DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE / PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
the security and confidences of private life even at
PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO
Facts:
Francisco, previously arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as
detention prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. He was allowed to
leave detention so that he may be able to raise his bond. Sergeant Pimentel
accompanied him. Upon reaching the house, Francisco was allowed to see his
wife in a room of said house, while Pimentel remained at the foot of the stairs.
After a few minutes, Pimentel heard a womans scream. Running upstairs, he met
defendants wife running out of the room and holding her right breast which was
bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel saw Francisco lying down with his little
son Romeo, aged 1 , on his breast. Pimentel also saw that Francisco had a
wound in his belly while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the
child dead.
The prosecution recommended the imposition of the death penalty, relying on
an affidavit executed by the accused to this effect:
o when I was in the house, I remembered what my uncle told me to the
effect that he would order someone to kill me because I am a shame and
a dishonor to our family and suddenly I lost my sense and I thought to
myself that if someone would kill me it would be more preferable for
me to kill myself; when I looked at the bed I saw a scissor near my wife
and unconsciously I picked up the said scissor and immediately
stabbed my wife whereupon I looked for my child on the bed and
stabbed him; I killed my son Romeo Francisco whose age is more or
less two years and after that I stabbed myself; after stabbing myself, I
heard a shot and the sergeant of police asked me if I would surrender
to him or not; I replied him "yes" then I lost my consciousness.
The prosecution also relied on the plea of guilty made by Francisco, as well as
the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, his wife.
He was convicted of parricide by the CFI of Mindoro. Francisco appeals to the SC
asking that the CFI decision be set aside.
Issues and Held:
WoN the CFI erred in convicting the accused- NO.
o On the admissibility of the wifes testimony:
Defense counsel argues that such is inadmissible on the
ground that it has not been properly identified. He also
impugns the admissibility of the testimony on the ground that
Sec. 26d of Rule 123 prohibits the wife and the husband from
testifying against each other.
The rule cited is an old one. The Court has previously cited 4
reasons for it:
Identity of interest
Consequent danger of perjury
Policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard
the risk of an occasional failure of justice
Where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is
a danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other
However, there are exceptions to this rule, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for
offenses committed by one against the other:
Where the marital relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace
and tranquility of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity
is non-existent
These considerations notwithstanding, in the instant case, the
wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution
but suing rebuttal testimony. The wife testified only after the
accused imputed upon her the killing of their son during his
defense testimony.
By all rules of justice and reason, this gave the prosecution,
which had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as
a witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in
rebuttal.
Hence, in giving such testimony, the husband must, in all
fairness, be held to have intended all its aforesaid natural and
necessary consequences. By his said act, the husband
himself exercising the very right which he would deny to his
wife upon the ground of their marital relationsmust be
taken to have waived all objection to the latters testimony
upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection would
have been available at the outset.
The State being interested in laying the truth before the
courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent
exonerated, must have the right to offer the rebutting
testimony in question, even against the objection of the
accused, because it was the latter himself who gave rise to its
necessity.
As well settled as this rule of marital incompetency itself is
the other that it may be waived. This may be done by:
Calling the spouse as a witness of him or her,
thereby making the spouse subject to cross-
examination in the usual manner
Failure to object when the spouse is first offered as
a witness, although knowing of such incompetency
Also: even restricting the wifes testimony to merely
contradicting her husbands version that she was the one who
killed their child, there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt
that Francisco was the killer.
Other Issues:
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 o On the admissibility of the confession: Agrees that Francisco should be convicted, but that the wife is incompetent to
Gave credence to Pimentels testimony that Francisco testify against the husband.
confessed the same to him.
The voluntariness and spontaneity of the confession was also
testified to by the justice of the peace of Mansalay and Dissenting Opinion, J. Feria:
Sebastian Punzalan, the chief of police Alfredo Iwahi.
The version of the accused (including allegations that he was The statute provides that a wife cannot be examined for or against her husband
maltreated, boxed, and threatened if did not swear to the without her consent except in a criminal case committed by one against the
contents of the confession) was also found by the court to be other. Since the defendant objected, such testimony cannot be admitted.
incredible. This statute cannot be construed as to capacitate a wife to be a witness against
Francisco testified that he understood English. her husband if the latter, in testifying in his own defense, says that his wife was
Complete absence of any reason or motive why Pimentel the one who accidentally inflicted the fatal wound on their small child.
would threated the accused.
Other indications of lack of trustworthiness of the accused:
Changing testimony with respect to whether or not 71 ALVARES V RAMIREZ
Pimentel accompanied him to his house when he
visited his wife. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, G.R. No. 143439
Although he would later on impute the killing of the Petitioner,
child to his wife, he admitted that he did not tell this Present:
to the justice of the peace of Mansalay. He claimed
that he did not inform the police because he was PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
afraid of Pimentel, but this is unacceptable because SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
he did not establish any reason for this fear. - versus - CORONA,
Also: signed the confession on the date of the commission of CARPIO MORALES, and
the crime, presumably when he did not yet have the time to GARCIA, JJ.
reflect upon the consequence of such a confession. Yet, one
year later, he impugns this through his own defense, at a time
when he had already had ample time to reflect upon those SUSAN RAMIREZ, Promulgated:
consequences. Respondent.
o On the record of his plea of guilty: October 14, 2005
No comment made because this was not objected to by the x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
defense counsel.
o The court found that the accused was suffering from some illness as D E C I S I O N
contemplated by the RPC as a mitigating circumstance: such illness of
the offender as would diminish the exercise of the willpower of the
offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The court found that the crime was very strange overall; there
was no adequate motivation for the proven acts of the
accused. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled SUSAN
RAMIREZ, petitioner, versus, HON. BENJAMIN M. AQUINO, JR., as JUDGE RTC, MALABON,
Ruling: MM, BR. 72, and MAXIMO ALVAREZ, respondents.
CFI decision modified; penalty lowered to reclusion perpetua.
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-
MN for arson[3] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The
accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez,
Concurring Opinion J. Padilla: sister of respondent.

2
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as
the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no
objection.
Esperanza testified as follows:
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the
accused, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear in the witness.
xxx
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for
the purpose of proving that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all
the elements of the crime being charged particularly that accused
Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at
Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the
house owned by his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo
Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of Susan
Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he
successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it
was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family as well
as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a
consequence of the accused in successfully setting the fire to the house
of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house was burned and together with
several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and others.
COURT:
You may proceed.
xxx
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
xxx
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the
source of that scent?
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in
the house of my sister (and witness pointing to the person of
the accused inside the court room).
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person,
if you know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his
name, he gave his name as Maximo Alvarez.[4]
In the course of Esperanzas direct testimony against petitioner, the latter
showed uncontrolled emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion[5] to disqualify Esperanza
from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition[6] to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial
court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza
Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.[7]The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order
dated October 19, 1999.[8]
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal
Case No. 19933-MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari[9]with
application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.[10]
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the
assailed Orders issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her
husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
3
 Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or
ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of
perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life,
even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one
spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.[11]
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses
committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by
sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule.
For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no
more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the
reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law
aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home.[12]
In Ordoo vs. Daquigan,[13] this Court held:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this
jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac.
64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a
physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and
the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly
affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when
an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally
impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the
exception to the statute that one shall not be a
witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against
the other.
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the
conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the
Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such
as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives
and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his
sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there,
and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally
alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the
disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained
of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation.
It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between
her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no
more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme
Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law
aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castaeda, 271 SCRA
504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital
Disqualification Rule.
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of
the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact,
they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence
and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth
before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must
have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the
accused, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco[14]), it was the latter himself who
gave rise to its necessity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC,
Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against
petitioner, her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
4
al
US v. DALMACEO ANTIPOLO
DOCTRINE: . The purpose of section 58 (privileged communication rule, at present) is to
protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the
marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential
communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the
prejudice of the other spouse.
Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes
a statement regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the communication
so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for
the express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant
to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
FACTS:
Antipolo is charged with the murder of one Fortunato Dinal. The trial court
convicted him of homicide and from that decision he was appealed.
One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit
Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man whom the appellant is accused of having
murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain
alleged dying declarations.
The witness was called to the stand and having stated that she is the widow of
Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what occasion did your husband die?" To this
question the fiscal objected upon the following ground:
o I object to the testimony of this witness. She has just testified that she is
the widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and that being so I believe
that she is not competent to testify under the rules and procedure in
either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent of her husband,
and as he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this
witness is disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband
is the injured party.
Antipolos counsel insisted that the witness was competent, arguing that the
disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in
which a husband or wife of one of the parties to a proceeding is called to testify
and that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are the Government
and the accused.
Also he claims that the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved
by the death of her husband, she is no longer his wife, and therefore not subject
to any disqualification arising from the status of marriage.
ISSUE: W/N the widow is disqualified to testify NO
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows: Except with the
consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other,
neither husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other
in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties.
o Reason for the rule: At common law, neither a husband nor a wife was
a competent witness for or against the other in any judicial
proceedings, civil or criminal, to which the other was a party. . . . If
either were recognized as a competent witness against the other who
was accused of crime, . . . a very serious injury would be done to the
harmony and happiness of husband and wife and the confidence which
should exist between them.
o Greenleaf: The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness
by placing the protecting seal of the law upon all confidential
communications between husband and wife; and whatever has come
to the knowledge of either by means of the hallowed confidence which
that relation inspires, cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony even
though the other party be no longer living.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is
based. The purpose of section 58 is to protect accused persons against
statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to
relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might
have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the
other spouse.
Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has
suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received those
injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the
contrary, such a communication is made for the express purpose that it
may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities
concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
Section 383, paragraph 3 of Act No. 190, reads as follows:
o A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her
consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent; nor
can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be, without the consent
of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the
other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil
action or proceeding by one against the other, or to a criminal action or
proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other.
The only doubt which can arise from a reading of this provision relates to the
meaning of the words "during the marriage or afterwards," and this doubt can
arise only by a consideration of this phrase separately from the rest of the
paragraph.
o Construed as a whole it is evident that it relates only to cases in which
the testimony of a spouse is offered for or against the other in a
proceeding to which the other is a party. The use of the word
"afterwards" in the phrase "during the marriage or afterwards" was
intended to cover cases in which a marriage has been dissolved
otherwise than by death of one of the spouses as, for instance, by
decree of annulment or divorce.
The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending
death, concerning the circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a
prosecution of the person charged with killing the declarant. (U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil.,
Rep., 530.)
Such dying declarations are admissible in favor of the defendant as well as
against him. (Mattox vs. U. S., 146 U. S., 140.)
It has been expressly held in several jurisdictions in the United States that the
widow of the deceased may testify regarding his dying declarations.
5
 In the case of Arnett vs. Commonwealth (114 Ky., 593, 596), the testimony of the
widow of the deceased as to his dying declarations made to her was objected to
upon the express ground that under the terms of the Kentucky Code, "the wife
was incompetent to testify even after the cessation of the marriage relation, to
any communication made by her by her husband during the marriage."
o COURT REJECTED THIS on grounds of public policy the wife cannot
testify against her husband as to what came to her from him
confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does
not apply to a dying communication made by the husband to the wife
on the trial of the one who killed him.
o The declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a
thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by any competent
witness who heard the statement. The wife may testify for the state in
cases of this character as to any other fact known to her. It cannot be
contended that the dying declaration testified to by the witness was a
confidential communication made to her; on the contrary, it was
evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the express purpose
that it should be testified to in the prosecution of the defendant.
PEOPLE V CARLOS
Lesson: Disqualification by reason of marriage
SUMMARY
Defendant Fausto Carlos was found guilty of murder. He appealed. He claims
that deceased Dr. Pablo Sityar attended to his wife (and also him actually for a
couple of consultations) at the time she had appendicitis surgery and was
recovering therefrom. Carlos received a letter from the deceased asking him to
immediately settle his accounts with the latter. When the two finally met, Carlos
sought for an extension to pay his debt, and was apparently insulted by the
deceaseds statement. (that Carlos should just send his wife over so that he the
deceased and the wife could talk and settle) claiming to be outrage, he
challenged the deceased and eventually stabbed him with a pocket knife,
claiming self defense. The trial convicted him of murder for the reason that a
letter by his wife was found during his arrest (proving his premeditation). The
Supreme Court held that even if this letter was not in the nature of a privilege
communication, the mere fact that the wife was not put on the witness stand
and the letter was not even offered, then the same shall not be deemed
admissible. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission
in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case
to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the
opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no difference
between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged. Crime
lowered to Homicide.
DOCTRINE:
For documents of communication coming into the possession of a third person, a
distinction should obtain: if they were obtained from the addressee by
voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged (for otherwise the privilege
could by collusion be practically nullified for written communications); but if
they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's
consent, the privilege should cease.
The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of
a third party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the
witness. Testimony of that character is admissible.
FACTS
The victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, on March 3, 1924, in Mary
Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon the defendant's wife for
appendicitis and certain other ailments.
o After her release, she was required to go several times to the clinic of
Doctor Sityar at No. 40 Escolta, for the purpose of dressing the wounds
caused by the operation.
The defendant states that on one of the visits, that of March 20, 1924, Doctor
Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that while defendant
was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar outraged the wife
Notwithstanding this he again went there on March 28th to consult the deceased
about some lung trouble from which he, the defendant, was suffering.
o He was given some medical treatment and appears to have made at
least one more visit to the clinic without revealing any special
resentment.
The defendant started suffering from stomach trouble, he entered Philippine
General Hospital and he was taken care of by other physicians.
While he was in the hospital he received a letter from the deceased, asking for
the immediate settlement of the account for the professional services rendered
his wife.
After his release, he sought Dr. Sityar who he could not find.
On one of these occasions he was asked by an employee of the office, the nurse
Cabaera, if he had come to settle his account, to which the defendant answered
that he did not believe he owed the doctor anything.
Prosecution:
Defendant again went to the office of the deceased and found him there alone.
According to the evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then, without any
preliminary quarrel between the two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and
stabbed him twice.
The deceased made an effort to escape but the defendant pursued him and
overtaking him in the hall outside the office, inflicted another wound upon him
and as a consequence if the three wounds he died within a few minutes.
The defendants made his escape but surrendered himself to the Constabulary at
Malolos, Bulacan, in the evening of the following day.
Defense:
6
 The defendant admits that he killed the deceased but maintains that he did so in
self-defense.
He explains that he went to Doctor Sityar's office to protest against the amount
of the fee charged by the doctor and, in any event, to ask for an extension of the
time of payment; that during the conversation upon that subject the deceased
insulted him by telling him that inasmuch as he could not pay the amount
demanded he could send his wife to the office as she was the one treated, and
that she could then talk the matter over with the decease; that this statement was
made in such an insolent and contemptuous manner that the defendant
became greatly incensed and remembering the outrage committed upon his wife,
he assumed a threatening attitude and challenged the deceased to go downstairs
with him and there settle the matter
The deceased thereupon took a pocket-knife from the center drawer of his desk
and attacked the defendant, endeavoring to force him out of the office; that the
defendant, making use of his knowledge of fencing, succeeded in taking the knife
away from the deceased and blinded by fury stabbed him first in the right side of
the breast and then in the epigastric region, and fearing that the deceased might
secure some other weapon or receive assistance from the people in the adjoining
room, he again stabbed him, this time in the back.
ISSUE/S && RATIO
WoN defendant is guilty of simple homicide or murder- HOMICIDE
TC: the crime was committed w premeditation
This finding can only be sustained by taking into consideration Exhibit L, a letter
written to the defendant by his wife and siezed by the police in searching his
effects on the day of his arrest.
WoN the letter by defendant to his wife constitute as privilege communication
(which should be deemed inadmissible)
NO- privileged communication
YES- inadmissible
It is dated May 25, 1924, two days before the commission of the crime and shows
that the writer feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical
violence in dealing with the deceased.
Counsel for defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged
communication and therefore not admissible in evidence
Majority View: where a privileged communication from one spouse to another
comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion
and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is
thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes
admissible.
Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows:
For documents of communication coming into the possession of a third person, a
distinction should obtain: if they were obtained from the addressee by voluntary
delivery, they should still be privileged (for otherwise the privilege could by
collusion be practically nullified for written communications); but if they were
obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's consent, the
privilege should cease.
Defense: citing Boyd v US, the letter was obtained during a warrantless search.
Hence, inadmissible as evidence for having a fruit of an illegal search
Weeks vs. United States, reverted to the original doctrine of the Boyd Case,
but with a condition, viz., that the illegality of the search and seizure should first
have been directly litigated and established by a motion, made before trial, for
the return of the things seized; so that, after such a motion, and then only, the
illegality would be noticed in the main trial and the evidence thus obtained
would be excluded.
The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for reasons not discussed
in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had
testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her
testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was
therefore not offered for that purpose.
If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to
the statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but
such is not the case here
o the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of
acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing
but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the
constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be
confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the
opportunity to cross-examine them.
o In this respect there can be no difference between an ordinary
communication and one originally privileged.
The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of
a third party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the
witness.
o Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates
to a conversation in which both spouses took part and on the further
ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a
statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence
implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in
an unanswered letter.
As we have already intimated, if Exhibit L is excluded, there is in our opinion not
sufficient evidence in the record to show that the crime was premeditated.
7

Barton vs. Leyte Asphalt (1924)
Topic: Disqualification by Reason of Privileged Communication (Attorney & client)
SUMMARY: Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co Ltd hired James Barton as its exclusive sales
agent in certain territories, including US and Australia. He was able to obtain orders from
US (San Francisco) and Australia (Sydney). He informed Leyte Asphalt of the orders, which
Leyte Asphalt acknowledged but said that they will not entertain the orders unless cash
deposit is made to either the International Banking Corporation or the Chartered Bank of
India, Australia and China, Cebu. Barton filed for damages before the COFI. During the trial,
Leyte Asphalt presented, among others, Exhibit 14, a carbon copy of a letter by Barton to
his attorney, Frank B. Ingersoll, Esq., of Manila, and in which Barton states, among other
things, that his profit from the San Francisco contract would have been at the rate of 85
cents (gold) per ton. Barton's counsel said he would not object to the introduction of
Exhibit 14 if Leyte Asphalt explains how they got hold of the copy of the letter. Leyte
Asphalt's lawyer said he got it from Leyte Asphalt's former lawyers. Barton's counsel
objected, so the judge excluded the document. COFI absolved Leyte Asphalt from 4 out of
6 causes of action. Hence this appeal. SC reversed, and admitted Exhibit 14.
DOCTRINE: The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his
attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, containing
admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it
is admissible in evidence. So when papers are offered in evidence, a court will take no
notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally, properly or improperly; nor
will it form a collateral issue to try that question.
James D. Barton (US citizen and resident in the City of Manila)
Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co Ltd (PH corporation whose principal office is in
Cebu): owner of Lucio mine in Leyte, a valuable deposit of bituminous limestone
and other asphalt products
April 21, 1920: William Anderson (president and general manager of the Leyte
Asphalt) addressed a letter (Exhibit A) to Barton:
o Giving Barton sole and exclusive sales agency for their products in
Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania, Saigon, India, Sumatra, Java, China,
Hongkong, Siam and US
o No orders less than 1000 tons of bituminous limestone will be accepted
except under special agreement with Leyte Asphalt
o Prices: 1000 tons (P15/ton), 2000 tons (P14/ton), 5000 tons
(P12/ton) and 10,000 tons (P10/ton)
o But if the sales equal or exceed 10,000 tons in October 1, 1921, the price
will be only P10/ton and the excess paid shall be rebated to Barton
o Barton has full authority to sell said product of the Lucio mine for any
sum he sees fit in excess of the prices quoted above, and such excess in
price shall be his extra and additional profit and commission.
o All ships, steamers, boats or other carriers shall promptly and without
delay and load not less than 1,000 tons each twenty-four hours after
March 1, 1921, unless Leyte Asphalt notifies Barton specifically prior
to that date that they are prepared to load at that rate, and that Leyte
Asphalt shall not be required to ship orders of 5,000 tons except on 30
days notice and 10,000 tons except on 60 days notice.
Barton was also granted the same selling agency for Japan, although not a regular
one until he makes large sales there.
Barton embarked to San Francisco and contracted sub-agency agreements:
o In San Francisco: Ludvigsen & McCurdy (Exhibit K)
o In Australia: Frank B. Smith
Anderson and Barton met in Manila Hotel. Barton informed him that he got an
order of 6000 tons from San Francisco, but Anderson told him to stop taking
orders because Leyte Asphalt lacked capital and adequate facilities. Then Barton
told him he also had big orders for Australia and Shanghai.
3 days later, Barton told Leyte Asphalt to prepare to ship 5000 tons of
bituminous limestone to San Francisco, 5000 tons to Australia.
Leyte Asphalt acknowledged the orders but wrote Barton a letter stating "no
orders can be entertained unless cash has been actually deposited with either
the International Banking Corporation or the Chartered Bank of India, Australia
and China, Cebu."
Barton replied, questioning Leyte Asphalt's right to demand for a cash deposit
and added new orders (10,000 tons to Australia). Then he informed Leyte
Asphalt of more orders from Japan and Australia.
However, Leyte Asphalt still hasn't entertained the orders nor paid him.
Barton filed in COFI Manila to recover damages for breach of contract
($318,563.30) + to secure a judicial pronouncement to the effect that he is
entitled to an extension of the terms of the sales agencies specified in the contract
Exhibit A.
During trial:
o Leyte Asphalt offered Exhibit 14: a carbon copy of a letter dated
June 13, 1921, written by Barton to his attorney, Frank B.
Ingersoll, Esq., of Manila, and in which Barton states, among other
things, that his profit from the San Francisco contract would have
been at the rate of 85 cents (gold) per ton.
o Barton's counsel said he would not object to the introduction of this
carbon copy if Leyte Asphalt's counsel explains how he got the copy of
the letter
o Leyte Asphalt's counsel said he got the letter from Leyte Asphalt's
former attorneys, but without explaining how it came to their
possession.
o So Barton's lawyer said they are objecting to the admission of the
carbon copy until Leyte Asphalt explains how it came to its possession-
- because it is a confidential communication between client and lawyer.
o So judge excluded the document.
CFI absolved Leyte Asphalt from 4 of 6 causes of action -- allowed Barton to
recover $202k for 1st cause of action and $405k for 4th cause of action.
Hence this appeal!
8
ISSUE RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC: WoN the carbon copy (Exhibit 14) is admissible -
YES
Even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which protects
communications between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the
letter came to the hands of the adverse party. And it makes no difference how the
adversary acquired possession.
The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his
attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document,
containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and
reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
Mr. Wigmore: "The law provides subjective freedom for the client by assuring
him of exemption from its processes of disclosure against himself or the attorney
or their agents of communication. This much, but not a whit more, is necessary
for the maintenance of the privilege. Since the means of preserving secrecy of
communication are entirely in the client's hands, and since the privilege is a
derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it
would be improper to extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain
knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the communication,
whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of
the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or
obtains possession of a document in original or copy."
When papers are offered in evidence a court will take no notice of how they
were obtained, whether legally or illegally, properly or improperly; nor
will it form a collateral issue to try that question.
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
MALCOLM, J. (DISSENT)
Majority decision is defective in the following cases:
o It set aside without good reason the fair findings of fact as made by the
trial court and substitutes therefor other findings not warranted by the
proof
o It fails to stress plaintiff's main argument
o It lay downs uncalled for rules which undermine the inviolability
of a client's communications to his attorney.
Re: Exhibit 14
o Whether or not it is improperly rejected would not change the result
one iota.
o The rule set by the majority is destructive of the attorney's
privilege and constitutes and obstacle to attempts at friendly
compromise.
o Uy Chico vs. Union Life Assurance Society: communications made by a
client to his attorney for the purpose of being communicated to
others are not privileged if they have been so communicated.
But here, there is no intimation that Exhibit 14 was sent by
the client to the lawyer for the purpose of being
communicated to others.
o Southern Railway Co. vs. White: statements in a letter to a party's
attorney handed by the latter to the opponent's attorney, are
confidential communications and must be excluded.
REGALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
September 20, 1996 | Kapunan, J. |Privileged Communication
Summary: PCGG field a case against Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth. Among the defendants were Raul Roco and the ACCRA Law Firm. Case alleged that
Cojuangco and defendants conspired in setting up through the use of coco levy funds
numerous banks; that ACCRA acted as dummies. ACCRA performed legal services for
clients, with the incidental services where its members acted as stockholders. In the
process, members of ACCRA acquired information relative to assets of clients and their
personal and business circumstances. PCGG excluded Raul Roco from the complaint as
party-defendant because of his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principals for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder in the companies involved.
Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the exclusion of ACCRA members in the
complaint as party-defendants. MR denied. PETs contend: that the exclusion of Roco as
party-defendant grants him a favourable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged
undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over ACCRA
members; that lawyers are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal.
Doctrine:
An atty is more than a mere agent or servant because he possesses special powers of trust
and confidence reposed on him by his client. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it
amounts to self-incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed, thereby
rendering the right to counsel practically nugatory. An effective lawyer-client relationship
is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client
which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and
flow of information. General rule: a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of his client.
Exception:
1. client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients
name would implicate that client in the very activity which he sought the lawyers advice.
2. the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance.
3. where the nature of the atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is
the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to
be privileged
9
Where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults
atty about it -> falls within the exception. But where client seeks services of an atty for
illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law to commit illegal activities
-> not covered by privilege. Purpose of privilege: to avoid fishing expedition by the
prosecution. There are alternative sources of information available to prosecutor w/c do
not depend on utilizing defendants counsel as source. Duration of protection: exists
not only during relationship but extends even after termination.
Facts:
The matters raised here are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint before
the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the PCGG against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. for the recovery of alleged ill gotten wealth which
includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in the PCGG case
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among
others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members
acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders in the performance of these
services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which
substantiate the clients equity holdings
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm
acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and
private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and
acquisition of the companies included in the case and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees stockholders of the said
corporations involved in the sequestration proceedings
PCGG filed a Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint and Third Amended
Complaint which excluded Raul Roco from the complaint as a party defendant.
PCGG based its exclusion of Roco on his undertaking that he will reveal the
identity of the principals for whom he acted as nominees/stockholder in the
companies involved in the PCGG case
PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:
o The disclosure of the identity of its clients
o Submission of documents substantiating the lawyer client
relationship
o The submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in
favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings
PCGG presented proof to substantiate compliance by respondent Roco of the
conditions precedent to warrant the latters exclusion as party defendant:
1. Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of Roco reiterating a previous
request for reinvestigation by the PCGG
2. Affidavit executed by Roco as Attachment to the letter in (1)
3. Letter of Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices to PCGG on behalf of
Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or reexamination of
the evidence of PCGG against Roco
During the proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in the
PCGG case not had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he
acted as nominee stockholder
Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution denying exclusion of petitioners for
their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG
ACCRA lawyers moved for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by
the respondent Sandiganbayan
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners
ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee
stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency?
Petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co defendants to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients. Respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but
the bigger fish as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the
PCGGs willingness to cut a deal with petitioners
Petitioers are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners
inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to
compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail
these clients
PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them
from the Third Amended Complaint.
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that,
under the facts of this case, the attorney client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their clients and other information
requested by the PCGG?
Nature of lawyer client relationship - one person lets his services and another
hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be
performed, wherein lawyers services may be compensated by honorarium or for
hire,and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could
be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the
contract to the person who requested him
Lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and
lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more
than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and
confidence reposed on him by his client
Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a quasijudicial
office since he is in fact an officer of the Court and exercises his judgment in the
choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him
from any other professional in society. This conception is entrenched and
embodies centuries of established and stable tradition.
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and
confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more
honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or
10
 governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of
the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and
industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the
detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure
enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code
specifically forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any
communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the
course of professional employment.
Rule 130, Section 24
Rule 138, Section 20
Canon 17 of the CPR
Canon 15 of the CPR
In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most
sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were
made to choose between legal representation without effective communication
and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he
might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the
judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high,
or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be
curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this
represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed
innocent is at once self-evident.
The duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners
clients in the case at bar
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in
mystery.Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the
United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
the name or identity of his client
o Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information
is sought to be protected is flesh and blood
o Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney client relationship has
been established
o The privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship
o Due process considerations require that the opposing party should
know his adversary
General rule is qualified by exceptions:
o Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
o Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged.
o Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys
client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would
furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench,
therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions
to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged clients name would lead to
establish said clients connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is
privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the
subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no
attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service
sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself.
The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which
constitutes petitioners ticket to nonprosecution should they accede thereto:
o Disclosure of the identity of its clients
o Submission of documents substantiating the lawyer client
relationship
o The submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in
favor of their cliens covering their respective shareholdings
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part
and parcel of petitioners legal service to their clients. More important, it
constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore,
have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the
very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the clients name
would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case,
where none otherwise exists.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer- client confidential
privilege under the circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of
the client, then it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by
their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the
exercise of their duties.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but
worse, to submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer
relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from
petitioners a link that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict the (client) of a crime.
Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not
requiring that the dropping of party defendants by the PCGG must be based on
reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right
of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law?
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer
and nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it
is sufficient to state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim not
merely outofcourt but also in their Answer to plaintiffs Expanded Amended
Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance
60
of legitimate lawyering. Being similarly situated in this regard, public
respondents must show that there exist other conditions and circumstances
which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from
11
 petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their
decision to sustain the PCGGs dropping of private respondent as a defendant
was his promise to disclose the identities of the clients in question. But they
failed to show and absolutely nothing exists in the records of the case at bar
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the
petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates
the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a
transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated
litigant from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others.
Moreover, the PCGGs demand not only touches upon the question of the identity
of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not
only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional
right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing
expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to recover illgotten
wealth, we will not sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee
and the right against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer- client
confidentiality privilege.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion
It is unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust
reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of incrimination
DAVIDE, Jr., J., Dissenting Opinion
The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer- client relationship is not a cause to
exclude a party.In view of their adamantine position, the petitioners did not,
therefore, allow themselves to be like Roco. They cannot claim the same
treatment, much less compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for nothing
whatsoever. They have no right to make such a demand for until they shall have
complied with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they cannot be
excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss based on the grounds allowed by
law
The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to
exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a witness (24, Rule
130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the appropriate time, i.e., when a
lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness, as when, having taken the
witness stand, he is questioned as to such confidential communication or advice,
or is being otherwise judicially coerced to produce, through subpoenae duces
tecum or otherwise, letters or other documents containing the same privileged
matter.
PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion
Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the attorney-client privilege since the
PCGG is no longer proceeding against them as co-conspirators in crimes, we
should focus on the more specific issue of whether the attorney-client privilege
includes the right not to divulge the identity of a client as contended by the
petitioners. As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does not include the
right of non-disclosure of client identity. The general rule, however, admits of
well-etched exceptions which the Sandiganbayan failed to recognize.
attorney-client privilege is not a magic mantra whose invocation will ipso facto
and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly put, it is not
enough to assert the privilege. The person claiming the privilege or its exceptions
has the obligation to present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of
the privilege.
81_PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR.
and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, July 16, 1997
DQ BY REASON OF MARRIAGE/PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION
------------------------------
Summary: PAREDES obtained a land title. RTC nullified this title after finding that Paredes
had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application.
Consequently, an info for perjury was filed against him in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
but the charge was dismissed without him being arraigned.
He was later investigated by the Tanodbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. His prosecution was recommended. To dismiss the case, PAREDES, his
counsel SANSAET, and court stenographer Honrada forged some Court documents - a
notice of arraignment, and transcripts of stenographic notes during the arraignment - to
support Paredes double jeopardy argument. The case was later dismissed on the ground
of prescription.
Teofilo Gelacio sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the 3 private
respondents for falsification of public documents
SANSAET later agreed to become a State witness regarding this forgery. A motion was then
filed by the People for the discharge of Sansaet as a state witness.
Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege, denied the discharge.
SC reversed this Resolution, opining that the attorney-client privilege does not apply in
this case as the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the
communications made to him at the time Paredes and Honrada, either with the active or
passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents.
Doctrines:
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed,
made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged
communications. Contrarily, communications between attorney and client having to do
with the clients contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not
12
covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications
between attorney and client.
In order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must
be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful
purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.
-----------------------------------
REGALADO, J.
Special civil action for certiorari
FACTS
Mansueto Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur.
Ceferino Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then
Governor of the same province, and is at present a Congressman.
Generoso Sansaet was the counsel of Paredes.
1st Case: In 1976, Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot 3097-A. His application was
approved and an OCT was issued in his favor for that lot.
In 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of Paredes patent and
certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site.
RTC nullified the patent and title after finding that Paredes had obtained the same through
fraudulent misrepresentations in his application.
2nd Case: Consequent to the foregoing judgment, Sangguniang Bayan filed a complaint->
preliminary investigation conducted-> information for perjury was filed against Paredes
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The Provincial Fiscal, however, directed by the Deputy
Minister of Justice, moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of
prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated.
3rd Case: Nonetheless, Paredes was haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary
investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to
influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for
free patent, he had violated S3(a) of RA3019, as amended.1
Tanodbayan recommended the criminal prosecution of Paredes.
Atty. Sansaet filed a MR, alleging that the complaint would constitute double jeopardy for
PAREDES, as he had already been charged in the MuCTC under the same set of facts and
evidence, and had already been jailed until the complaint was dismissed upon the DOJs
recommendation. He added, Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and
the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready reference.
1
Sec. 3(a) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: Persuading,
inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan charging Paredes with a
violation of S3(a) of RA3019, as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense
was later granted, and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription.
4th Case: On Jan 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and
graft charges against Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of
the 3 private respondents for falsification of public documents.
Allegations:
- Honrada, in conspiracy with Paredes and Sansaet, simulated and certified as true copies
certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and
transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on
the perjury charge.
- These falsified documents were annexed to Paredes MR of the Tanodbayan resolution
for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same
would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of
arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in
connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that
said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon was
suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice.
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded
and repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called
Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, Sansaet revealed that:
- Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on
the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by
the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were he later filed in the preliminary investigation
were prepared and falsified by Paredes and Honrada in the house of Paredes.
- he only did so upon the instigation and inducement of Paredes.
Apparently, there was a deal made between the prosecution and Sansaet for the latter to
make these statements and for the former to file a motion to make Sansaet a state witness,
which the prosecution did.
Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege, denied the desired
discharge.
RATIO: lawyer-client relationship existed between Paredes and Sansaet during the
relevant periods, the facts then surrounding the case and other confidential matters must
have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to Sansaet, as his lawyer.
MR was filed->denied.
Hence this petition.
-------------------------------------
offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
13
1 of 3: WON the projected testimony of Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred
by the attorney-client privilege.
Held: No
The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and the
actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule.
A distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes
already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client.
It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are
concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of
the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a
crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the
future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime that
the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional
seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without
the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with
regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for
purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed,
made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged
communications. Contrarily, communications between attorney and client having to do
with the clients contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not
covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications
between attorney and client.
In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are
the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes
at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were
about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the
Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes
to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not
yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present
co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those
communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of
falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It
is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence
of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.
2 of 3: WON an accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a
conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness.
Held: Yes
The rule on the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his
actual and individual participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not
have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused.
The criterion most guilty means the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the
penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of
conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty taking into account a persons degree
of participation in the perpetration of the offense.
3 of 3: WON Sansaet is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.
Held: Yes
Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification
charged in the criminal cases pending before the Sandiganbayan, and the prosecution is
faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents
who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is thus no other
direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity
for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Sansaet
has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules,
detailed the substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable
witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies.
On the final requirement of the Rules (S9, R119 of the RoC), it does not appear that Sansaet
has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the
impugned resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by
petitioner be allowed and given due course by Sandiganbayan.
Lim vs. CA
G.R. no. 91114
Sept. 25, 1992
Davide, Jr., J.
Facts:
- Nelly Lim (petitioner) and Manuel Victorio (private respondent) are lawfully
married to each other. However, on November 1987, private respondent filed
with the RTC a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that
petitioner has been allegedly suffering from schizophrenia before, during, and
after the marriage and until the present.
o Private respondent presented 3 witnesses before taking the witness
stand himself to testify on his own behalf.
- Subsequently, private respondents counsel announced that he would present
the Chief if the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia
Acampado. Said counsel then orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum to require Dr. Acampado to testify.
14
 o Petitioners counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the
testimony sought was privileged communication since the said doctor
had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
o Over such protest, the subpoena was still issued.
- Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and suspend
the proceedings pending resolution of the motion.
o The counsel for private respondent countered that the doctor would be
presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any
information acquired while attending to petitioner in a professional
capacity.
o After a hearing, the TC denied the motion and allowed the doctor to
testify.
- Dr. Acampado testified as an expert witness and was asked hypothetical
questions related to her expertise.
o She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated the
petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the
medicines she prescribed.
- Petitioners counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion be reduced
to writing, so the judge issued the corresponding written order. Some pertinent
parts:
o Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the
Court denied the respondent's motion and forthwith allowed Dr.
Acampado to testify. However, the Court advised counsel for respondent
to interpose his objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony
sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule.
o On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions
to qualify her as an in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion
as to what kind of illnesses are stelazine tablets applied to; she was
asked to render an opinion hypothetical facts respecting certain
behaviours of a person; and finally she admitted she saw and treated
Nelly Lim but she never revealed what illness she examined and treated
her; nor the result of her examination of Nelly Lim; nor the medicines
she prescribed.
- Petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the
aforesaid order of respondent Judge on the ground that it was issued with grave
abuse.
- CA: denied due course on the petition.
o A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a
patients ailment, when can disregard knowledge acquired in attending
such patient and make answer solely on facts related [to] the
hypothetical question.
Hence, this petition (under rule 45)
Held:
- Pertinent rule is Paragraph (C), Section 24 of the Rules on Evidence. SC then
detailed the history of the Rule.
1940 RoC which would tend to blacken the
character of the patient.
1964 RoC (Stricter requirement) which
would blacken the character of the
patient.
1989 RoC (Rule was relaxed by the
substitution of reputation to
character) which would blacken
the reputation of the patient.
o Character vs. Reputation: the former is what a man is, and the latter
is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is. Character depends
on attributes possessed, and Reputation on attributes which others
believe one possess. Character signifies reality, and Reputation is
merely what is accepted t be reality at present.
- This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make
safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their
subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the
end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general
interest of the community.
o May be waived if no timely objection is made to the physicians
testimony.
o In order that the privilege may be claimed, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed
is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics;
3. Such person acquired the information while he
was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;
4. The information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity; and
5. The information was confidential, and, if
disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly
character) of the patient.
o These requisites conform with the four fundamental conditions
necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the
disclosure of certain communications:
1. The communications must originate in a
confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of
the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
15
- The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when
he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus,
only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable
him safely and efficaciously to treat his patient are covered by the
Krohn
privilege.
G.R. no. 108854
o It is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere
fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation
Bellosillo, J.
and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from
disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated.
Facts:
- One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of the requisites. In
this case, petitioner failed to discharge that burden.
o Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness.
She did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her
examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner.
The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem
did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever findings the
doctor obtained while attending to the patient.
There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado's answers to
the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical
problem were influenced by the information obtained from
the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded
whatever information or knowledge she had about the
petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-
patient relationship existing between them.
o It was clear from the Doctors testimony that petitioner was never
interviewed alone.
Information elicited during consultation with a physician in
the presence of third parties removes such information from
the mantle of the privilege. (Some courts held that the casual
presence of a third person destroys confidential nature of said
communication. Other courts have held a contrary rule.)
o Nothing specific or concrete was offered by petitioner to show that
indeed, the information obtained from the Doctors testimony would
blacken the formers reputation.
After all, Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information
obtained from the petitioner regarding the latters ailment
and the treatment recommended therefor.
o While it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral
request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr.
Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the
said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner
makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had
objected to any question asked of the Doctor on the ground that it
elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial
court's advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the
testimony once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be
elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule.
Then, even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr.
Acampado was covered by the privilege, the failure to
seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.
Petition Denied.
vs. CA
Feb. 6, 2007
- 1964: Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr. (Krohn) and Petitioner Ma. Paz
Fernandez Khron (petitioner) married and had three children (Edgar Johannes,
Karl Wilhelm, and Alexandra).
o In 1971, to ease the stress from their marriage, petitioner underwent
psychological testing.
o In 1973, however, they separated in fact.
- 1978: Khron obtained a decree from the Tribunal Metropolitan Matrimoniale in
Manila nullifying his church marriage with petitioner (on the ground of
incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at
the time of the wedding and thereafter).
o Earlier on, he was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric
report on petitioner, and used this in the said tribunal.
- 1990: Khron filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with petitioner
before the TC.
o He cited the confidential psychiatric report in his petition, which
petitioner merely denied in her answer as either unfounded or
irrelevant.
o When Khron took the witness stand and testified as to the contents
thereof, petitioner objected on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient.
o Subsequently, petitioner filed a manifestation expressing her
continuing objection to any evidence that would thwart the said rule,
and thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record that there is no
factual or legal basis for Khron to claim psychological incapacity to
annul their marriage, such ground being completely false, fabricated
and merely an afterthought.
Edgar opposed petitioners motion to disallow the
introduction of the report as evidence, and afterwards moved
to strike out petitioners Statement for the Record.
- TC: overruled petitioners objection and sustained Khrons motion.
o Reasons: because the very issue in the case was WoN petitioner had
been suffering from psychological incapacity, and when the report was
referred to in the complaint, petitioner did not object thereto on the
ground of privileged communication.
- CA: dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners side: Khrons side:
- Since the RoC prohibits a - The rules are very explicit in that
physician from testifying on the prohibition applies only to a
matters which he/she may physician. The rules sanction his
16
 have acquired in attending to a
patient in a professional
capacity, with all the more
reason should a third person, in
this case her husband, be
prohibited from testifying on
the same matter. Basically,
what cannot be done directly
should not be allowed to be
done indirectly.
Held:
testimony considering the - Also, petitioner invoked the rule on privileged communications but never
husband may testify against the questioned the testimony as hearsay. In failing to object the testimony under
wife in a civil case filed by one such ground, counsel waived his right to make such objection, and so evidence
against the other. may be admitted.
- Besides, petitioner waived the
privileged communication rule Decision Affirmed.
when she gave her unconditional
consent to the use of the report
when it was presented to the Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank v Monetary Board (1986)
Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale.
- Also, petitioner failed to
specifically object to the SUMMARY: The RTC issued an Order granting BFs Motion for production, inspection, and
admissibility of the report in her copying of certain papers and records under Sec. 1, Rule 27. Respondents is seeking the
Answer where she merely setting aside of this Order, arguing that said items are privileged. The SC held that the
described the report as either documents are not privileged and constitute or contain evidence material to the issues
unfounded or irrelevant. being inquired into by the Court. It held that Sec. 21, Rule 130, RoC (A) does not apply
because the privilege is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the
protection of public interest. Here, since there is no public interest that would be
prejudiced, the rule is not applicable.

- The discourse presented by petitioner on the privileged communication Facts:

between physician and patient is not doubted, but is not applicable to the
case.
o The privileged communication is intended to inspire confidence in the
patient and encourage him/her to make a full disclosure to his/her
physician of his symptoms and condition, to the end that the physician
may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely to treat his/her
patient.
Consequently, his prevents the physician from making public
information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or
disgrace to the patient.
The physician-patient privilege creates a constitutionally-
protected zone of privacy.
o However, for this privilege to apply, the following must be
present: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person
against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery, or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the
information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and (e) the information was confidential and , if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation of the patient.
In the present case, the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery, or obstetrics.
o Neither can the husbands testimony be considered a circumvention of
the law, because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the
physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
RTC-Makati issued the Order granting the motion of Banco Filipino Savings &
Mortgage Bank [BF] based on Sec. 1, Rule 27, RoC, for the production, inspection, and
copying of certain papers and records which are claimed as needed by BF for the
preparation of its comments, objections, and exceptions to the Conservators report
dated Jan. 8, 1985, and Receivers Report dated March 19, 1985:
(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the
closure of BF and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985
(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the
MB and to Central Bank [CB] Governor Jose Fernandez
(3) Papers showing computations of all the interests and penalties charged by the
CB against BF
(4) Schedule of recommended valuation of reserves per Mr. Tiaoquis report dated
March 19, 1985
(5) Adjustment per Annex C of Mr. Tiaoquis report
(6) Annexes A, B, and C of the joint report of Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and
Mrs. Valenzuela
(7) Schedule of devaluation of CB-premises of Paseo de Roxas of same report
(8) Schedule of BFs realizable assets from P5,159.44 B to P3,909.23 B as of Jan. 25,
1985;
(9) Documents listed in BFs letter to Mrs. Carlota Valenzuela dated Oct. 25, 1985.
o The RTC held that the SCs resolution referring to it the matters relative to the
BFs closure does not preclude BF from availing of this mode of discovery as an
additional means of preparing for the hearing. It considered the above as not
privileged because these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues
inquired into by the Court as these are said to comprise of records of the
administrative proceedings conducted by MBs officials and representatives
17
 from the inception of and preparation of the challenged reports and the
resolution placing BF under receivership and thereafter under liquidation as it is
the regularity and impartiality of these administrative proceedings which are
being assailed by BF
Hence this petition from MB and CB [respodents] praying for the reversal and setting
aside of the above Order. BF filed its Comment, to which MB filed its Reply
Issue: WoN the above enumerated items are privileged NO
Relevant jurisprudence [putting everything because sometimes Maam asks about
cited cases]
o A party is ordinarily entitled to the production of books, documents and papers
which are material and relevant to the establishment of his cause of action or
defense (General Electric Co. v Superior Court in and for Alameda County, cited in
Martin, Rules of Court)
o The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of
documents and the suffiency of their description is one of reasonableness and
practicability (Line Corp. of the Philippines v Moran)
o On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection
of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged
matter, that is, books, papers which because of their confidential and privileged
character could not be received in evidence (27) CJS 224)
o In passing on a motion for discovery of documents, the courts should be liberal
in determining w/n documents are relevant to the subject matter of action
(Hercules Powder Co. v Haas Co., cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court).
o Any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential
should be liberally construed, to have an implied exception for disclosure when
needed in a court of justice (Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, p. 801, citing the
case of Marbury v Madison).
In the light of the jurisprudence above-cited, no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the RTC. The documents are not privileged and constitute or contain
evidence material to the issues being inquired into by the Court.
Items 3 to 9 are the annexes to the Supervision and Examination Sector, Dept. II (SES)
Reports submitted to the respondents which were taken into consideration by them
in closing BF. A copy of the SES Reports was furnished to BF so there is no reason why
the annexes should be withheld.
o Pertinent and relevant, these annexes could be useful and even necessary to
the preparation by BF of its comment, objections and exceptions to the
Conservators reports and receivers reports.
Regarding Item 2, these appear relevant as BF has asserted that the Conservator had
in fact wanted to resume normal operations of BF but then he was thereafter replaced
by Mr. Teodoro. The letter and reports could be favorable or adverse to the case of BF
but whatever the result may be, BF should be allowed to photocopy the same.
Regarding Item 1, respondents contend that it is obvious from Secs. 13 and 15 of the
Central Bank Act) that the subject matter of the deliberations when resolved shall be
made available to the public but the deliberations themselves are not open to
disclosure but are to be kept in confidence. This is erroneous. The deliberations may
be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific
provision in the Central Bank Act, even in Secs. 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits
absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these
are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending before it. The disclosure
is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no indication
that such disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third
parties. Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it
considers as information useful and indispensably needed by it to support its position
in the matter being inquired to by the court below.
Sec. 21, Rule 130, RoC (A) does not apply. This privilege is intended not for the
protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where there is
no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable.
o In the present case, the respondents have not established that public
interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and documents sought
by BF. Considering that BF P was already closed as of Jan. 25, 1985, any
disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this
time pose no danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank
run nor compromise state secrets.
o On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the
documents. Not only the banks and its employees but also its numerous
depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to w/n there was a
valid and legal justification for the BFs closure
o Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in
which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest by
which their legal rights or liabilities are affected (State v Crocket, 206, p. 816
cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).
FILIAL PRIVILEGE
Lee v CA (2010)
Petitioner: Emma Lee
Respondent: CA, RITA LEE, LEONCIO LEE, LUCIA LEE-ONG, JULIAN LEE, MARTIN LEE,
ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL,
VICTORIANO LEE and THOMAS LEE, represented by RITA LEE
Ponente: Abad, J.
Facts:
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the
Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China w/ their 11 children (Lee-
Keh Children)
Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to
serve as housemaid
After Keh died, Lee-Keh children went to NBI to investigate the claim of Tius
children with Lee (collectively, Lees other children) claimed that they, too,
were children of Lee and Keh.
o NBI report: It is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is
certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most
probably TIU CHUAN.
NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the
eldest of the Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who was
recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-
18
 year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the
time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was
born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40
years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital
records of the Lees other children, Kehs declared age did not
coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth
to such other children, numbering eight.
Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion
from the certificate of live birth of Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the
name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers
name.
Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lees presumed mother, to
testify in the case.
o RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena,
claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma
Lees stepmother
o RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and
oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the
obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that
she was Emma Lees mother
CA reversed;
o ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad
testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable
under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
o Also, SC held that Tius advanced age alone does not render her
incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for
that reason must prove that she would be unable to withstand the
rigors of trial, something that Emma Lee failed to do.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in ruling that the TC may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of
entry case that Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of
petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Kehs daughter
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action, obviously,
they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lees other
children, including Emma Lee.
Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lees other
children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have,
therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius testimony
and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to
compel the attendance of such a material witness.
But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come
to court and testify:
1. considering her advance age, testifying in court would subject her to
harsh physical and emotional stresses; and
About five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children
sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the
TC. RTC would have to update itself and determine if Tius
current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of
coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey
the subpoena issued to her.
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject
her to badgering by adverse counsel. TCs duty is to protect every
witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is
especially true where the witness is of advanced age.
2. it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify
against her stepdaughter (r130.25)
In the case at bar, Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that
she is the stepmother of Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to
them because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
o Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending. The former unites the head of the family
with those who descend from him. The latter binds a
person with those from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner
Emma Lee.
81_P vs. Invencion
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131636. March 5, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO
INVENCION y SORIANO, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us for automatic review[1] is the Decision[2] dated 22 September 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9375, finding
accused-appellant Artemio Invencion y Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter Cynthia P. Invencion, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay Cynthia the sum of P50,000 as
moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts
of rape in separate complaints docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9363 to 9375, all dated 17
October 1996. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment Artemio
entered a plea of not guilty in each case.
19
 The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Elven
Invencion, Eddie Sicat, Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio
Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro.
Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School
in Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his
second common-law wife. Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he
was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger
brothers, he was awakened by Cynthias loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father
on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his father put on his
short pants.[3]
Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a
drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever
he was drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino Navarro. [4]
Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang
Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that on the second week of March 1996, between 6:00 and
7:00 a.m., while he was passing by the house of Artemio on his way to the field to catch
fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped through a small opening in the destroyed
portion of the sawaliwall of Artemios house. He saw Cynthia lying on her back and crying,
while her father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie observed them for
about fifteen seconds, and then he left and proceeded to the field to catch fish.[5] He
reported what he had witnessed to Artemios stepfather, Celestino, later that morning.[6]
Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio,
testified that she and Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February
1969. Out of their common-law relationship, they had six children, one of whom was
Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted ways permanently. Later, Gloria and her
children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When Artemios mother died sometime in 1996, Cynthia
lived with Artemio in a small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino and located
in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac.[7] On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told
her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia
about her condition. The latter confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father.
Gloria then went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and
reported what Artemio had done to their daughter Cynthia.[8]
Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia
on 16 September 1996. She found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have
incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8 oclock positions, which could have been
caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign body inserted in her private part.[9]
Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia,
accompanied by her mother, complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando
Vergara that she was raped by her father Artemio. She then executed a written
statement,[10] which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Canlas.[11]
The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty.
Isabelo Salamida, took the witness stand and testified for the defense. He declared that on
24 June 1997 (the same day when he testified before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00
a.m., he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog. The
hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its windows were shut. When he went
around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on the front and left and
right sides of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his
children used to sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was dark inside.[12] Atty.
Salamida then concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth
when he declared having seen what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a
small opening in the sawali wall of the house in the early morning sometime on the second
week of March 1996.
On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live was a
small hut with some destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When she went there to visit
her children sometime in December 1995, there was a hole in front and at the sidewall of
the hut facing a vacant lot where people passed by to fish in a nearby brook.[13] When she
went to the place again sometime in September 1996 after she was informed of Cynthias
pregnancy, she noticed that the destroyed portions of the huts sawali walls were not yet
repaired.[14]
The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified that
he is the owner of the small house where Artemio and his children used to reside. At the
time that Artemio and his children, including Cynthia, were living in that house, the huts
old sawali walls had some small holes in them, thus confirming the testimony of Eddie
Sicat. After Artemio was arrested on the basis of Cynthias complaint before the NBI,
Celestino made some repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing galvanized iron
sheets to cover the holes at the destroyed portions of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a person
named Alvin occupied the house.[15]
In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court convicted Artemio in Criminal
Case No. 9375. It, however, acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of evidence.
In his Appellants Brief, Artemio contends that the trial court erred in
I
... BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II
NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE [HIS]
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that
Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section
20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[16] Besides, Elvens testimony appears not to be his
but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as the questions asked were mostly leading
questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was
cruel to him.
In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
Artemio points to the following inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as to the time of
the commission of the crime, Elven testified having seen Artemio on top of his sister one
night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified having seen them in the same
position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m.in the second week of March 1996; (2) as to the
20
residence of Cynthia in 1996, Gloria testified that the former was living with her in Guimba
from November 1995 to September 1996, while Elven and Eddie declared that she was in
Sapang Tagalog in March 1996; and (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr., Gloria stated
that he was living with the appellant, but later she declared that he was living with her in
Pura.
Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at
daytime, it was impossible for Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly doing pumping motion
on top of Cynthia. In his Reply Brief, he likewise urges us to disregard the testimonies of
rebuttal witnesses Celestino and Gloria. According to him, Celestino had an ax to grind
against him (Artemio) because he had been badgering Celestino for his share of the lot
where the hut stands, which was owned by Artemios deceased mother. On the other hand,
Gloria wanted to get rid of Artemio because she was already cohabiting with another man.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the
affirmation of Artemios conviction and sentence, but recommends that a civil indemnity
in the amount of P75,000 be awarded in addition to the awards of moral and exemplary
damages.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the culpability
of Artemio.
It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of the witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the
witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry
flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter
of a reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or
full realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien.[17] This rule, however,
admits of exceptions, as where there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence
that has been ignored or misconstrued by the court, or where the trial court has acted
arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts.[18] We do not find any of these exceptions in the
case at bar.
As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section
25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,[19] otherwise known as the rule on filial privilege. This
rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or
disqualified to testify against an ascendant.[20] The rule refers to a privilege not to testify,
which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower
court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial
privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was
testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only to tell the truth. [21]
Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecutions act of propounding leading
questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court[22] expressly allows
leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years like Elven.
The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves
scant consideration. Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by
the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a
public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the
despoiler of his sisters virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger
or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly pressured
or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that where
there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is
entitled to full credence.[23]
We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the
rape was committed, i.e., during the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and
7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie. The exact time or date of the commission of rape is
not an element of the crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the
rape by the accused has been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to
minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for
acquittal.[24] In this case, we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed, committed as
testified to by Elven and Eddie.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair
the credibility of these witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they are minor
inconsistencies, which do not affect the credibility of the witnesses. We have held in a
number of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor
and insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses credibility.[25] On the contrary, they
may even be considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the
material points in the testimonies. What is important is that the testimonies agree on
essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent whole.[26]
Artemios allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to have seen and
witnessed the crime because the room was dark even at daytime was convincingly
disputed by rebuttal witnesses Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro. Furthermore, as
observed by the OSG, even if the hut was without electricity, Elven could not have been
mistaken in his identification of Artemio because he had known the latter for a long time.
Moreover, Elven was at the time only two meters away from Cynthia and Artemio. Even
without sufficient illumination, Elven, who was jostled out of his sleep by Cynthias loud
cry, could observe the pumping motion made by his father.[27]
The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not sufficiently
proved. Nothing in the records suggests any reason that would motivate Gloria to testify
falsely against Artemio, who is the father of her other children. Moreover, we have
repeatedly held that no mother would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and
trauma attendant to the prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire
to have the person responsible for her childs defilement incarcerated.[28] As for Celestino,
he testified that the lot where the hut stands is owned by his daughter Erlinda, and not by
Artemios mother.[29] At any rate, even without Celestinos testimony, Artemios conviction
would stand.
The remaining issue for our resolution is the correctness of the penalty of death
imposed by the trial court. The death penalty was imposed because of the trial courts
appreciation of the special qualifying circumstances that Artemio is the father of the victim
and the latter was less than 18 years old at the time the crime was committed.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which is the
governing law in this case, pertinently reads:
21
Article 335. When and how rape is committed.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
...
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on a
daughter, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender, which are
special qualifying circumstances, must be alleged in the complaint or information and
proved by the prosecution during the trial by the quantum of proof required for
conviction. The accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 9375 reads as
follows:
That on or about the month of March 1996 at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused Artemio S. Invencion did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by using force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of his daughter
Cynthia P. Invencion who was sixteen (16) years old, in their house.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[30]
Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the complaint
and duly established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the complaint regarding
her age was not clearly proved.
In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,[31] we set the guidelines in appreciating
age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of
birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age,
the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was
presented and offered in evidence to prove Cynthias age. The statement in the medical
certificate showing Cynthias age is not proof thereof, since a medical certificate does not
authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover, pursuant to Pruna, Glorias
testimony regarding Cynthias age was insufficient, since Cynthia was alleged to be 16
years old already at the time of the rape and what is sought to be proved is that she was
then 18 years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even make a categorical finding on
Cynthias minority. Finally, the silence of Artemio or his failure to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding Cynthias age could not be taken against him.
It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and
final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly
subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.[32] Accordingly, in the
absence of sufficient proof of Cynthias minority, Artemio cannot be convicted of qualified
rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only be convicted of simple rape
and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the amount
of P50,000 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are insufficient. Civil
indemnity, which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape,[33] should also be
awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the victim shall not be less than P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in
Criminal Case No. 9375 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that that accused
22
Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as indemnity; P50,000 as moral
damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
82_P v Reyes
People v Reyes
- Pedro Reyes, Severino Austria and Vicente Gatchalian were accused in two
separate cases for the murders of Benjamin Nery and Alfredo Laguitan, and the
physical injuries of Francisco Orsino. At the beginning of the joint trial, the
fiscal moved for and was granted the dismissal of the case as against Reyes, so
that he may be used as a prosecution witness.
- Austria and Gatchalian were found guilty, and have since appealed to the SC.
The records of the CFI showed:
o That there was a religious celebration in Arayat, Pampanga.
o When the Pabasa (reading of the story of the Crucifixion), herein
appellants assisted by Marcelo & Gervasio Due (at large), armed with
pistols, approached the victims, members of the Military Police (MP),
who were peaceably seated and unarmed. They drove them down the
road at gunpoint and shot them from the back, leaving them lying on
the ground.
o The attackers were Huks, the motive of the killing being the enmity
between them and the MP.
- Evidence of prosecution:
o Eusebio Perez testimony: He attended the Pabasa, heard explotions
while he was eating, and ran. The next day, he says he saw 3 people
including Austria who told him they were going to hide as they were
involved in a shooting.
o Pedro Reyes testimony: That he saw the victims & accused at the
Pabasa, where the Huks invited him to speak to the MPs, that he
refused, and later heard several blasts. Due to this, he ran to the rice
field and saw the Gervasio & Gatchalian talking about how they were
certain the MP they shot would die.
This was inconsistent with some of his earlier statements
made via affidavit Exhibit A, where he stated that Gerevasio,
Gatchalian and Austria approached 3 MPs, lined them up on
the road, and then shots were heard.
However, it could be gathered from his testimony in open
court that Gatchalian was one of the assailants, the
conversation he overheard admissible as part of the res
gestae.
o Orsinos Testimony: As one of the victims, he narrated the incident
substantially as Reyes did, but could only identify Austria as his
assailant personally.
o Lt. Fidel Martinez & Secundino Quintans testified: Gatchalian
admitted before them, while under investigation, that he had
shot one of the MPs. He even showed how he had them from the
back, and posed for a picture (Exhibit H).
Quintans further asserted that Austria had voluntarily
signed the confession Exhibit E, where he admitted to
being at the area of the incident, that he forced the MPs
to come with them at gunpoint, and that upon hearing
shots from his companions, also shot the soldier with
him.
SC: Affirms CFI, satisfied with the evidence and ruling that the accuseds defense of alibi
is weak. Not much discussion.
Dissenting; J. Perfecto
- Evidence is far too weak to convict beyond reasonable doubt:
o Eusebio Perez testimony was incredible: why would someone who
wanted to hide tell you they were.
o Pedro Reyes testimony cannot be taken seriously, not only because it
comes from a polluted source, but also because it is inherently
unbelievable that the shooters would be so reckless as to make
comments on the results of the shooting, near the scene, and within
his hearing. According to Reyes, the shooters scattered after the
shooting, but he still managed to overhear their conversation??
o Orsinos testimony would only incriminate Austria, but serious doubts
if he could because according to him, the assailant was wearing a buri
hat, and according to several witnesses, the night was dark. In fact,
when Orsino was confronted by Austria in the fiscals office, he could
not identify him Austrias testimony on this matter, brought up on
cross-examination by the fiscal, is uncontradicted.
Though he testified that the shooting took place in front of
the pabasa, only Orsino allegedly was an eyewitness? This is
incredible.
o Lt. Martinez & Quintans supposed oral admissions are valueless
because of the uncontradicted testimonies of both appellants to
the effect that they were tortured, maltreated, and threatened to
be killed. In fact, to make the intimidation more effective, they
prepared 3 shovels to dig the graves intended for appellants.
Neither Martinez nor Quintans ever testified again to
rebut these declarations of the appellants as to the
intimidation & torture that they were subjected to,
which shown visible and tangible marks on their bodies in
black spots and scars.
o As for Austria, not only was he not arrested, he surrendered himself
upon learning he was being sought by the MPs not conduct from one
with a guilty conscience, but from a person with nothing to be afraid
of.
23

US v Bay (1914)
Admissions and Confessions
Carson, J.
DOCTRINE: In cases of rape, it is the duty of the courts to scrutinize with the
utmost care the story told by the complaining witness and the witnesses called
to corroborate her, especially when it appears either that the offended party did
not make immediate outcry or that there was any unexplained delay in
instituting criminal proceedings.
FACTS:
Florentina Alcones and Servando Bay are neighbors. At about 7pm on June 7,
1913, Alcones turned from her rice field when she was suddenly joined by Bay.
They were at a short distance from the mouth of the Subaan River when he
caught hold of her, picked her up, and carried her to the edge of some thickets.
At this point, he threw her on the ground and attempted to have carnal
intercourse with her.
She resisted which angered him so he drew his dagger and forced her to accede
to his desires under threat of her life.
Several people who were passing on a boat near the place where the crime
committed heard her cries and went ashore. Upon seeing Bay get up from the
place where the crime was allegedly committed, one of them asked, Whats
this?
Bay made no explanation of his conduct or his presence there and left the place.
Immediately after, the woman, accompanied by the persons from the boat, went
to a councilman of the barrio and made a complaint.
Bay, after having been brought before the councilman and asked if he had
committed the crime charged, admitted that he had. He was sent after to the
justice of the peace, who held him for trial.
CFI: convicted him of the crime of rape
Bays counsel stresses the apparent contradiction and inconsistencies in the
testimony of some of the witnesses for the prosecution
o Trial court erred in accepting the testimony of the complaining witness
and those called to corroborate her.
o Points to the inherent improbability of the story told by Alcones, who
appears to be more than twice the age of the accused, and is anything
but attractive in personal appearance (dafuq)
o Crime of rape is a pure fabrication brought about Alcones for the sole
purpose of wreaking her vengeance and to spite the accused, with
whom she had a quarrel over the trespass of one of his carabaos on her
land.
ISSUE/S:
WoN the trial court erred in convicting the accused: NO
o It is true that there are some apparent contradictions and
inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the witnesses for the
prosecution and it is difficult to comprehend how the accused (young
married man) could lose all sense of right and decency as to assault a
woman not only so much older, but also a neighbor and an old family
friend.
However, the evidence presented by the prosecution
supported by the witnesses is so convincing and conclusive.
o Convictions for the crime of rape should not be sustained without clear
and convincing proof of the guilt of the accused. The Court also noted
that unfounded charges of rape/attempted rape have been done by
women due to sinister/ulterior motives. It is the Courts duty to
scrutinize with care the story told by the witnesses especially when
there was no immediate outcry or there is a delay in the filing of
charges.
It appears that Alcones sought assistance and filed a
complaint immediately after the commission of the crime.
This precludes the possibility of a conspiracy between herself
and other witnesses.
o There is no doubt that the persons in the boat who passed the deserted
place where the crime was committed were attracted by the cries for
help by Alcones. She could not have expected them to arrive. She also
went immediately to the councilman to file a complaint immediately
thereafter.
o There is a direct conflict in the testimony as to whether the accused
admitted his guilt when the complaint was filed with the councilman.
Whatever the truth to this matter is, the evidence leaves no
room for doubt that at any time was the charge made by
Alcones a pure fabrication.
There can be no doubt that he was present when the party on
the boat were attracted by Alcones cries, and when he was
before the councilman. An innocent man would instantly
repudiate the accusations and would establish his innocence,
but there is no slightest indication that there were
denials/protests on the part of Bay.
HELD: Trial court judgment AFFIRMED.
Datoon vs. Kapili
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2247
March 2, 2011
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
- Jocelyn Datoon (Datoon) averred that on Dec. 11, 2008, at around 3 am, she was
in the labor room of Salvacion Oppuz Yniguez Hospital (SOYMH), waiting to give
birth. She was accompanied by her father Jose Gagan (Gagan).
24
 o Suddenly, they were disturbed by Judge Bethany Kapili (Judge Kapili)
who appeared to be drunk (with his face reddish and his sleepy). He
entered the labor room with a gun tucked at his waist. He was calling
out Lor, Lor, looking for his wife, Dr. Lorna Kapili (Dr. Kapili), a
practicing obstrecian-gynecologist.
o Not seeing his wife, he left and entered the delivery room. He came back
a few minutes later, during which Datoon was crying because of labor
pains. Judge Kapili allegedly pointed his gun at her and asked Whats
your problem? This caused Datoon to cry hysterically while saying
Please dont sir, have pity.
o At that moment, a woman entered the room and informed Judge Kapili
of the whereabouts of his wife, after which he left.
o Because of the incident, Datoon was said to have been unable to go
through normal delivery and had to undergo caesarian operation
instead.
o She then filed the case for Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the
Judiciary, and Gross Misconduct Amounting to Violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
- Judge Kapili: admitted being at SOYMH at that date, but denied having a gun.
o He related that he received several phone calls from a woman patient
who was looking for his wife, Dr. Kapili. He tried to contact his wife by
telephone, but she failed to answer, prompting him to proceed to the
hospital to look for her with his security escort, PO2 Jimmy
Ganosa (PO2 Ganosa), whose Affidavit was attached to the Comment.
o At the hospital, Judge Kapili instructed PO2 Ganosa to proceed to his
mother-in-law's house to check if his wife was there. He then
proceeded to the labor room where he saw Datoon who appeared to be
in pain and was surprised by his appearance.
He was irked by her reaction so he approached her to ask
what her problem was.
o He asserted that he did not have a gun and was instead carrying a clutch
bag, which Datoon might have mistaken as containing a firearm.
o He also denied that Gagan was in the room, as it was only Datoon and
the midwife Ermelinda Costillas, who was the one who informed him
that his wife was resting in the Doctors lounge. The affidavit of the
midwife was attached to the Judge Kapilis comment.
o He is of the belief that this is a ploy from the Hospital Administrator
Cielveto Almario (Almario) in retaliation for the various letters he
wrote to the hospital management and to various govnt agencies
criticizing the services of the hospital.
- Verified reply of Datoon: Judge Kapili (who came from an influential family) had
been sending her emissaries to convince her to drop the complaint. Also, Judge
Kapili did not deny the claim that he was drunk that night.
- Rejoinder of Judge Kapili: claimed that Datoon told a co-worker, Flordeliza
Marcojos, that he did not really point a gun at her and that Datoon was made to
sign an already-prepared complainant in exchange for employment in the
government office.
o He admitted sending persons to contact Datoon and her father, but it
was only to meet them, not to harass them.
o Also, according to one Orit, it was Gagan who was asking for P150K to
drop the case.
o Both Marcojos and Orits affidavits were attached to the Rejoinder.
- Sur-Rejoinder of Datoon: Basically denied the arguments in the Rejoinder.
- Datoon testified on her own behalf but presented no other witnesses; Judge
Kapili, on the other hand, presented 3 witnesses:
o Judge Paler-Gonzalez: testified that when she met with Datoon, the
latter told her that the complaint and affidavit were already prepared
by Almario, and that she was not certain of the truth of her statements
because she was experiencing labor at that time.
o Efledo Hernandez, executive assistant to the Governor: talked to
Datoon to verify reports about certain persons extorting from Judge
Kapili. Datoon was said to have stated that the Judge never pointed a
gun at her and that she did not know who prepared the affidavit.
o Rodulfo Orit, kagawad: testified that he went to house of Gagan to
convey the wish of the Judge to talk to them. Gagan told him that for
P150K, they would agree to meet him.
- Investigating Judge Alino-Hormachuelos: recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit.
Held:
- The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Judge. Charges against the Judge not sufficiently substantiated by Datoon.
o Datoons testimony was uncorroborated. Although she has the affidavit
of her father, still, she did not present him as witness to corroborate
her statement, nor was the woman (who entered the room and told
Judge the location of his wife) presented as witness.
o Datoons testimony replete with inconsistencies.
Complaint and affidavit: Judge was holding the gun
Testimony: carrying the gun at his waist, and that later, when
the Judge re-entered the room, he was pointing the gun at her.
o Highly unlikely that her crying would cause the Judge to pull a gun at
her when he knows hes in a labor room. In short, against human nature
and experience.
o Datoon only surmised that Judge Kapili was drunk because his face was
flushed and his eyes were sleepy. It was the natural state of his face
(flushed), and that it was 3am then and so his eyes were
understandably sleepy. Datoon also admitted that she did not smell of
alcohol at that time.
o Datoon failed to address the testimonies of the two witnesses
(Judge Paler-Gonzales and Hernandez) about her said admission
to them (separately) that she signed the complaint and affidavit
without meeting the lawyers who prepared the same.
Section 26, Rule 130: admissions of a party may be given
in evidence against him or her. Datoons admission
against her interest, as narrated by two credible and
neutral witnesses, militates against the credibility of her
charges. The presumption is that no person would
25
 declare anything against himself unless such declaration
were true.
Complaint Dismissed.
Heirs of Pedro Clemea y Zurbano v Heirs of Irene B. Bien
Summary: Respondents predecessor filed 2 consolidated cases for recovery of
possession and ownership over 3 parcels of land (but only 1 is in issue in the present case)
against petitioners predecessor, alleging that she is the owner of the land by virtue of a
deed of sale and that Pedro ZC unlawfully took possession of the subject land. In his
answer, Pedro ZC alleged that the land was his and that it was in his exclusive possession.
After the orginal parties died, the herein parties substituted them. The RTC ruled in favor
of petitioners, but on reconsideration, ruled that neither of the parties were able to
substantiate their claims of ownership. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of respondents.
Petitioners appealed the grant of damages to respondents as compensation for their
(respondents) having been deprived of possession and the owners share in the harvest,
alleging that they (petitioners) never took possession of the land.
Held: Petitioners predecessor statement in his answer that the subject land was in his
exclusive possession, insofar as it confirmed the allegation in the complaint that he had
retained possession of the subject land, took on the character of a judicial admission
contemplated in Rule 129.4. As substituting defendants, petitioners were bound by the
admission of their predecessor in the litigation.
Facts:
A ~20,644 sqm land located in Bolo, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay, described in Tax
Declaration No. 5299 (TD 5299), was one of three lots involved in 2 consolidated
cases for recovery of possession and ownership filed by Irene B. Bien [Irene] (through
her attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea) against Pedro Clemea y Zurbano [Pedro ZC].
The complaint alleged:
o Irene is the absolute owner the land through a deed of sale from Victoriano Napa
o Napa acquired the same by purchase from Francisco Barrameda who also bought
the said land from the administrator of the estate of Pedro Clemea y Conde
[Pedro CC] which sale had been duly authorized and approved
o Pedro ZC, since he was removed as administrator of the Estate of Pedro CC,
deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the possession and use of the said
land and refused to relinquish its possession, notwithstanding the fact that he
has no right or any color of title over the said land
o By reason of this, Irene will suffer damages and in fact has suffered damages
beginning Oct. 1943 harvest at the rate of 25 cavans of palay per harvest or
50 cavans yearly
In his answer, Pedro ZC alleged that the land was his and that it was in his exclusive
possession. His claim of ownership was similarly based on a sale by the estate of the
late Pedro CC to his predecessor-in-interest.
Neither one of the original parties lived to see the end of the trial, which lasted for
decades; they were both subsequently succeeded by herein petitioners and
respondents.
Eventually, the cases were re-raffled to Branch 2, RTC-Legaspi City
RTC rendered a decision, declaring petitioners to be the absolute owners of
the subject land described and directing respondents to respect petitioners
possession thereof
Subsequently, the RTC reconsidered its findings with respect to ownership and ruled
that the contending parties failed to prove their respective claims of ownership and
therefore the land in question still belonged to its original owner, the estate of Pedro
CC.
Respondents appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTCs resolution of the issues relating to the other two parcels of
land but reversed the ruling on the ownership of the subject land. It also awarded
respondents P118k in damages as compensation for their having been deprived of
possession and the owners share in the harvest, based on the ff findings:
o The recovered exhibits of respondents clearly indicate that ownership of the
subject land belongs to them by virtue of the documents of sale.
o The remaining issue to be determined is the amount of damages sustained by
respondents from petitioners retention of possession.
Gregorio Clemea testified on the damages incurred from in the form of
deprivation of the owners share of the harvest. He likewise testified on the
changes in the price of a cavan of palay over the years. Thus, the computation of
damages was:
P1.5k (50 cavans x 2 [the number of harvests in a year] x P15) x 27 years (1943-
1970) + P2.7k (50 cavans x 2 [the number of harvests in a year] x P25) x 31 years
(1971-2001) = P118k
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition for
review on certiorari
Petitioners no longer dispute respondents ownership of the subject land,
but they insist that they cannot be held liable for the harvest because (1)
they never took possession of the subject land and (2) the evidence the CA
relied on to determine the amount of damages, proceeding as it did from one
of the plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could not have been a proper
basis for such an award.
Issue: WoN the computation of the award of damages was proper YES
On petitioners 1st contention
o Petitioners predecessor Pedro ZC alleged in his answer that the subject land was
in his exclusive possession. That statement, insofar as it confirmed the allegation
in the complaint that petitioners predecessor had retained possession of the
subject land, took on the character of a judicial admission contemplated in Rule
129.4. As substituting defendants, they were bound by the admission of their
predecessor in the litigation. Without any showing that the admission was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners
cannot now contradict it.
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot
thereafter contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare instances
26
 when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and because of strong
reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of
his admission.
The rule on judicial admissions found its way into black-letter law only in
1964 but its content is supplied by case law much older and in many
instances more explicit than the present codal expression.
Irlanda v. Pitargue: acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot
be contradicted unless it can be shown that the admission was made
through palpable mistake
Ramirez v. Orientalist Co.: An admission made in a pleading can not
be controverted by the party making such admission; and all proof
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should
simply be ignored by the court, whether objection is interposed by the
opposite party or not
Cunanan v. Amparo: the allegations, statements, or admissions contained
in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary to, or inconsistent with, his
pleading
o This is question of fact which cannot be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari as the remedy is confined to pure questions of law. Petitioners invoke
a number of the exceptions, namely: 1) the factual findings of the trial court and
the CA are contradictory; (2) the decision sought to be reviewed is against the
law and in complete disregard of the rules on evidence; (3) there was grave abuse
of discretion in the appreciation of facts; and (4) the CA failed to notice relevant
facts and evidence which if properly considered would justify a different
conclusion. But the case does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Petitioners have shown no contradiction between the findings of the CA
and the RTC on the matter
The conclusiveness of Pedro ZCs admission of the fact of possession makes
the rest of the grounds invoked by petitioners undeserving of even passing
consideration.
On the 2nd contention
o Not infrequently, the term self-serving evidence is employed as a weapon to
devalue and discredit a partys testimony favorable to his cause. That, it seems,
is the sense in which petitioners are using it now. This is a grave error. Self-
serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its
proponents interest. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or
declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of
court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in
court. Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay
evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party
and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and
fabrication. In contrast, a partys testimony in court is sworn and subject to
cross-examination by the other party, and therefore, not susceptible to an
objection on the ground that it is self-serving.
o At any rate, for all their protestations against the use of Gregorios testimony,
petitioners never once alleged, much less tried to show, that his testimony was
inaccurate or untrue. As already observed, petitioners objection is founded
solely on the mere fact that he, being a plaintiff, was a witness interested in the
outcome of the case. While it is true that a partys interest may to some extent
affect his credibility as a witness, the Court cannot subscribe to the view, implicit
in petitioners argument, that a partys testimony favorable to himself must be
disregarded on account solely of his interest in the case.
o Moreover, in National Development Company v. Workmens Compensation
Commission, it was held that interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a
partys testimony. Elsewhere it has been said that the interest of a witness does
not ipso facto deprive his testimony of probative force or require it to be
disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness
testimony as he finds credible and to reject the rest.
DBP POOL V. RADIO MINDANAO
Facts:
Radio Mindanao filed a case against DBP (petitioner) and Provident Insurance
Corp. for recovery of insurance benefits.
Radio Mindanao owns several broadcasting stations all over the country.
Provident covered their transmitter equipment and generating set for Php
13.550M under a fire insurance policy, while DBP covered respondents
transmitter, furniture, fixture, and other transmitter facilities for the amount of
Php 5, 883, 650 under a fire insurance policy as well.
Radio Mindanaos radio station located in SSS Building, Bacolod was razed by a
fire causing damage in the amount of Php 1,044,040. Radio Mindanao sought
recovery under the 2 insurance policies. The claims were denied on the ground
that the cause of the loss was an excepted risk excluded in the policy.
o Company claims that the fire was caused by members of the CPP/NPA.
This prompted Radio Mindanao to file the civil case.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Radio Mindanao.
CA: Affirmed the decision but reduced the interest rate to 6% pa.
o Both courts found that petitioner was not able to prove that the instant
case falls under the excepted risks mentioned in the policy. The police
blotter did not categorically state that the 20 armed men who burned
the station were CPP/NPA members. They were only believed to be or
suspected to be members. Even Rochas, a policeman who testified,
admitted that he was not sure that the said armed men were members
of the CPP/NPA. The only witness who testified that they were
CPP/NPA members was Torres. However, his testimony canot be
conclusive proof since he did not personally see the armed men as he
tried to pursue them. Also, he was presened as an ordinary witness and
not an expert witness. Hence, his opinion on the identity or
membership of the armed men is not admissible. With respect to Celso
Magsilang, who claims to be a member of NPA-NIROC, being an
admission of person which is not a party to the present action, is
likewise inadmissible under Sec. 22, Rule 130.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues and Held:
27
 WoN the CA erred in sustaining the RTC decision- NO. talk to one another and exchange information, not to mention theories
o The Court will not disturb factual findings absent compelling or and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting situations
exceptional reasons. Petitioner was not able to show exceptional where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained
circumstances that would warrant departure from the above findings. whether these utterances were the products of truth.
o DBP: it is Radio Mindanao who has the burden of proving that the cause
of the damage/loss is covered by the insurance policy, as stipulated in
the insurance policy: Ruling:
In any action, suit or other proceeding where the Companies
Petition dismissed.
allege that by reason of the provisions of this condition any
loss or damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of
87_People v Aling
proving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the
Insured. 88_People v Villarino
o Court: The burden of proof contemplated by the provision actually
refers to the burden of evidence. As applied in the case, it refers to the
duty of the insured to show that the loss or damage is covered by the
policy.
o Burden of Proof- duty of any party to present evidence to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law, which is
preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
o Insurance: an insurer seeking to defeat a claim because of an exception
or limitation in the policy has the burden of proving that the loss comes
within the purview of the exception or limitation set up.
Consequently, it is sufficiently for private respondent to
prove the fact of damage or loss. Once it makes out a prima
facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts
to petitioner to controvert respondents prima facie case.
o Unfortunately, petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
o DBP: Insists that the evidence on record established the identity of the
author of the damage. The lower courts erred in not appreciating the
reports of Torres and Rochar that the bystanders they interviewed
claimed that the perpetrators were members of the CPPNPA as an
exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae. 89_People v Valero
o Court: A witness can only testify as to facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from People v Valero Case of deaf-mute Valero allegedly ordered by sister to give poisoned bread
his perception. Otherwise, such is hearsay and may not be admitted. to Velasco children. Witnesses were inconsistent and testimonies were hearsay.
o Res Gestae- refers to those exclamations and statements made by Nature of case/Procedure: Two separate complaints: one of double murder and other of
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately frustrated murder. After PI, complaint against Alfonsito Valero alias Pipe was dismissed
before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the on the ground that he was deaf-mute. Lucila Valero, sister of Pipe, as sole defendant.
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the Ceferino and Demetria Velasco had 5 children. On Feb 22, 1969, 3 of the children
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate ate bread containing endrin, a commercial insecticide. A result of which, Michael
and to fabricate a false statement. (9 months) and Annabel (1yr and 9 months) died, while Imelda (another minor
o The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res child as age not stated) would have died as well but she had timely medical
gestae. While it may concede that these statements were made by the assistance.
bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said however,
that these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders Prosecution Defense COURT
and before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood Poisoned bread was given to When the police
o Rochar and Torres received the bystanders statements when they were the children by Pipe and that investigated the
making their investigations during and after the fire, hence the it was Lucila who gave it to premises of the
bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, Pipe to give to the children. house of Ceferino
28
Velasco in the 3 witnesses
morning of Rodolfo Quilang: He was an INCONSISTENT little shit
February 22, He saw Lucila and eleventh-hour that even made the judge
1969, they found Pipe at the balcony witness! explode an expletive in
not only one of their house (Webster: the Tagalog because
pandesal but Testified that he latest possible In his self-contradictory
"several sliced saw Lucila deliver time before it is statements:
pan" scatterred in something wrapped too late) Affidavit dated
the sala, near the in a piece of paper to Mar 8, 1972: he
balcony, and Pipe with alleged stated he actually
under the instruction by sign saw Pipe deliver
balcony. language to deliver the wrapped
Defendants the same to the object to the
testimony, not Velasco children children
rebutted by the But he never saw Cross-exam on
prosecution, what was inside the Sept 15, 1975: he
Ceferino Velasco, paper said he did not
who was her really see because
tenant, dipped he was already
sliced pieces of departing from the
bread in endrin place; he was in
dried them up and the act of leaving
used them as bait Velascos gate
in his barn. where he was
At 6:00 o'clock in standing when
the morning of Pipe was entering
February 22, the gate of Velasco
1969, Ceferino In other portions of the
Velasco threw record:
into a nearby First statement
river a long string was dated March
of poisoned rats. 8, 1972 but he
Three puppies insited that he
died of poisoning testified on Feb 23,
under the 1969 and that
balcony. The rats, either the Fiscal or
the dogs, or the one acting on
maybe even his his behalf
minor children committed the
must have found error in indicating
the poisoned the date
slices of bread Court thinks it is
somewhere in the incredible jurat
barn or in the postdates 3 years
house, scattered later
them, and the Likely that he is an
children, not eleventh-hour
knowing the witness as when
danger of the the complaints
poison, ate them. were filed, he was
29
 not listed as one of from Pipe after such evidence
the several interviewing him by likewise violates
witnesses. It was signlanguage the principle of res
only 6 years after Pipe himself as not inter alios acta.
which he became presented The rights of a
star witness Excerpts of party cannot be
testimony which prejudiced by an
Federica Jaime (uncle of the The evidence is VAA may ask: Upon act, declaration, or
mother of the victims) purely seeing Ponsito I omission of
Claimed they hearsay.The asked him what was another.
learned or obtained presentation of that and he To the testimony
the information such evidence answered me that it of Ceferino, its
from Pipe after likewise violates was a piece of bread admission cannot
interviewing him by the principle of and he told me that be justified by
signlanguage res inter alios she was the one who claiming that it is
Pipe himself as not acta. The rights of caused the giving of a part of the res
presented a party cannot be the bread, sir. gestae. When Pipe
Excerpts of prejudiced by an (witness pointing to allegedly revealed
testimony which act, declaration, or the accused Lucila to Ceferino
VAA may ask: I was omission of Valero)..After Velasco that the
asking him as to another. having given the source of the
what happened to there is no bread, I asked him poisoned bread
the children and the showing that Pipe who gave the bread, was the defendant,
sign made by him made the and he said that the the children had
was like this. extrajudicial bread came from her not eaten or tasted
(Witness revelation (witness it. Nobody was yet
demonstrated by one spontaneously demonstrated by poisoned. Stated
of his hands when he was still swaying his right otherwise, there
demonstrating some under the arm and pointing his was no startling
kind of height and at influence of a forefinger sidewise.) occurrence yet.
the same time the startling INCONSISTENT too!
left hand pointing occurrence. Pipe when Ceferino
upwards where the made his Velasco made a
children were.) extrajudicial sworn statement 3
revelation not days after the
spontaneously but poisoning of his
after an interview children, he
through the declared that he
complicated did not know who
process of sign gave the poisoned
language. bread to his
Did not react children.
violently when he But when he took
learned that Lucila the witness stand
poisoned the six years later, he
children declared that on
Ceferino Velasco The evidence is that very morning
Claimed they purely of February 22,
learned or obtained hearsay.The 1969, he learned
the information presentation of from Pipe, when
30
 the latter was in subject Pipe to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only effective means to
the act of test the truthfulness, memory, intelligence, and in this particular case, the ability
delivering the of the deaf-mute, Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, to communicate with the outside
bread to the world. In conflict between a provision of the constitution giving the defendant a
children, that the substantive right and mere technical rules of evidence, we have no choice but to
source of the give effect to the constitution.
bread was the The cross-examination of Pipe, the source of the vital information for the
defendant Lucila prosecution, would have shown clearly his incompetence as a witness. During
Valero the preliminary investigation in the Municipal Court, experts on deaf-mutes like
He did not confront Lucila Belen Herreros who is the official interpreter of the only school for the deaf and
after learning she poisoned the blind in the Philippines, assisted by Mrs. Felicidad Vinluan who is the
his children. principal of the school of the deaf and the blind, Mesdames Gilda Tatum and
Salud Natividad, examined Alfonsito Valero alias Pipe and reported to the
Municipal Court that "questions addressed to him (Alfonso Valero) and answers
MOTIVE of Lucila: quarrel in There was no Agreed that there was no given by him cannot be accurately interpreted".
the morning of Feb 21, 1969 motive for Pipe motive.
because defendant interfered and Lucila Valero The trial Judge conjured up VAA class discussion notes re admission:
with how Demetria raised the to poison the something as the probable -Jaimes testimony would have been hearsay had it not been for the admission made by
children by scolding them three children. cause that might have Pipe.
Both Pipe and impelled the defendant to -The prosecution was trying to have Jaime testify as to the admission of Pipe and not only
Lucila Valero commit the crime. Trial the information he obtained from them in order for the testimony to not be hearsay.
loved the Judge said that there was
children. Ceferino something disquieting about If you find this format harder to follow, tell me. But the case has a lot of evidence like
Velasco admitted defendants seemingly affidavits ba or testimonies and inconsistent sila mga leche sila and not chronological kaya
that even when unfading smiles.. ginanito ko siya.
Pipe was only a That defendant was
small boy, the suffering some kind of
latter frequented psychiatric abnormality or 90_Heirs of Barredo v Besanes
his house to visit mental disorder that can
his children. make her violent.
When the But this is unfair for the Tan v. Rodil Enterprises
children were judge to mention it in his
dying because of decision without having Facts
the poison, Pipe mentioned it in the course of
Rodil Enterprises filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Luciano Tan
alternately the trial.
with MeTC-Manila.
fanned Michael
Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the subject premises, the Ides ORacca Building in
and Annabel.
Manila since 1959. The building is owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
In 1992, Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, through the DENR, entered into a
Court statements:
Renewal of a Contract of Lease over the Ides ORacca Building. A subsequent
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent
Supplementary Contract dated 25 May 1992 was similarly entered into, thus,
evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter
extending the lease agreement until 1 September 1997.
alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such
The validity of the 18 May 1992 and the 25 May 1992 contracts was placed in
evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any
question in several actions involving Rodil Enterprises, the Ides ORacca Building
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not
Tenants Association, Inc., and other tenants. The SC upheld the validity of these
be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to
contracts in a Decision rendered in 29 November 2001.
or not has no probative value.
OP Case
To give weight to the testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco,
Prior to this, the Office of the President in OP Case No. 4968 dated 8 Feburary
whether considered as hearsay evidence or as part of res gestae and make the
1994 rendered a Decision declaring the Renewal of Contract of Lease and the
same the basis for the imposition of the death penalty gravely violates the
Supplementary Contract of no force and effect.
constitutional right of the defendant to meet the witnesses face to face and to
31
 It appears that Rodil Enterprises appealed the (OP Case) 8 February
1994 Decision to the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 34586) which was dismissed for non-
compliance with procedural requirements.
The dismissal was appealed by Rodil Enterprises to the SC (G.R. No.
119711) which was also dismissed.
Subsequently, the OP issued an Order of Execution of its 8 February
1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968.
Rodil Enterprises filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CA on the
Order of Execution, (CA-G.R. SP No 79157).
CA annulled the Order of Execution, and enjoined the OP from enforcing its 8
February 1994 Decision. It also ordered the OP to abide by the 29 November
2001 SC Decision, upholding the validity of the contracts.
Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari with
the SC which was denied. MR was also denied.
During the pendency of these cases, on 18 October 1999, a subsequent Contract
of Lease was drawn between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, the same to be
effective retroactively from 1 September 1997 to 21 August.
Rodil Enterprises subleased various units of the property to members of the
Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. A space thereof, known
as Botica Divisoria was subleased to petitioner Luciano Tan.
In the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, Rodil Enterprises alleged
that Luciano Tan bound himself to pay under a Contract of Sublease, the amount
of P13,750.00 as monthly rentals. However, Luciano Tan refused to pay the
rentals from September 1997 up to the time of the filing of the Complaint, and
despite repeated oral and written demands, refused to vacate the premises and
to pay the rents due.
Rodil Enterprises prayed that Luciano Tan and those claiming rights under him
be ordered to vacate the leased premises. A payment of rentals in arrears,
amounting to P385,000.00 was similarly sought, including attorneys fees and
litigation costs, as well as, subsequent monthly rentals in the amount
of P13,750.00 until Luciano Tan vacates Botica Divisoria.
In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the
government who owns the Ides ORacca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. As
such, he has the right to lease the said premises pending the disposition and sale
of the building.
o He based his claim on the fact that the OP case on 8 February 1994 had
declared the Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplemental
Contract to be without force and effect.
o Accordingly, the DENR was directed to award the lease contract in
favor of the Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. of which he
is a member.
o He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint, and for the return
of whatever amount Rodil Enterprises had collected from 1987 to
1997, or during such time when he was still paying rentals to the latter.
The MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement entered into in open court
by Luciano Tan and Rodil Enterprises.
Luciano Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring that
he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the subject premises and to pay the
subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due; that the rentals in arrears from
September 1997 amounted to P467,500.00; and in line with his good faith in
dealing with Rodil Enterprises, he would like to deposit the aforesaid amount,
and the subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due. He prayed that he be
allowed to deposit the Managers Check for the amount of P467,500.00, made
payable to the City Treasurer of Manila.
The MeTC denied the Motion on the ground that the prayer to deposit specified
sum with the City Treasurer of Manila contravenes Section 19, Rule 70 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
o The MeTC ruled that notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil
cases that an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability,
and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror, the court cannot
overlook the frank representations by Luciano Tans counsel of the his
liability in the form of rentals, coupled with a proposal to liquidate.
RTC reversed the MeTC judgment.
CA reversed and reinstated the MeTC judgment.
o There is valid and subsisting Contract of Lease
between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic for a period of fifteen (15)
years.
o The existence of the aforesaid contract was not denied
nor controverted by Luciano Tan. What Luciano Tan, instead,
impugned was the validity of the contracts upheld by the SC.
o Tan made an implied admission of the existence of a contract of
sublease between him and Rodil Enterprises on the subject premises;
and that he had reneged in the payment of rentals since 1 September
1997. Moreover, it deemed his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit
Rentals as another admission in favor of Rodil Enterprises.
Issues
1. WoN there was a judicial admission as to petitioners liability under a contract of
sublease between him and Rodil Enterprises
YES
Petitioner: the admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion
to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his
liability, citing Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states that an
offer of compromise in a civil case is not a tacit admission of liability.
The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of
liability. It is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. However, the rule is
not iron-clad. In Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the
circumstances of the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be
considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same
for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is
inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the
existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably,
then, the admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness.
In this case, as the MeTC found, petitioner did not contest the existence of the
sublease, and his counsel made frank representations anent the formers liability
in the form of rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to
liquidate.
32
 The Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as pay the monthly rentals over Botica Divisoria under the contract of sublease
an explicit acknowledgment of petitioners liability on the subleased between the parties.
premises. The CA agreed with the MTC. On the other hand, CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 was a Petition for Review
Indeed, the existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Order of Execution of the Office of the
denied by petitioner. The contracts that were assailed by petitioner are the President of its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968 finding the
contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, the validity of which has been upheld by Renewal of Contract of Lease, and the Supplemental Contract of no force and
the Court. effect.
There is also a categorical admission by petitioner, not only as to his liability, but
also, as to the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. The Order of 92_P v Janjalani
the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was clear that the petitioner agreed in open court 93_Estrada v Desierto
to pay the amount of P440,000.00, representing petitioners unpaid rentals from
September 1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals
computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after 30 June
2000.
The petitioners judicial admission in open court, as found by the MeTC, and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals finds particular significance when viewed
together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, where
petitioner stated that the rentals due on the premises in question from
September 1997 up to the present amounted to P467,500.00, as of the date of
filing the Motion.
An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him
contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is
interposed by a party or not. A judicial admission is an admission made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case, for purposes of the truth of some
alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove.

Other issues
2. WoN the CA properly relied on the Decision of the CA Tenth Division (CA-G.R. SP
No. 79157)
YES
For the appellate court to ignore a decision rendered by a division thereof would
be to turn a blind eye on a valid judgment rendered by the same appellate body.
Furthermore, the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 has long reached finality. The
SC denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Ides ORacca Building
Tenants Association, Inc. thereon. The MR was also denied.

3. WoN respondent is guilty of forum shopping

NO
Petitioner: Rodil Enterprises filed the Petition for Certiorari with the CA (CA-G.R.
SP No. 79157), after it filed an Appeal (CA-G.R. SP No. 34586).
SC: The question of forum shopping is not even material to the instant petition.
Neither CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 nor CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 is before the Court for
consideration. These cases are separate and distinct from CA-G.R. SP No. 67201
now before the Court.
What are assailed in the instant Petition are the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 21 October 2002 and the Resolution, dated 12 May 2005 in CA G.R. SP No.
67201, which reversed the ruling of the RTC, and affirmed the MeTC,
ordering Luciano Tan to vacate the premises and peacefully deliver possession
to Rodil Enterprises. The matter in controversy is the refusal of Luciano Tan to
33
OCA vs. Amor Admissions and Confessions
Judge Amor was administratively charged of grave abuse of authority, grave
misconduct, and acts inimical to judicial service. He was given a chance by the OCA to
comment on the accusations against him. He failed to comment. The OCA found that
Judge Amors failure to comment on the administrative complaint despite being
given an opportunity to do so is tantamount to an admission of the truth of the
allegations against him.
- Judge Amors failure to file a comment despite all the opportunities afforded him
constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself
- In the natural order of things, a man would resist an unfounded claim or
imputation against him. It is generally contrary to human nature to remain silent
and say nothing in the face of false accusations.
o His silence may thus be construed as an implied admission and
acknowledgement of the veracity of the allegations against him.
- Judge Contreras filed a Memorandum against Executive Judge Owen B. Amor accusing
him of grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, and acts inimical to judicial
service.
- In his complaint, Judge Contreras enumerated 5 acts of Judge Amor, which caused him
to file this case
o First, Judge Amor impounded the tricycle of a certain Gervin Ojeda at the Hall of
Justice of Daet, Camarines Norte, when the latter bumped the formers vehicle
and was unable to pay the amount demanded for the incurred damages
Judge Conteras was able to secure a certification regarding the impounding
from Security Guard Morico and found out that Judge Amor berated the
guards of the Hall of Justice, including SG Morico, for issuing the
certification, and that SG Morico and Head Guard Quintin Fernandez tried to
conceal the alleged acts of grave abuse of authority by Judge Amor
o Second, Judge Amor berated Judge Lalwani and accused her of being lazy and
abusive like the other judges of Camarines Sur when she sought for
reconsideration of her detail to another station. Also, Judge Amor instructed
Judge Lalwani to go slow with the trial of a BP 224 case as the accused therein
was his friend
o Third, Judge Amor visited Judge Contreras to intervene for Atty. Freddie Venida,
who was previously arrested and charged with indirect contempt for his failure
to appear in 3 criminal cases wherein he was the accused.
Judge Amor told Judge Contreras that he does not mind Atty. Veridas
abusive practice as he gives him gold which was abundant in Paracale,
Camarines Norte
Judge Amor further sneered at Judge Contreras for "not exploiting the
situation" and intimated to the latter that Atty. Venida would give him gold
Judge Contreras rejected Judge Amors suggestion, thus the latter publicly
announced in open court that Judge Contreras was an abusive judge for
persecuting Atty. Venida
o Fourth, lawyers, prosecutors, and litigants complained about the habitual
absenteeism of Judge Amor during Mondays and Fridays, resulting in delays in
the disposition of cases in violation of existing laws and circulars on speedy trial
o Fifth, upon assumption as Executive Judge, Judge Amor ordered the Clerk of
Court to submit all petitions for extra-judicial foreclosures to him for scrutiny,
especially those requiring publication upon filing, resulting in the delay in the
proceedings
Judge Amor also ordered Atty. Loria to ask for "grease money" from the
newspaper publishers under the pain of being blacklisted
- The Court treated Judge Conteras Memorandum as an administrative complaint to
which Judge Amor was required to comment, but to no avail
o The Court further issued a resolution which ordered Judge Amor to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure, and to submit his comment on Judge Contrerass Memorandum.
o Judge Amor ignored the directives, so the Court referred the matter to the OCA
for evaluation, report, and recommendation
- Subsequently, Judge Amor filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for the 2002
Barangay Elections, resulting in his automatic resignation from the service effective
June 7, 2002
- OCA report (dated July 25, 2008 [wtf]): Judge Amor is administratively liable as
charged he was also guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination for unduly
refusing to obey the Courts repeated orders for him to file his comment on the instant
administrative case against him
o Judge Amors failure to comment on the administrative complaint despite
being given an opportunity to do so is tantamount to an admission of the
truth of the allegations against him
o Judge Amors filing of a COC for the 2002 Barangay Elections that resulted in his
automatic resignation "as a mere convenient ploy for a graceful exit from the
judiciary and to evade liability on his part."
However, his automatic resignation during the pendency of the case did not
divest the Court of its jurisdiction to pronounce whether or not respondent
was guilty or innocent of the charges against him.
W/N Judge Amors failure to comment is tantamount to an admission - YES
- Judge Amors failure to file a comment despite all the opportunities afforded him
constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself
- In the natural order of things, a man would resist an unfounded claim or imputation
against him. It is generally contrary to human nature to remain silent and say nothing
in the face of false accusations.
o His silence may thus be construed as an implied admission and
acknowledgement of the veracity of the allegations against him.
W/N Judge Amor is guilty YES
- The SC upholds the OCAs findings that Judge Amor: (a) abused his authority in
impounding the tricycle and exerted undue influence on the security guards of the
Hall of Justice in his attempt to obstruct the investigation of Judge Contreras; (b) was
discourteous in dealing with a fellow judge when the latter was merely asking for
reconsideration of her detail to another station; (c) used his office and position to
intervene in behalf of Atty. Venida and tolerated the latters abusive practice as a
lawyer in exchange for gold; (d) was habitually absent; and (e) gave orders to Atty.
Loria to submit all petitions for extra-judicial foreclosures to him which resulted in
delays in the proceedings and asked the latter to demand "grease money" from
newspaper publishers in order not to be blacklisted
34
- Also, he is guilty of Gross Misconduct and Insubordination for refusing to comply with
the numerous directives of the Court to file a comment on the administrative
complaint against him.
o Verily, a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply
with the resolution of the Court is guilty of the same
- His automatic resignation due to his filing of a COC for the 2002 Barangay Elections
did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction in determining his administrative liability.
o It is well-settled that resignation should not be used either as an escape or an
easy way out to evade an administrative liability or administrative sanction
95_Republic v Kenrick Development Corp
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Summary: The republic found out that the respondent corporation has fake TCTs so it
instituted an action against them. During the pendency of such action, the senate instituted
hearings with regard the fake TCTS. During these hearings Atty Garlitos (the repondents
ex-atty) testified that he never signed the pleading of the respondent. He simply drafted
the said pleading then gave it to the respondents president. Considering this admission
the TC ruled in favor of the republic, ruling that it was in default since what was given to
the court was an unsigned pleading since the respondent nor the atty signed it. CA
reversed. SC reversed the CA and sustained the TC ruling. The court ruled that the
Respondents adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive
on it. The respondent relied on the answer prepared by atty. Garlitos but that was not
signed by him or by the party. Being so, it is considered to be an unsigned pleading.
Doctrine: the principle of adoptive admission: A party may, by his words or conduct,
voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers statement. Where it appears that a party clearly and
unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those
statements is admissible against him. It is is a partys reaction to a statement or action by
another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of
something stated or implied by the other person a third persons statement becomes the
admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a
party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further
points which he or she has heard the other make or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.
Facts:
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development
Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located
behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO)
in 1996.
As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime
land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property.
It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and
135606 issued in its name and which allegedly originated from TCT No.
17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA). A report said that:
o The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508
and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450.
o The land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also found to be
within Villamor Air Base in Pasay City.
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint
for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against
respondent and Alfonso Concepcion.
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the
trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him
Senate Hearing
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and
Committee on Justice and Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of
legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, the
legislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on
how respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.
Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel, was summoned to the hearing
o He testified that: he prepared respondents answer and
transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr.
Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his.
He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not
know who finally signed it.
the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare
respondent in default, predicated on its failure to file a valid answer.
o The Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer was
neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer
was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court,it was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal
effect.
Lower Courts
TC: Ruled in favor of the republic
o It found respondents answer to be sham and false and intended to
defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answer
stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed
the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.
35
 The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and
formally offered its evidence.
MR by respondent is denied
CA: reversed. It directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent and
ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch.
o It found Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative hearing to be
unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination.
o The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos acts after the filing
of the answer and concluded that he assented to the signing of the
answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever
defect the answer may have had. Hence, the appellate court granted
respondents petition for certiorari.
MR by petitioner is denied
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which
declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did. The
respondent should have been declared in default.
the principle of adoptive admission: A party may, by his words or conduct,
voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers statement. Where it appears that a party
clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another,
evidence of those statements is admissible against him.
o It is is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person
when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of
something stated or implied by the other person
o a third persons statement becomes the admission of the party
embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a
party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by
another;
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another
but ignores further points which he or she has heard the other make or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.
In this case
respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its
case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels
statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as
its implications
o Respondents argue that:
o The important thing was that the answer bore a signature. It didnt
matter wn if it was Atty Garlitos
o While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the
party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel from giving a general
authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was what
Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of
no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by another.
This was similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it may
concern" such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not
known beforehand.
o Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned
its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for respondent
subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos
conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.
Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its
own. Respondents adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission
which was conclusive on it.
o Respondent consistently repeated the statements of atty garlitos in its
MR and petition in the CA as well as in th SC
SC RULING
SC: only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to
validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.
o Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He
may not delegate it to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the
pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. 16Under the
Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to
these matters.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
o Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified
persons, something the law strongly proscribes.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just
anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondents
answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading.
Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly
allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Garbo v. Court of Appeals: Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide
strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation
in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game
of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
96_People v Lauga
36
NAVALLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
July 16, 1994 | Vitug, J. | Admissions and Confessions
8.
PETITIONERS: Ernesto Navallo
RESPONDENTS: Honorable Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and People of the
Philippines
SUMMARY: Navallo was charged under Art. 217(4) for misappropriating government
money. He was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan. The SC affirmed the ruling.
DOCTRINE:
- A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit
examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated
in the above rule.
- Navallo contradicted his claim that he was pressured to sign the audit report when
through his testimony and in his petition to the Court (where he stated that he readily
agreed to sign the auditors report).
FACTS:
1. On May 11, 1978, Navallo was charged with violating Art. 217 (4) of the RPC in the
CFI of Surigao Del Norte:
a. Navallo is a Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National
Vocational School in Surigao Del Norte. He was, therefore, charged with
holding in trust moneys and/or properties of the government. He was
charged with misappropriating P16,483.62 which he failed to account
during an audit and failed as well to restitute despite demands by the office
of the Provincial Auditor, to the damage and prejudice of the Government
equal to the amount misappropriated.
2. A warrant of arrest was issued, and two alias warrants were issued, but he was still
not found.
3. Meanwhile, PD 1606 which created the Sandiganbayan took effect, conferring with it
original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers
embraced in Title VII of the RPC.
4. Navallo was eventually arrested and later released upon filing his property bond. He
pleaded not guilty before the RTC during his arraignment. Upon motion of the
prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the
Sandiganbayan.
5. Special Prosecutor of Sandiganbayan opined that since Navallo had been arraigned
before the case was transferred to them, the RTC should continue taking cognizance
of the case. The matter was referred to the Ombudsman which held otherwise.
6. A new warrant was issued, but was returned after certification from the RTC that
Navallo had previously filed his bond before. After the bond was found to be defective,
a new bond was approved and the case was transmitted to the Sandiganbayan.
7. Navallo filed a motion to quash, arguing:
a. Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the
accused
b. Since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to
prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. Novallo was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
a. Prosecution:
i. On 27 Jan 1978, the Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Norte,
Antonio Espino, made a preliminary audit examination of cash and
other accounts of Navallo, as Collecting and Disbursing Officer of
Numancia National Vocational School. Espino found Navallo to be
short of P16,483.62. The auditor, however, was then merely able
to prepare a cash count sheet since he still had to proceed to other
municipalities. Before departing, Espino sealed the vault of
Navallo.
ii. On 30 January 1978, Leopoldo A. Dulguime was directed by Espino
to complete the preliminary examination and to conduct a final
audit. Dulguime broke the seal, opened the vault, and made a new
cash count. Dulguime next examined the cashbook of Navallo.
Dulguime did not examine the official receipts reflected in the
cashbook, said receipts having been previously turned over to the
Officer of the Provincial Auditor.
iii. After the audit, he had the cashbook likewise deposited with the
same office. The audit covered the period from July 1976 to
January 1978 on the basis of postings and record of collections
certified to by Navallo. Dulguime confirmed Navallo's shortage of
P16,483.62. Dulguime made a Report of Examination and wrote
Navallo a letter demanding the restitution of the missing amount.
The latter neither complied nor offered any explanation for the
shortage. The official receipts and cashbook, together with some
other records, were subsequently lost or damaged on account of a
typhoon that visited the province.
b. Defendant:
i. Navallo testified that in 1970, he was a Clerk I in the Numancia
National Vocational School. In 1976, he was appointed Collecting
and Disbursing Officer of the school. His duties included the
collection of tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of
teachers and employees, and remittance of collections exceeding
P500.00 to the National Treasury. Even while he had not yet
received his appointment papers, he, together with, and upon the
instructions of, Cesar Macasemo (the Principal and Navallo's
predecessor as Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the school),
was himself already doing entries in the cashbook. Navallo and
Macasemo thus both used the vault. Navallo said that he started
the job of a disbursement officer in June 1977, and began to
discharge in full the duties of his new position (Collection and
Disbursement Officer) only in 1978. There was no formal turn
over of accountability from Macasemo to Navallo.
ii. Navallo alleges that the charge against him was motivated by a
personal grudge on the part of Espino. On 25 January 1978, he said,
he was summoned to appear at the Numancia National Vocational
School where he saw Espino and Macasemo. The safe used by him
and by Macasemo was already open when he arrived, and the cash
37
 which was taken out from the safe was placed on top of a table. He
did not see the actual counting of the money and no actual audit of
his accountability was made by Espino. Navallo signed the cash
count only because he was pressured by Macasemo who
assured him that he (Macasemo) would settle everything. The
collections in 1976, reflected in the Statement of Accountability,
were not his, he declared, but those of Macasemo who had
unliquidated cash advances.
iii. Navallo admitted having received the demand letter but he did not
reply because he was already in Manila looking for another
employment. He was in Manila when the case was filed against
him. He did not exert any effort to have Macasemo appear in the
preliminary investigation, relying instead on Macasemo's
assurance that he would settle the matter. He, however, verbally
informed the investigating fiscal that the shortage represented the
unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo.
9. Sandiganbayan found Navallo as guilty. His motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction YES.
2. WON double jeopardy set in NO.
3. WON petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the
certification prepared by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime NO.
4. WON Navallo was guilty of the offense YES.
RATIO:
1. Sec. 8 of PD 1606 is explicit and clear. A case falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan shall be transferred to it so long as the accused has not as yet been
properly arraigned elsewhere on the date of effectivity of the law, i.e., on 10 December
1978
2. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites:
i. (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge
is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
ii. (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
iii. (3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge;
and
iv. (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed
without his express consent.
b. When all the above elements are present, a second prosecution for (a) the
same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a
frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes,
or is necessarily included in, the first offense charged, can rightly be barred.
c. In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted
an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on
the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with
conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
3. Navallo claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution.
a. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused
is under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," which has
been defined as any "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way."
b. A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial
investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be
the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case,
the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report
prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own testimony, where he
was only persuaded and not pressured.
a. Q: How were you pressured? A: Mr. Macasemo told me to sign the
report because he will be the one to settle everything.xxx xxx xxx
b. Q: Why did you allow yourself to be pressured when you will be the
one ultimately to suffer? A: Because he told me that everything will
be all right and that he will be the one to talk with the auditor.
c. Q: Did he tell you exactly what you will do with the auditor to be
relieved of responsibility? A: No, your Honor.
d. Q: Why did you not ask him? A: I was ashamed to ask him, your
Honor, because he was my superior.
c. Navallo again contradicted himself when, in his very petition to this Court,
he stated:
a. Bearing in mind the high respect of the accused with his superior
officer and taking into consideration his gratitude for the favors that
his superior officer has extended him in recommending him the
position he held even if he was not an accountant, he readily agreed
to sign the auditor's report even if he was not given the
opportunity to explain the alleged shortage
4. Art 217 of the RPC states that "(t)he failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds
or property to personal use."
a. An accountable officer, therefore, may be convicted of malversation even in
the absence of direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence
of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to explain.
a. The claim that the amount of the shortage represented the unliquidated
cash advance of Macasemo does not inspire belief. No details whatsoever
were given on the matter such as, when and for what purpose was the
alleged cash advance granted, what step or steps were taken by Navallo or
Macasemo to liquidate it. In fact, Navallo admitted that he did not even ask
Macasemo as to how he (Navallo) could be relieved of his responsibility for
the missing amount when he was promised by Macasemo that everything
would be all right. When Navallo was already in Manila, he did not also even
write Macasemo about the shortage.
b. As to the collections made in 1976 which Navallo denied having made, the
evidence of the prosecution shows that he assumed the office of Collecting
and Disbursing Officer in July 1976 and the cashbook which was examined
during the audit contained entries from July 1976 to January 1978, which
he certified to. Navallo confirmed that indeed he was appointed Collecting
and Disbursing Officer in 1976.
c. Finally, the pretense that the missing amount was the unliquidated cash
advance of Macasemo and that Navallo did not collect tuition fees in 1976
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 was advanced for the first time during the trial, that is, 12 long solid years
after the audit on January 30, 1978. Nothing was said about it at the time of
the audit and immediately thereafter.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of respondent
Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto
VITARICH CORPORATION vs. CHONA LOSIN
FACTS:
Chona Losin (Losin) was in the fastfood and catering services business named
Glamours Chicken House in Cotabato City.
Since 1993, Vitarich, particularly its Davao Branch, had been her supplier of
poultry meat. In 1995, however, her account was transferred to the newly
opened Vitarich branch in General Santos City.
In the months of July to November 1996, Losins orders of dressed chicken and
other meat products allegedly amounted to 921,083.10. During this said period,
Losins poultry meat needs for her business were serviced by Rodrigo
Directo (Directo) and Allan Rosa (Rosa), both salesmen and authorized collectors
of Vitarich, and Arnold Baybay (Baybay), a supervisor of said corporation.
o Unfortunately, it was also during the same period that her account
started to experience problems because of the fact that Directo
delivered stocks to her even without prior booking which is the
customary process of doing business with her.
On August 24, 1996, Directos services were terminated by Vitarich without
Losins knowledge. He left without turning over some supporting invoices
covering the orders of Losin. Rosa and Baybay, on the other hand, resigned on
November 30, 1996 and December 30, 1996, respectively. Just like Directo, they
did not also turn over pertinent invoices covering Losins account.
On February 12, 1997, demand letters were sent to Losin covering her alleged
unpaid account amounting to 921,083.10. Because of said demands, she
checked her records and discovered that she had an overpayment to Vitarich in
the amount of 500,000.00. She relayed this fact to Vitarich and further informed
the latter that checks were issued and the same were collected by Directo.
It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checks amounting to 288,463.30
which were dishonored either for reasons - Drawn Against Insufficient Funds
(DAIF) or Stop Payment.7
On March 2, 1998, Vitarich filed a complaint for Sum of Money against Losin,
Directo, Rosa, and Baybay before the RTC.
RTC ruled against Losin. CA reversed stating:
o As far as Losin is concerned, Directo was a duly authorized agent of
Vitarich Corporation. As such, it fell upon Directo to place her orders of
dressed chicken and other related products to their General Santos City
branch. All such orders were taken from the Vitarich bodega by Directo
as testified by Alona Calinawan, then bookkeeper of Vitarich from
March 1995 to September 1998, who was responsible for all the
customers accounts, receivables and withdrawals of dressed chicken
from their bodega.
o It is noted that the dressed chicken and other related products as
manifested by the Charge Sales Invoices, were taken out of the bodega
and received by Directo, who is now at large. There was no evidence
presented by Vitarich to prove that aforesaid stocks were delivered to
Losin. Contrary to what Vitarich claimed that Directo resigned on
August 24, 1996, exhibit X shows that he was terminated.
o The fact can not be put aside that Directo was the salesman and
authorized collector and by law, the agent of Vitarich. Criminal acts
committed by Directo by his non-remittance of the proceeds of the
checks given by Losin, is his separate accountability with Vitarich and
should not be imputed to their client, Losin. In fact, defendant Directo
absconded when plaintiff-appellee started to question his
collectibles. The totality of Directos acts clearly indicated a
deliberate attempt to escape liability. (I honestly think this is the
only important part of the case hahahaha)
ISSUE: W/N Losin is liable to Vitarich YES
Initially, Vitarich claims a total of 921,083.10 from respondent Losin, Directo,
Rosa and Baybay (defendants in Civil Case No. 6287 for Sum of Money). According
to Vitarich, "[t]he successive and sudden resignations of defendants Directo,
Baybay and Rosa and the sudden change of mind of defendant Losin after
previously acknowledging her accounts are part of an elaborate and sinister
scheme of defendants, acting singly or collectively, in conspiracy or not, in
defrauding plaintiff corporation xxx."
Records bear out that Losin transacted with Vitarichs representative Directo.
Vitarich presented several charge sales invoices and statement of account to
support Losins accountability for the products delivered to her.
o A total of 921,083.10 was initially charged to her. Losin, on the other
hand, presented a copy of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich
through its agent Directo, and a Statement of Payments Made to
Vitarich to support her allegation of payment.
o It is worth noting that both Vitarich and Losin failed to make a proper
recording and documentation of their transactions making it difficult
to reconcile the evidence presented by the parties to establish their
respective claims.
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.
o True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove
the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of
evidence required by law. In this case, however, the burden of proof is
on Losin because she alleges an affirmative defense, namely, payment.
Losin failed to discharge that burden.
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 After examination of the evidence presented, this Court is of the opinion that
Losin failed to present a single official receipt to prove payment.
o This is contrary to the well-settled rule that a receipt, which is a written
and signed acknowledgment that money and goods have been
delivered, is the best evidence of the fact of payment although not
exclusive.
o All she presented were copies of the list of checks allegedly issued to
Vitarich through its agent Directo, a Statement of Payments Made to
Vitarich, and apparently copies of the pertinent history of her checking
account with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). At best,
these may only serve as documentary records of her business dealings
with Vitarich to keep track of the payments made but these are not
enough to prove payment.
The claims against Rosa and Baybay who allegedly did not fully account for their
sales transactions have not been substantially proven by evidence. In fact, it
appears that Rosa and Baybay resigned. Resignation would not have been
possible unless accountabilities with Vitarich had been settled first. It was only
the services of Directo that was apparently terminated by Vitarich. Summons,
however, was not served on him, so he could not be made to account for the
shortages of collection.

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