematic work De Principiis, I and II. Our objective in this essay is not to
proceed to an exhaustive analysis of the topic as a whole but rather to extract the
anthropological values that relate to our quest.
3
See Maximus the Confessor, De varis difficilibus locis, 1069A. It should be noted
that the terms "henad" (), "permanence" () and "establishment" ()
extensively occur in Neoplatonic Proclus and are connected with the definitions of his
polytheistic ontological system. See his work Concerning Plato's Theology, III 5.5 -
28.21.
4
See Maximus the Confessor, De varis difficilibus locis, 1069AB. On "movement"
in Maximus, see P. Sherwood, St. Maximus the Confessor: The ascetic life, pp. 39-49
and Hans Urs von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, Freiburg 1941, pp. 89-104.
5
See Maximus the Confessor De varis difficilibus locis, 1069B.
6
See ibid, 1069C.
7
See ibid., 10069 D-1072A. On no occasion should it be thought that a relativised
version of the good on the basis of the bad is introduced. Reference is different from
specification. According to chronological and rational order the good proceeds.
8
See ibid., 10069D-1072A.
9
See ibid., 10069D-1072A.
10
See ibid, 11072C
11
Ibid., 1072CD. Pantheism is by no means acceptable and Eastern Christianity
 Terezis - Tzouramani: Origen and Maximus 339

which stresses that God creates not according to his substance but according to his
energies. See here Gregory Palamas on the Divine energies, P. K. Christou, Gregory
Palomas Vol. Thessalonica 1964, pp. 96-136, a work representative of the Eastern
Christian tradition in this regard.
12
See Maximus the Confessor, De varis difficilibus locis, 1172D-1073B.
"See ibid., 1073B.
14
Ibid., 1073C. In this quote it is obvious that human history is not defined as a
development but as a gradual realization of the archetypes contained in the natural
[creation of the material world] and especially in the supernatural revelation [incarnation
of the Divine Logos].
15
See Origen, De Prncipiis, pref. 5 and ibid. II.6.7 "Si quis sane melius aliquid
pofuerit et evidentioribus de scripturis Sanctis assertfionibus confirmare quae diat, ilia
potius quam haec recipiantur."
16
See ibid., 1.7.1. "generali nobis sermone digesta sint, per consequentiae magis
intellectum quam definito dogmate pertractata atque discussa de rationalibus naturis."
See also ibid., 1.6.1 and 5 ana 9. In this regard see also J.Armantage, 'The best of both
worlds: Origen's view on religion and the resurrection," Origeniana Prima, p. 345;
C.E. Pabinowitz "Personal and cosmic salvation in Origen," vgilae Christianae, 38
(1984) p. 328; L.G Patterson "Who are the opponents in Methodius' De resurrectione,"
Studia Patrstica XIX, p. 229; J. Danilou, Gospel message and Hellenistic Culture p.
155; R. Daly, "Origen studies and Pierre Nautin's Origene," in Theological Studies 39
(1978) p. 509 and R.A Norris, God and the world in Early Christian Theology, p. 106.
17
De Prncipiis, 1.2.10.
18
Ibid., II. 2.2 and II. 9.3.
 ^ s
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