Presumption of Fault/ Negligence of Employer: Vicarious liability

Presumption of Fault/Negligence of the Employer

Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection or both.

Onus Probandi

The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. It is incumbent upon the employer to prove that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Due Diligence

In (Manliclic v. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157) the Court ruled that:

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to

their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the
employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation
and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.

In (Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104408) it was explained
that:

Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with
whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
 beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring
of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer,
acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence
of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of
the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the
latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is
decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.

We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the

formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being
complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence
of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing
the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and
safety were followed."

Captain of the Ship Doctrine

Under this doctrine, the surgeon is likened to a ship captain who must not only be
responsible for the safety of the crew but also of the passengers of the vessel. The head surgeon
is made responsible for everything that goes wrong within the four corners of the operating
room. It enunciates the liability of the surgeon not only for the wrongful acts of those who are
under his physical control but also those wherein he has extension of control.

In (Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354), it was found that:

Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper
authority (as the "captain" of the operative team) in not determining if his
anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record
 exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly
intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had
scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because
of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia
delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient.
Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.

Respondeat Superior

Literally translates to let the master answer, the master and servant rule is also known
as the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under this rule, the master, to escape liability, cannot
put up the defense of a good father in the selection and supervision of employees (except to
mitigate said liability, if this defense is duly proved).

In the case of (Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana, G.R. No. 126297), respondent PSI
was found not only vicariously liable, but also directly liable under the said doctrine. The Court
held that:

In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital
for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to
the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm
all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to
perform such duty. The findings of the trial court are convincing, thus:

x x x PSIs liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of the matter

reported in the nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure established PSIs part in the
dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes. Ethical considerations, if
not also legal, dictated the holding of an immediate inquiry into the events, if not for the
benefit of the patient to whom the duty is primarily owed, then in the interest of arriving
at the truth. The Court cannot accept that the medical and the healing professions,
through their members like defendant surgeons, and their institutions like PSIs hospital
facility, can callously turn their backs on and disregard even a mere probability of
 mistake or negligence by refusing or failing to investigate a report of such seriousness as
the one in Natividads case.

It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the
assistance of the Medical City Hospitals staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and
interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has
actual or constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of
the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. In Fridena v. Evans,41 it
was held that a corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired by or notice given to its
agents or officers within the scope of their authority and in reference to a matter to which
their authority extends. This means that the knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City
Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the failure of PSI, despite the attending
nurses report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts
to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all
persons who practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in
fixing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for
its own negligence under Article 2176.

In the case of (Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, G.R. No. 142625), respondent Capitol
Medical Center was absolved of negligence under said doctrine. The Court held that:

After a thorough examination of the voluminous records of this case, the Court finds no
single evidence pointing to CMC's exercise of control over Dr. Estrada's treatment and
management of Corazon's condition. It is undisputed that throughout Corazon's
pregnancy, she was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. At the time of
Corazon's admission at CMC and during her delivery, it was Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr.
Villaflor, who attended to Corazon. There was no showing that CMC had a part in
diagnosing Corazon's condition. While Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff privileges at CMC, such
fact alone did not make him an employee of CMC.42 CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada
to use its facilities43 when Corazon was about to give birth, which CMC considered an
emergency. Considering these circumstances, Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC,
but an independent contractor.
 However, the CMC was not automatically exempt from liability considering that Dr.
Estrada is an independent contractor-physician. In general, a hospital is not liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this
principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital.
This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority" to be discussed later on.

Vicarious Liability

As defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, vicarious liability is the imposition of liability on

one person for the actionable conduct of another, based solely on the relationship between the
two persons; for example, the liability of an employer for the acts of an employee, or, a principal
for the torts or [actions] of an agent.

In (Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez, GR. No. 160110), the court held that under the doctrine
of vicarious liability or imputed negligence, a person who has not committed the act or omission
which caused damage or injury to another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter
either directly or subsidiarily under certain circumstances. In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability
or imputed negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages
in the action under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the
selection or supervision, or both, of his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Citing (Viron v. Delos Santos, 345 S 509), As employers of the bus driver, the petitioner
is, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.
The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only jusris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. In fine,
when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties,
there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof
of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. Petitioner, through its witnesses,
failed to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of
employees, thus, petitioner as the employer is responsible for damages, the basis of the liability
being the relationship of pater familias or on the employers own negligence. Hence, with the
allegations and subsequent proof of negligence against the bus driver of petitioner, petitioner
(employer) is liable for damages.

Proof of Employees fault / Negligence

In (Mercury Drug v. Baking, 523 S 184), petitioners employee was grossly negligent in
selling respondent domicrum, instead of the prescribed diamicron. The employee should have
been very cautious in dispensing medicines. It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent
employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been
negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of the employee or the supervision
over him, after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing
on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his employee. In this case, petitioner failed to prove
such exercised of due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
employee, thus making the petitioner solidarily liable for the damages.

In the case of (Safeguard Security v. Tangco, 511 S 57), as the employer of Pajarillo,
Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.
Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by
operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the
employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the
supervision of its employee. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, due
diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for
the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of
breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of
and beneficial to their employer.

Citing (Pleyto v. Lomboy, 432 S 329), petitioners presented several documents in

evidence to show the various tests and pre-qualification requirements imposed upon petitioner
Pleyto before his hiring as a driver by PRBL. However, no documentary evidence was presented
to prove that petitioner PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees,
including Pleyto. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough for the employer to emptily
invoke the existence of company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the
negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence
of hiring procedures and supervisory policies without anything more is decidedly not sufficient
to overcome such presumption.